It may well be possible to develop animals, or provide situations for animals, which are pain-free, and to yet have it be the case that such development and the making of such situations are immoral acts and the implicated animals exploited.

In his critical notice of R. G. Frey's Rights, Killing and Suffering: Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics, in these pages, James Nelson cites Frey's use in his book of James Rachels' distinction between "being alive" and "having a life." Nelson comments that Frey's use of this distinction brings to mind Regan's notion of a "subject of a life." According to Nelson, Frey in his book favors the "concerned individual" approach to issues of factory farming over the "moral vegetarian" approach. Concerned individuals, Frey holds, work to improve conditions on factory farms, lessening the suffering of farm animals by diverting resources "into the development of new and relatively painless methods of breeding, feeding, and killing animals of new pain-preventing and pain-killing drugs, of new types of tranquilizers and sedatives, etc." and "seek further appropriate breakthroughs in genetic engineering."

Two considerations in Peter Singer's Animal Liberation bothered me. The first was his drawing of the line for equal consideration of species' interests just "above" the mollusc. The other, and it is this point that is brought freshly to mind by Nelson's review, was his decision to give less consideration to the question of killing animals than to that of their suffering. It seemed to me that this tactic clearly related to his insistence that moral change is to be effected first by rational argument in preference to any affective approach. Those who may have read my "Opinion" piece in BTS #2 will perhaps remember my remarks about Ivan Illich's contention that animals experience pain but do not suffer. But dead animals, those being killed humanely (theoretically), and those killed a moment ago and therefore not existing as live animals do not experience pain and do not suffer, at least in this world of which we have some knowledge. But, for me, it has always been evident that being killed is the most intense form of pain or suffering even though death itself is not felt. To expose an animal to suffering or cruelty and then to kill it is to doubly compound the moral malfeasance. I am no spiritualist, but my imagination has long automatically insisted that the full quantum of death's pain-equivalence is somehow immediately manifest just the other side of the boundary between life and death. The crime of killing is great, though no voice be heard.

Is it conceivable that to cause pain or suffering is morally wrong but that to kill is not? Perhaps it is also morally wrong to kill humans, morally considerable beings, but only wrong to cause animals to suffer cruelly?

It seems to me that part of the difficulty many have in assigning moral wrong to killing animals must rest in the difficulty of conceiving of any experience at all in life which has just in the moment ceased to be living. That which does not exist cannot either suffer or hurt and cannot be the object of moral action. By killing, in the case of animals, actions are substantially freed of moral relevance. Certainly the idea of humane slaughter rests at least in part upon a difference in the value placed upon pain-free life in comparison with non-existence. I find myself wanting to speak of the "pain of non-existence."

Can it be that some of the contemporary resistance to holding that killing animals is morally wrong originates in the anti-religious? Being that the injunction not to kill, which can be extended to refer also to animals, is taken to be a moral/religious injunction vouched for by Moses' reputed experience of God?

Whatever may be the true relationship of these matters, we should continue, I think, to be very wary of moral systems which do not also prohibit the killing of animals. The killing of animals is in itself a moral wrong. In addition, schemes to get around
the immorality of the act by providing ani-

mals with pain-free lives to the point of
death must be resisted. "Pain-free unto
death" gives the sense of it. When animals
are deprived of the ordinary pains of their
natural lives, that is a cruelty. Furthermore,
the destruction of an animal's capacity
to feel pain and/or the suppression of the
behaviors that in animals express pain, so
that the animal, it may be claimed, is not in
pain when in reality it is experiencing in-
tense pain, are not moral, no matter what the
calculus applied to whatever pain/pleasure
quotient is manifest only in the circum-
scribed limited.

I have been surprised by Evelyn Pluhar's
suggestion in "On the Genetic Manipulation of
Animals" (BTS, vol. 1, no. 3) that the chance
that the new biotechnological techniques will
be abused is "exceedingly slim." I think
Pluhar is too sanguine in this opinion. Ivan
Illich, in Medical Nemesis, documents exten-
sive abuse through practices so taken for
granted that their employment does not even
depend upon any clear point of moral choice
such that discussions by philosophers would
likely arise or have much impact upon any
course being followed.

The capacity of society and its medicine
to suppress the expressions (Darwin) of pain
and to suppress pain itself is already far
advanced. If there is no felt pain, but the
tissue or physiological functioning of the
animal is damaged nevertheless, then if by
means of the suppression of pain or suppres-
sion of pain's expression the animal is able
to be held in a way which overcomes any moral
objection based on cruelty, but is thereby
led to death, that is an immoral act. This
is why we need not only moral philosophy but
moral philosophy and science to work out the
exchanges (as Susan Isen puts it in "Beyond
Abolition: Ethical Exchanges with Animals in
Agriculture," BTS, vol. 1, no. 4) in a world
governed by an ethic that asserts that it is
wrong to kill animals. Such a world is envi-
sioned by George Abbe in Negavit.

