



23 CUSTODIANS OF (TRANS)NATIONALITY: METROPOLITAN JAKARTA, MIDDLE-CLASS PRESTIGE AND THE CHINESE

Abidin Kusno

Professor Terry McGee, an expert in Southeast Asian urban studies, in his recent article on the future of the Indonesian city, indicates that

"Indonesians now live in three main types of housing. The wealthy mostly occupied single-family houses in large developments on the edge of the cities, or high-rise apartments in the city core. The middle class, which now comprised a majority of the urban population, lived in smaller houses in suburbs scattered throughout the periphery of cities, and in upgraded 'kampung'-style houses within city boundaries. For the urban poor, the majority now live in legalized and upgraded squatter settlements, or in low-rise, walk-up, low-income housing."¹

Professor McGee's outline of the future of the Indonesian city is a very optimistic one. The "future" stratification of Indonesian society, in terms of the types of housing people are using, is seen as a natural outcome of a well-planned development, consequently accepted by all strata of the population and supposedly without any friction. This account, however, when examined across the memories of the nation-state and the ethnic tensions implicated upon class relations in the Indonesian "plural societies," has a special poignancy about it.² It gives us a pause to reflect on the processes of spatial segregation generated by ethnic and economic disparities, on the urban riots that recently explode into anti-Chinese violence in many urban centers of Indonesia, and on the ways the nation-state attempts to mend the increasing gap between social groups.³

Under this reflection, it appeared to me necessary to locate the "development" of the Indonesian city firmly within sociopolitical grounds.⁴ The present paper attempts to understand the construction of Jakarta as a modern metropolis from a cultural perspective of class and ethnic conflict. I attempt to show the way Jakarta is constructed as a modern metropolis by and for the emerging middle class who is trying to leave behind his/her "kampung" origin⁵ (Figure 1). Against the background of "modern" culture, the image of "kampung" has been represented as a space of the "poor" that is very much feared by the middle class who are afraid of falling.⁶ As a "negative" space, "kampung" becomes a powerful frame of reference for the city to imagine itself as a well-organized, clean and modern metropolis. Drawing from a recent study by Larry Chavis, an anthropologist of modern Southeast Asia,⁷ I extend this cultural construction of the modern city, under the prestige of the middle class, to the problems of national identity and issues of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

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Figure 1 “Kampung” with skyscrapers at the background.

Source: Hervé Dangla, *Belantara Jakarta*, Jakarta: Centre Culturel Français, 1996.

Flying Over Kampung: National Honor and the Middle Class Prestige

Anyone who has been to Jakarta will in one way or another, encounter a “traffic jam.” The “traffic jam” is perhaps one of the most popular memories and widely shared experience of Jakarta, a problem that always seems to exceed any proposed solution. As two columnists write:

“For all these years, no matter how often the authorities launch their orderly-traffic campaigns, no matter how many new rules and regulations are introduced and no matter how many new roads are built or enlarged, Jakarta’s traffic snarls continue to grow worse, almost by the day... Appeals are made for commuters to use buses, instead of

private cars, to commute to or from work. All to no avail, for reasons that must be obvious to anyone who has ever boarded a bus in Jakarta during peak hours... So, zones of restricted traffic are introduced around the city’s busiest business areas—the so-called “three-in-one” zones where, during morning peak hours, cars are prohibited from entering unless they carry at least two passengers besides the driver. In response, hordes of “jockeys,” street urchins who appear along the streets from seemingly nowhere, offer their services as momentary passengers to motorists intent on beating the law.”⁸

In this representation of Jakarta, the surplus of private cars and the excess of street urchins are complemented by the lack of discipline in law enforcement. The drivers mostly work in the formal sector of the city, using the highways and



Figure 2 Elevated highways at Tomang, Jakarta
Source: Tempo, June 22, 1991, p.32.

appropriating the excess of the nearby “*kampung*” youngsters who, in turn, gain extra income as passengers. In this way the urban excess is constituted both by the “*kampung*” youngsters as well as the riders in private cars who would perhaps have taken public transportation if not for its inefficiency.⁹ Excess, hence, is the contradiction of development that produces “inappropriate” activities according to the standard of a “modern” capital city.¹⁰ This surplus of population in the form of street urchins that “appear from nowhere” seems to be outside the spatial order of the city. It contributes to the predicament of Jakarta as a city saturated with “traffic jams” and “chaos.”

