

REPLIES

IN RE: This Issue, Gruber's review of Schwartz's
Judaism and Vegetarianism

Judaism and Vegetarianism is a polemic that argues that based on Jewish values, people should be vegetarians. Its message can be summed up by the question with which I end the book:

In view of the strong Jewish mandates to be compassionate to animals, preserve health, help feed the hungry, preserve and protect the environment, and seek and pursue peace and the very negative effects flesh-centered diets have in each of these areas, how do you justify not becoming a vegetarian?

While he states that he is a vegetarian, Rabbi Marc Alan Gruber apparently is determined to convince people that they need not be vegetarians based on religious values. To do this he has written a review of my book that is filled with inaccurate and misleading statements and implications.

Gruber's answer to the inhumane excesses of factory farming is to eliminate objectionable practices. Somehow he neglects to tell us how to do this. Does he expect those who raise animals to forget their economic interests and be more considerate of animals?

With regard to health, Gruber is evidently unaware of the strong recent evidence linking meat-centered diets to heart attacks, many types of cancer, and other diseases. His assertion that "Even if the medical evidence indicates that a vegetarian diet would increase our longevity, it is unfounded that the human life span would increase by 800 years or more,"

completely distorts my statement (pp. 2,3) that "Of course, a shift to a sensible vegetarian diet will not increase life spans to anywhere near those of early people, but recent medical evidence indicates that it would lead to an increase in the average span of life."

Gruber's assertion that I do not define what is "natural" regarding the human diet conveniently overlooks the discussion on pages 35 and 36 and the table on page 37 which clearly show that biologically we are closest to fruit eating animals. He conveniently ignores 7 out of the 8 anatomical similarities given. Also, the fact that people have developed tools which enable us to slaughter animals and prepare meat to eat does not mean that it is natural for us to eat meat, any more than the world's current arsenal of 50,000 nuclear weapons makes the production of such armaments natural.

Gruber, similarly, downplays the effects that a switch to vegetarian diets could have in reducing the scandal of global hunger. He conveniently ignores the many statistics in my book which show just how wasteful of grain, land, water, fuel, pesticides, and fertilizer meat-centered diets are. While Gruber is correct in stating that hunger is primarily related to the distribution of food and wealth, he overlooks my statement that, after people shifted to vegetarian diets, "it would then be necessary to promote policies that would enable people in the underdeveloped countries to use their resources and skills to become food self-reliant." Being aware that vegetarianism is only

part of the answer to global hunger, I address this issue in far more detail in my recently published book, *Judaism and Global Survival*. The matter of conscience that Gruber fails to address is how a person can continue a diet which involves the waste of so much grain and the importing of beef from poverty-stricken countries (the U.S. leads the world in this regard) when millions of people die of hunger each year.

Gruber similarly downplays the violations of *bal tashchit* (the Biblical prohibition against wastefulness) related to meat-centered diets. Since, as he states, the production of food is certainly a useful purpose, he is not bothered by the waste of valuable productive resources associated with livestock agriculture. Once again he asserts that rather than turning to vegetarianism, we should adopt less wasteful methods of raising and slaughtering cattle, without explaining how this can be done in the face of the hunger of corporations for the maximization of profits.

Finally Gruber denies the value of vegetarianism in creating a more peaceful world. In spite of overwhelming evidence, he denies that more people would be able to enjoy the earth's resources if everyone ate a vegetarian diet. He challenges the idea that vegetarianism helps people to be more peaceful, compassionate, and humane by bringing up the ruthless "vegetarian" Adolph Hitler. This is equivalent to condemning all members of a group, for example, because of the unethical acts of one member. For the record, several biographers of Hitler have commented on his fondness for several types of meat; Hitler evidently was a vegetarian for several periods of his life to help overcome the negative health effects of his generally meat-based diet.

