CITY SPACE + GLOBALIZATION

An International Perspective

Editor
Hemalata C. Dandekar

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Proceedings of an International Symposium
College of Architecture and Urban Planning
The University of Michigan
February 26–28, 1998

Hemalata C. Dandekar
Editor

College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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CONTENTS

Preface 1

Acknowledgments 2

Global City, Local Citizenship

1 *Global Space Meets Local Space in the Twenty-first Century* 5
Hemalata C. Dandekar
College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

2 *The Common Good: Assessing the Performance of Cities* 15
John Friedmann
Professor Emeritus at University of California, Los Angeles

Part I: Design, Shape and Culture

City Shape in the Twenty-first Century

3 *Writing the Transnational: The Distant Spaces of the Indian City* 25
Anthony D. King
Department of Art History, State University of New York at Binghamton

4 *Canaletto's Dresden: Rebuilding a Lost Urban Image in a Time of Rapid Change* 32
Raymond Isaacs
School of Landscape Architecture, Louisiana State University

5 *Globalization and the Urban Form: Transformations in Colombo in the 1980s and 1990s* 39
Nihal Perera
College of Architecture and Planning, Ball State University, Indiana

6 *Bazaars in Victorian Arcades: Conserving Bombay's Historic Core* 46
Rahul Mehrotra
Rahul Mehrotra Associates, Bombay, India

7 *Public Open Spaces and Growth: Bombay/ Mumbai* 54
Nandita Godbole
Program of Landscape Architecture, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

8 *Reinventing the Psyche of American Cities: Detroit as Paradigm?* 57
Robert M. Arens
Department of Architecture, Kansas State University

9 *Fort Bonifacio Global City: A New Standard for Urban Design in Southeast Asia* 63
Sara Liss-Katz
Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, San Francisco

Culture and City Shape

East Asia

10 *A Search for a Cultural Paradigm of Urbanization in East Asia* 72
Sang-Chuel Choe
Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Seoul National University, South Korea

11 *Urban Revitalization and Cultural Memory: Rethinking Taipei's Urban Renewal Plan Regarding Wan-Hua* 76
Kuan-chu Wei, Min-chih Yang
Chaoyang University of Technology, Taiwan

12 *The Urban Palimpsest: The Transformation of Bangkok and Its Palaces During the Colonial Era* 80
Pirasri Povatong
College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

13 *Xidan Street, Beijing: Reading and Writing Urban Change* 88
Emel Yucekus and Tridib Banerjee
School of Policy Planning and Development, University of Southern California

Middle East

14 *Preserving Old Neighborhoods of Damascus, Syria* 98
Riad G. Mahayni
Department of Community and Regional Planning, Iowa State University

15 *The District of Gamaliya: A Socio-Economic Perspective* 106
Madiha El Safty
The American University in Cairo, Egypt

Latin America

16 *Financing Urban Heritage Conservation in Latin America* 113
Eduardo Rojas
Inter-American Development Bank

17 *Popular Modernism: The Brazilian Experience* 122
Fernando Lara
Pontificia Universidade Católica de Minas Gerais, Brazil

USA

18 *Ethnic Enclaves: New Urbanism and the Inner City* 126
Udo Greinacher
School of Architecture and Interior Design, University of Cincinnati

19 *Ethnicity in the City: Reading Representations of Cultural Difference in Indian Storefronts* 132
Arijit Sen
Department of Architecture, University of California at Berkeley

20 *New Ife: Rebirth of a Nation* 136
Scott Lawrence Ruff
Department of Architecture, Hampton University, Virginia

Part II: Class, Economy and Polity

Class and Choices

21 *Urban Reconstruction, Development and Planning in the New South Africa: The Case of Durban* 143
Brij Maharaj and Sultan Khan
Department of Geography, and the Social Policy Program, University of Durban-Westville

22 *Fighting a Losing Battle? Planning Policies of Mumbai in the Wake of Globalization* 151
Arvind Adarkar
Adarkar Associates, Bombay, India

23 *Custodians of (Trans)nationality: Metropolitan Jakarta, Middle-Class Prestige and the Chinese* 161
Abidin Kusno
Department of Architecture, State University of New York at Binghamton

24 *Expatriate Global Investment and Squatter Displacement in Manila* 171
L. Shelton Woods
Department of History, Boise State University, Idaho

25 *The Greening of Exit 7 in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania* 178
Jack J. Ford
Department of Geography-Earth Science, Shippensburg University, Pennsylvania

26 *Art and Commerce as Logics of Budapest's New Public Spaces* 183
Judit Bodnar
University of Ghent, Belgium

Public and Private Roles

27 *Towards an Indonesian Urban Land Development Policy* 194
Tommy Firman
Department of Regional and City Planning, Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia

28 *Expanding the Urban Transportation Infrastructure through Concession Agreements: Lessons from Latin America* 207
Daniel A. Rodriguez
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Michigan

29 *The Informal Housing Production Process in Latin America: Connecting the Poor to the City* 218
Alejandro Florián-Borbón and Catalina Velasco-Campuzano
Columbian Institute for Housing, and Urban Reform and University of Michigan

Participating in Shaping the City

30 *Kerekere, Hierarchy and Planning in Fiji: Why Cultural Understanding Should Be A Prerequisite to International Planning* 225
Marc Schlossberg
College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

31 *The City Community: Building Bridges to Sustainability* 232
Akhtar Badshah, Sheila McNamee and Jane Seiling
Asia Pacific Cities Forum, University of New Hampshire, and private consultants

32 *Listening to the Subaltern: The Ethics of Professional Work or, Notes Towards The Pedagogy of The India Studio* 245
Vikramaditya Prakash
Department of Architecture, University of Washington

Ways of Knowing Space

33 *Microcosmic Research and Global Awareness: Rethinking the Local Heritage* 250
Ray Bromley
Department of Planning and Geography, State University of New York at Albany

34 *The Space on the Edge: Dichotomous Perceptions of Place* 256
Máire Eithne O'Neil
School of Architecture, Montana State University

35 *Making Place in the 21st Century: Accelerating the Search for Harmony Between Emerging Values of Global Consumership and Time-honored Values of Vernacular, Family, and Human Spirituality* 265
James Chaffers
College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

Regional Effects

36 *Ramayan to Globalayan: Transformation of Nasik* 282
Sulakshana Mahajan
Epicons Consultants, Bombay, India

37 *Explaining Redevelopment in Hong Kong* 296
Ann Susnik, Sivaguru Ganesan
Department of Architecture, University of Hong Kong

38 *The Polarization Effects of Globalization on the State of Queretaro, Mexico* 303
Juan Carlos Trejo Jiménez
Servicios Integrales de Planeación, Queretaro, Mexico

39 *Growth and Metamorphosis of Bombay through Four Centuries of Globalization* 312
Sulabha Brahme
Emeritus, Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, India

40 *Taiwan's Urban System in Transition* 319
Jack F. Williams
Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University

41 *A Social Perspective on the Future of Transportation Design* 328
Cathy L. Antonakos
Center for Nursing Research, University of Michigan

Housing Issues and Gender

42 *House Types and Housing Uses in Kumasi, Ghana* 335
Irit Sinai
Institute for Reproductive Health, Georgetown University Medical Center

43 *Gender Planning and Housing in Masaya, Nicaragua: A Question of Accessibility* 345
Beth Patton
University of New Mexico

44 *Working Women's Hostels in India: Extensions of Family Control or Expanders of Urban Choice?* 354
Kameshwari Pothukuchi
Department of Geography and Urban Planning, Wayne State University, Detroit

45 *Surveillance, Circumscriber of Women's Spatial Experience: The Case of Slum Dwellers of Calcutta, India* 364
Mallika Bose
College of Architecture, Georgia Institute of Technology

46 *Gender and the Development of Community Services in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* 373
Moshira El-Rafey and Hanadi Y. Bukhari
College of Architecture and Planning, King Faisal University, Saudi Arabia

Conference Program 378

Films Series and Books Exhibit 387

Call for Papers

City, Space, and Globalization

February 26 - 28, 1998, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

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Concentrated and growing cities, increasingly regional and international in economy, cultures, tastes and life-style, exist in the midst of a local space, a local economy, and a local culture. The synergy and the tensions, the inter-relationships and polarization that evolve between local and global forces on the tangible arena of local city space/place are the topics of this symposium. The discussion will be critical, theoretical, empirical, historical, and based on actual cases. The presentations will be organized under three themes which reflect the shaping of cities today and are germane to their planning and design.

I. Architectural Design, Physical Planning & Internationalization

This will include issues of technology and changing city form; of choice in local or global technology and skills; of fit or friction with local infrastructure and resources; of enhancement of, or discord with, culture and climate; of questions of sustainability of city form and function in the 21st century; and of the tensions between development and environment, economy and ecology.

II. Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development

This will include issues of renewal and transformation of the historic urban fabric; of urban reconstruction; of tourism and city growth; of engulfment of city core and transformation of city periphery; and of protecting the cultural specificity and textuality of place, and its friction with global culture and international rents.

III. Gender, Class, Ethnicity and Globalization

This will include issues of changing configuration of,and roles in, households and of the spatial implications of their different and unequal access to city shelter, services and amenity; of global trade and related work juxtaposed with microenterprise and local employment; of power and conflict over city space by local and global stakeholders and resources.

The explorations of the spatial and the tangible/physical manifestations in cities of the evolving local to global relationships may be examined at the scale of the local neighborhood; city-hintf land; regional or metropolitan; or at the national/international. It may include examination of the interrelationships within and between these scales. A multi-disciplinary, cross-cultural, and comparative perspective is suggested. Various current or potential actors in city-shaping activities including the State, the Private Sector, Non-Governmental Institutions and private Citizens and Community Groups may be scrutinized. Presentations may address either the technical, design and planning issues framed by the local, global tensions or reflect on the theoretical aspects of their formation.

PREFACE

We are facing the start of a century in which, it is projected, there will be more urban than rural dwellers in the world. This in itself has caused a revised interest in the city as an object of scrutiny. Furthermore, it is predicted that urban dwellers will be living in a world in which issues traditionally perceived to be of local concern—land use, jobs, shelter creation, and provision of cultural and social services and amenities—have become intrinsically interlinked with, and affected by, forces which are global in nature. This fact, in and of itself, raises questions about the future role of architects, urban and regional planners, and others in the planning and design professions who act predominantly on local space. What role might and will they play and how will they do this in professional and responsible ways? With this backdrop and these questions in mind, a symposium was held on February 28–March 1, 1998 at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The call for papers, partially reproduced on the facing page articulated the problem and the invitation. It made the symposium's intent explicit: to capture the observations of architects, urban planners, and urbanists and thus help reveal the energies and the tensions, the interrelationships and polarization, that are evolving between local and global forces within the tangible arena of local city space and city place.

Held at the College of Architecture and Urban Planning, the symposium featured academics and practitioners from some 25 countries, including Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Egypt, India, South Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Columbia. In the keynote presentation, internationally renowned planning theoretician John Friedmann used the metaphor of city-as-hotel to sketch out the consequences of a citizenry just "renting a room" in the city. His was a call, in the face of globalization, for active and engaged local citizenship and participation in the policy decisions that shape cityscape today and into the future. Four powerful political leaders, in local to national levels of government, all of them women, and deeply involved in issues of access to housing, jobs, training and the protection of the environment, clearly understood this call.[1] In their remarks at the symposium they reflected on how the concerns expressed by the gathered international experts are their concerns too as they represent their constituents in the heartland of the U.S. This was a glimpse of a new face of America for the foreign participants –politicians, planners, professors that they were. They commented that, until then, they had known only the American politicians who push trade agreements and globalization.

What became clear at the symposium, and is captured in these collected papers, is that there are things of concern in the local life space of cities and their citizens around the world as ubiquitous as the macro, integrating phenomena posited in the theoretical literature on globalization. The conversations at the symposium encompassed what was happening in some

forty cities around the world. These papers suggest why and how planners and design professionals need to be protective and watchful as globally integrating forces affect their local communities and local space.

About three hundred people were formally registered for the symposium. Many others in the university and local professional community accepted the invitation to drop in more casually on selected sessions. Some sixty papers were formally presented and an additional twenty were exhibited in poster form. A book fair displayed some one hundred and fifty current books on the city. Some thirty documentaries and films featuring the city were shown, with discussion sessions scheduled so as to stimulate critique. A formal exhibition entitled *The City*, curated by Lisa Iwamoto and Craig Scott, two members of the architectural faculty, provided a stunning visual rendition of the emerging form of the future city. The simultaneous activities at the symposium were rich and varied. Even those attending the duration of the conference could participate only in parts of the program.

The papers presented in the symposium served both to augment ideas in the existing literature and to introduce new observations in the ongoing discourse on globalization. The major impetus for this book, therefore, was to establish a record of this gathering and to make accessible to a larger audience a selection of the papers and ideas emanating from this event. Toward this end, and to keep intact the authenticity of the perspective offered, the editor has maintained the voice of each contributor to the maximum extent possible. The collection is being published expeditiously in hopes that it will be useful to the design and planning professions as they face the urban realities emerging in the twenty-first century. As editor of this book, it has been my honor and privilege to be the first to read these contributions as a collection. The vantage point has been illuminating and provided an opportunity to see the globalization and city space connection with broadened vision. I hope the book will make a useful contribution to furthering the discourse about the city, and sharpen the design professionals' perspective of the implications of globalization for the local, grounded space of cities in the twenty-first century.

Hemalata C. Dandekar
Chair, City, Space and Globalization Symposium

Notes

[1] Leaders who graciously addressed the symposium were Ingrid Sheldon, Mayor of Ann Arbor, Liz Brater, Representative, State of Michigan, U.S. Congresswoman Lynn Rivers and environmental activist and former State Senator Lana Pollack. The organizers of this conference are most grateful to these leaders for their time, energy, and thoughtful rendition of issues that affect their terrain.

[2] The overall format of submissions has been standardized for visual cohesiveness. However, the editor has minimized her interventions in the stylistic rendition of the narratives presented and left intact choices made by authors in matters such as the style of referencing work, English versus American spelling, grammar and sentence structure, and regionalisms in use of language.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Publication of these proceedings and the City, Space and Globalization Symposium itself, held at the College of Architecture and Urban Planning of the University of Michigan, were made possible by the generous support provided by several units at the University. The International Institute provided significant initial and sustained funding through various phases of a project entitled *City, Space and International Development,* which included the creation of a cross-campus, multi-disciplinary course on the role of cities in development. The substantive interest in this area of the Institute's Director David W. Cohen, and then Associate Director, John Godfrey served as a catalyst for this work. The Center for South and Southeast Asia (CSSEAS) provided major and sustained staffing and office support through the preplanning, organization, and smooth execution of the symposium. I would like to thank all the CSSEAS staff, and in particular, Dorathea Dootz, Senior Administrator, for her strong oversight and organization, Jodi Forrester for shouldering travel arrangements, and Francis Garcia, Program Coordinator, for extensive and ongoing work on designing

and updating the conference web page. The energy and good-humored efforts of CSSEAS staff made the symposium a reality and rendered the venue pleasant and supportive. Funding for this effort came from a grant to CSSEAS from the U.S. Department of Education National Resource Center Grant for South Asia. This supported the participation of several academics and researchers working on South Asian cities. Grants from the Office of Multicultural Affairs and from the Institute for Research on Women and Gender enabled the organizers to include an expanded set of perspectives and sessions. The Korean Studies Program and the Center for Russian and East European Studies each brought to the table one participant from their regions of the world.

The College of Architecture and Urban Planning (CAUP), in additional to making a substantial financial commitment, was the host unit for the symposium. CAUP thus contributed a large variety of "in-kind" resources which made the intellectual discourse so successful and these proceedings possible. The CAUP community, consisting of faculty, administrators, students, and staff, far too numerous to list here, enthusiastically welcomed the symposium participants on their territory. They cheerfully shared college space, equipment, and services in the middle of an academic term. I would like especially to thank William Manspeaker, CAUP's computer system's specialist, who provided essential oversight and hands-on audio visual support for all four days of the symposium. Bill was the first to arrive and the last to leave. He made the technical aspects of the flow of communication seem effortless. His assistance has continued though the creation of this publication as he has provided us with needed computers, equipment, and expertise.

Michigan students, particularly from the doctoral program in Architecture and the master's and doctoral programs in Urban and Regional Planning, were enthusiastic participants in the intellectual give-and-take. They provided person power as needed for the smooth operation of the event. Two doctoral planning students, Catalina Velasco-Campuzano and Thana Chirapiwat, initiated and made real a stimulating exhibit of poster papers which facilitated the inclusion of work of emerging scholars and researchers. Trisha Miller, with assistance from Kenneth Lo, prepared an exciting book exhibit featuring some one hundred and fifty recent books on the city (for a partial listing of titles displayed, see pp. 390–391) and organized a film festival of thirty-five documentaries and feature films (see program and listing on pp. 388–389). These contributed greatly to the intellectual vitality of the conversations. With design guidance from Brian Carter, Chair of the Department of Architecture, the students installed a visually attractive exhibit of posters and books which provided a stimulating backdrop to discussions over coffee and at breaks.

The substantive intellectual underpinnings of this symposium and these proceedings were made robust not only by student energy, which was considerable, but by faculty colleagues within CAUP and across the University. In the organization phase faculty and students helped shape the thematic boundaries. In this effort I am grateful to the then Chair of the Urban Planning Program, Robert Marans, and the current chair, Margaret Dewar, for their vision of emerging issues facing cities of the future. Faculty guided and stimulated the intellectual exchange in the various panels through exercising a strong role as moderators and discussants. Their input was critical in stimulating and energizing the discussions. Their names and affiliations are noted in the program (pp. 378–386). Most important in this exchange was the contribution of over sixty panelists (see program, pp. 378–386) whose thoughtful and carefully crafted presentations were pivotal. I would like to thank all the panelists for their presence and their intellectual contributions. Forty-five papers which emanated from the symposium and poster submissions are featured in these proceedings. I would like to thank the authors for their work and for their cooperation in responding promptly to my request for materials and clarifications.

A number of individuals have collaborated closely in compiling this book. I would like particularly to recognize Thana Chirapiwat, who was responsible for the book design and composition, and for the design and execution of the book cover. Thana also provided graphic support for the symposium. This effort has required a great ability to work under pressure. It has involved tasks such as designing a logo or a program overnight so that the order for buttons or printing could go out at dawn. In addition to rising to this challenge, Thana provided key computer support which enabled us to accept documents in many disk formats received from all over the world. I would also like to thank Vivienne Armentrout, who provided detailed and careful editorial help with great sensitivity to the intent of this publication, to expeditiously produce a record of *the City, Space and Globalization Symposium*. Thana and Vivienne contributed long and unpredictably scheduled hours which have enabled us to produce this volume quickly but carefully. Rudolf B. Schmerl, friend and editor, Karin Klinkajorn, urban planning student, and Dixie Farquharson, academic secretary in CAUP, helped in this task at critical junctures. Sandra Patton, Bussiness Manager, CAUP, provided strong financial guidance and support, and Maureen Perdomo, Director of Communications, CAUP, good technical advice during production. Finally, I would like to thank Dean Douglas S. Kelbaugh, CAUP, for good advise on cover design and for supporting the overall endeavor. It is very clear that this project would not have been completed as quickly, or as well, without all their considerable efforts.

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

Global City, Local Citizenship

I GLOBAL SPACE MEETS LOCAL SPACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Hemalata C. Dandekar

Globalization is a term which has come into good currency in the past decade. But the word has been used so often in the popular and the academic press, and with such diverse and encompassing connotations, that it is close to meaningless. It has been used to signify and explain a multitude of international connectivities and flows: the burgeoning interrelatedness of finance markets; the near collapse of the Southeast Asian "Tiger" economies; trade in commodities and ideas; and the "MacDonaldization" and "Disneyfication" of world culture which is said to be replacing economic Pax Americana. In the literature on cities and city development too, considerable attention has been turned to globalization and its effects.[1] In their work on World Cities, Castelles, Knox, and Sassen[2] posit contexts in which the world is tied tightly together in critical financial interactions situated in global cities. However, in the diverse discourse on globalization, analysis of its implications for the physical fabric of local place, particularly for the local space of city neighborhoods, has remained relatively neglected. But, if globalization is, and will continue to be, as ubiquitous and significant a force as the current discussion implies, then, this question does need to be considered. What *are* the manifestations of globalization in tangible reality, in the physical spaces and places of the emerging city of the twenty-first century? This question is taken up in a variety of ways by the authors in this collection of papers.

For architects and urban planners, the various impacts of the generic phenomenon termed "globalization" on the three-dimensional built form of city real estate promise to be crucial in determining how, and in what arenas, their professions will play a role in the next century. Germane questions are apparent. How will the concentrated and growing cities of today, increasingly integrated regionally and internationally in economy, culture, tastes and life-style, coexist in the midst of the local space, the local economy, and the local culture? How will globalization shape evolving city habitat? Will this emerging city be reconciled with and recognize its past? With increasing social and physical mobility, can people develop an urban life style sustainable in the long term, given currently understood limits of the environmental and of socio-cultural flexibility? In addressing such questions, one must take into account the following themes which surface in current discussions about globalization as they help shape the contours of the larger environment, and locate the issues, addressed in the contributions to this book.

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The Nature of Globalization

The definition of globalization, its nature, and its processes are subjects which are currently debated within several disciplines.[3] In the literature one finds disagreement about

the question of whether the current form of global connections between nation states *is* a significant departure from the past—or merely an extension and deepening of the interrelatedness which has been forged historically through various periods of colonialism. Theoretical concerns have included questions such as: Is what is happening, variously described by the term globalization, significantly and structurally different and unique? If yes, in what ways is it different from the knitting together of the global marketplace which occurred after the Industrial Revolution; or later, in the aftermath of World War II, with the emergence of the modern-day nation-states which constitute the United Nations? Or, on the contrary, is this globalization merely an increased scale and volume of interaction, facilitated by technological change and enhanced information flows — particularly through the accessibility of computers and their capabilities in electronic communications?

Perspectives from the "North" and "South." Some scholars and policy makers, particularly those who work in the countries of the "North" such as the U.S. the UK, and the countries of the European Union, are *not* convinced that global integration *is* a significant factor in their domestic landscape. They cite facts such as that in the economy of the U.S., the trade component represents but a small fraction of national Gross Domestic Product. They illustrate how, in these countries, well over 70% of the multinational holdings and finance remain domestic in locus. They point out that this is not unlike, and even a continuation of, a connectivity between nations forged since the Industrial Revolution. Global space, they claim, has little face-to-face contact with how their local space is configured and shaped.[4]

Others, working on countries of the "South," argue that the impact of globalization on the culture of the "developing" "post-colonial" countries *is* pervasive and endemic. It is not the proportion of trade which counts, they argue, but its characteristics. Like a drop of red wine which tinges all the water in a glass, today's globalization touches every component of the local economy. In *Modernity at Large, Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Appadurai points to the homogenization of the textual fabric of everyday life.[5] A backlash by the State to global culturation is also apparent. There is "fundamentalism" of various kinds. There are attempts by the apparatus of the state to mold a "national" and "traditional" identity. This identity may be authentic and contextualized, but in selected history. It may be fabricated with new associations strategic for the legitimization of a particular political authority. These efforts and their reflections on and for physical built form have been the subject of scrutiny and deliberations in architecture and urban planning. They are reflected in concerns within the professions about what constitutes the "real" Chinese, German, Brazilian, Thai, Japanese, or Indian architectural form and motif. It has raised questions about how to preserve historic and cultural identity, as embodied in the physical fabric of the city, without commodifying and packaging it purely for touristic consumption.

Jobs, Work, and the Nation-State. Discussion about globalization, its extent, impact, and meaning, is paralleled by an unease on the part of lay publics around the world as they confront everyday work realities which are unfolding on the local life space of communities. The globalists are pronouncing the death of the Nation-State as we know it today. As one indicator, they point to the ability of the multinational corporations to operate transnationally with little regard to national boundaries and with scant accountability to any Nation-State. They draw attention to the literature on flexible modes of production. It is one in which a highly skilled labor force is replaced with lower skilled labor using technological breakthroughs in computerization, robotics, and automation. These innovations have made it possible to produce efficiently using a less skilled work force readily available throughout the world. This change, they argue, renders the multinational corporation "footloose and fancy free." It is a change which disempowers the working class, a group which tends to be grounded and emotionally connected to a specific space and location. In cities such as Los Angeles and Seattle, poised on the rim of the Pacific Ocean on the West Coast of the U.S., flexible production space may feel familiar and be quite tangible and visible in the city resident's daily life.

In Midwestern cities such as Detroit or Flint, the migration of production capacity in the automobile industry to sites in foreign countries and the resulting job losses in the region has been broadly experienced in the past few decades.[6] Scott and Storper (1990) explain the process by describing flexible production as being quick on its feet, "renting space" on the landscape of various nation-states, and able to pack up and leave when it finds lower rents, a more friendly environment, and/or less expensive and more pliable workers who are cooperative and grateful for a chance to work.[7] They argue that, given computer-driven production machinery, the critical profitability advantage no longer rests with "Fordist" style, vertically and horizontally integrated mega firm enterprises such as the automobile industry that once dominated significant regions of the midwestern U.S. Rather, it lies with units which efficiently produce small batches of specialized products, targeted to a specific market niche. It is a mode in which innovation and early entry into production can reap phenomenal profits. The successful producer is no longer a Chrysler or a General Motors but a constellation of firms, combined together for a specified time period, to create a particular end product. This constellation can be quickly reconfigured to respond to changes in the global market.

It is a production system which can retool and reshape the end product quickly and is interrelated vertically and horizontally through a communications and information net that spreads over regions. These regions transcend national boundaries and historic and social/cultural groups. This is key to the arguments made by the globalists when they describe the inability of the Nation-State to truly regulate, shape, curb, or redirect the activities of the corporate sector. Labor unions, too, find their power to influence corporate decisions considerably diminished. One observes in televised interviews of Midwestern automobile industry workers, on strike against job losses in GM, Ford, or Chrysler plants in

Michigan, that they clearly fear the implications of global connectivity for their livelihood and consequently their life styles and life space. In this globalized world of flexible production, it is anticipated that generally work will consist of temporary employment based on short-term contractual relationships with lower-end jobs filled by unskilled immigrants. Thus the city becomes a place in which the power of workers, their unions, and the power of the middle class too are greatly diminished.

Changing Roles of Public and Private. This is an era in which, in both the public and the private domain, the idea of the global market is very much *the* "idea in good currency." International aid agencies, such as the World Bank (IBRD), and international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), are in synchrony in their espousal of liberalization of the economies of the developing world. It is an era of structural adjustment programs with their emphasis on the market place to mediate price of goods and services; on reduction of subsidies for basic goods and services; and on an absolute faith in comparative trade advantage as the engine of growth and development. In the last decade, the dominant prescription by the IBRD and IMF for economic malaise has been for a reduction in the role and the apparatus of the Nation-State. Preferred solutions are ones that rely on privatization and corporate solutions, or, at least on forging partnerships between the public and private for greater efficiency and production. The role of the public sector is considerably diminished. The pressures are to privatize, to diminish the presence of government, and to put the state in a facilitator rather than a provider role.

A key question that emerges in this current paradigm of privatization is how, if at all, issues of equity in the distribution of resources is to be mediated. In the last five decades of experimentation with development, nation-states of the "South" have intervened in the market place with the goal of redistributive justice in the interest of a larger societal good. How will differences in class, race, gender, ethnicity, religion, culture, and histories, factors which result in unequal access of individuals and groups to societal goods, be resolved in the local space of the twenty-first century city? What mechanisms will be acceptable as this city attempts to respond to the needs of global activity and its demands for an unfettered and free market?

Life Space and Global Space. Tensions and complementarities are inherent in the juxtapositioning of "global space" with its internationalized, universalized economy, culture and values and "local space" with its historic communities and their grounded and particularized customs, habits and locus of daily lives. The various interfaces are sometimes smooth and even, and sometimes jagged. As Friedmann describes it, life space is where people live, recreate, find an education for their children, where they get health care and find meaningful social connections.[8] This space is where life is lived in its physical, local dimensions. Yet it is increasingly and significantly penetrated by, and intrinsically integrated with, global space which reflects global finance, culture, and economy. This interpenetration is accentuated as the world becomes more urban. Cities are arguably the points, on the landscape of the world, where interconnections, communications, and exchange are the most dense, most direct, and where the influence of global forces is felt most acutely.

Urbanization and city growth, particularly in regions of the world that were colonized and until recently referred to as the Third World, is *the* significant, tangible phenomenon of the last five so-called "development decades." As satellite imagery of the last fifty years reveals, the accelerated formation of very large clusters of human habitation in metropoles around the world is the most apparent social/spatial artifact of this century. In the last decade, more cities from the developing world have grown large enough to be classified as "Mega-Cities," and this phenomenon is expected to accelerate in the next twenty or so years. As one considers the implications of this for the city of the twenty-first century, current critical work on the differences and similarities in the development of urbanization in various regions of the world offers useful insight. In *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*, McGee deciphers the extended city structure of large and rapidly growing Asian cities with the eyes of the cultural geographer.[9] He describes settlements, in high-intensity rice cultivation regions of Southeast Asia, that in their density and other criteria qualify as urban. Yet, people are engaged there in significant levels of agricultural activities. This urban area is one in which differentiation between town and county, urban-rural in physical/spatial terms is being erased. This and other emerging work suggests the need to think of urban systems in non-Western areas with a critical eye to their particularities and their differences from those in the West. As global space meets the local space of the city in the twenty-first century, the particularities of that local space, its history, society, culture and tradition, must be factored into our assessment and understanding of potentials and outcomes.

City Space in the Twenty-first Century

The collection of papers in this book concerns issues related to the local space of people in some forty cities of the world, cities poised to enter the twenty-first century. They provide a rich and diverse set of observations of the city as it is and as it promises to be. The papers speak for themselves. This chapter does not aspire to offer a summary. It does attempt to provide a rendition of some of the cross-cutting themes which emerge from reading these individual works as a collection. It also aims to provide an intellectual road map, an organizational key, to this book.

A significant common element of these papers is their shared concern with the *life space* of city fabric, beyond economics, beyond world markets and world trade, beyond "the rhetoric of global systems." This life space is the neighborhood and community space of city residents. It refers to memory, to history, to tradition in the face of homogenizing global forces. It is related to issues of the city core and the city periphery as

they expand, are reconfigured, and reshaped. It mediates issues related to ethnicity, race, and gender and reflects their implications for the division of the benefits and the costs of change. Some of the papers address these issues from a "bottom up" perspective which is case-grounded with spatial, social, and empirical detail. Some are "top down" perspectives which are conceptual, theoretical, and empirical, providing us with templates with which to understand the emerging shape of human habitat, the nature of city society and community, and the city aesthetic, visual, concrete, and real. Still others are successful in connecting textual, micro, spatial information to the larger forces presented as causal and providing explanations. As a collection, they yield a fascinating view of the various ways in which city space of the twenty-first century promises to adapt and transform to a new global proximity.

Juxtapositioning of "North" and "South." Authors discuss how the forces joining the world into one global market place and one financial system are: affecting the design of home space; influencing who gets access to prime urban location and neighborhoods; and also reinforcing the status quo of groups that get and those that do not (King, Kuzno, Mahayni, Maharaj, Woods).[10] The real-estate aesthetic and value systems fueled by the new money generated from global commerce are delineated. As King convincingly elaborates, high-end housing developers use "international" images to attract the non-resident, ex-patriate Indian, Indonesian, Thai, or Philippina. High-rise luxury condominiums are set in a safe and sanitized landscape, with swimming pools and golf courses. They are populated by upscale, two-children nuclear families, the women thin, fit, and beautiful, who live in complexes named so as to evoke the west, and often the colonial past—Oxford Estates, Windsor Plaza, Berkeley Place, Cambridge House. They assure the upper-income new aristocracy of expatriates or globalizers safety and insulation from the habitat and life conditions of the poor and the middle class. This type of development is apparent around the world, whether in the gated communities of California, the farm estates, waterfront villas, and apartment plazas in India, or the new towns and condominiums built by Chiputra which ring the city of Jakarta.[11]

Jobs, Work, and Nation-Space. The authors of these papers are concerned with, and worry about, outcomes attributed to globalization, for example, the kinds of jobs that emerge and those that disappear or migrate to other parts of world, and the effects this has on the way city land is used and by whom. Thus, in these papers, we find the dilemma of a Detroit shaping its future and reconciling with the structures of its past. We are shown communities adjacent to large cities, with differing resources and expectations of the space they occupy, battle about infrastructure decisions which will result in very different futures for their local space. In these renditions class is examined, or presented, as a key element in the way people value and use the city (Arens, Ford, Isaacs, Mehrotra, O'Neill, Schlossberg, Wei and Yang). The authors in this collection speculate about the sustainability of the environment resulting from rapid city growth fueled by globalization. They are concerned about the quality of life and aesthetics of the spaces created by forces that appear to be knitting their communities into one interlinked global system. They are concerned about the nature and control of public space in the city, so essential to civic life (Adarkar, Arens, Brahme, Bodnar, Godbole). They articulate a philosophical and ideological need to hear, respect, and give shape to the subaltern perspective in city planning, thus finding a way to break from the modernity of a western colonial past. And they call on concerned professionals to act in ways that allow movement and change in the tangible formation of the city so that it represents the interests not just of those actively and powerfully engaged in globalization but also those who must passively bear its effects. Detailed, microcosm-oriented research involving local people, as well as master planning work, are suggested as ways to identify the actual and significant links which exist between neighborhoods and the wider world, and, through the process, possibly strengthen the local community (Badshah et al., Bromley, Choe, El Safty, Rojas, Prakash).

Public Role in Redistributive Justice. Sharp inequalities in the city fabric, both socio-economic and spatial, are suggested by the work in this book. The growth of high-income commercial properties and the gentrification of traditional residential building stockare observed. A growth of the underclass, of a two-class labor force of elites and non-elite, a proliferation of the informal economy, and the rise of homelessness and poverty are feared. In the bustle of a Beijing's modernization, the "Silicon Valleyization" of a Bangalore, the break in the momentum of a Jakarta , and the democratization of a Durban, who will gain and who will lose and what role will and should the government play in determining that? These are the critical observations made and questions asked (Brahme, Maharaj, Mahayni, Pothukuchi, Woods, Yucekus and Banerjee). Concrete details of concession agreements, for transport infrastructure in Latin America or urban land development policy in Indonesia, highlight the complexities of structuring public/private partnerships and underscore the limited role of the private sector in finding solutions. Authors reiterate that government is and will be needed and is and will be important in shaping policy to respond to the needs of all sectors of the population (Firman, Rodriguez, Florián-Borbón and Velasco-Campuzano).

Organization of Papers

The papers in this book are organized into two major parts, following a lead paper by John Friedmann in which he suggests the need to look at the city-regional level on its own terms. He asks city residents to assume ownership of the physical, organizational, decision-making and political fabric of the city. Pointing out as problematic the current encompassing call for privatization, Friedmann notes that, more recently, international aid institutions are acknowledging the function of the public and state realms in sustaining the stability and continuity of effort crucial for any city-based undertaking.

Although most of the papers in this collection address more than one element of the city in their narratives, those in Part I consist of papers primarily addressing issues of design, shape, form, physicality, and culture as they reflect diversity around the world, while those in Part II primarily address issues of class, economy, polity and process, and serve to explain how the varying perspective of different constituencies at the global, national, and local levels play a role in reshaping the city. They also discuss how these constituencies are differentially affected in the evolving city. As described below, the chapters within Part I and II are clustered by some unifying themes and idea sets.

Part I: Design, Shape and Culture

The first cluster of papers in Part I, *City Shape in the Twenty-first Century*, give attention to the physical shape and characteristics of the built form of the twenty-first century city. As King, in the lead paper in this group, states, he addresses "the spatial transformation over the last three decades in the realms of architecture, urbanism and the larger built form." King refers both to the discursive space in which notions of the transcultural are being constructed, and also, and more importantly for the mandate of this book, to the *production* of this transnational space. He describes the ways in which the notions of "international modernity," as represented in spatial and architectural terms, are projected to India's Non-Resident Indian community. Taking tangible and familiar examples, he deconstructs the characteristics of this space, how it is described, and how this reflects the economic, social, political, and cultural conditions in which it is produced. While his cases are South Asian his work elicits recognition from observers of this phenomenon as it is manifested around the world.

Isaacs and Perera each look at how value systems and political ideology in the varied contexts of Dresden, Germany, and Colombo, Sri Lanka, shape the landscape of these two cities and how the cultural symbolism of the architecture of a particular period is appropriated by the group in power to further its national agenda. They illustrate how choices of architectural form and urbanscape convey messages that groups or government wish to disseminate, for example, that this is a new, consumer-oriented, nationalist, centralized, populist, democratic, traditional, or dissenting society. In deciphering the social and spatial restructuring of Colombo since the 1980s, Perera speculates on issues such as what representation the capital complex should have in the style of architecture—colonial, traditional, or post-industrial. He points out how the choices made reveal not only a tangible shift from the colonial past but also broader political and cultural alliances being forged between countries in the South Asian region. These two papers convincingly delineate the ways in which architecture and urbanscape are truly political and ideological statements. National cultural identification and self-representation are shaped by the modes of social organization in which they are formed and architecture and city scape are chosen vehicles in which this choice is communicated.

Mehrotra describes how the physical form of Bombay's colonial Victorian architecture in the Fort area can be, should be, and to some extent is being preserved. He emphasizes the need to adapt and reuse this space, respecting the past, but in the service and meeting the needs of the present. Using *bazaars* in Victorian arcades as signifiers, he illustrates how an urban landscape can internalize the past, respond to the needs of the present, and contribute to a sustainable future. Having helped to shape and shepherd to approval legislation for heritage buildings and precincts conservation in Bombay's Fort Area, he provides an example of the role architects and planners can play in shaping city form that reflects the past and faces the future. In stark contrast to Bombay, exploding at its seams, is Arens's Detroit, a monument to the rise and fall of the might and power of an industrial automobile age. The choices of approaching Detroit, from the outside, as an American acropolis, or from the inside, as an art project of giant assemblages of Detroit's castoffs are described. The public debate about these private visions reveals the conflicting ideologies about urban public space and the contemporary conditions which are producing it. Godbole echoes this idea in pointing out how the notions of public open space in Bombay as they shifted from native Indian to British colonial, have resulted in contemporary definitions that are a disjointed overlay of westernized concepts of Indian needs. The magnitude and scale of Fort Bonifacio Global City, designed on a Philippine army base in Manila, illustrate the potential effects of globally financed and designed efforts on the city form of the future. Liss-Katz articulates the nature of the efforts made by an international design firm to set standards for excellence in urban design, which draw on both global and local inspiration.

