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IGBO WOMEN, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES AND PROTESTS (1946-1953)

John Oriji, History Department

The historiography of “women and technology” has continued to grow at a fast pace since the 1960s. The momentum it gained in the US, for example, is largely due to the contributions of feminist scholars who have questioned the male orientation of existing works, derisively labeled as “his-
tory” which they argue, marginalizes the contributions of women to technological innovations.¹

The broad spectrum of issues addressed by feminist scholarship, however, deals largely with the United States and other “western” nations. African women are hardly mentioned, except in foot-
notes or where they are used to reinforce the popular images of “passive and primitive women,” who lack the capacity to resist and adapt to the demands of modern technological changes.

Using examples from Igboland and other parts of Southeastern Nigeria, this paper will question the aforementioned stereotypes and show that African women were actively involved in protesting against new technologies they reasoned threatened their economic and social interests. In addition to discussing the protests in a diachronic perspective, the paper hopes to raise some theoretical issues that may be helpful in understanding their underlying historical roots and significance in the history of Nigeria and the larger world.

Theoretical Issues

No single theory can fully explain how and why Igbo women protested against technological inno-
vations during colonialism. Each theory, as the present writer and others have argued elsewhere, has its merits and limitations, and the best one can do under the circumstance is to select theories that presumably provide the best analytical insights to the subject-matter one is discussing.² A broad review of two theories relevant to this research are provided below:

The Center Periphery Theory

Events in history are best understood in terms of the principal characters involved and the time dimension and spatial contexts in which they occurred. Although the center periphery theory lacks time dimension, if it is applied to the colonial period, it offers valuable insight on how the varying roles the main characters performed in the political economy of Southeastern Nigeria helped in triggering off the women's protests. At the center of the theory, were British colonial officers, manufacturers, and merchants (multinational corporations) while women and others in the colony stood at the periphery, serving as consumers of imported technologies and goods and producers of raw materials.³ It must not, however, be imagined that the colonial officers and multi-nationals always acted in concert to introduce new technologies to increase production of palm oil and kernel and ruthlessly exploit the periphery.⁴ Surely, those in the center shared some common broad goals in terms of advancing British political and economic interests. But as this study will show, many colonial officers were concerned about the disruptive effects of the new technologies, and they took various measures to ensure that women and others were consulted before the technologies were introduced. Similarly, the periphery did not act in unison; each locality organized its protests independently, and in some cases, some powerful men whose interests ran counter to those of women were able to use their influence to buy and introduce the new technologies in their community.

The Conflict and Equilibrium Theory

The protests marked a period of intense conflict between the center and the periphery, generating a lot of suspicions on both sides. But from 1953, the perceptions of women began to change, and the new technologies were introduced in many areas without any resistance, leading to the restoration of peace or "equilibrium." The problem with this theory is that it draws a fine line between the periods of conflict and equilibrium, whereas, in reality, such a distinction may appear illusive.⁵ A period of equilibrium may be transitional, preparing the way for more conflicts. In fact, Igbo women continued their tradition of protests in the 1950s, although the roots of the protests, and their organizational strategy, differed from the previous ones.⁶

Technology and Protests: The Global Dimension

The Luddites of England (1831) and Linotype Technicians (1975)

Technology, as many experts have pointed out, is not a neutral tool. Its introduction affects individuals, and groups in varying ways and those who feel threatened are likely going to engage in protests to articulate their grievances. A case in point are the Luddites of England who, for diverse reasons, protested against the increased mechanization of the textile industry. Many in the cropping unit, for example, smashed innovative cropping machines they feared would take over their jobs and keep them unemployed.⁷

Although the Luddites lived in a different age and environment, it is noteworthy that similar protests against technological changes occurred in the U.S. recently. For example, newspaper linotype technicians protested in Washington D.C. in 1975 against computerized typesetting equipment they feared threatened their jobs. Many of them were reported to have got involved “in large-scale industrial sabotage.”⁸

The Example of Igbo Women of Southeastern Nigeria

Igbo women were a primary organ of interest-articulation during colonialism. They organized, for example, the famous Aba Women’s revolt of 1929, which has continued to attract much scholarly inquiry and discourse, and mobilized themselves to protest against the colonial situation and the harsh economic conditions of the 1930s and early 1940s.⁹ As this study will show, Igbo women, and others from parts of Southeastern Nigeria were also actively involved in protesting against the introduction of new technologies in palm produce production between 1946-53. To better understand their reasons for protesting against the new technologies, it is necessary to provide a brief ecological and historical background of Southeastern Nigeria.

