Descriptive Statistical Analysis of OSHPD Quality Inspections on California Hospital Projects

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California hospital construction projects are large, complex, and extremely difficult projects to execute and navigate successfully. One of the primary reasons for this is the OSHPD permit, review, and inspection process. The quality control rigor imposed by this third party inspection procedure has caused great angst amongst most general contractors and subcontractors. This study examined over 60,000 OSHPD inspections, spanning six California hospital projects and forty-one separate subcontractors. Specifically, this paper conducts descriptive statistical analysis on the total number of inspections conducted and the percentage of failed inspections (or re-inspections) that occurred. The analysis, conducted on major subcontractors working on significant California hospital construction projects, revealed that on average nearly 1500 inspections per subcontractor per project were conducted with an average overall re-inspection or failure rate of just over 9%. This is a directly measurable input to the cost of quality or rework. Benchmarking analysis was also conducted revealing that for all major subcontractors a best inspection failure performance of 2.02% was achieved and worst of 21.82% was observed. These kind of statistics are noteworthy as they are measurable data which could be applied to future projects and assist in decreasing inspection failures and the cost of quality.

Key Words: Quality, Subcontractors, Hospital Construction, Inspection Failures, Benchmarking

Introduction

It is well established that “the project cost, quality, safety, and duration are core elements that contribute to project success” (Wanberg, Harper, Hallowell & Ragendran, 2013, p.1). Three of these elements are fairly well understood, measurable, and clearly definable, but the term “quality” has continued to be treated with some ambiguity. The construction industry has always struggled with the term quality, partially because of an inability to properly define it (Love & Edwards, 2004). Quality is often related to characteristics or a degree of excellence or goodness. From this it can be presumed that “high quality” goes hand-in-hand with high material costs, esthetically pleasing design, or a high degree of functionality. But these are nebulous and subjective concepts, not easily quantifiable and dependent on the person’s point of view. Quality defined this way is mostly controlled by the design team and not the general contractor, who typically bids the job after the project design was completed.

Quality control (QC) is the consensus term for a construction inspection process which verifies the quality of construction projects. Crosby (1980) defined quality succinctly as the “conformance to established requirements”. If construction quality fails to meet the established criteria, applicable codes and contract document requirements, then additional resources must be spent (or wasted) on quality costs. Failed third-party inspections and the resulting direct cost of rework, termed deviations, has been one cause of unnecessary construction cost attributed to lack of quality or cost of quality (Love & Edwards, 2004). Alfeld (1988) advances the view that construction, due to its magnitude alone, promises a greater payback for performance improvement than almost any other industry. A small improvement in quality performance during the construction process could translate into billions of dollars of cost savings for the industry.

The purpose of this paper was to analyze a specific sampling of data which measured the actual quality performance (inspection success) of major subcontractors on large California hospital projects. This data was examined to help better understand the quantity of inspections a subcontractor could expect on future projects, the percentage of failed
inspections which might occur, and develop benchmark data used to measure a subcontractor’s level of inspection success against other subcontractors and projects.

**Subcontractor**

A subcontractor is a construction firm that “contracts with a prime contractor to perform some aspect of the prime contractor’s work” (Clough, Sears, and Sears, 2005, p.4). A large portion of the physical and billed work on most commercial construction projects (including hospital projects) is performed and accounted for by subcontractors (Hinze & Tracey, 1994). On commercial construction projects, general contractors have typically subcontracted to specialty subcontractors as much as 75% to 100% of the work (Schaufelberger & Holm, 2002). Because these specialty contractors have executed most of the tasks involved with a construction project, they have a significant impact on the project’s success or failure (Schaufelberger & Holm, 2002).

Despite this fact the “issues concerning subcontracting practice are seldom acknowledged and the ways to improve subcontracting practice are seldom discussed.” “Little research has been conducted and little information is published on this topic” (Arditi & Chotibhongs, 2005, p. 866). More efficient subcontracting (increased inspection success and reduced rework) would benefit all parties involved in the construction process including the general contractor, the owner, and the subcontractor (Arditi & Chotibhongs, 2005). Methods should be put in place which improve the chances of subcontractor success by ensuring that all aspects vital to a subcontractor go well (Boynton & Zmud, 1984).

**Hospital Construction**

The “Sylmar” earthquake in 1971 caused severe damage across southern California. It destroyed two hospitals causing the death of over 50 people. This event led to the passage of the Alfred E. Alquist Hospital Seismic Safety Act in 1973, which in turn led to the creation of the Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in 1978. All California hospital construction projects are subject to a separate design review and construction inspection process performed by the Facilities Development Division (FDD) of OSHPD. The FDD conducts plan reviews, issues building permits, confirms seismic compliance, performs construction inspections, and interprets regulations, building codes, and policies (OSHPD, 2013). Because of these regulations, hospital construction projects in California are highly scrutinized and are a rigorous ordeal for general contractors and subcontractors engaged in this building process.

