


# A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism

Nicholas Dixon  
Alma College



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## 1. Types of Opposition to Vegetarianism

Although supporters of vegetarianism (and animals' interests in general) come in many varieties, we may distinguish two groups. First, utilitarians such as Singer base their argument on the suffering that factory farming causes to nonhumans and the absence of comparable benefits to humans.<sup>1</sup> Second, the animal rights view, as expressed by Regan, extends Kant's respect for persons principle to include nonhumans and argues that meat eating wrongly treats nonhumans merely as means.<sup>2</sup>

Similarly, I find it useful to distinguish two types of defense of meat eating. My division is based on how each group responds to Singer's demand that we extend the equal consideration of interests principle<sup>3</sup> to include nonhumans and to his parallel between speciesism and, on the other hand, racism and sexism. Some grant Singer's premise that nonhumans do deserve equal consideration of interests, but they argue either that animals actually *benefit* from being raised on farms or that their suffering is outweighed by human gains. Others, paralleling Regan's rights approach, reject utilitarian calculations of interests. However, they argue, in direct opposition to Regan,

that animals' interests are qualitatively less important than those of humans or even that animals' interests are not morally significant at all. While we should not gratuitously cause them suffering, we may use them as we wish in order to benefit ourselves. In contrast to utilitarian defenders of meat eating, I call this second group "human supremacists."

My goal in this paper is to argue that neither type of defense of meat eating is successful against Singer's utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. Instead of attempting a comprehensive response to all defenses that fall into these two categories, I will focus on what I consider to be the most powerful, representative ones. I have confined myself to Singer's argument for the strategic reason that it requires only that we extend moral concern to all sentient beings. Sceptics are more likely to grant this premise than they are to accept Regan's persuasively argued but more controversial view that all animals have an intrinsic value that may not be sacrificed in the course of utilitarian calculations.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. Utilitarian Defenses of Meat Eating

In this section, I am interested in those who try to justify meat eating on Singer's own utilitarian terms. They agree, that is, that to attempt to justify meat eating by simply asserting that humans are superior to nonhumans is speciesist and that it is incumbent on them to explain



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how human gains from meat eating outweigh non-human suffering. I will focus mainly on R.G. Frey's justification of meat eating in his book, *Rights, Killing, and Suffering*.<sup>5</sup> Frey takes Singer's challenge seriously and gives a careful, detailed response.

Frey defends the strategy of the "concerned individual," who continues to eat meat but tries to reform farming techniques in order to eliminate cruelty to farm animals. He argues that Singer's demand for the end of factory farming is based on the implausible "single experience" view of suffering: meat eating is wrong if it causes any suffering at all to farm animals. Frey proposes that we adopt instead the "miserable life" view of suffering, according to which we may be justified in causing animals some pain in order to raise them for food, as long as we ensure that their lives are on balance more pleasant than painful. He points out that the "single experience" view of suffering would almost certainly have the absurd consequence that raising human children would also be wrong, since it would be practically impossible to eliminate all suffering from their lives.<sup>6</sup>

Frey is correct when he argues that the "miserable life" view of suffering is superior to the "single experience" view. However, his argument neglects a third option that is more salutary than either of the ones he considers. I will call this third option the "minimal suffering" view. Granted, the "single experience" view is too stringent, but his "miserable life" view has the opposite fault of being too lenient. It is itself vulnerable to a *reductio*: it would justify even the gratuitous infliction of suffering on our children, as long as the suffering is just barely outweighed by the pleasure they experience. Far more plausible is my "minimal suffering" view, which permits the infliction of suffering only when doing so prevents even greater suffering or when it is a deserved punishment for past behavior. Abusing children (while carefully ensuring that their overall happiness outweighs their suffering) is repugnant, because it does not serve any legitimate punitive purpose or prevent even greater long-term suffering, either for our children or ourselves. Similarly, the suffering caused to animals when we raise them for meat is justified only if they deserve it (which is clearly not the case) or if it helps to prevent even greater suffering. Consequently, the burden is on Frey to show what the benefits of continuing to raise animals for meat are and how they outweigh the suffering caused to animals.

