

# **Movements of "Crisis" and Movements of "Affluence"**

## **A CRITIQUE OF DEPRIVATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORIES**

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### **Abstract:**

In response to the empirical and theoretical weaknesses of the older social stress or deprivation theories of social movements, a new general theory of social movements- resource mobilization theory-has become increasingly popular. One of the most basic points of disagreement between theorists accepting one or the other general perspective involves the extent to which the development and growth of a social movement can be attributed to the preconditions of social stress or some form of deprivation. This article begins by describing how the two perspectives are indirectly rooted in differing paradigms of social organization, which leads to divergent assumptions about the nature of social conflict and social order. Next, theoretical and empirical problems contained in each perspective are shown to be partially related to these assumptions. Finally, a continuum describing "movements of crisis" and "movements of affluence" is constructed to suggest that the structural conditions inviting social movement activity are varied. When such variance is recognized, we find there is a place for both theories in the complex field of study, though deprivation theories especially face many continuing problems.

The study of social movements and collective behavior proliferated in the 1960s. With this new interest, and building on the earlier work of the "Chicago school," a general social stress or deprivation perspective emerged into a dominant theoretical position. Though there are both social psychological (e.g., Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970) and structural variants of this perspective (e.g., Smelser, 1963; Johnson, 1966), the general perspective continues to direct theorists to situations producing individual-level stress or discontent as a major cause of social

movement development. In the 1970s, several works appeared under the general label of "resource mobilization" that seriously questioned the basic assumptions of the social stress or deprivation perspective.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, the current belief suggests that there is sufficient deprivation, or simply demands, in any society so that deprivation need not be a key element to understanding the development of social movements (see especially McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1215). In place of the deprivation assumption, the resource mobilization perspective focuses attention on the ability of social movement promoters to gain and manipulate resources of power, to organize, to recruit members from existing voluntary association networks, and to provide individual incentives or coercion in motivating participation in social movement activities.

The resource mobilization perspective has without question added new dimensions to our understanding of the growth of social movements. Many of the criticisms directed toward deprivation explanations by resource mobilization theorists are valuable, but the time is ripe for more critical analysis of resource mobilization theory itself. Some of this criticism has already appeared (see Fireman and Gamson, 1979) in the form of a reanalysis of the utilitarian logic of Olson's (1965) thesis of collective action (a thesis that helped stimulate the development of the resource mobilization perspective). Others have noted (with as yet no detailed analysis) that resource mobilization theory may not adequately explain the development of all kinds of social movements and collective violence (Perrow, 1979; Snyder and Kelly, 1979: 221).

This article is intended to expand this criticism of resource mobilization theory, if only in a tentative manner. I will first briefly explore some of the underlying paradigmatic assumptions of both deprivation and resource mobilization theory, and then show how these assumptions have led to diverging views of social movements. Following this, I will note some of the now standard criticisms of deprivation arguments, and then review problems inherent in resource mobilization arguments. It should be noted that my focus at this point will be on the variety of resource mobilization theories referred to by Perrow (1979) as "RM II" (see note 1). Finally, a continuum will be constructed describing what I will call "movements of crisis" and "movements of affluence" to suggest that neither deprivation theories nor resource mobilization theories alone have adequately explained the early development of all types of social movements.

**1. I will use the term "resource mobilization" for the works of McCarthy and Zald (1977), Zald and McCarthy (1979), and Zald and Berger (1978), though similar terms have been suggested by others-e.g., "resources management" (Oberschall, 1973) and "power struggles" (Snyder and Tilly, 1972). All of these theorists are referring to the same general set of resource variables in the growth and development of social movements. However, the rejection of deprivation theories is strongest in the works of McCarthy and Zald, which has led Perrow (1979) to separate these theorists into "RM I" (e.g., Oberschall, Tilly, Gamison) and "RM II" (e.g., McCarthy and Zald). Most of the criticism and analysis to follow in this article pertain to the theories Perrow groups under "RM II.**

## THE PARADIGMATIC BASE

The idea of competing social science paradigms has been explored in various ways by several theorists. One standard view is that there are competing "order" and "conflict" paradigms from which competing theories of society are drawn. For our purposes, however, a more complex scheme, giving recognition especially to the diversity of conflict assumptions, is more useful (see Strasser, 1976; Kerbo, forthcoming: 4). Although the most popular? stress or discontent explanations of social movements have roots in an order paradigm, the resource mobilization perspective must be seen as rooted in a particular type of conflict paradigm.