Ecological and Historical Background

Southeastern Nigeria has been a major exporter of palm oil and kernel (palm produce) to England since the 19th century. It is reputed to have the densest palm groves in the world, and the oil content of palm fruits from the region, in relation to their weight, stands out to be the highest in West Africa.¹⁰

The need for palm produce arose in England for a variety of reasons. During the heydays of the industrial revolution, there was remarkable demand for vegetable oils to replace the infamous slave trade that had been abolished in the 1850s. Palm oil and kernel became the major export commodity from then because they were used in manufacturing bath soap for industrial workers, candles, and lubricants. In addition, they were essential ingredients needed for the production of edibles like margarine and cookies, and residues from oil palm kernels were used in feeding pigs. Palm oil became a much more needed commodity during WWI when the ammunitions industry discovered that it was a valuable ingredient in manufacturing glycerine.¹¹

Roots of the Protests: Mechanization of Palm Produce Production in the 1940s

The decision to mechanize palm produce production was largely made by the colonial office in London, its agents in Nigeria, and multinational trading and manufacturing companies. The need for mechanization stemmed from various economic and political imperatives which drove colonial policies during and after World War I and World War II, especially the global economic depression which heightened the quest for increased revenue for running the colonial administration. The economic situation in Nigeria after World War I, for example, was so grim that the colonial government had to dip its hands into government reserves to meet its financial obligations between 1914-16.¹² The situation worsened during World War II when the Japanese occupied the palm oil producing

region of southeast Asia, (Malaya and Sumatra) cutting off British supplies of palm produce. The remarkable drop in palm produce production in Southeastern Nigeria is affirmed by statistical evidence which indicates that between 1909-13 and 1926-30, the export of palm produce increased to 80% and 70% respectively, whereas between 1926-30 and 1935-39, palm oil and kernel exports increased only by 35% and 45% respectively.¹³

British policy during and after World War I and World War II was then geared towards finding ways and means of jump-starting the economy by increasing the levels of palm oil and kernel production. As will be discussed, many options were considered, but the most attractive one, bearing the abysmal economic situation in mind, was the model of Southeast Asia whose oil palm industry had been modernized by mechanization. To justify the introduction of the Southeast Asian model, many in official circles began to criticize the indigenous methods of production which were labeled as “primitive,” “crude” and “wasteful” and contributory to the declining exports of palm oil and kernel.¹⁴

Strategies for Increasing Palm Produce Production: Introduction of High Yield Strains of Oil-Palm Seedlings “Deli Palms”

The administration adopted two main strategies to increase palm produce production. The first one executed by the Agricultural Department was meant to offer technical assistance to small holders who had received its new, high oil-rich strains of palm seedlings similar to the Deli Palms of Sumatra. By the end of 1929, the Agricultural Department had set up 27 plots in Onitsha, Owerri, and Calabar Provinces to facilitate the distribution of the new seedlings to local farmers. The government followed this measure up in 1935 by offering an incentive amounting to about 5% rebate in export duty to farmers who had registered their plot of at least five acres planted with the new seedlings. Although some farmers probably falsified their figures to benefit from the project, the incentives yielded positive results. The number of registered farmers and their plots of lands increased astronomically from 707 cultivating 1457 acres in 1934 to 5602 cultivating 10551 acres in 1939.

The “Deli Palms” experiment, however, proved to be a disaster when it was realized that the new strains of oil palm seedlings were unable to adapt to the Nigerian environment, and many of them died due to the “yellowing disease.” The Agricultural Department then had to abandon the importation of more “Deli palms” to eastern Nigerian from 1929.