Frey argues that the concerned individual's tactic is sufficiently effective in reducing animals' suffering to justify continuing to raise animals for meat. Throughout his book, Frey takes advantage of a concession that Singer makes: the equal consideration of interests principle does not necessarily condemn all meat farming, since animals raised on free range farms (and, we may suppose, on the kind of reformed farms that Frey proposes)<sup>7</sup> may avoid much of the suffering for which Singer condemns factory farms. However, Singer questions whether even free range farms would reduce animals' suffering to a level that would be outweighed by humans' gains and whether, even if they did so, they would be economically feasible.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, he points out that the pertinent issue is whether we may eat *today's* meat, most of which is raised on factory farms.<sup>9</sup> In any event, even if Frey were able to show that the concerned individual's tactic and vegetarianism would have equally good consequences for the animals, his argument for continuing to raise animals for meat would still depend on showing that doing so would have better consequences for humans than vegetarianism.

Before we turn to Frey's answer to this challenge, let us examine another utilitarian defense of meat eating that goes even further than Frey's and argues that our practice of raising animals on farms benefits the animals themselves. Farm animals have become domesticated, so the argument goes, and would be unable to survive in nature, were we to set them free. If exposed to life in the wild—bitter winters, savage predators, etc.—farm animals would be likely to die slowly and painfully from starvation, or quickly and savagely at the hands of wolves and bear. As long as we follow Frey's concerned individual's tactic and reform our farming practices to give animals long and peaceful lives, we are actually doing them a favor. A life that is overall pleasurable, even though it might contain some pain, is preferable to no life at all, which is the likely consequence of ending meat farming.

This "animal husbandry" argument can draw support from an unexpected source: J. Baird Callicott's defense of a "land ethic." He criticizes supporters of animal rights for ignoring the vital distinction between wild and domestic animals.<sup>10</sup> He argues that none of the likely outcomes of our ceasing to raise animals for meat are favorable to the animals themselves. Unused to fending for themselves in competition with other wild animals, domestic animals are likely to become extinct, and we might consider it more humane simply to allow

existing farm animals to die peacefully on farms than to put them at the mercy of predators. Callicott comments on the irony of the liberation of domestic animals resulting in their extinction.<sup>11</sup>

I follow Bart Gruzalski in biting the bullet in response to this *reductio ad absurdum* argument.<sup>12</sup> The discontinuation of meat farming will likely result in the *replacement* of domestic by wild animals. But this is an advantage, since it will result in an *increase* in the total amount of pleasure experienced by nonhuman animals. First, even if the adoption of Frey's concerned individual's tactic makes domestic animals' lives pleasurable, this pleasure will be replaced by that of the additional wild animals that will flourish on the land previously used for grazing on farms.<sup>13</sup> Second, wild animals live *more* pleasurable lives than domestic ones. Gruzalski points out that no amount of modification of our current farming practices will eliminate the frustration of animals' natural urges and instincts, in terms of movement, social organization, and diet. Thus, it isn't clear that animals raised in the manner proposed by Frey's "concerned individual" have lives that are on balance pleasurable. In contrast, while wild animals can indeed suffer painful "natural" deaths from predators, these deaths at least avoid the additional terror caused by the unfamiliar environment of the slaughterhouse. And some wild animals die peacefully of old age, thus avoiding any terror at all.

We still need to address another of Callicott's objections, which is also based on the distinction between domestic and wild animals. Arguments (such as Gruzalski's) that claim that meat farming frustrates animals' "natural desires" neglect the fact that "human artifacts" such as domestic animals do not *have* a nature that can be violated.