Animals and humanity must find common
cause. The means whereby humanity confines
and restricts its own members are developed
and perfected in research into the confine-
ment of non-human species. Parallel psycho-
logical and propagandistic techniques move
the human person to his/her restricted situation
at work and in an increasing assortment of
life situations, including the house and yard

in which the occupant is contained more and
more indoors, more and more in the absence of
soil, vegetation and animal life, more and
more connected to a high-tech "life support
system" whose plug at some point may be
pulled by the programmers of politics or
economics. It is insane to justify explora-
tions which likely will be, and are being,
used against human freedom. And it is in-
moral to advance the confinement, or adjust-
ment to confinement, of animals. This con-
nection is a principal reason why the desti-
nies of animals and human persons are now so
substantially intertwined.

IS THE MERELY PAIN-FREE LIFE
(MORALLY CONSIDERABLE,
NEVERTHELESS)

A LIFE WORTH LIVING?

When the integrity of animals' natural
ways of living remain intact, then those
animals "have a life." They are the "subject
of a life." They are "life-that-wills-to-
live in the midst of life-that-wills-to-live" (Schweitzer), a formulation not easily im-
proved upon. This does not mean that finally
a morally relevant distinction can success-
fully be drawn between "being alive" and
"having a life." If confined and pain-sup-
pressed animals, whose natural ways are not
intact, no longer "have a life" but are
alive, nevertheless, then their killing re-
mains immoral, perhaps even particularly so,
since one evil is compounded (not brought to
an end) by another.

These considerations are not to be un-
derstood in a way that aligns them with any
religious, social scientific, legal, or psy-
chiatric insistence upon the preservation/extension of life at all costs (particularly to the public treasury and clients?). Death is more acceptable than that. Death is neither to be hurried on its way nor grotesquely forestalled. But the acceptability of death is not either to be understood in a way that conspires with some new technology of dying and grief or aligns acceptance of death with indifference toward one's own having of a life or toward the lives of others.

Herding native peoples onto reservations or "homelands," cattle into feedlots, trees and shrubbery into "landscaped" plazas are all actions that clear the terrain. Into the clearings speed houses, streets, cafes, gasoline stations, silicon chip factories, video arcades, and other structures all containing a growing human population. The process goes on also at the expense of crop-land, already a displacement leading to restricted woodland and other natural habitat. Fairly far along, some national parks, open space, a bit of farmland, some reservations will remain. At that point, and we are sufficiently close to that point now to discern the trends, these uses and this "setting aside" which is also a ruling out, will be seen even more clearly than at present to have accomplished an enclosure, an entrapment of humanity. At the individual level or at the level of the family, this entrapment is already far along: people cut off from countryside, fresh air, and clean water, kids and companion animals contained by dangerous city streets, the outside now so impoverished that the environment has become very substantially inside. Accompanying the self-entrapment of humanity is the extinction of species, except for genetically engineered life forms adjusted to the restricted space and possibility of living—and even these only in the interim before space completely disappears.

Just as those New Age spiritual and humanistic psychological methods of the 60's and 70's that were designed to free and make whole the human person have been significantly co-opted by consultants to corporations and employed in an attempt to enhance the capacity of managerial groups to control the workplace, so will and does the development of means of growth facilitation, disease control, and painlessness for the lives of animals in confined spaces auger the application of some of these and other similar methods to humanity itself. Do not do unto others that which you would not have be done to yourself. No matter that the ostensible goal of new developments in animal husbandry is, through food, to provide for the well-being of humanity, the arts of confinement come to have wider application. This is not to say anything against what has since Kohn and Schumacher become known as human scale in living or as voluntary simplicity, for these are genuine and ecological ideals. But the technology of the restriction of the organism has nothing in common with such true ideals. Nor, really, does the answer to the classic Buddhist question concerning how the fish in the bottle is to be freed: "There, it is free," suggesting that freedom is wholly inner in nature. We know that while there is meaning in the idea of inner freedom, and know that it is possible to have an inflated notion of what is required to be free, such meaning as there is in the idea of inner freedom does not make it good to have imprisoned Gandhi, Aurobindo, or Thoreau. Similarly, there is no virtue at all in the confinement of animals. Nothing good has or will come of it, though the consequences in the lives of animals and human persons be "painless."

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