Mastery Without Enmity: Athletics, Modernity and the Nation in Early Republican China

by Andrew Morris

In an interview given on the occasion of the Forty-first World Cup Golf Tournament, held in Shenzhen in November 1995, China’s Sports Minister Wu Shaozu told reporters of his plans actively to promote golf throughout China. Wu explained his enthusiasm thusly: not only is golf “a sport beneficial to the body and mind,” but also, “in some coastal cities and special economic zones, golf has become a helpful intermediary in expanding China’s foreign trade.” Perhaps most importantly for Wu, “The physique of the Chinese people is suited to the sport, which requires techniques [sic] and coordination of movements rather than strength.”

These recent official comments on golf in China caught my eye not so much for their seeming crassness and cynicism as for the odd and distorted echoes they sounded of early Republican China. Eighty-some years ago, Chinese bodies and minds simply did without the benefit now apparently provided by golf clubs, courses and carts. In China there were as yet no alcohol- and greed-soaked 19th holes in which to close multinational corporate deals. Athletics, exercise and Chinese physiques were already quite common topics of discussion, however, as educators, intellectuals and students of a different China worked feverishly to save and strengthen their new republic.

The philosophical, educational, political, cultural, literary and scientific explorations that so marked China in the 1910s were also accompanied by a fascination with physical education and Chinese bodies. Among the many new concepts that quickly became common sense in the Republican era was the
idea of a strong national body that would be strengthened and solidified by a fit, competitive, disciplined citizenry that could work and play together as a team. The connection between physical exertion and a strong nation, especially as trumpeted by Western and Japanese patriots, already seemed rather obvious to many concerned Chinese of the 1910s. Exactly how to make this crucial connection, however, was still open to debate. Discussions of physical education and endeavor (tiyu) and the nation usually centered around two main types of exercise—German and Swedish gymnastics and calisthenics (known as ticao), and the Anglo-American team sports of ball games and track and field (also referred to as tiyu). By the May Fourth movement of 1919, competitive team sports had emerged as the strengthening and unifying tiyu of choice, with ticao lingering on as a more seldom-used disciplinary supplement. Noticeably absent from these debates and this final outcome was the traditional Chinese martial arts (wushu); the fact that this absence is “noticeable” to us today says much about our own notions of Chinese nationalisms, national essences and their masculine overtones. But it would not be an exaggeration to say that the wushu simply was not noticed at all by many of these modern-minded Republican patriots, whose aversion to Chinese feudal and unscientific forms led them to construct a tiyu based on Western definitions of bodies and nations.

By the early 1920s, the forms of physical exercise and recreation in China marked by the term “tiyu” bore great resemblance to forms that would be recognized both then and now by Westerners as “sports” or “athletics.” (As neither of these words provide an exact fit for Chinese physical culture, however, I feel most comfortable using the term “tiyu.”)1 Remarkably, since these early debates, this definition of tiyu has never been seriously challenged, and remains almost completely intact to this day.2 These same games originally pushed by imperialists, missionaries and “puppets of anti-democratic government cliques” have since formed the basis not only of competitions between revolutionary war teams and military units in the People’s Republic, and between China and its Third World allies in the 1960s Games of the New Emerging Forces, but are also the events in which PRC athletes now excel in international competitions. If we recognize the importance that has been placed on tiyu and physical fitness in twentieth century China, then this poses two very important questions: What was the power and attraction of this new Western tiyu, and how did it become so wrapped up in the Chinese nation?

Much has been written by sociologists of sport on the important factors of violence, class stratification, and political ideology in sport all over the world.3 However, these works all seem to share assumptions that the Anglo-American “sports” are very natural forms of societal organization, or that there is a basic human need to participate in rituals of competition and teamwork. In this literature, it is never questioned why Americans, Chinese, Brazilians, and Iranians, for example, would all choose to compete in similar forms of physical activity, like basketball or a 100-meter dash. I do not share these assumptions about the universality of these games, but still must face the question of why so many peoples all over the world have taken to the Western athletic forms as universal. The Anglo-American sports are particular forms of physical activity, developed at specific times in specific places as part of specific worldviews. How have these values managed to endure as the Chinese tiyu?

I hold that the prevalence of a fairly uniform standard of physical activities and competitions around the world is very closely tied to the fairly uniform standard of the modern nation-state that transcends any official ruling ideology of the twentieth century. Athletics and the nation should not strike us as an odd pairing; it seems almost impossible to imagine modern athletics without its national foundation and functions (from national fitness standards and international competitions to national sports heroes and sports jargon). China is no exception to this model. The Chinese tiyu was being built along with, and in, the new Chinese nation, and was influenced from outside in similar ways. The reasons for the development of the popular tiyu, for holding national and international athletic meets, and for tens of thousands of spectators to pay to watch these competitions, derive from, and reflect back into the story of the nation. In Republican China, it was in the nation’s name that tiyu could develop in the ways it did. Likewise, the competitions and struggles on the athletic grounds of China would influence how many Chinese people saw their future as a nation.

The two English-language book-length histories of twentieth century Chinese tiyu concentrate on explicit ties between sport and political ideology, or privilege foreign contributions as the most significant impulses in the shaping of Chinese athletics.4 Both works are important contributions in understanding Chinese tiyu, but their authors leave out the story of how this tiyu becomes Chinese in the first place. In this paper, I hope to work towards explaining how the world systems of athletics and of the nation-state worked in parallel and complementary ways, posited the athletic arena as a representation of the nation, and presented Chinese with the foreign details that (by May Fourth) were then translated into pieces of the Chinese nation.

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In studying why this kind of “athletics” came to form the Chinese tiyu, we must realize that many in Republican China sought to imagine these new activi-
ties in terms of older documented forms of Chinese physical culture, mainly aristocratic games and military training, that came to be called the “ancient tiyu.” This moment of comparison, the consciousness of what had come before, is extremely important to me. These comparisons reflect the inherent need to create a transition between the old and new (which by definition have to be very different in the young nation), and are instances from which we can learn much about the developing Chinese tiyu and nation. Pierre Bourdieu writes convincingly of the impossibility of making comparisons across the break where older games or rituals become “sports.” There is no question that, as Bourdieu writes, these activities are seen by old and new participants and their societies in fundamentally different ways. However, these “impossible” connections are exactly the ones that many Chinese people in the early 1920s believed in, as they saw the new Chinese tiyu in fact having very much to do with the physical forms that preceded it.

Early Republican-era tiyu writers like Guo Xifen and Gunsun Hoh (Hao Gengsheng) did not address the different turns that physical culture took in the late Qing and early Republican eras, or even the Western origins of the tiyu and ticao. This might be expected; to the tiyu community of the time, the exact origin of a game or exercise decades before could have been of only minuscule importance compared to its value, here and now, to Chinese bodies and the young nation. A more critical and historical narrative such as this, however, requires more attention to these details.

Military ticao drilling was imported into a China that many reformers hoped could learn from the modern militarist techniques of the rich and strong West. Several of the great Qing armies (Xiang, Huai, New Army) and the Tianjin Maritime Academy invited German instructors to teach military drill (caofa, including dumbbells, jousting, boxing, and pole climbing) in the 1860s and ’70s. By the mid-1880s it was common for military academies to have German or Japanese drill instructors. By the late 1890s, after the disastrous Sino-Japanese War and the aborted “Hundred Days Reforms,” many of the new Qing xuetang academies featured classes in Japanese-style military ticao (taught by retired Chinese soldiers, for lack of any formally trained native personnel). In this drive to build the nation, the Prussian martial ideal and the Japanese bushido and “Yamato spirit” proved strong examples to emulate. Qing reformers made ticao instruction mandatory in all middle and higher schools for boys and girls in accordance with the 1906 Education Edict, which borrowed from Jiang Baoli’s 1902 treatise on “The Militarization of the People’s Education.”

Military strongmen caught this military ticao fever as well. Warlord Feng Yuxiang enforced rigorous physical training among his men, requiring classes in boxing and gymnastics, in order to cultivate officers who could “jump off a horse and write, or jump on a horse and kill an enemy.” Zheng Zuolin instituted military training in Shenyang schools as the “root of a strong and victorious armed forces.” The Education Bureau of the new Republican government later followed the same militarist visions. An announcement in December 1912 instructed educators to emphasize the military aspects of ticao in order to nurture a “law-abiding and cooperative spirit” among the people. And the Bureau reminded students that “to be idle and weak is a shame, and to be brave and vigorous is glorious.”

However, this rigid picture of the nation and the exercises that accompanied it soon proved unappealing to those citizens privileged enough to have the opportunity to train their bodies, but who were expected to do so to defend the Chinese nation. It was only in the late 1910s, when young people felt encouraged to question many of the assumptions of Chinese educational or governmental policy, that students would start to express their strong feelings for the drilling and calisthenics that they now resented and saw as embarrassing.