First Phase of Mechanization: Nut Cracking Machines, Hand Presses, and the Genesis of Protests

The failure of the “Deli palm experiment” heightened the need to find alternative means of increasing palm produce production, leading to implementation of the second strategy involving the mechanization of the oil palm industry. It began with a modest policy of collaborating with British manufacturers to develop nut cracking machines and hand presses that would be respectively more efficient in production of palm kernel and extraction of oil palm. When the nut cracking machines

were produced, women refused to use them and even boycotted selling uncracked palm kernels to foreign traders who had nut cracking machines.¹⁵

As for the hand presses, their introduction appears to have been more successful than the nut cracking machines, although as will be discussed later, it helped in alienating women. The initial presses manufactured were advertised to have extraction efficiency of 80-85% in comparison to 55-60% of the manual or traditional method.¹⁶ But due to the prohibitive costs of the presses costing about 17 pounds, 10 shillings in 1920s, only rich male traders and public servants were able to buy them. It's interesting to note that the first wealthy planter to buy a hand press in 1927 from the United Africa Company (UAC) was "Chief Benstowe of Azumini." By 1928, only three more men were reported to have bought the presses. The popularity of the presses had increased by 1938 when eastern Nigerians owned 362 out of a total of 390 presses that existed in southern Nigeria. The demand for the presses continued to rise, and by 1940, 1048 were reported to have been sold, while 150 potential buyers were placed on the waiting list.¹⁷

The introduction of hand presses further posed a threat to the economic livelihood of women and the division of labor in the family. It created a situation in which men came to dominate not only the production but also the marketing of palm oil and kernel. As N. Mba correctly noted, women opposed the hand presses because:

Men who owned them kept the palm kernels for themselves, and thus deprived women of a major source of income. [The hand presses helped men gain] greater participation in the extraction of oil, which brought a further redistribution of labor activities between sexes.¹⁸

Second Phase of Mechanization. Machine Cracking Kernels, Oil Palm Mills Violent Protests.

Owing to the various ways they were introduced and their productive capacity, which created the need for palm plantations, machine cracking kernels and oil palm mills aroused more violent protests in many parts of Igboland than any of the new technologies. Their introduction followed a technological breakthrough by the United African Company which, in the 1930s, had developed the power- driven "Pioneer Oil Mills"(POMs) that were capable of extracting oil from palm kernels at a rate four times faster than the hand presses. The new technology, which could be outfitted with kernel-cracking machines, was extolled as "the best means that could be devised of introducing more modern and efficient methods of production into the industry without disturbing the present system of individual holdings."¹⁹ In addition, it was argued that the POMs, as an intermediate technology, could serve an area of about 3-5 radius from its location and help in generating employment for about 24 people including technicians, administrative staff, and laborers.

To help in installing and marketing the POMs, the colonial administration, in 1949, established the Nigerian Palm Produce Marketing Board and the Eastern Regional Produce Development Board and provided them with loans to be given to farmers who wished to buy the mills. The loan incen-

tive is helpful in understanding why the number of farmers who purchased the mills in Nigeria increased rapidly, from 5 mills between 1946-49, to 145 by 1960, and about 80% of them were located in Southeastern Nigeria.²⁰

Women and their Opposition to the POMs: Ndiya (Uyo Division) 1946

There was widespread opposition by women against the POMs in various parts of Southeastern Nigeria, especially in the palm oil belt of Calabar and Owerri Provinces. One of the earliest recorded protests broke out in Ndiya in Uyo Division in 1946 when the government wanted to build a mill near the Qua Iboe River. In a mass meeting with the District Officer (DO), the women who naturally felt threatened by the project asked him: "What shall we do, insofar as we know that if the mill is owned and run by men we will be thrown out of a job?"²¹

The women then came up with their own proposals, demanding, among other things, that the mills be owned and run by them, while men served as paid laborers. As for the high cost of a mill, amounting to about 25,000 British pounds in 1946, the women asked that they be allowed to repay over time the cost of installing the mill after selling palm produce to men. Fearing that the situation might get out of control, the DO referred the matter to the Ndiya Council for deliberation. Council members wisely voted against the establishment of the mill in order not to arouse the displeasure of the women.

