Title

Product Liability, Entry Incentives and Market Structure

Author Info

Stephen F. Hamilton, University of ArizonaFollow
David L. Sunding, University of California - Berkeley

Recommended Citation

Postprint version. Published in International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 20, Issue 2, June 1, 2000, pages 269-283.

NOTE: At the time of publication, the author Stephen Hamilton was not yet affiliated with Cal Poly.

The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00029-6.

Abstract

The article characterizes the entry incentives provided by increases in product liability under various forms of competition. It is demonstrated that the entry of small, high-cost firms is likely to occur in imperfectly competitive markets when the average damage increases with industry output. Special cases are considered, including Cournot–Nash oligopoly and dominant firm-competitive fringe.

Disciplines

Economics

Copyright

2000 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.