The group of papers on *Culture and City Space* discuss the importance of cultural paradigm and cultural memory in the shaping of cities. They juxtapose the challenges and difficulties of reflecting these in city fabric in the face of the ubiquitous spread of global forms of commerce and production. In the lead paper Choe delineates his search for a cultural paradigm for the city of East Asia, a region of the world which has experienced a most dramatic speed and scale of urbanization and, as he states it, "developmentalism largely devoid of cultural identity." Choe reflects that now culture and historical spatial heritage are increasingly being perceived as antidotes to rampant and unsettling economic and spatial development. He connects Confucian values of loyalty and care of extended family, and moral over material well-being, and frugality to their reflection in the physical fabric of the East Asian city. He calls attention to hidden dimensions, deeply rooted in culture, of the use of space within neighborhoods in East Asian cities. Choe states that temporal patterning, mixed land use, and communal facilities render the East Asian city one of humanity and convenience and concludes that "the Asian urbanites know how to live in a crowded city."

This knowledge, and the cultural experience of a people as it is inscribed in the built form of a historic site, need to be

preserved in a heritage preservation effort, state Wei and Yang. They raise questions about who should determine what is indigenous and what is traditional. They criticize the trend to commodify historic buildings for touristic consumption as a way to obtain economic development. They urge a rethinking of Taipei's urban renewal plan so that it reflects and supports indigenous social interactions, and helps reinforce collective memory and ritual activity. Povatong, in his morphological study of Bangkok's transformation, delineates how the contemporary city fabric is a product of the gradual integration of change and progress in existing urban patterns. In doing so, he illustrates how notions of what is traditional and acceptable incorporate new forms that represent changing social and cultural realities. Change is inevitable, but it is possible to make necessary changes yet maintain an intrinsic sense of community and urbanism.

Yucekus and Banerjee address the fact that the mandate for the architect and planner is not just to *read* and decipher the city, but to *write* the text, to shape the contemporary city. They describe the building and transformation of Xidan, which has been a commercial street in Beijing since the seventeenth century. They attribute the changes to both state intervention and to the influence of domestic and global capital. The private investor and developer and the government official each search for order, rationality, and efficiency. They describe the emerging streetscape as "seemingly one of unbridled market economy." It is quintessentially the spirit of market liberalism, and in this, money rather than environment or ambiance is what counts. The sobering message is that the significant agent in Xidan Street's physical transformation, as it is in much of the developing world, is global capital, and capital's instinct to make a profit.

Concern about the loss of long-standing heterogeneity and distinctiveness in ancient cities is echoed in Mahayni's chapter on Damascus, a city which, the author states, has been continually inhabited for over 6,000 years. Showcasing the district of Midan, which is over a thousand years old, and was established as a suburb outside the wall of Damascus in the early days of the Ottoman Empire, Mahayni describes the destructive effects of the last sixty years of development on the residential fabric and social texture of neighborhood space. New communities were designed in the "modern" mold, isolated from and unrelated to immediate context and adjoining communities. But they were constructed on old urbanscape as if on raw, undeveloped land. An antidote to such "top down" interventions is suggested by El Safty. She surveys the historic but decaying site of Gamaliya, Cairo, rich with historic monuments, to decipher the embedded social fabric that holds the community together. This information provides the insight to articulate the kind of preservation and upgradation which is possible "from the inside" through raising awareness and helping stimulate community-based effort.

Rojas reiterates this theme that multiple actors, including private property owners, need to be involved in urban heritage preservation. Reflecting on the experience of financing such ventures in Latin America by the Sustainable Development Department of the Inter-American Development Bank, he identifies the two major factors which contribute to deterioration in the historic city centers of Latin America—functional and physical obsolescence. Although the market allocates few resources to conservation, increasingly communities are recognizing both the social and touristic value of such efforts. Rojas discusses how this recognition, usually on the part of an elite, can be strengthened by comprehensive measures by government in support of preservation. His cases illustrate issues to be considered in designing such incentives and regulation. The objective is to achieve an efficient and effective balance between the roles played by the public and private sectors. He notes that strong local government and popular participation are needed for a public-private participation to be forged that will protect poorer populations from the effects of gentrification, yet lead to sustainable conservation efforts. Rojas observes, echoing Yang and Wei, that enhanced appreciation of historical, traditional city space seems to gain in importance as cultures around the world become more globalized. But Lara's essay on the popular adoption of modern architecture into the predominant aesthetic in Brazil illustrates the forces against which heritage conservation must stand.

How do cultural forces which shape form play out in the multicultural landscape of the U.S.? Greinacher, Sen, and Ruff provide some provocative examples from their observations of Chinese, Indian, and African-American communities. New York's Chinatown is a successful inner-city neighborhood which has provided work and community for over 100 years for immigrant Chinese. Describing its evolution from a largely bachelor society in 1943 to its current role as a vibrant social and community center which serves both the "Uptown" educated, professional migrant and the "Downtown" rural migrant lacking formal education, the author suggests that its success and vitality provide insights for designing good cities. The segmentation of the professional and non-professional migrant stream is observed by Sen in the cultural differences in East Indian storefronts at the two ends of University Avenue in Berkeley. The immigrant bourgeoisie favor East Indian stores in the downtown, near the University Campus, and the working class frequents and is served by East Asian stores near the freeway. It is a fractured landscape reflecting a social division inflicted by taste and social class. Ruff suggests a physical design intervention to help soften a fracture on racial lines in Washington, D.C. He proposes the construction of a State Capital for the city of Washington, a city which is more than 70% African-American. It is designed with pedestrian-scale grid, expressing cultural difference in use of space, but is inserted into the grid lines of the mainstream, grand manner plan. These three papers provide creative perspectives of young planners and architects seeking to contribute constructively and professionally within the multicultural mosaic of contemporary U.S. society.

Part II: Class, Economy and Polity

The first cluster of papers, on *Class and Choices*, refers to some of the most troubling questions under discussion about globalization. What are its distributive effects on city space in terms of variables of class, race, and ethnicity? Furthermore, in a context in which the market is paramount, is there room for equity and redistributive effort? And, if so, what mechanisms and institutions will be legitimized to initiate such effort?

The lead paper by Maharaj and Khan succinctly and dispassionately notes that present city form in South Africa is inherited from the legacy of apartheid urban planning which left behind open spaces and under-utilized infrastructure and services. Remedial models suggested include city infill, compact cities, and inner-city densification. The government has developed five action strategies which include taking a regional posture, investing in urban development enhancing urban security, stimulating economic development, and creating public private partnerships for service delivery. However, the new urban reality, illustrated by the case of Durban, has salient characteristics, which can in fact be observed in most developing regions of the world: desegregation, but primarily along class lines; proliferation of informal settlements; and flight of capital from the central business districts (CBD's). In conclusion the authors note that South African segregation is deeply rooted in the socio-spatial fabric, and that despite the repeal of discriminatory legislation, this legacy will be visible for a long time. Redistributive action for social justice and participation of people in the planning process will be needed to change this reality.

This intra-city class issue and a city-hinterland conflict are elaborated in Adarkar's paper about access to real estate in the textile mills area of Mumbai, home to three million textile workers. Adarkar perceives an alliance of the government, elites, and the corporate sector against the claims of the working class. In the wake of globalization, redistributive justice in favor of the workers living in the textile mills area of Mumbai, on prime central -area real estate, seems improbable. With data on land availability and occupancy, Adarkar argues that, if Mumbai is to become a "global city" as its' political and business elite wish, it will have to be on the space vacated by residents of the central city, for example, the three million textile workers. Mill owners are interested in dismantling their aging and obsolete textile operations and capturing the profits from sale of their real estate. Government policy aids them in this. If they wish to continue textile manufacturing, flexible modes of production enable them to operate at much lower cost, by shifting to small, non-unionized, decentralized units in the suburbs of the city. Loss of livelihood in the downtown textile mills equates to loss of ability to remain in Mumbai for textile workers who have had a stake in this city space since the turn of the century.[12] In the globalizing climate of Bombay, there seems to be little redistributive policy in sight that would bolster their claims.

Kusno and Woods, in their respective work on Jakarta and Manila, reiterate this theme of class conflict over city space. Whether it is the wealthy ethnic Chinese in Jakarta or the Hong Kong Chinese and overseas Filipino workers investing in property in Manila, the story is of unequal access to urban land and shelter. Anti-Chinese riots are increasing in Indonesia, and Kusno discusses the ways in which architecture and urban form are appropriated in Jakarta to reinforce the dominant ideology of the new order. Woods describes how private-sector expatriate investments in the real estate of Manila develops the city for the few people with overseas money while those in the local economy, living in squatter settlements, are displaced. The jurisdictional conflict over the location of a highway exit in Pennsylvania is presented by Ford as a conflict between a younger and an older community. He reveals how it can also be understood as a conflict of class interests, and their differing value of and need for economic development; aesthetic, cultural, and scenic value; and a historical agricultural landscape. In Ford's terms, this reflects the different value the two communities give to an economic versus a representational space. Bodner's work on art movie theaters and malls, the new public spaces, which she notes are the privileged sites in postsocialist Budapest, illustrates the possibilities of a cultural resistance to cultural globalization without resorting to a nationalist code. The initiatives which keep the art movie network viable in Budapest are those of a private company, and represent an indigenous and heterogeneous interpretation of a globalizing force.

The papers on *Public and Private Roles* share an integrating concern with balancing government and private sector roles in responding to forces of globalization and urbanization. Firman clearly delineates a significant need for the Indonesian government to design a comprehensive urban land development policy. Otherwise, he argues, uncontrolled agricultural land conversion to urban land can potentially adversely affect food production. He claims that a well-designed policy will help make the land development process more efficient and equitable. Rodriguez showcases concession agreements with the private sector to construct, operate, and maintain transportation assets. These efforts need a great deal of capital and are important as they can increase the availability of public transport, a component of urban infrastructure essential for growing cities in developing countries. Reviewing five efforts in three Latin American countries to develop such agreements, Rodriguez provides an analysis of their prominent features and comes to useful conclusions about their utility. He stresses the essential role of government in forging agreements that are efficient over the long term. With detailed and thoughtful information, the paper underscores a larger point. By illustrating how complex and tailored to specific context successful public-private agreements must be, the author establishes that government has more rather than fewer decisions. Its role in providing an adequate regulatory and policy framework and climate are critical to a concession's success.

Florián-Borbón and Velasco-Campuzano discuss the government role in enabling about half of all the urban

dwellers in Latin American countries to move from illegal occupancy of their "informal" housing to legal urban citizenship with homes connected to public utilities and amenities. They examine the responsibility of government with respect to this "other half" of urban population, a particularly significant number as these countries have more than three quarters of their total population living in cities. The authors remind us that, in thinking of partnerships with the public sector, the considerable investment the poor make in constructing their own shelter needs to be recognized. The government needs to facilitate connecting these homes to urban infrastructure.

The papers on *Participation in Shaping the City* address the theme of such participation in planning and decision making by groups to be affected by planned changes. Schlossberg makes a case for greater cultural understanding when planning is a global activity. He points out how the U.N. Pacific Human Development Report for the South Pacific region, which provides a regional framework to guide specific countries like Fiji in planning their futures, overlooks key Fijian cultural characteristics that will prove to be critical in developing plans sustainable at the local level. In the cash-based economic order recognized in the U.N. Report, the significance of Fiji's *kerekere* system of shared goods, anchored in a subsistence economy and traditional culture, is not recognized. Thus, any planning derived from it continues a pattern of working against native practices and organization rather than with them. Badshah et al. outline an approach to eliciting the participation of communities and stakeholders in the development of plans more likely to be sustainable. Echoing the theme of privatization, but modifying it so that the subaltern has a voice, they take as focus the empowerment of city community. They outline processes designed to enhance popular participation of citizens in decision-making and management while including the corporate sector. Prakash's work, while raising ethical and ideological issues that professional architects working in South Asian cities should consider, explores the need and contributions that might be possible with subaltern master-planning. He posits that this will make a more useful contribution in the long term than the profession's current engagement either in making grand plans or engaging in grass-roots activism.

In *Ways of Knowing Space*, three different ways are described of knowing about local space and how it is approached and experienced by local communities. Bromley delineates an action research method which he terms "microcosmic research" to augment data collection methods conventionally used in social science research on community. He suggests a simpler method to study local history, cultural diversity, and economic development to be used by local residents, in institutions such as schools, churches, non-profits, local business associations and local NGO's. The intent is to learn from "the inside of communities" the links between a neighborhood and the wider world. It is simple to do and requires little or no external funding. Involvement in such research, he claims, can help not just to reveal new and different information but to enhance local pride and awareness, improve ethnic relations, develop new forms of entrepreneurship, and make a neighborhood dynamic and distinctive. O'Neill's paper presents a method to explore how people learn and know about local space. She examines how ranchers in southwest Montana of third- to fifth-generation ranching families develop a shared way of knowing about their spaces and their community. The method deciphers cognitive mapping processes in an attempt to reveal the ties that bind community together. Chaffers' paper provides a framework for knowing and making city space, incorporating values of vernacular, family, and human spirituality. Pointing to the tensions in market-driven economies, where he posits an overemphasis on material and individual well-being, he calls for an approach in which the tensions between finance and family are mediated. He places the role of architects and planners in a global context involving not just the elements of technology and leadership but also of spirituality, education, and vision. He argues for this way of building the city of the future based on twenty-one years of work with the GROW Land Association in inner- city Detroit, where the community perceives the building of housing and neighborhood not as building physical plant but as building families and relationships.

In the cluster of papers in *Regional Effects*, authors reach beyond the city itself to delineate the impact of globalization. Mahajan provides detailed descriptions of Nasik, a city which established "global" links with the Roman Empire in the second century B.C., through Nasik's major periods of growth and changes in political power. Her data reveal an accelerated expansion of city space in the last one hundred, and particularly in the last fifty, years. Nasik is modernizing and benefiting from the government's policies to disperse and diversify urban growth. In the industrial triangle of India, whose center is Mumbai and includes Nasik and Pune, Nasik has competed effectively and modernized through cultivating local, regional, and global connections. In contrast to Mumbai, global connections are transforming both Nasik city and its region into a vibrant modern space. Mumbai's loss, it appears, is Nasik's gain. The synergy, but also the competition and differing outcomes between cities in a production region, are made clear.

Success is also reported by Susnik and Ganesan in the recent redevelopment of Hong Kong's older urban areas. There is region-wide interest in Hong Kong's success. The paper presents issues which should be considered by localities with global economies and obsolete building stock. Hong Kong's success, the authors state, could become a prototype for the upcoming Yangtze Basin plan in which, it is reported, over two hundred cities are expected to be rebuilt. The authors observe increased private sector involvement in redevelopment of Hong Kong which is complemented by a small but increasing activity by urban renewal agencies. For a development to be sustainable in the long term, they advocate an affordable level of foreign exchange availability for the urban sector. An excess of foreign exchange content in the market value of urban ventures is seen as a concern, since such redevelopment seldom earns enough revenue in foreign currency to repay a higher debt.

Jiménez, proposing ways to bring about development in a region of Mexico in the economic shadow of Mexico City, advocates coalition building and planning between city governments to make a regional claim for development resources from the center. As in most centralized developing economies, these resources, usually in the form of capital, are essential to construct the capital infrastructure needed if a region is to be a viable actor in the global marketplace. With the case of Bombay (Mumbai), Brahme describes the effects of what she sees as four centuries of globalization. She points out how built-up space, urban facilities, and the windfall profits of global connections have accrued to the city elite but served to impoverish both the working classes in the city and in the rural hinterlands. She warns against a strategy that relies primarily on connectivity to the nation and the world, and states that the ambitions of Bombay's elite to elevate it to an international finance center, like Hong Kong, will come at the expense of the local region and the working-class inhabitants of the city.

Describing Taiwan's transformation into a key industrial player on the global landscape, Williams notes the costs this has entailed to the environment and to the quality of life to be enjoyed in cities such as Taipei. However, his paper points out that effective action on the part of government can be ameliorative. Antonakos reflects on the ways in which designs of transportation systems around the world need to be evaluated from a social perspective, and endorses moving away from automobile-dependent models to reduce stress and enhance sustainability of the system in the long run. Two papers presented at the symposium and published elsewhere address regional implications in additional dimensions. Corey[13] details the efforts made by countries in Southeast Asia and the United States to control and shape cyber communities in the twenty-first century, the new territorial frontier. Zusman[14] delineates the regional impacts, including those on urban space, of water shortage in the Yellow River.

Finally, papers on *Housing Issues and Gender* deal with a specific sector of city infrastructure, namely, shelter, and a specific constituency of the city population, namely, women. The particular needs of women and the variations in these needs in different societies that are globalizing are illustrated. Sinai's paper draws on empirical evidence to confirm the utility of housing in income generation in Kumasi, Ghana. Her paper provides the kind of data which is needed for a context-grounded assessment of policy options in the shelter sector. For example, Sinai's data reveal that female-headed households more often use their homes for income generation. Patton explores whether a Nicaraguan housing project is accessible to low-income women and provides another example of research useful to decision makers interested in forging a gender-sensitive housing policy. She suggests project-based approaches directed by NGO's as having the greatest possible potential. The papers by Pothukuchi, Bose, and El Rafey and Bukhari serve to highlight the spatial constraints and limitations on women even in the modernizing and large cities of South Asia and the Middle East[15]. Educated women seeking to work in the city need shelter separate from that within a family to which they are traditionally entitled, states Pothukuchi. Working women's hostels fill this need, but more than monetary costs are involved, costs which women pay to gain a foothold in the city. She suggests policy recommendations which might reduce these costs. Bose's paper on the culture of surveillance as a force that circumscribes and limits women's spatial experience in the city reveals a social reality in many regions of the world beyond the specific South Asian context she uses for her case study. Her work reveals conditions in which women are rewarded for conforming to societal norms and punished for non-conformance. Similar societal conditions make the work described in El Rafey and Bukhari particularly significant and constructive. They describe the design goals for community centers for women in Saudi Arabia, thus creating semi-public realms in which women can socialize and interact.

The diversity of regions, subjects, and social groups embraced in this collection of papers is revealing on two counts. First, it illustrates the multifaceted and varied understanding of authors about of what is meaningful and significant about global-local connections which affect the space of cities. Secondly and more importantly, the collection reveals many common themes and issues which appear to transcend regional and cultural specificity. The commonalties seem to be particularly obvious if the perspective taken is class- or sector-based in its concern. This collection of papers, addressing as it does the tangible and spatial manifestations of global links on local space from a multidisciplinary perspective, begins a conversation which needs to continue. The quality of life space which people around the world will experience in the twenty-first century will be improved by critical examination and corrective action by concerned citizens playing decisive roles in the public, private, and professional realms. Discussions that transcend national boundaries and bring together life space experiences and observations, will be needed to assist this action. The editor and authors of this book hope the work presented here is useful and informative in that effort.

Notes

[1] See for instance, King, Anthony D, ed., *Culture, Globalization, and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, University of Minnesota Press: 1997; and, *Re-Presenting the City: Ethnicity, Capital and Culture in the 21st-Century Metropolis*, New York University Press: 1996; Smith, D., *Third World Cities in Global Perspective: The Political Economy of Uneven Urbanization*, Westview Press:1996; Chiu, Stephen W.K., K.C.Ho, Tai-Lok Lui, *City-States in the Global Economy: Industrial Restructuring in Hong Kong and Singapore*, Westview Press: 1997; Sharon Zukin, *The Cultures of Cities*, Blackwell: 1995; Sassen, S., *Losing Control? : Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, Columbia University Press: 1996; and Douglass, Mike and John Friedmann, eds., *Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age*, John Wiley and Sons: 1998.

[2] See Castelles M. *The Informational City: Information, Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban-Regional Process*, Blackwell: 1989; Knox, P.L. and Peter J. Taylor, eds. *World Cities in the World System*, Cambridge University Press: 1995; Sassen, S., *Cities in a World Economy*, Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge Press: 1994.

[3] This conversation has been particularly active and significant in sociology, anthropology, political science, and economics.

[4] For example, the urbanist Witold Rybezynski in a public lecture at the College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan, February 21, 1997, when asked about the implications of globalization on American cities and their real-estate markets, was dismissive. He did not know what "this globalization" was. He did not think it a significant factor in his own scholarship on North American cities. Whatever it was, it was not a significant factor in the real-estate marketplace of a Philadelphia, a Boston, or a Montreal.

[5] See Appadurai, Arjun., *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Public Worlds, Volume 1, University of Minnesota Press: 1996.

[6] During the strike in the Spring of 1998 by workers in G.M.'s Michigan plants, various local newspapers, including the Ann Arbor *News* and the Detroit *Free Press*, noted quite specifically issues about job loss and flight of production capacity to Mexico as key concerns of the striking workers.

[7] Scott, Allen J. and Michael Storper, *Regional Development Reconsidered*, Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies, UCLA, Working Paper 1: 1990, pp. 1–50.

[8] See Friedmann, John, "Life Space and Economic Space: Contradictions in Regional Development" in *Life Space and Economic Space: Essays in Third World Planning*, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1988, 93-107.

[9] See McGee, T.G., "The Emergence of *Desakota* Regions in Asia: Expanding a Hypothesis" in Ginsburg, Norten., Bruce Koppel and T.G. McGee eds., *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu: 1991.

[10] In this chaper references to papers in this book are made only by their authors' name.

[11] Presentations made at the 1996 conference (The Future of Asia's Cities) including those describing activities of Chiputra, Lippo Karawaci were dramatically illustrative of this (see Prakash), as is the work of scholars such as Edward Blakely on gated communities in the USA.

[12] For a description of the textile workers life space and their historical claim on the textile village land, see Dandekar, Hemalata C., *Men to Bombay, Women at Home: Urban Influence on Village Life in Deccan Maharashtra, India, 1942-82*, Center for South and Southeast Asia Publications, University of Michigan:1986, and Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, *The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies and the Working Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940*, Cambridge University Press.

[13] See Kenneth E. Corey, "Electronic Space: Creating and Controlling Cyber Communities in Southeast Asia and the United States, http://www.ssc.msu.edu/~Dean.

[14] See Eric Zusman, "A River Without Water: Examining Water Shortage in the Yellow River Basin," The LBJ Journal of Public Affairs, Spring 1998, pp. 31–41.

[15] For a cross-national rendition of the various aspects of women's relationship to the local space of house and home see Dandekar, Hemalata C., ed., *Shelter, Women and Development: First and Third World Perspectives*, George Wahr Publishing Co., Ann Arbor: 1993.

2 THE COMMON GOOD: ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF CITIES[1]

John Friedmann

The question of the state has recently reappeared on the development agenda. After nearly three decades of neo-liberal rhetoric, in which the state figured as Enemy No. 1, even the World Bank has come around to acknowledge that, without a strong and active national state, sustainable development is impossible. "An effective state," thus the World Bank in its updated collective wisdom, " is vital for the provision of the goods and services—and the rules and institutions—that allow markets to flourish and people to lead healthy and happier lives" (World Bank, 1997, 1).

Its *World Development Report* for 1997 is unquestionably a tour-de-force, giving a detailed treatment of the state and its multiple failings in all the major world regions. Not surprisingly, its focus is on the national state (the number of United Nations member states stands currently at 185). I say "not surprisingly," because the Bank, along with all other United Nations agencies, continues to believe in the mantra that economic development is best revealed in national statistics: it is the national state that is invariably taken as the "natural" unit for analysis.

This picture is rapidly becoming obsolete, however. The actual geography of the world economy is coming to resemble more and more the geography of the United States, where it makes little sense to speak of, say, the economy of a Rhode Island, North Dakota, or even California, because the states of the Union are so tightly interlinked that their economic performance cannot be properly assessed *except as a function of these linkages*. This is not to argue that sub-national policy measures are unimportant, especially when they are focused on those metropolitan regions—a Boston, Miami, Chicago, Los Angeles, or Seattle—that serve as vital command centers, switching points, and global investment hubs through which the nation's economy is articulated into the global *space of flows* (Castells, 1989; 1996). Quite to the contrary. What the World Bank has not yet dared to say is that the global space of flows is more accurately modeled by articulating it through a network of city-regions that function as the new core areas of the world economy (Sassen 1994; Knox and Taylor 1995; Friedmann 1996).

Once we accept this point of view, it follows that, important as is the role of national states in setting the institutional and policy parameters of all developments within their borders, it is the governance of their cities or, more accurately, of major city-centered regions, that, in the final analysis, will be decisive for how well they perform, not only in the global economy geared to capital accumulation but also in providing for the life and livelihood of their inhabitants. Perhaps the best way to understand the functioning of the actually existing world economy is not as an ensemble of 185 national states but as an archipelago of some 30 or 40 quasi-city-states that

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are linked to each other in a global system of economic, social, and political relations.

The question of good city governance is thus a direct counterpart of the question of governance posed by the World Bank at the level of the national state. While good governance nationally will undoubtedly benefit domestic city-regions, the performance of cities is not merely a reflection of structure and processes at the national level. We will have to look at the city-regional level on its own terms. And that is the premise with which I shall begin this paper.

Posing the Question

When shall we say that a city is well governed? Having posed this question leads me to ask two more. If governance concerns political process, what of a city's management—its ability to translate plans into action—and, beyond that, what about the desired outcomes of good governance and good management? What should be the characteristics of a good city, which is our ultimate destination?

As a friendly critic (Roger Keil) has pointed out to me, this tripartite division is problematical because, so he argued, governance and management are intersecting, overlapping categories. Many government agencies wield more power than the city's executive authority or deliberative assembly; national ministries wield power over and may even preempt local decisions; and privatization has removed many traditional urban services from direct public scrutiny. The political moment and the bureaucratic moment, therefore, should not be separated.

This is no doubt a valid way of looking at the problem of "performance." I have nevertheless decided to retain the distinction. Although the concept of governance is inclusive of both corporate sector and organized civil society, it is the state that is ultimately responsible for political decisions and their outcomes. And it is the state's bureaucracy—its management arm—that is supposed to transpose political decisions into facts on the ground.

Taken together, my three questions pose the even broader issue of urban performativity. How well would any actually existing city or city-region stack up against criteria of good governance, good management, and good outcomes?

My questions raise major issues in political philosophy, but my deeper interests are practical. Given that our cities, especially our large cities, both East and West, are in a sorry state—I do not wish to rehearse the litany of urban problems yet again—what shall we hold out as a vision, so that political practice (and planning) do not merely chase after problems, making small improvements here and there as opportunities arise, but move coherently towards an agenda of a truly human development? (For the current state of our cities, see United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 1996).

I am fully aware of the utopian character of any project that seeks a broad consensus around a vision of "the good city." Self-styled realists will argue that all we can ever hope to accomplish is to solve problems pragmatically with whatever resources are at hand. May they continue to do what they are doing. I will pitch my remarks to those who crave a different approach, who are not afraid to look beyond the visible horizon as a source of inspiration. We, too, want to be problem-solvers. The question is, how shall we define the problem so that, when we move towards ostensible solutions, we can be reasonably confident that, step-by-step, we are getting out of the woods rather than become more deeply entangled in the wilderness?

Economic Space, Life Space, Political Space

Up to now, I have used the term city in a very loose, general sense. On one hand, "city" can refer to a municipality. This is the simplest case. In other contexts, it can mean the densely built-up urban area, regardless of politico-administrative boundaries. But given the character of actual urbanization processes world-wide, I would like "city" to stand, at least for purposes of this essay, for the more encompassing concept of "city-region" that consists of a core city and its surrounding *urban field* which, together, constitute an *integrated functional/economic space* (Friedmann and Miller, 1965; McGee 1995). Urban fields typically extend outward from the core to a distance of more than 100 km; they are the spaces into which the core city expands; they include the city's airports, new industrial estates, watersheds, recreation areas, water and sewage treatment facilities, intensive vegetable farms, outlying new urban districts, already existing smaller cities, power plants, petroleum refineries, and so forth, all of which are essential to the city's good functioning. City-regions on this scale can now have many millions of inhabitants, some of them rivaling a medium-sized country. This space of functional/economic relations may fall entirely within a single *political/administrative space* as is the case of the Hong Kong SAR and Toronto; more likely, however, it will cut across and overlap with a number—in some cases a very large number—of political-administrative spaces of cities, counties, districts, towns, provinces, and so forth. *Political/administrative space is the primary space of governance.*

Both spaces, functional/economic and political/administrative, overlie a set of smaller, loosely bounded, more intimately constructed spaces of social relation which I call *life space*. Life space is the space of everyday domesticity, of residentiary households in their social relations with neighbors, friends, family, and basic service providers. Often, it is centered on religious institutions and will typically include convenience stores, sport fields, pubs, local cafes, playgrounds, and parks. It will also be served, well or badly (and sometimes even not at all), by public facilities such as transportation, health posts, police posts, and the like. *Life space is the primary space of social reproduction.*

Although all three of these spaces can, in principle, be mapped,

precise boundaries are often arbitrary, frequently blurred, and, because of the internal dynamics of the city, may require repeated revisions to reflect continuous changes "on the ground." Moreover, cities do not exist in isolation but are interconnected with both near-by and distant, non-contiguous city-regions. *Cities form parts of systems of cities.*

The City as a Political Community, or Why a City is not a Hotel

Cities are real physical spaces in which our lives as urbanites unfold. The question that I now wish to pose is this: How do we relate, first, to the urban habitat; second, to our fellow urbanites; and third, to those in authority who claim to govern us? These three questions ultimately boil down to this: what does it mean to be an urban citizen?

In medieval Europe, to be a burgher was to be a citizen of a fortified city. Burghers were the inhabitants of a self-governing, chartered city and, as such, entitled to privileges not granted to the more numerous peasantry that served their feudal overlords in the surrounding countryside (Martines 1979; Braudel 1992). As the familiar saying went, "*Stadtluft macht frei*"—city air makes free—and this tradition of the city as a self-governing commune survives to this day; witness the loose association of some 70 major cities in the European Union that calls itself *Eurocities* and is engaged in cooperative research, information exchange, and policy coordination (Eurocities 1996).

Much has changed, of course, since self-governing cities first emerged in the European heartland during the 12th and 13th centuries. With the rise of the national state following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, cities lost much of their autonomy. The democratic revolution that began in the latter part of the 18th century and is still ongoing, resurrected the idea of citizenship but lodged it squarely in the national state, imagined as a sovereign political community. This weakening of city autonomy entailed a sharp decline of interest in local governance. In the United States, for example, where local councils are elected, citizen participation in local elections involves typically less than a third of those eligible to vote. Most people are content to pay their taxes and live in the city as though it were a hotel.

Let me elaborate on this metaphor and try to show where, I believe, it goes wrong. Let's assume that the city would, indeed, be like a hotel. As a hotel, it would be managed as most of them are, primarily in the interest of its well-paying guests who influence management and occupy the top floors of the tower, especially its penthouse suites. (The cheaper rooms are always in the lower stories, with single cubicles set aside for the poor in crowded basements, whilst numbers of homeless people jostle in the alleys behind the kitchen, feeding off food scraps.) The management reports annually to a distinguished Board of (mostly male) Directors and an anonymous body of shareholders, most of whom have given their proxy vote to the Board. At these meetings, everyone's attention is focused on a single question: is the hotel profitable; what is its share of the local market; how can operating costs be further reduced?

Contrary to its glossy brochure, Hotel Metropole—which is what I shall call this run-down city hotel—is not the five-star facility it imagines itself to be. Although its management has become deeply corrupted, the elevators still work in a fashion, the water—increasingly of a dubious color—still runs from the faucets, the garbage still gets collected from most of the floors, albeit on an irregular schedule, the hallways are uncomfortably drab, smelly, and noisy. Over time, the hotel is getting ever more crowded, and new structures are being added haphazardly here and there. Guests are continually switching rooms: those who can afford it move up to higher floors which are reputed to have better service, others respond to the advertisements of competing hotels in the chain, still others move to different rooms on the same floor: there are rumors that things may be a bit more tolerable further down on this or that corridor. Despite increasingly appalling conditions, the Board of Directors has decided to keep the hotel running. Profits from its operations are helping to finance new hotels elsewhere. Hotel Metropole has become a cash cow.

What, if anything, is wrong with this story? The overall picture is surely a familiar one, and yet, something is not quite right. There are, in fact, three fatal flaws. No one can be said to "own" the city in the sense that stockholders own a capitalist enterprise;[1] cities are not supposed to be "profitable;" and many of the city's inhabitants, especially among the older generation, harbor strong attachments to the small corner of the earth that they regard as their "life space:" the city, or at least their urban neighborhood or borough, forms a facet of their collective identity. But if the city is not a capitalist enterprise, and there is no distinguished Board of Directors, then what is it? And to whom should the city's management team report? If the city is not out to make a profit, then what purpose does it serve? And if the city's inhabitants are not paying "guests," then what are they, and what are their rights and obligations?

I shall cut directly to the core of my argument. In my view, the city is not a "hotel," because it is, potentially at least, a *political community*, that is to say, a collective entity whose management is ultimately accountable to its long-term residents, its "citizens." In the final analysis, it is citizens who constitute its putative "Board of Directors," with the implicit power to "hire and fire" the city's management. A well-run city makes possible and enhances collective life. It creates the conditions for the integration of economic activities within the functional space it controls, and it supports the cluster of life spaces within which civil society and individual human lives flourish. The city's management can open up new economic and cultural opportunities and mediate conflict within the city's political space. But it is its residents who make the city productive. They constitute the city as a polity.

Nevertheless, I am aware that many, perhaps even most of us would prefer to inhabit the city as though it were, indeed,

something like a hotel. It would certainly be a lot more convenient. We may be long-suffering "guests," but getting involved in the mire and muck of urban politics is not worth the trouble with so many more immediately pressing or amusing things to do. In the United States, as I already mentioned, voter turnout in local elections is typically very low. People may grumble and complain but, so long as minimal services are provided, at least to their own neighborhoods, they remain largely unconcerned with the city as a political community.

Here, I shall argue for a more politically engaged position. The concept of *local citizenship*—practiced in a small federated republic such as Switzerland to this day—is not yet in currency world-wide, partly because citizenship is still thought to be tied exclusively to the national state. But this tight identity relation, nation-citizen, is beginning to crumble: in a dynamic, global economy, with mobile capital *and* labor, changing technologies, and shifting markets, multiple citizenship with all of its attendant ambiguities is becoming more and more the rule. In Europe, citizens of the European Union elect the parliament sitting in Strasbourg but they elect members of their own national legislatures as well: in some sense, they are already citizens of both, the European Union and their respective national states. Why should they then not also assert their right to be *local* citizens of the city or town where they reside?[2] And are we not, all of us, at least informally, already global citizens, concerned with world poverty issues, peace-keeping missions, the adjudication of international conflicts, global warming accords, species survival? Granted that global, macro-regional, national, and local claims on individuals may be in conflict, and this presents a practical, that is a political problem. But, whatever the difficulties in the specific case, I believe that formal recognition of local citizenship is now merely a matter of time.[3]

Some Preconditions for a Political Community

The concept of a political community and its associated ideas of (local) citizenship derive from the liberal democratic traditions of western Europe and North America, whose intellectual roots can be traced to ancient Greece, the Roman Republic, European humanism, and the democratic revolutions in the late 18th century in the American colonies and France (Skinner, 1978). Although there were long centuries, even millennia, when democratic thought and practice were at low ebb, philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Madison, J.S. Mill and others still carry a vital, contemporary message.

It is not my intention here to argue that democratic ideals are universally desirable, or indeed that they have ever been fully realized. Moreover, these ideals vary substantially, from those of liberal democracy on the right (Berlin 1969) to those of radical (participatory) democracy on the left (Barber 1984). Some uphold individualist, others more collective conceptions of justice as the foundation of political order (Walzer 1983; Young 1990). There are also important feminist perspectives (e.g., Pateman 1989). Political traditions follow different trajectories, and political systems in the Middle East and China, for example, would probably not support all of the performance criteria for cities I will propose in this essay. It remains to be seen to what extent, for example, Islamic or Confucian political traditions will devise performance criteria based on different principles (see, for example, Hsiao 1979; Du and Song 1995). Nevertheless, it is clear that democratizing forces are presently at work in many parts of the world outside the European heartland. The globalization of capital is partly responsible for this insofar as it is justified by an ideology of possessive individualism (MacPherson 1962) and requires the free circulation of information for its own long-term survival. Global media and the Internet are also contributing to this diffusion of political ideas. I shall therefore persist with my argument, leaving it for future resolution whether broadly democratic or some other set of criteria should be universally adopted (Davis 1995).

A political community, then, has *institutional correlates* without which it ceases to be a meaningful concept. I shall merely list some of the major ones, since a full discussion is, in the present context, impossible. They include: universal suffrage and free periodic elections; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; freedom from arbitrary arrest; public media independent of state control; and a non-partisan legal system. It is these and similar conditions that make possible the vibrant life of a political community and undergird the role of citizens in the governance of cities.

Human Flourishing as a Universal Human Right

Allow me now to return to my main topic. Criteria for assessing the performance of cities require a normative foundation without which any further discussion would become incoherent. These founding principles should be so clearly formulated that they can be communicated even to people who are not philosophically inclined but make their living as carpenters, domestic workers, or construction workers.

As a norm, they must also be powerful and persuasive enough to serve as a beacon for governance and public policy. Here is how I would formulate this foundational value:

Every human being has the right, by nature, to the full development of their innate intellectual, physical, and spiritual potentialities in the context of wider communities.

I call this the *right to human flourishing*. It has never been universally acknowledged as an inherent right of being human. Slave societies knew nothing of it; nor did caste societies, tribal societies, corporate village societies, or totalitarian states. And in no society have women ever enjoyed the same right to human flourishing as men. But as the fundamental

right of every person, human flourishing is implicit in the democratic ethos.

Human flourishing underlies the strongly held belief in contemporary western societies that privilege should be earned rather than inherited. Human beings should accordingly have an equal start in life. Over a lifetime, individual and group outcomes will, of course, vary because of differences in innate abilities, family upbringing, entrenched privilege, class formation, social oppression, and other reasons. Still, the idea of a basic equality among all of their citizens underlies the mild socialism of western countries with their systems of public education, public health, the graduated income tax, anti-discriminatory legislation, and so forth, all of which seek some sort of leveling of life chances among individuals and groups.

The Common Good

It would be foolish, however, to insist, as Margaret Thatcher did when she reportedly dismissed the notion of "society" as a fiction, that human flourishing is largely or even primarily an individual achievement, independent of any social context. Flourishing does not depend on us alone as individuals—it is not only a matter of individual achievement—for the simple reason that we are all profoundly social beings as well. As individuals ultimately responsible for our actions, we are constrained in what we do by (1) our social relations with family, friends, work mates, and neighbors, in short, by an ethics of mutual obligation within civil society and (2) the social settings of our lives, by which I mean the set of socially produced *conditions* that may and often do inhibit human flourishing. Although the first set of constraints can be very powerful indeed, I will not further address it here because, for the most part, it lies outside the public sphere. Rather, I will turn to the second set which is the primary focus of this essay.

Briefly, my argument is that local citizens do not merely *use* the city to advance their personal interests—some will do so more successfully than others—but also contribute, as members of their political community, which is the city in its political aspect, to establish and maintain *the basic conditions—political, economic, social, and physical—for the human flourishing of all citizens of the community.* I refer to these basic conditions as the *common good* of the polity, or the *good city*, because without them, human flourishing would be impossible. The "common good" therefore implies something akin to *citizen rights*, that is, to the rightful claims that any local citizen can make on her or his political community based on the inalienable right to human flourishing.