Identifying the paradigmatic roots of the more macrosocial stress models of social movements presents few problems. The work of Smelser (1963) and Johnson (1966), for example, begins from a structural-functional analysis of society. If it is a paradigm that directs the scientist's attention to "certain facts" and influences the manner in which theoretical and empirical problems are conceptualized (Kuhn, 1970), then it is this order paradigm that directs attention to problems of systemic stress and disorder in explaining the development of psychological discontent and social movements (for example, see Smelser, 1963: 47). The underlying assumptions of the more social-psychologically oriented stress or deprivation models of social movements are less explicitly tied to an order paradigm, but they too have roots in this paradigm. Gurr (1973: 371) himself argues that social-psychological models such as his are complementary to Smelser's and Johnson's structural models. For example, anomie, defined as a disjuncture between socially constructed means and goals, parallels Gurr's definition of relative deprivation as a gap between value capabilities and value expectations (as Gurr, 1970: 24, 42, makes clear).

If we are to understand adequately the paradigmatic base of the resource mobilization perspective, we must first dispel the misconception formed by placing all conflict theories under one general paradigm. For, though these theories focus on power and conflict as key factors in understanding social structures, it is clear they have differing views about the nature of conflict. One group of conflict theorists (for example, Karl Marx; Mills, 1956; Bottomore, 1966) see inequality and conflict as "problematic." That is, inequality and conflict are not seen as inherent in human nature or human societies but as something that is in a sense "unnatural," the product of "temporary" social structures (see Giddens, 1973: 25; Kerbo, forthcoming; Strasser, 1976). For theorists such as Coser (1956, 1967) and Dahrendorf (1959), on the other hand, inequality and conflict are not "unnatural," but continuing and constant aspects of human societies. Most important for the present analysis, this second group of conflict theories makes the development of inequality and class conflict a secondary question, while making problematic the question of how various groups or individuals use and gain power for their own self-interests. The significance of the repeated argument that there are always enough

inequalities, demands, and claims on valued resources to spark social movements (see Tilly, 1973: 437; McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1215; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977: 266) can be better understood when we recognize the particular conflict base of the resource mobilization perspective. As Oberschall (1973: 33) states, "Social conflict arises from the structured arrangement of individuals and groups in a social system-from the very fact of social organization."

The main point of the preceding discussion is not that all deprivation or resource mobilization theories are in agreement on all points and equally in opposition to the other perspective. However, it must be recognized that the two competing perspectives on the development and growth of social movements are rooted in differing social scientific paradigms. Because the strain and deprivation theories view society through the selective lens of an order paradigm, discontent and conflict are considered unnatural and in need of explanation. Because the resource mobilization perspective views society through the selective lens of the particular type of conflict paradigm noted above, the existence of conflict, inequalities, and demands is considered less problematic-such conditions are simply assumed to be a product of all social organizations. What becomes problematic and in need of explanation is how changing conditions lead opposing interest groups to attain more resources and press for demands.

The differing views taken by the deprivation and resource mobilization perspectives on the development of the black civil rights movement serve as an example of the above discussion. From the deprivation perspective, of course, the civil rights movement was born of increasing discontent. Davies (1969) attempts to show how improving objective conditions produced higher expectations among blacks in the United States, and thus more relative deprivation. Those following a general resource mobilization perspective, however, view the same historical conditions in a different light. To the extent that conditions were improving for blacks in the United States since World War II, it was not increasing discontent that sparked the movement but improved resources for mobilization (Oberschall, 1973). In an almost classical case of paradigm conflict, the same historical information can be interpreted differently to support differing theories.