Gruber claims that my extensive

chapter on questions frequently asked of Jewish vegetarians does not answer the ones raised in his review. But, he overlooks my question 15 (page 81), which, I believe, directly addresses Gruber's most consistent argument against my book:

Question: Instead of advocating vegetarianism, shouldn't we try to alleviate the evils of the factory farming system so that animals are treated better, less grain is wasted, and less health-harming chemical are used?

Answer: The breeding of animals is a big business, whose prime concern is profit. Animals are raised the way they are today because it increases profits. Improving conditions as suggested by this question would certainly be strongly resisted by the meat industry and, if successful, would greatly increase already high prices.

Here are two counter questions. Why not abstain from eating meat as a protest against present policies while trying to improve them? Even under the best of conditions, why take the life of a creature of God, "whose tender mercies are over all his creatures," when it is not necessary for proper nutrition?

His other questions are answered by the abundance of information in my book showing the negative effects of flesh-centered diets with regard to the treatment of animals, human health, world hunger, pollution, waste, and the possibility of war.

Rabbi Gruber is so determined to argue against vegetarianism that he ignores the great weight Judaism

traditionally gives to Talmudic sages and Biblical commentators in explaining and clarifying verses of the Torah. Hence, when he asserts that Genesis 1:29 may not indicate that people were meant to be vegetarians, he is disagreeing with the opinion of countless rabbis and scholars, who have analyzed the Torah in great detail. If this verse were not meant as a prohibition against eating meat, why was it necessary for God to later give permission to Noah to use animals for food?

He also distorts several of my statements related to the Bible. For example, he states that I attribute the reduction in life spans recorded in the Bible to the change of diet from vegetarian to meat consuming. In the book, I state that this is "a possible explanation." He also claims that I assert that "a carnivorous diet leads humans to such corrupt practices as eating limbs torn from living animals." What I do indicate is that because of such corrupt practices, as a concession to people's weakness, permission to eat meat was given to Noah (Gen. 9:3.) Several more examples of incorrect assertions by Gruber could be given.

I do frequently quote great Jewish authorities throughout the book. This is to illustrate that the analysis and opinions are not just mine, but are based on Jewish tradition, as inter-

preted by Jewish scholars. Without the support of these great leaders, my arguments would have far less weight.

I am sorry that Gruber, a long-time vegetarian, is unhappy with my book. However, *Judaism and Vegetarianism* has been enthusiastically received (50 favorable reviews), especially by Jewish vegetarians. Mr. Philip Pick, the founder of the international "Jewish Vegetarian Society" wrote the foreword to the book. A review in the *Jewish Vegetarian* called *Judaism and Vegetarianism* "...a brilliant book of outstanding merit...a classic that should find its way into every Jewish bookcase and certainly of interest to all others who love to widen their knowledge of the ancient and compassionate philosophies."

Rabbi Gruber starts and ends his review by stating that I bring out the correct principles but fail to properly develop them to convince readers to become vegetarians. In view of the many problems related to meat-centered diets, he would do a great public service if he would drop his apparent anti-vegetarian bias and show us a better way to use Jewish values to convince people to adopt vegetarian diets. Until he does this, he appears to be in the position of one who criticizes without having anything better to offer.

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IN RE: E&A V/3, White's review of Norton's
"Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism"

In his review of my "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism,"

James E. White misunderstands the logic of my case. He argues that the

examples I include in order to *illustrate* my case are not really examples of anthropocentrically based ethics. Perhaps my examples are not unexceptionable. Here is not the place to enter into detailed textual analysis. My case does not rest on examples, but on my analysis and framework of definitions.