It would make almost as much sense to speak of the natural behavior of tables and chairs.<sup>14</sup>

In response, Gruzalski cites experts who believe that

the natural, instinctive urges and behavioral patterns...of... ancestral wild species have been little, if at all, bred out in the process of domestication.<sup>15</sup>

In the face of this stalemate on the nature of domestic animals, we may reasonably err on the side of caution and place the burden of proof on those who would use

animals for food. In any event, the animal husbandry argument has been neutralized, since its goal was to show that meat farming is beneficial to animals, and we have seen that the replacement of farm animals by wild animals would create *at least as much* happiness as is currently experienced by farm animals.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, even if we concede that domestic animals have no natural instincts that could be violated, our utilitarian approach still favors a world in which wild animals flourish in the place of domestic animals, since animals that both *have* a nature and *live in* nature arguably have richer, more fulfilling lives.

Those who go beyond the utilitarian framework used in this paper can further criticize the confinement of animals on meat farms by citing Regan's view that raising animals on farms violates their inherent value, by treating them only as a means. Even though he rejects Singer's and Regan's approach, Callicott himself gives a nonutilitarian reason against factory farming, namely that it involves "the monstrous transformation of living things from an organic to a mechanical mode of being."<sup>17</sup>

The foregoing discussion suggests that nonhuman animals would be better off if we completely ended meat farming than if we followed the tactic of Frey's concerned individual. Consequently, the justifiability of the concerned individual's tactic hinges on showing that the benefits *for humans* of continuing to raise animals for meat outweigh its disutility for nonhumans. Let us turn at last to Frey's main argument.

Frey bases his utilitarian defense of meat farming on a detailed conjecture as to the bad *economic* consequences for humans of its cessation.<sup>18</sup> Frey predicts a massive loss of income and employment, not only for farmers but also for the vast number of people in meat-related industries. He also includes the loss of pleasure resulting from a decrease in such social activities as restaurant-going and barbecues. Since space does not permit detailed discussion of Frey's specific predictions, I will confine myself to a few general responses.

First, Frey's argument is based on worst-case scenarios which underestimate the new economic and social opportunities that will arise because of the need for enormously greater production of vegetarian food. For instance, the growing popularity of vegetarianism in the United States and, especially, in England has led to a profusion of vegetarian restaurants, and most restaurants now offer vegetarian options. These

developments indicate that the gloomy predictions that Frey made twelve years ago about the future of the restaurant industry if meat eating were to be abandoned were unfounded. The fact that even MacDonaldis has developed a vegetarian burger, and that supermarkets now stock a wide variety of different types of non-meat burgers and hot dogs, undermines Frey's claim that fast food restaurants would collapse and shows that barbecues could continue even if we gave up meat. More generally, Frey's claim that all vegetarian restaurants are alike reflects the common myth that vegetarian cuisine is bland, a charge that is already belied by the imaginative menus available in such restaurants.

Second, even granting that conversion to vegetarianism would cause some economic hardship, and granting Frey's point that this hardship is *commensurable* with animals' suffering,<sup>19</sup> economic factors are unlikely to outweigh the physical and mental suffering that would remain for farm animals even if we reformed farming methods. By analogy, even a purely utilitarian approach, which forswears any reference to rights, would certainly not accept the economic arguments that could doubtless have been made in favor of child labor in the 19th. century. The children's suffering outweighs any financial gains that might have arisen from exploiting this source of cheap or free labor.

Third, a consistent utilitarian approach must consider not only the potentially harmful effects for humans of giving up raising animals for meat but also its potential *benefits* for us. As well as the health benefits arising from giving up meat, we must take into account the fact that, as a far more efficient source of protein than a meat-based diet, a vegetarian diet may help substantially to alleviate the problem of world hunger.<sup>20</sup> Now, Frey is aware of these arguments based on human welfare,<sup>21</sup> and, reasonably enough, he decides to focus instead on arguments based on animal welfare, since these arguments have "recently given the question of vegetarianism a new focus."<sup>22</sup> The problem for Frey is that the alleged *harmful* effects for humans of vegetarianism play a vital role in his response to the argument for vegetarianism based on animals' suffering. The structure of his argument is that, since the concerned individual's tactic is effective in reducing animals' suffering, the harmful effects *for humans* of giving up meat farming are sufficient to tilt the utilitarian balance against vegetarianism. Consequently, any *beneficial* effects of vegetarianism for humans are also directly relevant to Frey's utilitarian defense of meat farming,

yet he does not include these effects in his discussion of consequences. Only if he can show that the benefits for humans of meat farming outweigh its disutility for animals *and for humans* has he successfully responded to Singer's utilitarian argument defended in this paper.