The "common good" may sound today like a concept coming from an earlier, more benign era. In a neo-liberal age and a globalizing economy, where the untrammeled pursuit of self-interest has been raised to the level of an unassailable virtue, it has a distinctly old-fashioned ring. While neo-conservatives in the West raise the banner of possessive individualism unconstrained by social obligations, progressives decry the "common good" as a rhetorical trick of the hegemonic class that merely serves to hide their own class interest. Post-modern critics, for their part, argue that ours is an era of social fragmentation, and that meta-narratives proposing to offer a basis for social coherence are simply no longer possible (Tagg 1996). Their refuge is a regressive aestheticism. Against neo-liberals, political progressives, and post-modernists, I would argue that a political community has no purchase except as it invokes a conception of the "common good." Unless we can agree that, for a given social formation, a common good can, at least in principle, be defined, we would have to be content with our fable of the Hotel Metropole; we would have to be satisfied to live as "guests" in a city on which we have no special claims.

Towards Criteria for Assessing the Performance of Cities

Let me review the logic of my argument so far. I have posited human flourishing as a universal human right. To make this right operational, certain conditions of a political, economic, social, physical, and environmental character must exist. Although these conditions are, in principle, enabling, they also impose social constraints on the individual. The primary site for establishing/creating these conditions is the city, constituted as a political community. In this context, the right to human flourishing appears as a right that can be claimed by local citizens. Becoming a member of a political community, and thus an active local citizen, should be facilitated for newcomers to the city.

Continuing this line of argument, the facilitating conditions for human flourishing must be available on an equal basis to all citizens who, in turn, assume a civic obligation to help bring about and sustain these conditions. Although this equality principle is unassailable as such, the unequal treatment of women, ethnic and religious groups, lower castes, the invisible underclass, and groups marked by certain phenotypical characteristics is a fact in virtually every major city of the world. As a principle in the political order, however, egalitarianism cannot by itself dissolve the remaining, stubborn inequalities in the civil order. In addition to the formal declaration of rights in the political order, therefore, a concurrent struggle must take place to secure an equality of rights in the civil order as well.

An unresolved question concerns the correct balance between individual, self-interested striving and one's obligations towards groups and collectivities, including one's political community. The Anglo-Saxon variety of capitalism has always leaned far to the side of individualism, leaving little more than a yearning for community among many people. Socially, it has been a disaster. Chinese communism of the Mao Ze Dong variety leaned far in the other direction, where the demands of the collectivity all but swallowed up individual striving. It, too, was a disaster. The golden mean obviously

lies in the difficult balance between the one and the many. The problem is that whatever equilibrium between self-advancement and social obligation may be momentarily attained, it will never be a stable one. At present, there is considerable debate in the United States about the importance of so-called family values, communitarianism, and relations within civil society based on trust, face-to-face relations, and mutuality, often referred to as *social capital* (Putnam 1993). But mainstream America continues to be enthralled by the promise of an unfettered individualism and fails to connect its rampant and pervasive problems of social alienation to the absence of precisely this lack of social engagement, this blind denial of the social nature of human beings and the deeply felt human needs that spring from that source.

Defining the Criteria

I now turn to the identification of the criteria for assessing the performance of cities. As I hinted at the start, criteria can be divided into three groups: good governance, good management, and good outcomes. *Good city governance* refers to the political processes of allocating resources and "steering" the collective life of the political community. It involves the triad of state, corporate sector, and civil society joined in various forms of collaborative local action.[4] *Good city management* concerns the administration and use of common resources in bringing about those minimal conditions of urban life that make possible individual human flourishing. Finally, *good city outcomes* concern those which further the common good of the city, including the strengthening of good governance, thereby completing the circle.

The specific criteria I would propose follow below:

I. Criteria of Good City Governance

- *Inspired political leadership*: leaders capable of articulating a common vision for the polity, building a strong consensus around this vision, and mobilizing resources towards its realization.
- *Public accountability:* (1) the uncoerced, periodic election of political representatives and (2) the right of local citizens to be adequately informed about those who stand for elections, the government's performance record, and the overall outcomes for the city (see III below).
- *Inclusiveness:* the right of all citizens to be directly involved in the formulation of policies and programs whenever consequences are expected significantly to affect their life and livelihood.
- *Responsiveness:* the fundamental right of citizens to claim rights and express grievances; to appropriate channels for this purpose; to a government that is accessible people in their neighborhoods and districts; and to an acknowledgment by government that citizens' claims and grievances require an attentive, appropriate response.
- *Non-violent conflict management:* refers to institutionalized ways of resolving conflicts between state and citizens without resort to physical violence.

II. Criteria of Good City Management

- *Accessibility, transparency, responsiveness*: the city bureaucracy should be equally accessible to citizens from all walks of life, transparent in its manner of operation, and responsive to citizen complaints and initiatives.
- *Effectiveness*: programs launched to attain specific, politically-sanctioned results should also come close to achieving them. Privatized urban services should be carefully monitored for their compliance with performance standards.
- *Efficiency:* in striving for maximum effectiveness, government-sponsored programs should use resources as efficiently as possible.
- *Honesty:* in carrying out public programs, all concerned parties should be treated fairly, without favoritism. Basically, this criterion speaks to the honesty and incorruptibility of public officials.

III. Criteria of Good City Outcomes

- A *productive* city: provides the right to adequately remunerated work for those who seek it.
- A *sustainable* city: ensures the right to a life-sustaining and life-enhancing natural environment for every citizen, now and in the future.
- A *livable* city: guarantees all citizens their right to decent housing and associated public services, including health and personal safety, in neighborhoods of their choice.
- A *safe* city: ensures each person's right to the physical integrity and security of their body.
- An *actively tolerant city*: protects and promotes citizen rights to group-specific differences in language, religion, national custom, sexual preference, and similar markers of collective identity, so long as these do not invade the rights of others and are consistent with more general human rights.
- A *caring* city: acknowledges the right of the weakest members of the polity to adequate social provision.

I call this listing of criteria a *minimum agenda* for the "good city"[5]. Although it does not place extraordinary demands on existing institutions, it does entail a vibrant civil society, an active praxis of democratic citizenship, and an independent press prepared to support responsible, investigative journalism. These are, you might say, preconditions before the "good city" can make an appearance. Once these preconditions are met, however, how should the criteria be used, and by whom, towards what end? First, I want to emphasize what I would consider to be an inappropriate use. The criteria of good city governance, management, and

outcomes are not designed for a comparative analysis of city performance. To look for and construct quantitative indicators by which to measure and compare city performance would be a misguided effort. This is so for two reasons. Even if it were possible to construct plausible indicators for each criterion, it would be virtually impossible to combine them into an aggregate performance index for the simple reason that there will never be agreement on the relative weighting of the separate criteria. Secondly, quantitative indicators are normally read as standing for the whole they are supposed to "indicate," but such a reading would be invalid in this case. An actively tolerant city, for example, cannot be adequately measured, say, by the number of violent acts committed against so-called minority groups. Whereas reducing violence against certain sectors of the population may become an immediate objective in one situation (though not necessarily in others), it cannot replace the continuing search for a more actively tolerant city everywhere, which will always have a more encompassing meaning than can possibly be captured by any single indicator or set of indicators, particularly one of negative performance. What is needed, then, in place of performance indicators is *a critical, narrative account* of the way that the civil and political rights of different socially and culturally specific groups are adequately protected and promoted in a given city.

No actually existing city would, in any event, score high on all of the criteria I have enumerated; no city is ever likely to be called a "good city." But every city can try to better itself on some dimensions of its performance. The criteria are thus intended to be used by the citizens of each city—its organized civil society—as a tool for mapping actually existing states of affairs, and for setting an agenda for civic struggle and action (Douglass and Friedmann, 1998). For I believe that it is, in principle, possible to obtain substantial agreement among the general population on criteria that propose to tell us what we have the right to hope for in a "good city."

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Roger Keil, Brian Howe, Rebecca Abers, and Leonie Sandercock for their thoughtful reading of earlier drafts of this paper and for their many useful suggestions for its improvement. Responsibility for the present text remains, of course, entirely mine

Notes

[1] But see Isin (1992) for the contrary review that modern cities in Europe and North America are best understood as corporations.

[2] Denmark is one European country where even non-Danish nationals obtain the right to vote in local elections after a residency of three years (Garcia 1996).

[3] See Held, 1995, for a similar argument.

[4] There are numerous attempts to define "governance." But a core meaning to all is the conjoining of state and civil society in the process of making decisions in the public domain (McCarney 1996). To this dyadic formulation. I have added as equally indispensable the corporate sector, thus forming a triad. See Berg, et. al., 1993.

[5] In the April 1998 Asia-Pacific Intercity Network workshop on urban-regional governance held in Taipei, where I presented this paper, Professor Won-Bae Kim pointed out that my "good city" criteria concerned citizens rights to the exclusion of obligations. I concur with this observation. On reflection, however, I would venture the following generalization. Whereas western political theory is, indeed, primarily a theory of individual rights, east Asia philosophy has elaborated a complex theory of obligations. First articulated in the *Analects* of Confucius, the latter is based on a "bottom-up" system of reciprocal obligations (i.e., beginning with familial relations) that extend, step by step, all the way to the King or Emperor (the state). A correlative theory of rights is foreign to this conception, just as rights theory (as formulated, for example, in the U.S. Bill of Rights) has little to offer on the question of citizen responsibilities. The Bill of Rights is essentially the individual citizen's principled line of defense against the encroachments of the state. Such a conception is difficult to graft onto Chinese political theory

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PART I
DESIGN, SHAPE AND CULTURE



City Shape in the Twenty-first Century

3 WRITING THE TRANSNATIONAL: THE DISTANT SPACES OF THE INDIAN CITY

Anthony D. King

Introduction

This paper reports "work in progress" on a project which I've titled, "The Spaces of Transnational Cultures". The aim of the project is to build on, but be methodologically different from, my earlier research on the architecture and urbanism of colonial and postcolonial cities in which the principal objective had been to demonstrate the inherently constitutive relationship between the political, social, and cultural regimes of colonialism in specific locations and their urban, architectural and spatial representations (King, 1976; 1990)

In this new project, my aim is to examine different disciplinary as well as popular discourses dealing with the 'transnationalization of cultures' (including theoretical ideas and concepts, developed in the last two decades, on, for example, globalization, postmodernism, postcolonial criticism etc.). My objective here is to assess their effetiveness in helping to explain spatial transformations over the last three decades in the realms of architecture, urbanism and the larger built environment, particularly in major world cities. The assumption behind this objective is that if we can demonstrate the existence of specific colonial cultures and the powers and spaces they constitute (and which, in turn, help to constitute them), we can also do the same for transnational, or global cultures.

My paper is in two parts. I first address the larger theoretical frame and elaborate some of the concepts used before discussing the particular instance of transnational cultures as exemplified in specific Indian cities.

I use the term "space" in two senses. First, metaphorically, to refer to the discursive space in which notions of the transcultural are being constructed; but also, in a very materialist, realist sense, to refer to those phenomena that are described and signified by these discourses—physical and spatial urban form, architecture, the larger built environ-ment. "Space" here also implies addressing the *production* of space—to use Lefebvre's (1991) phrase—and the economic, social, political, and especially, cultural conditions in which space is produced.

"Transnational cultures" is more problematic. If we can accept that transnational means "extending beyond national bounds or frontiers", trans*national culture* perhaps suggests not only that cultures are normally somehow "national", that is, that they somehow belong to nations (that is, peoples, not nation-states); but that they are also confined within the territorial boundaries of the nation-state. Not only do cultures—by which I refer to socially organized systems of meaning and identity which are not necessarily coherent or even stable—increasingly exist far from their places of origin but, as Gupta

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and Fergusson (1992) have argued, cultures aren't necessarily situated in a particular space or place.

Here it is tempting to explore the now substantial literature which speculates about the existence of "global culture(s)", about which Appadurai (1996), Featherstone (1990), Waters (1994), among others, have written. Yet having addressed some of the issues elsewhere (King, 1997), and in the interests of both space and time, I will resist that. Illustratively, Homi Bhabha (1994) speaks of "locating culture in the realm of the beyond", coming up with concepts like a "third space", and interesting ideas about the "extra-territorial". He does not, however, actually address the issue that I'm interested in: while it is possible for people, ideas, memories, images, or movable objects to be located (almost) anywhere and to move around at will, immovable objects, such as buildings or the spaces of city squares, have to be fixed, to be located. And they're fixed in particular places, most often in cities, which are situated in nation-states.

There is, therefore, a basic contradiction that has to be dealt with, namely, that if there are transnational spaces in a realist, physicalist sense, they're still located in *national* space. Alternatively, we can suppose that national space has become metaphorically,and representationally, if not legally or technically, transnationalized.

There are, therefore, four components to the project. First, the discursive construction and representation of the spaces of transnational culture. This includes the concepts, languages, images, theories, and visual representations, and the meanings which people invest in these: for example, ideas about globalization, as well as all the "posts" (postcolonialism, postnationalism, etc.), about global cities, cultural flows and the rest. These concepts are what people use to talk about the phenomena and, through these discourses, bring the transnational spaces into representation.

For example, to clarify: we can say that "national space" refers to that space which is represented in and by a national cultural tradition ("American architecture"); "international space" is that space constructed by a combination of elements from two or more national cultural traditions (e.g. Maryknoll seminary, built for a missionary brotherhood at Ossining, NY, on the Hudson River, is a robust masonry building in the American Arts and Crafts tradition yet hybridized with Chinese features and roof structure); "transnational space" acknowledges the existence of specific national cultural traditions but either ignores them or attempts to go beyond them.

It could be suggested that such a transnational space is impossible in that every architect, builder or client is a subject of, and every space is necessarily located in, a nation state. However, it may be possible to have a space that deliberately attempts to transcend national cultural traditions, as, for example, was attempted by the so-called "international style", though of course, this also came from particular national traditions, technologies and modes of production (Banham, 1988). This is clearly not the end of this argument but it is all there is space for here.

"Global space" ignores all socially constructed divisions of "the nation", and assumes either a humanistic, tech-nological or anthropomorphic universalism. Again, however, similar objections can be raised. There is no global category which does not have a "lower" categorization of identity.

Second, the realm of "the real", whether economic, financial, political, communicational, technical, and so on. By this I mean the movements of capital, media technology (the internet, the Web), the decisions about investment and real estate. We can cite here Arjun Appadurai's notion of the global cultural flows in their various dimensions—ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes (1990).

Third, is what I shall call the "fixed spaces" of transnational culture. A production of space is materialized and located in a particular place and brought together by the combination of 1 and 2 above.

Fourth, the cultures of the people who construct the representations I discussed first. James Clifford (1992), for example, writes of "travelling cultures," the ways people leave home and return, enacting differently centered worlds (made up of) interconnected cosmopolitanisms. These are the people who move between and speak across cultures (such as most of us at this conference).

Diasporic Designs: Constructed Dream Cultures of (or for) the NRI

In order to put some substance into these ideas let me address what I'd suggest is a good example of a transnational culture, as I've described it above This is the diasporic culture(s) of the "NRI", the Non-Resident Indian. I shall speak about some of its institutions, and also, some of the spaces produced in its name. These are some preliminary observations on this phenomenon as it manifests itself in one of the key institutions of that culture, the bi-weekly magazine, *India Today*.[1]

Given my earlier definition, the category of the Non-Resident Indian is one that closely approximates the idea of transnational culture. On one hand, the legal status of the identity is established by the Government of India through various tax, citizenship and financial regulations such that Indian subjectivity is firmly centered in a powerful sense of nation and culture, an essence where the notion of *home* (as residence from which NON Resident takes its logic and meaning) is ultimately located in India. Non-Resident *Indian* refers to a *personal* identity as Indian (to be one, to be able to speak, feel and probably also look like one) but *not*, however, to reside like one. The negation of this particular identity here is in the fact of residence; Indian residence is denied because, just like the definition of transnational, the NRI lives "beyond national bounds and frontiers".[2]

If living in the USA, the NRI or, for that matter, the British

expatriate (note the difference in terminology) can, of course, be a *Resident Alien*. This, however, completely opposite to the status of the NRI, gives the right of *residence*, but only as an *alien* (defined in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as a subject of another country in which he or she resides). Here, it is not residence that is denied but one's national, cultural, personal, and indeed, political (that is, voting) identity. As far as my own immigrant status is concerned, when in the USA, I have just the same identity—as a British, Anglo-Saxon, white, UK citizen with a "Green Card"— as the Indian Resident Alien.

Yet being resident somewhere implies at least three conditions. We are, first, resident in a particular territorial nation state. Second, we occupy some kind of dwelling or residence. Third, we are in some social and/or tenurial relationship—as guest, visitor, tenant or owner—to that dwelling, in which case the residence is also property.

As this dwelling or residence always involves some kind of choice, in terms of place, location, cost, form, size, image, it is also part of our identity—whether that identity is professional, class, social, ethnic, cultural, or, in particular places, racial. The place where we live is one way, and an important one, of how we represent ourselves to others.

I want, therefore, in this paper, to look at how some recent developments in domestic architectural culture in India are currently being represented in the pages of *India Today*. And, not least, how this is being done in the name of the NRI. First, however, some background.

Figure 1 Palam Vihar apartments, Delhi

The Context: Architecture and Property in Postcolonial India

With the decline, if not the end, of over forty years of a predominantly state-regulated economy in the late 1980s, and the formal liberalization of India's economy and opening to foreign direct investment in 1991, the space of particular cities in India has been increasingly exposed to the winds of economic globalization, developments that have been paralleled by the outward spread of the diasporic culture of the NRI.

After half a century of political and bureaucratic state building and a varying output of private enterprise, the last few years have witnessed changes in the production of domestic space which, in terms of India's urban and architectural history, have not only been of revolutionary proportions, but also, of revolutionary architectural design. The combination of India's booming economy, and the much-publicized growth in the size of its urban middle class (estimates range between 100 to 200 million significant new consumers) are two important factors. A third has been the continuing rise in Indian real estate prices compared to other investment havens worldwide. According to the director of one Delhi development company, unlike in other parts of the world, real estate prices have not fallen in Indian cities in recent years whereas in the USA (and the UK) values went down by 30–40 per cent in the years after 1987 (15 June, 1995. Bahri, p.77). In Bombay, Bangalore, Delhi and elsewhere they have increased—in Delhi, by a factor of nine between 1985 and 1995. Since June 1994, following the relaxation of Government regulations, NRI's have been allowed to repatriate the original investment of up to two houses in foreign exchange after a three year lock-in period. They have also been exempt from wealth tax for seven years. What this has meant, according to journalist Monica Raina, writing in *India Today* (15 May, 1995, p. 70) is that "luxury living" has become the new buzz word in Delhi, represented especially by the upmarket condominium—fully furnished, air-conditioned, high security, club, gym, pool, and the rest. In mid-1995, over fifty percent of condominium buyers were said to be NRIs.

Where, a hundred years ago, under the influences of capitalist imperialism and the historically distinctive forms of colonial culture, European and especially British architectural paradigms shaped the cities and suburbs of both England as well as India, Malaysia, Egypt, and elsewhere (Abel, 1997; Crinson, 1996; Evenson, 1989; King, 1976; Metcalf, 1989), in the 1990s, the rapidly expanding suburbs of Indian cities are now being influenced, if not totally shaped, by an equally specific, historically, culturally and geographically influenced interpretation of transnational culture.

Thus, one developer in Bangalore announces, "Live the way the world does (sic). (We offer) International style houses...(and) exclusive locations in Asia's fastest growing city". In Cochin city, a residential project of what are termed "international standards" is "fondled by Mother Nature"; in Delhi (Figure 1), Palam Vihar apartments are being built to

"global specifications"; Unitech developments offer what they state are "world class homes" "exclusively for Non-Resident Indians"; in Pune, other developments are of "international quality and style". How is this sense of "international style and standards", of "global specifications", being constructed?

The first condition apparently is that one lives in a jet-set world, linked by global airways. Architectural critic Deyan Sudjic (1992) has suggested that the symbolic center of the contemporary metropolitan city has shifted from the city hall and market square to the airport plaza. In India, NRI-favored properties in Delhi are, for example, represented as "ten minutes drive from the IGI Airport"; "close to the international airport in Powaii", in Mumbai; "near the planned new airport in Bangalore". Prominently featured facilities in these new developments include swimming pools (with spiral splashdowns) or "Beverly Hills style pools", jogging tracks, tennis courts, croquet lawns, indoor badminton courts, putting greens, discotheques, boat clubs, 18 hole golf courses, private airstrips, shopping malls, multi-cuisine restaurants, laundromats, gyms, table tennis and billiard rooms, party rooms, health clubs, saunas, landscaped gardens, waterfalls, and inside, individual jacuzzis, video entry phone security systems, marble flooring, teakwood floors and doors, designer toilets, and air conditioning. The "international" nature of facilities is matched by the "international" (though mainly Euro-American) signifying nomenclature used to market the developments—Bel Air, La Hacienda, Villa Del Mar, Belvedere, Riviera, Manhattan, as well as a rich sprinkling of Anglicized pseudo-aristocratic names—Burlington, Somerville, Sinclair, Eden Gardens (rather than the Garden of Eden). On this evidence, "international standards" clearly suggests not only those of the world's wealthiest states but also, those of the most privileged class within them.

In this symbolic construction of the "international"—presumably meaning *all* the world's (some 200) nation-states including India—there is a peculiar disjuncture in that "international" and "India" are positioned as being mutually exclusive, rather than inclusive of each other. Thus, advertisements for Unitech's Manhattan apartments in Delhi suggest "when you come home to India, you don't have to leave your international lifestyle behind". "International" here, therefore, is "other" than, or different from, India—and the ads, to use William Whyte's old phrase, are inherently "other directed". Take, for example, "Draw the curtains and you could be in one of London's fashionable designer homes" (but not, apparently, in India), or the Premier Park View apartments in Madras (Figure 2), "that would easily belong in Park Avenue, New York; Mayfair, London and Bel-Air, Los Angeles" (but again, apparently not in India).

In the context of an increasingly globalized clientele, although some of the advertisements are directed, as we have seen, exclusively at NRIs, it is not evident to whom else they're addressed. They could be institutional or private investors, drug lords, or occupants of any nationality. One might surmise that, whatever their nationality, they are likely to belong to one class, namely, Sklair's "transnational global elite" (Sklair, 1990) Yet anecdotal evidence from India suggests the opposite, at least for some properties; the space is bought by members of the new middle class and then split up according to family requirements. Yet, irrespective of who their purchasers are, these new "international palaces" are likely to have a significant impact, as models of domestic consumption, on the new (economically-franchised) upper middle class.

Figure 2 Premier Park View, Madras

It is here where financial, economic, cultural, discursive, as well as spatial and architectural manifestations of globalization overlap. "Liberalization" and "globalization", with increased foreign direct investment has obviously brought more multinational companies into India. Indeed, MNCs and NRIs are acknowledged as the principal forces giving "a new impetus to building activity" (Figure 3); it is these who are associated with "selling lifestyles". In Madras (Figure 4), "Spencer Plaza is already home to some of the best corporate names like Citibank, Cathay Pacific, American Express, Nestle etc". According to Delhi's Ansal Properties, "the country is moving to the central stage of the world-economy. Ushering in an era of plenty and prosperity. Nurturing many new aspirations and many new dreams" which Ansal Plaza, the "international shopping cum-office complex", is meant to symbolize".

Appeals to the collective diasporic imaginary fuse luxury with

Figure 3 MNCs and NRIs give a new impetus to building activity.



Figure 4 Spencer Plaza, Madras

dreams. Delhi (despite its record as having the most polluted environment in Asia) is represented as a "dream city" (Figure 5); builders are said to be "cashing in on the NRI need to have dream houses and addresses in India" so they can "come home to luxury". In Madras, another company suggests "We don't build apartments...We build dreams". For the Bombay developer, K. Raheja, the dream is a lifestyle to which one "comes home"—recreational, athletic, muscular and masculine—women's place, apparently, is with the children.

What is also remarkable about all these advertisements is the

Figure 5 Delhi, a "Dream City"

way that the space is gendered. None refers to the domestic realm of eating, dining, or cooking; none make any reference to kitchens, presumably because this does not belong to the spatial realm of the male or, at least, not the socially hegemonic male which is being addressed here.

The principal dream, in fact, may simply be the accumulation of capital. These are "Boom Times in Bangalore", Bombay, or Madras, announce the developers. In Rosewood City, a "luxurious 115 acre English township" in south Delhi, you can "watch your money grow by leaps and bounds"; in the nearby Charmwood Village, prices have tripled in three years. In Bangalore, "investment priorities have shifted from jewellry and stocks to real estate". Throwing the gauntlet to the financial machismo of the NRI, another company challenges, "The true measure of your success lies in how fast you can identify prime real estate opportunities in your homeland" (*India Today*, 1995, 1996 passim).

Other advertising copy constructs a particular type of imperial nostalgia, where colonial mimicry is strong. Here, one of the most frequently used signifiers is Oxford—Oxford Citadel, Oxford Towers, Oxford Hermitage, as well as Oxford Suites, Oxford Studios, Oxford Chambers, Oxford Palazzo, Oxford Ambience, Oxford Manor and—naturally—Oxford Spires. On the outskirts of Bangalore, in the words of this advertisement, in a premier residential locale, "the essence of British Architecture is about to make its presence felt, with Oxford Impero, with motifs and elements from different styles of early 17th century architecture spanning 350 years". This

"mega project...is sprawling across 13 prime acres of which 75 percent is devoted to traditional English style of landscape". The 26 buildings (with 550 premium apartments) sport appropriate signifying labels designed to appeal to the social and spatial memories of the diasporic NRI—in the West End and inner as well as outer suburbs of South Asian London: Hampstead, Regents Park, Royal Crescent House, Bedford, Dorset, but also Drayton, Shelburne and Bristol (though not Dubai, Dharan, Saudi).

These extracts may suggest that the way in which this new architectural culture is being both imaged and imagined for the NRI diaspora is entirely exogenous, exhibiting little of what we might describe as "traditional" indigenous values, and denying the identity from which it originates. This is not entirely correct. Occasionally the plan of a residence will reveal a puja room or in houses in another Bangalore suburb, reference is made to the Rajarajeshwari Temple close by. Other bungalow plots are "developed with Vedic wisdom" according to ancient principles of Vastu Shastra.

Conclusion

If we accept this advertising copy at face value, what meanings can we give to these representations and the reality they purport to describe? My first inclination is to return to my comments at the start; to see these phenomena, as simply another, but quite unique example of how particular spaces are produced and the very historically, culturally and geographically specific conditions which produce them.

Just as the Europeans, or before them, the Moghuls, under different regimes of political power, were the mediators of new, and specifically colonial forms of urban development in India, so today, the global community of the NRI, together with its local agencies, has become a significant force in transforming the space of Indian cities.

Yet what these empirical materials also reveal is that there is no singular phenomenon that can be categorized as "international or transnational identity", any more than one can speak, in the singular, about "global culture". International identities, in the plural, are formed and framed from socially constructed historical, cultural, and spatially specific hybridizations. Nor, for obvious reasons, can there ever be "global" or "international standards", defined independently of the distribution of wealth, resources and power of the richest and most powerful states.

Moreover, looked at "internationally", and specifically in relation to the NRI community in either Britain or the United States, it is evident that Indian identities (and no doubt those of others "displaced" abroad) are apparently dependent on their cultural and spatial context, and formed in a dialectical relation (and reaction) to it. In the cultural space of "the West", the formal display is to look, and be, more "Indian", signifying one's own difference in response to the difference of others; in India, on the other hand, the NRI's cultural identity is again signified by showing one's difference to others, though in this case, it is by being more "Western"[3].

This spatially split identity is especially evident when leafing through the pages of *India Today*. Reports of cultural performances in the United States—traditional forms of dance, music, theatre, as well as the Bombay film—are classically (or typically) "Indian". In India, as we have seen, the new domestic architecture of the NRI is typically "international". Identities, social, spatial, and cultural, are being remade from outside.

What the materials also highlight are the complex, interactive conditions under which new (local) class identities are being formed, with the help of new forms of architectural and spatial representations, in contemporary urban India. They are an outcome of the interactions between the "real" as well as the imagined lifestyles of a globally dispersed, diasporic NRI, the local (and also mobile) middle class, developers, entrepreneurs, and the urban policies of the state. In this context, where McDonald's has met with substantial cultural resistance in India (dietary habits touching more deeply sacred and bodily taboos), exogenous spatial and architectural images and the lifestyles they represent have so far sparked off no riots. This is culture building in a transnational context; commodification at a global level, yet carried out with local roots.

From a more political position, however, we can see that this expanding architectural culture emerges from an imagined hybridization of historic time and diasporic space, an imagination of exogenous standards and transnational lifestyles. The existence of the developers' real estate agencies in the USA, UK, Australia, Bahrein, United Arab Emirates, Dubai, or Kuwait, suggests some of the locations from which ideas, finance, and imaginations may arise. But property is also being sold to NRIs from the Sudan, China, Libya, Hong Kong, South Africa, Singapore, France—each group of potential investors and consumers perhaps exercising, if only in theory, something of the expectations and standards of the lifestyle cultures.

Just as economic globalization has, from the mid-1980s, created a market for top-level multinational CEOs, bond dealers, and specialists in international business, simultaneously forcing down the wages of the underclass to a global minimum and increasing the numbers of the unemployed so, in spatial and cultural terms, architectural globalization, on one hand, generates the world's tallest or most expensive building and, on the other, provides sleeping spaces on the streets for the increasing number of homeless.

In India, this globalization of architectural space can, of course, be seen from many different viewpoints. It can be said, for example, that the Indian "City of the Future" is becoming much more cosmopolitan, inter-nationalized by designs for suburban housing from America, Canada, or Britain. This brings a degree of social, spatial and visual diversity to a domestic architectural scene long dominated by the uniformity of government fiat and the equally numbing tradition of the Public Works Department. Yet the most recent

developments show that it is already massively adding to the ways in which different forms of housing provision signal the momentous, and increasingly social and economic as well as shelter divisions between the impossibly rich and the miserably poor, such that the differences one can see in Manhattan will, by comparison, look like a socialist paradise. New Delhi is fast becoming the most spatially re-feudalized city in Asia, with new walled compounds, patrolled by the universal *chowkidar*, sealing off lifestyles of luxury from the surrounding seas of poverty.

Notes

[1] The international edition of *India Today* began in 1981, the American supplement to this in 1992, and the UK supplement, in 1995 (*India Today* April 15, 1995, p.1).

[2] Ten years ago (1987) the number of NRI's was put at 12.6 million, of which the seven largest populations were in Nepal (3.8m), Malaysia (1.2m), Sri Lanka (1 m), South Africa (850,000), the UK (789,000), Mauritius (701,000) and the USA (500,000). See *Statistical Outline of India* (1995). More recent numbers are likely to be more than double this number.

[3] I am indebted to Shelly Ryan and Abidin Kusno for this insight.

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4 CANALETTO'S DRESDEN: REBUILDING A LOST URBAN IMAGE IN A TIME OF RAPID CHANGE

Raymond Isaacs

The condition of contemporary cities is one of change and fleetingness. Within this condition, the image of a city and individuals' identities with that city are ephemeral qualities. As culture and commerce become increasingly independent of local and regional boundaries, there is a tendency toward homogeneity of both the social environments of cities and their spatial environments. Throughout the twentieth century in Dresden, Germany, radical transformations in ideological views and social structures have brought about dramatic transformations in the urban landscape. The process of transformation continues following the renting of the iron curtain, the re-unification of Germany, the emergence of the European Union, and increasing international exchange. Though a bit extreme, the current situation of Dresden reflects those of other cities as they struggle to define their images and identities in a time of increasing globalization of commerce and culture. As the city emerges as a competitor in the global economy, a concerted effort is being made to establish an image that is unique and readily identifiable by the residents of Dresden and by outsiders. A single painting by Canaletto has become the blueprint for that image. However, how does that time-frozen snap-shot made in the middle of the eighteenth century serve a contemporary community that is moving rapidly into the future? A closer look at both the city and the painting reveal that there is more to the picture than meets the eye.

Twentieth Century Dresden: Waves of Sudden Change

The urban space of Dresden has been shaped by a long history of social transitions. Through earlier centuries, periods of prosperity, political prominence, social revolutions, religious revolutions, wars, bombardments, fires, and so on, resulted in a rich urban collage of spatial environments, including pre-Renaissance farm houses, narrow streets leading into plazas, broad baroque allees and palaces, and several gothic and neo-gothic churches. By the turn of the century, railroads had replaced the city walls as the demarcating line around the city core, and industry surrounded the city center which became a commercial center and the headquarters for financial institutions such as the Dresdener Bank. While National Socialism brought changes to the city, these changes were eclipsed by the events in mid-February of 1945, when three waves of allied bombers pounded the city, leaving much of the city center a smoking pile of rubble.

In the aftermath of World War II, a new social structure was established: the Soviet-controlled German Democratic Republic (GDR). Some rebuilding of the historical structures was undertaken. However, other more essential needs took

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priority, in particular the need for housing. For the next four decades, the urban form was shaped primarily by mass, centrally planned housing projects, culminating in the 1980s in large high-rise blocks scattered throughout the city. Pre-war spatial patterns were often isolated from the city structure and, in many cases, removed all together. By 1989, the city had become a fragmented assortment of relatively anonymous and unconnected spaces.

For many years a larger-than-life statue of Lenin stood at the end of Prager Strasse, in the city center of Dresden. Rebuilt from scratch after the war, Prager Strasse was the showcase socialist spine of the urban space of Dresden, with gleaming white rectangular structures of ultra-human proportions. The powerful, forward thrusting likeness of Lenin dominated a vast public square which bore his name, Leninplatz. This unbounded public space was the site of mass gatherings in the time of the German Democratic Republic. Photographs show a sea of young people, many in uniform, facing the public speakers standing alongside Lenin.

Immediately following the collapse of Soviet communism and German re-unification, Lenin was sold to a very rich man, and removed from this square. The name of the square was changed back to the pre-World-War II name of Wienerplatz. Today the site is marked by a Burger King, and a large commercial building is planned to fill the empty space of the square. So begins the current social/spatial transformation of Dresden, as a sudden wave of capitalist dreams washes away years of socialist ideology. This is not a critique of value systems or political ideologies, but a story about a particular place in a time of rapid social change, including not only the renting of the Iron Curtain and the re-unification of Germany, but the emergence of the European Union, the opening up of eastern Europe, and the increasingly rapid flow of global exchange.

Building a New Consumer Society/City

Today it appears that the symbol of Dresden is the construction crane. As in most cities in eastern Germany, Dresden is experiencing almost total reconstruction, ranging from the rebuilding of infrastructure to the renovation of the existing housing stock, along with a very large portion of new construction. Confronting construction is an accepted part of a daily routine. It can't go unnoticed, in physical space, or in social/political realms. A large room in the city hall is set aside as a permanent display of construction projects. New proposals are displayed, discussed, and even debated. The centerpiece of the display is a large, scale model of the city showing existing buildings in white and new buildings in brown. The amount of brown is roughly equal to the amount of white. Another more accessible public forum for the presentation of construction proposals and documentation of the process are the local newspapers. Almost daily appears an article about a new building project.

Between 1990 and 1997, 50 billion marks ($32 billion) were invested in Dresden, and the city proudly maintains the lowest unemployment rate in the eastern part of Germany. New structures pop up everywhere almost overnight, including a high percentage of speculative office buildings, financed by investors from outside the region and designed by non-local architects. Along with speculative office buildings, retail shopping facilities are dominant building types among the new projects. One report claims that four out of five new retail establishments in Dresden are now owned by chain operations. These trends are reflected in the urban spatial environment. Not only is the square where Lenin once stood now occupied by Burger King, but the entire Prager Strasse is lined with a range of shops leading to a new cluster of large multi-story department stores. The message of the advertising-adorned urban space is consumption—making money and spending money.

In addition, large discount centers have appeared suddenly at the periphery of the city, taking advantage of inexpensive land and the new mobility of the citizens afforded by the availability of automobiles. The convenience of small neighborhood oriented shops is being sacrificed for the convenience of one stop auto-oriented shopping centers. Traffic clogs the streets while recent planning decisions indicate that freeways and bridges will soon be prominent new features in the landscape. While air pollution from coal is substantially lessened, pollution from automobiles is on the rise.

A series of high-profile competitions generated design ideas intended to fill in existing gaps in Dresden's fragmented center, including an entry by artist Frank Stella. These projects are given a high priority by the local planning officials. Yet, despite the large sum of money poured into the city, many of these projects are on hold, waiting for investors, emphasizing that the shaping of Dresden's urban space, and consequently the image of the city, is largely dependent upon fast, flexible and unpredictable capital. How will this image be distinguishable from that of any other city in the region, and beyond?

The Canaletto View

A golden statue of a man on horseback stands at the end of a tree-lined allee. The man is August der Stark. The prosperous period of the 18th century, after the Sachsen Prince, August der Stark (August the Strong), became King of Poland, was the golden era of Dresden. During this time the physical form of the baroque inner city reached its maturity. In the middle of the century, August der Stark's son and successor brought the Italian artist, Canaletto, to Dresden as the royal court painter. Canaletto's paintings remain among the most famous representations of Dresden, contributing to the likening of Dresden to Florence, Italy. For many people the image of Dresden was frozen in time with those 18th century scenes, particularly one painting which hangs in Dresden's Zwinger Gallery of Old Masters, a panoramic scene of the old city viewed from across the river (Figure 1). The view of Dresden from this vantage-point is referred to as the "Canaletto-Blick",

Figure 1

or Canaletto View. While the statue of Lenin was auctioned off and removed, the golden statue of August remains at the old northern entrance into the city, as construction workers rebuild the city center according to the image represented by Canaletto View.

Today a large dome-shaped form is conspicuously absent from the Canaletto View: the form of the Frauenkirche, an 18th century Protestant landmark.. The beloved church, the dominant form in the skyline of Dresden for nearly 200 years, was a victim of the 1945 bombing raids. Fifty years later, the people of Dresden are rebuilding the Frauenkirche, stone by stone. After 47 years, the ruins of the Frauenkirche laid in a pile, with plants growing out of it. In the meantime, other less-damaged historical structures—the Zwinger Court and Gallery, the Semper Opera, the Katolische Hofkirche, etc.—had been largely restored. However, the Frauenkirche posed a much more difficult task. While an archeological reconstruction—reconstruction using the original stones—was proposed in the late forties, and cataloging of the stones actually began, during the time of the German Democratic Republic (1950–1990), no serious consideration was given to this project. Following the reunification of Germany, this idea was once again put forth, and accepted. In February of 1992, the Dresden city council agreed to support the reconstruction of the Frauenkirche. Cataloging was resumed, and construction began in 1994. It was estimated that the structure can be finished by 2007 using 80% of the original stones at an astronomical cost (about $200 million).