Our next consideration must be the effect of these differing assumptions on an adequate understanding of the full range of social movements. As I will attempt to show in the next section of this analysis, though the resource mobilization perspective emerged, in part, because of the inadequacies of the deprivation and structural strain models, it too proves to be inadequate for a full understanding of all social movements.

#### KEY EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS

Following the above description of paradigm assumptions, the primary empirical task of our opposing models of social movements should be clear; when a social movement is born, the empirical search begins for either (1) the source of discontent or (2) the newly emerging resources that made it possible. The outcome of both searches requires brief comment at this point.

For the deprivation theorist, of course, the search has had a longer history. But the success of the search, at best, has been mixed. Many well-known studies have found higher levels of discontent or higher expectations among social movements participants (versus nonparticipants), or objective conditions consistent with the J-curve thesis (believed likely to produce discontent) preceding social movement development. Many other studies, however, have not.

Since the development of relative deprivation theory, considerable research by psychologists has provided continuing support for the general frustration-aggression hypothesis behind the theory (see Berkowitz, 1978). But the key problem for deprivation theorists has been identifying specific conditions that consistently lead to frustration and discontent. For example, in a highly insightful work, Moore (1978) attempts to generalize about what conditions lead individuals to perceive "injustice." Using historical data, Moore argues that there are universal norms of distributive justice (1978: 38, 34) and universal norms of the just use of authority (1978: 26, 28) that, when violated, can lead to anger and revolt. However, the historical data have also led Moore to recognize that norms of justice are highly dependent on historical and cultural circumstances. Thus, what constitutes injustice for one group of people at one point in time may not be considered injustice by others, or even by the same group in different time periods.

Recent research on social stratification has also shown the existence of norms of distributive justice (Alves and Rossi, 1978; Jasso and Rossi, 1977). Such norms can be considered in terms of "value expectations" in Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation model. But the problem is that this research has also shown these norms vary within a society (see also

**2. In examining norms of distributive justice, Alves and Rossi (1978) considered individual judgments on a fair distribution of income in terms of merit and need. What is interesting is that Alves and Rossi found fairness judgments much more restricted than is the actual distribution of income in the United States.**

**3. After developing an "Index of Perceived Inequality," Bell and Robinson (1978, 1980) used a sample of individuals from the United States and England to examine differing perceptions of inequality. Several findings are of interest at this point. Bell and Robinson (1980: 328) found higher perceptions of inequality in the United States. Also, those in the U.S. sample perceived more inequality by class and much more by race (1980: 325). In both countries minorities perceived a higher level of inequality than did white males but more inequalities were perceived by minorities in the United States (1980: 329).**

Robinson and Bell, 1978)<sup>2</sup> The second basic component in Gurr's relative deprivation model is "value capabilities"-or individual perceptions of "actual" opportunities or the distribution of goods and services. But again, recent research has shown that even the perception of actual inequality varies within societies (Bell and Robinson, 1980, 1978).<sup>3</sup>

Thus, a key problem for discontent theories is variance in the level of discontent that may follow the same objective conditions due to variance in justice norms and the perception of inequality. It must be recognized that Gurr (1970), for example, is somewhat aware of this problem, for he adds many secondary variables to his basic relative deprivation model (e.g., salience of affected values). The future may bring some quantification of the many factors producing variance in perceived injustice, but it is unlikely that empirical models of deprivation can ever achieve much precision in this respect. In agreement with Moore, it seems fair to say that some form of discontent is behind all rebellion. Any more precise generalization, however, will probably prove illusive.