The June 1917 issue of Association Progress, the normally placid mouthpiece of the YMCA in China, included a pointed piece by Yun Daiying, then a student at Zhonghua University in Wuchang. Yun attacked the military ticao currently taught at his university. He admitted that “every student of our nation is a weak sissy (wenruo), totally unable to handle any weighty task,” but also saw great problems in the way P.E. classes were designed, with their “overexertion that can injure [students’] internal organs or limbs and torso, bringing no benefit and only harm.” Yun suggested that in the current system of martial education, students “didn’t learn any more than if we were just listening to some army commander’s barked orders.” He demanded that Chinese educators: “Transform the fragmented tiyu into a systematic tiyu. Transform the lopsided tiyu into a comprehensive tiyu. Transform the jerky, inconsistent tiyu into a progressive tiyu. Transform the listless and dry tiyu into an interesting tiyu.”

I read Yun’s frustration and concern as one of the clearest representations of the battles being fought in 1917 over just how, by whom, and even why, Chinese people would be taught to use and exert their bodies. Riding the winds of the New Culture and May Fourth movements, Chinese of the late 1910s and early 1920s hoped to redefine the terms on which physical education and recreation would be handled; in this time of learning from the Enlightened West’s science and democracy, the modern games and competitions that came from
Great Britain and the United States were all the rage. In 1917, Yun could refer to the military-style ticao drill as a type of tiyu, or physical education. But the new Anglo-American tiyu that Yun called “progressive” and “interesting” soon became known as the tiyu, a term that could be used in opposition to the ticao. The ticao drill, despised by liberal-minded college students all over China, was now attacked for its connections to both the now-bankrupt Prussian martial ideal and the antiquated Chinese martial arts. By the early 1920s, the militaristic ticao already seemed obsolete, advocated only by those seen as sentimental or deluded diehards. Guo Xifen’s 1919 classic History of Athletics in China already referred to a Chinese tiyu that he distinguished from the old (and presumably extinct) German- and Swedish-style ticao movement in China. What some called the “smelly double-track system” of equal concentration on ticao and tiyu ended around 1922, when the “stale and hackneyed” old ticao drills were abandoned, and ticao “coaches” were replaced by tiyu “teachers.” And a sure sign of the passing of ticao was the 1922 call by the Education Department’s Physical Fitness and People’s Recreation Conference for the use of new tiyu even in military and police training, sites that were bastions of the old martial drill.

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Alongside military ticao, another form of physical education and exertion was growing in China—the Anglo-American-style tiyu. Here, though, it was spirited missionaries (especially the YMCA), not hardened mercenaries, who hoped that a bit of the magic of the Western experience would rub off on their Chinese pupils. The earliest reference I have found to a Western-style athletic experience in China was in 1878, when a missionary in Ningbo praised cricket as an enjoyable way to “cure dyspepsia and ... clear up many gloomy views of religious matters and of the state of the world in general.”

Personal digestive idiosyncrasies aside, this second quality of Western sport that the missionary describes should seem familiar to us. Christianity, a can-do spirit, and physical wellness were all part of this missionary tiyu package that established itself as ticao’s competitor for the loyalties of the physically active Chinese. Christian universities in the urban areas and YMCA scattered throughout the empire became the bases for the introduction of this new tiyu. S. E. Smalley, a Canadian missionary at St. John’s University in Shanghai, organized China’s first school athletic meet in 1890, and this Yundong jingsaihui afterwards became a biannual event. In 1898, missionary and ex-Princeton star center Robert Gailly brought the game of basketball to the Tianjin YMCA. The game spread so quickly that another missionary some twenty years later could write to James Naismith, the game’s inventor, that in China he saw “basketball goals everywhere ... [with] lots of spectators from all kinds of social levels.” We should not imagine that this tiyu push was limited only to China’s urban centers, however; in 1895, British missionaries built a ball field on the grounds of a church in a Yunnan Lahu minority village called Nuofu near the Burmese border.

This Western-flavored tiyu did not have to be purely a missionary effort for long, as the rah-rah ideology of team spirit proved attractive to secular Chinese as well. In 1895, a contingent of Overseas Chinese boys from Honolulu left a great impression on the students of St. John’s with their tremendous enthusiasm for athletics and sporting spirit. People in Meixian County, later the soccer hotbed of Guangdong province, first learned about the sport from returned Overseas Chinese. Chinese returning from Singapore, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam brought back home rubber soccer balls and their zest for the game they learned in colonized Southeast Asia. The game so rapidly caught on that by the end of the Qing, soccer was part of the curriculum of every Meixian elementary school. Tiyu thus provided a strong connection to a greater worldwide China, a China that could transcend the depressing “split melon” of the late Qing. And the realization that Chinese people could also excel at these new games, if given the right conditions, gave many a great appreciation for the value of these sports.

In urban settings, the original exclusivity of the new tiyu was itself valued. Privileged university youth of the 1900s-1910s could pad their elitism with the new Western/modern ideology of sport and its new knowledge of the body and its movements. Alumni later remembered fondly that “[f]or a time people were able to ‘spot’ a St. John’s student by the way he walked and by the way in which he carried himself when walking.” But the bubble soon burst, and this era of exclusive access to Western tiyu clearly passed sooner than these alumni would have hoped. Participation in Western-inspired sports and competitions became quite common for students at Christian universities and at official xuetao academies by the last years of the Qing.

This last imperial decade brought new forms of organization to Chinese tiyu: the great athletic meet (usually called yundonghui or yundong dahu) and the inter-school or amateur athletic association. Two examples of these massive meets came in 1907, in Guilin and Nanjing. The Guilin meet was host to thirty-nine middle schools, with a thousand students participating in events like footrace and tug-of-war. Nanjing’s First Ningyuan Inter-School United Athletic Meet hosted students from eighty-six schools, taking part in sixty-nine events,
including boxing, fencing, ball sports, and dance. Military ticao drill was included in the Nanjing meet, but the atmosphere was completely tiyu—pagantry, team and school loyalty, and the chance to meet and compete with one’s peers from all over the city. The Chinese Intercollegiate Athletic Association (Zhonghua daxue lianhe yundonghui) formed in 1904 by four Shanghai colleges, and the Hebei athletic alliance of private and public colleges formed by 1910, partook of this same spirit of bringing people together who would compete in the short term, but shared the long-term goals of a healthy and fit populace and a united China. This was clearly an ideology that had been initiated by Westerners in China. But it was one that, once taking hold among Chinese people, no longer depended on the presence of glad-handing missionaries to push this form of tiyu any farther.

Military drill aimed for physical readiness in the case of battle with a national enemy, and a constant mental awareness of the nation and its interests. This newer form of tiyu offered much more to Chinese people whose very sense of their nation was slipping. The discipline, the barked orders, and the strict cadence of military ticao must have seemed a joke to many young Chinese who saw a corrupt and morally bankrupt Qing dynasty on its last legs. National survival obviously required a strong military. More than this, however, China also needed a new type of community, one where the bitter struggle to survive in the world could be bred by friendly struggles within. Ticao involved a collective focus (on the person of the drill leader), an important step in solving what many saw as the lack of a collective spirit in China. But it could not arrange the friendly micro-struggles between schools, cities, provinces, and soon nations, that tiyu could. Only tiyu could focus the gaze of its participants on the transcendent concept of victory. The teamwork and the distances that teams covered to compete with each other in the tiyu provided a sense of a community all striving for this singular goal. The timing, measuring, and official rules allowed for structured ways to evaluate improvement and progress, so crucial to survival in the modern world. And the crowds that attended the games provided the athletes’ senses of performance, drama, and tension that would have seemed so appropriate as the very future of their nation was being decided in the great international struggles of the world.

The one-dimensional ticao may have claimed the allegiance of some patriots, as a militarist ideal always does. But after all, it could only cao (drill or control) the body. It offered nothing like the yu (nourishment, education, uplift) that came in this new ideology of physical culture. The ticao was direct, top-down, and easy to understand: strong people, strong nation. The tiyu could never be this straightforward, with its intra-city/province/nation competitions, its obvious and long-lasting connections to the foreign missionary presence, its new ideals of amateurism and sportsmanship, its cheering crowds, and its commercialism. But in terms of an extension to feelings of commitment to the nation and national triumph, tiyu would become the only real option.

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An advertisement placed by Shanghai’s Dalong Pharmacies in the 19 October 1910 edition of Shenbao promised a “strong body” for consumers using their product, Powdered Cow Marrow (Niu sui fen). Targeting “palid-faced and sickly” readers, Dalong guaranteed a rosy and healthy complexion after five days’ use, and a weight gain of ten pounds in just half a month. The marrow was “replete with all the essentials to turn the weak into strong,” for just one yuan per box. The ad was notable for its timing; the day before, China had taken what many saw as a great step toward turning the nation from weak to strong by kicking off the first Chinese national athletic meet.

The decade of the 1910s brought astounding new developments to a Chinese world of physical culture that was still extremely undecided about where it was headed, or what it was expected to do, or if it was even a single unified “it” at all. There seemed to be no doubt that the more Chinese people actively participated in tiyu, the better off in general the nation would be. However, tiyu provided none of the immediate answers that ticao did, and ideas of what tiyu meant would continue to evolve throughout the decade.