In sum, Frey's argument, even if supplemented by the animal husbandry argument, fails to overcome the utilitarian case against raising animals for meat. Neither his contention that it will sufficiently reduce animals' suffering, nor his argument that it will have better results for humans than vegetarianism, have succeeded in making the case for the concerned individual's strategy. Consequently, the only certainties are that today's meat farming causes the animals considerable suffering and that discontinuing meat farming will end that suffering.

### 3. Human Supremacism

We have seen that meat eating is hard to justify on utilitarian grounds. Once we concede that the moral interests of nonhumans should be given equal weight alongside those of humans in our moral deliberations, human gains from meat eating appear trivial compared to animals' losses. At this point, many defenders of meat eating take a different tack and withdraw their assent from Singer's application of the equal consideration of interests principle to nonhumans. According to this position, which I call "human supremacism," humans' interests should count for more than those of nonhumans, making utilitarian comparisons of human and nonhuman gains and losses inappropriate.

The issue at stake between utilitarian vegetarians such as Singer and, on the other hand, human supremacists is whether the morality of meat eating depends on a *quantitative* comparison between the gains and losses of humans and animals. Singer believes that it does and argues that giving preference to humans in spite of animals' greater interests is speciesist and, therefore, wrong. Human supremacists, in contrast, claim that a *qualitative* comparison is also needed. Because humans have greater inherent moral value than nonhumans, human interests should take precedence over those of animals. I devote this section to an examination of one such human supremacist view, that of Carl Cohen, who brazenly embraces the label of speciesist. His paper concerns medical experiments on animals, but I will consider its implications for vegetarianism.<sup>23</sup> Cohen himself clearly believes that his argument justifies meat eating, since he offers as a

*reductio ad absurdum* of arguments against medical research on animals the consequence that meat eating would also be wrong.<sup>24</sup>

Speciesism is not analogous to racism and sexism, Cohen argues, because whereas no morally relevant distinctions exist between the races and sexes, the morally relevant differences between humans and nonhumans are "enormous, and almost universally appreciated."<sup>25</sup> Now, Singer would not deny that humans, because of their greater intelligence, have greater interests than do nonhumans. The equal consideration of interests principle requires not equal treatment but, rather, that like interests be given equal weight. Consequently, in situations in which humans' and nonhumans' interests clash, humans' greater interests will sometimes justify giving them preference. For example, since "[n]ormal adult human beings have mental capacities that will, in certain circumstances, lead them to suffer more than animals would in the same circumstances,"<sup>26</sup> we may sometimes be more justified in performing scientific experiments on nonhumans than on humans. Singer opposes meat farming, however, because our benefits are easily outweighed by animals' suffering.

In contrast, Cohen flatly denies that "the pains of all animate beings must be counted equally"<sup>27</sup> and even that nonhumans have any rights at all. On what qualities does Cohen base humans' alleged greater inherent moral value?

Cohen believes that only beings that are capable of both claiming their own and respecting other beings' rights are eligible for having rights:

Humans confront choices that are purely moral; humans—but certainly not dogs or mice—lay down moral laws, for others and for themselves. Human beings are self-legislative, morally *auto-nomous*...Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that word) lack this capacity for free moral judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals therefore have no rights...<sup>28</sup>

Cohen does not deny that we do have duties towards nonhumans, even though they have no rights. In particular, we "are at least obliged to act humanely" towards animals, in view of their status as sentient creatures. But these obligations are imperfect, in the

sense that no animal has a *right* to be treated in this way. Cohen does not explain exactly what the extent of our imperfect obligations to animals is. At one point, he refers to the duty not to gratuitously harm sentient creatures. On the interpretation of "gratuitous" that I assume Cohen intends, this would rule out torturing animals for our pleasure but would permit virtually any of the currently common uses of nonhumans, including meat eating and medical experiments. However, defenders of animal rights regard most of these common practices as gratuitous, because the sacrifices imposed on nonhumans are not outweighed by human gains. Consequently, Cohen's view, whatever its other merits, fails to give a clear criterion for determining which uses of nonhumans are justified.

