Title

Centralization and Government Competition

Author Info

David Joulfaian, U.S. Department of Treasury
Michael L. Marlow, California Polytechnic State University - San Luis ObispoFollow

Recommended Citation

Postprint version. Published in Applied Economics, Volume 23, Issue 10, October 1, 1991, pages 1603-1612.

The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1080/00036849100000125.

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between government size and fiscal centralization with specific focus on the separate influences of centralism and fragmentation on the size of public sector in the United States. The empirical findings at the national level provide support to the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization leads to a smaller government. The findings at the state and local levels, however, show no empirical relationship between government size and the degree of centralization.

Disciplines

Economics

Copyright

1991 Taylor & Francis.

Publisher statement

This is an electronic version of an article published in Applied Economics.