Perhaps as part of the response to this, in 1995 on the National Awakening Day, President Suharto launched the National Discipline Campaign which promotes discipline and orderliness, for they are “the foundation for a society that is modern and progressive.”¹¹ Following the President’s proclamation, more than 2,000 military personnel were distributed on the streets of the Jakarta area. The military was to “take action against anyone violating the city’s ruling on sanitation and order” and to “instill a high sense of discipline among the public.”¹² Along with this, 14,000 “volunteers” armed with clubs were mobilized to help prevent petty criminals and insure that pedestrians crossed the street properly so as not to interfere with traffic.¹³ In addition to this discipline and order, an underground expressway is declared to be built in Jakarta and the building of the elevated highways is to be accelerated.¹⁴

Central to the state’s concern about discipline and order is the overlapping, and not quite often conflictual, interests between the upper-middle-class Jakartans who are concerned with their identity, on one hand, and the government promotion of its ruling ideology of “development” on the other. At this juncture, elevated highways occupy a special position, not least because of their visibility, like a giant roller-

coaster stretching over the capital city (Figure 2). The elevated highways are not just a means for decongesting metropolitan Jakarta; they are also a “sign” of progress for a developmentalist regime that measures its achievement through the way the city is represented. Furthermore, they are considered a great achievement of the New Order’s technological capability and could therefore also be seen as a monument for the emerging middle class of Indonesia. As the “initiator,” Mrs. Rukmana (the eldest daughter of President Suharto), after reviewing this mega-project, points out

“We are not merely building elevated highways. We have built up the confidence and enthusiasm of the Indonesian contractor services sector in which case they have moved us a class upward. We have successfully accomplished a big task which before was thought to be impossible to be built by our nation.”¹⁵

As the city completes these, a new regime of visibility consolidates itself, altering the spatial experiences of commuters and pedestrians alike. Driving through the elevated highways suggests an experience of flying over the top of the city, escaping from its congested roads and leaving behind the lower classes who are routed through the crowded street at ground level. From this suspended driveway, the details of the urban fabric are transformed into a series of blurred sketches, giving a sense of detachment from the “worldly” street below.

The elevated highway is thus a system of representation that allows certain forms and spaces to be visualized and others to be concealed. It is a kind of fluency that the city provides to create a dream-state of upward mobility in order to overcome the contradictions of “development.”

The imposition of elevated highways can therefore be seen as a technique of resolving the urban chaos by adding another

layer of modern infrastructure to the existing sea of unsightly “*kampung*,” which the “city” seeks to negate. As part of the enforcement of law to overcome the lack of urban rationality, the elevated highways have therefore defined the “normal” and the “pathological” of the city. As such, the elevated highways could be seen as a metaphor of the mobility aspiration of Indonesian middle class against his/her “*kampung*” origin.

This “fear of falling” of the Indonesian middle class could be best illustrated in the discourses of private housing enterprise known widely in Indonesia as the “real estate.”¹⁶

Dream Home: The “Real” Estate and the “Imagined” *Kampung*

Inseparable from the discourse of elevated highways, the real estate constitutes a new identity for the emerging middle class by offering them an exclusive residential neighborhoods away from “*kampung*.” Starting on the periphery of Jakarta in the early 1970s, and expanding in the 1980s to the surrounding region of Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi, it seeks to represent the attraction of living in a new housing environment.

Urban dwellers involved in these developments since then have increasingly found themselves, in one way or the other, being represented in an idealized “home.” Targeted at the middle class or the citizens with some chance of upward mobility, housing exhibitions have been staged quite intensively in the metropolitan city of Jakarta, displaying a

discursive (re)construction of linguistic order that contrasts the “modern” house with the living conditions of the “*kampung*” as hierarchically lower.

