
Ethics, a scholarly journal of social, political and legal philosophy published by the University of Chicago Press, added status to the discussion of animals' rights by featuring it in its January, 1978, issue. The lead article by Lawrence Haworth sets the analytical posture by distinguishing "rights for humans or non-humans" from "rights as guides for human behavior", a distinction particularly relevant to the philosophy of law.

Michael Fox (Queens University, Ontario) comes down entirely for the latter use of the term. Peter Singer (Animal Liberation) and Tom Regan ("The Moral Status of Vegetarianism") reply. While the debate is good reading, understandably there is no resolution, if only because contemporary ethics has made little progress out of the absolutist/pragmatist controversy which the phenomenologists, beginning with Nietzsche, attempted to bypass by placing it in the perspective of actual human existence.

Interestingly, one of the books reviewed in this same issue of Ethics was Stephen Clark's The Moral Status of Animals which, in a confusing way, almost says that some sort of non-Kantian and non-utilitarian solution to the nature of animals' rights is appropriate. This reviewer feels that Clark would move beyond Singer and Regan if he was less burdened by the need to frame his ideas in the perspective of Christian Thought.

Returning to the principal articles in Ethics (Vol. 88, #2), one might suggest asking certain questions when reading them. If three philosophers all decide to abstain from eating meat, but for different reasons--fear of bowel cancer, respect for life, and a rational balancing of interests, respectively--are all three of them equally "moral"? Secondly, do such questions have any meaning?

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