Though some argue against the idea of historical replication, the building will be built as true as possible to the original design. Interestingly, before construction began, a detailed computer simulation was made, showing, in full color, the complete Frauenkirche, inside and out. State-of-the-art computer modeling is being used to study and recreate a building designed in the 1720s, a building using state-of-the-art construction practices at the time, a building responding to contemporary social practices and aesthetic attitudes, a building that, ironically, replaced an older, obsolete structure in disrepair. Now the building that most residents have never seen can be experienced in virtual reality. In addition, a web site is being developed which will provide photographic images of the construction process, updated several times daily. This will allow the reconstruction of this 18th century structure to be monitored from almost any point in the world.

The use of these electronic media illustrate that the situation of Dresden at the close of the 20th century is very different from that of the time of the original construction. The conception of the original design was at the intersection of specific time and place events and constraints. It was a structure that was born in the imaginations of the citizens of Dresden at a particular point in time, but with an eye to the future, reflective of their political and religious beliefs. It was the physical center of their community, the house of the most sacred aspect of their collective identity. It was the social and spatial heart and soul of Dresden. They had a vision and they pushed the construction technology of the time to achieve that vision.

Amidst the current situation of technology and society, the people of Dresden proceed with the archeological reconstruction, stone by stone, of a costly, outdated building. Clearly the sacred nature of the Frauenkirche goes way beyond the structure's meaning as a church. In a time when the spatial environment of cities is shaped by consumerism, speculative construction, transient investment capital, and globalization

of culture and economy, with little sense of space and time, the individuals of Dresden seek an image to establish their own identities and to present to the region, the nation, and the World. In this light, the Frauenkirche is no longer a church, but an event, a spectacle, a sensation.

One does not need to look very far for evidence of the sensational nature of the reconstruction project. Continuous updating of the construction progress can be seen almost on a daily bases in the local newspapers. Hardly a move is made on the construction site that isn't documented with a photograph, often including a prediction of when the next major level of construction will be achieved. But, one can find more than a running account of the construction process. Periodically, an important public figure, such as the new minister of the church, appears, explaining to the readers the significance and importance of the reconstruction. Books and posters can be bought in local bookstores and souvenir shops. Even Frauenkirche T-shirts can be bought just outside the construction fence.

In its unfinished, or perhaps better, hardly begun, state, the Frauenkirche is the site of organized public events. In the summer of 1996, Dresden was the site of an international theater festival, Theater of the World. Several playhouses and temporary theaters were designated for the performances with the ruins of the church being one of those sites. Also in the summer of 1996, the completion of the cellar of the Frauenkirche was celebrated with a series of high-profile, as well as high admission price, string quartets.

The reconstruction of the Frauenkirche is rarely out of the view of public attention. This is due in part to a genuine public interest in the building, and also to the uniqueness of the process, which was declared by a Berlin newspaper as the most difficult historical reconstruction in the world. But, it is also one of the most expensive. While the municipal government has agreed to support the reconstruction, much more funding is needed—in a time when funding from the public sector is increasingly tight and under scrutiny by the citizens. Thirteen years is a long time to build a building by contemporary standards. If precious public funding is involved, public interest and enthusiasm has to be maintained, perhaps even manufactured by high profile events and media attention. Perhaps more importantly, these events draw money from the private sector. Expensive concert tickets, books, and posters all contribute to the construction funds.

Other fund-raising events are also employed. Two men build a large "Lego" model of the Frauenkirche, which, if you ignore the typical Lego colors, has a pretty good formal resemblance. However, each lego block must be "purchased" by a contributor before the model builders will attach it to the model. The money paid for the block is added to the reconstruction fund. Through another scheme, contributors "adopt" specific stones to be placed in the building. They pay a higher price for more significant stones. For example, a man paid $1700 for the cap stone of an arch. For his contribution he gets to be the honorary construction superintendent for the day his stone is placed. Like every other event, his day on the job site, along with the placing of his stone, is made into a media event.

As the structure grows higher and more visible, it is likely that the enthusiasm will grow as well. When it is complete, well into the 21st century, the panorama of Dresden will once again resemble those 18th century paintings by Canaletto. The inaugural religious ceremonies will be marked with a lot of fanfare and media-coverage. Those services will be attended by politicians and city officials, and also by curious citizens. But what will be the meaning of those services? For Dresdeners it will mean a reconnection to a fragmented history, and the overcoming of decades of war (hot and cold). The consecration of the building will tie a once glorious past into an uncertain future, looking back in order to move forward and put the last sixty years behind them. It will also symbolize Dresden as the beautiful Baroque city, an image that can be marketed to outsiders, bringing tourism and investment capital.

In a more abstract sense it represents a need among an urban society for a symbolic re-centering of urban space and culture. The significance of the Frauenkirche as a 21st century church is overshadowed by its significance as a sacred landmark in a secular-social sense. In the rapidly transforming environments of contemporary cities, image of a place and identity with a place are fleeting qualities. While the reconstructed artifact lacks the poetics of the ghostly ruins, and many question the appropriateness of rebuilding the church and, even more, the replication of the 18th century building, the recognizable icon provides a visual anchor unique to a specific place. A symbol that Dresdeners can identify with, as well as a symbol that outsiders can identify.

An Alternative Image

In 1996 a new school building, the St. Benno Gymnasium, was completed. The Catholic Church hired Stuttgart architect Günter Behnisch to design and build the neo-Modern structure, located in a housing district built in the 1960s. The colorful building of concrete, glass, and steel stands in stark contrast to the simple brown and gray buildings in the surrounding neighborhood. The reactions to the building have been strong, both in support and in criticism. Some Dresdeners are dismayed that the Catholic Church would build a building with such a chaotic form and color palette, and that is so insensitive to the surroundings.

Others argue that this building is a symbol for the future of Dresden, rather than the sandstone replicas of the 18th century. The dynamic form, spectacular colors, bright interior, they argue, are the qualities that Dresden's students should be exposed to as they are prepared for their futures, rather than the gray and static forms of the last fifty years. The school is an image that demonstrates confidence in the present to face to challenges of the future, rather than a static reminder of the glory of the past. It is an architectural metaphor for opportunities that were not possible neither in the time of the

GDR nor in the 18th century.

The St. Benno Gymnasium is a unique building in Dresden. However, as a symbol for Dresden, the individuality of the building within a larger context is questionable. Though the architectonic form of the building is particular to its site, the materiality, detailing and overall character of the building bear a striking resemblance to other schools designed by Behnisch, such as one on the outskirts of Frankfurt. The paradox here is that in order to be non-conformist in Dresden, the school conforms to a larger social/spatial realm from which the city of Dresden can never really separated.

The Neustadt: Dissent

The Neustadt (New town) is on the opposite side of the river from the city center and historically divided into two parts. During Renaissance years, the inner Neustadt was an expansion of the old city and served as the north gate into the city. It was originally an assortment of narrow, irregular streets over which a Baroque trivium was superimposed in the 17th century, establishing a formal link to the old city. Portions of the inner Neustadt were destroyed during the 1945 bombing. In the decades following the war the area was largely transformed by the planning practices of the GDR, as large areas were cleared and rebuilt with long rows of mass housing surrounded by broad open spaces. The pre-war buildings that survived the war and the GDR are being renovated, with many being converted from housing into office buildings.

Today when someone speaks of the Neustadt, they imply the outer Neustadt. The outer Neustadt was a 19th century city expansion, based loosely on a grid of moderately narrow streets, providing workers housing in three to four story buildings with small shops and businesses at the street level. The outer Neustadt was left relatively unscathed by both the war and GDR planning. At the time of re-unification the basic structure of the district was largely intact. However, the building stock and infrastructure were in a crumbled condition. As the urban structure did not conform with the planning and construction principles of the GDR, neither did the residents. As many buildings were abandoned by their owners, they were occupied by the misfits and dissidents within the socialist society.

Following the collapse of the GDR, the Neustadt became an enclave of non-conformance in an emerging capitalist society, fueled by the arrival of many young people from both eastern and western parts of Germany. It was a time and place of both individualism and community, when people of different backgrounds and intentions settled in a place seeking something new and discovering that it was up to them to create what they were looking for. In this spirit the Bunten Republik Neustadt was declared in 1990, an independent nation within the city limits of Dresden. A currency was established, based largely on barter and exchange. The name "Bunten", which means colorful, summarized the character and intentions of the community, based on individual liberty, group cooperation, and having fun. It developed into a community of intimate meeting places, dimly lit bars, independently—and often spontaneously—organized night clubs and all-night dance parties, film presentations and art galleries, and apartments furnished primarily by found objects and clever plumbing improvisations.

Even the defiant spirit of the Neustadt cannot fend off the inevitable influx of speculation and investment development. Late in 1996, Roskolnikov, one of the prime meeting places in the Neustadt, a bar listed in the American travel guides to Germany as representing the true character of the "east", was closed as renovation on the building began. Next door opened a trendy film oriented bar, named Oscar, as in award. Several other fashionable bars and restaurants opened in the area earlier that year and the all night parties are now stopped by the police. The Bunten Republik Neustadt exists only on one weekend in June, when it is celebrated by a heavily advertised street party. Even the non-conformist image has become a marketable commodity.

Fortunately, strong building and housing preservation laws will protect the basic structure of the Neustadt. However, the crisp cleanness of the new, often marred by the graffiti of the dissenters, stands in sharp contrast to the un-renovated structures, sometimes singing with brightly colored murals. The tension is high, as developers and speculators persist and the Neustadt residents resist. A person seen taking photos of buildings can expect to be interrogated by people on the street: "Why are you taking pictures? Are you renovating that building?" They know that along with the changes in the spatial character of the place comes a change in the social character—one that may not include them.

Historically, the Bunten Republik Neustadt is past. Its imprint on the social and spatial realms of the district remain, coexisting with financed development, but how long this will last is uncertain. Perhaps the current economic downturn will result in a harmonious relationship within a truly multicolored urban space. In many ways the example of the Neustadt, representing diversity and change, is a microcosm for the larger city. The current situation in Dresden illustrates that urban places are not frozen in time, and that there is a mutually interactive relationship between the social and spatial environments of urban places. At the moment the spatial Dresden is a fragmented collage of various urban "typologies", reflecting not only historical transitions of social structures, but a range of social environments residing in Dresden at this particular point in time. Those with the power are making important decisions regarding which images will dominate. These images will also influence the various identities of individuals with their city.

With this in mind, take another look at the Canaletto painting. Canaletto framed a picture from a particular point in space at a particular moment in history. If you look closely, you can see construction scaffolding against an unfinished tower. The artist could have easily edited the scene to exclude the scaffolding, but didn't. This very painting, held today as a timeless image of Dresden, shows that, even at the time of its

execution, the city was being transformed. Stepping back again to see the bigger picture, one apprehends a truly timeless image: the river landscape, complete with workers on boats and on the shore. The painting is not a rendition of architectural icons, but an instant's glance of a living, working, and changing human settlement in a unique landscape setting: the Elbe River Valley.

The Elbe River flows north out of the Czech Republic through the Sachsen region, reaching the ocean near Hamburg. It flows craggy mountains, past hillside villages and terraced farm land, through rolling hills and wide meadow flood plains, past villas and chateaux, under a bridge called the Blue Wonder, and into the city. Over a thousand years a primitive village on the banks of the river transformed gradually into the modern city of Dresden. The river is the reason for the city's existence, and also the natural source of the city's beauty. Throughout the centuries artworks by countless artist have featured the relationship of Dresden to the river. It is the river setting that inspired the urban form that in turn inspired the images of Canaletto.

Today the river and its broad banks are the primary public space of the city. It is a visual focal point, as well as a place to be. It affords unique opportunities for recreation, relaxation, gathering and socializing. In the last six years the banks have been the site of public festivals, performances and other events. As for social class and architectural styles the Elbe River is impartial. The well executed modern glass façade of the new state capitol building is as welcome as the sandstone palace structures and terraces. The non-conformist members of the local society are as free to circulate within this setting as those who desire a more conventional lifestyle. In these respects the river has always been neutral and always will be. All are a part of this river landscape, and it is a part of them.

In many ways the City of Dresden is a mirror of contemporary urbanism—a situation of change and fleetingness, of flexible investment capital and quick turn over time, of cultural homogeneity in a time of multi-culturalism, of a trend toward a time and place lacking a sense of time and place. In this situation the Frauenkirche is an identifiable icon of the re-establishment of Dresden at the regional, national, European and global levels. It is an image that says this is Dresden. It is an anchor in both space and time. The image can be marketed and sold, but it can also be held sacred. However, individuals identities with and within the city require more than an icon. For some this identity is with the Neustadt, for others with the socialist housing community, for others with the new shopping centers, for most it is with some combination, perhaps including even the former Leninplatz. The real challenge in Dresden is to weave these multiple images and identities together, enhancing the rich collage of urban places and the potentially rich experience of these places within the context of the unique landscape.

The rebuilding of Dresden will never be complete. A city is not frozen in time. Conflict and cooperation—dissonance and harmony—these are the qualities of the urban composition. The Canaletto View provides a vision, but the true vision is in the process as much as it is in the product. City building is a piecemeal art,[1] and the degree to which Dresden succeeds in balancing the city-shaping forces during the next decades will teach us much about the state of the art. Vision is required to establish an urban image. But an image based on an icon will be limited. A truer and more enduring image can be found in a city's unique relationship to its landscape: the city in the landscape and the landscape in the city.

A Postscript

While the re-construction of the Frauenkirche advances, the speculators race to hasten their returns, and Dresdeners complain about traffic, a little girl plays in a fountain just a few blocks from the Elbe River. I don't know this little girl. But, she probably has a good eighty years ahead of her. In her lifetime Dresden will change in ways which we today can't even imagine. Her memories and images of her home will be influenced in part by the physical space of the city. Buildings will come and go. Some will be selected as monuments. The Elbe River will continue to flow north, rising and falling, sometimes freezing, but always present. That river landscape will provide the setting for the drama of a large part of this little girl's life. She will be a part of that landscape and it will be a part of her.

Note

[1] Lynch, Kevin. *City Sense and City Design*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990, p. 499.

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5 GLOBALIZATION AND THE URBAN FORM: TRANSFORMATIONS IN COLOMBO IN THE 1980S AND 1990S

Nihal Perera

The colonial built environment of Colombo, the former capital of Sri Lanka, remained largely intact for three decades after independence in 1948. From the late 1970s, however, it was subjected to drastic transformations highlighted by the shifting of the seat of government from Colombo to Sri Jayawardhanapura, symbolized by a national-looking new parliament complex, and the invigoration of the central business district in the former fort area by turning it into an "international-style" high-rise development. *What does this abrupt transformation of Colombo's landscape mean? Why in the late 1970s and not immediately after independence? What are the relationships between the transformations in Sri Lanka and those in the rest of Asia during this period?* Addressing these questions is not only crucial for the understanding of changes in Colombo, but would also shed light on similar social and spatial restructuring of cities in rapidly transforming Asia. I shall argue that this phenomenon, which is much broader than these transformations in Colombo, is best understood as part of the particular process of globalization that has been taking place over the last couple of decades.

Changes in the landscape of Colombo during the first three decades after independence were largely limited to incremental amendments, extensions, and the restructuring of social, political, and economic structures this space contained. The first decade was the slowest. The elite, urban middle classes, and the migrants continued to move into colonial spaces, administrative positions, and economic roles, "indigenizing" the colonial society and space in Colombo.[1] This process did not constitute much change in the colonial urban structure and its built environment.

The nationalist and socialist leadership whose policies directed the country over the next two decades perceived the state as

Figure 1 The new Parliament house in Sri Jayawardhanapura

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Figure 2 The new CBD soaring over the old colonial landscape

the principal instrument of the people. Since the state was expanding through the nationalization of private enterprises and new state-sponsored investments, particularly under the United Front government of 1970, Colombo's property too got transferred to the public sector.[2] The old colonial buildings were turned into government departments and corporation headquarters, and the new high-rises that were built in the 1970s included the state sponsored bank and corporation headquarters. With the implementation of the Ceiling on House Property Act of 1973, which limited the ownership of housing property to two units, Colombo's rented housing stock fell from 41% of the total in 1971 to 28.6% in 1981,[3] and many tenants of what urban planners and administrators call "slums" became home owners.

Despite the continuation of the physical form of its landscape, therefore, the ownership structure of urban institutional buildings and dwelling houses in Colombo was radically transformed. So did the social, political, and cultural meanings of this built environment. As demonstrated in the government's initiation of the Colombo Master Plan Project in the mid-1970s, these transformations had brought the changes in Colombo to a threshold, requiring the reorganization and reordering of its urban structure and the built environment. From the late 1970s, however, the spatial order of Colombo, by which I refer to the spatial organization of centers of political power, economic production, and ethno-religious institutions, as well as their built forms and interconnections, has been radically transformed.

Such spatial transformations have not only taken place in a large number of countries and cities during the 1980s, they have also been seen as interrelated.[4] I use the 1980s, in this paper, to represent the two decades between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s. The obvious example, of course is the connection between the disappearance of manufacturing jobs in the United States and western Europe and the increase of such jobs in east and southeast Asia. The broader process of worldwide restructuring largely comprises of reactions to the down turn in the world-economy and the breakdown of the "world political order" constructed under the US hegemony and domination.[5] From a cultural perspective, most countries in the periphery, particularly the postcolonial states, have demonstrated a concurrent desire to express themselves. It is as part of this changing national and international conditions and concerns that the transformations in Colombo can be usefully examined.

In this context, examining disparate cases like Sri Lanka—a post-colonial peripheral state which had a strong nationalist and socialist presence, and one which earned independence immediately after World War II and refused to participate in the Cold War—could illuminate our understanding of the broader national and international processes of social and spatial restructuring. The objective of this paper is to examine transformations of Colombo's social and spatial order in the 1980s, focusing on the policies of the three consecutive United National Party governments from 1977 to 1994, exploring their objectives, and how these have been contested and negotiated by other national and international interest groups and classes.

State-Sponsored Transformation

Spatially significant projects and programs sponsored by the state during the 1980s include:

First, shifting the location of the government, separated into a legislative council and an executive presidency, from the former colonial fort area of Colombo, to a new parliament

complex built on the outskirts of the city, in Kotte. Although the former colonial fort area is known as Fort, I shall continue to use "the fort area" for the purpose of clarity.

Second, re-establishing the fort area as the central business district of Colombo by relocating its other occupants, including the Parliament, government department headquarters, the military, and warehouses to locations outside municipal boundaries.

Third, introducing export-processing zones, devoid of labor laws in order to attract foreign investment, within what is called the Greater Colombo area, beginning with one near the Colombo International Airport.

Fourth, compressing into six years the main thirty-year component of the ninety-nine year multipurpose development project—the diversion of Sri Lanka's longest river, the Mahaweli, to irrigate areas receiving low rainfall, and also produce hydropower.

Finally, carrying out a program to build 100,000 houses in six years followed by a One Million Houses Program, largely based on the provision of state support for self-builders. It is important to note that the total population of Sri Lanka is eighteen million people.

Over and above these and many other smaller scale projects which it carried out, the state has also stimulated private investment through the removal of legal and administrative constraints, provision of fiscal incentives, and the privatization of state corporations. As anticipated, these state policies and programs caused a building boom in the 1980s. The heightened construction activity transformed the colonial landscape which, till then, had largely survived for three decades.

Centralization Within Separation

The new landscape of Sri Lanka produced through these policies and projects demonstrates the separation of the state and the economy, or the "national/political" space from the "capitalist/economic" space, as well as the decentralization of some major functions located in Colombo—understood as the municipal area. This separation and decentralization are best expressed in the separate location of governmental and administrative complexes in the outskirts of Colombo, at Kotte, and the business district in the fort area. Moreover, the privatization of state corporations has changed the ownership of many of their headquarters located in Colombo, from state to private. At the same time, Colombo's boundaries have been expanded and redefined as Greater Colombo and the Colombo Metropolitan area.[6] Further evidence of the state's drive to centralize the institutions of the society and relocate their command functions in Colombo can be found in the arenas of production and cultural activity. What we see here is, therefore, a strategy to separate and replenish key institutions of the society, such as the government and *controlling* organizations of the economy, in order to reorganize them into a new social and spatial order centralized on Colombo.

Colombo's political and economic command capability and cultural supremacy over the former Crown colony of Ceylon was a British colonial production. The strategy of European colonizers was to establish a "colonial port city" in Colombo and then spread outward, incorporating the island into its sphere of domination. Colombo was therefore the node from which imperial power and European capitalist culture diffused over the territory, and channeled economic gains from, and domination over, the colony back to the metropole. Colombo continued to be the center of political and economic command functions and capitalist culture in post-colonial Ceylon. The name Ceylon also continued until 1972, when it was made a republic and the name was changed to Sri Lanka.

The decolonization of Ceylon, however, not only enabled the indigenous cultures and religions to play a prominent role in the society, but also revived historic ethno-religious centers—the Buddhists in Kandy and Hindus in Jaffna—producing a multicentered cultural arena. Until the 1980s, governments reinforced this multicentric cultural and spatial formation. Not only did the cabinet members of the new governments make a pilgrimage to the Temple of the Tooth Relic of Buddha at Kandy, but also the first executive President, J.R. Jayawardene, in 1978 opted to address the nation from the octagonal podium of the temple where kings used to address the "citizens."

His successor, R. Premadasa, who was also the Prime Minister under President Jayawardene, however, attempted to promote the Buddhist temple at Gangaramaya, Colombo, to a "national" level by, among other things, holding an annual procession comparable to the one held at Kandy. Attempts to advance Colombo to a significant ethno-religious center have not been limited to Singhalese-Buddhists, but can also be seen among Hindu-Tamil elites and middle classes of Colombo. Although certain Tamil militant groups have been fighting for over a decade to separate the north and the east of Sri Lanka, areas furthest from Colombo, into a new Tamil state, the Hindu temple at Wellawatta, Colombo, has also acquired a great importance among Hindu temples of the island. It is, therefore, the elite of Colombo—the power elites,[7] capitalists, and the upper middle class—of perhaps all ethno-religious groups that have striven to construct a more central cultural role for Colombo. Such drive has certainly produced tensions between the desire of the capitalist classes to incorporate cultural activity into its political economy centered upon Colombo, and those who strive to preserve ethno-religious identities based upon historic centers located in the hinterland.

In regard to production processes, the colonial economy of Ceylon had been constructed as one part of the division of labor of the British Empire, acting as a plantation producer,[8] with the main export earner, tea plantations, located in the central highlands. From the late 1950s to late 1970s, however, the nationalist-socialist governments reacted against the domination of private as well as foreign capital. The nationalization of foreign banks and oil companies like Shell,

Esso, and Caltex that began in the late 1950s was followed by the appropriation of British-owned tea estates in 1976. Anti-imperialist and non-aligned political positions, as well as proto-import substitution and industrialization economic policies followed by these governments did promote industries, but these were state run and dispersed throughout the island. The main exports, however, continued to be plantation crops, and the landscape of production largely remained intact.

Government policies after 1977, however, enabled the garment industry[9] in the Export Processing Zones, to surpass tea as the main export earner, in 1988. This change concentrated the production system in the enterprise zones of Greater Colombo, administered by the Greater Colombo Economic Commission, replacing the dominating position of plantations in the economy by industry. The introduction of such zones in the late 1970s, however, has reintroduced foreign enclaves, in the form of compounds, with fences around them: not plantation but industrial space, not British-owned but South Korean- and Taiwanese- owned, not in the central highlands but near the Colombo International Airport.

With regard to economic command functions, the nationalist-socialist governments nationalizing private enterprises merged economic and political command functions, agglomerating them in the hands of the state, particularly the state corporations and departments of which the headquarters were located in Colombo. In the 1980s, the privatization of many state corporations and the invigoration of the business district represented by the emerging high rise skyline, established the fort area as the main economic command center. Since foreign capital was invited to occupy this central space, economic command functions were not only centralized in Colombo, but were also passed over to foreign banks and corporations.

Finally, this process of centralization culminated at the level of government. The establishment of an Executive Presidency, concentrating political power in the President's office, strongly demonstrates the government's drive to centralize command functions of key social institutions. Moreover, the replacement of the former Prime Minister directly responsible to the legislature, with a Presidency that stands above all social, political, and economic institutions of the country, indicates the government's desire to organize a supreme command center.

Integration in Dispersal

I would go a step further and argue that the state's activity in the hinterland, for example, as with the Mahaweli Project, and the housing programs, was largely an attempt to expand the domain of the centralized structure discussed earlier, into more closely integrating the hinterland.

Agriculture in Ceylon, mainly the production of the staple food of rice, was largely neglected during the period of the British Empire, of which the main rice producer was Burma. After the demise of the Empire, its economy fell into the hands of new, individual states. Responding to the financial burden of importing rice, the post-colonial governments of Ceylon embarked on a revitalization of the ancient irrigation structures which had been abandoned for centuries under the imperial regime. The new settlements in both revitalized and newly constructed irrigation schemes in the rural areas, begun only at the latter stages of colonial rule and continued by post-colonial governments, were appropriately called "colonies." These projects, which constituted a "national plan," continued to transform outlying rural areas into social, political, and economic hinterlands of Colombo. The Mahaweli Project was the largest of these, aimed at making Sri Lanka self-sufficient in rice, as a strategy within a large program to produce a cheaper labor force and entice foreign capital to invest in Sri Lanka.

Housing programs also highlighted the rural housing component through the theme of "Village Reawakening." The transition from the 100,000 Houses Program to the One Million Houses Program also meant a transition from providing state built housing, largely in the cities, to the provision of support for self-builders in the whole national territory. This small support also indicates the state's withdrawal from housing and the acceptance of housing conditions that were previously defined as below standard.

Both the acceleration of the Mahaweli Project in 1977, and the launching of massive housing programs can therefore be viewed, among other things, as attempts to exploit human and territorial resources to expand the base of cheap labor and serve foreign investors, mainly in the Export Processing Zones and the business district. The wide national coverage of these projects therefore indicate the close integration of those areas and population in restructuring the national social and spatial order.

New Orientation?

What we see here is a strategy of both decentralization and recentralization. It was a selective decentralization of institutions, such as the Parliament, and activities, such as production, outside the old boundaries of Colombo, simultaneously expanding the city boundaries to incorporate those activities which renewed its centrality. Moreover, the expansion of government programs to support activities such as agriculture and housing was, at the same time, the strategy to closely integrate the "outlying areas" to the centralized national spatial structure.

The crisis the governments of the 1980s have responded to was both national and global. Nationally, as mentioned above, the nationalist-socialist governments had sufficiently ruined the capitalist structures that any significant capitalist activity would have needed to rebuild a new social and spatial order. The magnitude of such a need and the government's use of the opportunity to enhance the prospects for capital are expressed in the pretentious programs of the 1980s, mentioned

earlier, that transformed the whole post-colonial landscape. Internationally, the state policies constituted a response to the down turn in the world-economy from the 1970s, which had also brought stagnation to the Sri Lankan economy. They also demonstrate the state making use of the expansion in its "room for maneuvering" for individual states due to the fall of US hegemony and domination, a condition which had also increased the capacity of various international and intranational groups to bargain.

The state's initiative, therefore, did not go uncontested, having to be negotiated at both intranational and supranational levels. Nationally, the state's attempt to renew Colombo's political centrality, only achieved after independence, and integrate the outlying areas more closely was, ironically, challenged by the Tamil separatist movements operating in the north and the east, and another guerrilla movement operating in the rest of the island from the mid 1980s.[10] The development of Colombo as the locus of political negotiations—the principal place where political parties debate and discuss their differences regarding political conflicts—was a colonial goal attained only after decolonization. Colonial struggles with the local Ceylonese largely took place outside Colombo, in the remote areas. Both peasant resistance at the beginning of colonialism and the Socialist-led anti-colonial struggles at the end were also waged in the central highlands and the plantations. With independence, once again, Colombo restored its long time colonialist-capitalist goal. Until the mid 1970s, the final stages of political negotiations largely took place in the House of Representatives—later, the National State Assembly, built in high-imperial style.

Both these movements refused to participate in the parliamentary process. Instead of negotiating in Colombo, representatives of both movements have invited the state to their territory to negotiate on their terms, but with arms. Tamil separatism had not only hampered the state's focus on the economy, elevating the ethnic strife to a priority in the national political agenda, but has also made territorial integrity an issue requiring the state to increase its military expenses annually to reproduce it. These movements have, therefore, challenged not only Colombo's role as the locus of political negotiation, but also its territorial domain.

Internationally, too, the state's initiative was caught in a paradox. On the one hand, foreign capital, mainly US and European, has been reluctant to invest in a country known for its strong socialist-nationalist movements and governments. Paradoxically, despite supporting the state's "brave" move to create conditions conducive to foreign investment, the lending agencies have attempted to capture this opportunity in order to dictate conditions and to incorporate the state programs into theirs. For example, although the government has privatized a large proportion of state corporations and agencies, the IMF continued to demand further privatization, including the two state-run banks, the devaluation of the currency, and the curtailing of welfare as conditions for the granting of loans.

Furthermore, these negotiations have transformed the whole orientation of Sri Lankan society and space within a larger world spatial system. During colonial rule, instead of competing with British capital, like in India, Ceylonese capitalists surreptitiously sneaked into the British dominated plantation economy. This process produced a British oriented Ceylonese capitalist class which peacefully coexisted with the British planters, and shared their values. Despite the postcolonial Sri Lankan refusal to participate in Cold War politics, and the attempt to construct an identity of non-alignment, Sri Lanka, even under nationalist-socialist governments, always maintained a close relationship with Britain, particularly through the British Commonwealth.

Making Sri Lanka a republic and severing the vestiges of colonial power in 1972, together with the nationalization of British owned plantations in 1976 have, however, been a major blow for the Sri Lankan plantation capitalist class. Estates owned by nationals were also restricted by a ceiling on land ownership imposed in 1972 and the nationalization of company-held estates in 1976. Changing its old British orientation, the United National Party government of 1977 looked towards the United States for help in reconstructing favorable conditions for capital in Sri Lanka, and also anticipated more US and western European interest in the enterprise zones and continued to depend on the World Bank and the IMF for loans.

The new British focus on Europe, the weakening of the US economy and power worldwide, the inflow of capital from South Korea and Taiwan, the importation of commodities from Japan, and the entry of banks from the Middle East and Malaysia have, however, done much to reorient Sri Lanka towards east Asia. In regard to the immediate region, although Sri Lanka and India have maintained good political and economic relations, south Asian cooperation has been limited, largely due to the presence of a US ally in the region, Pakistan. From the late 1980s, however, not only is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) functioning, but those countries are becoming closer. Shifts in the orientation of Sri Lanka also demonstrate, and are facilitated by, the parallel process of formulating new east Asian and south Asian world-regions.

As much as the demise of the structure of the post-war world economy has paved the way for "Third World" states to achieve their long-struggled "economic development," the decline of the cultural hegemony has opened up space for national expression. Highlighting their concern for national expression, the state moved the seat of government away from this 'colonial' area to a former Sri Lankan seat of power right outside the city. This move can be seen as an outcome of globalization,[11] understood as the increasing consciousness of the world becoming a single place, and a process that has made national identity an important national concern. In this way, the Sri Lankan state instituted both a CBD in an *international* mode and a Parliament in a *national* mode.

Conclusions

In short, what we see in the transformation of Colombo's urban form in the 1980s is a profound restructuring of the social and spatial order as well as the political, economic, and even cultural orientation of Sri Lanka. Government programs of the 1980s that initiated such transformation were largely a response, nationally, to the weakening of capitalist structures and, internationally, to a down turn in the world-economy. Concurrently, the leaders were also committed to the re-inscribing of national identity in an increasingly homogenizing world. The demise of the extant world political order, and US hegemony, produced favorable conditions for the national programs to succeed. The transformation of Colombo's urban form can, therefore, be best understood in relation to these global conditions and transformations, and the transformation of the national social and spatial order, of which Colombo has been a part.

Notes

[1] For an elaboration of the process of "indigenization," see Perera, *Society and Space*, 1998, Chapter Four.

[2] For an elaboration of the process of "nationalization" of space, see Perera, *Society and Space*, 1998, Chapter Five.

[3] Marga Institute, *Housing Development in Sri Lanka* 1971–81 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1986), 142-3.

[4] See, Manuel Castells and Jeff Henderson, "Techno-Economic Restructuring, Socio-Political Processes and Spatial Transformation: A Global Perspective," in Jeff Henderson and Manuel Castells eds. *Global Restructuring and Territorial Development* (London: Sage, 1987), 1–3; Anthony D. King, *Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System* (London: Routledge, 1990), 69; Nihal Perera, "Exploring Colombo: The Relevance of a Knowledge of New York," in *Re-Presenting the City: Ethnicity, Capital, and Culture in the 21st Century Metropolis*, ed., Anthony D. King (London: Macmillan, 1996).

[5] See Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of Capitalist World-Economy," in *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 37–46; and Giovanni Arrighi, "Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism," *Review* XIII (Summer 1990): 365–408.

[6] I have derived "Greater Colombo" from the name of the state agency that administers the Export Processing Zones: "Greater Colombo Economic Commission," and Colombo Metropolitan Area from the terminology of the Colombo Master Plan Project. Although they are not identical, and not so concretely defined as the municipal limits, both these new names indicate the expansion of the boundaries of Colombo.

[7] See Charles Wright Mills, *Power, Politics, and People: The collected Essays of C. Wright Mills* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

[8] Of coffee in the second half of the nineteenth century, and tea, rubber, and coconut in the twentieth century.

[9] See, Perera, "Exploring Colombo 1996"; Michael Davenport and Sheila Page, *Europe: 1992 and the Developing World* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1991), 95–6.

[10] The Janata Vimukti Peramuna also waged an attack on the state in 1971, but were defeated. Their second major operation lasted throughout the second half of the 1980s.

[11] I am drawing on Robertson's notion of globalization. See Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992). See also Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," in Anthony D. King, ed. *Culture, Globalization and the World-System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*: 19–39 (Binghamton, NY: Department of Art History, State University of New York at Binghamton, and London: Macmillan Education, 1991); "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities," in Ibid: 41-68.

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6 BAZAARS IN VICTORIAN ARCADES: CONSERVING BOMBAY'S HISTORIC CORE

Rahul Mehrotra

Introduction

In Bombay, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Government reshaped the City by means of a series of distinct, planned architectural and urban design projects. The authorities sought not only to make the city's growth cohesive but also to place their imprint on its form by controlling building activity and investment in infrastructure—however sporadic and incremental it may have seemed.

The old Fort area of Bombay, the object of the colonial government's attention, marks the origin of Bombay as a city, and is the commercial and also perhaps a symbolic center of the Bombay metropolitan region. (This in spite of the fact that it is an invisible entity—in that the fort does not exist today)! But now the urban fabric of the Fort area is being altered by various activities vying for the same space, and current building laws, which are standardized throughout the city, do not attempt to safeguard the clarity that the makers of this area had envisioned during the past century.

The most emblematic of the conflicts, the spread of traditional Indian *bazaars* into the formal urban spaces planned by the colonial government, suggest new approaches to the preservation that take into account the constantly changing nature of the city. This brings to the fore the urgency to outline relevant strategies and approaches for its conservation as a historic urban center relevant to the emerging form and structure of Bombay. This is especially important given that the state government has now legislated policy which protects the Fort area as well as other historic areas in the city. And in order to make the implementation of this conservation policy effective, it would be crucial to fine-tune these to the contemporary forces that are moulding the form of Bombay's historic center and other conservation zones.[1]

Structuring the Core

The renewal of the Fort area dates to 1864, when the removal of the fortifications that surrounded the city was finished. The removal of the ramparts symbolized a change of purpose for Bombay, which no longer needed to serve as a land-based defense fort and whose growth as a prosperous trading and manufacturing city was being constrained by the fortifications. It also precipitated a strategic plan to restructure the city center that included the widening and improving of roads, the addition of new open spaces, the construction of public buildings and the imposition of urban design standards. Consequently, the demolition of the ramparts intensified, clarified and made irreversible Bombay's change of urban

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function from a fortified port town to multifunctional trading and manufacturing centre.

These renewal efforts projected a consciously conceived, visible image of Bombay, perhaps the first such urban design gesture in colonial India. At the western edge of the Fort area, along the Back Bay waterfront, several public buildings were put up on land made vacant by the removal of the fortifications. This magnificent ensemble of Gothic buildings (which included the High Court, the University, the Post and Telegraph offices and the Old Secretariat) helped clarify the existing bow-like cross axis, which had implicitly structured the Fort area for more than a century. These buildings transformed Bombay's skyline and visually structured its western edge.

A smaller-scale project was the privately sponsored Horniman Circle (1864), which involved restructuring a green in front of the Town Hall into a formal circular park enclosed by an assembly of architecturally unified commercial buildings. Although the plots on the Circle were auctioned to commercial firms, the design of the facades was controlled to create a sense of unity. This urban design approach, popular for more than a century in countries like England and France, had not been previously used in India. The arcade also offered protection to pedestrians from both the intense summer sun and the lashing monsoon rain.

These projects created an east–west and a north–south axis through the Fort area which over the next three decades became more pronounced with the addition of public buildings that were added as the city grew. The east–west axis ran from the Town Hall through the public buildings on the western edge, and ended with a vista across the bay. The north–south axis was anchored at one end with the grand Victoria Terminus (1878–1887) and at the other by the Gateway of India (1911–1914), a monument that symbolized the ceremonial entry to the city. The intersection of these two axes was celebrated by the construction of the Flora Fountain (1887).

In 1898, the north–south axis was further reinforced by the development of Hornby Road under public design controls. Here, unlike Horniman Circle, there were no restrictions on the design of the facades, which were conceived and built by different architects. But each building was required to have an arcade, which acted as the physical and visual element that tied together the varying architectural styles and enhanced the legibility of Hornby Road as an urban design composition.[2] This development along Hornby Road connected the crescent of public buildings south of Flora Fountain (including Elphinstone College, Sasson Library, the University and Watsons Hotel), unifying disparate elements in the composition of the newly designed city core.[3]

This decisive re-ordering of central Bombay, which was directed by the colonial government, contrasted with the additive, incremental and impulsive growth that had characterized the Fort area since the inception and settlement of Bombay. In spite of the overwhelming problems of sanitation and overcrowding in other parts of the city, the administration had the liberty, and the power, to focus its attention on a smaller, more tangible area. The government used every opportunity to use buildings and infrastructure to establish a cohesive urban form that responded to the unprecedented increase in commerce and industry, and to give colonial political power a visible expression.



Figure 1 Renovated Fort and the emergence of the cross-bow axis after the removal of the fortifications.

Dual City

A century ago, Bombay was two separate cities, Western and Indian, with parallel residential, commercial, religious and recreational areas—two separate networks of spaces in which these different worlds existed with minimal conflict. In the Western quarter, all efforts were being made to impose a formal structure upon the city—reinforcing the axes, controlling building edges and styles, instituting traffic regulations and encouraging large corporations to open offices. The Indian city, in contrast, was characterized by chaotic, haphazard growth and overcrowding.

The boom decades of the 1860s and 1870s resulted in fragmented development all over the island. Growth was incremental and organic in the Indian city. Cotton mills, which drew immigrants from surrounding agricultural areas, served as the heart of districts in the Indian city. Small businesses grew and shops and stalls mushroomed near temples, mosques and along main traffic routes. Here, unlike the city center, little control was exercised over the sites being developed for housing or industrial use. Residential, commercial and religious activity patterns were integrated in a tightly knit urban fabric like a traditional Indian *bazaar* town.