Even before 1910, many in athletic circles had great ambitions for Chinese tiyu. There is an apocryphal story, most likely untrue, of Qing officials refusing modern Olympic founder Pierre de Coubertin’s invitation for a Chinese team to participate in the first Games in 1896 Athens. But Zhang Boling, founder of the Nankai Middle School and Tianjin tiyu doyen, was already writing in 1907–08 of his dream of Chinese Olympians. Chinese tiyu was now at a stage where many wanted to take the next step past this “tutelary stage” under the West; the true test would be Chinese athletes competing for themselves on a world stage.

The first step came with the First National Athletic Alliance of Regional Student Teams (Quanguo xueziao qufendui di yi ci tiyu tongmenghui), which was held 18–22 October 1910 on the grounds of the Nanyang Industrial Exposition near Nanjing’s Xuanwu Gate. This national meet was the brainchild of Zhejiang/Jiangsu Viceroy Rui Fang and YMCA National Physical Education Director M. J. Exner, and was organized by Exner, Rui’s successor Zhang Renjun, and industrialist Zhang Jian. This exposition, this great celebration of
and monument to the construction of a capitalist economy, a capitalist labor discipline, and a modern ethos of production and consumption in China, seems the perfect moment for such a breakthrough in Chinese national strength, modernity, and integration.

The week before the exposition, Shenbao posted daily information about the coming games, welcoming athletes from all around China, listing daily event schedules, and announcing the good news that admission to all the athletic events would be included in the price of the Industrial Exposition ticket. Organizers formed a sixteen-person national committee ("equally divided between Chinese and foreign members"), as well as subcommittees to represent each of the five regional teams: Huabei (North China), Huinan (South China), Wuhan, Shanghai, and Wuning (Nanjing/Suzhou).

There is little record of the first All-China meet itself; Shenbao’s updates end after the meet’s first day. It seems clear that in 1910, a tiyu meet was seen as an important event to announce beforehand, but not necessarily to describe afterwards (despite a total attendance of some 40,000 people). The importance was not in who won or how much, but in that the meet was happening, and was apparent to all as a very visible sign of national and masculine progress. Short and random records provide us with the only details of the meet. Xu Shaowu remembered traveling with his parents from Huangmei in eastern Hubei to the Nanjing meet, hinting at a truly national interest that now could be expressed by movement over the national territory. Xu described a soccer game between Soochow and Jinling universities, played in front of a crowd of up to 2000 people, with the players’ queues swinging to and fro, and officiated by British referees. The YMCA magazine Association Men reported “monster gatherings” at the meet’s basketball and soccer games, and a first-day crowd of “16,000, mostly college boys!” It also told the story that could have become the stuff of Chinese tiyu/modernity legend: Tianjin high jumper Sun Baoxin finished the first day of competition in second place in his event, frustrated by his swinging queue, which kept knocking down the pole he was trying to clear. This new-minded Chinese man “hacked off the queue that night, declaring he would jump higher than any man ever jumped before in China, and he did.”

What better image of tiyu could there be for young Chinese people who aspired to cut off China’s collective queue and finally scale these new heights?

The differences between the second national meet, held 22–24 May 1914, and the larger and more spectacular first meet, can tell us much about how people’s conceptions of tiyu were moving. The unwieldy fifteen-character official name of the 1910 Alliance was shortened to a more snappy and stream-lined Second National Athletic Games (Di er ci quanguo yundong dahui). Organized by the Peking Athletic Association, an organization with close ties to the Beijing YMCA, these games had a new host site as well: Beijing’s Tiantan Park, an abrupt change from the Nanjing Industrial Expo. The museumified “Chineseness” by then associated with the Altar of Heaven hardly would have recalled the atmosphere of progress and industry that athlete and spectator alike breathed in Nanjing four years before. Perhaps with this fact in mind, the Games’ sponsors provided the trappings that could bring a modern national spirit to the capital. The Games’ second day featured not only music by an official Presidential Palace marching band and a volleyball exhibition by American athletes, but also a thrilling air show put on by the Nanyuan Aviation School, whose planes showered Games leaflets and colored confetti over the thousands gathered at the Tiantan grounds.

Later Chinese authors have almost totally ignored the Second National Games; the spirit in which these Games were undertaken at Tiantan is difficult to recapture. The official Games Pronouncement described the four ethical qualities “necessary for achieving victory on the athletic stage”: honesty, loyalty, fortitude and unity. From pieces of information such as this, one can start to imagine what tiyu values might have meant to citizens of the young Republic. The choice of Tiantan as home to the Games fascinates me, however. Were participants in a national athletic meet held in Tiantan supposed to sense a connection with the storied Chinese past as they competed in events not long removed from their Western origin? Or were the meet and its modern appendages something very different, a deliberately formed “striking” contrast between progress and tradition, much like later pictures of token rickshaw men standing next to shiny new automobiles? Either way, the choice of Tiantan shows the new confidence the athletic community had in the new tiyu, that in one way or another it was qualified to stand on its own in the long shadows of the Altar of Heaven.

In line with an evolving sense of the importance of teamwork and team spirit, the team sports baseball and volleyball were added at these Second Games to the track, tennis, soccer, and basketball of 1910. The first meet had hosted competitions on three different levels, sectional (open to all), intercollegiate, and middle school (ages 15–20). In the new Republican age, these divisions, which reflected on the athletes’ schooling (and ultimately their socio-economic status) in a very un-nationlike fashion, seemed very unnecessary. Furthermore, the presence of three distinct divisions of competition in 1910 meant that there would not necessarily be one winning team. There were no “shared titles”
when it came to national survival, however; these practice struggles had to be to the (athletic) death. The 1914 merger of the three levels into one allowed the Northern team to consolidate the crown they had to share with the Shanghai section and the St. John’s varsity in 1910.

Finally, the regional divisions were also completely redrawn here, as the seventy-plus athletes present were split into the four very generically named regions of East, West, South, and North. The groupings of 1910 split the nation into three specific (and central) metropolitan regions, and two vague, amorphous (and peripheral) stretches of South China and North China. These new lines of 1914 represent a tremendous change, as they, on one hand, performed a “levelling” on the nation. There are no more readily identifiable central or more privileged regions in this exclusively compass-defined China. All we see are the four directions, objective, scientific, and describing no regional favoritism in this new nation of equal citizens. Something else was gone from here as well, though; there was no “China”! The “Hua” that put some Chinese specificity on the scope of the Huanan and Huabei teams was gone now; why was there now no nation in these National Games? The next National games (in 1924) brought back the “Hua”; in 1914 there might have been some ambivalence about tiyu and its relation to the nation? The old assumption was that tiyu and the National Games were strong and forceful entities that could unite and put borders around a Chinese Hua nation. But at this time, from the depths of national disunity, perhaps even the idea of make-believe Social Darwinian struggles were too traumatic to imagine. Did the heat of these competitions between countrymen pose a dangerous threat that could wipe out any sense of nationness at all, turning what was once the “Middle Kingdom” into the dreaded “split melon”?

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This vagueness raised by the national competitions could finally be addressed only when Chinese athletes began venturing away from China into the sacred realm of international athletic competitions. In 1913 Manila, they were welcomed thusly by Philippine Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes to this new stage:

In the name of the Government of the United States and the Government and people of the Philippine Islands, I stand before you, the athletes of the new Republic of China and of our sister nation, the Empire of Japan, and of the Philippine Islands, and extend to you all a hearty welcome. I hope that all your contests will be carried on in the spirit of fair play, which in after years may govern your conduct in business and other vocations of grown-ups.

With this condescending allusion to the universalizing ideologies of free trade and fair play, and to the nationhood that Forbes felt the United States shared with Japan but not yet with China, so began the First Far Eastern Championship Games, and the international athletic debut of the Republic of China. An annual carnival held every February in Manila had featured informal athletic events (including athletes from Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) for several years. In 1909, when YMCA officials became concerned about the adverse moral effects of athletes being paid to participate in these events, the Carnival games were promptly put under the jurisdiction of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation. It did not take long for YMCA organizations in Asia to take the next step in their concern for “their” young athletes in China, the Philippines, and Japan, and form the Far Eastern Athletic Association in 1911.

It is obviously impossible to avoid the imperialist stamp that was imprinted on the Manila meet, and later the Second Far Eastern Games held in Shanghai in 1915. These Games were put on by Western men for the edification, masculinization, and Westernization of their weak Oriental pupils. They hoped that for the athletes themselves, the Games could be a place to learn and live Governor-General Forbes’s fair play and capitalist spirit. The Games would also spread the fruits of the Western nation-state system to those places still mired in more backward forms of government. (In the Philippines, if the goal was not to foster a nationalist spirit among the colonial subjects, the Games could at least treat and accustom them to the values and experiences of American trusteeship.) Even the newest qualifications for nationhood did not escape the Federation, who listed as the very first “Purpose” in the Association Constitution, “to supplement the work of the International Olympic Committee.” But the bringers of culture would only tolerate national forms that were designed on their own terms. When dealing with these mysterious, irrational and undisciplined Orientals, it was important that the West bring a safe and recognizable nationalism (embodied here in the international Olympic movement) to them, avoiding the risk that they might come up with their own and unknown national forms.