Deprivation theories face another, related problem. If some form of discontent is behind all, or even most, social movements, must we say that all social movement participants (in the same or separate social movements) are equally angry or discontented? Can we conclude that participants in the antinuclear movement or antiabortion movement share an anger or fear equal to most participants in the Russian, French, or Iranian revolutions? If we conclude that the level of anger does, in fact, differ among these examples, then we must ask other questions: Why has a lower level of discontent or anger sparked a particular movement? Obviously, other variables are necessary in explaining social movement growth that a stress on discontent and anger has led deprivation theorists to neglect. This, of course, is a primary charge from the resource mobilization perspective. Turning to the resource mobilization thesis, we find the repeated argument that because inequalities and class conflicts are present in all organized societies, there is no need to rely on deprivation explanations to understand social movements. From this viewpoint, ever-present inequalities and class divisions are equated with discontent. No doubt, inequality and class divisions make discontent and collective challenges by subordinate groups a problem of management by superordinate groups, as Dahrendorf (1959) and Coser (1967) point out. But, for one thing, the ideological rejection of these inequalities by subordinates must be made theoretically and empirically problematical. For, as theorists such as Moore (1978), Miliband (1969), and Della Fave (1974, 1980) have noted, superordinate resources for legitimizing these inequalities are numerous, and often successful. However, political or economic "crisis" situations may at times help create something like class consciousness among subordinate groups (Piven and Cloward, 1977: 7-9), an argument that Gamson (1975: 112) misses in his own data showing that over one-half of the social movements in his random sample began in "turbulent times" like the 1930s (Goldstone, 1980).

Most important, however, there is simply too much historical evidence contrary to the resource mobilization argument that changes in the level of deprivation and discontent are not primary moving factors in the development of many social movements or revolutionary challenges. Criticizing Olson's (1965) view of collective action, Salert (1976: 45) notes that this thesis is unable to explain adequately the more spontaneous mass participation behind many revolutionary events such as the early stages of the French Revolution of 1789 (see also Snyder, 1978: 506).

For a specific example, both Olson and McCarthy and Zald refer to the Russian Revolution of 1917. McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1237) argue that the Bolsheviks prevailed because of the "stable resource flows" to their social movement organization, even when they "depended heavily upon isolated conscience constituents." And following the argument that it is "irrational" for an individual to participate in collective action he or she may benefit from without his or her participation (the "free-rider" problem that has received recent empirical criticism; Marwell and Ames, 1979), Olson (1965: 106) writes, "A worker who thought he would benefit from a 'proletarian' government would not find it rational to risk his life and resources to start a revolution against the bourgeois government.... It is natural then that the 'Marxian' revolutions that have taken place have been brought about by small conspiratorial elites that took advantage of weak governments during periods of social dis-organization." It was a "conspiratorial" organization that brought the Bolsheviks to power in the October Revolution of 1917. But this begs the question of what brought about the social disorganization, anger, and crisis that led to mass revolt and made these conspiratorial efforts pay off. The October Revolution was one of organized conspiracy (Salisbury, 1977); but the February Revolution (the critical first stage) was one of upheaval and bread riots in the streets. "Instead of leading, the revolutionaries, like everyone else, had all they could do to keep up with the Russian masses streaming into the broad avenues and prospects of the capital city" (Salisbury, 1977: 352). As Skocpol (1978: 198) writes, "It was not that a communist party created popular organizations ... rather, it first allied with spontaneously created or popularly supported bodies" (see also Skocpol, 1979: 17).

The important point is that movements such as these are sparked by unemployment, food shortages, and/ or conditions following from devastation in war times. Dismissing such factors as important underlying precipitants for social movements, as the resource mobilization thesis does, leads to an adequate explanation of only some types of social movements (what will be called below "movements of affluence"). McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1212) are quite right in noting that traditional theories of social movements have neglected "problems of mobilization, the manufacture of discontent, tactical choices, and the infrastructure of society and movements necessary for success," while placing "emphasis upon structural strain, generalized belief, and deprivation." But, a major argument of this article is that neither set of

factors should be neglected in a complete theory of social movements. With some types of social movements (e.g., what will be described as "crisis movements"), factors considered by resource mobilization theorists can help us understand the success or failure of a movement, but not what produced the movement.

#### MOVEMENTS OF "CRISIS" AND MOVEMENTS OF "AFFLUENCE"

Following the discussion thus far, it could be suggested that these two perspectives on social movements are simply asking different questions about the subject matter. This, of course, is one outcome of paradigm conflict. However, for those taking the extreme positions in both perspectives (e.g., Davies, 1962, 1969, versus McCarthy and Zald, 1977), they are not just "talking past one another" (as Kuhn, 1970, puts it) but mutually rejecting main components of the opposing theory.

