


Those persons, including some students, who spoke on behalf of the substitute policy urged that this approach be viewed as a timely challenge in the best tradition of American higher education. In this tradition, students are allowed to benefit from the better and newer teaching models and techniques at their disposal. They are thus encouraged to learn well, and at the same time, to develop fully into the human, civilized beings which they have it in them to be.

References

Francione, Gary L. and Anna E. Charlton. *Vivisection and Dissection in the Classroom: A Guide to Conscientious Objection*. (Jenkintown, PA: The American Anti-Vivisection Society, 1992).

"Senate Debate on Rights and Responsibilities of Students in Courses Using Animals." *The Faculty Voice*. University of Maryland at College Park, Spring 1990.



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WE ARE TOO....

Did you know that philosophers have also made a contribution to the growth of the animal liberation movement? — Think of Regan, Singer, Clark, Magel, Rollin and Sapontzis.

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**PHILOSOPHICAL ACTIVISM
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**Bill,
 Why
 Do
 You
 Stare
 at That Dog as if
 He Could Tell You
 Something?**

Bill Kaul
University of Mississippi

However you look at these animals, even if the animal is up against the bars, less than a foot from you, looking outwards in the public direction, *you are looking at something that has been rendered absolutely marginal;* and all the concentration you can muster will never be enough to centralise it. Why is this?

Looking, John Berger, p.22

Consider.
I look at my dog, and I see that he is looking at me. There is a space of air across which we are looking at each other.
I cannot know what is being seen by him as he looks at me.
What he sees, whether he thinks about the sights, if he is reifying the abstraction of "human" and feeling himself as subject, or if the picture he sees is just so many retinal impulses being coordinated, I cannot know.
He cannot say.
I know that I am looking at him, and I am aware of thought.
But I do not know where that thought is coming from.

"My" dog, a "pet," named "Bowser," where are these attached to reality?

When I look closely at his eyes, he seems to be thinking. But what does "thinking" mean?

As Wittgenstein said, if my dog *could* speak English would I understand him?

Our worlds would be so different that a common language would be useless in describing what we see to each other.

But I wish to make them the same, marginalizing his. We are looking across fear, as Berger says.

And I assuage that fear by framing it.

Framed in spaces, or walls, or fences, or bars

Or words.

Once framed, it can safely be interpreted.

Or "appreciated."

Trapped, at any rate, managed.

I am trapped by words; alone, I use these words only to frame my fear.

Words comfort and distort.

But apparently I can step back and see this

Or do I only hint at it?

Can I feel the same way about this gulf of ignorance once I "word" it?

What would set me free from words?

What would let me see as I would have seen in a "natural" state? [Rousseau]

What would I do with the seeing?

It does not seem possible, yet I believe [I "know"] I have been there.

But what do I mean by "seem" and "believe"?

It's as if I said, "I am *certain* that one day I will die."

What is certainty of this sort, or of the sort where I say, "I felt as if I was going to die."

What do I mean by "felt as if"?

Have I anything to compare it to, to make it certain or at least empirically probable?

It *seems* I do.

By "seeming" I might mean that there is a referent that I cannot reify, so it only *seems* there.

But if I would frame fear with words, why not this seeming referent?

What is this gulf that separates the "seeming" referent and the feeling of knowledge?

It is not fear.

Or it is at least not fear of the same sort as the fear I look across at an animal of another species.

It is unframeable.

A fear of being?

Being looks across at the one other which can only safely be "seeming," and Being "sees" there Not-Being. Not-Being which cannot be reified any more than Being can be deontologized.

But am I looking at it now, as a series of events, a Jamesian "stream"?

How can that be?

Isn't time then a frame?

And it shouldn't, then, surprise me that words are in time.

So words themselves, as on this paper now, are evidence of the struggle to frame Not-Being and to reify Being.

Or so it *seems*.

Anyway, you wanted to know why I'm always looking at animals. Why I look at Bowser as if he could tell me something, for instance. Perhaps this helps explain.... or not.