For instance, the catalogue of the 1995 Ninth Housing and Interior Exhibition consists of forty-six advertisers (out of 110 participants); keywords in either Indonesian or English such as “location”, and “modern facilities” receive the most attention, followed by attributes of the built environment and its images.¹⁷ The three dominant factors that determine the value of a house in Jakarta, namely, location, availability of urban services (infrastructure), and security of tenure (having a registered title), have been carefully exploited by the private housing institutions.¹⁸ These qualities are those presumably outside the milieu of the “*kampung*.” We can see statements, in Indonesian, such as “your dream house with real estate facilities,” “live comfortably in a beautiful environment” and “modest house with the aura of real estate,” and so on. Furthermore, each “real estate” company inserts a location map depicting the propinquity of its housing project to the center of the city where access to elevated expressways is emphasized. The style of the houses are consciously supranational. Their names are in English. These extra-ethnic and supra-local identification are hinted to the transnationally-oriented clients. As a manager of a real estate argued:

“Today, clients want to be international, because of their extensive travels to Europe and the U.S. They are also highly influenced by television. They aren’t too keen on ethnic architecture... They want Mediterranean style, Los Angeles style and Beverly Hills styles...”¹⁹




Figure 3 Source: Kongres 35 tahun Pendidikan Sarjana sititektur di Indonesia, Jakarta: IAI.



Figure 4 Security guard of Kelapa Gading “real estate” housing

Source: Hervé Dangla, *Belantara Jakarta*, Jakarta: Centre Culturel Francais, 1996.

This process of knowledge and identity construction in “modern” Indonesia, deprived of any identification with the specific cultural space within the nation, can be seen as assuming a transnational connection, in one way or other, to the market place ideologies of the happy “first world.”²⁰ Yet the sublime imagination of the transnational conceptual space provided by the “real estate” for its potential consumers is presumably realized through the living memories of the “kampung” as well (Figure 3). Though the items promised are varied and the prizes are offered in accordance to the values that can be put on the house, they are all constructed around one basic market requirement: the promise of what an Indonesian architectural historian, has called a “street” architecture;²¹ a style of architecture that found itself drawn to the “street” of the “West,” as much as it measured itself against the “kampung” with which it exists side by side.

It is therefore plausible to say that the “real estate” industry attempts to construct a “modern” Indonesian, in relation not merely to “developed” countries but, most importantly, to the conditions in the “kampung.” The possibilities of escaping from the “kampung,” of entering or leaving the built-up area of the city takes the images of power, status, excitement of being located in the extended space of the “city,” in gated and guarded enclaves in a suburban landscape segregated by class.²² (Figure 4).

“Real Estate” or “Perumahan”: The Politics of Naming and the Chinese²³

As metropolitan Jakarta of the 1990s expanded to incorporate its neighbors, creating clusters of what are to be “self-sufficient” pools of suburbia, “baptized” in “English” phrases and installed with expensive hospitals, country clubs, schools, and huge areas of mall space, a curious decree was issued by the government. Approaching the 50th anniversary of Indonesia’s independence (August 17, 1995), the Ministry of Education and Culture ruled that the names of all housing estates, apartment buildings, office blocks and shopping malls be represented in bahasa Indonesia, the national language.²⁴ A lawyer, supporting the government agencies, described the matter in this way:

“In the business world today, one feels an increasing use of foreign terms while they are available in bahasa Indonesia. For instance, instead of using ‘real estate,’ one could use ‘kompleks perumahan,’ ‘puri,’ ‘wisma,’ and so on. Using Indonesian terms should be required in the world of education and business... To straighten up the order of language, force and harsh sanction should be applied to those who disobey. If still stubborn, the violator should please leave the Indonesian soil, because as a citizen we are required to follow the instruction of the government, including here the use of bahasa Indonesia as the language of everyday life.”²⁵

Compliance with the instruction was soon followed. Despite



Figure 5 Riot police prevent workers from entering Medan's industrial area as part of anti-Chinese violence in Sumatra. Source: Margot Cohen, "Days of Rage", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 1994, p.14.

costing considerable money, developers changed the names of their projects, from English into bahasa Indonesia. Lippo Village becomes "Lippo Karawaci," Sentul Highland becomes "Bukit Sentul," Citra Garden becomes "Perumahan Citra" and so on. A major developer declared:

"By using Indonesian names, it also shows that we, in the business sector, have a strong commitment to society, to be the pioneers in promoting the spirit of nationalism."²⁶

Behind this event, trivial in itself and of very uncertain usefulness, lay a long and far from trivial story. Questions of name dropping and changing, of foreign terms and bahasa Indonesia, of citizenship and national loyalty, of business and commitment to society and, most critical of all, the sense on the part of government agencies that un-Indonesian components have become increasingly visible in the city, are all caught up in what is considered to be a perennial problem of Indonesians of Chinese descent. The above "dialogue" between an indigenous professional and an Indonesian Chinese businessman was marked by a division, and ultimately, a resolution of what a "modern Indonesia" should be what it ought to look like in a time of a growing gap between the rich and the poor.