Hospital construction costs have continued to increase even through the “great recession” of 2008 and 2009. From 2007 to 2008 alone, health care construction costs rose in all sectors of the health care construction industry; 2-3 story hospital project costs rose over 3% over that time (Carpenter, 2008). Jim Lott, executive vice president and spokesman for the Hospital Association of Southern California trade group, confirms the cost for building and rebuilding hospitals by “the state deadlines are causing all this construction to take place around the same time, which is causing a lot of challenges” and costs continue to go up (Crowe, 2008, p.4). In 2013 the square foot cost for health care facilities was over $400 per square foot according to R.S. Means (2013) a national construction cost estimating service. Other sources put it well above $450 per square foot. The need for an increase in quality and a corresponding decrease in schedule delays and cost overruns is vitally important to the California health care industry.

**Research Methodology**

This study mined existing third-party construction quality inspection data from the FDD through a proprietary inspection process tracking software. The intent was to document inspection success and failures on hospital construction projects in California at a subcontractor level. Existing data was extracted from the proprietary software and downloaded into MS Excel spreadsheets for further sorting and analysis. This data was gathered remotely and after-the-fact thus eliminating any form of bias and avoiding the Hawthorn effect. Three sets of data were discernable:

- Total number of inspections conducted per subcontractor.
- Total number of re-inspections (or failed inspections) per subcontractor.
- Total number of inspections and re-inspections per subcontractor over a common timeline.
The continuity of the data was validated by extracting data from six separate hospital projects, constructed in California, and all under the review and supervision of OSHPD. The construction projects were all completed between 2009 and 2014, varied in total construction cost between $260 million and $550 million, and ranged in total square footage of 300,000 to 650,000 square feet. No further information about the projects was provided in this paper to keep the identity of the projects and the project teams anonymous.

In all, OSHPD quality control inspection data was obtained and analyzed from forty-one (41) different subcontractors spanning the six different California hospital construction projects described above. See figure 1 for a breakdown of the forty-one subcontractors by trade, number in each trade, and designation reference number.

In order for an individual subcontractor on a project to be recognized as significant and used for this study, a minimum of 150 inspections conducted by OSHPD was established. Subcontractors who had less than 150 inspections were dismissed due to an insufficient number of data points. See figure 2 for a breakdown of the forty-one subcontractors selected, the hospital projects they worked, and the number of inspections conducted.

<table>
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<th>Hospital 5</th>
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<td>21. EL3</td>
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* FD7 exists because one of the six hospital projects used two framing and drywall subcontractors due to the size of the contract.

**Figure 1:** Subcontractors by trade, number (each), and designation

**Figure 2:** Subcontractors by project, designation, and number of inspections
Data Analysis and Results

Three categories of descriptive statistics were conducted with the data obtained from the proprietary inspection tracking software:
1. The total number of inspections conducted for each subcontractor.
2. The total number of re-inspections (or failed inspections) and when in the project they occurred.

Total Number of Inspections

A total of 61,070 OSHPD inspections occurred over the six hospital construction projects and the 41 subcontractors identified above. An average of 1,490 inspections were conducted per subcontractor per project. Major subcontractors on significant California hospital projects could generally expect nearly 1,500 inspections to occur on any particular project. This piece of data is probably not particularly useful knowing that the average number of inspections required for any particular trade would vary greatly. While more data points are desired, a particular subcontractor could benefit from figure 3 which identified the mean number of inspections required of a particular trade.

![Figure 3: Subcontractors by trade and mean number of inspections per project.](image)

Taking the analysis of that data one step further, the calculations above were then compared against the average total square footage and the average estimated initial total cost of those construction projects. The result of these calculations were reflected in figure 4 and 5 which show the likely number of inspections for each trade per total project square feet and per total dollars of estimated initial construction cost.
For example, a framing and drywall subcontractor on a significant California hospital construction project might expect one inspection for every 145 SF of building project and one inspection for every $122,153 of total construction cost. A subcontractor in one of these seven ‘major trades’ could reasonably estimate how many inspections a particular project might require by knowing the total estimated construction cost of the project and/or the total square footage of the building. This could be valuable information when estimating and/or bidding a subcontractor’s total cost of a significant California hospital construction project.