The YMCA role in these early Games brings us to a complex historical problem. From a nationalist perspective, the imperialist framework described above can do little to ignite a strong Chinese tīyu spirit. However, it is also a mistake and an insult for us to somehow conclude that these Far Eastern athletes were merely unfortunate, deluded dupes selling out their national identity to YMCA chauvinists, as some later Chinese scholarship has done. How could one discount the great pride these athletes must have felt representing their nation (actually personifying the nation, not just defending it like in the tīcau)
under their national flag, before tens of thousands of people in international settings like Manila or Shanghai? The preliminary competitions held to determine who would represent China in the Games, the traveling done to reach the competition site, could not but have impressed the athletes with the immensity of what they were involved in. No matter who was putting on or refereeing the Games, the act of leaving the Chinese realm for the foreign, or of competing with representatives of other nations in one’s own homeland, could confirm that there was now a China that belonged in the world. And no matter who had taught them the connections between nation and physical exertion, their sweat and strain in these international settings could never have seemed more valuable to their beloved China.

The coming of the Second Far Eastern Games to Shanghai in 1915 was another glorious stride on this road to real nationhood. In his opening address, Foreign Ministry representative Yang Cheng, representing President Yuan Shikai, proclaimed:

This is an age of young men—young men, to take the responsibility which will soon be yours as leaders of the nation, must have strong bodies. To get strong bodies you must be active and energetic, and there is nothing that will help, both in the development of the body and in the development of character, like competitive athletics... [The Games] offer the opportunity for you to measure your strength against foemen worthy of you. The champion athletes of three nations are here assembled. May your time and energies be spent in healthful competition, striving for mastery without feelings of enmity against your brother man. You are representing the best men of your nations, and it is reasonable to suppose that in time you will become the representatives of your nations and will take your places in the world’s conferences to solve the great problems of mankind. I wish you success in the development of the highest type of manhood.

This manhood would be the medium in which China proved its ultimate worth as a nation. Among these young Chinese men, crew cuts and muscle-revealing tank top jerseys and shorts replaced the queues and robes that had kept alive the dreaded image of a feminine China in a world of men and their nations. It took real men to play out these microcosms of the international struggles that all good Social Darwinsians knew to be imminent, and it took the new riyu to put the focus on this type of struggle. Military calisthenics drilled into its participants a lockstep efficiency, a quality of no small importance in this vicious age.

These riyu concepts of the team and of friendly struggle (that by definition were posed against an other), however, filled all the requirements of national survival. Stakes were especially high by the opening of these Second Far Eastern Games; only six days had passed since the Yuan Shikai government’s decision to accede to Japan’s predatory 21 Demands. Predictably, the meet quickly took on a more nationalist tone. Perhaps hoping to prove that he was not a complete sellout after all, Yuan personally put up 500 yuan to bring a standout baseball team of Honolulu Chinese to represent the motherland in the Games. This move was a clear violation of the Association Constitution ruling on territorial representation, but clearly provided an inspiring taste of pan-Chinese nationalism for athletes and fans alike.

The Games were enough of an event to warrant daily updates in Shenbao and the North China Daily News days before the actual competitions began, and the Shanghai Tramway and Nanjing-Shanghai railroad adopted special schedules to accommodate fans attending the meet. The Games included several Western participants, including a handful of Westerners on the Chinese tennis and swimming teams, and local foreign club teams competing in Open Championship soccer, baseball, and track and field contests. But Chinese spectators chose wisely which events they would attend (at one yuan per ticket), ignored these mostly-foreign Open matches, and cheered with abandon for any and all Chinese athletes. J. H. Crocker, National Physical Director of the YMCA in China, wrote of the crowds’ wild support for any Chinese, “so long as he had the [national] five-barred ribbon on they cheered him.” Dr. Elwood Brown of the Philippine delegation, originator of the Far Eastern Games, compared the enthusiasm in Shanghai to that even of the biggest American college football games, and reported:

I have never seen such enthusiastic rooting and cheering in my life at any athletic event... [when the Chinese soccer team scored a goal to tie the Philippine team] instantly that whole Chinese crowd rushed from all four sides out into the field, thousands of hats sailed into the air, the Chinese players were lifted up... It was fully ten minutes before the officials could clear the grounds and allow the contest to go on.

Nor was this kind of exuberance the only sort of audience participation at the Games. If sporting struggles were only meant to be mere preparation for the real international thing, this distinction escaped the attention of many Chinese fans caught up in a fever of nationalist manhood. Fights between the two teams’ players marred the second Philippine-Chinese soccer contest, and when Chi-
inese spectators joined in the violence against the visitors, the game had to be postponed.59

The competitions themselves, and the emotions that went with them, were not the only attractions at these 1915 Games. Opening ceremonies, beginning with a slow march around the playing field by athletes grouped by nation, and speeches like Yang’s above set the tone for serious competition between these men as real representatives (not just mere citizens) of modern nations. A calisthenics program performed by 700 boys from the Nanyang Public School and the YMCA was part of the opening ceremonies, and was even featured in newspaper advertisements for the meet.60 A highlight of the Games’ fourth day was a Boy Scout competition featuring some 500 Scouts from Shanghai, Guangdong and Great Britain; the program included events like building bridges, marching, archery, pitching tents, model airplanes, and even a flag routine promoting use of the baihua vernacular.61 Demonstrations such as these only accentuated the youthful strength and modern creativity of the young men of China on full display at these Games. YMCA sponsorship or not, it seems impossible that one could walk away from these Second Far Eastern Games without an awareness of what these athletes and other youth of China were doing to move powerfully and fearlessly into a future that was the strong and masculine nation-state.

* * * *

The decade of the 1910s brought with it further broadening of the reach of tiyu. Once almost exclusively the province of urban university men, tiyu was now brought to a wider group of men via the regional organizations and competitions that popped up seemingly everywhere during this time. But the supposedly modern and liberal tiyu was doing little to include women, where even the “feudal” Qing had included schoolgirls in the 1906 order for mandatory military calisthenics. In October 1910, on the heels of the first National Games, Shenbao announced an upcoming women’s athletic meet in Changzhou, Jiangsu, between the Banyuan private and Wuyang public girls’ schools, and hoped that it would be a “lively” event.62 In 1911, a Chinese educator advocated coeducational tiyu in order “to build a cooperative spirit between boys and girls,” writing that this kind of sporting interaction was more healthy than men “singing and drinking wine with beauties in heavy makeup.”63 But for the most part, despite other ways in which women were being asked to sacrifice for the nation, this physical aspect of national survival was clearly men’s work. The New Chinese Man who could honorably represent China on the world stage was the goal.

The universities, and the role of the physical realm there, were a significant part of this process. A 1931 Qinghua University publication reflected back fondly on an earlier practice known in the students’ English as “Hit to Freshies” (or in Chinese as the “Physical Tests for New Students”). In an aggressive microcosm of the conflicts and contradictions of China’s ongoing nationizing and unifying processes, incoming Qinghua students were habitually subject to rituals of physical hazing, including involuntary performances on the side horse, one-handed pushups, rope-climbing, and the dreaded “corpses toss” by upper-classmen swinging and then releasing each of their four limbs. Direct disciplining of the body was an important language in which students of the era expressed this very difficult and contradictory process of making from many, one, of striving to fashion a single “Qinghua man” of the boys that came to the university from all over China.64

Tiyu also became a subject of research and public discussion at this time. In Beijing, a Tiyu Research Society was established in 1912.65 A Tiyu Research Society was founded in a Nanjing Higher Normal School physics classroom in 1917, and months later published a 266-page book of 47 essays on subjects ranging from German military ticao, to the relation between exercise and semen, to the morality and ideals of amateur sport.66 Shanghai’s Athletic World (Tiyu jie), published on and off since 1909, was a 24-page monthly by 1918. Shanghai’s Athletics Magazine (Tiyu zazhi) and Changsha’s Athletics Weekly (Tiyu zhoubao) were also popular by this time.67 Pang Xingyue drew on his experience studying tiyu (taiiku) in Japan to establish the private East Asian Physical Education Training Institute in Shanghai in 1918. Pang published two books titled The Philosophy of Athletics and The Management of Athletics, as well as the yearly school publication featuring tiyu instruction methods and songs.68

This research into and writing on tiyu would swell with the student activism of the late 1910s into a tide of criticism of and concern for this emerging physical culture. Above were seen some of the pro-tiyu attacks on the impracticality and the irrelevance of the ticao martial drilling still being taught in most schools. But the May Fourth line was not by any means an unquestioning acceptance of the Anglo-American tiyu; many of the ideas and attitudes that came with this form of physical performance and conditioning fell under attack as well. Democratic (pingmin zhuyi) ideology was credited by many as having brought down the military ticao. Many recognized, however, that it had also contributed to the selfish and materialistic approaches of “trophyism” (jinbiao zhuyi), and the “athlete system” (xuanshou zhi, where schools paid non-stu-
Some went so far as to condemn the whole new tiyu enterprise; competitive sports were called "the birth of vanity" in schools of the time, or merely a simple game of "Envy-the-West."