To his credit, Cohen deals directly with the most obvious objection to his account of rights. The objection, the so-called "argument from marginal cases," is that very young, severely retarded, or comatose humans would also fail to qualify if being able to exercise and respond to moral claims is a necessary condition for having rights.<sup>29</sup> They are not moral agents, since they are unable to reciprocate any moral concern that we show towards them, nor are they able even to understand any moral claims that may be made on their own behalf. But we *do* regard them as having rights, and we punish people, such as child abusers, who violate these rights.<sup>30</sup>

Cohen's response is that qualification for rights depends upon the "natural moral functions" of the species. Members that, due to youth, birth defects or accidents, do not have these capacities are, as it were, carried through on the coattails of the rest of the species.

The capacity for moral judgment that distinguishes humans from animals is not a test to be administered to human beings one by one...The issue is one of kind.<sup>31</sup>

All nonhuman animals, in contrast, simply lack the capacities that most humans have. The first problem with Cohen's response is that, while it produces the result he desires—humans have rights, and nonhumans don't—it amounts to an assertion rather than an argument. Exactly *why* should rights be based on the normal capacities of a species rather than on the capacities of each individual member? Second, his view seems to entail an absurd consequence. Suppose that one of the chimpanzees that have been taught sign language develops an ability to understand moral

arguments, to restrain its behavior in the light of these arguments, and to make moral claims on its own behalf. These abilities would remain far above the "natural moral functions" of chimpanzees as a species. Consequently, according to the view that bases rights upon the normal capacities of the species as a whole, this chimpanzee would have to be denied the status of a right-holder. But this seems arbitrary and unfair.

None of this is to deny that humans' greater capacities sometimes give rise to special moral obligations towards them. For instance, because of their ability to make and respond to moral claims, I am able to make agreements and promises and to enjoy deep, mutually supportive relationships with healthy humans that are difficult or impossible with nonhumans or "marginal" humans. These agreements, promises and relationships make our moral ties to healthy adult humans more extensive and complex than those we have to nonhumans. But this does not preclude nonhumans from having rights, any more than the fact that I have special moral obligations towards some people, such as my friends and family members, precludes strangers from having moral rights that I treat them certain ways. Since I am defending Singer's utilitarian view, my response to Cohen is not intended to show that animals have rights. My point, rather, is that nonhumans have as much claim to having rights as do humans and that the existence of special obligations towards healthy adult humans does not entail human supremacism.

Similarly, I can concede other justified differences between the moral standing of healthy adult humans and nonhumans, without resorting to human supremacism. The view that only self-conscious beings capable of future-oriented desires, especially the desire for continued life, can have a right to life<sup>32</sup> can be justified on the utilitarian ground that persons' greater mental capacities, including their greater power of anticipation, mean that they would lose more than nonpersons from being killed.

These human capacities that are not shared by nonhumans—e.g., the ability to make and respect moral claims and to form extensive future-oriented desires—will sometimes act as a "tie-breaker" that justifies giving preference to humans—for instance, if we had to choose between feeding humans or a dog in a time of extreme shortage. However, the justification for giving preference to humans has nothing to do with humans' alleged greater inherent moral worth. It is, rather, that giving equal weight to the like interests of humans and nonhumans, an impartial utilitarian calculus requires

that we give preference to humans in these rare situations. The moral community is strengthened when, other things being equal, we give priority to beings capable of reciprocating our moral concern. And when either a human or a nonhuman has to suffer physically or die, humans' greater capacity for suffering will usually tilt the utilitarian balance in their favor.