Indonesians of Chinese origin today constitute about 3% of the country's 200 million population, yet they are perceived as dominating the country's economy.²⁷ This has become even more controversial by the enormous physical transformation of the city, in which about 60,000 hectares of land for housing, located on the outskirts of Jakarta, is reported to be controlled by ten large developers, mainly of ethnic Chinese background.²⁸ The Minister of Housing was

disturbed not only by the scale of private land ownership but also by the fact that these developers tend to sell lands merely to speculators or otherwise, to build luxurious houses for the comparatively small number of middle- to upper-class Jakartans.²⁹ This practice far from conforms to the ideal of the privatization of the housing industry which, according to the Minister of Housing,

"should be to create housing areas occupied by various groups of mixed professions, economic levels, and social status, based on togetherness and mutual aid."³⁰

But in the consuming eyes of capitalist modernity, cheap houses do not make profits and "could be an eyesore for the modern, prestigiously designed compounds."³¹ To promote image and social prestige, many of the satellite towns were "baptized" with foreign names and phrases, a representation of exclusivity for the upwardly mobile class.

The cultural orientation of these developers is neither rural nor "national." One might argue that they merely represent the other side of nationality, namely, a desire to pursue material progress like their "foreign" counterparts.³² Yet, when we look across the historicity of the Indonesians of Chinese descent who control a major portion of the housing industry, their temporal and spatial imagination of Indonesia could hardly be anything other than supralocal.³³ In 1967, after the collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party, accused of having close political ties with China, the New Order of Indonesia banned public representations of Chinese cultural events. Aiming to build Indonesian official nationalism to foster assimilation with the indigenous people, Chinese schools were shut down and the use of Chinese characters in public was made taboo.³⁴ A logical outcome of this is that

the private business initiatives of this group makes the Euro-American suburb, with its common transnational living style, its defining feature. The source of inspiration for this and the models of representation for their housing industries are supranational. For the dream of Ciputra, the largest real estate developer of Indonesian of Chinese descent,

"(It is) the world (that) inspires us... All the beauty and harmony in this world are the sources of inspiration to create and innovate special designs that will enable people to enjoy a more colorful and joyous life.³⁵"

Yet, as this idea of the "world" city becomes ever more luminous and more absorbing in the sprawl of modern urban life, it becomes increasingly significant as a cultural aspiration of only a particular class. English, as used to represent the aspirations of "modern Indonesia," connotes an international flavor in which only the emerging middle class has a chance to really make use of it. It thus connotes an essential class difference in Indonesia.³⁶ The widening income gap and the long history of the society's resentment of the Chinese transposes the staging of whatever is "foreign" (such as the English language) into a symbolic representation of Chinese domination over Indonesian society.

The increasing gap between the rich and the poor thus extends into anti-Chinese riots that have become increasingly significant since the 1980s (Figure 5).³⁷ In 1984, weeks before the commemoration of Independence Day, the commander of the armed forces called on the nation to stop using the term "pribumi" (indigenous) and "non-pribumi" (for the Chinese).³⁸ Part of this idea of assimilation is to make invisible the ethnic component of the social-economic tension. Following this, many Indonesians of Chinese descent dropped their Chinese names to avoid discrimination and to "publicly" represent themselves as national subjects.

The aesthetic and moral reaction by the municipality to "foreign names" appearing in the cityscape as offenses against nationalism thus overlaps with the masking of "Chinese identities" in Indonesia. By containing them under an "Indonesian" name, a sense of national integration is supposedly felt, social inequity blurred, and discrimination concealed. The campaign against "foreign" representation is, in a strange way, also a protection against the exposure of the "real" conditions of its existence. Nevertheless, the changing of a name (of the real estate) also puts under pressure the cultural assumptions that development is without contradictions.

Notes

¹ Terry McGee, "The Future of Urbanization in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia." *Third World Planning Review*, 16, 1, 1994, p. ix.

² The notion of "plural societies" was first used by John Furnivall to describe a society in which groups met in the

market place, but were separated from each other by his/her living and working spaces. See: John Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 446-469.