However, most critiques of the new tiyu were about how it was not being implemented properly. In the new physical education classes, students felt that there was still a shortage of qualified teachers, and those who were properly qualified put too much emphasis on winning, harshly criticizing or even beating students who fell short of their high demands. Yun Daiying was critical of the excesses of tiyu as well, writing that "tiyu should be for all students, regardless of how strong or weak their bodies are... It is not a school's duty to have athletes performing exceptionally in the big meets, and it is not a disgrace if they do not." Schools were seen as spending inordinate amounts of money on the athletes, who were so spoiled by their special privileges that some became "plain hoodlums." (But their adoring publics could turn on these athletes as well; when they represented their schools poorly, some fellow students "took it personally" and cursed and ridiculed them in school publications.)

The inclusive potential that these critics saw in tiyu might seem inspiring and admirable, and certainly matches our own inherited wisdom about the moral worth of team sports. But this rhetoric should not obscure the fact that these critiques still came from a very narrow and privileged band in society, those in the student community who somehow cheated out of the obvious benefits of tiyu—the availability of these games and of this sporting ideology was still far from universal. The bubbling excitement and nationalist hope that came with the tiyu could easily spill over into hyperbole, however, distorting the picture of tiyu into an entity that could envelope and represent the entire Chinese nation. By the May Fourth period, it had become time to finally make rational and national sense of tiyu, to figure out where exactly it fit in the whole scheme of Chinese history, culture and society.

It was a delicate process as writers sought to give the tiyu its rightful niche in the world of things Chinese. Inherent in, and crucial to, this very effort of placing tiyu in China's historical progress was the fact of the new tiyu's ultimately foreign (and specifically Western) connections. Fanon has written of a mode of anti-colonialist "nationalist culture" where, in order to fight off the colonizing power, native intellectuals "relentlessly determine to renew contact once more with the oldest and most pre-colonial springs of life of their people." However, it is not the case that Chinese nationalism necessarily required the denial of the existence of any points of commonality with the foreign. The very idea of making China a nation, and the modern nationalism it had to achieve, were based on a specific Western European example of strength and power and a will for progress. The competitive and rational tiyu fit perfectly here. Tiyu had provided gratifying, energizing, and liberating experiences for many Chinese people for almost three decades now. But only when Chinese tiyu took the logical step to involvement in ideas of China as a nation, whether it be in arenas international, national, or even regional, did it take off the way it did in the 1910s. As the nation needed the masculine, muscular boost that was tiyu, so did tiyu need the nation and its (imported) structure. The sense that this tiyu was not totally a "Chinese" invention was, by definition, an integral part of this narrative.

Yet despite this sense of progress and entry into an international community, a Chinese nationalism did need to have some essential China somewhere in it. Furthermore, this China could not be the modern Republican China, the history of which at this point amounted to one often messy and frustrating decade. A more inspiring tradition and history, which China certainly had at its disposal, would be necessary to cite. As Ernest Renan observed, knowledge of "common glories in the past" are just as crucial in forming a nation as "a common will in the present." Appeals to the ideals of progress and international kinship had to be balanced somehow with a new understanding of the achievements and the wonders of ancient China as well.

A schema was formulated in which the tiyu of the twentieth century was the completely logical successor to the aristocratic games and military training of imperial China. The very recent appearance in China of this specific form of tiyu was not forgotten; in 1922 Dr. Min-Ch'ien T.Z. Tyau described how gratifying Chinese athletes' performances were, seeing as "[a]thletics in China are only one or two decades old." But there was a convenient reason why this new form was so late to bloom in China. "Why Chinese tiyu has not developed" was one of the first questions Guo Xifen posed in his classic treatise on the history of Chinese tiyu. His answer was quite simple. "Ancient tiyu" for Guo equaled military training, which he saw peaking in the Spring and Autumn period—after this, unfortunately, China experienced a long slide of some 2500 years in the military arts. Generations of weak Confucian scholars who emphasized study and detested the military, and for whom "drinking wine and being lazy was the highest achievement," could do nothing to end this skid. Thus, it was only in this decade (the 1910s) that Chinese people "awakened from their delusion."

But Guo's 160-page book on Chinese tiyu had to be about something. It turned out that somehow in these dazed millennia of lethargy and confusion,
there had developed many Chinese games and exercises. And these games were amazingly similar to the forms of tiyu spreading so rapidly in Guo’s China; he identified one single identifiable “quality” or “nature” (xingzhi) to the development of tiyu all over the world. For example, the old cuju “kick-ball” was “similar” to modern soccer, and the old “hit-ball” game of chuiwan was also “similar” to baseball. Guo not surprisingly concluded that “Chinese and Western [tiyu] are kindred, these are not two different principles.” The only difference he pointed out was that “Western games emphasize rules, but simply do not have this [Chinese] sort of grace and elegance.” In 1919, Guo established a very comprehensive way of looking at Chinese tiyu—an entity that on one hand (in keeping with the new progressive histories) had been suppressed by the backwardness of imperial rule, but that at heart always was following and developing along the universal line of tiyu to which the West had (re-)exposed China in recent years. Qinghua University’s Dr. David Z. T. Yui also denied any fundamental difference or “compet[tion] for supremacy” between the Chinese and Western forms of tiyu. And Qinghua professor Gunson Hoh, the next great (American-educated) spokesman for tiyu in China, never saw any problem in Guo’s formulation that Chinese tiyu had grown geographically and temporally separately from, but spiritually in near-lockstep with, Western athletics. By the late 1910s and early 1920s, there was really no question that tiyu in some way or another was of vital importance to the Chinese nation. Some saw tiyu in very hard geopolitical terms. Shenbao’s “Lao” wrote,

The spirit of struggle in athletics is the same as in war. If one is defeated in war, territory is lost. If one is defeated in athletics, reputation is lost. And of territory and reputation, no one yet knows which is more important... We need to be able to perform in athletics before we can talk of war. A nation needs to be able to fight before it can talk of peace. World peace begins with athletics.

Others spoke of tiyu in terms of the important ideal of progress; another reporter wrote,

An athletic competition is not for people to win and feel arrogant. Nor is it a performance of quirky or unusual skills to please the crowds. Nor is it a time for gamblers to play their luck. As I see it, victory allows us to recognize our hard work, and a defeat enables us to know where we fall short and need to keep working.

The prominent international role of athletics also made it imperative that all Chinese learned the international rules of proper decorum for attending these events. If the ultimate goal was to finally ascend the international stage, it would do no good to be immediately laughed off it for unbecoming conduct. Another Shenbao writer worried openly about “foreigners laughing at our citizens for our lack of common sense... [for their] immoral and improper clapping when opposing athletes made mistakes.” In fact, at the 1921 Fifth Far Eastern Games in Shanghai, workers were stationed in the bleachers to announce that “clapping in these situations [when opposing athletes make mistakes] is a form of ridicule, and that the morality of the athletic grounds should be maintained. By doing this we can avoid the slyths of foreigners, and avoid losing national prestige.”

The appeal of the world of athletics was so broad that it could be used towards astounding ends. Perhaps the most startling incident at these 1921 Games in Shanghai was the arrest of six Hunan anarchists outside Hongkou Park after one of them fired a gun during the huge Boy Scout demonstration to close the games on 4 June. Thousands of anarchist pamphlets seized by French and Chinese detectives contained materials on the great East Asian revolution to come. Even the anarchists bought into the connection between athletics and national and international politics. According to their rhetoric, it would take “the strength of athletes” for Chinese to attack capitalism and overthrow the government. One banner confiscated at the site screamed, “Punch the capitalists and kick the government!”

The excitement and the motion of tiyu made a powerful force, and one that very logically was enlisted in new Chinese nationalisms. The tiyu and the nation as written by May Fourth-era writers like Guo Xifen and Gunson Hoh were versions that remembered aspects of the old China in a way that, feudal and decrepit as it was, shared (and even foreshadowed) aspects of a universal development with the dynamic and advanced West. This tiyu community never shared the unquestioning faith in the West and universal condemnation of all things Chinese of many May Fourth writers, and thus saw the nation in a much broader way. There was no sense of nationalism as nativism, and here indeed there could not be. Tiyu’s inclusion in the story of the new Chinese nation dictated that this nation would have to be more flexible and syncretic, and would have to account somehow for the fact that the new Chinese tiyu, like the new Chinese nation, included in it ideas and ideologies from without.

* * * *

Up to this point the Chinese wushu martial arts have been virtually absent from my history of physical exercise and endeavor in the young Republic, but
this is no simple negligence on my part. In fact, the imagining of this modern Chinese tiyu/nation I have described above was possible only with a modern attempt to erase the very ambiguous tradition of the Chinese wushu.

Wushu was far too easy a target for the May Fourth tiyu generation, as it seemed to be everything that these modern men wanted China not to be. It belonged to the old “closed China” and could trace no heritage to the modern West. It was unquantifiable and unscientific. It belonged to the wandering jianghu itinerants of the countryside, not to the “xian zhi xian juewu” enlightened urban classes who could lead China into modernity. It left no written records that could be spread among the masses. It was secretive and divided, the exact opposite of what was needed to unify the nation. Little about wushu seemed to suit the needs of the modern nation-building project.