The situation is completely different when we consider the utilities involved in the debate over meat eating. Since we do not need meat to survive, we are not faced with the choice of imposing *comparable* suffering on either humans or nonhumans, and so humans' greater capacities are *irrelevant* to the tradeoff of interests involved. As we saw in the previous section, a quantitative comparison of rival interests shows that human gains are insufficient to justify the imposition of suffering on nonhumans. So, the only way to justify continuing to raise animals for food is to abandon the utilitarian approach that gives *equal weight* to the like interests of humans and nonhumans. But we have just seen that Cohen has failed to give a cogent reason for abandoning the utilitarian approach and regarding human interests as qualitatively more important than those of nonhumans. Consequently, the human supremacist approach fails to dislodge our earlier conclusion that raising animals for food is wrong.

#### 4. Conclusion: Theory and Practice

I have argued that the strongest utilitarian defense of raising animals for meat—Frey's—does not work and that the human supremacist attempt to sidestep utilitarian calculations by attributing greater intrinsic moral worth to humans is unfounded. However, even if we accept that the discontinuation of raising animals for meat would have better results than following the concerned individual's tactic, Frey points out that a crucial step remains to be provided before any utilitarian argument can condemn meat eating. This step is showing that the act of becoming a vegetarian and encouraging others to do so will actually help to achieve the goal of the abolition of meat farming and, hence, produce better results than the concerned individual's tactic. Frey argues that the practical impact of any one person's becoming a vegetarian will be negligible, given the vastness of the meat industry in countries like the U.S.<sup>33</sup> In contrast, political action in order to reform farming practices to reduce animals' suffering is far more likely to produce tangible benefits.

In response, the private action of becoming a vegetarian in no way precludes political activism of precisely the kind that Frey supports. The only difference is that the activism would aim at the abolition, rather than the reform, of raising animals for meat. Additionally, while my becoming a vegetarian may have negligible effect, Frey dismisses too easily the impact of the combined effect of thousands of people's becoming vegetarians. Given the dramatic increase in vegetarian restaurants and vegetarian options within conventional restaurants in the twelve years since Frey's book appeared, we may plausibly claim that conversion to vegetarianism really has reduced the amount of meat that would otherwise have been produced and consumed. Finally, as vegetarianism becomes more "mainstream," it gains more credibility and power as a political force.

My second response to Frey concerns the morality of eating *today's* meat, the vast majority of which is raised on the very factory farms that he wants to reform. A great strength of Frey's book is that he gives a detailed and sophisticated discussion of the charges of insincerity and inconsistency that we might level at the concerned individual, who, while campaigning for reform, continues to eat meat raised in a manner that he or she concedes causes unfair suffering to animals.<sup>34</sup> Frey responds plausibly enough by pointing out that demanding that we have absolutely no contact with a practice that we consider wrong is unduly rigid. For instance, I can quite actively and consistently oppose my country's foreign policies, without leaving the country in order to express the extent of my disapproval. Similarly, argues Frey, as long as the concerned individual actively strives to reform cruel farming practices, the fact that she continues to eat meat is proof of neither insincerity nor inconsistency.

However, continuing to eat meat while striving for reform is different in a crucial respect from Frey's analogies. Remaining in a country and trying to change its policies from within is arguably far more effective than simply leaving the country and having no contact with it. In contrast, continuing to eat meat seems to have no positive impact on the effectiveness of the concerned individual's attempt to end cruel farming practices. On the contrary, a reduction in the demand for meat (which is the likely result of a temporary boycott by concerned individuals) would seem to create economic pressure on the meat industry that is likely to *accelerate* the desired reforms. Once the reforms have occurred, the

concerned individual may then resume eating meat. So even the concerned individual is not justified in eating meat raised on today's factory farms. The concerned individual who continues to eat meat, even though she admits that it was produced in cruel conditions and that her eating meat will in no way enhance her efforts to improve these cruel conditions, seems to be guilty of a *lack of integrity*.

