Recommended Citation
Preprint version. Published in Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 36, Issue 9, November 1, 2010, pages 1113-1136.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453710384354.
Abstract
This article makes three main claims: (1) that the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, properly understood, has no normative or political implications whatsoever; (2) that scholars with otherwise dramatically conflicting interpretations of Wittgenstein should nonetheless all agree with this conclusion; and (3) that understanding the (non-) implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy helps to answer the two motivating questions of the literature on value pluralism — whether values are (or can be) plural (yes), and whether value pluralism leads to, requires, or reveals some particular normative or political response (no).
Disciplines
Political Science
Copyright
2010 Sage Publications.
URL: https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/poli_fac/9