I say that an environmental ethic will be "adequate" if it provides a set of principles sufficiently strong to proscribe behaviors "which virtually all environmentally sensitive individuals agree are environmentally destructive." And I argue that weak anthropocentrism, an environmental ethic that distinguishes between *actual* felt preferences (which may be irrational) and *considered* felt preferences (rationally justifiable preferences) is adequate in this sense. While the pursuit of selfish, short-term, consumptive desires may lead to the destruction of nature, a far-sighted individual with scientific knowledge, rationally defensible moral ideals, and a set of preferences consistent with such a world view would protect nature for *human* reasons. This protection is essential for the long-term survival of the human species. Further, a rational individual would see the value of wild species and natural ecosystems as occasions for the examination and reformation of short-sighted, selfish, and consumptive materialistic values. I call the value of such experiences "transformative."

How badly White misconstrues my argument is indicated by his conclusion that "[weak anthropocentrism] presents no threat to advocates of nonanthropocentrism...". No threat was ever suggested or implied—I showed that environmental policy makers need not choose between strong anthropocentrism, the view that nature has value only for fulfilling the demands that our currently misguided society registers, and nonan-

thropocentrism, which posits intrinsic value for nonhuman species.

That pro-environmental policy makers might wish to avoid this choice is indicated by the almost complete lack of theoretical explanation and justification of claims attributing intrinsic value to nonhumans (see, for example, the disclaimers listed by Tom Regan in the "The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic," *Environmental Ethics* 3 (1981), pp. 19-34). The burden of my case was to show that a form of anthropocentrism which places appropriate weight on human ideals embedded consistently within a rationally defensible world view would include principles adequate to protect wild species and natural ecosystems. I intentionally left open the question of whether nonhuman species or specimens *have* intrinsic value. I do not see how such claims can be evaluated until nonanthropocentrists give a much clearer explanation of what characteristics indicate and justify such value.

Quite aside from the truth of such abstract claims, policy makers can justifiably ask whether philosophers can justify environmental protection on some other basis. Must the development of an adequate environmental policy wait until philosophers resolve their internecine quarrels about whether humans are "superior" to plants and animals and so forth? (See, for example, Paul Taylor, "Are Humans Superior to Animals and Plants?" *Environmental Ethics* 6 (1984), pp. 149-160.) Given the lack of specificity of, and absence of any consensus on, claims of intrinsic value such as Regan's and Taylor's, policy makers might well fear that humans will live in an otherwise sterile world before philosophers agree on a concept of intrinsic value sufficiently justified and precise to determine the details of environmental policy.

The purpose of my paper was to

show that proscriptions against environmental destruction and the generation of a positive environmental policy need not wait upon these philosophical developments. If this argument is considered a "threat" by nonanthropocentrists, this may result more from their embarrassment at being unable to describe adequate principles for environmental protection deriving from their ethical and metaphysical views, than from my case that environmental policy formation can proceed on

another, equally adequate basis. (See, for example, Peter Singer's problems in deriving from his nonanthropocentric principles any special obligation to give special treatment to individual members of nearly extinct species. "Not for Humans Only: The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental Issues," in K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre, *Ethics and the Problems of the 21st Century* (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1979), p. 203.)

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IN RE: This Issue, White's review of Loftin's
"The Morality of Hunting"

I agree that hunters are not the only group working to preserve habitat for wildlife. There are many others, but to subtract hunters (and fishermen?) from the total social effort would have a serious weakening effect. In Florida, where I live, I have often seen hunters, fishermen, bird watchers, hikers, campers, and others work together for environmental causes such as stopping the Cross Florida Barge Canal or setting aside the priceless Guana tract. Without the hunters I don't think we could have prevailed as often as we have.

I don't know what a happy life is for a White-tailed Deer or a Bobwhite Quail. If a happy life means not to be hunted, no quail will know that until Red Foxes and Cooper's Hawks become extinct. The reviewer seems to regard a "happy life" and a "normal life" for a game animal as the same. A normal life for a game animal is to be hunted, and, more often than not, to die in violence and pain. If I had my way, the lives of many more

White-tailed Deer in Florida would end under the fangs of a Florida Panther. I would like to see the re-establishment of the natural predators to control overpopulation among game animals. That is the *normal* life. Whether it is a "happy" life I cannot say, but, to quote Aldo Leopold, "it is a poor life that achieves freedom from fear."