What must be recognized is that, at the point of development, there can be differing socioeconomic conditions from which social movements are spawned. Depending on these conditions, the mix of conceptual tools needed in order to understand a social movement adequately may differ. Having reviewed the literature on social movements, collective behavior, revolutions, and especially the debate between deprivation and resource mobilization theorists, I believe the following elementary classification can provide a beginning in better understanding the underlying base of preconditions for social movement development. The concepts "crisis movements" and "affluence movements" are admittedly exaggerated. Certainly this classification should be refined and expanded, but it will serve our present purpose of unraveling the controversy between the competing perspectives of social movements outlined in this article.

As shown in Figure 1, the differing socioeconomic conditions for major participants in a particular social movement suggest that movements can be placed on a continuum ranging from movements of crisis to movements of affluence. By movements of crisis, I am referring to collective action brought about by life-disrupting situations, including (but not limited to) widespread unemployment, food shortages, and major social dislocations. Under conditions of extreme social disruption or crisis, daily routines become increasingly impossible. We can assume that some form of discontent and fear would follow these crisis situations, but I am not suggesting that conditions producing some type of deprivation, discontent, or anger are all that is needed to explain the long-term development of this type of social movement, nor am I stressing any specific pattern of discontent such as J curve, decremental deprivation, absolute deprivation, or simply unstable, fluctuating rewards or satisfactions. However, with movements flowing from these extreme conditions, an explanation beginning with an examination of social disruption is especially needed (see Piven and Cloward, 1977: 7-11).



By movements of affluence I am referring to collective action in which the major participants are not motivated by immediate life-threatening situations of political or economic crisis, but rather, have their basic needs of life met, or even in abundance. In fact, it is because these basic needs have been met that they have surplus resources such as time, money, and even energy to devote to social movement activity. Individuals participating in these types of social movements are often what McCarthy and Zald (1977: 1222) refer to as "conscience adherents" (individuals who are participating in the movement but do not stand to benefit directly from the achievement of movement goals). But clearly there are affluence movements made up primarily of "beneficiary" members (members who stand to benefit personally from the success of the movement). The major point is that because human needs are met, and the members have surplus resources to devote to movement activity, new claims can be made.

These movements of affluence seem most in line with McCarthy and Zald's (1977: 1224-1225) hypotheses suggesting that,

as the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite publics increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the social movement sector increases, [and thus] the greater the absolute amount of resources available to the social movement sector, the greater the likelihood that new social movement industries and social movement organizations will develop to compete for these resources.

It should be seen that these hypotheses apply best to periods such as the 1960s in the United States, when relatively comfortable individuals (in terms of having life necessities met) could be found in large numbers participating in movements evolving around moral or conscience issues. But contrary to McCarthy and Zald's hypotheses cited above, it may conversely be suggested that, as the amount of resources of mass and/or elite publics decreases to the point of crisis, the greater is the likelihood that new social movements and social movement organizations will develop in response to the crisis. As stated above, the overall amount of resources McCarthy and Zald argue is needed for movement activity may have decreased. However, at least for some groups, such as the unemployed, resources such as time have increased, and they may be more willing to devote scarce resources in helping overcome or change what they believe are the underlying conditions of crisis. Examples of movements of this type can be found in periods such as the 1930s in the United States-like the 1960s, another high point of social movement activity.<sup>4</sup> Also, it should be noted that movements in these crisis periods are at first often less organized and more "spontaneous" (see Piven and Cloward, 1977). Thus, what McCarthy and Zald (1977) call "social movement organizations," the "social movement sector," and the "social movement industry" would be at first less developed and less likely to precede the outbreak of social movement activities.

Referring to Figure 1, the following contrasting characteristics of movements lying on the extremes of the continuum may be described.<sup>5</sup>

(1) By definition, movements of crisis develop from times of severe economic and political disruption for at least a significant number in the society, while movements of affluence are more likely to develop during times of relative well-being (economic and / or political). For example, it has been noted by many (see Stohl, 1976: 114; Korpi, 1974: 1577; Olson, 1956: 80) that industrial workers are more likely to strike in times of low unemployment because their chances for success and resources for doing so are greater. It also seems that strikes during relatively good economic times occur in great part because of prior organization, as the resource mobilization thesis suggests. But there is some relationship between strikes and very poor economic times-in times when severe wage reductions may push workers to strike without the prior benefit of organization (Piven and Cloward, 1977; Snyder, 1975: 263).