But some still saw use in the old martial arts. In 1918, members of the Fourth National Education Convention at Shanghai called for schools to promote wushu education throughout China. They received an answer in Lu Xun’s “Random Thoughts” in the October 1918 New Youth:

There are many now who actively support and advocate boxing. Remember, this was advocated in the past, but then it was pushed by Manchu kings and princes; now it’s Republican educators... These educators take these old ways, “passed down from a mystic woman of the highest heavens or some such, to the Yellow Emperor, and then to some nuns,” now called “new martial arts” or “Chinese ticao,” and tell youngsters to practice... Some say that the efficacy of Chinese people learning Western ticao cannot yet be seen, so we have no choice but to teach our own nation’s ticao (or boxing). But I think that if you pick up foreign hammers or batons and begin exercising your arms and legs, this will have some “efficacy” in terms of muscle development. How could you not see it? Apparently we now have to switch to “Wusong Slipping out of Handcuffs” or some other [martial arts] tricks. I suppose this is due to Chinese people being physiologically different from foreigners.... We have seen all this before, in 1900. That time it ended up in the total destruction of our reputation. We will have to see what happens this time.48

Lu Xun’s association of a wushu curriculum with the disastrous Boxer Uprising of two decades past might have been the final nail in the martial arts’ coffin; he described a wushu that was not only irrelevant to the tasks at hand, but also responsible for many of China’s problems. Chen Tiesheng, later publisher of Shanghai’s Pure Martial Magazine (Jingwu zazhi [1920–25]), was not going to stand by and watch quietly Lu Xun’s rude burial of the entire wushu tradition, however. Chen tried to dissect Lu Xun’s random thoughts, drawing a clear line between “Boxer bandits” (quansie) practicing sorcery and super­naturalism (guidao zhuyi), and true martial artists who celebrated humanitarian­ism (rendao zhuyi) through their wushu. Chen also described the recent American publication of a book on Northern Chinese martial arts, as he attempted to establish a connection between Chinese wushu and New Youth’s vision of the modern and progressive West.47

A thorough dismissal of the wushu would not be as easy as many of these modernizers might have hoped, especially with the development of urban martial arts societies. Lin Boyuan has described the process by which economic conditions in the late Qing Chinese countryside pushed many itinerant wushu teachers into cities like Tianjin, Qingdao, Jinan, and Shenyang. Here, during the 1910s, many of these martial artists were able to make a living teaching in schools or in new public wushu organizations.48 These wushu communities would have to wait until the mid-1920s for the flood of written coverage in books and magazines that made it impossible for the tiyu community to try to ignore the martial arts any longer. But at this heady time of new culture and the cult of the strong and modern West, the wushu pushed by these organizations was still not seen as being up to the national task.

One other problem plagued wushu: the “new martial arts” of which Lu Xun spoke, although carrying on the name wushu, likely would have been unrecognizable to the old masters. A main vehicle for martial arts in the 1910s was wushu expert Huo Yuanjia’s famed Jingwu (Pure Martial) school, founded in Shanghai in July 1910. Huo left Tianjin in 1907 for Shanghai, where he quickly became renowned for his penchant for flattening Japanese ronin, Russian rascals, and foreign rogues in general. The most famous Jingwu legend tells of a barnstorming Russian muscleman in Shanghai who claimed that the whole of China could provide no competition for his strength and fighting abilities. This time, Huo recruited star pupil Liu Zhensheng to fight this bully, and arranged a date for a great showdown at his new boxing arena on Jingansi Road. The Russian soon fled in fear of the Jingwu prowess he had seen, bringing glory upon the brand-new Pure Martial Ticao School (Jingwu ticao xuziaox).49

It did not take Jingwu skill to soon figure out which way the physical culture winds were blowing, and the organization changed its name in 1916 to the more fashionable Pure Martial Athletic Association (Jingwu tiyu hui). By showing Pure Martial films and putting on demonstrations at schools around the country, the Association spread quickly, with branches in Guangzhou, Foshan,
Shantou, Xiamen, and Hankou by 1919. Overseas Chinese also opened several overseas branches in locales like Selangor, Kuala Lumpur, Saigon, Penang, and Jakarta by 1920. But this spread was not without its price. The Pure Martial message had to be diluted before it made much sense to Chinese people of the 1910s; their success was only achieved after Jingwu began holding classes and competitions in very un-martial sports like soccer, basketball, bicycle racing, table tennis, billiards, and roller skating. But the Association could still serve as a valuable vehicle for pan-Chinese nationalism; during the summer of 1920, four of Jingwu’s “Five Special Ambassadors” (including female star Chen Shichao) performed for two nights in Singapore before audiences of 10,000 Overseas Chinese, raising money for flood victims in China. Even with this Pure Martial push, the new martial arts remained for many a curiosity, even in the Association’s hometown. At the 1921 Far Eastern Games in Shanghai, a demonstration on the fifth day of competitions by the Chinese Wushu Association featured both “new ticao and ancient wushu.” In the painfully short notice given them by Shenbao writers the next day, the participants were praised for their “tidy appearance and sharp movements ... [and for] adding not a little color to the Far Eastern Games.”

Their seems to have been only the third most popular performance at the Games. Perhaps the biggest news of these Games was the Far Eastern debut of women participants. The meet’s third day, following a spectacular airplane flyover, saw an amazing YWCA-led demonstration of some 800 women performing a mass calisthenics dance using the bodily motions of different sports like baseball, swimming, tennis, fishing, and tug-of-war! Women were not recognized as suitable or true international representatives who could actually engage in competition with women of other nations. But they were now allowed briefly to share the stage in this supporting role. What these women did represent was a new fit and healthy feminine ideal, as these dances and exercises were filmed for YWCA distribution into the Chinese interior. Even the omnipresent Boy Scouts, 1,400 of whom participated in the gala closing ceremonies, saw fit to include three Girl Scout troops from Suzhou and Shanghai. Girls and women were finally being permitted to take steps for the nation in the physical realm. But the martial artists were completely overshadowed, and had to settle for a very unbecoming (and perhaps feminized?) role of providing “tidy” and “colorful” diversions to what were now seen as the real physical arts of manly competition.

The once-proud martial arts also suffered from an acute internal identity crisis, as the few aficionados who remained were not even quite sure what to call it. Some stuck with the all-inclusive wushu, some used the term jiji (literally “skilled blows”), while others hoped to consolidate this vague entity under a national label, using the odd-sounding guoshu (“national arts”) or guoji (“national skill”).

The wushu community continued to be marginalized even further by the May Fourth tiyu elite, as these martial arts were diverse and inexact (and therefore nonsensical in the modern nation); perhaps it never even occurred to these modernizers that there even remained a wushu to ignore. Guo Xifen’s outline of the history of Chinese tiyu dedicates some twenty-one pages to Chinese boxing, alongside discussions of other ancient recreational activities like wrestling, archery, and dance. However, only seven of these pages cover post-Ming developments. After briefly describing the “bitterness and dedication” of Qing boxers, and listing the skills of five standout Qing masters, Guo’s discussion of “modern” wushu is confined to a mere list of the fifty-five brands of boxing and sixty-four of weapon-fighting in the Yellow River Valley wushu school, and the nineteen styles of boxing and nine of weaponry in the Yangzi Valley school. Gunsun Hoh, who could barely admit that there was even a ticao before his beloved tiyu, mentioned only, and just in passing, the skills of Jingwu master Huo Yuanjia. Instead, his twenty-eight-page chapter on “Chinese Games” ignored martial arts completely, seeing the Chinese tiyu tradition instead embodied in games like kite-flying, Squirrel Holes, Eagle Catches the Chick, and Catch the Puppies.

The existence of modern wushu was being written out of existence, actively denied and forgotten, as a new Western-style tiyu was being remembered into Chinese history. Wushu was simply too “Chinese” (or in other words, too backward), too unquantifiable for the new physical forms so important in the new Chinese nation. Martial arts would, in the late 1920s, reappear and be remembered as guoshu (and this initial forgetting, itself forgotten). The moment of this active reinvention and consolidation of the once-diverse wushu would form an important component of the China of that age, which was forced actually to fight off threats and disorders from within and without.

But the China of the early 1920s was one that did not have to be so martial, or even so “Chinese.” Things clearly not Chinese could become Chinese, and things clearly Chinese were scorned as “feudal,” shrugged off as “colorful,” or even forgotten completely. Such is the very arbitrary nature of creating the nation. However, if arbitrary, the process might actually seem somewhat predictable with the hindsight we now possess. Put simply, how many
other ways were there for nations-to-be to become so in the early twentieth century? Students of Chinese history now (rightfully) try to avoid assigning strictly reactive definitions to Chinese forms. But it seems hard to deny that the nation was a means to ending the unequal treaties and fighting imperialism in China, of winning respect from the strong nations of the world, and was so created in their image.