³ For an earlier account of the relations between the built environment and the class structure of Southeast Asia, see: Hans-Dieter Evers, "Ethnic and Class Conflict in Urban South-East Asia." In *Sociology of South-East Asia*. Hans-Dieter Evers (ed), Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 121-124.

⁴ The notion of "development" here means "pembangunan," an ideological keyword of President Suharto's New Order that is essentially based on modernization theory but conducted under an authoritative traditional-like polity. For an account of "pembangunan," see: Ariel Heryanto, "The Development of 'Development,'" translated by Nancy Lutz, *Indonesia*, 46, 1988, pp. 1-24.

⁵ "Kampung" here means "the residential area for lower classes in town or city." See: John Echols and Hassan Shadily, *Kamus Indonesia-Inggris*, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990, p. 258. The same term is also often used to designate a small rural settlement. The linkage of urban "kampung" to the small rural settlement has given rise to a colloquial understanding of "kampung" as "hometown", "native village." The notion of "kampung-an" therefore means "to have no taste, no class", "a country bumpkin", "not like a lady or gentlemen." See: *Kamus Ungkapan Indonesia-Inggris* by Hadi Podo and Joseph Sullivan, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1986. According to Darrundono, an Indonesian town planner, 70 % of the population of Jakarta lived in "kampung" which has an "official" area of only 20 % of the whole city. See: Darrundono, "Penanganan Kampung Pengharapan," *Sketsa*, 06/09, 1991, pp. 76-81. However, "kampung" as a genre consists of various types, ranging from a permanent structure of the middle class to the often force-demolished temporary squatters. For a summary of various types of "kampung," see: Larry Ford, "A Model of Indonesian City Structure," *Geographical Review*, 83, 4, 1993, pp. 374-396. My use of "kampung" here is both "real" and metaphorical. Represented by developers as the space of the "non-modern," "kampung" becomes a trope in which the real estate housing qualifies itself as "modern."

⁶ The notion of "middle class" is hard to define. There is a range of possible meanings of the term middle class. I use it to identify what is loosely called the "consumer class." According to Howard Dick, who takes the 1978 per capita expenditure data as the background, the middle class of Indonesia earned Rp. 15,000 permonth. In this account, the middle class of Indonesia is composed of only 16,6 % of the urban population of Java. See: H. W. Dick, "The rise of the middle class and the changing concept of equity in Indonesia: an interpretation." *Indonesia*, 39, 1985, pp. 71-92. For a discussion on Indonesian middle class, see: Richard Robinson, "The middle class and bourgeoisie in Indonesia," in *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile phones*,

