advocate that others ought to boycott meat and will be inconsistent if he/she urges this upon others yet shirks it him/herself. This is not because of some principle that we must have nothing to do with anything of which we morally disapprove but for the particular reason that he/she must advocate vegetarianism for others and, unless he/she is relevantly different from his/her audience, he/she must take his/her own advice.

Frey might point out here that even if the concerned moral vegetarian strategy is liable to be more effective than either the concerned individual or the moral vegetarian alone, the target of the campaign is not one at which animal liberationists customarily aim. It is not the reform but the elimination of factory farming that is called for. Of course, the question of how much reform is necessary cannot be said to have been answered by Frey's text, and until that is clarified, whether the needed reform is compatible with any kind of factory farming is unclear. But even if it is, the alteration in the lives of farm animals will have to be substantial. If, after needed reforms, there is still something morally objectionable about the rearing, killing, or consumption of animals, it will take something other than act-utilitarianism to illuminate just what it is.

Notes

1. See, for example, reviews by Sumner, (Philosophical Review 92 (1983)), Steinbock, (Philosophical Books 22 (1981)), Clark (Mind 91 (1982)), and VanDeVeer (Canadian Philosophical Review (1981)).


3. Regan's The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) is a good example.