Postprint version. Published in Journal of Economics and Business, Volume 34, Issue 2, January 1, 1982, pages 165-171.
NOTE: At the time of publication, the author Michael L. Marlow was not yet affiliated with Cal Poly.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/0148-6195(82)90031-5.
A model of enforcement is developed that determines the impacts of OSHA actions on regulated parties. This model analyzes the effect of decision procedures developed by OSHA to enforce the law and their effect on resource allocation within the firm. It is concluded that the impacts from both the initial inspection and reinspection programs on the resource allocations of firms have likely been insignificantly different from zero. If OSHA is to increase the allocation of injury control resources of firms through its enforcement program, it must increase the costs of noncompliance that it imposes on firms.