(2) Movements of crisis are made up primarily of beneficiary members (individuals experiencing life-threatening conditions), while movements of affluence may have a higher number of conscience members (individuals motivated primarily by ideology and moral issues who have surplus resources to devote to causes from which they benefit less directly). The above suggests affluence movements may have more conscience members because there are clearly movements during times of affluence made up primarily of beneficiary members (such

**4. Following the logic of Figure 1, as we move toward the middle of the continuum (from either end), we would expect the potential for social movement activity to decrease. While such speculation must remain an empirical question, it is based on the idea that both reduced deprivation (or less threat of crisis) and fewer mobilization resources would result in a moderately unhappy or anxious population unable to mount a collective challenge toward what its members may perceive as their problems. This, of course, is not to say that social movement activity at the midpoint of the continuum is impossible; though the deprivation and anger may be less than toward the extreme left of the continuum, mobilization resources would be somewhat more abundant. But the logic of this argument is consistent with high points of social movement activity in times such as the 1930s and 1960s in the United States.**

**5. From his review of history, Tilly suggests he can identify two types of political movements: (1) reactive, in which participants are reacting against losses and new demands made by dominant groups, and (2) proactive, in which participants are reacting to new opportunities to press for new claims of their own (see Tilly et al., 1975; Tilly, 1978). In a very general sense, reactive and proactive movements can be seen as similar to movements of crisis and movements of affluence. However, Tilly's analysis creates problems in that he continues to reject or play down the importance of discontent and deprivation in the development of social movements (even though in his historical case studies he must revert time and again to describing the anger and felt crisis on the part of reactive movement participants). Following the main argument of this article, we may agree with Tilly that deprivation explanations have been overused. But at the same time, we may disagree with Tilly by suggesting that some form of deprivation explanation remains useful in understanding movements of crisis (or reactive movements), while movements of affluence (or proactive movements) are best understood with resource mobilization variables.**

as industrial workers) who have the advantages of prior organization and more discretionary resources.

(3) Movements of crisis are made up primarily of members who are "movement specific"-that is, individuals who are motivated by a more specific issue that is personally threatening (such as unemployment) and are less likely to join other movements attacking more remote issues. Movements of affluence, however, are more likely to have members who are less movement specific-that is, they are also likely to be members of movements (at the same time or later) attacking a diverse range of moral or conscience issues. Frendrich (1977) for example, has found that whites and the more affluent involved in the civil rights movement were more likely to become involved in other types of social movements.

(4) Movements of crisis are more likely (at least in the early stages) to be relatively unorganized and to develop more spontaneously, while movements of affluence are more likely to begin with (or from) a social movement organization. The latter parallels closely McCarthy and Zald's (1977) arguments about the importance of a social movement organization in the development of a movement or even in the creation of issues. For movements of crisis, however, we find relatively unorganized, spontaneous outbreaks and disruptions that only later (if at all) result in strong social movement organizations. This type of collective action by the unemployed in the 1930s is described by Piven and Cloward (1977). Other examples would include the early stages of the Russian and French revolutions (described above). However, this is not to say that social movement organizations do not develop rapidly, or that some previously organized groups may have a hand in some of the early disruptions and demonstrations (such as communist support for some of the early demonstrations of the unemployed in the 1930s; see Piven and Cloward, 1977: 68). But, contrary to McCarthy and Zald's arguments, it cannot be said that these events developed only after strong social movement organizations appeared (see Piven and Cloward, 1977: 49).