I suppose that by a "happy life" the reviewer has in mind something like the lot of the tame ducks that loiter around the artificial ponds that grace many apartment complexes. These animals are not confined, they hang around of their own accord and because the apartment dwellers feed them bread. They are not hunted by human or natural predators, and they don't have to work to make a living so I guess they must lead "happy lives." All they have to do is eat and breed, so after a few generations of miscegenation they are an odd lot indeed. Since natural selection is not operating to hone their generic heritage to

the razor sharpness necessary for survival in the wild, all sorts of generic oddities are seen in these motley assemblages. Apparently this is the sort of life that some animals liberationists would like to see all animals lead (see "Predation" by Steve Sapontzis, *Ethics & Animals* 5:27). Personally, I regard these poor creatures as objects of pity mingled with disgust.

I'm not sure about the feasibility of a sterilization program to control overpopulation of game animals. Presumably this would involve capturing large numbers of male animals for vasectomies or something of the sort. Such an effort would be enormously time consuming and expensive, so at the present time, I don't think this solution is technically feasible. But the interesting philosophical question is—Suppose it were? Let's imagine a sterilization drug which worked only on White-tailed Deer which could be distributed at low cost simply by scattering it at salt licks or broad-

casting it from aircraft. Would a good utilitarian prefer this to controlling overpopulation by hunting? It seems obvious to me that the answer is yes. My personal preference would be to foster natural predators, but cheap, *feasible* sterilization would be preferable to hunting to control excess population in those animals that will overpopulate and stress the habitat.

The final point the reviewer makes is that in his honest opinion, the bad consequences of sport hunting outweigh the good consequences. This points up what has long been realized about utilitarianism or any consequentialist position—just how does one weigh the consequences? Hunters shoot other hunters (and non-hunters) each year just as swimmers are drowned each year. Are the lives lost swimming enough to prohibit these activities? I don't know of any intelligent way to answer that question, which is only to point up the major weakness of consequentialist ethical thinking.

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IN RE: This Issue, Sapontzis's review of Callicott's
"Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair"

I wrote "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair" in a bold, swashbuckling style precisely in order to attract the kind of critical notice which Steve F. Sapontzis has given it here. My primary purpose was to draw a sharp distinction between environmental and animal welfare ethics, which, before "A Triangular Affair" appeared, had been generally (and carelessly) confused. A secondary purpose was to draw animal welfare ethicists (a much larger contingent of professional

philosophers because animal welfare ethics rest upon much more timid, conventional precepts) into debate with environmental ethicists (a much smaller contingent of professional philosophers because environmental ethics require much more creative ethical theory building). At the time it was written a cozy, essentially internecine controversy was bubbling along between conservative humanitarian ethicists ("moral humanists" as I called them there) like R. G. Frey

and liberal animal liberationists ("humane moralists") like Tom Regan. Environmental ethics as such was simply largely ignored.

As a philosophical provocateur, I have been, if anything, too successful. Before Sapontzis, Edward Johnson, William Aiken, Robin Attfield, Mary Ann Warren, and, in a veiled sort of way (I suspect so as not to make it more widely known than it already was), Tom Regan have all publicly been horrified and outraged by "A Triangular Affair"—particularly by its radical ethical holism.¹ Now that I have managed to draw attention to the really new and different approach to an expanded moral sensibility sketched in the land ethic of Aldo Leopold, I hope soon to detail a more finely textured interpretation and elaboration of it which eschews the "total holism" (in Sapontzis' terms) of my original characterization or rather caricature. After all, "a land ethic," according to Aldo Leopold, "implies respect for...fellow members [of the biotic community] and also [i.e., as well as] respect for the community as such."² I chose not to emphasize the former, respect for fellow members, in "A Triangular Affair," so that I might more starkly highlight the latter, respect for the community as such—and thus contrast more vividly environmental ethics and animal welfare ethics. The land ethic, as I think I can show, actually provides a comprehensive moral theory which will consistently accommodate (1) humanitarian moral concerns (the dignity of human individuals and primacy of human interests), (2) respect for non-human individual animals (and plants as well), and (3) the more holistic (and distinctly environmental) concern for populations, species, biotic communities, and the global ecosystem.³

