

# Descartes and Locke on Speciesism and the Value of Life

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In his history *Of Man, Animals, and Morals*, Brumbaugh contends: "It is hard to know just what to make of Descartes' insistence that respect for human dignity requires us to show no respect toward animals. He does not mean hostility, though as far as I can see he would find nothing *ethically wrong* with hostility, except that its motive might be irrational. Whatever we make of it, Cartesian thought reinforces tendencies that have militated against morality, sensitivity, and realistic observation."<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, Locke is credited with the humane position "that causing pain or destroying life needlessly" is morally wrong. He points out that Locke was convinced that attitudes toward animals transfer to attitudes toward other human beings."<sup>2</sup> Cartesians have argued that Locke provides a philosophical model which denies human freedom, contributes to elitism, social control, and racist ideology, while it is characteristic of Descartes' philosophy to assert the intrinsic dignity of all humans.<sup>3</sup> In this paper I argue that the similarities between Descartes and Locke are more pronounced than their differences, that both regard animals as property to be used to advance human life and that both may be accused of elitism with regard to the value of life.

In a letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, Descartes explains that non-linguistic behavior cannot be a criterion of thought or rationality. "I cannot," he says, "share the opinion of Montaigne and others who attribute understanding or thought to animals," for none of our external actions can show "that our body is not just a self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts, with the exception of words, or other signs."<sup>4</sup> For Descartes the difference between man and animal is one of *kind* rather than degree. Animals are natural automata, their behavior explicable in terms of the laws of physics that govern material bodies. Animal behavior is not the result of thought, but of "the disposition of their organs." Since animals do not use words or signs, they cannot be said to possess reason or a degree of reason lower than man; that they "have none at all" follows from the fact that they do not speak.<sup>5</sup>

For Descartes animal mechanism is the only hypothesis consistent with the Christian doctrine of the primacy of man's soul. It is more probable, he says, "that worms and flies and caterpillars move mechanically than that they all have immortal souls." This opinion, he states, "is not so much cruel to animals as indulgent to men—at least to those who are not given to the superstitions of Pythagoras—since it absolves them from the suspicion of crime when they eat or kill animals."<sup>6</sup> The possession of a rational, immortal soul constitutes a morally relevant difference between



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humans and animals, a difference which justifies speciesism.<sup>7</sup>

It is certain that in the bodies of animals, as in ours, there are bones, nerves, muscles, animal spirits, and other organs so disposed that they can by themselves, without any thought, give rise to all the animal motions we observe. This is very clear in convulsive movements when the machine of the body moves despite the soul, and sometimes more violently and in a more varied manner than when it is moved by the will.<sup>8</sup>

In the *Principles* he asserts that the highest perfection of man is "to have the power of acting freely or by will, and that this is what renders him deserving of either praise or blame."<sup>9</sup>

The most intelligent of all animals would not, for Descartes, be comparable to humans considered to be marginal cases (mentally or physically impaired). He points out that "it is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same."<sup>10</sup> Descartes admits that *within species*, some animals are "more perfect" than others. This can be seen, he says, "in horses and dogs, some of whom learn what they are taught much better than others." Although animals can learn commands and can communicate anger, fear, and hunger, their behavior is due to "natural impulse" or instinct and not pure thought. However "stupid and insane" some people may be, "and though they may lack tongue and organs of voice," they can nonetheless use signs which indicate thought and the possession of a rational soul.<sup>11</sup>

Since animals are mere corporeal beings and humans are a union of mind and body, there can be no real comparison between the two. Animals are not simply *less perfect* than humans, they do not share human perfections at all. The difference here is one of *essential*, not *accidental* properties; species differences are real, not arbitrary. Because man's essential properties reside in his spirit it seems reasonable to presume that within the human species all lives are equal or equally valuable.