(5) Movements of crisis are more likely in the early stages to be accompanied by hostile outbursts and collective violence than are movements of affluence. This observation follows partially the views of Coser (1956, 1967), Dahrendorf (1959), and Piven and Cloward (1977) that relatively unorganized and less centralized movements result in less control over aggressive factions within the movement, and make conflict resolution more difficult. The main thesis of Piven and Cloward's (1977) recent work, with historical data from four "poor peoples' movements," is that in all of these cases it was the early stages that brought more turmoil and disruption in the streets. The collective violence, however, was later reduced, or brought under control, as the movements became centralized and organized.

(6) Finally, in movements of crisis, active participation in the early events of the movement requires less systematic use of individual incentives or coercion described by Olson

(1965) than is needed in later stages, or in movements of affluence. This follows from the argument that early events in movements of crisis are more spontaneous and unorganized. This is not to say that the "benefit/cost" ratio used in understanding social movement participation by resource mobilization theorists cannot also be used in understanding "collective defiance" or early social movement events in times of crisis. As Granovetter (1978) and Berk (1974) have shown, this benefit/cost ratio can be applied to crowd participation in hostile outbursts and riots. But the systematic use of individual rewards and coercion to promote active participation described by resource mobilization theorists is simply less possible in the early stages of crisis movements.

Space limitations preclude detailed description of the application of the above characteristics of movements to specific cases. It can be briefly suggested, however, that movements falling toward the crisis end of the continuum would include the early events of major revolutions such as the French Revolution of 1789 and Russian Revolution of 1917, and the unemployed workers' and industrial workers' movements of the 1930s in the United States (see Piven and Cloward, 1977). As noted earlier in reference to the Russian Revolution, the "leaders" and social movement organizations were not at first directing the revolution, but trying to ally themselves with the spontaneously created mass revolt (Skocpol, 1978: 198). In the French Revolution of 1789, for example, it was unemployment, the loss of land, food shortages, and "the great fear" that produced the early mass revolt and stimulated the organized activities of the revolution (Skocpol, 1979: 118, 121; Soboul, 1974: 136). In France, 'what made the mass of people into a political force . . . was the seriousness of the economic crisis which was making their lives more and more difficult" (Soboul, 1974: 57). For example, by 1788 in the cities the masses had to spend 58% of their income on bread, while by 1789 this figure was 88% (Soboul, 1974: 55). In the United States during the depression of the 1930s, for most people overall economic conditions were not as extreme as in France during 1789, but the well-being of millions was threatened. In October 1929, there were 429,000 unemployed, but by October 1931, over 12 million were out of work, almost one-fourth of the labor force (Piven and Cloward, 1977: 46). With community or government relief depleted or nonexistent (Piven and Cloward, 1977: 60), "mob looting," rent riots, and riots at relief offices soon developed (as during earlier, less severe depressions in the United States, though on a smaller scale; see Piven and Cloward, 1977: 43-44). As in France and Russia, previously organized groups or rapidly organizing groups quickly attempted to ally themselves with the mass revolt.

Movements falling toward the affluence end of the continuum would include the antiabortion campaign, the environmental movement, the antipornography campaign, and the antinuclear movement. Here the issues are better described as moral issues, and the participants are best described as "conscience members." Following the resource mobilization perspective, Kronus (1977) was able to show that an existing network of voluntary associations,

rather than strong discontent, has been critical in mobilizing activity in a segment of the environmental movement, while the same was found by Zurcher et al. (1971) for an anti-pornography campaign. This is not to say that members of these movements were not angry or experiencing discontent. But they were not experiencing immediate life-threatening situations; on the contrary, these people tend to be secure in their jobs and have average or above-average incomes (see Zurcher et al., 1971). It is because these people have more "discretionary resources" and have contact with an existing voluntary association network that they can be mobilized for such moral concerns.

The above, of course, are examples of movements predominantly directed toward political or economic change in society. But the continuum can be used to understand, for example, conditions underlying the development of broad religious or quasi-religious movements as well. Toward the crisis end of the continuum we could include millenarian movements, revitalization movements, and cargo cults, while the affluence end would include movements such as the pentecostal movement (see Gerlach and Hine, 1970) and the temperance movement. Thus, because the continuum is concerned only with conditions promoting social movement development and mobilization, movements with varying goals, ideology, and tactics can be considered.