The *bazaar*—a chaotic market place comprised of shops, stalls and hawkers- can be seen as the symbolic image of and metaphor for the physical state of the Indian city. The chaos and apparent disorder of the *bazaar* is precisely the quality essential for the survival of vending—physical proximity between seller and buyer. It also is the physical manifestation of incremental and *laissez-faire* growth of the market place. More importantly, it symbolizes positive energy, optimism and a will to survive outside the official system.

This classical, colonial, dual-city structure survived until the 1960's when the unprecedented scale of distress migration from rural areas to Bombay (and other urban centers) completely altered the exclusivity of the two domains. The *bazaar* became an instrument that absorbed migrants, cushioning their entry to the city, and swept across the city—sprawling along transport lines, slopes of hills, underutilized land, undefined pavements and even the arcades in the Victorian core.

The *bazaar*s blurred beyond recognition the physical segregation of the dual cities. They wove the two worlds together with a system of shopping and recreation spaces that infused their own architectural and visual character wherever they spread. The arcades, in particular, provided a condition most appropriate for hawking: the supporting columns of the arcade gave definition to the amorphous spaces of the *bazaar* and defined the territory of individual hawkers.

The spread of the *bazaar* into the Fort area transformed the intensity and patterns of use there and began to wear down the physical environment with overlays of an alien imagery and building materials that compose the paraphernalia of the *bazaar*. Today, shrines and stalls abut the splendid Gothic buildings and fill the spaces in their arcades. Overcrowding has altered traffic patterns and made the bow-like cross axis unrecognizable.

The physical degradation was further accelerated by the imposition of the Rent Control Act (1942), which froze rents and gave tenants legal protection. As a result, it became uneconomical for landlords to maintain buildings, which are now subdivided to accommodate the swelling population of the city.

Furthermore, the formulation of building regulations (such as setbacks and floor-area ratios) generalized throughout the entire city (presumably for ease of administration) have resulted in the destruction of the street edge. The rebuilt Alice Building on Hornby Road is a case in point: its setback has destroyed the continuity of the street edge and arcade, crucial components in the design of Hornby Road. The new block does not comply with either the architectural textures (for example, the masonry bases) or details (such as cornice bands, articulation of arcades) that characterize the precinct. This has happened in spite of the implicit and explicit rules for building that have been followed in this precinct for the last century.

Contemporary Context

Increasingly, the Fort area is seen as the Financial center of the city. This inspite of the BMRDA's (Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority) aggressive policies to create a polynucleated structure for the region and promote Bandra-Kurla (in North Bombay) as the new International Finance Center. In fact, in the early 1980s the BMRDA issued a notification barring the creation of additional office space in the island city and capping the available Floor Space Index at 1.33. in order to discourage growth in South Bombay, and encourage growth in the north as well as give impetus to the growth of New Bombay. Clearly, the State Government's failure at implementing this policy of creating a "polycentric growth" through the development of alternate business centers at Bandra-Kurla and New Bombay, has not prevented the growing displacement of residents by commercial buyers. The BMRDA survey of 1995 reveals that 1.06 lakh new jobs were created in an area of 23 sq. km in the southern tip of the city between 1981 and 1991. This has actually accelerated the concentration and importance of the Fort area as a Financial center with an increasing number of commercial establishments opting to be located here.

Furthermore, with the recent liberalization policies of the Government, multinational corporations, especially banks and investment companies, are opting to be located in the Fort area—usually in older Heritage buildings. The companies acquire and renovate heritage buildings to be located in a historic environment which instantly gives them an identity and of being perceived as having been around for a while! Simultaneously, with the patronage of the city's Yuppies and expatriates, related functions such as art galleries, specialty restaurants, boutiques, travel agencies, etc. are appearing at a rapid rate to service this interrelated global clientele that is coming to use the Fort area. In the meanwhile, with the additional pressure on the southern tip of the city, the infrastructure in the area is being overstressed to the point of collapse—traffic, and the physical state of public spaces, being the most obvious ones. So while the Fort area is increasingly becoming a more exciting place to be located in, it is fast deteriorating physically.

Conservationist and citizens' groups emerged in the late 1970's to address this rapid deterioration and transformation. In the best case, these groups represented a new relationship between citizens and cities authorities, a coalescing of private initiative for public good. This was especially important given that city authorities and Government (comprising chiefly of politicians elected from rural constituencies with no interest in Bombay apart from its role the administrative capital for the State Government) seemed incapable of playing a leadership role. And private enterprise seems, even today, to lack a moral conscience.

It was in response to this deterioration and the resulting demolition of historic buildings in the 1970s and 1980s, that some citizens' groups[4] took it upon themselves to list important buildings and petition the government to protect

them through legislation. In 1991, the Government of Maharashtra listed approximately seven hundred buildings and a draft notification was published for objectives and suggestions. It was clear that the government list which largely recognized and identified individual buildings had not addressed the issue of safeguarding the physical form of the precinct or the context in which these buildings were situated. It is the lack of legislative framework, which recognizes the importance of special planning rules for the area, that has been detrimental to the conservation of the urban form and character of this historic area.

Conservation Legislation

Although there existed a number of citizens' groups and non-governmental groups interested in the conservation of historic buildings, they desperately lacked technical inputs in the form of architects and planners working with them who could address issues related to building bylaws and other aspects related to infrastructure proposals. Therefore, their roles were restricted to exercises such as listing buildings and protests against threats that these buildings might face. Their efforts were limited in that there were no attempts to dovetail conservation into the planning process and thereby evolve legislation that would protect these building together, within the context they were set in. Recognizing this deficiency in the conservation movement which was by 1990 giving some popularity and support, The Bombay Conservation Group, a loose association of practicing professionals, decided to organize an international workshop in October 1993 to stimulate a discussion and articulate ideas and strategies about Area Conservation and the relationship between Conservation and Planning. In order to focus on these broader issues and make them tangible for citizens as well as city administrators, the Fort Precinct was taken as a focus for the deliberation of the workshop. The workshop was successful in that it not only attracted intense public participation, but also that a number of ideas and directions were generated as a result of the deliberations—both formal and informal. It was to follow up on these ideas and suggestions and to extract the lessons of the workshop and actually apply these principles towards evolving a conservation strategy for the Fort Precinct, that the Urban Design Research Institute set up a research team in January 1994—3 months after the workshop.

As a first step, an analysis of the Government' s draft notification and listing reinforced the relevance of treating the Fort Precinct as a conservation zone on account of the incredible concentration of the listed Heritage buildings in this precinct. Of a total of 624 listed buildings in Bombay, 193 are located in the Fort Area—almost a third! And fifty percent of the total number of Grade I buildings and an almost equal proportion of Grade II buildings are in the Fort Precinct. In short, the very concentration of listed buildings demanded that the Fort area be treated as a 'Heritage Precinct' with a special designation as a Conservation Zone. And such a concentration of listed buildings would imply that the overall context that they exist in should be dealt with sensitively, for, any incongruous development would impact a large number of heritage buildings. Therefore, by saving the buildings in the Fort, you basically take care of approximately half the city's conservation-worthy buildings!

Having established a team consisting of practicing architects, urban designers and students of architecture, the first stage of the exercise, viz.: the Documentation and analysis of the Fort Area was carried out. Having completed this, the core team interacted with various professional and activists to formulate a set of preliminary recommendations for the Conservation Proposal.

This was published as a book with an accompanying volume documenting the deliberations of the Workshop. The intention of this publication was to act as a catalyst—a document or handbook which could form the basis for both citizens groups and the Government to formulate legislation in order to declare the Fort area a Conservation Zone or Heritage Precinct. The incorporation of this legislation would be, it was felt, the critical first step in rejuvenating the physical condition of this precinct, as well as harnessing ideas, resources and efforts to sustain this historic core of Bombay as a valuable asset of the city.

The document was submitted to the Government in October 1994, one year after the workshop. Government officials, such as the Urban Development Secretary, the Municipal Commissioner, etc. had been involved in the proceedings of the Workshop and participated informally even in the documentation and analysis process. Therefore, on submission of the document there already existed a receptive audience in the Government. And what did become evident was that by laying out the entire picture clearly as a document, more than half the battle was won! For not only could the ideas and proposals be presented clearly, but also that a ready document was available for reference—to show politicians, administrations, etc. Moreover, the politicians and administrators were now obliged to react—one way or the other!

At this next stage, the critical players in seeing the legislation through, were members of non-governmental groups such as the Bombay Environmental Action Group, who in numerous meeting spread over 6 months, convinced, worked and helped the Government draft the final document which was to be published as legislation. The process ended in June 1995 when the resolution was passed and the official document and notification of Heritage Buildings precincts published—here the Fort area together with seven other smaller precincts were demarcated for conservation.[5]

The accompanying legislative framework that evolved was surprisingly flexible and wide ranging. Besides making provisions for the aspects of modifying building bylaws that have an impact of the physical of buildings in conservation areas (eg. setbacks, heights, etc.) the legislation addressed the issues of road widening, FAR, development plan reservations, overall height regulations, etc. which might irreversibly effect the physical character of the precinct.

Furthermore, the legislation included powerful incentives such as TDR (Transfer of Development Rights) and user changes (Residential to Commercial)[6] to encourage the conservation of building and precincts.

This legislation has now been in active operation for almost three years and besides the usual grumblings against additional bureaucratic processes, the legislation has virtually drawn no criticism from the builders, building landlords and property owners. The only criticism, usually voiced informally by citizens groups concerned with the Heritage and Conservation issues, is the one which has to do with the flexible approach taken towards authentic architectural and material conservation by the implementing authority—in this case the Heritage Conservation Committee which advises the Municipal Commissioner. This is particularly relevant when the Fort precinct is discussed only because of the great concentration of Grade I and II buildings in the area. This contrast between the general conservation standards and what might be perceived as the 'more purist approach' is highlighted by the precedents set by the multinational banks and financial institutes which are increasingly situating in old building in the Fort precinct.[7] Besides being totally interested and committed to the "complete" restoration of the building they occupy, their financial capacities facilitate conservation projects which unfortunately for the citizens' groups (usually composed of highly educated upper income people) are coming to set a benchmark in terms of the standards for conservation and its very perception.[8]

This approach, besides not recognizing smaller incremental efforts which might coalesce over time to positively transform the area, also negates the possibility of fundamental adjustments to buildings more akin to the contemporary aspirations of the local inhabitants who are in the process of re-colonizing an environment that they inherited! It is for this reason that these groups run the danger of being myopic and exemplifying egocentric thinking; they may result in little more than superficial corrections such as facade restoration (usually at extremely high costs) and 'beautification', improved pavements, etc. What these groups do not posses is a sense of what the city should be; they lack a constructive, action-oriented agenda for grappling with the city's transformation. Their crusades inevitably devolve into 'turf battles' that represent the limited perceptions that a select minority have of the city and its form—in the process putting conservation further away from the planning process and its relation to the larger issues in the city.

Bazaars in Victorian Arcades

Bombay's century-long history of being a dual city is shifting; its two worlds, and their varied activities, attitudes and physical manifestations are coming together in the same place. The phenomena of *bazaars* in Victorian arcades in the old Fort area is emblematic of this conflict; it is not only forcing a confrontation of uses and interest groups but also demanding new preservation approaches.

For the average Bombay resident, the hawker provides a wide range of goods at prices considerably lower than those found in local shops. Thus hawking in the arcades that characterizes the Fort area is a thriving business. For the elites and for conservationists, the Victorian core represents the city center, with icons complete. In fact, as the city sprawls out, dissipating the clarity of its form, these images, places and icons have acquired even greater meaning for these groups as crucial symbols of the city's fast deteriorating image. Consequently, hawking is deemed illegal by city authorities who are constantly attempting to relocate the bazaars.[9]

What this conflict brings to the fore is a fundamental issue when dealing with conservation in post-colonial situations—whose image is one seeking to conserve? For an entire generation of citizens, the Victorian core of the city represents repression and exclusion—the buildings are clearly icons of our colonial past. To others, the historic center is a bit of the city where cohesiveness of urban form and the integration of architecture and urban design create a pleasant (or atleast potentially beautiful) environment by sheer contrast to the laissez-faire growth that has come to characterize the contemporary Indian urban landscape. Therefore, in this context conservation approaches have to treat their "object" purely in terms of "building and environment as resource" devoid of its icongraphic or symbolic content. For now, many worlds inhabit the same space in the city, relating to it and using it in different ways.

Can designers and planners contribute towards conserving and moulding the physical form of the Fort precinct in a way that responds to the massive shifts in demography and use patterns? Can we address, through design, the connection between social issues Bombay faces and the conservation of its physical form? How might we weave into this transforming historic city center, the aspirations and use patterns of a world different from that which created it? Can we design with disparate attitudes?

Architects and planners can play a decisive role in initiating new solutions, in creating new contexts by reinterpreting the existing ones. The solution lies not only in creating new districts to take the pressure off the city center, but in simultaneously understanding, restructuring and shaping perceptions of the existing city form. We also must recognize that a city's prime resource, in addition to its urban form, is its concentration of human skills and enterprise, of services and activities. To sustain and accommodate this requires change from within the city. At times, the urban form must be renewed: buildings must be recycled or demolished, new streets and infrastructure must be added, and so on.

Regional Context

This brings us to the issue of the "purpose of the city". It is apparent that in order to conserve or transform the built environment of a city, or part of it, it is critical to identify and clarify its purpose in the historic, the contemporary and the

emerging future context. That is, the very raison d'etre that gives the physical form of the city meaning and contextual validity. For example, what would the role of the Fort Area be, and what kind of transformation would it undergo, if Bombay as some economists believe becomes a de-industralized global city offering more financial services?

In the context of the recent trends towards liberalization and globalisation, Bombay is being re-structured to accommodate growth, and efforts are on to strategically place Bombay as the financial capital of India. The Fort area, which has always been the financial centre of Bombay, would have to be critically evaluated in terms of its role in the new emerging scenario for the city.

In order to dissipate traffic and allow balanced growth, a multi-centered approach is being applied to the Bombay Metropolitan Region. The Regional plan envisages four new centres—besides the Central Business District (CBD) in the Fort area and Nariman Point, the other commercial/financial centres are to be in Bandra-Kurla, Oshiwara and the CBD at Belapur in New Bombay. Hence the role of the Fort area as a Financial centre is being re-examined in the current debate which has preoccupied the BMRDA, the State Government as well as the private sector.

What still makes the Fort the most viable choice as a financial center (as opposed to developing the Bandra-Kurla area) is that the Fort precinct houses a number of corporate headquarters, besides the Reserve Bank of India, the Stock Exchange & the other Bank Headquarters. It is also in close proximity to the Mantralaya, as well as most Government administrative offices which are within walking distances. Other subsidiary services like the High Court which is within the Fort and the Income-Tax Offices on the periphery, are also important factors. In addition the Fort area is already well connected by the mass transportation network of both the rail systems and water transportation, to the Nhava Sheva Port area and the industrial belt in New Bombay which are fast gaining importance, are also conveniently located and could be accesses easily from any point along the eastern foreshore of the Fort Area.[10]

However, what will work against the potential of the precinct as a Financial centre is non-availability of land to accommodate growth. This is mainly on account of properties being frozen due to the Rent Control Act.[11] Also, present Government policy does not encourage urban land renewal propositions. On the other hand, with some shifts in policy, the Fort Precinct could be transformed and rejuvenated substantially, perhaps by appropriately recycling portions of the BPT and Naval lands. In any case, this is an issue that would have to be carefully examined with a longer, time frame perspective.[12]

Similarly, is it too implausible to imagine that another way to open up potential space to accommodate the financial center in the Fort Area would be to move the Mantralaya, State Assembly and related Government offices to New Bombay?[13] This would not only give impetus to the growth of New Bombay as planned in the 1960's, but in the process allow the Fort precinct to rejuvenate itself both in terms of its changing purposes as well as its physical state. Conservation would work as an advantageous strategy, in the urban renewal process, as it would make available a ready stock of buildings, with the necessary infrastructure.

Challenge for Conservation

This strategy for conservation through identifying the purpose of the city is perhaps appropriate even at the micro level with the conservation area itself. For example, within the Fort area, a number of sub-precincts have been designated. These sub-precincts have, aside from their architectural characteristics, also intrinsic use patterns which have resulted from the concentration of particular functions. Ballard Estate is, for example, an office district with a mix of large private corporations (mainly Insurance and shipping related) as well as some government offices, the area around the Flora Fountain and Horniman Circle are clearly emerging as a banking district, the zone around Kala Ghoda, a cultural/ art district, etc. If these intrinsic use patterns were identified clearly and encouraged through incentives, the adaption of these areas to their emerging use as well as their physical conservation and improvement would easily emerge. Furthermore, breaking large conservation area like the Fort Area into smaller units would reduce the number of interest groups acting on a particular part of the cities facilitating a common purpose as well as minimizing conflict. This would allow the environment to be re-adapted (if only temporarily) in response to contemporary aspirations of the city.

In order to facilitate this process, it is critical that conservation processes encourage the recycling of buildings as a conservation strategy. The interplay of this discipline of keeping the external illusion intact while adapting the inside to evolving social needs and contemporary aspirations is worth serious consideration. In the exterior, the Victorian townscape will be recalled while the insides accommodate turn of the millennium banking offices public institutions: in the various forms that characterize contemporary urban India? It is through this process that there will be a draining of the symbolic import of the edifice, and a deepening of the ties of architecture with contemporary realities and experiences—where a particular urban typology will be transformed through general architectural interventions and placed in the service of contemporary life and realities.[14]

With today's transformation in use, conserving the Fort area effectively would require identifying those components of the city's urban system that are essential and should be conserved—such as its physical structure, or the architectural illusion that it presents through features like principal views, skyline and urban design punctuation—and those that can be transformed to other uses, even if only temporary.

The challenge in Bombay is to cope with the city's transforming nature, not by inducing or polarizing its dualism,

but by attempting to reconcile it, to see opposites as being simultaneously valid. The existence of two worlds in the same space implies that we must accommodate and overlap varying uses, perceptions and physical forms. For example, the arcades in the Fort area are a special urban component that inherently possess a capacity for reinterpretation. As an architectural or urban design solution, they display an incredible resilience: they can accommodate new uses while keeping the illusion of their architecture intact.

The original use of the arcades was two-fold. First, they establish a definite position in terms of building—street relationships: the adoption of this architectural/spatial element provided a mediation between building and street. Second, they were a perfect response to Bombay's climate: they served as a zone protecting pedestrians from both the harsh sun and lashing rains.

One design solution might be to re-adapt the functioning of the arcades. They could be restructured to allow for easy pedestrian movement and accommodate hawkers at the same time. They could contain the amorphous bazaar encased in the illusion of the disciplined Victorian arcade. With this sort of planning, components of the city would have a greater ability to survive because they could be more adaptable to changing economic and social conditions.[15]

There are no permanent solutions in an urban landscape charged simultaneously with duality as well as rapid transformation. At best, we could constantly evolve and invent solutions for the present using and safeguarding the crucial components of our historically important urban hardware. In fact, "Bazaars in Victorian arcades" could potentially become an authentic symbol of this preferred reality—an urban landscape that internalizes the past for the present and towards a sustainable future.

Notes

1 This paper was first written in 1992 and published in volume 8, number 1, of PLACES (MIT Press) - titled Transformation and Conservation. Since, the paper has been substantially modified to include the process of conservation legislation and related issues which did not exist at the time.

2 This project was initiated by the City Improvement Trust, a government organization whose responsibilities included formulating specific development plans and controls for different parts of the city, if acquired private lands, redeveloped old and congested areas and prepared layouts for underdeveloped portions of the city.

3 Definite and consistent principles guided the planning and expansion of the rest of the urban center. It grew out of a process of additive transformations rather than a comprehensive system of land division, although one can recognize instances of a more rigorous division of land blocks on the west side of Hornby Road (land freed for development by the removal of the ramparts). The primary concern, the relationship between buildings and streets, was expressed in a set of agreements in regard to issues of street hierarchy, nodes, building location and frontage.

4 In the late 1970s, the Save Bombay Committee and, in succession thereafter, the Bombay chapter of INTACH (Indian National Trust for Art and Cultural Heritage), the Indian Heritage Society, and the Bombay Environmental Action Group mooted the preservation of key landmark buildings. Their representation took the form of a series of lists submitted to the city planning authority, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (the BMC). This approach marked a radical departure from the conventional view that conservation was the duty of the Central or State departments of archeology. For the first time, the conservation group were suggesting that the very authority they daily took issue with on matters of civic governance, should henceforth be the custodian of the city's built heritage.

5 The legislation bill was one of the first signed by the new Shiv Sena government that was elected to power in the State of Maharashtra in 1995.

6 In the 1977 BMRDA had banned office buildings or conversions to commercial uses in the island city of Bombay to encourage the decentralization of the CBD in the larger Bombay Metropolitan Region. Therefore the incentive in the conservation or heritage legislation to allow commercial uses in the heritage precincts was a big break from this policy and therefore perceived as an important incentive.

7 The Deusche Bank etc. recently bought and restored two important heritage properties in the Fort Area. The American Express, Standard Chartered Bank, the Bank of the Middle East have all spent substantial amounts over the last three years restoring their heritage properties.

8 There appears to be an overemphasis of the British model of conservation with a great bias and dogma towards material conservation and its authenticity. This is further reinforced by the active involvement of the British Council Division in the support and sponsorships of conservation oriented training programmes and perhaps their implicit political agenda to conserve (as authentically as possible) colonial icons.

Moreover, it is often not financially viable to restore or preserve a building (in a conservation area) for various reasons ranging from the availability and exorbitant costs of craftsmen and traditional materials to the limitations in terms of space usage. It is in situations such as these, that it is far more relevant, at least as a first step, to invent legislation which focuses on urban form (mass, height etc.) rather than architectural detail and ornamentation. In fact, it is imperative that Urban Arts Commissions, Heritage Committees and Conservation Groups should widen their emphasis from the present obsession with

architectural style to issues of urban form. In order to conserve precincts within a city or for that matter even to create new city centers, it is not solely the style of architecture that needs attention but the overall urban form that will make possible an appropriate architecture. For it is extremely difficult to legislate anything as nebulous as aesthetic taste and this perhaps cannot be attempted as the sole strategy when implementing area conservation.

[9] The Municipal Corporation has proposed special hawking zones in the city—areas where they perceive hawking will not interfere with pedestrian and vehicular traffic. This seems unlikely to be accepted easily by the hawkers as they presently locate along busy routes which are ideal locations for business.

[10] Another important factor to its advantage is the proximity of prime residential properties of Bombay from the Fort area which are necessary to accommodate expatriates and the high-income professional related to banking and financial institutions.

[11] A crucial issue related directly to the recycling potential as well as the physical state of the Fort precinct (and also most parts of South Bombay) is the Rent Control Act. Today as a result of this Act it has become unviable for landlords to maintain their properties on account of inadequate returns. This leads to intensified sub-divisions of the premises as well as lack of maintenance. Together both these factors not only cause the building to look decripit but a strain on the structural systems of these buildings while simultaneously overloading other infrastructure like watersupply and electricity in the entire precinct. And quite often, the combination of haphazard sub-divisions and sub-standard or overloaded electrical systems turn the building into virtual fire traps! Thus to affect any rejuvenation of the building stock in the Fort precinct, the Rent Control Act will have to be critically examined and amended appropriately safeguarding the tenants as well as making upkeep viable.

[12] It has been recommended in a recently prepared McKinsey and Company report of SICOM (State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra), that the JNPT (Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust) which offers more efficient facilities than BPT (Bombay Port Trust), is capable of handling larger traffic, and could be developed into a world class facility as it has plenty of land available to do so. By downsizing BPT activities the valuable land that BPT sits on could be freed for urban renewal adjoining the Fort area. For if, all the port related activities move to the JNPT across the harbour, an incredible amount of properties could be made available to compensate for any deficiencies the Fort Precinct might have for a Financial centre.

[13] Even if it is not viable to move all government offices to New Bombay, at least some offices that have little need to be located in Bombay (Rural development, tribal welfare etc.) could be moved. Moreover, this would considerably reduce the pressure on the Fort Area and its adjoining office district of Nariman Point.

[14] Here, issues such as financial incentives for particular types of uses, safeguarding employment patterns, and ensuring that existing landuses are incorporated in the planning process at the Greater Bombay level would have to be addressed. That is to say the area be considered in a much wider context. For, any such conservation strategy would carry the responsibility of ensuring no displacement of population or that Economic hardship is not imposed on present users. Or more positively to ensure that fair financial incentives be provided to make preservation and conservation of buildings a worthwhile and even beneficial exercise for users and owners of listed buildings. Thus, Conservation strategy for the Fort would have to be an integral part of a coherent policy of economic and social development visions for the larger Greater Bombay area. In fact, master planning schemes or visions for Greater Bombay or New Bombay should have had in-built into their proposals the creation of area conservation zones like the Fort precinct. For it is obvious that to give impetus to growth in these so called counter magnets would necessarily require capping growth or re-defining the use and role of older parts of the existing city.

[15] The city administration has to necessarily play its role as a facilitator—i.e. to provide financial and other incentives to encourage the conservation of precincts and buildings. Just as the government provides infrastructure for new urban development, it cannot be absolved of this lead role in conservation. However, the question of role like this raises is how realistic is it for the government to prioritize funding for urban conservation given the multitude of pressing needs of the city viz. slums, infrastructure etc. It is precisely for this reason that financing mechanism have to be dynamic enough to be self-sustaining by harnessing the inherent potential that lies in the precinct itself.

7 PUBLIC OPEN SPACES AND GROWTH: BOMBAY / MUMBAI

Nandita Godbole

Bombay (Mumbai) is a mosaic of several kinds of people living next door to one another: a pure-bred local and an immigrant from a neighboring state or even country. Different cultures sharing the same space, the same neighborhood, the same city. Each culture whether local or foreign bringing its own way of life and lifestyle to the neighborhood. A neighborhood becomes a piece in the mosaic of culture, which becomes Bombay.

Its story began several centuries ago with the arrival of the fisherfolk, the Kolis who are believed to be of Dravidian origin. A collection of settlements on the seven islands was called Mumbai after the Goddess Mumbadevi they worshipped. As in any other Indian settlement, the temple of Mumbadevi became the focus for their village as a symbol of their faith at the same time giving identity to their remote settlement. Also, on the islands of Salsatte were the cave temples of the Buddhist monks at Kanheri. The later arrival of King Bimbadev of the Mauryan dynasty at Mahim was significant because he built a temple to Goddess Prabhadevi here. He also created orchards along his palace, gardens for him to enjoy. The building of the temples at the village of Walkeshwar, and at Mahalakshmi came soon after which became the centers for their locales. Fairs and weddings were accommodated in their courtyards or spilt out onto the surrounding streets. Tanks in the courtyard served as cleansing baths to pious pilgrims. Temples also became places for sermons and religious "theater". They were public places without (almost) any restriction, shared places for the community.

The concept of open space in India originated in such settings, from the motif of a shared village space. Temples, tanks, riverbanks, "the village tree" became such a place. Streets became processional paths. The village-square accommodated the weekly market, and bathing banks along the river became secret rendezvous points at night and the temple courtyard became fairgrounds. Their importance stemmed from their adaptability to varied functions, adjusting to varied celebrations, suiting varied purposes.

Latterday arrivals of Moughal rulers and Parsee settlers brought with them mosques and fire temples. Being from different cultures, these places almost barred the "sharing" of this space with other communities, each thus becoming an isolated space within its own setting.

The European influence began with the Portuguese in 1517. Their settlement itself was separated from the "natives" when they fortified their town and created a large swath of open land for clear firing, the Esplanade. Inside their secluded town, a village green was created. The "Green" was a large circular ground that was not only used for military practice, but hosted

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the military bands in the evening. The Esplanade became popular with the arrival of the British in 1673 when promenading came to the fore. Children played here and summer camps were constructed on its grounds, being close to the ocean, bringing comfort from the hot humid air of the island. The military practiced here sometimes, but later it was moved over to the cantonment area of Colaba. The Green was now used as a cotton trading market. Both the Green and the Esplanade were popular amongst the Europeans, and were also dominated by them. Few natives ventured here except during annual fairs.

European residences were also moving out of the confines of the Fort, towards Colaba, and the hills around Malabar Hill and Parel. Estates with romantic gardens became popular. The Governors' house at Parel is an example of one such place. Botanical gardens and cemetaries were combined to create "scenic" resting places. Thus, the European notion of open space—which was a garden, a promenade or an activity place, as recognized by J. C. Loudon in the 19th century—came to the fore here.

By the 17th century, more and more European residences 'moved' with summer houses to cooler places like Malabar hill and Parel, and some in Colaba. They retained some residence in the central Fort area for the rest of the year. This movement literally formed connections and as land eclamation became common by the 19th century, these settlements began to physically connect. Some of these places originally housed only natives, but now there was a blend of native and non-native in these areas.

Nevertheless, as a result of the extension of the physical limits of the city, some of the native public spaces were juxtaposed with non-native public areas. This was clearly evident in the latter half of the 19th century at Walkeshwar on Malabar Hill where European residences sat side by side with the Walkeshwar temple and its Banganga tank, and the Mahalakshmi temple on the nothern slope of the hill. This place became more diverse still with the development of the Malabar Hill gardens atop the water reservoir built at the end of the 19th century here and the development and beautification of the Chowpatty beach at the base of the Walkeshwar temple. The Victoria gardens developed as a botanical and zoological garden set on Mount Estate in the European suburb of Byculla, but the area was quickly taken over as a native settlement too.

The city soon emerged and a "City Improvement Trust" was set up. Roads were laid out and streets lit, buildings built with strict regulations and the city grew in all dimensions. The Port was becoming an important part of the city economy and land was developed for its use. The Esplanade was divided due to the addition of 4 roads through it, making thus 4 maidans, the Oval, the Azad, the Cross and the Cooperage grounds. With the new economy, the Green was shrunken to accommodate a smaller Elphistone Circle, surrounded by a strong business core.

The first few decades of the 20th century brought more development to Bombay. New suburbs, being Mahim and Dadar, were envisioned. Some wooded marshes were reclaimed for development. Shivaji park, a large "maidan" (quad-like open ground) similar to the Oval and Azad maidan at Fort was developed. Five Gardens at Dadar was added to the suburban development scheme which set guidelines for roads, buildings, neighborhood parks etc. Beachsides like Chowpatty, Marine Drive, and Apollo Bunder were developed to create promenades.

By the mid-20th century, until India's Independence in 1947, all the public places that were truly public came from European motifs. Some European places however like golf courses, yacht clubs, and such were restrictive for a considerable period of time, until the natives forced their way in using their financial status.

With Independence, there remained no "natives v/s non-natives". There were only Indians. Independence, however, found no expression in its public places. With more and more people adjusting to the previously considered "elite" European way of life, golf courses and clubs became popular. The "new elite" as they rose above the "common", focused on the "elitist" ways within "refined" spaces. This created a distinction between the common and the ex-common citizens who created more spaces for their kind. Areas that were sparsely populated became dense and crowded and recreational spaces were concentrated collectively into those like stadia, swimming pools and golf course or a cricket club and its grounds. Single level residences were replaced by tiny and cramped cubicles to house the many that poured in everyday. Streets became narrower, courtyards were lost, tanks and wells filled in, land cleared and land made for new settlements.

However democratic one might declare the country, few of these public open spaces are truly democratic. Annual dues and memberships keep these places from being truly public in nature. A demand for a new public and private, space and life arose and the common did not remain the common anymore.

What remains today in the old island are three types of public places remnants from European times—the beaches and promenades, the gardens and the maidans. Despite the several centuries of foreign influence, these places have been adapted to the Indian way of life. The beaches and promenades go back to being the riverbanks and the fair grounds in the evening hours. They become jogging tracts for health conscious citizens in the morning hours. They become places to interact with the society actively and passively. The maidans also become fairgrounds, theatrical stages, wedding grounds, gathering arenas for political parties and social activists or even stadia for one day inter-school cricket or soccer matches, or the padav or camp ground of the Indian village. The temples have however given up their courtyards to accommodate new house and have passed on some of its functions to other places. The gardens for most part yet remain the "formal" space—sometimes Moughal, sometimes European in nature, still struggling to be accommodated into the Indian life and are

often seen to be declining in their aesthetic appeal.

Traditionally, only about 20% of an Indian village or settlement was built up and thus 80% left open. Today Bombay has inverted this ratio by having about 69% area as built-up space and only 5% open space, the rest taken over by transportation networks. So the question is, what do we really need in Bombay? Less development, yes, of course! But, are the existing open spaces truly sufficient to accommodate the city and its needs? How appropriate is it that place like jogging parks, stadia, race courses, golf courses or even the National park that allows only limited access, be included in the overall category of public places, are they truly public in nature? Or are they included to add the numbers? The development of new parks in new spaces is close to impossible, so is it not time that existing places are opened up to accommodate all needs? It is true that some visions aim optimistically towards a "modern" lifestyle. But their shortsightedness comes forth with ill-designed parks, underestimated uses and insufficient capacity. With an advancing economy and lifestyle, are we able to come up with ideas to reflect our own sensitivity to our needs or do new designs reflect a disjointed overlay of Westernized concepts on Indian needs?

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8 REINVENTING THE PSYCHE OF AMERICAN CITIES: DETROIT AS PARADIGM?

Robert M. Arens

American cities change faster that their inhabitants do, and it is the inhabitants who outlive the cities...[1]

Detroit as an urban phenomenon is particularly interesting and perplexing. Its advanced state of decay and defiance of renewal have been widely and dramatically documented in the press, so much so that it has become a poster child for the decline of the American city after Richard Plunz observed that "Detroit is Everywhere."[2] Hidden In the midst of the analysis of Detroit's rise and fall, however, are several responses to its devastated physical fabric which are at the same time troubling and touching in their attempt to replace urban utility with poetry and restore urban fabric with art or archaeology.

Camilo Jose Vergara's American Acropolis proposal and Tyree Guyton's Heidelberg Project are both aimed at restoring vitality to the most bewildering zone of space in Detroit and cities like it: that ever-expanding zone of abandoned structures and vacant land which is equally dysfunctional as the private space it formerly was and as the accidental public space it has become. Vergara's proposal for "an urban Monument Valley" calls for a moratorium on the razing of the downtown's silent and forlorn pre-Depression skyscrapers and the creation of a twelve block national park of sublime ruins. Guyton's project, a self-termed "museum park," has transformed an east side neighborhood by appropriating vacant houses and lots as the starting point for ever-changing assemblages of trash in the name of art. Both extremely controversial, these projects drew swift dismissal for their embrace of ruins, symbols of impotence and failure to a city already reeling from decades of negative criticism.

Underlying the controversy are true critical responses which made acute observations and insightful propositions in an effort to restore meaning to the urban condition. These projects warrant examination not only for the valuable debate they triggered in Detroit, but also for the questions they raise as to the role of culture and theory in the restoration of meaning in all American cities. In terms of culture: how do cities and their institutions respond to the shift from private to public space as buildings become abandoned? To what extent can individuals apply private visions to ever-expanding public space? What is the role of citizens in the creation and determination of public space? In terms of theory: how do these projects relate to emerging urban strategies being posited by a group of architects (Rem Koolhaas, Coop Himmelblau, Bernard Tschumi) which has turned its attention away from new, discrete objects towards existing urban fragments and the space between them? How mindful are these theories of the complex urban psyche which changes at a far different, i.e. slower, rate than the physical environment?

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The American Acropolis Proposal

Is this a collection of irrelevant symbols, icons of a dead civilization? Their powerful forms in constant flux indicate that we are in the presence of something momentous.[3]

Camilo Jose Vergara, a New York journalist and photographer, began making observations and photographs of Detroit in 1992 as research for his book The New American Ghetto. Like others who confront Detroit beyond its image, he was appalled by the extent of the city's socioeconomic problems and its advanced state of decay. In soliciting views and opinions from Detroiters, he recorded anger, blame and resignation but these sentiments were underscored with a surprising toughness to survive. "People are running; there is nothing to do here; there is no jobs here," said a retired carpenter, but he quickly followed, "I am not leaving; I am a Detroiter." A university official, when asked why black families who can afford to move choose not to leave the predominantly black city answered with an analogy of a poor family being left a large mansion and struggling with its upkeep. "They cannot heat it, or paint it or keep up the grounds..., but as long as they stay, they prevent the fixtures from being stolen, and the pipes from freezing. If they manage to preserve it, it would be for those who stay."[4]

Vergara found that the persistence of the city's inhabitants was echoed in the forsaken, but struggling urban landscape. Detroit's physical environment both contributed to and resulted from the despair he had recorded in his interviews, yet he was moved by its evocative power. "The powerful spell of this magnificent skeleton city by the river forces us to go beyond the issues of blame, anger and hopelessness; to ask questions about our national goals. Visits to Washington and New York City, our imperial capitals, should be followed by a visit to Detroit, a place for reflection."[5]

Vergara focused his interest on Detroit's downtown where he was struck by the concentration of 1920's skyscrapers built during the city's boom. He found scores of these structures empty or suffering from threateningly low occupancy, the result of tenants having been lured to newer down-town buildings, or, in most cases, to the burgeoning suburbs. He also noted that a cottage industry of salvagers had picked many structures clean, thus hastening the downward spiral of decay and decline. Yet Vergara was somehow drawn to the sheer beauty and sublime power of these shadowy structures which had outlived their former uses and which stood silent waiting for salvation or salvage crew, whichever came first.

Within Detroit's current socioeconomic climate, the fate of these structures was obvious to Vergara. There was much more commercial space than was needed in the downtown, and businesses predictably chose newer buildings clamoring for their leases, relegating older buildings to low tenancy. The viability of fringe buildings had to be weighed by their owners against the biggest business in the core: surface parking. But with lots already blanketing the downtown, many of them parked to well below capacity, even this had become less of an option. Most telling of the future of the core skyscrapers was a 1994 recommendation to the mayor by the Land Use Task Force calling for the demolition of "structures which are functionally obsolete and have no viable reuse."[6] Ironically, it was the lack of private and public resources for demolition that saved the buildings long enough for them to serve as Vergara's muses.