Bracken has written extensively about the difficulty of stating a racist or sexist position if one is a Cartesian. Man's "colour, his language, his biology, even his sex" are *accidental*, not essential properties.<sup>12</sup> This notwithstanding, Descartes does distinguish spirits or souls in accordance with a scale of perfection. "It is easy to believe," he says, "that all the souls that God places in human bodies are not equally noble and strong."<sup>13</sup> A human body is not different than the body of an animal; if not "mastered" by the soul an individual would not be much different than an animal. A noble and strong soul is one that has a good degree of control or mastery over the body. With the exception of not determining value in accordance with species, some contemporary critics of inherent value theories do not differ significantly from Descartes' perfectionist view of man.<sup>14</sup> Frey, for example, argues that mere existence does not confer value; the exercise of autonomy does. By exercising autonomy we can pursue a conception of the good life, a life which includes a variety of cultural and intellectual achievements. What is missing in the case of animals is the "same scope or potentiality for enrichment." According to Frey, lives of less richness have less value. Given this criterion, some human lives have more value than others. Individuals are ranked on the basis of specific virtues and talents, intellectual, moral, and artistic.<sup>15</sup>

Like Frey, Descartes insists on ranking individuals in accordance with certain perfections. Within a single species of animal, he says, some "are more perfect than others, as men are too." All humans are born with free will and with the capacity to distinguish good from evil. According to Descartes, the value of a human life is tied to the same variables that distinguish humans as a species from animals, *viz.*, free-will, language, and rational thought. Control over passions arising from the body is possible only with knowledge and correct reasoning. There is "no soul so feeble," he contends, that "it cannot, if well directed, acquire an absolute power over its passions."<sup>16</sup> Vices such as irrationality, excess hatred, cowardice and jealousy can be remedied by education. Descartes contends that "low and feeble-minded" souls cannot control passions; "noble and strong" souls do so and disdain nothing but vice. Those who have a "low and feeble mind," he says, "are subject to sin by excess;" passing from superstition to impiety, "there is no vice nor disorder of the mind of which they are not capable." According to Descartes, those who have a noble, strong and generous soul are inclined to render each man "what

pertains to him” and thus have not only a “very profound humility in regard to God” but also “render without any repugnance all the honour and respect which is due to each man according to the rank and authority which he has in the world.”<sup>17</sup> Blom correctly notes that Descartes is comfortable with speaking of civilized and uncivilized. “More relevant,” he notes, is Descartes’ “insistence upon fostering genuine culture of which philosophy, which is at once our ‘sovereign good’ and the highest expression of human reason, is the greatest manifestation. Thus we never find Descartes dreaming of an innocent savage. Rather, good fortune for both individual and society begins with imitating actions approved by those of higher wisdom.”<sup>18</sup>

For Descartes, the right to life is species specific and applicable to all humans and humans only. However, since not all humans are of equal value, Descartes accords some humans preferential treatment. Although animal life has no value other than that of utility for human beings, Descartes admits that not all things were created for man.<sup>19</sup>

Unlike Descartes, Locke argues that the difference between man and animal is one of degree rather than kind. In 2.11.11 of the *Essay* he contends that if animals “have any *Ideas* at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain Instances reason, as that they have sence.”<sup>20</sup> His disagreement with Descartes is based on three contentions; first, the real essence of mind and matter is unknown, second, non-linguistic observable behavior must be taken as evidence that animals reason and have emotions, and third, a rejection of dualism.

Locke defines the real essence of objects as their internal or atomic constitution, an essence which is unknown. Since we cannot classify species of things by real (unknown) essences, classification into species is determined by the observable characteristics that particular objects share. The definition of a bird, for example, is not based on a natural or real essence, but on observable properties that birds have in common. Locke refers to this definition as the nominal essence or abstract idea of birds. We cannot reasonably think, he says, “that the *ranking of things under general Names was regulated by those internal real Constitutions, or anything else but their obvious appearances*; Since Languages, in all Countries, have been established long before Sciences.”<sup>21</sup> Locke often includes the predicates of thinking and reasoning in the nominal essence of

certain animals. It follows that some animals differ from man in degree rather than kind.