It may be helpful at this point to note some recent data on a revitalization movement. Carroll (1975) examined the acceptance versus nonacceptance of the Ghost Dance movement among American Indian tribes in the late 1800s. Carroll's conclusion was that strong discontent explains acceptance versus nonacceptance. Tribes whose old cultures and lifestyles were threatened by the rapid decline of buffalo were more likely to participate. In a more recent study by Thornton (1981), tribal acceptance of the Ghost Dance was found strongly related to rapid population decline. And further, this relationship was much stronger among smaller tribes that had population declines of 50% or more over

## CONCLUSION

A number of points require emphasis in concluding this theoretical discussion. First, as is obvious, the above description of movements of crisis and movements of affluence is highly abstract. Its value is as a conceptual tool in directing observations on the diverse, underlying structural conditions that make social movement activity more likely. And in doing so it should be helpful in clearing up some of the disagreements between discontent and resource mobilization theories. Most often the key focus of discontent theories has been conditions similar to what I have described (with some admitted oversimplification) as crisis. When many movements in the 1960s emerged with participants who could not be described as desperate

or experiencing high relative deprivation, the focus of resource mobilization theories moved to what I have described as conditions of affluence. A basic point of the above discussion, however, is that we must recognize that social movements may differ in terms of their preconditions. The continuing debate between theorists from the two perspectives has led some to call for a synthesis (e.g., Useem and Useem, 1979; Korpi, 1974). However, it is not so much a synthesis that is needed, but a recognition that social movements are not all alike in their underlying preconditions for development. With such a complex subject matter, grand theory may be a fading hope.

Second, the descriptions of movements of crisis and movement of affluence have been purposely oversimplified in a number of ways. On the one hand, many specific conditions may constitute a crisis or affluence. This is to say that, rather than one continuum of crisis versus affluence, we could consider several. For example, conditions may vary with respect to employment opportunities, the cost and abundance of basic necessities, or political freedom or oppression, to name only a few. All of the conditions may or may not vary together; thus, the researcher must think in terms of the overall degree of crisis or affluence. Further, various combinations of crisis and affluence with respect to the separate continua may be more conducive to social movement activity (e.g., a crisis with respect to basic necessities, but affluence with respect to the freedom from political constraints). On the other hand, the overall population may not be equal in the degree of crisis versus affluence of its members; thus, the researcher must also think in terms of the scope of the population experiencing crisis versus affluence. If the potential membership base for a social movement (e.g., a socioeconomic class or ethnic group) has a high percentage of its population experiencing conditions of crisis or affluence, then social movement activity would seem more likely.

Third, the above discussion has not contributed much to helping discontent theorists solve the problem of what objective conditions are most likely to result in injustice, anger, or discontent. Casual observation shows us that social movement participants are filled with a sense of injustice. But current theory has been relatively unsuccessful in generalizing the precise conditions that lead to a sense of injustice. If this article has made a contribution to this theoretical problem, it has done so by pointing out that when a personal crisis is experienced, the sense of injustice may be deeper, thus requiring fewer resources described by resource mobilization theorists to spark a social movement. Participants in movements of affluence, no doubt, also feel a sense of injustice. But this sense of injustice may be less personal and less severe, thus requiring more movement resources and encouragement to motivate their social movement activity.

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Movements of Crisis

- 1) Preconditions found in times of life threatening political and/or socioeconomic crisis
- 2) Participants primarily beneficiary members
- 3) Participants primarily movement specific
- 4) Early stage of the movements usually spontaneous and relatively unorganized
- 5) Collective violence and hostile outbursts more often involved (at least in early stages)
- 6) Less systematic use of individual incentives to motivate movement participation (at least in early stage)

Movements of Affluence

- 1) Preconditions found in times of affluence or relatively good political and economic periods
- 2) Participants often include a greater number of conscience members
- 3) Participants often multi-movement oriented
- 4) Movements more likely to begin with a social movement organization and leadership structure
- 5) Less likely to involve collective violence and hostile outbursts
- 6) The systematic use of individual incentives to motivate movement participation

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**Figure 1: Movements of Crisis and Affluence: Continuum of Differing Movement Characteristics**