Women's Protests in Amuro, Okigwe Division (1946) and Owerrinta Aba Division (1947)

As in Ndiya, women in other parts of Southeastern Nigeria continued to mount opposition against the establishment of the POMs. The Amuro Group Council in Okigwe Division, for example, had to vote down a proposal to establish a mill in its area of jurisdiction on the grounds that the mill would increase prices of palm produce and create pollution. Similarly, efforts made to build a mill at Owerrinta, in Aba Division, were said to have been frustrated by the natives who refused to give land for the project.²²

The persistent opposition against the mills was a major source of concern to the colonial administration who decided, in January 1947, to hold a meeting of the Residents of the Eastern Provinces to discuss the matter and find a solution to the problem. The Residents recommended that the POMs should be abandoned to avoid the looming crisis in the Province. But as the Nsulu example illustrates, the recommendation was largely ignored by influential men, who by their actions, helped in precipitating more oil mill protests. The Nsulu example is indeed significant since it sheds more light on various other factors that contributed to the protests.

The Nsulu Protest of 1948 and the POMs of Chief Josiah Wachuku

Perhaps, the most violent revolt in Igboland against the POM took place in the Nsulu community in the then Northern Ngwa County Council. A major cause of the revolt is traceable to some of the "false steps" Chief Josiah Wachuku took to establish his mill. As already noted, the administration had, in early 1947, placed a moratorium on the establishment of mills in eastern region. Yet Chief

Wachuku used partly his influence and partly some disingenuous measures to get an approval for his mill. He was, in the 1940s, the president of the Nsulu Native Court and Nsulu Group Council. Women were upset when they learned that Chief Wachuku, in his application for the mill, had misinformed the DO by claiming that they and members of the Nsulu Group Council had been consulted about the project.²³

More importantly, the ways in which Chief Wachuku went about acquiring land for the mill, and the large palm plantations he hoped to establish, created a lot of misgivings in Nsulu and some nearby communities. Although the initial land where the mill was scheduled to be located belonged largely to Umuala village of Nsulu, the other part was said to have been pledged to one Odoh Anugwa of Ubaha village, also in the same community. But rumor, which later proved to be true, had it that the entire land had been confiscated by the “government” for the project, and the original owners would not be compensated.²⁴

When the project began on January 3, 1948, women from Ubaha began to protest after they found out that their cassava farms, vegetables, and other crops had been destroyed by laborers hired to install the mill. In a few days, hundreds of women had joined the protest by chasing away the laborers and burning stores on the mill. The number of protesters increased as many women from nearby villages of Umuosu and others as far as Oloko in Bende Division joined the picket line. They began to chant some war songs to strengthen themselves and then moved to Umuala to release prisoners after burning down the native court whose president, as already noted, was Chief Wachuku.²⁵

The controversy surrounding the Umuala-Ubaha land might have convinced Chief Wachuku to use that land for palm plantations and search for a new area for the mill currently located near Nbawsi Grammar School. The land occupied by the mill was originally small in size, but Chief Wachuku used his office to appropriate large acres of land for a palm plantation to feed his mill, extending from parts of Nbawsi to nearby Nvosi community. It is noteworthy that Chief Oyoyo of Umuokori village of Nvosi, a member of the then Nkwo Udara native court, was among those who lost his land. According to his son, the late Eze B. Oyoyo, who became the traditional ruler of Nvosi, his father pronounced a “curse” over their land that had been taken by Chief Wachuku, and cautioned his sons and members of his community not get involved in any form of litigation to recover it.²⁶

Results of the Nsulu Protest

The protest at Nsulu, no doubt, attracted the immediate attention of the government, which took some measures to contain the situation. Thirty-six women who participated in the protest were arrested, and bailed out by their lawyer, Dr. Jaja Wachuku, son of Chief Wachuku, who had returned from Ireland in 1947 after graduating from Dublin university. Three of the women were eventually found guilty, and then fined five pounds, which was paid by their lawyer.²⁷

To forestall future protests, the government instructed the DO to ensure that women, men, and the Nsulu Group hold a meeting to decide if they wanted the mill project. The meeting which

attracted over 3,000-4000 people was held on January 12, 1947, and 90% of the attendees voted against the project.²⁸ Following the Nsulu protest, the Secretary of Eastern Provinces also sent out a circular to residents in February 7, 1948 stressing the need for consultation with women and others before the installation of any mills:

It has always been recognized that women of Ibo country might view the introduction of [an] oil mill with alarm as a measure which might deprive them of their customary profits they derived from the sale of palm kernels. Direct your administrative officers that particular attention should be paid in the future to the possibilities of unfavorable reactions on the part of the women and that women in addition to the Native Authorities and men should be consulted.²⁹

But the Secretary's instructions were not strictly adhered to. It appears that influential men, who continued to apply for the installation of mills in their localities, dealt largely with the Native Authorities, ignoring women. It is then not surprising that much violent protest led by women continued to break out, especially in parts of Calabar Province between 1950-52, until a better strategy for consulting women in the Province was implemented.