In 1995 Vergara made a somewhat quixotic but not entirely naive proposal in Metropolis magazine calling for a twelve square-block area in the downtown core to be declared a national park. He reasoned that the pre-Depression skyscrapers could be stabilized at a far lower cost than demolition or renovation and could be left standing as ruins, allowed to persist in the splendor of continual decay. He offered the proposal, which he called the American Acropolis, as "a tonic for our imagination, as a call for renewal, as a place within our national memory,"[7] and a "memorial to a disappearing urban civilization."[8]

Not surprisingly, Vergara's proposal angered many Detroiters and was seen as an easy insult and a cheap shot by an outsider. Residents viewed the ruins as evidence of the city's persistent social and economic problems and as the root cause for Detroit's tarnished image. Business owners insisted that the ruins deflated commercial property values and inflated crime. In the ruins neither group could see power and allure, only neglect. "It's an insult to America, to what America stands for," said an owner of a building encompassed in Vergara's plan.[9] "Buildings represent an economic structure, not a romantic evocation of the past," responded an architectural historian. "Buildings have to be retrofitted for another use that creates a tax base and produces some form of employment," noted a journalist.[10]

Dismayed by the inability of Detroiters to look beyond negative associations of ruins, worried by their insistence on waiting for businesses to return, troubled by the ease with which the city would raze the skyscrapers given the resources, Vergara argued for both the poetry and pragmatism of his proposal. "A memorial to a disappearing urban civilization is a realistic alternative. Costing little in comparison with the expense of rehabilitating or demolishing the old downtown, a ruins park would occupy only a minuscule fraction of the city's idle space, estimated at more than 15 square miles. Not a firm basis on which to rebuild the local economy, but it preserves a wonderful space, a key to understanding an essential part of our recent past. If visitors come, new signs of life might appear with them."[11]

The Heidelberg Project

See the rhythm? It's positive and negative, it's got a beat. That's what it's all about.[12]

An interesting counterpart to Vergara's proposal began ten years earlier on the east side of Detroit, although several distinctions must be noted. First, the project targeted a

residential neighborhood rather than the downtown. Second, this project was implemented beginning in 1986 and continues to this day. And finally, the response was provided by an insider rather than an outsider, a native son who developed his vision in the very place it took shape.[13]

Tyree Guyton, an African-American artist, was dismayed by the abandoned houses on Heidelberg, the street where he grew up. Furthermore, he was infuriated by the use of these houses by crack cocaine dealers and the inability of the city to curtail this threat to the neighborhood. He responded as any artist would, though his art. Guyton appropriated the vacant houses, and claimed them as the starting point in giant assemblages which he created with found objects hauled in with the help of his wife and grandfather. Guyton's interest in obsolete everyday objects began as a young boy when given castoff items by his mother to reassemble as art projects. On Heidelberg Street this palette was a conscious decision as a mature artist to give new life and meaning to domestic elements.[14]

With the Baby Doll House, Guyton's third work, he made two major developments which would figure prominently in subsequent additions to the project. The first was the exploration and expression of social themes in the assemblages, in this case the tainted innocence of children growing up on the turbulent streets of Detroit. The second was the inclusion of the neighborhood, especially its children, in the execution of the project in an attempt to trigger community involvement and interaction. Guyton noted, "People from all over participated. City workers would leave me signs. Little kids would bring me toys. It was art that everybody took pride in."[15] Later came the Dotty Wotty House which was a celebration of color inspired by Dr. Martin Luther King's statement that "we are all the same color on the inside." Obstruction of Justice, sometimes referred to as the OJ House, mocked the media attention given to the Simpson trial in light of the pervasiveness of social injustice surrounding us all which goes virtually unnoticed.

As the project grew, so did the reaction to it. The art community was solidly in support of Guyton. "Artists relate to Tyree's work. It's very exciting to see such fresh vision, such awesome talent,"[16] said a local artist. The Detroit Institute of Arts recognized the work by awarding Guyton a one-man show in its Ongoing Michigan Artists Program.[17] A curator at the museum observed, "the message in his work is very complex. It ranges from the humorous to the sober to the very serious to the enlightening. His work is very positive even when it's dealing with difficult and negative issues."[18] Word spread of Heidelberg's sheer visual energy and mostly white outsiders, including foreign visitors, could be seen slowly driving through the neighborhood. Doors locked, of course.

But the project had numerous detractors as well. "What Mr. Guyton is calling art is what residents are calling garbage," said a member of the McDougall-Hunt citizens group who felt it was difficult enough for black neighborhoods to present a positive image without additional trash parading as art. The group's chairman added, "People around the country see what he's doing on the news and think that's the way we live. Detroit's not like that."[19] A neighbor of the Numbers House commented, "I'm not against his work, but how would you like this next to your home?"[20] "Junk is junk is junk," wrote a resident in a letter to *The Detroit News*.[21] A city spokesperson was quoted as saying the city received complaints daily.

In the fall of 1991 Guyton began a new project entitled Street People which sharpened criticism of his work. He scattered hundreds of discarded shoes in the street with the intention that they be run over by cars and pummeled by the elements, the plight of homeless people as he saw it. This strong act drew a harmless littering ticket, but may also have forced the city's hand to curb the growing media attention for the Heidelberg Project and its statements about Detroit's shortcomings. "When complaints come through, whether we like it or not, we have to act on them," said a public works official.[22] On a Saturday morning a month later, Guyton was given fifteen minutes notice that city bulldozers were on their way. They arrived, escorted by six police cars, by order of the mayor who "didn't really consider it art."[23] By the end of the day four houses had been flattened and removed. "A shame?" responded Guyton, watching six years of effort being summarily erased, "there's three crack houses the city left standing right behind here. That's the shame."[24]

A supportive neighbor lamented, " That man was making something out of this neighborhood. Now that it's gone, we really do live in a ghetto."[25]

But the project wasn't gone for long and continues to this day. Guyton began again, this time targeting the vacant lots left in the wake of the demolished houses. If you drive down Heidelberg you will see People's Tree, a memorial to the first phase of the project assembled with objects salvaged from the wrecker's piles, Tithes and Offerings with its handbags twisting in the breeze as symbols of portable vaults of resources which continue to flee the city, and a tribute to Rosa Parks called The Bus, created with a bus manufactured in the same year as her historic ride. These assemblages are contrasted with Field of Grasshoppers, a lot left untouched and overgrown like countless others in the city as a testimony to the desolation which could creep in if not for the Heidelberg Project.

Say Nice Things About Detroit

To look at Detroit is to look at all of our cities, but with the symptoms of our urban decline enhanced.[26]

Guyton's choice of trash, like Vergara's choice of ruins alienated many Detroiters who see junk and abandonment as the visible evidence of the city's failure and the cause of a persistent tarnished image which has plagued the city for decades. These reactions unmask a general frustration and anger with the urban condition which face all cities.

Overwhelmed by problems and shrinking resources, city governments struggle with day-to-day matters and can generate few if any large-scale solutions to urban problems. Residents who are inundated with their own personal problems feel powerless and frustrated by the unresponsiveness of city institutions to their needs. One of those needs is a voice in the struggle for social and cultural control, yet If there are no actions taken and no proposals offered, debate about the urban public sphere remains unfocused and can lead to scant discussion.

Vergara and Guyton's embrace of the widening gaps in the city's fabric and their attempt to reprogram rather than replace the obsolete urban fabric alienated them from prevailing sentiment of city dwellers who consider abandonment an indication of rejection, failure, and decay. At the same time, their attempts to deprogram this space which exists uncomfortably between private and public and revitalize it with open programs detached from traditional notions of utility, aligns these projects with a strain of urban theory which claims discontinuity as a strategy for re-energizing contemporary cities.

Private Visions and Public Debate

Detroit did not become great through centrally planned visions. Detroit became great through the millions of spontaneous, very personal and not always beautiful visions of its people.[27]

The strain of urban theory which I refer to is that being developed by architects who came of age in the socially turbulent Europe of the 1960s. Rem Koolhaas, Coop Himmelblau, and Bernard Tschumi are the most prominent names among a group of architects who have turned their interest towards the space between rather than the structures of the city and make, in Koolhaas' words, "urban voids at least one of the principal lines of combat, if not the only line."[28] Recognizing the disjuncture of program and object in the city, each has turned their attention to a more open architecture, a kind of Situationist *detournement* which not only accepts but exploits the discontinuity that now defines much of our cities' urban fabric. Tschumi states, "Architecture is not about the conditions of design but the design of conditions that will dislocate the most traditional and regressive aspects of our society and simultaneously reorganize these elements in the most liberating way."[29]

These architects feel that the strata that comprise our cities, fragments of modernity as Koolhaas calls them, which physically negate the traditional city through their openness and their decay, may offer new themes with which to renew this terrain. These strata become the starting point for new projects with open programs and non-traditional hierarchies. Koolhaas favors dense clumps of buildings which through their density preserve the gaps rather than filling them in. Coop Himmelblau prefers open structures created with tangents and vectors which may by used without codes. Wolf Prix explains, "In order to live in a city people must have the possibility to create their own spaces, without codes and rules...this would give a city the variety we are thinking of. This is the parasite city: saving existing structures and transforming them like parasites using the host to live."[30] Tschumi believes a strategy may exist within the conjoined/ disjoined condition of space and event, and that deregulation along with rupture and realignment of elements drawn from the existing strata may suggest a new definition of urban architecture: "Excentric, disintegrated, dislocated, disjuncted, deconstructed, dismantled, disassociated, discontinuous, deregulated...de-, dis-, ex-. These are the prefixes of today."[31]

These strategies are predicated on a city which is no longer defined by its built space but by its empty space and are accepting of the fragmentation which is repulsive but at the same time emblematic of the contem-porary city. "Leave Paris and Amsterdam," Koolhaas says, "and go look at Atlanta, quickly and without preconceptions."[32] Apparently he has not visited Detroit where he could ponder the projects of Guyton and Vergara which together serve as a litmus test for this redefinition of the city. Koolhaas and the others could hear the reactions of decent, city-dwelling Detroiters who cling to their memories of the traditional city, are fearful of open gaps in the fabric for the control they lack and the crime they attract, and who feel that the city is chaotic enough without deregulation.

These very sentiments reveal some of Detroit's psyche. Though global redeployment of industry and commerce has stripped the Motor City of its nickname, it still maintains a strong belief in progress, an uncanny faith in modern technologies, and favors replacement over repair. Alex Krieger observed that the Renaissance Center set a precedent for replacing the downtown fabric rather renewing it, a tendency which has slowly taken place over the subsequent twenty years. "Maybe this is expected of Detroit," he wrote, "the automobile-made city, where last year's models command little attention."[33]

But if Plunz is correct that "Detroit is Everywhere," then the Europeans would encounter not only the psyche of Detroit on their visit, but that of urban America itself which cannot appreciate urban decay as something romantic until it is safe and clean. This psyche is also colored by a temporal and spatial proximity to the ruins that does not allow the detachment necessary for their appreciation. Vergara admits as much when he writes, "Our very closeness to them prevents us from seeing them clearly, from meditating upon their significance, while a strong taboo, marked by rage, impotence and despair, keeps us from admiring their evocative power."[34] Clearly, the power of past associations which modern ruins possess always vibrate and often pulls in opposite directions.

The dimension missing in this strain of urban theory is its relationship to the social, cultural, economic, and political forces which have formerly contributed to the expansion of the industrial city and now must bear on the contraction of the post industrial city. It is precisely this dimension, the confluence of these forces which are far more complex in the

contemporary city than ever before, which is the value of the American Acropolis proposal and the Heidelberg Project.

Conclusion

The specificity of these projects managed to give substance to far-ranging issues, theoretical and socioeconomic, which could then be identified and discussed. Since they challenged traditional approaches to urban planning, they generated much needed debate that previous planning proposals could not. And because the projects were presented in an open forum with public scrutiny, they were in turn challenged by considerations often secondary in theoretical strategies. Open debate, as was generated and focused by these two projects, is often painful in the short term but is ultimately healthy for the vitality of civic engagement in discussions regarding the future of our contemporary cities.

The American Acropolis proposal and the Heidelberg Project may also be valued for more general questions they raise about abandonment and its inevitable role in the contemporary city. Questions regarding the role of culture and theory in the future of the nebulous terrain which results from abandonment, a territory which is neither private or public but which inspires private visions and public debate. Their importance is not as long-term solutions but rather as fluid proposals for urban public space which is shifting as much as the contemporary condition which creates it.

Notes

[1] Jean-Paul Sartre, "American Cities," in *Literary and Philosophical Essays* (London: Hutchinson Publishing Company, 1955).

[2] Richard Plunz, "Detroit is Everywhere," *Architecture*, April 1996, 55-61. An exhibit of student proposals held May-1 July 1995 at New York's Storefront for Art and Architecture took the same title.

[3] Camilo Jose Vergara, "Downtown Detroit—American Acropolis or Vacant Land?" *Metropolis*, April 1995, 36.

[4] Al, a retired carpenter and Arthur Johnson, vice president for community relations at Wayne State University quoted in Camilo Jose Vergara, "Detroit Waits for the Millennium," *The Nation*, 18 May 1992.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Vergara, "Downtown Detroit," 36.

[7] Ibid., 33.

[8] Ibid., 38.

[9] Constantine Roumel quoted in James Bennet, "A tribute to ruin irks Detroit," *New York Times*, 10 December 1995.

[10] Carol Willis, an architectural historian and Michael Goodin, a journalist with *Crain's Detroit Business* quoted in Vergara, "Downtown Detroit," 37.

[11] Ibid., p. 38.

[12] Tyree Guyton quoted in Greg Lopez, "Street surrealism," *The Detroit News*, 24 August 1988.

[13] A precedent for Guyton's project was destroyed the year his began. Rosetta Archie began assembling a pile of junk seven feet high by a block long in the early 1970s claiming she was God's messenger and was creating a shrine. After a litany of littering tickets, the pile was hauled off by city workers in March 1986.

[14] Art critic Joy Hakanson Colby was an early and steady chronicler of the Heidelberg Project. See "Urban renewal—Tyree Guyton's Heidelberg Project changes junk into jewels," *The Detroit News*, August 17, 1988, p. 1D.

[15] Guyton quoted in Ann Sweeney, "Art everyone took pride in...it's gone," *The Detroit News*, 24 November 1991,1A.

[16] Colby, "Urban Renewal," 7D.

[17] Tyree Guyton's exhibit in the Ongoing Michigan Artists Program of the Detroit Institute of Arts was held June 30 through 19 August 1990.

[18] Patience Young, curator of education at the Detroit Institute of Arts quoted in Scott Walton, "Rising From the Razing," *Detroit Free Press*, 18 December 1991, 1E.

[19] Sentiments of the McDougall-Hunt Citizens District Council are expressed in William Kleinknecht, "Neighbors say it's not art, seek to end show in street," *Detroit Free Press*, 5 November 1991, 1A.

[20] Heidelberg resident Otila Bell quoted in Nancy Ann Jeffrey, "Flattened creation draws a crowd," *Detroit Free Press*, 25 November 1991, 1A.

[21] Gerald P. Klosky, Detroit resident, in a letter to the editor, *The Detroit News*, 25 November 1991.

[22] James Bledsoe, an official in the environmental control division of the Detroit Department of Public Works quoted in Jim Schaefer, "Heidelberg down at the heels," *Detroit Free Press*, 10 October 1991.

[23] Joy Hakanson Colby, "Deconstructionism," *The Detroit News*, 26 November 1991.

[24] Heidelberg Street resident Teresa Woods quoted in Sweeney, "Art everybody took pride in," 10A.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Plunz, "Detroit is Everywhere," 55.

[27] Thomas Stull, "Is saving Detroit ruins truly absurd?" *The Detroit News*, 24 December 1995.

[28] Rem Koolhaas, "Toward the Contemporary City," *Design Book Review* no. 17 (Winter 1989,) 16.

[29] Bernard Tschumi, *Architecture and Disjunction* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994,) 259.

[30] Wolf Prix quoted in an interview with Ziva Freiman in *Progressive Architecture*, September 1991, 137.

[31] Tschumi, 225.

[32] Koolhaas, 15.

[33] Alex Krieger, "The American City: Ideal and Mythic Aspects of a Reinvented Urbanism," *Assemblage* no. 3 (1987), 47.

[34] Vergara, "Downtown Detroit,"

9 FORT BONIFACIO GLOBAL CITY: A NEW STANDARD FOR URBAN DESIGN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Sara Liss-Katz

Introduction

> "Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men's blood and probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans; aim high in hope and work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram once recorded will never die, but long after we are gone will be living thing, asserting itself with ever-growing insistency. Remember that our sons and grandsons are going to do things that would stagger us. Let your watchword be order and your beacon beauty."
>
> (Daniel H. Burnham, 1907)

So wrote Daniel Burnham in the opening years of this century when he helped set the framework for the expansion of Old Manila (Fig. 1). As we approach the beginning of the next century we architects and urban designers are required to bring our expertise to bear in an entirely new environment. We are challenged by massive scale, fast pace and complexity of development projects in the economic boom of Southeast Asia.

Figure 1 Master Plan for Manila, Daniel Burnham

Figure 2 Fort Bonifacio Model

The master plan developed by Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum (HOK), provides a broad vision, as well as the detailed planning, urban design and landscape guidelines necessary to make it a reality (Fig. 2). Our objective, was defined through a collaborative team effort, involving a multi-disciplinary team which included architects, urban designers, landscape architects and engineers, to create the

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following:

- A design that optimizes the use of mass transit through an integrated transit strategy which is flexible and compatible with all phases of development.
- An integrated car parking strategy that minimizes the impact of the automobile by creating a pedestrian-friendly environment within the city.
- A series of definitive urban neighborhoods which focuses on distinct individual open spaces.
- A set of documents and a structure to ensure correct implementation of the master plan.
- A design sensitive to local culture, context, and climate.

The credo of the developer states that, "Land is not inherited from our forefathers, rather it is borrowed from our children." Underlying this statement is a recognition that it is in the long-term interest of everyone, including the developers, to create a sustainable city with a strong sense of place.

Figure 3 Metro Manila

Background

The rapid development of Manila in the last 10 years has outstripped the capacity of its infrastructure, resulting in a crowded, traffic-congested environment that is hostile to pedestrians (Fig. 3). There is little space and few trees, and pollution is a serious problem. The goal of the project was to create a new urban center that avoids these conditions through careful planning and skilled urban design.

Site

The site of Fort Bonifacio, the former Philippine Army Base, has intrinsic character and a wealth of natural surroundings. The American Memorial Park with its grand ceremonial circles is to the south. The fairways of the Manila Golf Club provide rolling green open space to the west. The C5 Expressway marks the eastern edge and provides access to the airport. To the north runs the Pasig River, and the R4 Roadway. The site also offers distant views of Manila Bay and the skyline of Makati, Manila's current business district, and the surrounding mountain ranges.

Program

The program for Fort Bonifacio Global City is to provide a high-density, mixed-use urban center with integrated open space, public transportation, distinct neighborhoods and pedestrian-oriented streets. Bonifacio's center, 9 million square meters of building space, will be developed on 250 hectares of land. The overall master plan covers an area of 440 hectares. Population projections are for half a million daytime occupants and 200,000 permanent residents. The master plan encompasses office, commercial, residential, institutional, recreational, open space, parking, utilities, and full supporting infrastructure.

Urban Systems

Before the design process began, project executives toured 13 cities in Europe, Asia and the United States to search for inspiration of both visionary and innovative city-building. Both positive and negative aspects of cities were carefully observed and analyzed.

The master plan for Bonifacio was created considering three system types: grid, geometric and organic patterns. Historic precedents and current city models were studied both for their positive urban qualities as well as inherent drawbacks.

The Grid System

The grid-system is dominant in American cities, which were built over comparatively short spaces of time. New York and Chicago are good examples of the grid-system. In historical terms Chicago sprang up almost overnight. This is of special interest to us because Bonifacio is developing very quickly. Grid-systems are not unique to America: early examples include the Japanese city of Nara, shown here, which dates from the 8th century AD (Fig. 4).

The principal advantage of the grid-system is that it is easily comprehensible, providing an immediate sense of orientation. Traffic circulation is simple, alleviating potential congestion. The drawbacks are twofold. From a functional standpoint, the grid must be skillfully managed or it will encourage ever



Figure 4 Plan for Nara, Japan

increasing through traffic. Aesthetically, a grid system can be tiring on the eye as well as dulling on the spirit.

The Geometric System

For developed examples of the geometric system we can cite Washington, and Paris as great examples. The radial patterns usually developed around an earlier architectural core with subsequent development emanating from the center. A powerful example is the 1593 plan for Palmanova in Italy, where pure geometry creates a timeless appeal. Palmanova remains remarkably unchanged to this day. As a diagram for transit routing within a city, this system has much to offer to planners and designers (Fig. 5).

Figure 5 Photograph of Palmanova, Italy

The Organic System

Many of the older European cities and towns have developed over centuries according to topography, boundaries and natural pathways. Examples of the organic system are found in the Italian town of Sienna, and in Hong Kong, which is recognized as the urban center of Asia. The garden cities of the United States are another form of freer organic patterns (Fig. 6).

Figure 6 Plan for Riverside, Illinois

Concept/ Synthesis

The organic system is certainly the most *'human-friendly"* and potentially the most sensitive to the environment, but has also been viewed in the past as least efficient when having to cope with late-20th century traffic conditions. With the current trends towards traffic calming and the discouraging of auto traffic within cities, the organic system is one which warrants attention.

The Bonifacio Master Plan concept takes its inspiration from the best elements of cities, gardens and monuments from around the world, synthesizing them into a unique plan (Fig. 7).

Figure 7 Fort Bonifacio Illustrative Plan

The density and street grid of New York City, the broad axial boulevards of Paris, the skywalks of Hong Kong, the transit systems of Frankfurt and London, the parking arrangements of Barcelona and Minneapolis, as well as the picturesque landscapes of English gardens and American parks all show the breadth of design issues considered and the commitment of those involved to learn from the past.

The Bonifacio Design Framework is an overlay of grid, geometric and organic patterns (Figure 8). The grid system establishes the main framework of north-south and east-west axes. The major public open spaces are created by overlaying the geometric circular patterns, creating the green, open spaces

Figure 8 Fort Bonifacio Concept Sketch

throughout the plan. The larger concentric circles emanating from the center form the spaces of the neighborhoods and districts of the plan. Both the grid and the circular overlays become key elements in the development of the transit system for Fort Bonifacio. The Crescent West neighborhood takes its form by responding to the circular geometry, as well as to the organic edge adjacent to the Manila Golf (Fig. 9). The planning structure thus yields to existing edges, topography and special conditions adding the *"organic"* richness to the plan.

Figure 9 Sketch of Crescent West Neighborhood

Neighborhoods & Districts

The Bonifacio plan is an integration of comprehensible districts. In the spirit of the Baranghay, the Philippino word for community, the livability of a plan ultimately lies in the way it creates distinct neighborhoods in which people can lead their daily lives and relate to the amenities of the larger community (Fig. 10).



Figure 10 Neighborhood Concept Plan

City Center

The City Center is the 24-hour urban core with business, hotel, retail and entertainment uses located at the physical center of Bonifacio City. The public commons and the activity of the uses set the character of this district.

Crescent West

The Crescent West neighborhood is predominantly residential with convenient links to the activity of the city center and broad views across the Manila Golf Club to the west.

Station Square

This multi-modal hub will be the new transit center for Bonifacio and metro-Manila. This rail, bus, taxi and auto interchange will ease the traffic load within the city center. The station will also generate commercial activity, enlivening the plan with convention, exhibition and international trade facilities.

Institutional District

The Institutional District has the least density of all neighborhood districts within Fort Bonifacio. Anchored by a meandering parkway, land uses within this district are reserved for institutions which enrich the lives for the entire community; these include health care, education, research and religion.

Bonifacio North

Conceived as the final phase of Fort Bonifacio, the Bonifacio North neighborhood will become the financial center of the Philippines.

Transportation

Transit and transportation systems are key components of the Master Plan. Fort Bonifacio has been designed to reduce the impact of personal vehicles, with the added benefits of cleaner air and a great reduction in traffic congestion and noise-related stress. The following elements are key components of Fort Bonifacio's transportation system.

- The multi-modal station, Bonifacio's transit hub is strategically located adjacent to the newly completed 45 Expressway. It will ultimately connect different transit networks, providing easy transfer to local and regional transit lines (Fig. 11).



Figure 11 Sketch of Multi-modal Station

- Parking for private development will be supplemented with additional high-turnover perimeter parking facilities and an underground garage beneath public open spaces. This unique parking system has been designed to get people out of their cars, minimizing traffic on local streets. Public parking will be distributed between more affordable periphery parking facilities (as in Minneapolis) and underground garages beneath open spaces (as in Barcelona). These parking facilities will be close to transit systems. High parking fees and limited on street parking will discourage driving into the city center district. These measures aim to lessen the environmental impact caused by automobiles in the city.
- Shuttles and a light-rail system will serve strategically-located routes within the plan. To accommodate Fort Bonifacio's future growth, the master plan designates routes for the future development of below-grade transit. As neighborhoods become dense, generating a demand for mass transit and city-wide transit systems are developed, these zones will ensure that the required areas will be available to build mass transit facilities.
- Land use guidelines for Fort Bonifacio are developed around a strategy for integrated mixed use development which will reduce the dependency on the automobile. Developing office, residential, and retail within the same block also helps to create vibrant urban neighborhoods and reduce the need for cars. Land use guidelines in the Bonifacio plan allow flexibility through the mixing of uses. Additionally, this ensures that the plan is responsive to the demands of the market, both present and future (Fig. 12).

Figure 12 Land Use Plan

Streetscape & Open Space System

To create a sense of city, memorable street and open space framework have been conceived ranging from grand ceremonial Boulevards to winding parkways and pedestrian-scaled streets.

Figure 13 A Pedestrian-Scaled Street

People-Friendly Streets

The streetscape and open spaces account for about 40% of the land. Public open spaces, parks and gardens, integrated throughout the city fabric will provide gathering places, landmarks, visual interest, a sense of place for each neighborhood, and places of repose and refreshment.

A pedestrian-friendly environment is essential in creating a viable urban place. One of the main goals of the project was to create a city that encourages people to walk and use transit instead of driving. Prescribed first floor uses, such as street-level detail, create an interactive environment between the architecture and the street. In order to create a comfortable walking environment, sidewalks are shaded by canopy trees and other generous landscaping. In addition many buildings have arcade requirements. Throughout most of the development, pedestrians will also have the choice of traveling through a network of 2nd level sky-walks.

The hierarchical structure of the street framework–from grand, ceremonial axes of Bonifacio Boulevard to winding parkways of McKinley Boulevard and neighborhood streets–strengthens the sense of place by differentiating areas and helping people to orient themselves (Fig. 14).



Figure 14 Typical Street Sections

Landscape treatments which were developed simultaneously with the plan support this notion. In difference to nature, a native plant palette has been incorporated into the design; many of the existing trees on the site are being saved for replanting along streets and gardens.

Street trees are incorporated into all streets of Bonifacio to create a green city and respond to the following goals:

- Encourage pedestrian circulation by providing shade, reducing solar glare, and providing a barrier between sidewalk areas and vehicular traffic
- Introduce a human scale into the streetscape
- Give unique identity to each neighborhood and district

Public Spaces

Each of the neighborhoods have their own public parks, plazas and greenways (Fig. 15). In addition to providing a natural setting that will complement the city's urban character, these places serve social and recreational functions. They also highlight the geometry of the plan and give each neighborhood a sense of place.

Historically, the town square has always held an important place within the traditional Philippino town. Events focus here, families gather, fiestas and religious observances are held and local news is exchanged. Too often the importance of these places is ignored in the development of new communities. The design effort of Fort Bonifacio creates a series of discrete open spaces which will provide a focus and sense of community for each neighborhood.

Figure 15 Open Space Plan

Engineering

On a more detailed, engineering level, there are plans for a grey-water system for use in flushing, irrigation and fire services. Solid waste will be reduced by a mandatory recycling program. Storm water retention basins will reduce adverse run-off effects. A district cooling system is being considered as an efficiency/cost saving measure. Regulations within the project's design guidelines will govern the reflectiveness and energy efficiency of glass used in the towers.

Follow-Through

HOK's master plan calls for five phases of development during the next 20-25 years. Since the ground breaking in March 1996, infrastructure and roads have been built as part of the 50 hectare Phase 1 development (Fig. 16). HOK has worked with the developers to respond to issues as they arise, and has developed more detailed urban design guidelines. With help from a team of legal consultants, these items have been translated into a set of Codes, Covenants and Restrictions that become part of every property deed. Subjects covered include easements and set-backs, signage and lighting restrictions, FAR and height regulations, etc (Fig. 17).

Figure 16 Fort Bonifacio Construction Photo 1996



Figure 17 Urban Design Guidelines

Significance of the Results

We believe the Bonifacio Master Plan is unmatched in its depth, breadth and thorough attention to detail. From its design philosophy and development guidelines to the planting of trees and the lighting of buildings, this project represents a new standard in comprehensive urban design.

It is worth noting that any project of this size and scope needs more than a good design to succeed. It needs a dedicated, visionary client—someone who is not afraid of long-term commitment, and who wishes to create something more than just a profit. Everyone involved—from the banks and developers to the architects and engineers—has to understand and be willing to participate in a collaborative process.

Figure 18 Model Photo

The developers/investors of the project have experienced a good return as property prices have risen beyond their original investment. The project has been widely published in a number of business magazines for this reason. The initial financial success of the project has been significant, because it can influence other developers to take a look at what we are doing. With the current challenges faced by Asian economies many projects in the region have been halted. Only developments which have been carefully planned and well thought out will still grow during these difficult times. This is demonstrated at Fort Bonifacio where construction of the new city is continuing, albeit at a more modest pace. As time goes on, we can expect that the most successul ideas of the design will be repeated elsewhere. Developers are beginning to appreciate the benefits of good urban design in a region previously cha-racterized by overly rapid, and somewhat haphazard, growth.

Figure 19 Greenbelt Mall, Manila

All of this bodes well, both for cities *and the environment*.



CULTURE AND CITY SHAPE



East Asia

10 A SEARCH FOR A CULTURAL PARADIGM OF URBANIZATION IN EAST ASIA

Sang-Chuel Choe

Culture and the City

East Asia can be defined both in terms of geographical and cultural entities. Narrowly, it includes China, Japan and Korea as geographical neighbors. As a cultural entity, it may cover those three countries, in addition to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the sense that they still use Chinese characters as the base of their mother tongues and share many cultural and spiritual denominators such as Confucianism and Buddhism. East Asian cities have gone through profound changes both in urban form and urbanism as a way of life since the late nineteenth century, both by indigenous enlightenment and alien domination over local culture. They have seen the manifestations of modernization, westernization and revolutionary nationalism. Especially during the last half century after the World War II, the East Asian city has been the material expression of development which has been largely devoid of cultural identity or has at least shown benign neglect of the cultural heritage in the urban process. Although it does not totally ignore arguments on the importance of cultural elements in urban transformation, it has suffered from academic parochialism and lack of methodological logic in the study of culture and the city. Comparative urban studies in terms of demographic and economic aspects are important, but one of the least explored areas for comparative urbanism is the cultural dimension. Culture is becoming an antidote for the formerly exhalted norm of economic development, where the city has played as a locomotive for economic development and a symbol for national development.

East Asian cities have suddenly been awakened by the collapse of socialist utopianism and the surge of globalization. A strong sentiment is on the rise to reinstate their cultural identity in search of their own urban process and built environment. Rich urban traditions of the East Asian countries have been unfairly overlooked. The cultural importance of inserting a long-time frame into the analysis of urban phenomena is that it highlights the historical and ideological characters of urbanization. The Weberian bias on the Asian cities have persisted. Many writers have also responded that the Western city is mercantile and autonomous in its governance and plebiscite while the East Asian city is aristocratic, despotic and lacking of civic awareness. From the Western eyes who have lived by geometrical purity, Euclidean zoning and stylized architectural design, the Asian cities would be hazardous, confused and devoid of planning effort. They also like to point out the virtues of the Oriental quiescent and adaptive approach towards nature in contrast to the aggressive masculinity of the Western culture. East Asian cities compress enormous changes into a brief time span. There is the wide gap between where they are and where they want to be. A walled city has been opened to give way to a sprawling metropolis. Vernacular architecture and a traditional urban facade coexists with

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international and eclectic ones without intended harmony. Once-sacred and celestial cities have become secular and terrestrial. Spatial segregation by status has been replaced by sprawling office towers and high-rise apartments. Higher city (Yamanote) and lower city (Shitamachi) in Tokyo during the Edo period, Northern district (Bukchon) for mandarins and Southern district (Namchon) for commoners in Seoul during the Chosen kingdom, and Heavenly City and Mundane City in Beijing during Ch'ing dynasty are no longer meaningfully existent.[1] There is no spatial differentiation by a born status, rather space has been reshaped by income level and life style. The formation of a middle class in terms of norms and life style is in the making. The East Asian cities have just followed what the Western counterpart would have experienced after the Industrial Revolution. For them, Western cities have been a model to follow. Ironically, in this era of globalization, they begin to throw doubt on the Western urban paradigm and to trace back to their own identity from their historical and cultural heritage.

Professor Huntington's epochal essay "The Clash of Civilization" appeared in Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1993 announcing in its first sentence that "world politics is entering a new phase". By this he meant that whereas in the recent past world conflicts were between ideological camps grouping the first, second, third worlds into warring camps, the new style of politics would entail conflicts between different and presumably clashing civilizations. The great divisions among mankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. He particularly mentioned the fundamental disagreement, potential or actual, between the West on the one hand and, on the other, the Islamic and Confucian civilizations. It is quite a quite alarming statement in this highly urbanized world.[2]

The East Asian countries are highly urbanized except for China. China will follow the path of urbanization sooner or later without a policy of controlled migration and with a relaxed migration policy after the liberalization programs. The rate of increase in urban populations is particularly high in their large cities. At the turn of the this century, more than a half of the total population will reside in urban areas in China. The East Asian countries as a whole will be predominantly urban. Competition among mega-cities and their metropolitan shadows will become more intense. Rivalry among the nation-states will be replaced by the extended city-states. Then, as Professor Huntington admonished, is there any possibility of a cultural clash between the Oriental city and the Occidental city? The answer is not that simple. Although there is not an immediately prominent possibility because the Oriental cities are already too assimilated culturally and physically to revolt against the Occidental urban paradigm, serious efforts will be made to draw away from the Western path of urban civilization and to look for their own way of urban process. The East Asian intellects would have been disillusioned by the predicaments on the Western urban civilization which were succinctly laid out by a historian, Oswald Spengler and an urbanologist, Lewis Mumford in their theoretical and nostalgic formulation. The city was for them the central civilizing agency, an original creation of the folk, and the perfecter of rational civilization. However, they regarded the modern urban community as neo-nomadic, dependent upon the spectacle of the ever-changing urban scene to fill the void of a desocialized consciousness. They distend these insights into a vision of imminent catastrophe and welcomed the demise of the modern urban civilization.

Confucian Wisdom Revisited

Among many cultural roots of the city formation in East Asia, Confucianism would be singled out as the most important cultural denominator. Many values nurtured by Confucianism, now internalized and no longer conscious, have provided a cultural and behavioral basis for everyday life and requisite urban transformation, and to create a leverage for sustaining urban society. The important Confucian values include filial piety, moral emphasis over material well-being, the concern with social harmony and an unobtrusive living with nature.

According to Confucian philosophy, the city has been thought to be evil. Anti-urbanism and ambivalent attitudes toward the city have been prevalent. Rural life is praised more than urban life. People engaged in manufacturing and commercial activities are regarded as mischievous and untrustworthy. There is a strong sense of agrarian romanticism even among modern urbanites. Many urban migrants want to keep a foothold in their home districts by leaving their parents or at least one of their family lineage in the rural area where they were born and raised. This Confucian bias against urban life may have influenced the general orientation of migratory flows and urban policy-making. In highly urbanized countries like Japan and Korea, urbanization has been accepted as an undesirable consequence of development. The governments have made every effort to slow down urbanization and to redirect urban flow from large cities to small-medium sized cities. In particular, they have repeatedly expressed their strong opposition to the excessive growth of big cities.

For decades scholars had followed the lead of Max Weber in considering Confucianism the main cultural impediment to national development by strong negative factors such as the existence of a powerful land-based aristocracy and the justification of authoritarian rule over individual freedom and creativity. However, this premise is no longer persuasive as the land-based aristocracy is already replaced by urban industrial capitalism, and oriental despotism by participatory democracy. The need is strongly felt to recapture some ingredients of the Confucian values which would help facilitate the on-going urban process in the East Asia while escaping the predicaments of the Western urban phenomenon.

Among others, filial piety or family royalty, usually expressed by the extended family and multi-generation family system, seems greatly facilitative to reduce the societal burden of urban governance for the aged and youth problems which are becoming crucial in a rapidly urbanizing world of East Asia. The public housing policy of Hong Kong which gives a preemptive right for the distribution of a public housing unit

to the extended family with a parent would be understood in the train of neo-Confucian thoughts. Internal designs of a housing unit and community services are also deliberately introduced to accommodate the extended family and especially parental care.

The extreme commodification of human relationships that subordinates social and cultural institutions to the utility of market tends to result in societal collapse. Another attribute of the Confucian virtues is a moral emphasis over material well-being and an emphasis on self-cultivation and education. According to the Confucian legacy, wealth can be the object of envy but has never been fully respected. The East Asian cities are not far from being physical and spatial expressions of Confucian thoughts. The East Asian city seems a relatively egalitarian city as compared with the Western counterpart. It indeed has both slum squatter and high income block. Nevertheless, the rich and the poor live side by side and even in a housing complex without much antagonism. Residential segregation by income and religion is hardly problematic and has never been a great social issue. The concern with social harmony which is a prime virtue of human beings has been already present in varying degree in the Asian culture. Anti-urbanism embedded in the Confucian philosophy dies hard. Urban and rural areas have never been seriously defined in everyday life. It can be productive to create a rurban society as an alternative toward the future image of human settlements proposed by many visionary thinkers.

Sustainable urban development is becoming a catchword on a local as well as a global scale. Recognizing that world population growth is posing a threat on both the global environment, and that more than a half of the world population will live in cities in the end of this century, urban environmental issues will be of crucial importance in solving global environmental problems and will threaten the very survival of the Asian cities. If the urbanized China of 600 million inhabitants is motorized to the extent of the current Western car-ownership, the world can not afford the necessary oil reserves, and East Asia will be suffocated by air pollution and cross-border acid rain. As the Asian economic miracle is fading away and economic crisis comes close to financial moratorium, austerity measures are becoming a part of daily life for Asian urbanites and the government circles. Everybody knows that they cannot afford the urban life they enjoyed during the heydays of economic prosperity. They are trying to find an alternative way of life, naturally retreating to the humble and frugal life which the Confucian thinkers have long embraced and preparing for the worst scenario. Many give up their private car, install energy-saving measures and even go back to the rural homeland where they used to live. Although it does not necessarily say that the East Asian city is more sustainable than the city in other part of the world, the Confucian city may be more flexible to adapt itself to the urban hardship waiting to be escalated and may be more facilitative to solving global environmental problems.

Internal Characteristics and Urban Texture

Viewed from high above, the East Asian cities are not greatly different from the Western cities, but upon closer examination one may find that even the smallest urban neighborhood offers a wide range of texture and color, and there are marked differences in the way of life.[3] One may also find that living patterns and spatial arrangement at the microscopic scale is persistent to change. In the Western cities, diversity between neighborhoods is more visible, while diversity within neighborhoods is more prevalent in the East Asian cities. There are hidden dimensions in the use of space and different pattern languages in urban context of human behavior which are not easily seen but are deeply rooted in their cultural characteristics. Physical appearance as a built-form and the man-made environment become more prone to assimilation than behavioral and attitudinal change.