Locke’s scepticism with respect to determining the real nature or essence of the mind prevents him from drawing an absolute distinction between humans and animals. In 4.3.6 he contends that it is conceivable that humans as well as animals may be nothing more than material beings. We have “the *Ideas of Matter and Thinking*,” he says, “but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own *Ideas*, without revelation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of Matter fitly disposed a thinking immaterial Substance: it being, in respect to our Notions, not much more remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that *God* can, if he pleases, superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substance the Almighty has been pleased to give that Power.”

Locke argues that it is not a contradiction for God to grant immortality to life forms that are not immaterial. Unlike Descartes he does not consider speculation about the soul, whether human or animal, to be of any importance to religion or philosophy. For Locke, animals differ from humans in degree of rationality. Having general or abstract ideas is, he says, “that which puts a *perfect distinction* betwixt Man and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the *Faculties* of Brutes do by no means attain to.” Like humans, animals receive simple or particular ideas and have the capacity to remember such ideas: “This faculty of laying up, and retaining the *Ideas*, that are brought into the Mind, several other Animals seem to have, to a great degree, as well as man.”<sup>22</sup>

Like Descartes, Locke holds a perfectionist view of value in which animals, lacking the intellectual perfections of man, are considered as having utilitarian value only. Locke actually goes a step further than Descartes in claiming categorically that God has given all animals to humans as property. In the *First Treatise* he claims that there is no doubt that God has granted humans a *right* to the “use of” creatures “for the desire, strong desire of Preserving his Life” and thus, he concludes, “Man’s *Property* in the Creatures, was founded upon the right he had, to make use of those things, that were necessary or useful to his Being.”<sup>23</sup> Man’s “Propriety in the creatures,” he says “is nothing but that *Liberty to use them*, which God has permitted.”<sup>24</sup>

The type of awareness and rationality that Locke attributes to various animals is comparable to that which he attributes to the human fetus and young children. In this case, the ideas received by sensation include hunger, warmth, light, and pain. Since the mind is furnished with ideas gradually, there are "few signs of a Soul accustomed to much thinking in a new born Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all." Qualitatively, the mental life of a fetus is comparable to that of an oyster or to vegetables. He who considers this, says Locke, "will, perhaps find Reason to imagine, That a *Foetus in the Mother's Womb* differs not much from the *State of a Vegetable*; but passes the greatest part of its time without Perception or Thought."<sup>25</sup>

Locke does not consider species central to determining the value of life. Whether humans and animals are something more than organized systems of matter, the qualitative distinctions between them are based on degrees of perception, memory, and corresponding mental *activity*. Locke does not hesitate to express the view that some people lead a life which is qualitatively lower than that of some animals. His position is not unlike that expressed by Frey. Frey, for example, contends: "If few people consider animal life to be without value, equally few, I think, consider it to have the same value as normal (adult) human life. They need not be speciesists as a result: in my view, normal (adult) human life is of a much higher quality than animal life, not because of species, but because of richness; and the value of a life is a function of its quality." Frey argues that his position is not speciesist because it does not use species membership to determine the value of lives; it quite explicitly allows, he says, "that some animal life may be more valuable than some human life."<sup>26</sup> In accordance with this view Locke states: "For were there a Monkey, or any Creature to be found, that had the use of Reason to such a degree, as to be able to understand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general *Ideas*, he would no doubt be subject to Law, and, in that Sense, be a Man, how much soever he differed in Shape from others of that Name."<sup>27</sup>

Locke regards the value of some elderly people, as well as of idiots, to be similar to that of the lowest of animals. Of oysters, he says, "I cannot but think, there is some small dull Perception, whereby they are distinguished from perfect Insensibility," and, he says, even in mankind itself we have plain instances:

Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the Memory of his past Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the *Ideas* his Mind was formerly stored with; and has, by destroying his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Taste to a great degree, stopp'd up almost all the Passages for new ones to enter; or, if there be some of the Inlets yet half open, the Impressions made are scarce perceived, or not at all retained. How far such an one... is in his Knowledge, and intellectual Faculties, above the Condition of a Cockle, or an Oyster, I leave to be considered. And if a Man had passed Sixty Years in such a State, as 'tis possible he might, as well as three Days, I Wonder what difference there would have been, in any intellectual Perfections, between him and the lowest degree of Animals.<sup>28</sup>

According to Locke, those considered to be idiots have dull perceptions, retain few ideas, do not compound or abstract ideas, do not judge, think, "make very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all."<sup>29</sup>

Like Descartes, Locke places ultimate value on intellectual pursuits and abstract philosophical reasoning. He argues that shape, sex and color are not relevant variables in the determination of value. "Shall a defect in the Body make a *Monster*; a defect in the Mind, (the far more Noble, and, in the common phrase, the far more Essential Part) not? Shall the want of a Nose, or a Neck, make a *Monster*, and put such Issue out of the rank of Men; the want of Reason and Understanding, not? This is to bring all back again, to what was exploded just now: This is to place all in the Shape, and to take the measure of a Man only by his out-side."<sup>30</sup> Thus, notwithstanding, Locke's view, as well as Descartes', can be charged with elitism. The quality of life for both is determined by the arbitrary standard of intellectual acumen, more precisely, European standards of rationality. For Locke, abstract reasoning and the development of culture and property are intimately connected. God, says Locke, gave the world "to the use of the Industrious and Rational."<sup>31</sup> According to Locke, God commanded man to labor the earth, and so *entitled* him to appropriate whatever land and other goods he mixed his labor with.

The degree of rationality that is a necessary condition of the right to acquire and to dispose of property is specified in the *Second Treatise* in terms

of a capacity to distinguish moral right from wrong. Locke states: "The Law that was to govern *Adam*, was the same that was to govern all his Posterity, the *Law of Reason*." The law of reason or natural law "in its true Notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper interest." To the question, What gives a person "a free disposing of his Property according to his own Will, within the compass of that Law?" Locke replies, "State of Maturity wherein he might be suppos'd capable to know that Law so that he might keep his Actions within the Bounds of it."<sup>32</sup> The natural law is a God given set of rules and principles of right and justice. According to Locke, natural rights are discovered by reason and include the right to life, liberty, and property. It is clear that anyone who does not understand and obey God's command to labor and the law of reason (children, animals, some elderly people, idiots) does not have property rights and is of relatively little value to self or to society. Those who labor more and who accumulate more property are of more value than those who do not labor or own property. "Labour," he says "makes the far greater part of the value of things we enjoy in this World."

Locke contends that land "left wholly to Nature, that hath no improvement of Pasturage, Tilage, or Planting is called, as indeed it is, Waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing."<sup>33</sup> "There cannot," says Locke, "be a clearer demonstration of any thing than several Nations of the *Americans* are of this, who are rich in land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life; whom Nature having furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of Plenty, i.e. a fruitful Soil, apt to produce abundance, what might serve for food, rayment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labour, have not one hundredth of the Conveniencies we enjoy."<sup>34</sup> Locke accords little value to Native Americans, regarding their life style as a backward state of nature. "Thus in the beginning," he says, "all the World was *America*."<sup>35</sup> It is assumed that the quality of life is better, and hence more valuable, in a state of society or "civilization." According to Locke, God gave the land for the benefit of all mankind. Those who do not cultivate or use it, leave the land to waste, a violation of the common good. Locke would not find it plausible to argue that land used by animals and plants is not waste.