Later, a stronger and more confident Chinese nation could afford to experiment with new forms, as the PRC deliberately set itself in the 1960s as a model alternative to the Western nations for other developing peoples to emulate. This possibility did not exist for the early Republicans. If there were elements that we might classify as “foreign” in the Chinese tiyu of the 1910s, it should not strike us as somehow less properly “Chinese” than some ahistorical essentialist nationalism that we might project back onto and expect from that era. Rather, this historical episode should testify to the resourcefulness of Chinese nationalists working desperately to save China from what they saw as sure destruction. There is much that can be learned from a nation that wrote itself so skillfully as a mixture of consciousness of the old and knowledge of the new, transforming into agents of Chinese modernity inventions and ideologies of very un-Chinese traditions.

Notes

1 Cai He, "Minister of Sports Commission on Golf in China," China Sports 329 (February 1996), p. 6. This Commission is known in Chinese as the Guojia tiyu weiyuanhui. A recent television program shown in China explained other motivations for the new promotion of golf. Cao Jianzhong, President of the Beijing Hading Golf Training Club, expressed his hopes that his Club could “cultivate golfers to compete internationally, and demonstrate the strength of our nation.” “Tiyu baike” [Sports Encyclopedia], CTV5 television broadcast, 25 December 1996.

2 There are a few reasons for my pickiness. Firstly, there are problems raised by the English word “sport” and its unique range of meanings. The word, from the Old French “desport,” meaning “diversion, recreation, pastime, [or] amusement,” still carries with it a sense of idle fun or ostentation. Although “sport” is used by many contemporary Chinese scholars as an English term that can refer to physical activities ranging from chess to meditation to ancient archery rituals, I find the term a poor choice to translate the Chinese tiyu. “Physical education,” which would seem to be a direct translation of tiyu, is much too narrow to encompass the wide range of the term tiyu. The word “athletics” is a more attractive option, as it signifies a physical, competitive concept of recreation; however, its Greek roots relating to combat or prize contests share nothing of the concepts of “nourishment,” “uplift” or “education” that the Chinese character “yu” brings to the compound tiyu.

3 A notable exception would be tennis, the bourgeois and more individualistic roots of which later made it a decidedly un-yu activity in the eyes of PRC tiyu figures (who chose to ignore that the game had been quite popular in Communist base areas in the 1930s and 1940s).


8 Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, p. 67.

10 Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, p. 68.
13 Hao Gengsheng, “Tiyu,” pp. 2–3; Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, p. 82.
15 Yun Daiting, “Xueziao tiyu zhi yanjiu” [Research on physical education in schools], Qingnian jinbu (Association Progress) 4 (June 1917), pp. 2–3. This ticao vs. tiyu debate was not unique to China. In Germany, where the Turnerian military calisthenics were founded in the 1810s, nationalists were horrified by the introduction of modern sports in the late 19th century. Patriotic Turner warned against sports like soccer that were “as alien to German behavior as their name, for which there is no German word.” Dutch educators also saw sports clubs as a destructive “cancer.” Not as pressurised as Chinese later were to seize on “progressive” Anglo-American modes of culture, Europeans of the late 19th century could afford to privilege martial calisthenics over the new sports. Allen Guttmann, Games and Empires: Modern Sports and Cultural Imperialism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 46–47, 142–45.
16 Another article on physical education, published in New Youth just two months before by a young Mao Zedong under the pen name “28-brushstroke student,” would later be officially recognized as a tiyu Holy Writ, a primal inspiration for the physical movements of every Chinese person under the sun. However, despite the later glorification of this article, its value lies mostly in its representation of the standard liberal take on tiyu of the age; Mao’s idea that “the way of physical education is what makes possible an education in morality and wisdom” would not have seemed out of place in the inspired pep talks of any foreign missionary or YMCA track coach. Ershiba huasheng, “Tiyu zhi yanjiu” [Research on physical education], Xin qingnian (La Jeunesse) 3.2 (1 April 1917), p. 2. Even into the 1990s, this article is seen by some as setting down the “correct definition” of modern Chinese tiyu. Qiao Keqin and Guan Wenming, Zhongguo tiyu sixiangshi [The history of Chinese athletic thought] (Gansu minzu chubanshe, 1993), p. 231.
17 That is, until the fascist athletic movement of the early 1930s, when many students demanded that the missionaries teach these same military drills! Graham, “Exercising Control.”
18 Guo Xifen, Zhongguo tiyushi [The history of athletics in China] (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1919), Final preface pp. 1–2. When this work was published, the Suzhou native Guo (also known as Guo Shaoyu), was teaching tiyu history at Shanghai’s East Asian Physical Education Training Institute. He later went on to form (with Zhou Zuoren) the Literary Research Society at Beijing University.
20 But the Education Department did insist on the maintenance of elective military drill classes in schools. Hao Gengsheng, “Tiyu,” p. 5.
22 Shanghai tongshe, ed., Shanghai yanjiu, p. 444; Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, p. 69.
25 St. John’s University 1879–1929 (Shanghai: St. John’s University, 1929), p. 59.
26 Li Cimin, “Meixian zuqu yundong shihua” [Items from the history of the soccer movement in Meixian County], Guangzhou wenshi ziliao, pp. 164–65.
27 St. John’s University, p. 59.
This term “yundong” (literally “move-action”) adds another complication to the picture of physical culture in China. The large athletic meets are almost always referred to as yundonghui, although the activities that go on there are all called tiyu. This use of yundong comes directly from the Japanese undoo, and yundonghui from undookai, a term used for this same sort of meet in Japan since the 1890s.


Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, p. 73.

Shanghai tongshe, ed., Shanghai yanjiu ziliao xuj [More information on Shanghai research] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1984), p. 527; Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, p. 70.

For examples of this spirit of Social Darwinism, see writings of Ouyujia cited in Prasenjit Duara, “Provincial Narrations of the Nation: Centralism and Federalism in Republican China,” in Harumi Befu, ed., Cultural Nationalism in East Asia: Representation and Identity (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993), p. 12.

Shenbao, 19 October 1910, p. 1.6. This advertisement, which also ran on 12 October (p. 2.6) and 26 October (p. 1.6), was one of three different advertisements used by Dalong for their Cow Marrow product. The other two testify to the product’s use in curing myriad diseases or bringing color back to a smoker’s complexion.


Articles in 1907–08 Tiensin Young Men quoted in Chih-Kang Wu, Influence of the YMCA, p. 106.


In Shenbao: 15 October 1910, p. 1.4; “Quanguo da yundonghui zhi xiansheng” [Announcement of the National Games], 16 October, p. 2.3; 19 October, p. 1.3.

Hugh Moran Report to YMCA, quoted in Chih-Kang Wu, Influence of the YMCA, pp. 123, 125. A total of 140 athletes participated in these Games: 20 from Huabei, 28 from Huanan, 21 from Wuhan, 31 from Nanjing-Suzhou, and 40 from Shanghai.

This game, now known as zuqiu, was still new enough that people were not quite sure exactly what to call it. In one Shenbao article, it was referred to twice as cuqiu (“kick-ball”), this cu coming from cuju, an ancient Chinese game resembling soccer, and once as tiqiu (also “kick-ball”), “Quanguo da yundonghui zhi xiansheng,” p. 2.3. It is clear that there is identification here of the new Western-style soccer as being at least somewhat related to the ancient cuju.


“China is Getting Athletic,” Association Men 36 (March 1911), p. 243. This picture-perfect instance of achieving Chinese masculinity and modernity through sports, for some reason, is rarely mentioned in Chinese tiyu histories. But statistical records do show that Sun, competing for the Tianjin YMCA team in the intercollegiate division of the meet, set a Chinese record and captured first place with a 5-foot, 5 1/4-inch high jump. Sun’s earlier disappointing attempts can be accounted for as well; he earlier finished in third place in the high jump competing for North China in the sectional division, and won first place (but with a 4’11” mark) in the high jump in the middle school division. Sun also won four other medals for the North China and Tianjin YMCA teams in different shotput and long jump competitions. Liang Tian, Zhongguo tianjian fazhan jianshi [A simple history of the development of track and field in China] (Guangdong tiyu kexue yuansuo and Guangdong tiyu wenshi weiyuanhui, 1982), pp. 12–14.

See Gunsun Hoh, Physical Education in China (Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1926), pp. 95–96; Ping Shuiwen, Quanguo yundong dahui shi [The history of the National Games] (Shanghai: Shanghai tiyu shuju, 1934), p. 4; Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, pp. 99–100; Shanghai tongshe, ed., Shanghai yanjiu ziliao, p. 450.

“Lijie quanguo yundonghui huiishi” [A brief history of previous National Games], Di qi jie quanguo yundonghui jianshi shouce [Seventh National Games Commemorative Program] (Shanghai: Shenbaoguan, 1948).

For example, Wu Wenzhong’s 576-page book on the development of Chinese tiyu devotes seven lines to these Games. Tiyu fazhan, p. 99–100.


I would like to acknowledge Professor Takashi Fujitani’s help in bringing to my attention these concepts of a new type of national geography.
Opening speech by Forbes, “President” of the First Far Eastern Championship Games, quoted in Chih-Kang Wu, *Influence of the YMCA*, pp. 132–33.