According to Sapontzis, "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair" has

become the "'classic' environmental ethics critique of the animal rights movement." If so (and at the risk of appearing immodest I will not gainsay it), it can't be as bad a piece of philosophy as he makes it out to be. The space allowed me here does not permit a reply to each of the issues Sapontzis raises in interpreting and criticizing it. I, therefore, invite readers of this journal whose interest has been piqued to read "A Triangular Affair" with an open mind and evaluate for themselves its conceptual architecture and arguments.

In "A Triangular Affair" I tried strictly to maintain a journalistic separation between myself as reporter and commentator and the two philosophical movements—environmental and animal welfare ethics—I was comparing and contrasting. My sympathies for Aldo Leopold's land ethic and against animal welfare ethics were, however, unconcealed. Even so, it cannot be accurately or fairly said that I personally develop there an environmental ethic or for that matter, that I personally advocate a philosophy of any sort as Sapontzis' remarks frequently imply.

Nowhere, I think, does he distort my discussion more than when he says that I seem to regret that it is impossible to return to the Stone Age and that I favor, among other less noisome things, infanticide, stylized warfare, leaving injured wilderness adventurers to their fate, and sexual continency. As the page numbers he cites will reveal, mention of these things was scattered and occurred in very different contexts. I remark that human ecologist Garrett Hardin (not I) has publicly recommended a non-rescue policy for wilderness excursions and, not that we ought, but that tribal people—whose moral views, nevertheless, might provide valuable perspective on our own—did optimize their populations by (God forbid) sexual

contingency, abortion, infanticide, and stylized warfare. I will here confess that I do in fact favor and indeed practice a personal regime which includes a simple (incidentally, vegetarian) diet and vigorous exercise, and, speaking just for myself, nor wishing to impose such a bizarre doctrine on anyone else, I do in fact regard chronic illness as a worse evil than death. But in "A Triangular Affair" these attitudes and practices were variously attributed to other thinkers or other peoples' mores, as the case may be; they were not expressly advocated by me.

I don't mind being accused of having done bad philosophy. The history of philosophy is a history of philosophical error—otherwise it would all have come to an end in the one true view. The important thing is to go wrong in interesting and provocative ways. (Judging by the strong response so far to "A Triangular Affair," it went wrong in very creative ways.) However, I would be very mortified to have done bad scholarship—for which I can discover no similar redeeming virtue. Hence, I will defend myself directly and specifically against Sapontzis' claim that I have not gotten my Plato right.

To prove that Plato is not a moral holist—the philosophical antecedent at the level of social ethics which both Kenneth Goodpaster and I suggest as a respectable paradigm for a holistic environmental ethic—Sapontzis refers us to the origins of society as speculatively posited by Plato early in the *Republic*.⁴ Sapontzis *infers* that, since Plato imagines a human community to arise because each person does not suffice for his or her own needs and so associates with others, therefore (?) Plato regards the commonwealth to exist for the happiness of its individual constituents severally.

But we need not deduce Plato's

views on this point since he later makes them quite express. At the beginning of *Republic IV* Adeimantus complains to Socrates that he (Socrates) is "not making these men very happy." To which Socrates replies that "the object on which we fixed our eyes in the establishment of the state was ... the greatest happiness of the city as a whole."⁵ And if that does not prove that Plato espoused moral holism, still later, in *Republic VII*, Socrates refers back to this point and reiterates it in even stronger terms, if that is possible. He says, "You have forgotten, my friend [Glaucou, this time], that the law is concerned not with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition in the whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion *and compulsion*..., not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to *using them* [!] for the binding together of the commonwealth."⁶

Sapontzis doesn't attempt to deal with the other (overwhelming) evidence I cite in "A Triangular Affair" for Plato's "total" (social) holism at least in the *Republic*. So on this question of how to read Plato—as a moral atomist or a moral holist—I must insist that I am right to think that he is a holist and Sapontzis is wrong to think that he is not.