A Western architectural critic, J.M. Richards, who has spent some time in Asian cities gave his image of the Japanese cities as follows:

> "the Japanese city is not design that had been done badly; it is the negation of design, an urban happening with its own special vitality. As to why it has come about in such an extreme form in Japan, I formed a personal theory that the special circumstances of Japanese land use make the city the only place where an impetuous, anarchical, instinctive life is possible—The Japanese, consequently and instinctively allow themselves freedom from rules and disciplines in their cities. The city has become the Japanese jungle."[4]

From the Western eyes who are accustomed to the geometrical street layout, the Euclidean zoning and stylized architectural design, the Asian cities including the Japanese do not derive their dynamism from the efforts of urban planners and architects but just the reverse may be true. Confused and hazardous like a jungle as it is, the Asian city is a city of humanity and convenience. Each section of urban neighborhood has various services, shops and eateries, many of which are open until midnight and some people are waiting to serve customers. The Asian urbanites know how to live in a crowded city. Temporal patterning and mixed land use are a part of their ordinary life style. The spatial differentiation of dining, sleeping and living rooms in a house is largely the Western cultural habit which is highly space-and-energy consumptive. Communal facilities like the bath are a favorite place to meet people of the neighborhood and to share information, grief and joy. In the rapidly urbanizing Asian cities, we would not be able to afford the Western life style.

It seems very crucial to identify what have been changed and what have not been changed, and what are the cultural characteristics to be preserved. The built environment of the city is the amalgamative product of polity, economy, culture and even historical incidence. It can be expressed in urban form and iconic artifacts, which are not necessarily replaced by the existing one but very often coexist in harmony or in contradiction. The city is a contesting ground for many

conflicting forces. They can be alien, ethnic, religious, ideological and socio-economic in a specific place on a given time. We have observed the changing perception of the same urban space: Imperial Palace Square in Tokyo; Tienanmen Square in Beijing; Kwanghwamun and Kyongbok Palace in Seoul; the Thirty-Sixth Street in Hanoi. Contesting forces are still very much working to shape the East Asian cityscape: the recent demolition of the Japanese Government General Office as the remnant of colonial imprints in Seoul; a skyscraper's vision in Marunouchi against invisible Imperial Palace in Tokyo; the Governor's House and the Bank of China building in Hong Kong; and factional locals and mainlanders in Taipei.

Confucianism as a cultural denominator of the East Asian cities would not have resulted in the same consequence but has been deflected in a prismatic manner. Differences among the East Asian cities can be more conspicuous than differences between the East and the West. However, while convergence between the Western and the East Asian cities takes place from a macroscopic perspective, there is more distinctiveness in the microcosm of urban texture and urban life which is largely embedded in the Confucian legacies. The East Asian cities are very much in transition, and are struggling to find their own identity. Korea has also reached a juncture in urban history that is calling for substantial social, political and spatial restructuring to renew the base towards the twenty-first century. The city is a key element of this theme, with efforts to construct new forms of societal guidance both as the built environment and as an arena for the formation of culturally enriched and inclusive social processes. After all, the city is a moral entity expressed by cultural characteristics. The present endeavor does not pretend to foretell what the East Asian cities culturally should be. But it is the beginning of a long and thorny journey exploring the Asian way of urban transformation which ensures itself from the risk of blind imitation of the alien urban paradigms.

Notes

[1] Choe, Sang-Chuel, et.al. *Culture and City in East Asia*, Oxford University Press, 1997.

[2] Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilization," *Foreign Affairs*, 1993, summer issue.

[3] Heikkila, Eric J. "Los Angeles: La-La-Land" in E.J. Blakerly and R.J. Stimson eds., *New Cities of the Pacific Rim*, University of California at Berkeley. Monograph 43, 1992, pp. 2-17.

[4] Richards, J.M. "Lessons from the Japanese Jungle," *Ekistics*, August 1969, pp. 75-76.

11 URBAN REVITALIZATION AND CULTURAL MEMORY: RETHINKING TAIPEI'S URBAN RENEWAL PLAN REGARDING WAN-HUA

Kuan-chu Wei
Min-chih Yang

Urban renewal planning for cities in the Third World involves a set of complex issues pertaining to the local cultural heritage and its tension vis-à-vis the dominant global forces of urbanism. The changing global context in the latest developments of capitalism, moreover, creates new conditions and new dynamics, which calls for radical rethinking about urban revitalization in general and on the preservation of cultural heritage in particular. The purpose of this article is to begin to situate and untangle the complexities of the urban issue in this new global situation. The vehicle for this critical reflection will be Taipei's urban renewal plan (1997) regarding Wan-hua, a historic district in the city.[1]

The dominant urban form in Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, is shaped primarily by rapid economic developments in the post-war decades. In Taiwan, as in many other so-called Third World countries, plans for rapid development have generally meant systematic repression and ruthless destruction of the cultural specificity in the urbanized areas. There was indeed a tragic tension between modern urbanism and the traditional spatial settings. Modernization, after all, was an imperative to develop, lest one should face the threats of national survival. Due mainly to the loss of its cultural distinctiveness, Taipei's effort to enter the mainstream modern culture inadvertently turned itself into one of those important yet faceless nodes in the world. It now has an appearance like many modern cities, a mediocre copy of Houston, Frankfurt, or Tokyo. It is a typical modern, exchangeable, anonymous urban form, a place that represents merely a global unit in the capitalist economic system.

It is Wan-hua, an aged urban district in Taipei, which renders the city a recognizable uniqueness. Wan-hua was founded in the early 18th century under the reign of the Ching Dynasty in approximately its present location. It was an old port town by the Tam-kam River where the Chinese people and culture first settled in the northern part of Taiwan. With the silting up of its harbor, the shipping of rice, hemp, and medicine from the port ceased a century later. Today's Wan-hua is a locale of 130,000 people with a total area of about 860 acres. It is an urban community with visible signs of the past still evident, such as the ancient Buddhist/Taoist temples. In the past decades, these temples have added new significance to Wan-hua, making it an emerging religious center in Taipei. While its commercial area is largely modernized, Wan-hua still provides us with the glimpses of early settlers' economic and cultural life, such as the shops in which artisans worked and musicians performed.

If we were to turn to Taipei's urban renewal plan of Wan-hua and to examine its discussion of the urban issues, we find that in spite of its insistence on preserving historic buildings in this area, this plan reflects in its deployment and outlook

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the ahistorical and universalizing intellectual tendencies typical of the mind-set in the heyday of modernization. It continues the same pattern of throwing simplistic physical solutions at complex societal processes and cultural problems, which assumes that selective refurbishing of the historic buildings will lead to desired qualities in the cultural realm. It is obvious to us that this plan does not respond in any way to the current transformations in global relationships caused by changes within the capitalist world economy. We are referring here to the new world situation created by the emergence of what has been described as late capitalism or global capitalism.[2] What is interesting about the situation is the way in which capitalism is becoming more geographically dispersed. Businesses and corporate powers need to maintain their competitive edge through flexible responses to global consumer markets and labor processes.[3] These new dynamics of global capitalism do have significant cultural repercussions. However, they are hardly addressed in the plan, if at all.

To bring about a more up-to-date vision of a modern city and the direction for its renewal, planners in Taiwan, or in other Third World countries for that matter, need to better understand the economic and cultural dynamics in the latest developments of global capitalism, and its corresponding impacts on cultural politics and urbanism. To achieve a better understanding as such, we have made the following observations:

(1) Global capitalism has transformed Taipei into a pluralistic society which enjoys unprecedented economic affluence. People of the middle class are economically empowered to engage themselves in issues other than those at the subsistence level. Amongst them, one key issue emerges: after decades of unquestioned modernization/Westernization, how do a people in the Third World face their own history? In the past, people in Taiwan regarded themselves as underdeveloped and deemed rapid development as the first order of the day. Today, their economic well-being begets a sense of cultural pride amongst its residents and the desire to seek stronger self-identity. Buttressed by economic viability, political democracy and an environment of social pluralism, people seeking their cultural identity and distinctiveness now find that their previous insistence on being "modern" has lost its steam, and choose to give their own tradition a second look.

(2) Global capitalism's more flexible motion of capital emphasizes the new, the fleeting, and the fashionable in modern life. It creates the disorienting urban experience of living in a "perpetual present".[4] This disorienting experience is again intensified by the stark monotonous modern urban setting. The triumph of modern urbanism thus inversely produces people's psychological needs to identify themselves with their past, with their ancestral traces still legible in some of their physical surroundings. Against this backdrop, the older areas in the city now function as invaluable therapeutic milieus. The more solid and deep-rooted values inherent in the traditional spatial patterns provide a sense of stability, familiarity and anchorage. The residents begin to cherish the ideals and the emotions that these physical settings represent. The faults of modern cities, as a result, seem to be much lessened when people can live and enjoy themselves as before in social and cultural relationships provided by the proximity of these more traditional spatial settings.

(3) The historic fabric of places has been viewed as a barrier to economic growth. In the new global situation, however, cities which are able to demonstrate their historical richness are more appealing to those with capital seeking stable and secure locations. Stronger historical identity and greater cultural well-being do demonstrate certain qualities of trust-worthiness of a place. Such a place tends to attract long-term investments, instead of short-term opportunist speculation. The distinctiveness of particular places thus assumes greater significance in gathering capitals. Historic sites and cultural heritage now become the dynamic assets that combine the local and the global: they establish the local specificity and cultural strength which are attractive to a globalized flow of capital. In turn, the concentration of capital as its result helps to structure and protect the localized patterns of development brought about by ample economic exchange. This local-global linkage explains in part why the conservation of historic sites can create profitable conditions now for the Third World cities if they seek to retain and expand their competitive edge.

These tendencies as outlined above indicate a set of new dynamics between the forces of globalism and local culture. The global and the local are no longer in a tragic tension as before. In the new world context, they have become dependent upon each other's existence, instead of mutually excluding one another. In short, they have developed a symbiotic relationship, one that is imbued with a certain constructive tension. It is in responding to the impacts of these new dynamics which lies the edge of change: Now, contemporary urban issues in many Third World regions should be understood and seriously dealt with as indigenous place-making processes where a traditional cultural landscape reemerges to claim its due territory and seeks to reconcile with the forces of global capitalism. Such understanding could yield culturally appropriate views on urban development, and avoid the curse of the postwar economic development paradigm: the promotion of wholesale modernization, in places with culturally charged spatial forms or areas where important historic sites are located.

Examined in light of the changing global situation, Taipei's urban renewal plan regarding Wan-hua obviously lacks the awareness that what is fundamental to urban planning for a Third World city such as Taipei is cultural politics, and that urban planning can play an instrumental role in promoting transformative cultural directions and ways of life. It lacks an understanding that, at this moment in time, a project such as renewing Wan-hua has significant cultural implications at the local, the national, as well as at the global level.

Not surprisingly, the renewal plan under our scrutiny here ends up articulating empty principles which are clichés mostly and too vague to be of use in any genuine effort to seek a sensible new urban culture. For instance, the primary prescription for Wan-hua in Taipei's urban renewal plan is tourist development. And yet, the makeover of a heritage

landscape into a production of neatly-packaged tours for quick consumption is questionable. It is an agenda which sets up conditions that contravene the more traditional pattern of life still extant in the historic site. It tends toward the kitsch policy of recapturing the historic buildings in the form of a hollow scenography, which may transform the authentic cultural landscape into a theme park. The significance of this historic site may thus be appropriated for and reduced to market values pending tourist consumption.

Unlike a commodity or fashion trend, a heritage site is the genuine cultural experience of a people as inscribed in the built environment. It is the crystallization and the physical manifestation of their deepest imaginations and feelings. In fact, what makes the traditional spatial settings attractive and moving is exactly their ability to empower the public's imagination and intrigue their cultural memory. A tourist or commodified version of the heritage landscape, however, would only deteriorate the historic area further by feeding the public but flimsy visual impressions instead.

According to Connerton's theory, collective memory can be either inscriptive or incorporating. The inscriptive discursive and representational process of remembering, however, are less powerful than the incorporating rituals which are impressed on our deep-seated experience mechanism through action and form the essential part of our social memory.[5] In the case of Wan-hua, various ritual activities and religious ceremonies performed in the area do make the otherwise monotonous urban living a fascinating cultural experience. For instance, visitors frequented the temples in Wan-hua. The biweekly (the first and the fifteenth day of each month) observance of worship rituals in the temples attracted a sizable amount of visitors on such dates. These dates of observance are regulated according to the Chinese lunar calendar, which are believed to have sacral meanings in traditional Chinese cosmology. This certainly adds an imaginative dimension to modern urbanism. Moreover, folk legends are often associated with the food, the drinks, the medicinal products, and the goods. Take the snake soup, for example. The cook would perform the art of skinning a snake alive and cook it for the customer. It is a ritual-like performance, a mixture of popular legend and folk beliefs. What makes the soup attractive then is not what is made for consumption, but the ancient mystery and the adventure associated with the cuisine. Such dining activity generates cultural variation and colorful imagination added to the mediocre and insipid modern urban experience.

It is alarming, therefore, to view visitors to the historic site merely as tourists—those wandering observers who get canned impressions instead of intriguing imagination and deeper cultural experience. We prefer an urban renewal plan that accordingly effects a re-centering of people's cultural experience around this historic site, turning Wan-hua into a magnetic nucleus for the public's imagination. The cultural memory of a people can thus be rekindled by the adventure and romance that Wan-hua provides. In our view, this aged urban district in Taipei should be perceived accordingly as the emerging new frontier for Taipei's development—a mysterious and enchanting core of our urban life.

Culture generates its desired space. Any plausible cultural theory of the Wan-hua district, and of its renewal, rests ultimately on its potential to reinvigorate those silent and subordinate folk traditions it now hosts, in order that these traditions can appropriate space in their struggle for territory and manifestation. It calls for the construction of a general doctrine of the historic site as a distinct form of existence, a form of localized pattern of social-economic relations. Doreen Massey (1993) holds that a place "is constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, articulated together at a particular locus," where the social processes are at work.[6] Manuel Castells (1983) comprehends the city as spatial forms formulated by social actions within a given mode of production: "Spatial forms [of a city], at least on our planet, will be produced by human action, as are all other objects, and will express and perform the interests of the dominant class according to a given mode of production and to a specific mode of development."[7] In regard to Wan-hua's renewal, we also believed that it is vital for the plan to resonate with the concerns and orientations of the ingrained social relations in this specific locus. Tending to this goal, we need to set up guidelines, thereby reinstating a localized mode of production and consumption as the basis for attaining those social-economic relations.

This localized economic pattern helps to construct place-based activities, articulated at the popular level and in social interactions. Take for example the localized form of exchange in the traditional market place. It is the immediacy and spontaneity of human interaction that is appealing to the customers of the traditional market. The prices of the goods are negotiable. One can get good bargains through knowledge and experience. In this mode of exchange, what has been exchanged is more than monetary credits and commodities. The customer and the vendor in the exchange process share vital social information. It is a process of human interaction in disguise, which creates a sense of social belonging and bondage. This mode of exchange is, in fact, a perpetual form of social interaction that intensifies social identification and reinforces social stratification on the local level. This accounts for the fact that traditional market places, despite their now often ill-managed environments, continue to attract a good fraction of the urban residents.

In our attempt to reestablish traditional social relations, the goal before us then is to instill renewed vitality in the traditional social and spatial structures, by providing them with corresponding modes of production and exchange. In other words, it is to animate traditional cultural practices and social relations through promoting indigenous modes of production and exchange in the area. Traditional market places, crafts-shops, medicine shops, tailor's shops, the traditional retail enterprise, eateries, temples and their "miao-chen" (squares in front of the temples for ritual performances), etc.—these are social agents of our rebuilding localized social-economic relations in Wan-hua and cultural catalysts of the urban-spatial transformation we envision for Wan-hua.

Conclusion

Our rethinking of Taipei's urban renewal plan regarding Wan-hua begins with the more profound conception of *"cultural memory" that Wan-hua can trigger, and its role in sustaining Taipei's economic virility in the changing global context.* The emphasis, moreover, is put on establishing a milieu of indigenous social interactions. For collective memory is often communicated through the performance of different social activities in particular places.[8] The traditional social and economic context of Wan-hua, within which the collective memory can be rekindled, should be restored and reinvigorated by reinstating the traditional modes of production and exchange, and the traditional patterns of social interaction and ritual activities. New policy mechanisms and incentive strategies should be devised to secure and enhance the social and economic fabric upon which the desired historicity and cultural vitality is based.

Wan-hua, as a historic site of significance, is indeed at the forefront for planners in Taiwan to deal seriously with the issues of cultural heritage, and to rework the official narrative of development into a new lesson of urban cultural politics. In this new lesson, we envision a genuine multi-cultural cosmopolitanism for the future of the global society in which each member, while actively participates in global relationships, retains its own cultural memory and manifest its own uniqueness. It is intended to achieve an authentic globalization of cultural diversity by reintroducing into the world of the distinctive voices from the earlier forms of urban settlement. It means that each member in the world community can in its own way help reveal societies globally of their complex heterogeneity and their distinctiveness.

Notes

[1] The Bureau of Urban Development of Taipei City, *The Rebirth of Meng-ga: Urban Renewal Plan of the Wan-hua District*, BUDTC 1997.

[2] Late capitalism or global capitalism are terms coined by David Harvey and Fredric Jameson, among others, to describe a new phase in the development of capitalism which gives birth to the ascending postmodern culture. See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford, 1989), and Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *New Left Review* 146 (July/Aug. 1984): 53-92.

[3] Harvey, op. cit., 158.

[4] Fredric Jameson adopted the phrase "a perpetual present" to describe modern men's schizophrenic comprehension of time. See "Postmodernism and The Consumer Society," in *Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, ed., Hal Foster (Seattle, Wa.: Bay Press, 1983), 119.

[5] See Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 37-43.

[6] Doreen Massey, "Power Geometry and A Progressive Sense of Place," in *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change*, eds., J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson, L. Tickner (London: Routledge, 1993), 66.

[7] Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1983), 79.

[8] David Middleton and Derek Edwards, eds., *Collective Remembering* (London: Sage, 1990), 24-32.

12 THE URBAN PALIMPSEST: THE TRANSFORMATION OF BANGKOK AND ITS PALACES DURING THE COLONIAL ERA

Pirasri Povatong

Introduction

We seek an understanding of cities, and the role they play in the evolution of cultures and civilizations, by looking within them, searching for patterns, asking questions about the growth and decline of cities, the forms into which they grow, and the effect of these forms upon urban culture and life. Although it is only partial in the understanding of the city, the bulk of the material of the urban form is enormously rich (Summerson 1963: 166). Traditionally, architectural history mainly concerned itself with "high architecture", as expressed in great civic buildings (Ackerman 1980: 72), thus the total building output of the city, the entire system of built form, was not properly understood. Similarly, urban history traditionally concerned itself with the urban heritage of the major world civilizations, such as India or China. The urban forms of the lesser world cultures, such as Southeast Asian cities, are largely unseen and unstudied (O'Connor 1983: 114). Despite the fact that the geographical location between the major world cultures has left this region with a rich and diverse texture of urban forms, it was traditionally accepted that "South-East Asia in general does not have a strong urban tradition" when compared to East or South Asia (Yeung and Lo 1976: xvii).

This study argues that there certainly was a local language of urban form which has evolved, palimpsest-like, through history. The early urban scape has left impressions which remain and shape succeeding built forms of varying styles. Unfortunately, nowadays that language seems to be poorly understood, within the contemporary climate of globalization. The palimpsest is on the verge of being discarded, as Paul Ricoeur describes: "Thus we come to the crucial problem confronting nations just rising from underdevelopment. In order to get on to the road toward modernization, is it necessary to jettison the old cultural past which has been the *raison d'être* of a nation?" (Ricoeur, 1965: 277). Instead, the heritage of urban form should be carefully read and interpreted, in order to create a firm standing point for a city capable of consciously interfacing with the forthcoming global changes.

In order to navigate through the rich texture of Bangkok's urban palimpsest, a theory of Southeast Asian urbanism postulated by Richard O'Connor (1983) is taken by this study. According to that theory, there are two concepts that are common to most Southeast Asian urbanism, *internal essence* and *external paradigm* (O'Connor, 1983: 11). *Internal essence* is the sphere of social and cultural cohesion, deeply-rooted in ethnic kinship and tradition. It is the intrinsic essence of the society that saturates in all levels of life, starting from a single house, to a city. It is what holds the city together, maintaining the stability and continuity of urban life.

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On the contrary, *external paradigm* is the way by which the elements of the community are arranged. Three sets of paradigm have been adopted consecutively in Southeast Asia: the Indic, the Colonial, and the Modern. "Today that world is modern, so everyone is ranked in a paradigm of modernity. Earlier, when the outside world was Indic, an Indic idiom defined the social hierarchy and its institutions of king, court, and social ranking"(O'Connor, 1983: 11-13).

The palimpsest-like urban form is a result of the dialectic interaction between internal essence and external paradigm, the latter being the stylistic and technological changes brought by the world outside. The interaction between the recurring themes and the contrasting variations of urban form is of interest here. The recurring themes thus represent the internal essence of urbanism, while the variations reflect the ever-shifting paradigm.

A major part of this study involves the systematic deconstruction of an urban fabric in terms of its constituent parts. As stated earlier, this study perceives the *typology* of the palace compound as a microcosm of the surrounding urban *morphology*. Formal and spatial elements of the palaces are here abbreviated into a typology that represents both the palace and the city. Furthermore, readings of city maps and images are also conducted, in order to validate the postulated urban typology.

The City and the Palaces

Bangkok was founded in 1782, fifteen years after the fall of the ancient Thai capital at Ayutthaya. The city was surrounded by water: the river to the west, and two parallel moats to the east, which formed a great system of urban armature that sustained all sorts of public activities, including transportation, commerce and defense (Suksri 1996:16-17). Palaces and temples were also constructed along these major waterways, forming neighborhood centers for the surrounding urban fabric that supported the population of 20,000 (Nagavatchara 1985: 71-72). The Grand Palace, the king's principal residence, was also the administrative center of the capital. Its urban supremacy was expressed through its commanding location and magnificent architecture. Covering an area of 61 acres, the Grand Palace was the epitome of an urban center (Fig. 1). The palace is divided into four parts: the Outer Court, the Central Court, the Inner Court, and the Palatine Temple (Kalyanamitr, 1982: 328-331).

The north side of the palace compound contained the Temple and the Outer Court. The latter part included the public buildings such as the law court, the royal treasury, and the garrison. Two ceremonial ways lead from the Outer Court to the most important area of the palace, the Central Court, which contained the throne hall, and the king's residence. To the south of that was the Inner Court, the domain of the royal consorts and their children, the living quarters for the female courtiers, guardswomen, and servants.

Apart from the Grand Palace, smaller palaces were also built for members of the royal family. Building a palace compound was a major urban development strategy, as the city expanded into several directions over time. In the mid-nineteenth century, for instance, Bangkok fully expanded to its wall, so the king ordered a new moat dug further east. While the city almost doubled in size, princely palaces were built for the king's sons along the new moat, thereby giving direction to the city's future expansion in that way, and the extended area soon became populated.

Almost a century after the construction of the Grand Palace, Bangkok had expanded under the mounting pressure of Colonialism in the nineteenth century. After his return from a visit to Europe in 1897, King Rama V decided to built a summer palace on the outskirts of Bangkok, four kilometers to the north of the Grand Palace. In 1902, rice fields were purchased and transformed into a palace compound (Suksri, 1996: 195-196). Avenues, bridges, canals, and other infrastructures were also constructed, accommodating the subsequent development in the area. The results of this building program still resonate to this day in the configuration of Bangkok. The palace compound itself was in fact a showcase of the newly-acquired Colonial paradigm, imposed upon the traditional palace type, transforming it into a model for all urban developments around the country (Fig. 2).

Like the Grand Palace, the Dusit Palace consisted of three courts and a Palatine Temple. The Outer Court here was located at the eastern part of the compound. Its main entrance opened to the majestic throne hall, a domed structure in the Italian Renaissance style. To the west of the Outer Court was the Central Court, which contained the king's residences. The Inner Court of the Dusit Palace was located to the west of the Central Court, separated from other parts by two canals. The large area was one of the first Western-style housing developments in the country. It had villas and apartments for the female courtiers, all linked together by lakeside rambling paths.

Architectural Typology

Both palaces embodied a large number of buildings for various palatial functions. The common impression of a palace compound, as reflected by travelers' writings, is that of profuse splendor. In this study, however, a palace compound is considered to be more than just a spectacle of Thai architecture. Like a palimpsest, it is perceived as a microurbanism which summarizes how the city had maintained its identity through the time of rapid transformation. Adaptations for survival are noticeable in both the typology of architectural forms, and in the planning principles that held these forms together.

The architectural typology of the Grand Palace was conceived from the social arrangement which put the king at the apex of the society, justified by Indic symbols of power. In case of the Dusit Palace, here was Bangkok's first encounter with the Colonial paradigm in full force. European architects,

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

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

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

1g

Figure 1 The Grand Palace.

a Aerial view, looking south.
b Throne Hall.
c The king's residence.
d The Inner Court.
e Plan.
f Figure and ground.
g Geometry.

2a

2b

2c

2d



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

2g

Figure 2 The Dusit Palace

a Aerial view, looking noth
b Throne Hall
c The king's residence
d The Inner Court
e Plan
f Figure and ground
g Geometry

engineers, and gardeners were asked to replicate the grandeur that the king experienced on his journey through the European courts (Tiptus 1992: 17-18). Most dramatic was the change in the architectural typology, as the palatial functions remained basically Thai, but the form and space were attired in all sorts of European fashion of the new paradigm. Three examples of building types are chosen here to illustrate that *paradigm* change.

The first example is the throne hall (Fig. 1b, Fig. 2b). In the Grand Palace, the concept of divine kingship was made visible through the multi-tiered pyramidal spire, which represents Mount Meru, the Indic center of the universe. Inside was the throne, also shaped as Mount Meru in miniature, surrounded by images of deities and mythical animals (Jumsai 1988: 131-132). A hundred years later, the main throne hall of the Dusit Palace was built "...in the style of Italian Renaissance, and was generally considered to be the finest piece of this style east of Suez"(Seidenfaden, 1932: 252). The spire, the Indic model of Mount Meru, was here replaced by the dome, a Western model of heaven. The royal throne under the dome, however, was still executed in the traditional Thai style, complete with all Indic symbols of heaven and power.

Another example is the king's residence (Fig. 1c, 2c). In the Grand Palace, the king's residence was built in the traditional Thai style. The symmetrical, one-story floor plan was covered with tiers of gable roof, polychrome glazed tiles, and gilded gable decoration, all of which clearly manifested the king's sovereignty. In case of the Dusit Palace, the traditional multi-tiered gable roof gave way to new kinds of roof forms: hip, octagonal, mansard, vaulted, to name but a few. Especially in the king's residence, multiple roof forms were incorporated together, covering the complicated floor plan. The king's octagonal bedchamber was placed at the top floor, an attempt to express his majesty's supremacy in the new architectural typology.

The last example here, is the mansions of the Inner Court (Fig. 1d, 2d). Due to the limited space of the Grand Palace, its Inner Court mansions were tightly arranged on uniform blocks. Originally, the mansions were typical groups of wooden Thai houses, each a cluster of two to four buildings around a central courtyard, all raised on stilts. Later, due to overcrowding, these mansions were replaced by multi-story masonry mansions, occupying the same blocks (Suksri, 1996: 216). In the Dusit Palace, instead of either traditional Thai houses or dense building blocks, scattered villas were built for members of the Inner Court. This new forms of housing was a far cry from the crowded mansion blocks of the previous generation. It is exactly a predisposition of the transformation of Bangkok's residential area during the late nineteenth century, as the city was greatly changed by all sorts of modernization, especially the introduction of the automobile. The colonial paradigm had brought more than mere stylistic changes by then, bringing also the garden city ideas, together with new building materials and techniques. The indigenous urban form which was densely based on water soon became obsolete.

Formal Composition

These stylistic and technological changes may seem to be profound, but in fact the essential concepts were safely transferred from one palace to another, from one generation to the next. The reading of the essential compositional rules that hold these architectural forms together shows that, despite the obviously different forms, the Dusit Palace still managed to maintain many of the Grand Palace's planning principles. Some obsolete notions were discarded, while new ones were adopted.

At first glance, the organization of forms and spaces of the Grand Palace seemed almost chaotic. In fact, there were some underlying rules of composition that reflected city structure outside the palace wall. First, buildings and spaces were subdivided into autonomous complexes, each with its own set of rules, some sort of axial or gridiron structure (Fig. 1g). The orientation of these autonomous complexes was subject to topography, visual harmony, and palatial functions, not to any rigid geometric order. Regularity and symmetry was kept within each complex, while the juxtaposition of these complexes led to the "organic" character.

In comparison, the organization of space and forms of the Dusit Palace may seem to be diametrically opposed to that of the Grand Palace. Upon closer scrutiny, however, one found that the palace still maintained the essential structures of the ancient palace typology. The major difference was the axial orthogonality of each group of buildings. Unlike the varied orientations of the building complexes of the Grand Palace, all parts of the Dusit Palace are parallel with one another (Fig. 2g). The groups of buildings, however, remained autonomous, set amidst the lush landscape.

Apart from that, the compound was still divided into three courts, each with relative autonomy. An orthogonal street system was used as a matrix for the arrangement of these building complexes, enhancing the visual regularity of the landscape. The placement of the complexes, however, was not absolutely regular. The "organic" character from the Grand Palace survived, in a downplayed manner. Equally significant, was the change in the formal and spatial relationship. The Grand Palace had a dense urban fabric interrupted by spaces, while the forms of Dusit Palace were placed as objects on empty ground. This latter characteristic was almost modern in nature, a predisposition of the coming paradigm.

Urban Transportation

Reflecting these changes in forms and planning principles of the two palaces, was the city of Bangkok itself. The ground of the city was not and could never be erased completely for the stylistic and technological changes brought by the Colonial era. Unlike its contemporaries, Bangkok was not a *tabula rasa* when Colonialism was engulfing the region in the nineteenth century. By the time the foundation of the Dusit



Figure 3 Urban Transformation

a Bangkok 1854
b Bangkok 1927



Figure 4 Urban representation.

a City scene, 19th century mural painting. Wat Suthatthepwararam, Bangkok
b *Aerial view of Bangkok*, early 20th century

Palace was laid, the city was more than a century old, probably at its prime as a manifestation of Thai urban tradition. The seemingly dramatic changes in the latter half of the nineteenth century were in fact gradual integration of progress into the existing urban pattern.

A reading of two maps of Bangkok is conducted here to demonstrate such an incorporation (Fig. 3). The first map, drawn by a French missionary in the early days of Colonial influence (Pallegoix 1854), stylistically shows the indigenous city on the river, its urban fabric criss-crossed by extensive canal system. These canals were not only the major urban armature for movement and transportation, they also generated the "organic" character of the city, with their spidery lines and curves. The areas inaccessible by water were linked by a secondary system of dirt roads or brick-paved footpaths (Suksri 1996: 17), their configuration determined by the surrounding waterways. The map also shows the major structures of the city: palaces and temples, scattered along the main routes. Each with some sort of orthogonal or axial structure, these building complexes were distinctly rendered against the backdrop of the densely organic urban fabric.

The second map shows the city fully expanded in 1927, two decades after the Dusit Palace was constructed (Credner 1935). Waterways began to lose their importance as the city's arteries, as land-based transportation was greatly developed. Automobiles, trains and streetcars had brought new configurations to the city, driven by their unprecedented speed and scale. While wide straight streets and boulevards were cut through the city, the European concepts of perspective and Cartesian geometry were incorporated into the Thai mind. The map also shows the expansion of the street system to the east, linking the old city with the new business districts and port down the river, while the flatland outside the old city wall to the north was developed around the Dusit Palace. The subsequent urban densification led to the rotated patches of grid patterns of the city, following the curves of the river. The palimpsest of Bangkok had expanded, combining its *genius loci* with the new progress.

Apart from these cartographic representations, the same urban transformation was also reflected in other kinds of urban representation. The traditional urban structure, with the autonomous complexes of palaces and temples set against the organic urban backdrop, was reflected in Thai art as well. Traditionally Thai painting made no attempt at depicting any real sense of depth or distance, thus the city and architectural setting is flatly drawn in isometric perspective (Fig. 4a). Similar to the way the groups of buildings in the Grand Palace were placed together such that "each volume is suggested separately, so that each architectural feature (is) represented in its own perspective, usually with no thought of unifying the various view-points and, of course, with no single vanishing point" (Boisselier 1976: 64).

Not until the second half of the nineteenth century, when the new streets were cut, did the notions which had until then been traditional begin to change. In Thai art, new subject matters were included, together with the adoption of the European law of perspective, and a system of tonal gradation to suggest volume and depth of field (Boisselier 1976: 54). The new urban form marked its presence in Thai mural paintings as well as in the real city outside. One can feel the conflicted emotions in the paintings: the subject matters called on the past, as if to fix it in memory, while the new forms and techniques, emblems of progress, look toward the future.

These changes in urban imagery came to the culmination with the new medium: photography (Fig. 4b). Unlike the stylized, poetic depictions of the city in the traditional paintings, engravings and photographs of the real Bangkok were mechanically produced and disseminated, spurring parallel transformations in cities throughout the kingdom.

Conclusion

The study has tried to describe the palimpsest-like transformation of the city of Bangkok, as manifested in the actual forms of the city, in its microcosm of palace compounds, and in its representation in art.

The similarities and differences of the two palaces suggest that there were some intrinsic essence that had been transferred from one era to the other. The subdivision of the organic urban fabric into districts centered by building complexes of public institutions, the multiple orientation of street grids in relation with the topography, particularly the water's edge, were some of the most common urban concepts encountered in Bangkok. Another significantly durable concept was the materialization of the social structure through built forms. Despite the stylistic or technological changes, the Dusit Palace compound was still zoned into three courts, according to the ancient palace planning principle. The Italian Renaissance-styled throne hall was still a model of heaven, similar in meaning to the spires of the ancient palace in Ayutthaya, built half a millennium earlier.

The transformation from the Indic paradigm to the colonial one was clearly inevitable. These palace compounds exhibited several coping mechanisms or strategies of change to facilitate the process. Unlike many other countries, Thailand was fortunate enough to remain independent through the age of Colonialism. Consequently, the adaptation to the new paradigm was consciously undertaken. By being selective, adaptive, and flexible, the essence of urbanism was transferred from one generation to another. Unavoidable damages and losses were also kept at a minimum.

The city of Bangkok has changed dramatically since the completion of the Dusit Palace. Similarly changed are the society and culture. After the coup of 1932, which started in front of the Dusit Palace, the absolute monarchy became constitutional. The democratic movement led the Colonial paradigm to its demise, and brought Modernity into the scene as the next paradigm. Bangkok has been transformed into a regional metropolis, shaped by global transactions, as demonstrated by the current economic crisis. Changes are inevitable, but it is challenging to maintain the intrinsic sense

of community, and other essence of urbanism, as our ancestors did.

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13 XIDAN STREET, BEIJING: READING AND WRITING URBAN CHANGE

Emel Yucekus
Tridib Banerjee

> "Thus we understand why spatial images play so important a role in the collective memory. The place a group occupies is not like a blackboard, where one may write and erase figures at will. No image of a blackboard can recall what was once written there. The board could not care less what has been written on it before, and new figures may be freely added. But place and group have each received the imprint of the other. Therefore every phase of the group can be translated into spatial terms, and its residence is but the juncture of all these terms. Each aspect, each detail, of this place has a meaning intelligent only to members of the group, for each portion of its space corresponds to various and different aspects of the structure and life of their society, at least of what is most stable in it."
>
> Maurice Halbawchs (1980), *The Collective Memory*, p. 130.

A city is also is not like a blackboard, we can argue, following Maurice Halbawchs (1980). Yet, many observers see the built environment of cities as a collection of writings that accumulates in time and space. Each building, each sign, each coat of paint represents an intent, an expression of commerce, an assertion of identity, a message in social communication. However, unlike a blackboard, which is meant to be erased and written repeatedly, the writings that constitute the physical city are much less impermanent. At the same time, we also recognize that change is inevitable, some decay is unavoidable, and renewal and rebuilding are inexorable. Thus, the question is always how much should change, at what rate, and what specifically should be preserved and maintained. Because it is through our collective memory of the city and our associations with our past, that our sense of continuity with the stable elements of the structure of society is preserved. It is against this memory that the inevitability of change is judged, and sometimes challenged. Indeed it is this memory that shapes our collective sense of risk and uncertainty.

All too often, however, we transform our cities willy-nilly, and treat them like blackboards. We erase entire blocks or districts of the city in the name of urban renewal, or modernization, or imperatives of development. Harvey Cox (1966) recalls the discussion about the disappearance of historic, albeit run-down, Scollay Square in the late sixties in the wake of the construction of Government Center in downtown Boston. "...certain planners contend," wrote Cox, "that Scollay Square simply does not exist anymore." He added, in irony: "Like the lost continent of Atlantis or that prehistoric dinosaur called the pterodactyl, it is simply gone." Like Halbawchs, Cox too argues about the visual continuity of spatial relationships in the city that represented organization of social relationship in space. He spoke eloquently of social

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and psychological significance of the loss of place in our everyday life. He further argued that the secularization of the western material culture had systematically divested space of sacral or symbolic values and had contributed to declining respect for place.

Thirty years later, Harvey Cox's reflections on the loss and change of the visual environment, which were triggered by urban renewal of American cities, are still relevant in the context of the urban development of third world cities of rapidly expanding economies. The scale and scope of the transformation of major Chinese cities, for example, is truly unprecedented. The imperatives of development in a global economy are far more irreverent than what Cox saw in the urban renewal of American cities thirty years ago. Global capital is much too impatient today, and it is reflected in the high discount rate and expectations of large returns on investment.

Development of course always involves change. To quote Hirschman (1988), development implies a "chain of disequilibria." In the urban context, it means discontinuity, disjunction, and dissolution. It is to be expected in transitional urbanism (Banerjee, 1992). In this paper we will examine the nature of disjunction in the proposed development of a historic shopping street in Beijing, a street located within the historic Ming and Qing dynasty walled city, immediately west of the Forbidden City. Today it is slated for major widening, from its present width of about 30 meters to a final width of 70 meters, and expected to accommodate some six million square feet of additional retail space. Our aim here is to interpret the timing, pace and scale of such massive and unprecedented urban change, and to situate it in the context of recent writings on comparative urbanism. We argue that such change might be analyzed in the metaphorical construct of the Faustian imperative of development as discussed by Marshall Berman (1982). Drawing from the familiar notion of the city as text, we argue that it is not just the reading but the writing of the text that is also critically important for urban designers and planners. What role do designers and planners play in writing the script of urban change?