An Overview of the Roots of the Protests, and Application of Theories

Conflicting Interests: Varying Perceptions of Technology and Production

The protests of 1946-52 were caused largely by the conflicting interests of the colonial administration and the multi-nationals (the center) and women who were actively involved in palm oil and kernel production (the periphery). The center, for example, extolled the need for mechanization of palm oil and kernel production largely for economic reasons. It hoped for a similar reason that the new technologies would free women from some of the arduous tasks involved in palm produce production and save them more time to invest in other economic activities.

The women, on their own part, were not necessarily protesting against the new technologies per se. Instead, they were primarily concerned about the economic impact of mechanization and its social and political consequences. Surely, available evidence suggests that the protests stemmed primarily from the fact that the women reasoned that their economic interests were threatened by mechanization. They were, for example, concerned that the new technologies, which posed a threat to female property rights, would undermine the traditional method of palm produce production based on sexual division of labor, and thereby, deprive them of the income accruing from palm kernels. The situation was not helped by the economic depression stemming from World War II that led to a sharp decline in family incomes and the volume of imported goods, which created spiral hyperinflation. Evidence of the economic crunch is provided by the fact that the volume of food items like dried and salt fish imported into Nigeria fell from 200,000 to only 21,000 tons between 1942-43.³⁰

Fear of loss of income, and other psychological dimensions of the protests probably made it more difficult, at least at the initial stage, for women to buy the argument that the new technologies would save them more time to be invested in other productive activities. Surely, the traditional method of palm produce production demanded much labor. It took 3 to 5 person-days per tin to produce 36-lb. tin of semi-had oil, using 300 lbs. of palm fruit amounting to about 25-24 clusters.³¹ But traditional societies that were not necessarily concerned with the maximization of production took care of the labor problems in varying ways. Well-to-do men, for example, increased their labor force by marrying many wives, while others who could not afford to do so, got extra help from their own relatives or those of their wife. For women, palm produce production provided a unique opportunity for members of their nuclear and extended families to meet, perform common economic tasks, reinforce their fraternal ties, and even exchange gossip.

Similarly, women feared that mechanization would undermine not only their ability to market palm produce, but the social ties they had established among themselves and in the exchange centers. Their fears are better understood in the light of the fact that marketing palm produce helped women to break the monotony of farm and family work, and as they traveled to exchange centers, many of them developed common bonds of friendship among themselves, exchanging ideas, gossips, and jokes. They also socialized with women involved in retail trade at the exchange centers while buying salt, meat, crayfish, and other food items from them.

As for men, the role some of them played in marketing palm produce is noteworthy. Among the Ngwa, for example, women, after the eastern rail line had been constructed between 1914-15, increasingly sold their palm produce in nearby commercial centers like Aba, Nbwasi, and Omoba either to middle men or directly to European firms. At times, palm kernel was sold to local middlemen known as “Ndi Okoro Akpa” who waited at strategic junctions on market days to haggle prices with women. It is noteworthy that in Nguru Mbaise, men who benefited from the palm produce trade joined women in protesting against the installation of a mill in their community in July 1950.

Women were also concerned about how the ownership of the new technologies undermined the delicate balance of political power in their communities. They did not have the resources to purchase the mills that were emerging as new “symbols” of power in Igboland. In addition, women, as the Nsulu example suggests, feared that they were going to lose their rights over land and farm crops to influential men who purchased the mills.

The crisis helped in intensifying the communication problems that had developed between the center and the periphery. The situation was not helped by the fact that multinational corporations like the UAC, which were driven by the profit motive, at times sold the mills to influential men without necessarily adhering strictly to the official guidelines.

The Era of Equilibrium

As already noted, the colonial government took various measures to ensure that women and others were consulted before mills were established in any community. The DO, for example, was expect-

ed to itemize the names of women leaders and Native Group councils he consulted, the dates meetings were held with them, and then comment on their general reaction to the proposal. The consultations certainly helped in winning the confidence of women and other interest groups, and from 1953 upwards, there were no further protest against the mills.