**Percentage of Failed Inspections**

The percentage of OSHPD re-inspections (or failed inspections), which was mined from the same proprietary software data base, revealed that 9.07% of all inspections conducted did not pass inspection or failed (see figure 6).
Figure 6: Total failed inspections, null inspections, and quarterly failed inspections.

The result of a failed inspection is that work has to be redone (re-work), a new inspection must be requested, and a re-inspection is conducted by OSHPD. These additional steps are the true cost of quality (COQ) for a California hospital construction project. The overall re-inspection percentage number is based on over 60,000 inspection attempts with a standard deviation of 5.559.

From the proprietary software database, OSHPD inspections and re-inspections were date stamped. Meaning they had a time element which was documented and recorded for each inspection completed and failed inspection recorded. This allowed for the failed inspection analysis to occur over time. Since each subcontractor had a different quantity of work and time to complete that work, the dates recorded were broken down into quarters. The total number of inspections and failed inspections for each subcontractor were broken down into 25% (1/4 - quarter) increments and compared against the percentage of failed inspections which occurred over that same quarter.

The results of the inspections and failed inspections time-line analysis were consistent but counter intuitive, increasing each quarter from an average of 6.38% to 12.16% (see figure 6). As the project team worked together longer and better understood what the OSHPD inspectors were looking for, it could have been anticipated that inspection failures would decrease as the work progressed instead of increase. Further investigation is needed to better understand this unexpected occurrence.

Benchmarking Analysis

The percentage of failed inspections was also compared against all other subcontractors surveyed, ranking high achieving (low percentage of re-inspections) and low achieving (high percentage of re-inspections) as shown in figure 7. The electrical subcontractor was broken-out in this figure to be used as a specific example.

Figure 7: Ranking of subcontractors by percentage of re-inspections (or failed).
Based on an internal benchmarking analysis, each individual subcontractor might conclude that the percentage of OSHPD inspection failures they obtained on a particular hospital project were “normal” and should be expected for future projects. The second part of figure 7 focuses on the six data points in the EL – Electrical category. Without divulging any subcontractor’s identity, EL1 and EL2 were the same electrical subcontractor. While this individual electrical subcontractor benchmarking analysis (from only two data points) might conclude that (7.23%) and an average (7.78%) re-inspection rates were conclusive benchmarks that could be used to measure and access future construction projects.

Continuing to use Barber (2004) conceptual progression nomenclature, competitor’s benchmarking transitions the analysis from an internal to an external analysis. In this case competitor’s benchmarking analysis represents all electrical subcontractors engaged in California hospital projects and the OSHPD inspection process. While this analysis only relies on six data points, electrical subcontractors best (2.18%) and average (7.72%) re-inspection rates could be used as better benchmarks for individual electrical subcontractors to measure future project inspection success against.

Industry benchmarking analysis includes all significant subcontractors working on California hospital construction projects. This analysis identified an overall best (2.02%) and average (9.07%) re-inspection rate which are likely the best benchmarks for subcontractors to measure future projects against. Further refining this benchmarking analysis based on a subcontractor work timeline and average inspection rate failures; 1st Quarter (6.38%), 2nd Quarter (7.98%), 3rd Quarter (9.76%) and 4th Quarter (12.16%) could also be beneficial for future comparison.

Conclusions and Future Research

Benchmarking results such as these would not only be useful to individual subcontractors on California hospital construction projects, but they would also be useful to general contractors, owners, and OSHPD inspectors. If the inspection failure rates were tracked from inception on a current project that data could then be compared against the 2%-7% of leading performer inspection failure rates and the 9.07% average failure rates. Non-conformance with benchmarks such as these could trigger project adjustments to bring inspection performance back within these norms. Field adjustments such as consistent drawing updates, communication routines, and quality assurance strategies (to name just a few) might be considered and implemented.

This type of inspection result data and industry benchmarking standards could also be used proactively as management incentive tools for field crews by the subcontractor main office, project general contractor and project owner. Essentially, either pitting subcontractor field crews against each other as a motivational tool in obtaining higher inspection success rates or consistently tracking and improving them over the duration of the project.

The potential for future research as a result of this work is significant. The old adage, which is generally attributed to Edward Deming “you can’t manage what you don’t measure” is the rudimentary goal of this study. Further individual trade inspection data points could be gathered to increase the certainty of these statistics. This data combined with a subcontractor survey could result in a predictive model to assist project teams, subcontractors, and field crews increase the probability of inspection success. This data combined with the true cost impact of failed inspections could be used to accurately estimate the cost of quality (COQ). The descriptive statistics contained in this study is a small step toward assisting California hospital construction project teams to decrease inspection failures and thus decrease the cost of quality associated with those failures.

References