Malay and Siam were also invited to join the Association in 1913, but never did. Unless noted otherwise, information on the First Far Eastern Games comes from: Gunsun Hoh, *Physical Education*, pp. 96–97; Chih-Kang Wu, *Influence of the YMCA*, pp. 130–33; Wu Wenzhong, *Zhongguo jin bai nian tiyu shi* [The history of Chinese athletics over the last century] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1967), pp. 92–93.

For instance, China’s three official administrative representatives to the First Far Eastern Games were Alfred Swan and F. R. Wilber of the Shanghai and Canton YMCA's, and Dr. Arthur Shoemaker of Qinghua University.

The FEAA's overture drew a quick response from many in the IOC, who too saw the Olympic movement as an integral part of the world nation-state system. The American IOC representative Sloane sent a congratulatory wreath to the FEAA in 1912 on the occasion of the upcoming First Far Eastern Games. The gift was accompanied by discouraging news fromler IOC, however; the FEAA's desire to call the upcoming competition the “Far Eastern Olympic Games” was not approved by the IOC, who were much more generous with their ideals than with their registered trademarks. The Far Easterners were also denied official IOC recognition until 1920.

Attendance was estimated at 150,000 over seven days at the first Games in Manila, and 100,000 over seven days at the Second Games in Shanghai. Gunsun Hoh, *Physical Education*, p. 108; J.H. Crocker, “100,000 People at the Far Eastern Championship Games,” *Association Men* 40 (August 1915), pp. 565.

Other evidence of the importance of Chinese “international” athletic success is presented by Xu Shaowu, who tells of great crowds flocking to a vacant area outside Nanjing to watch a 1914 soccer game between a Nanjing all-star team and a team of surrendered German sailors. The Nanjing team won, 2–1. Xu Shaowu, “Wo de huiyi,” p. 79.


The 21 Demands crisis endangered the Games themselves; after a prolonged domestic debate on whether a Japanese delegation would be sent to Shanghai, the Japanese athletes only arrived two days after the Games had begun. Ruan Weicun, *Yuandong yundonghui lishi yu chengji* [History and records of the Far Eastern Championship Games] (Shanghai: Qinfen shuju, 1933), p. 50. Fortunately for them, there were no competitions held the second day, Sunday the 16th, in this YMCA-run meet.


Most of the 2000 spectators in attendance for the Open Championships held on 21 May were Japanese. “Yuandong yundonghui di liu ri bisai jishi” [A Record of the Far Eastern Championship Games’ Sixth Day], *Shenbao*, 22 May 1915, p. 10.


“Yuandong yundonghui di yi ri,” p. 10; Page 1 advertisement, *NCDN*, 13 May 1915.


*Shenbao*, 22 October 1910, p. 1.3.

“Zui heyi zhi sui yi yundongfa” [The most suitable, appropriate type of exercise], *Jiaoyu zazhi* (*The Chinese Educational Review*) 3.3 (10th day, 3rd lunar month, 1911), p. 4.

Guoli Qinghua daxue ershi zhouian jinian kan, *In Commemoration of Tsing Hua 20th Anniversary* (Beiping: Guoli Qinghua daxue, 1931), “Recollections”
section. Writings in the Qinghua yearbooks confirm to this idea of Qinghua as a China unto itself. Kunming native Tao Zhenyuan (Class of '25) was known as the “Yunnan Barbarian (manzi);” his peers wrote that Tao “clings fast to his native custom of dressing without being the least assimilated by our T. H. civilization.”  

Tsinghopper 1924–25 (Beijing: Qinghua University), p. 65.

65 Su Xiongfei, “Wu si yundong qianhou wo guo tiyu de fazhan” [The development of athletics in China around the time of the May Fourth Movement], Tyu xuebao (Bulletin of Physical Education) 7 (December 1985), p. 72.


67 Guojia tiwei tiyu wenshi gongzuo riqian weiyuanhui, Zhongguo tiyu wenshi ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, pp. 8.

68 “Shanghai Dongya tiyu zhuankan xiaoshi” [The history of the Shanghai East Asian Physical Education Training Institute], Zhongguo tiyu wenshi zhili ziliao bianshen weiyuanhui, p. 70.


74 Mai Kele (C. H. McCloy), “Wo duiyu zhe yi ci kai Yuandong yundonghui di xiwang (What I Expect From the Coming Far Eastern Olympic Games),” Qingshan jinbu (Association Progress) 42 (April 1921), p. 3.


76 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?”, Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 19. The nearly three centuries of Manchu rule were of no use, as there could be no Chinese nationalism at this time that did not recognize the barbarism and fundamental un-Chineseness of the Qing rulers.


78 Guo Xifen, pp. 4–5, First Preface p. 1. This concept of a multi-millennium decline from the high point of Chinese tiyu became the accepted explanation. Gunsun Hoh referred to a decline of 3000 years, which places his peak in the late Shang dynasty! Physical Education, p. 34. Tang Leang-li referred to this period as a “2000-year deposit of misguided sloth” in Reconstruction in China (Shanghai: China United Press, 1935), p. 94. One Shenbao writer opined that Chinese athletic performance had been so poor over the centuries because “the people with free time, like officials, exam candidates, merchants, people with a family fortune but with nothing to do, were not even strong enough to bind a chicken.” Leng, “Yundonghui suoxia xizhong guominxing” [The citizenship I have seen at the Games], Shenbao, 2 June 1921, “The Far Eastern Olympic Games Supplement #4” section, p. 1.

79 Guo Xifen, Final Preface pp. 3–4, and pp. 109, 118, 137. Here is another instance of ambiguity in what these new games are called. In the Final Preface he refers to baseball as yeqiu (from the Japanese yakyuu), and later he refers in long-hand to yewai bangqiu, or (literally) “outdoor stickball.”


82 Leng, “Hegu you yundonghui” [Why we have athletic meets], Shenbao, 3 June 1921, “The Far Eastern Olympic Games Supplement #5” section, p. 1.

83 Mo, “Di si ri huichang suojian” [What I saw on the field on the fourth day of the meet], Shenbao, 3 June 1921, “The Far Eastern Olympic Games Supplement #5” section, p. 1; untitled item in same, p. 2.

84 “Yundonghui zhexun guojidang kaiti qiwaixun” [News on the radical party’s opening fire at the athletic meet], Shenbao, 6 June 1921, p. 10; “Yundonghui zhexun guojidang zhi zhuoxun” [Yesterday’s incident involving the radical party at the athletic meet], Shenbao, 7 June 1921, p. 10.

85 Wu Wenzhong, Tiyu fazhan, p. 84.
86 Lu Xun, “Sui gan lu (sanshiqi)” [Random Thoughts (37)], Xin qingnian (La Jeunesse) 5.5 (15 October 1918), pp. 514–15.


88 Lin Boyuan, “Zhongguo jindai qianqi wushujia xiang chengshi de yidong yiji dui wushu liupai fenhua de yingxiang” [The movement of martial artists to the cities and its influence on martial arts factionalism in early modern China], Tiyu wenshi (Sport History) 79 (May 1996), pp. 14–16.

89 Kuang Wennan and Hu Xiaoming, Zhongguo tiyu shihua [Items from the history of Chinese athletics] (Chengdu: Baodur shushe, 1989), p. 219; Wu Wenzhong, Jin bai nian, p. 40. In one version of the story the foreign bully is an Englishman, stirring up trouble in Shanghai’s brothels and pledging to “flatten any Sick Man of East Asia (DongYa bingfu)”, until Tongmenghui revolutionaries Chen Qimei and Nong Jinsun recruit the well-known Huo to bring an end to this humiliation. Jiang Zhihe, “Aiguo de Jingwu tiyuhui” [The patriotic Pure Martial Athletic Association], Shanghai tiyu shihua 30 (February 1991), p. 36.


91 Kuang and Hu, Tiyu shihua, pp. 220–21. The Association also held violin and piano classes, and had its own Cantonese Orchestra, Western String Orchestra, and Camera Club! Chen Tiesheng, ed., Jingwu benji [Record of the Pure Martial] (Shanghai, 1922 reprint), pp. 107–133.


93 Shenbao, 4 June 1921, “The Far Eastern Olympic Games Supplement #6” section, p. 2.


96 Wu Wenzhong explains the eventual decision to use the term guoshu, which he says was shorthand for Zhongguo wushu (Chinese martial arts). Many wanted a new nomenclature called “guo-something,” but the term guowu (“national martial”) “did not sound ideal.” Wu promises that the shu in guoshu is short for wushu and not just any other jishu (technique). But something is fishy here — the guoshu journal for which Wu writes translates the term guoshu into English as “National Gymnastics”! Wu Wenzhong, “Zhongguo wushu de pingjia yu gaijin fazhan de jujing” [The value of Chinese martial arts and the path of its development and evolution], Guoshu yuekan (National Gymnastics Monthly) 1.3 (1 March 1972), p. 3.

97 Guo Xifen, pp. 29–49.