In conclusion, my utilitarian argument that raising animals for meat is wrong does indeed demand a vegetarian diet. And even if Frey were correct that trying to reform our practice of raising animals for meat would have better consequences than working for its abolition, eating the meat raised on today's factory farms would still not be justified on utilitarian grounds.

I am grateful to an anonymous referee, commentator Alex Wellington, Harlan Miller, and audience members for helpful suggestions.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*, 2nd. edition (New York: New York Review, 1990); and *Practical Ethics*, 2nd. edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 3-5.

<sup>2</sup> Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).

<sup>3</sup> "The essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions." *Practical Ethics*, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Similarly, the fact that I do not discuss arguments for vegetarianism based on a feminist ethic of care is not intended to reflect a negative judgment on these arguments. It reflects only the fact that the purpose of this paper is to respond to objections to the best-known argument for vegetarianism: Singer's utilitarian view.

<sup>5</sup> R. G. Frey, *Rights, Killing and Suffering* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 174-83.

<sup>7</sup> Frey is not explicit on whether his reformed farms would be considered free range farms or more humane factory farms.

<sup>8</sup> See Singer, *Practical Ethics*, pp. 64-65.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* I pursue this theme further in section 4.

<sup>10</sup> J. Baird Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," Eugene C. Hargrove (ed.), *The Animal Rights/*

*Environmental Ethics Debate* (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 52-59.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Bart Gruzalski, "The Case Against Raising and Killing Animals for Food," Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (eds.), *Ethics and Animals* (Humana Press, 1983). The section in which he discusses the animal husbandry argument is reprinted in Thomas Mappes and Jane Zembaty (eds.), *Social Ethics*, 4th Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), pp. 449-53. Page references are to the reprint.

<sup>13</sup> Gruzalski, "The Case Against Raising and Killing Animals for Food," pp. 450-51.

<sup>14</sup> Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," p. 53. See also Frey, *Rights, Killing, and Suffering*, pp. 185-86, for a similar argument.

<sup>15</sup> Gruzalski, "The Case Against Raising and Killing Animals for Food," p.452.

<sup>16</sup> In his more recent article, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics," reprinted in Eugene C. Hargrove (ed.), *The Animals Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate: The Environmental Perspective* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), Callicott has proposed a partial reconciliation between his view and that of supporters of individual animals' interests, such as Singer and Regan. However, his view on the moral status of so-called domestic farm animals has *not* changed significantly. Continuing to distinguish them from wild animals, Callicott regards the use of domestic animals for food as unobjectionable, as long as, unlike factory farmers, we do not violate the "kind of evolved and unspoken social contract between man and beast." (*Ibid.*, p. 256)

<sup>17</sup> Callicott, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair," p. 58.

<sup>18</sup> Frey, *Rights, Killing, and Suffering*, pp. 197-206.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 241.

<sup>20</sup> See Gruzalski, "The Case Against Raising and Killing Animals for Food," p. 451; and Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 220.

<sup>21</sup> Frey, *Rights, Killing, and Suffering*, pp. 17-20.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>23</sup> Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research," *The New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 315 (Oct. 2, 1986). Page references are to its reprint in Mappes and Zembaty, *Social Ethics*.

<sup>24</sup> Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research," p. 466.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 463.

<sup>26</sup> Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, p. 59.

<sup>27</sup> Carl Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research," p.463.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 460.

<sup>29</sup> This objection is a variation on an argument given by Singer, *Practical Ethics*, pp. 67-68, 74-78.

<sup>30</sup> For a discussion of other unsavory consequences of the view that bases moral standing on the ability to reciprocate, see Peter Singer, *Ibid.*, pp. 78-82.

<sup>31</sup> Cohen, "The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research," p. 461.

<sup>32</sup> See Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, pp. 95-99; and Mary Anne Warren, "Human and Animal Rights Compared," *Social Ethics*, p. 469.

<sup>33</sup> Frey, *Rights, Killing, and Suffering*, pp. 206-16.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 18.

Konrad Gessner  
*Beasts & Animals*  
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