This seemingly trivial scholarly dispute opens onto a larger, much more important question, perhaps really the deepest bone of contention between Sapontzis and myself, *viz.*, what is moral philosophy and what ought its business to be? Sapontzis seems to think that moral philosophy should first construct a rationale for "currently accepted moral principles or values"—he cites Kant as an exemplar of this approach—and then perhaps—this is apparently the only moral criticism he thinks legitimate—point out

that common practice is hypocritical, that, in other words, common practice does not in all domains exemplify the moral principles or values to which most people publicly swear allegiance. In this, Sapontzis affords, I think, a very illuminating analysis of the general program of animal welfare ethics. Our current culture values equality, justice, compassion, and the alleviation of suffering. Peter Singer found a simple rationale for these values in classical ethical hedonism. He then pointed out that most people turn a blind eye to the extreme hardship and suffering imposed upon innocent, equally sentient animals. This is a valuable service, which I respect, but I do not think it is the whole or the only legitimate role of moral philosophy. Sapontzis, on the other hand, wants somehow to prove that this is the only legitimate thing a moral philosopher can do. Anything significantly deviating from "currently accepted moral principles or values" would be "merely 'a code for conducting one's life' [not] a morality at all," he claims.

If constructing a rationale for currently accepted moral principles or values and criticizing only moral *practice* is all that moral philosophers may properly do, one wonders whose job it is to criticize currently accepted moral principles or values themselves? Or does Sapontzis want to rule them beyond criticism? Are they an implacable given?

Surely there is some merit, from time to time, in taking an intellectually disciplined critical look at currently accepted moral principles or values themselves and speculatively advancing alternatives. If no one did, or as Sapontzis seems to wish, no one were allowed to, there would be no change at all or only an aimless drift in commonly accepted moral principles or values. Plato's moral and political philosophy is the historical

exemplar not only of my kind of moral holism but of my kind of critical, speculative moral philosophy—if Kant's is the exemplar of the kind Sapontzis would impose. Plato lived in democratic Athens and was unalterably opposed to democracy. He was consistently critical of practically all of the other currently accepted moral values of his fellow Athenians: Think of the devastating parody of common Greek religious values in the *Euthyphro* and the then completely novel alternative at which it points; or the critique of current Athenian political values and principles of justice—giving each his due; helping friends and harming enemies and so on—in *Republic I*, not to mention the extremely eccentric conception of an "ideal" community which follows in subsequent books of that dialogue. But were it not for Plato's wholly novel and discontinuous moral vision and that of other speculative moral philosophers, we would not now enjoy the advanced moral sensibilities Sapontzis so cherishes.

More generally, Sapontzis' conception of moral philosophy seems to me to be parochial, myopic, and intellectually stultifying. Other contemporary cultures accept very different moral principles and values. Mention of Plato and the ancients reminds us that very different moral principles and values prevailed in our own Western cultural past. Stone Age peoples (to whom we are much closer than the "tens [sic] of thousands of years of evolution and history" Sapontzis imagines separates us from them) held very different moral principles and values than those common in civilized cultures today. I think that we can gain a very valuable perspective on today's currently accepted moral principles and values by seeing them in this larger historical and cultural context.

