

## Reviews

The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films etc.) which are concerned in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human animals. These reviews will be both critical and reportive--primarily reportive in the case of most scientific and historical material, and increasingly critical as the material is more argumentative and philosophical. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Second Opinions' and contains second (and usually dissenting) reviews of works reviewed in the first part in earlier numbers of E&A. After a review appears in E&A (and after the 'second opinion' if one appears within the next two numbers) the Editor will invite the author of the original work to submit a brief rejoinder to the review(s). Rejoinders received will appear in the third part of the Review Section. Members of the SSEA who wish to submit reviews (first or second), or recommend works for review, should contact the Editor.

## Books

JOHN HICK, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, (PRENTICE-HALL, INC.) 1963, III pp., \$6.95.

An issue of long standing in the philosophy of religion is the problem of evil. Philosophers recognize two kinds of evil, moral evil and nonmoral evil. "Moral evil" refers to the pain and suffering which results from the acts of persons. "Nonmoral evil" refers to the pain and suffering arising from natural causes such as storms, fires and earthquakes. The problem of evil consists in noting that, if God is perfectly loving, then he must wish to prevent evil. Furthermore, if he is all-powerful, then he must be able to prevent evil. Yet, evil exists. Therefore, God is either not perfectly loving or else he is not all-powerful.

John Hick addresses himself to this issue in his book, The Philosophy of Religion. His solution consists in arguing that moral evil is a result of man's free will. To demand that God not allow this kind of evil is equivalent to a demand that he not create persons. For a person, Hick tells us, is "a (relatively) free and self-directing agent responsible for one's own decisions." Moral evil flows from the misuse of this freedom. Nonmoral evil exists because of the operation of causal laws. If there were no nonmoral evil, God would have to continually

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intervene in the daily affairs of the world. When a person falls over a cliff, for example, the law of gravitation would have to be suspended to prevent his injuring himself. If occupants of automobiles were not to be injured in collisions, the law of inertia would need to be suspended.

It turns out on Hick's analysis, that pain and suffering, whether resulting from human agency or the operations of nature, is good for the soul. This process of "soul-building," Hick argues, "must continue beyond this life if it is ever to achieve more than a very partial and fragmentary success." Overlooking for present purposes any problems with this theory, we are entitled, I believe, to require of Hick an explanation of animal pain. According to orthodox views, animals do not have souls. It follows from this that they cannot benefit from the experience of pain and suffering. If orthodoxy wishes to opt for souls for animals, then we must treat them as our brothers. We must recognize their rights and place them on a plane equal to our own. If, however, orthodoxy elects to deny souls to animals, it owes us an explanation of the truly frightful amount of pain befalling animals from both the acts of man and the operations of nature. Without such an explanation, we can only stand in stupefied disbelief before the claim that God is both perfectly loving and all-powerful.

Robert L. Greenwood  
University of South Alabama