Given the emphasis that both Descartes and Locke place on reason and science, it is not surprising that

their conclusions with respect to the value of life are similar. The fact that Descartes is usually considered a speciesist while Locke is not, does not entail that Locke regards animals as having any more value than Descartes. Descartes' position is one of strong speciesism while Locke's view is best described as weak speciesism. Both regard animals as tools to further human interest, both appeal to God to support such a view, and both stress the necessity of mastery over animals and nature. The highest degree of value is assigned to those who possess abstract reasoning and use it "correctly" to benefit self and mankind.

Schouls argues persuasively that Descartes' views were absorbed rather than rejected by the Enlightenment, that Descartes, Locke and Newton shared a common method, a method from which they "expected liberation and mastery." Views which deny the status of "Enlightenment thinker" to Descartes, but accord it to Locke, are regarded as superficial. Schouls points out:

It is correct to say that the central doctrines of Locke's *Essay* determine Locke's thoughts on education. It is equally correct to say that Locke shared these doctrines with Descartes, and that Descartes had published them more than a decade before Locke became an undergraduate at Christ Church, Oxford. In Descartes' works these doctrines play as crucial a role as they do in Locke's. The doctrines in question are those about man as a rational being and about method or the nature of reasoning, about man as a free being questing for mastery.<sup>36</sup>

Neither Descartes nor Locke consider reason or knowledge an end in itself. In the *Discourse* Descartes contends that the principles of science cannot be "concealed without greatly sinning against the law which obliges us to procure, as much as in us lies, the general good of mankind." He urges a "practical philosophy by means of which...we can...render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature."<sup>37</sup>

Like Descartes, Locke stresses the connection between human freedom and the capacity to reason:

The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own will, is *grounded on* his having *Reason*, which is able to instruct him in that Law he is to govern himself by,

and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him loose to an unrestrain'd Liberty, before he has Reason to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of his Nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst Brutes, and abandon him to a state as wretched, and as much beneath that of a Man, as things.<sup>38</sup>

Both Descartes and Locke assign value to humans by contrast to animals and nature, a traditional comparison that when adopted by Americans resulted in the degradation and exploitation of those seen as closer to nature. With regard to Blacks and Native Americans, for example, Deloria notes: "Both groups had been defined as animals with which the white had to have some relation and around whom some attitude must be formed. Blacks were ex-draft animals ... Indians were ex-wild animals who had provided the constant danger for the civilizing tendencies of the invading white." The notion that cultures cannot be judged by the standards of other cultures is precluded by faith in reason, science, and progress, by the rejection of superstition.<sup>39</sup> That which is closer to nature (the less rational) is deemed a worthy object of control, mastery, and change. Following Locke's description of the state of nature, Jefferson regarded the American Indian as an inferior uncivilized human, yet a being capable of rising to a state of civil society by the use of reason. This would be achieved by education, by giving up superstitious customs, earthly passions, communal ownership of land, and by settling down as farmers. Like Descartes, Locke regards the chief obstacle to the use of reason as "our passionate nature" or "brute" appetites. He is somewhat more pessimistic than Descartes about the ability of all people to overcome such appetites for the life of reason.

Both Descartes and Locke support a performance model of man. Both support a hierarchy of perfection based on analytic reasoning. In spite of Locke's protestation that all men are born free and equal and Descartes' claim that reason, by nature, is equal in all men, this equality is short-lived.<sup>40</sup> Differences in environment, education, and especially in the application of reason, result in inequality. Neither philosophy is able to fully support an ideology which assigns inherent or intrinsic value and dignity to animals and humans.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Of Man, Animals, and Morals: A Brief History," in *On the Fifth Day: Animal Rights and Human Ethics*, edited by Richard Knowles Morris and Michael W. Fox (Washington, D.C.: Acropous Books), p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>3</sup> According to Bracken, the empiricist/rationalist "debates of the seventeenth century and of today are debates between different value systems or ideologies. Hence the heat which characterizes these discussions." H.M. Bracken, "Essence, Accident and Race," *Hermathena*, Winter 1973, p. 127. Similar arguments are found in Noam Chomsky, *Reflections on Language* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975).