Finally, a word on why I think

animal liberation is world-denying and life-loathing. I have recently come to think that animal welfare ethics are appropriate for our relations with domestic animals, although as I pointed out in "A Triangular Affair," if animal liberation prevails and we all become vegetarians, the only domestic animals left in any quantity would be pets. We would have destroyed farm animals in order to have saved them. If, however, we extend the principles of animal liberation and animal rights into the wild with ruthless consistency, we shall find ourselves engaged in a campaign of humane predator extermination. It is ironic that Steve F. Sapontzis is the person who has most confirmed my darkest suspicions on this head. In an article in this journal Sapontzis seriously entertains the possibility of policing the wild to prevent vicious carnivorous animals from inflicting suffering and death on innocent herbivorous animals.⁷ Sapontzis doesn't think that ridding the world of predators would not be a desirable goal or that the world would be immeasurably impoverished without predators. Rather, he invokes the Kantian principle that ought implies can and since we cannot succeed in eliminating predators from nature it is not our duty to try.⁸

This is a frighteningly fragile theoretical barrier to an ecological nightmare. It overlooks the practical role of unattainable ethical ideals. We cannot do lots of things we think we ought to do—love our neighbor as ourselves, always act as if the maxim of our action were to become a universal law of nature, stamp out war, poverty, crime. Still we think we should try because in trying we may make

some progress toward the ideal.

Similarly, we may not be able humanely to phase out of nature all wild predators, still we should try and in trying we would definitely make some progress toward that "ideal"—a natural world that much freer of pain and violent death, a "better" world in Sapontzis' view. We could all too easily succeed completely with the larger, rarer predators, the Bengal Tiger, the other big cats, wolves, and so on.

This is what I mean by life-loathing and world-denying. Animal liberation projected to its logical conclusion morally condemns the most fundamental biological facts of life on the planet. Perhaps, as Sapontzis maintains, morality requires that we oppose some natural tendencies and processes, but can it require us to oppose the most fundamental biological facts of life and not seem self-contradictory or at the very least absurd?

But, as I tried to point out in "A Triangular Affair," and on this I think Sapontzis would agree, animal liberation is the logical extension of current moral principles and values. Such internal contradictions and/or absurdities, therefore, call into serious question either current moral principles and values and/or their conventional philosophical justification. Thus, like it or not, Sapontzis and other animal welfare ethicists are unwitting contributors to the critical and speculative sort of moral philosophy which I attempted in "A Triangular Affair" and which he would like to sweep under the rug.

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Notes

1. Edward Johnson, "Animal Liberation vs. the Land Ethic," *Environmental Ethics* 3 (1981): 265-73; William Aiken, "Ethical Issues in Agriculture," in Tom Regan, ed., *Earthbound: New Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics* (New York: Random House, 1984): 247-88; Robin Attfield, "Value in the Wilderness," *Metaphilosophy* 15, July/October 1984: 289-304; Mary Ann Warren, "The Rights of the Nonhuman World," in Elliott and Gare, eds., *Environmental Philosophy* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983): 109-34; Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Regan here sinks to name calling when he characterizes as "environmental fascism" what appears to be my strongly holistic interpretation of Aldo Leopold's land ethic (p. 262).
2. Aldo Leopold, *A Sand County Almanac with Essays on Conservation from Round River* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1966), p. 240.
3. A preview of my more finely textured, subtly shaded, comprehensive, and socially responsible interpretation of the Aldo Leopold land ethic is forthcoming. See J. Baird Callicott, "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Tom Regan, ed., *Matters of Life and Death*, Second Edition (New York: Random House, 1985): in press.
4. See Kenneth Goodpaster, "From Egoism to Environmentalism" in K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre, eds., *Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1979).
5. Plato, *Republic* 420b; Paul Shorey, tr. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Loeb Classical Library).
6. *Ibid.*, 519e; emphasis added.
7. Steve F. Sapontzis, "Predation," in *Ethics & Animals* (June, 1984): 27-36.
8. Mark Sagoff, "Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce," *Osgoode Hall Law Journal* 22 (1984), thinks we can. He writes, "I do not know how animal liberationists, such as Peter Singer, propose to relieve animal suffering in nature (where most of it occurs), but there are many ways to do so at little cost" (p. 303).