- McDonalds and middle class revolution*. Richard Robinson and David S.G. Goodman (eds), London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 79-101.
- ⁷ Larry Chavis Jr., "Hiding English, the Money, and the Chinese: Building Unity Through Language and Discipline," MA Thesis, Asian Studies: Southeast Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University, August 1997.
- ⁸ Hartoyo Pratiknyo and Rita A. Widiadana, "Jakarta badly needs modern transit system," *Jakarta Post*, January 8, 1995, p. 1.
- ⁹ See also a discussion of Manila from which some of the insights in this paper are drawn, Neferti Tadiar, "Manila's New Metropolitan Form," *Differences*, Fall, 5, 3, 1993, pp.154-178. In this article, Tadiar demonstrates the multiple ways in which the urban form of metropolitan Manila inserts itself into metropolitan lives. The infrastructures of the city, while dominating the cityscape, are subjected to the appropriation of the population.
- ¹⁰ Recent postcolonial studies have made us aware of this contradictory aspect of the "transfer of technology". Homi Bhabha has argued that the emergence of "modernity" in the late nineteenth century as a sign of Western power constituted the "colony" as an object of modernist discourse, but the very enactment of this process also displaced the representation of its Western domination. See the collection of Homi Bhabha essays in *The Location of Culture*, N.Y.: Routledge, 1994, especially chapter 4, 5, and 6. For the discourse of built environment, see: James Holston, *The Modernist City*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. Holston demonstrates how the deployment of "Western" modernity through the architectural modernist discourse in order to appropriate the postcolony also produced an "inappropriate" transformation. "Once constructed (the modernist architecture and urban planning project) constituted something very different from their imagined city." *ibid*, p. 96.
- ¹¹ "Presiden Suharto Canangkan Gerakan Disiplin Nasional," *Kompas*, May 21, 1995, p.1.
- ¹² "Military launches discipline program," *Jakarta Post*, May 24, 1995, p. 3.
- ¹³ Budi Winarno et al, "Disiplin Nasional: Tertib Bersama Kader Berompi," *Sinar*, December 9, 1995, p. 83.
- ¹⁴ The speeding-up of the flyover projects to catch up with the event recently caused a catastrophe when part of a semi-constructed, 500-ton overpass collapsed in West Jakarta at the beginning of a working day killing at least four workers and injuring 18 others. See: *Kompas and Jakarta Post*, March 23, 1996.
- ¹⁵ Siti H. Rukmana, "Teknologi Penghemat Biaya" summary from "Mendobrak Kultur Pesimis," in *Pengalaman Membangun Jalan Layang Tol Cawang-Priok, Jakarta*. English citation from *45 Years Public Work Department*, Jakarta: Public Work Department, 1990, pp. 238-39.
- ¹⁶ For an interesting study on the American middle class, see: Barbara Ehrenreich, *Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class*, New York: Harer Perennial, 1990.
- ¹⁷ The housing exhibition has become an important arena for agencies involved in marketing, consulting, information services and the production of architectural knowledge. The year 1994, for instance, witnessed no less than 88 housing exhibitions in major cities of Indonesia, varied in scale, but with similar subject matter. See: *Katalog Pameran ke-9 Rumah dan interior 1995*, (catalogue of the Ninth Exhibition on Housing and Interiors 1995), Jakarta Convention Center, 13-21 January 1995.
- ¹⁸ These three factors: location, infrastructure, and legality are paramount for the valuation of a residential plot in Jakarta, see Michael Leaf and David Dowell, "The Price of Land in Jakarta," *Urban Studies*, 28, 5, 1991, pp. 707-722.
- ¹⁹ "RI enters Post-mo in architecture," *Jakarta Post*, Sunday, March 16, 1995, p. 1.
- ²⁰ Michael Leaf, "The Suburbanisation of Jakarta: A Concurrence of Economics and Ideology," *Third World Planning Review*, 16, 4, November 1994, pp. 343-356.
- ²¹ Josef Prijotomo, "Tampang Arsitektur Jalanan dan Arsitektur Kampung" (The Faces of Street Architecture and 'Kampung' Architecture), lecture given at PPIA, Surabaya, May 25, 1984.
- ²² For a recent discussion on fortified spaces as an outcome of social inequality, see: Teresa Caldeira, "Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation," *Public Culture*, 8, 1996, pp. 303-328.
- ²³ I am indebted to Larry Chavis Jr. for the insight and references of this section. See: Larry Chavis Jr., "Hiding English, the Money, and the Chinese: Building Unity through Language and Discipline," 1997.
- ²⁴ Emily Thorton, "Name Dropping," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 158, 29, July 20, 1995, p. 74.
- ²⁵ Purwanto Setiawan, SH, "Selamat Tinggal Istilah Asing," *Gatra*, June 17, 1995: p. 8 (my translation).
- ²⁶ James Riady, "Lippo Group Hails Nationalism," *Indonesia Business Weekly*, 3, 26, June 12, 1995, p. 35.
- ²⁷ The misleading idea that all Chinese are rich and that they all become rich through a collusion with government officials at the expense of indigenous people has caused endless tension among many people. This knowledge has also been used by the leaders of the state to control the