<sup>4</sup> René Descartes, Letter to Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November, 1646, in *Descartes' Philosophical Letters*, translated and edited by Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 206. Descartes construes "thought" in the widest possible sense to include emotions, pain, etc.

<sup>5</sup> René Descartes, "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, translated by Haldane and Ross, Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 116-117.

<sup>6</sup> Descartes to More, 5 February, 1649, in *Philosophical Letters*, pp. 244-245.

<sup>7</sup> Speciesism is defined in terms of Pluhar's distinction, weak speciesism: "The according of preferential treatment to a being A, because A is a member of species X"; strong speciesism: "The ascription of basic moral rights, including the right to life, to a being, A, because A is member of species X." Evelyn Pluhar, "Speciesism: A Form of Bigotry or a Justified View?," *Between the Species*, Vol. 4, no. 2, Spring 1988, p. 84.

<sup>8</sup> Descartes to More, p. 244.

<sup>9</sup> René Descartes, "The Principles of Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, p. 233.

<sup>10</sup> Discourse, p. 116.

<sup>11</sup> Descartes to More, pp. 244-245.

<sup>12</sup> Bracken, p. 93. According to Bracken, Cartesian dualism provides "a modest conceptual brake to the articulation of racial degradation and slavery," whereas empiricism makes racism easy to justify "by providing us with ways of counting colour, head shape, language, religion, or IQ as essential properties of the person."

<sup>13</sup> René Descartes, "The Passions of the Soul," in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, Vol. I, article CLXI, p. 406.

<sup>14</sup> For "perfectionist" view or theory I employ Russow's definition: "A theory is perfectionist...if it draws a distinction based on any quality, natural or developed, which might be had in various degrees by moral agents." Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Regan on Inherent Value," *Between the Species*, Vol. 4, no. 1, Winter 1988, p. 49.

<sup>15</sup> R.G. Frey, "Moral Standing, The Value of Lives, and Speciesism," in *Between the Species*, Vol. 4, no. 3, Summer 1988, p. 195.

<sup>16</sup> Descartes, *Passions of the Soul*, p. 355.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 407.

<sup>18</sup> John Blom, *Descartes: His Moral Philosophy and Psychology* (New York: New York University Press, 1978), p. 13.

<sup>19</sup> *Principles of Philosophy*, p. 271.

<sup>20</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.6.25.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.11.10.

<sup>23</sup> John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, edited by Peter Laslett (New York: New American Library, 1965), *First Treatise*, par. 86.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 39.

<sup>25</sup> *Essay*, 2.1.21-22; 2.9.5.

<sup>26</sup> Frey, p. 196; As cases in point Frey cites severely handicapped infants, elderly people with Alzheimer's disease, and people with degenerative brain, nervous or physiological disorders. The value of such life is regarded as much lower than that of "normal" adult human life and lower than that of some animals.

<sup>27</sup> *Essay*, 3.11.16.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.9.14.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.11.12-13.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.4.16.

<sup>31</sup> Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, par. 34.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 57. par. 59.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 42.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 41.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, par. 49.

<sup>36</sup> Peter A. Schouls, *Descartes and the Enlightenment* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), pp. 178-179; p. 180.

<sup>37</sup> Descartes, *Discourse*, p. 119.

<sup>38</sup> Locke, *Second Treatise*, par. 63.

<sup>39</sup> Vine DeLoria, Jr., *Custer Died For Your Sins* (New York: Avon Books, 1969), p. 172. As Schouls points out, "Descartes rejects the notion of 'points of view' because methodic procedure necessarily leads its practitioners to the same results. He holds that with respect to each matter there is only one truth," p. 113. Locke professes the same faith in reason to determine the right, good, or just; in the *Essay* he expresses confidence that a deductive science of morality is possible.

<sup>40</sup> Locke, *Second Treatise*, par. 4; Descartes, *Discourse*, pp. 81-82.