In accounting for the absence of protests after 1953, one also needs to take into consideration the fact that most men did not patronize the mills because of the economic imbalance and labor problems it would create in the family. Many of them saw it as “a dishonorable and unmanly act” for them to carry palm oil fruits on their heads for sale to the mills, and up until the present day, nearly 80% of the palm produce exported from Southeastern Nigerian is produced by small family farms. The increasing lack of local patronage the mill owners experienced is helpful in understanding why many of them had to establish palm plantations to feed their mills.

The women’s protests against the oil mills are significant in many ways in world history. They help in debunking the myth that African women were simply passive observers of their history. In fact, the protests are in modern times, the only known movements of their type that were led and organized by women against technological innovations. Their roots lay largely in the varying goals of the center and periphery and their misperceptions of the intentions of each other. These problems were exacerbated by the communication gap that was often exploited by vested interest groups. The protests ended when the colonial administration took measures that helped in closing the communication gap that existed between the center and periphery. ☹

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Endnotes

1. For example, see Corlan G. Bush, “Women and the Assessment of Technology,” in A. Teich (ed.), *Technology and the Future*. New York: 1997. 157-179.
2. For a critique of the “conflict and equilibrium” in relation to its application to Igbo society, see J.N.Oriji, *Ngwa History*. New York:1998. 3-4.
3. Exponents of the “Center Periphery/Dependency Theory” include Samir Amin, *Imperialism and Unequal Development*. New York: 1977 and Susan George, *A Fate Worse than Debt: The World Financial Crisis and the Poor*. New York: 1988.
4. Dependency theorists create the misleading impression that the center acted in concert to attain its goals.
5. See: J.Oriji, 1998, p3-4.
6. For a study of these protest movements, see Nina Mba, *Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women’s Political Activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900-1965*. Berkeley: 1982. 98-134.
7. Rudi Volti, *Society & Technological Change*. New York:1992. 21-22.
8. *Ibid.*, 23.

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9. Much has been written about "The Aba Women's Revolt," e.g., see A.E. Afigbo, *The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in South-Eastern Nigeria, 1891-1929* London: 1972. H.A. Gailey, *The Road to Aba*. New York: 1970. Susan Martin, *Palm Oil and Protest: An Economic History of the Ngwa Region, South-Eastern Nigeria, 1800-1980*. New York: 1988 and J.N. Oriji, "Igbo Women From 1929-1960," *West African Review* 2, I August: 2000. 74-102.
10. S.Martin (1988), 47. For major works on the palm produce trade see, D.Northrup, *Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria*. Oxford: 1978 and B.N. Ukegbu, "Production in the Nigerian Oil Palm Industry," unpublished Ph.D. thesis. London University: 1974. For micro studies see, A.J. Latham, *Old Calabar, 1600-1891*. Oxford: 1973. J.N. Oriji, "A Study of the Palm Produce Trade Amongst the Ngwa-Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria," *Cahier d'Etudes Africaines*, 91 , XXIII-3 (1983), 311-328, and Felix Ekechi, "Aspects of Palm Oil Trade at Oguta (Eastern Nigeria) 1900-1950," *African Economic History*, 10 (1981), 35-65.
11. Martin (1988), 56.
12. *Ibid.*, 58.
13. *Ibid.*, 120.
14. *Ibid.*, 60.
15. Mba, *op.cit.*, 106; Ukaegbu (1974), 233.
16. Ukaegbu, *op.cit.*, 230-231.
17. Martn, *op.cit.*, 65.
18. Mba, *op.cit.*, 106-107.
19. *Ibid.*, 106.
20. Martin(1988), 128.
21. Mba, *op.cit.*, 107.
22. *Ibid.*, 108.
23. *Ibid.*, 108-110.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*
26. Information obtained from Eze B. Oyoyo at Umuokiri Nvosi on August 12, 1996. Some local people believe that the "curse" came true in 1998 when the first son of the late James Wachuku, retired Justice Nna Nwa Wachuku who inherited the lion's share of the plantations, was killed by enraged villagers of Umuala after he had accidentally shot a seminarian to death while chasing away thieves who were alleged to have harvested his family palm trees.
27. Mba, 109.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, 110
30. Martin, *op.cit.*, 123.
31. Oriji (1983), 323.