- Chinese by routinely unleashing society's deep resentment as a way to remind them of their precarious position.
- ²⁸ The country's ten giant developers control up to 70% of land for housing projects in the Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi (Jabotabek) area. See: "The New Suburbia: Chasing the Indonesian Dream," *Economic and Business Review Indonesia*, 156, April 8, 1995, p. 8. See also: "Gonjang-Ganjing Bisnis Property" (Ups and downs of the property business), *Info Business*, 32nd edition, Year II, 16 July 1996. This issue of *Info Business* has a listing of 20 of the largest property and real estates companies, of which at least 18 can be recognized as owned by ethnic Chinese (pp. 60-61). Ranked according to assets, the seven owners at the top are recognizably ethnic Chinese. The structure of the housing industry in Indonesia thus parallels the structure of Indonesia's private capital in general. Here, the wealthy Chinese and the indigenous capitalist, benefitted from close association with the president's family and the patronage of government officials. These two groups are by no means independent of one another. Their operations are tied together by an intricate network of joint ventures and financially related companies. However, it is plausible to say that investment in housing industry is dominated by Indonesians of Chinese descent.
- ²⁹ "Will the Bubble Burst?" *Economic and Business Review Indonesia*, 141, December 24, 1994, pp. 6-15.
- ³⁰ Akbar Tandjung, "New Towns and Satellite Cities: Problems and Prospects," *Indonesia Property Report*, 1, 2, 1995.
- ³¹ "The New Suburbia,," *Economic and Business Review Indonesia*, 156, April 8, 1995, p. 6.
- ³² Partha Chatterjee argues that the cultural forms of imagining the nation by the nationalist elite are conducted through a separation of culture into the material and the spiritual domains. The very separation offered nationalism a hybrid character. The supposedly "uncontaminated" spiritual domain, instead of opposing materiality, initiated material progress along the trajectory of its "foreign" counterpart. See: Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, Chapter 2.
- ³³ The identity formation of Chinese in diaspora, according to Aihwa Ong, should be understood in intersecting national and transnational political arena. For a recent discussion on cultural representation of "overseas Chinese," see "On the Edge of Empires: Flexible Citizenship among Chinese in Diaspora," *Positions*, 1, 3, 1993, pp. 745-778. Also: Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (eds), *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, London: Routledge, 1997. For a recent collection on the historical background of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Anthony Reid (ed), *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1996.
- ³⁴ "Chinese New Year is a family affair," *Jakarta Post*, February 18, 1996: 1. To this date, they are kept away from official involvement in political forum but promoted to engage in the mobilization of national and transnational capital. The negation of the political cultures of the Chinese came hand-in-hand with the utilization of their capital.
- ³⁵ Advertisement page of Ciputra, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 22, 1997, p. 51. In her observation of the cultural orientation of the Indonesian businessmen of Chinese descent, Mely G. Tan indicated that Ciputra, among others, pays serious attention to "Feng Shui" (Chinese art of Geomancy). The norms of "Feng Shui" may have gained considerable influence in the Indonesian real estate business, but the forms in which it is publicly represented is "western," instead of explicitly "Chinese." For a discussion on the influence of "Feng Shui" on the business of ethnic Chinese, see: Mely G. Tan, "Feng Shui and the Road to Success: the Persistence of a Traditional Belief System in the Face of Market Expansion," paper presented at the 3rd Seminar on "The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Market Expansion," organized by the Goethe Institute in cooperation with the University of Bielefeld and Gajah Mada University, held in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, August 26-27, 1996. I would like to thank Wastu Pragantha for this reference.
- ³⁶ The convergence of "English" and "Chinese" was most clearly represented in the recently built new elite school of Pelita Harapan, built as part of the Lippo Village. It provoked debate as it became the "favorite" school of many of the rich Chinese families, among others, since the youngest students will spend up to 80 % of their time speaking English. See Margot Cohen, "Eton of the East: Elite School Raises the Hackles of Nationalists," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 22, 1993, p. 20, 22.
- ³⁷ For a recent upheaval against the Chinese following the financial crisis in Indonesia, see: Margot Cohen, "'Us' and 'Them,'" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 12, 1998, pp. 16-17; For some other occasions see, Margot Cohen, "Under the Volcano," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 13, 1997, pp. 42-46; John McBeth and Margot Cohen, "Tinderbox," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 9, 1997, pp.14-15; Pete Engardio, "Tremors in Jakarta," *Business Week*, August 12, 1996, pp.42-43; Margot Cohen, "Days of Rage," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 28, 1994, pp.14-15; Susumu Awanohara, "Bombs in Chinatown," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 18, 1984, pp.18-19; William Branigin, "Indonesia's Chinese Fear Prejudice," *The Washington Post*, December 10, 1982, p. E 8. Paul Zach, "Indonesians Reflect Area Hostility Toward Ethnic Chinese," *The Washington Post*, June 3, 1980, p. A 12. For the earlier sequence, see J.A.C. Mackie, "Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia," in J.A.C. Mackie (ed), *The Chinese in Indonesia*, London: Nelson, 1976; see also, Anthony Reid, "Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State," in Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (eds), *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation*

of Southeast Asia and Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp. 33-71.

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