The City As Text

The idea that city can be read as text grew out of early writings on urban semiotics and has recently become popular in a number of disciplines, such as sociology, art history, literature, and geography[1]. Surprisingly, in the field of planning we have been minimally aware of this possibility, although Lynch (1960) had emphasized "legibility" of the visual form of cities almost forty years ago[2]. Text, however, is but one of many metaphors (like tree, machine, organism, market, bazaar, and theater) that could help us understand the city[3]. It might help us to see the city in a different way, "a way that could not be imagined before the metaphor was used"[4]. It allows us to explore the deep meanings imbedded in the urban landscape, and to discover a variety of clues and messages about the social, political, economic, and cultural contexts within which the city is written and re-written. More importantly, the text metaphor acknowledges the complex, dynamic and interactive relationship between the authors and the audience[5]. Thus the city is constantly endowed with new meanings as people read this text in many different ways through their daily activities and experiences. This interpretation of the city helps planners and architects to be aware of the fact that the lines that they draw on a piece of paper become the defining text for people's daily lives. This calls for an increased sensitivity to the design of urban space.

In a way the city is a very unusual text form. Unlike conventional texts it is not portable. The observer must navigate through the space of the text, to be able to read it. Even that is not quite guaranteed, since the text may not have an obvious beginning or an end, and often one might find some critical lines and pages missing. In the earlier times when the city was a discrete, geographical, economic, political, and social unit, boundaries were well-defined, and the its text had a clear sequence. Today, there are more boundaries within the city than between the city and the rural space. In that sense, the city as physical text is not necessarily universally accessible. It may be risky or impossible to move through the text of the city, since access to many places within the city is restricted. There are barriers and controls. One may need a key, or have to pay a gate fee, or to be of right class or color (like gated communities or ghettos). In some instances, the access to the whole city may be restricted (like the ones in socialist economies, or Mecca to non-Muslims)[6].

Despite all these difficulties in reading the city as text, is it still possible to decide what the basic syntax of the city is? Of course there have been many attempts to decompose the city into basic building blocks that fill its space. Thus the built environment of the city has been disaggregated into dwellings, "buildings and monuments"[7], "streets, public spaces, districts, and city edges"[8]. Others have tried to deconstruct the city into its social elements—its citizens, ethnic groups, and communities.. Furthermore, one should also remember that the city not only can be read from its visual form, but also sensed through its palpable ambiance, even if invisible, as suggested by writings of Calvino (1972), Lynch (1960) and Raban (1977).

Reading the City

Like any other text, the city as text also has an audience, a real or imaginary group of persons who are acquainted, could be acquainted, or are meant to be acquainted with the city. The city is read daily by countless people at different times through sight, hearing, touch, taste or smell[9]. We read the city by simply living in it, interpreting it in infinitely varied ways. In that sense, there is no such a thing as "the city," but there are "cities" as Jonathan Raban would argue:

> "For better or worse, it (the city) invites you to remake it, to consolidate it into a shape you can live in. You, too, decide who you are, and the city will again assume a fixed

> form around you. Decide what it is, and your own identity will be revealed, like a position on a map fixed by triangulation. Cities, unlike villages and small towns, are plastic by nature. We mold them in our images; they, in turn, shape us by the resistance they offer when we try to impose our own personal form on them. In this sense, it seems to me that living in cities is an art, and we need the vocabulary of art, of style, to describe the peculiar relationship between man and material that exists in the continual creative play of urban living. The city as we imagine it, the soft city of illusion, myth, aspiration, nightmare, is as real, maybe more real, than the hard city one can locate on maps, in statistics, in monographs on urban sociology and demography and architecture."[10]

Our reading of the city is affected by a number of factors[11]; (1) the quality of the itinerary: i.e. the routine (journeys between place of work and of residence) versus the exceptional (shopping, walking around at random without having any preconditioned idea of where we want to go); (2) the variations which refer to our affective state: i.e. happy vs. unhappy; (3) those which refer to our material situation: i.e. man vs. female, child vs. adult, low income people vs. high income, pedestrians vs. motorists, and the like.

In the planning discipline, Kevin Lynch (1960) made one of the first, and certainly most influential investigations of reading the city through his studies of cognitive maps[12]. His aim, indeed, was to discover the image of the city its readers form through their interactions with the city. He was interested in increasing the legibility of the city. Lynch's analysis has stimulated subsequent research by behavioral geographers and environmental psychologists and has led to a better and more informed urban design. In recent years, however, his approach has been criticized for being limited to an understanding of the city at a "perceptual knowledge of physical form"[13]. Ledrut (1973), for example, sees his way of analysis as being no different from analyzing the behavior of animals in a maze: both are adopting to their environment[14]. It is now generally accepted that the city is not only perceived as Lynch argued, but it is also conceived by its residents on the basis of what they do there. In that sense, the city in which we actually live is socially produced and, therefore, is ideological in its content.

Writing the City

Some literary critics argue that the meaning of a text has more to do with its audience than with its author. Some go so far as to say that the meaning of a text has nothing to do with the author but is solely derived through its audience. Although any text can be read differently by different readers it cannot exist without original intentions and ascribed by its creators (its authors).

Unlike conventional texts that are written by identifiable authors at a particular time and place, however, the city is simultaneously written by anonymous and partial authors: by planners, architects, developers, politicians, economists, engineers, landscape architects, community groups, not to mention people who live in the city, its inhabitants. The authors of this anthology may never know each other and may live centuries apart. They do not usually cooperate in writing the collective text of the city. Yet, there is a partnership among these authors of the city. Every generation maintains some parts of the city text and erases some part of its inheritance. The final creation is a city text with many layers forming a "palimpsest,"[15] a composite landscape made up of different built forms superimposed upon each other with the passing of time[16].

On each layer of the city palimpsest inscribed are the natural, political, socio-cultural, and economic life (context) of the city at the time the layer was produced (which are always unfixed, contested, and multiple)[17]. As Italo Calvino put it nicely about Zaira (city of high bastions);

> "The city... does not tell its past, but contains it like the lines of a hand, written in the corners of the streets, the gratings of the windows, the banisters of the steps, the antennae of the lightning rods, the poles of the flags, every segment marked in turn with scratches, indentations, scrolls."[18]

It is the writing of the text of this contemporary city that we turn to in the following text. We recognize that much has been written in recent years about the city as text and how to read such text. As noted previously, some of this literature has been triggered by semiotics of space, and the notion of city as sign. Others are written as post-modern and post-colonial interpretation of city building of the past. But relatively little of this literature has been devoted to the writing of the city text in contemporary times, in the context of economic development and modernization. It is our intent here to examine the role of city planning and design in the context of capital accumulation, investment and stock formation in a new global economic order. What follows is a discussion of the planned transformation of a historic street in Beijing against the background of unprecedented transformation of the historic city induced by imperatives of modernization and economic development.

Xidan Street: A Historical Major Shopping Area in Beijing

Xidan has been a commercial street in Beijing since the seventeenth century. During the Ming (13th-17th Century) and Qing Dynasties (17th-20th Century), it was a major grid road connecting two of the historic city gates: Xuanwumen in the south (which was torn down during the socialist period) and Deshengmen in the north[19] (Figure 1). Today Xidan Street is one of the three major commercial areas in Beijing located to the west of the Forbidden City. The other two include Qianmen and Wangfujing. These three are not complementary to each other as far as the sorts of commodity and customer composition are concerned. Qianmen has been a commercial center off and on since the beginning of the fifteenth century[20].

Figure 1 Location of Xidan Street Development in the context of historic-walled cities of Beijing

Its entry is marked by the imposing, fifteenth century, double-arched Qianmen Gate just south of Tiananmen Square. Qianmen continues to function as a traditional commercial center, serving a large proportion of customers from Beijing's agricultural hinterland[21]. It is characterized by hundreds of shops, restaurants, refreshment rooms, theaters and inns that are arranged in a row along crowded narrow streets, typical of Chinese style commercial areas. Located east of the Forbidden city, Wangfujing on the other hand, is considered a modern, western style shopping area with several large department stores and many smaller retail shops lining the street. It houses some international brand names like Cerruti and Georgio Armani. It is close to the eastern part of the city, not too far from the diplomatic enclave in the Chaoyang district inhabited by expatriate population with a higher purchasing power. Its customers are mainly upper end shoppers consisting of Hong Kong and other overseas Chinese tourists. Compared to Qianmen and Xidan, the commercial functions of Wangfujing developed much later, only at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Figure 2 Xidan Market, a major department store

Today, Xidan is a shopping area with large department stores and many smaller strip commercial and restaurants[22]. Goods in different quality and grade are provided in the area. Big-box retail intermingles with local street markets linked by hutongs to centuries-old courtyard housing situated just east and west of the main spine. The three major shopping centers along this north-south corridor are the Xidan Market (Figure 2), Xidan Shopping Center and Xidan International Mansion. It draws its customers (mainly local people rather than tourists) from the suburbs in the west and north west of Beijing, and the West City proper where a large number of government agencies, research institutions and colleges, and many residential quarters (the residents of which enjoy high incomes) are located[23]. A new financial district is also located to the west of Xidan.

As a commercial area Xidan Street ranks after Wangfujing in respect to size (total operating space), total turnover and profit per operating space[24]. Qianmen follows these two. However, among the three major shopping areas of Beijing, the accessibility of Xidan is the highest because it holds the shortest distance to subway stops. On average, it is one of the major nodes in the urban road network of Beijing, and a number of bus and trolley lines meet at this crossroads. According to Wu-yang (1990) who carried out a central place theory analysis on Beijing's commercial network, this makes Xidan and its vicinity a candidate to become the CBD of Beijing in the near future while Wangfujing and Qianmen would be commercial centers of high rank (metropolitan centers).

In addition to three major commercial areas that serve as downtown centers for the entire city and attract large pools of non-resident customers, new commercial centers are being developed in Beijing[25]. These include specialized computer and electronics retail stores in northwestern Haidian district and the joint venture Lufthansa Center/ Landmark Towers area development in northeastern Chaoyang District. Haidian District has a high concentration of research and commercial enterprises associated with high technology. Chaoyang District, however, is the center of foreign embassies and diplomatic residences, foreign residential, social and retail establishments. Therefore, it is designated as the "Foreign - Influenced Area." The majority of its retail demand is foreign tourists, expatriates and embassy personnel. Besides these newly emerging commercial centers Beijing is dotted with hundreds of local commercial centers of varying scope and size.

Transformation of Beijing: Plans Versus Markets

Although the transformation of Beijing, and indeed that of China, is attributed to the nation's embrace of market economy in the mid-eighties, the seeds of the change were planted immediately after the end of Cultural Revolution in the late seventies. In the fourteen years since 1978 a total investment of 2.7 billion yuan (or $400 million) was directed to the

improvement of urban infrastructure, amounting to 21.2% of the city's total investment in fixed assets. Thus a total of over two billion was spent in the transformation of the urban form of Beijing between 1978 and 1992. By 1985 Beijing already had a total office space of 6.73 million square meters or about 70 million square feet. In another seven years, by 1992, it has increased to 9.5 million square meters or over 100 million square feet. By mid-nineties, the retail space in Beijing has grown to over 5 million square meters or about 55 million square feet. By 1992 the Beijing Land Administration Bureau has negotiated investment projects on 1369 hectares of land, involving about $371 million, more than half of which came in the form of foreign capital. As China's economy is growing at an astounding rate of 8-9% per year (12.4% since 1992, compared with the US average of 2.8%), both domestic capital formation and foreign investment are growing at a concomitant pace. For the economy as a whole, foreign investment accounts for more than 5% of gross domestic product.

Thus the text for transformation of Beijing is written by a combination of both state intervention and domestic and foreign capital. The emerging landscape is seemingly one of unbridled market economy that has helped raise living standards and create a new consumer culture. The question is: what role, if any, does city planning have in writing this text?

Municipality planners of Beijing of course would argue that they are trying their best to manage this transformation as reasonably as they can. The master plan of Beijing has several goals that attempt to protect the original text of the historic urban pattern. These include: protecting and developing the central axis of the city; retaining the line of the old city wall; protecting the net of rivers and lakes closely related to the evolution of the city; preserving the original "chessboard" pattern of the roads; assimilating the traditional grey dwellings of the city; maintaining height controls in the vicinity of the Forbidden City; protecting city vistas; protecting historic streetscapes; increasing number of city squares; protecting old trees, increasing green spaces, and so on. One might look at these goals as a way to write the organization of the text, and to establish the basic syntax of the language. And one could argue that some of these policies indeed have helped to maintain the historic urban pattern, only if visible from a satellite camera. But very little remains at the street level that makes the pattern apparent or visible with the exception of occasional gates or walls or temples or gardens. Some of the social memory, however, continues in the naming of the streets that maintains reference to outside or inside of the various gates of the old city wall, none of which exist today.

Rewriting Xidan

Like any other text, Xidan commercial area as text comes into existence by its authors, readers and contexts in which it is written and read. In this section, as a reader of Xidan's landscape, we look at the relationship between some of the authors of this urban text and the larger historical context of economic, political, and cultural change. What we decipher from this text is that although it was the Chinese history and traditions that produced the text of Xidan until very recently, today Xidan is being written to a great extent by the private investors and developers as well as by Chinese government officials. The intent of these new authors is to respond to the urgent needs of the emerging market economy in China in general and in Beijing in particular. Therefore, they are in search of an order, rationality, and efficiency, and they do seem to care more about the money and less about the environment.

Xidan Commercial Area constitutes only a small example to the recent obsession with growth in China in the form of increased real estate construction. According to the Beijing Municipal Planning Commission, for example, approximately 6 million square feet of retail development is planned and approved for Xidan, an amount far exceeding the total retail space in downtown Los Angeles. This number is quite high considering the fact that Xidan is only one of the three centers in Beijing where the commercial development will be speed up according to the Beijing Master Plan. Such amount of proposed construction makes one wonder if there is indeed a demand of such magnitude. Yet true to the spirit of market liberalism, the local planners are not about to question the validity of such assumptions, as long as investors are willing to bring the money. Signs of overbuilding and slow demand are becoming apparent today in many parts of Beijing, including the Xidan corridor. The construction of a massive mixed use complex at the prime corner of Wangfujing and Changan Street is on hold indefinitely, because of sudden drying up of foreign capital. Similarly another major office and retail complex that was constructed by clearing out the traditional shopping area along Xidan, now sits empty, waiting for capital and customers. The massive Junefield Plaza at the southern end of Xidan Street, has yet to find adequate financing—preferably foreign—to begin construction of the hotel tower, although the main office and retail complexes are near completion (Figure 3).

Figure 3 Junefield Plaza, a hotel-office complex under construction on Xidan Street, south of Fuxingmenwai Street

Impatient Capital and Tragedy of Development

Harvey (1985) argues that "the very existence of money as a mediator of community exchange radically transforms and fixes the meanings of space and time in social life and defines the limits and imposes necessities upon the shape and form of urbanization"[26]. Although this was not true for China for centuries, money has finally started to talk in Chinese urban landscapes. In better terms, it has started to write the Chinese city and push for changes in the style of buildings, in the use of urban land, and the form of urban areas. The skyline of today's Chinese city is highly in contrast with the Chinese imperial city as well as with the uniform gray horizons of the socialist city of the 1960s and 1970s.

The power of money on the Chinese urban landscape has become visible since 1979. This was the year when the government officially opened up China to world markets and foreign investments, and promoted economic and technical cooperation with other countries. In the 1980s, the dominance of central state planning was reduced, and a more market-led economy was permitted. In this new economy the majority of the production units are owned by the state officially, but managed according to free market principles.

In a time of high economic growth, combined with a number of reforms on land use rights, local government officials (one of the major authors of the urban text in China) have now started to realize the relative economic value of inner city sites, and make money for the local government through agreements, open bidding or auctions[27]. This has led to an enormous increase in the development of new office and commercial projects, upscale residential developments as well as infrastructure improvement projects in most Chinese cities.

Of course one would ask, "What is wrong with development?". Marshall Berman (1982) offers an answer by giving a fascinating allegory. According to Berman, Goethe's Faust is the first and still the best case of the tragedy of development. Faust in Goethe's writing first emerges as The Dreamer, then, through Mephisto's mediation transforms himself into The Lover, and finally, long after the trudge of love is over, he reaches his life's climax as The Developer[28]. Goethe's Faust, unlike its predecessors [i.e. Johann Spiess's Faustbuch (1587), and Christopher Marlowe's Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (1588)] wants for himself "a dynamic process that will include every mode of human experience, joy and misery alike, and that will assimilate them all into his self's unending growth; even the self's destruction will be an integral part of its development"[29]. Berman calls Faust "The Primal Growthman" and argues that he "would tear the whole world apart for the sale of insatiable expansion, without asking or caring what unlimited growth would do to nature or to man."[30] One interesting thing about Faust's trudge of development is that it is a trudge that "nobody wants to confront—neither advanced nor backward countries, neither capitalist nor socialist ideologies—but that everybody continues to re-enact."[31]

Thus the global capital is not the only villain in this game. Capital's instinct is in making profit, not in development in the Faustian sense. The persona of Faust—the "primal growthman," as Berman suggests—is interestingly manifested in the form of the Chinese state. Even though the leadership and the ideology have changed, the primal urge for development and modernization have not. We should recall the circumstances of the disappearance of the old city wall. The gates and parts of the wall began to come down during the last years of the Qing dynasty, and during the Japanese control, the remaining segments of the wall and gates came down during the socialist era, as the "orders came down from the very top." Whether it was the Qing monarch, or the Japanese colonialist, or Mao Zhe Dong, or Deng Xio Ping, the text of the city has been written by the primal Faustian urge of development. Today most of the Third World States are preoccupied with the Faustian drive, aided and abetted by the World Bank and the global capital. Indeed, this is how this tragedy of development is played out not just on Xidan Street in Beijing, but throughout the developing world.

Notes

1 See, for example, Keith and Cross (1993), Savage (1995), Duncan (1990), Short (1996), Soja (1986) (1995), Dear (1998).

2 Not until very recently have there been some attempts to include literary theory in the planning discipline. Milroy (1980), Mandelbaum (1990), (1993), Tett and Wolfe (1991), Healey in Mandelbaum, Mazza and Burchell (eds.) (1996), Fischler (1995), for example, applied the conceptions of literary theory in order to understand the ways written texts of planning (planning documents) are produced and read.

3 In planning there has been an increasing interest in metaphors. See, for example, Verma (1993) and Sandercock (1995).

4 Rorty (1989): 16.

5 Etymologically, the term audience refers to a group of listeners, the meaning of which goes back to a time when the primary form of acquaintance with the work of an author was through spoken world. But here we refer to an audience as a group of readers.

6 In Chinese cities, for example, until very recently, migration was forbidden unless the interested party was specifically recruited, for a job or university study. To police this system, each household was listed a registration booklet (hukou bu) which listed the members of the household and their gender, age, marital status, class background, work unit, educational level, hometown, etc. The police had to be informed of any changes in the household. This system helped control the flow of migrants and stabilize the residential population in China for decades.

[7] Rossi (1994): p.5.

[8] Kostof (1992).

[9] Although according to some we live in a world of things seen, a world that is visual, seeing is not more important than the other senses in an empirical understanding of the city. As phenomenology emphasizes, the full ontological potential of human experience is important as far as the city is concerned. Accordingly, the city can be visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory, depending on how we perceive it.

[10] Raban (1974): 9-10.

[11] Fauque (1973) in Gottdeiner and Lagopoudolos (1986).

[12] Cadwallader (1996) and Gottdiener and Lagopoulos (1986) emphasize that there have been some early studies on reading the urban environment by Trowbridge (1913), Frey (1945), Tolman (1948), Wright (1947), Wahl and Strauss (1958).

[13] Gottdeiner and Lagopoudos (1986): 7.

[14] Faquoe (1973) in Gottdiener and Lagopoulos (1986).

[15] Harvey (1988).

[16] This, however, does not mean that we can unpack the layers in the city and explain one by one and interpret the past.

[17] Following Pierce, Barthes, and Eco, urban socio-semiotic approach has provided a useful tool for deciphering the layers of meaning hidden in the urban environment. According to this approach, semiotic systems are not produced by themselves but are rooted in non-semiotic processes of social, political, and economic practices/ context of society (material conditions of everyday life).

[18] Calvino (1972): 11.

[19] Xuanwumen was torn down during the socialist period while Deshengmen was kept since it was closer to the main north-south axis of Beijing.

[20] Traditionally, trade and commerce within the Chinese city were strictly regulated and restricted by officials within the markets which occupied discrete and very limited space within the city. Before the Ming dynasty, for example, the market in Beijing was only allowed in the northern part of the Forbidden city (in the area of the drum and bell towers). To the south were the administrative quarter, the ancestral temple to the east, and altar of grains and soils to the west. Although this tradition was followed during the Ming Dynasty, commercial activities were no longer confined to the northern part of the city alone. The location of the market had started to shift to the west of the imperial city. See Sit (1995): 246-247. Also, during the socialist period in China (in the 1950s and 1960s and during the years so called cultural Revolution), the development of Beijing's trade and service was quite slow.

[21] Gaubatz in Davis, Kraus, Naughton and Perry (eds.) (1995).

[22] Office and residential use is quite limited in Xidan.

[23] Only 30% of its customers are from other sites and regions. See Wu-yang (1990): 53.

[24] Wu-yang (1990).

[25] Retail market in Beijing has developed gradually over the past ten years, but it was only in the last three years has there been a profusion of western goods in the market. As living standards in China improve, so do the quality and variety of consumer products. Today many western products can be found at local corner shops. Some of the major retailers coming to Beijing include Lafayette, Theme, the GAP, the newest. Brand names already in Beijing are Christian Dior, Hugo Boss, Nautica, and a string of cosmetic lines such as Elizabeth Arden and Shisheido. See JLW (1997).

[26] Harvey (1985): 1.

[27] Before China's transition to market economy, land in cities belonging to the people (namely the state) could only be transferred by the state by taking the needs and norms into consideration. The land could not be sold or leased to individuals, foreign ventures, or domestic companies. Since 1988, however, all institutions and individuals have had a right to land use though they do not have a right to ownership of land.

[28] Berman (1982): 40-41.

[29] Berman (1982): 40.

[30] Berman (1982): 83.

[31] Berman (1982): 86.

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

Middle East

14 PRESERVING OLD NEIGHBORHOODS OF DAMASCUS, SYRIA

Riad G. Mahayni

Introduction

The urban form of Arabic-Islamic cities received much attention by Orientalists in the early part of this century. This interest rested on their belief that these cities are different from medieval Western cities and cities of other civilizations. The old organic urban form is gradually disappearing in favor of a more Western form where narrow and meandering streets are being torn up in favor of a transportation network that can support much higher densities. People who lived in old houses, with their shaded central court yards and water fountains, are moving to live in high-rise apartment buildings. The new urban form is not necessarily offering a better living environment. The spatial organization of old neighborhoods, with their associated mixture of land use hierarchies, is not being recreated in the new areas.

There are many reasons for this change. The rapid pace of urbanization in many of the Middle Eastern countries has created tremendous development pressures on their cities. As a result, they grew rapidly (Mahayni 1990). This growth was not matched by expansion of their public infrastructure and other needed urban facilities. In addition, changing life styles have generated new demands on housing. The extended family often resided in the same neighborhood. Married brothers, with their families, lived together and with their parents in old Damascene houses. Their house is usually surrounded by the houses of their cousins and other relatives. Neighborhoods were close-knit and often associated with familial ties. Many of these families are finding it necessary to move to separate dwelling units, and often to different neigh-borhoods.

In addition, urbanization pressures started to increase rapidly since World War II. These added pressures for housing and public infrastructure facilities were accommodated through infill development within the city, and with new subdivisions in the green-belt areas surrounding the city. The old Damascene house was not rebuilt in these areas and was replaced by a much higher density offered by high-rise apartment buildings.

Planners of the city faced a serious dilemma. On the one hand, they realized that old neighborhoods, and their historic structures, are being torn down in favor of the much more dense infill development called for by previous city plans, and that by pursuing this approach they were destroying a cultural heritage that will be very hard to replace in the future. On the other hand, development pressures and economic realities of the time were forcing them to go to much more dense developments in order to meet the increasing demand for housing. Thus, housing shortages, overcrowding , traffic congestion, pollution, among many other urban problems,

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started to emerge at alarming rates (El-Shakhs and Amirahmadi 1993).

This crisis has led many local urban planners and architects to search for resolutions to these problems through studying the past achievements of these cities. Many of them started to value the need of **adapting**, rather than **adopting**, the turn-of-the-century physical planning approaches of the West in dealing with the development of their cities, and realized that socio-economic, physio-geographic and cultural factors have to be integrated in their design. Cities are the product of their times. Past achievements do not offer any guarantees for success today. Nevertheless, old neighborhoods in these cities are disappearing, and their heritage deserves further study before they are lost forever.

Orientalists

The Marcais brothers (1928, 1945) are often cited as two of the earliest Orientalist researchers to describe the characteristics of Arabic-Islamic cities. Based on their studies of cities in the Maghreb, North Africa, they argued that Islam is an urban religion, and that Islamic cities were founded by new powers and caliphs. Their urban form consisted of Jami (mosque) with a close-by Suq (market/bazaar) and Hammam (public bath). George Marcais (1945) agreed with his brother William that Islam is an urban religion, and that a Friday mosque is a must for a city to be considered "Islamic." He added that there are other qualities to Islamic cities: separation of residential areas from markets, the organization of neighborhoods according to ethnic or religious groups, and the presence of a hierarchy of markets where the "clean" ones are located closer to the mosque.

Another French Orientalist, Jean Sauvaget, (1941, 1949) focused his attention on the cities of Damascus and Aleppo, Syria. He discovered that these cities had a geometric design which disintegrated later during the Byzantine Empire. He also noted the presence of a linear market, a Friday mosque, and a central square that connects to meandering alleyways which lead to other commercial or residential areas.

The work of Gustave Von Grunebaum (1955) on Islam in general, and Arabic-Islamic cities in particular, received much attention by many scholars. He attempted to integrate the works of the earlier French Orientalists. He indicated that the Friday mosque is usually located at the intersection of major thoroughfares, and reiterated the presence of ethnic separation of residential areas cited earlier by the Marcais brothers. He also noted the lack of civic city-wide municipal organizations.

Von Grunebaum was severely criticized by Abu-Lughod (1987), AlSayyad (1991), and Said (1978). Abu-Lughod (1987) was critical. She noted that he depended on previous research without any critical evaluation of it, and she argued that much of the earlier works by Orientalists on Arabic-Islamic cities present a "model of products rather than processes." Said (1979: 299) was even more critical. He accused him of triviality and of having the "us" and "them" mentality, and he described his understanding of Islam as that of "the earlier European Orientalists—monolithic, scornful of ordinary human experience, gross, reductive, unchanging."

Much of the above literature on Arabic-Islamic cities suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, there is no consensus on what we mean by an Islamic city? Does the term "Islamic," the way it is used in the literature, convey the same meaning as when it is used in, for example, "Islamic Sharia" (Islamic jurisprudence) where it has a definite meaning? Some argue that most Islamic cities were inherited from earlier civilizations, and that the Islamic World is not a monolithic world. Yet, at the same time, they admit that Islam has influenced the urban form of these cities. Second, much of the emphasis in this literature is on the physical form and the spatial organization of these cities where, mostly, only highly aggregated central city functions are considered. Cities, however, are complex systems of interacting socio-economic, political, religious, cultural as well as legal processes. The interactions among these processes are reflected in the physical form.

Third, this highly aggregated approach ignores linkages among the various districts within a city, or interactions within the district itself. Cities are made of neighborhoods and districts, and their associated different land-use hierarchies. Their spatial organization give these cities their urban form. Residential districts, for example, have their own hierarchies of mosques, markets, and other activities. They interact with each other and with other activities in other districts. Finally, much of this literature is based on specific case studies of a particular city or region in the Islamic world, and the results of these studies are generalized to other Islamic cities.

The above criticism attracted a new wave of interest in the latter part of this century where socio-economic-political, anthropological, and legal studies were attempting to gain better understanding of Arabic-Islamic cities. Examples of such studies are the ones made by Lapidus (1967, 1969, 1973) on the cities of Damascus and Aleppo during the Mamluk dynasty. Lapidus did not consider cities as artifacts. Rather, he focused his attention on the interactions among residential and commercial areas. Hourani and Stern (1970) also investigated social relations and how these relations are influenced by a hierarchical structure stretching from the local to the universal. Besim Hakim's classic study (1986) was more on the legal aspects of the urban form of these cities, and he documented how Islamic legislation impacted them. He argued that this legislative approach was one of the primary reasons for the urban form of these cities.

Hameed (1991) argues that there is another wave of new literature calling for the need to return to the original sources of Islam for an understanding of the design of these cities. Khalidi (1984), for example, questions the wisdom of considering Islam as an urban religion. He uses the Q'uran and Hadith (the sayings of the prophet) to document his point. Haider (1984) proposes that in order to understand the structure of Islamic cities one has to look at them as moral

communities where responsibility, justice, purpose, cultivation of nature, knowledge and creativity are keys to their existence.

The above suggests that an understanding of what makes a city "Islamic" has not remained constant over time, and that the concept, as a concept, is still evolving. Scholarship in this area is becoming increasingly more interdisciplinary, and the focus is no more only on the physical environment, but, in addition, on the institutions and their interactions as they manifest themselves in this environment.

The Old Neighborhoods of Damascus

Damascus is one of the oldest continually inhabited cities of the world. It goes back more than 6000 years, and parts of the old wall of the city is still standing. Damascus was always an important city in the region, and has always served as one of its major urban centers. It was the capital of the Ommayad dynasty for more than a century and a half. Many of the old neighborhoods of Damascus survived over the centuries despite the suffering they experienced through many invasions and occupations by foreign powers as early as the days of Alexander the Great and as late as the days of the French occupation till the mid-forties.

Safouh Khier (1982) notes that the physical make-up of the old city was influenced by a variety of factors that go beyond its topography. He indicates that security reasons have played an important role in generating its urban form. In addition to the wall surrounding the city, with its seven gates, each district inside the wall had its own physical characteristics that distinguished it from other districts in the city. Some neighborhoods had what resembles a cul-de-sac where members of extended families, or families that share a village origin or belief, live in different houses in this cul-de-sac and are able to lock the gate at its entrance at night for extra security.

Security was even more of a concern in the districts which started to emerge outside the wall. The shape of the meandering streets' form is often explained in terms of the need for security. Having a specific address is relatively a recent phenomenon, and one had to know exactly the location he intends to visit. Strangers in the neighborhood are easily recognized. Many of the houses did not have outside windows in the first floor which open to the alleyways. Those houses that have such windows cover them with iron rods and wooden shutters for both security and privacy reasons. Most houses, and especially those of the well-to-do families, compensate for the narrowness of this street pattern by having larger houses with open court yards and water fountains, and they landscape it with local plants and citrus trees. Alleyways often terminate into squares where local mosques and markets locate.

Environmental factors also played a major role in the design of these neighborhood. Some would argue that these old urban forms are more sensitive to the local environmental conditions than the new ones (Olabi 1982). Temperature in Damascus can get, for example, to more than 100 Fahrenheit degrees in the summer. Yet, pedestrians walking in the alleyways will not be exposed directly to the sun. The walls on either side of the alleyway are two stories high, and they often shade it from direct exposure to the sun. These alleyways were also designed with due respect to air movements and currents. They tend to be much cooler than other areas in the summer.

Mosques served as a spatially organizing factor in shaping the urban form of the old neighborhoods. In addition to their religious function, mosques also served an educational function in their neighborhoods (Allaf 1983). The hierarchy of mosques is not that much different from the hierarchy of a school system introduced much later by Perry earlier in this century. The local neighborhood mosque is the smallest, and it is used for all prayers except the Friday noon prayer. The Jima (Friday) mosque tends to be larger and serves a district. The Eid mosque is the largest one, aside from the city-wide mosque, and most zones of the city tend to have more than one Jima or Eid mosque depending on their size.

Markets are also associated spatially with mosques and tend to locate close to them. They have their own hierarchy, and their threshold and range are a function of the area they serve (Shihabi 1990). Again, you have here the local neighborhood markets where convenience shopping is made, and these markets are spread all over the district. Larger markets tend to locate on arterial streets and closer to Eid mosques. They offer a variety of goods and services to the district. Local markets locate, in addition to the arterial street, in open squares spread around in the various neighborhoods of the district. Some zones also have specialized city-wide markets. The district of Midan, for example, served for a long time as the central grain market for Damascus (Khier 1982). Grain merchants located their offices and warehouses along its major arterial.

Various areas within different districts and zones in old Damascus are associated with ethnic or religious groups or with familial or tribal associations. A strong communal sense is quite prevalent in many of them. These socio-cultural factors influenced where people live, and affected their integration within the community. There is a district in Damascus, for example, named the Kurdish district. The majority of the residents of this district are from Kurdish origin. There is another district, Kassa, where the majority of the people in it are Christians. You will also find members of large extended families locating close to each other within a neighborhood. The neighborhood becomes known and associated with the name of the family. This is not the case anymore. Old cohesion of these neighborhoods is disappearing, and families are moving to newer developments.

M. Ecochard is a well known name to many residents of Damascus. He is the French architect/planner who worked on the 1937 plan and returned in 1963 to formulate another plan for the city. The first plan was, to a large extent, a city beautiful type of a plan except for not allocating enough green space and parks. Emphasis was on establishing a modern transportation network to serve the ever increasing number of automobiles in the city. Damascus was always known for

being surrounded by orchards and green fields. The first plan called for re-designing old established neighborhoods and starting new residential subdivisions by invading these orchards and fields.

A new street system was planned for the old neighborhoods. The plans were made as if the existing neighborhoods did not exist, and that one was planning for raw land, except for preserving some old historic structures. These plans established new real estate economic realities where demand for land was much higher than the available supply . Land became much more expensive, and no incentives were offered to maintain existing old neighborhoods or structures. As the development process started to accelerate, the process of transformation intensified. Old neighborhoods are not old anymore. They became a mixture of old and new as apartment buildings started to replace old houses. The local government became more aggressive, and started to give notices to residents in certain areas to vacate their houses during a specific period to initiate new development. Others responded to housing shortages by tearing their houses down and building new apartment buildings as the new plan allowed. This process of transformation has been taking place for decades, and it is expected to continue for many more.

In addition to the infill development the 1937 and 1963 plans called for new subdivision developments around the edges of the city. Al-Zahera district was developed east of and parallel to the Midan district. The Mezza district, south west of Damascus and outside it, was also developed. It started as a residential area for families with limited income, and mushroomed into a major suburb which was annexed to Damascus later. Similar developments were also initiated in Barzeh, Khafersousa, and Dummer, nearby small towns sharing borders with Damascus. Both Barzeh and Khafersousa were also annexed to Damascus.

Many of the above developments took place in fragmented ways. They were designed as residential developments by themselves with little regards to the overall development of other needed land uses or basic urban infrastructure. The comprehensive plan of 1963 is currently being updated as a result of discovering the numerous shortcomings of this fragmented approach.

The Case of Midan

Midan is one of the largest districts of Damascus. It is located on the southern parts of the city, and it grew over the years in a linear fashion extending for about three kilometers from the central area of Damascus along a twenty meters arterial street. It is the only linear district in the old city. Small farms and orchards used to surround it in the early part of this century. The neighborhoods of the district stretch from either side of the arterial for about one kilometer. Midan originally started as a suburb to Damascus during the early days of the Ottoman Empire outside the walled part of the city. It is more than a thousand years old.

Many of its original residents are migrants, and its rise is often explained by two major reasons. First, by being the southern entryway to the city, residents of Midan have always had strong relations with the farmers of the southern part of the country. Many of its residents trace their roots to this part of Syria. Farmers brought their grain to the city, and sold it to the grain merchants of Midan. The urban-rural linkages of this district were the strongest in Damascus, and they were not replicated in any other district of the city. This linkage influenced the type of economic activities that take place in the district. Most of the grain merchants in the city are located in this district, and a number of rural-related activities serving rural visitors dotted its arterial street. In addition, the district housed some central city-wide rural-related markets such as the farm animal markets and the major slaughterhouse serving the city.

The second reason also relates to its location being the southern entryway to the city. Pilgrimage caravans to the holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, with pilgrims from Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, as well as some other pilgrims from other Muslim Asian countries, used to gather in Midan and start their trip to Mecca from the district annually. This special function gave Midan prestige, and with it came the responsibility of being a good host. The district used to get transformed during the pilgrimage season twice: when the trip is initiated to Mecca, and when the pilgrims returned from Mecca. This function started to disappear a few decades ago with the introduction of new transportation modes.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of mosques in Midan around the turn of the century. All of these mosques still exist today, and they are protected as historic landmarks. A number of small, local, mosques have disappeared over the years and very little is known about them (Olabi 1982). Mosques served as the focal point of their neighborhoods and districts. Residents in the areas surrounding them, although free to pray at any mosque, frequent their mosque regularly and they tend to pray in the same mosque most of the time. Jima and Eid mosques also served during that time an educational function. Kids received special instruc-tions on how to read and write, and regular specialized religious classes were usually offered every day.

The markets that existed in Midan around the turn of the century still exist today. Their distribution at the time is shown in Figure 2. Most of the markets, aside from the small neighborhood ones, are located on the major arterial street, and in close proximity to Jima or Eid mosques as illustrated in Figure 3. Local markets tend to be closer to neighborhoods and they locate in squares which connect the alleyways to each other. These markets concentrate on convenience shopping items and offer little variety in their supplies. Besides the markets, the arterial street served other commercial functions which, in some cases, were city-wide functions. Grain merchants located their offices and warehouses on both sides of the arterial.

These distributions reinforce a strong community sense common to these areas. Residents knew each other, and their



Figure 1 Distribution of Mosques in Midan



Figure 2 Distribution of Markets in Midan



Figure 3 Mosque and Market Relationships in Midan

families have been living in the district for a long time. They pray in the same mosque, shop in the same market, and their kids play in the neighborhood squares and its alleyways.

Development pressures started affecting Midan more than sixty to seventy years ago. A new arterial street was paved about half a kilometer to the west of the old one, and a new linear residential developments started to emerge on both sides of this arterial. A similar development was initiated a few decades later on the east side of the district. Currently, the total population of the zone is estimated about one million, and it is considered as the largest zone in the city.

The contrast between the old and the new neighborhoods is, at best, startling. Originally, the new developed areas were planned as residential areas, and no other land-uses were permitted. Residents of the new areas have found it necessary, to this day, to do their convenience shopping in the old neighborhoods of the district. In time, garages were transformed to shops, and new construction was allowed to devote the first floor of the high-rise buildings for commercial and professional office use. A rigid grid-iron street pattern was platted with little open space or play areas, especially in the early parts of the development. Development pressures started to move into the old neighborhood themselves. New subdivisions were designed and superimposed on existing development. The municipality took over and bulldozed some of these neighborhoods and redistributed the land, according to established shares of ownership, to the resident population. New construction had to follow the adopted plan and the new subdivisions were designed accordingly. Other neighborhoods were allowed to exist for a while. If residents wished, however, to bulldoze their old homes and re-build them they had to follow the new subdivision layout for that part of the zone. As such, much of the old zone lost its charm, and its urban form is disintegrating into a mixture of old and new.

Conclusions

Development pressures over the past few decades have destroyed much of the old neighborhoods of Damascus. The old neighborhoods in the central part of the city, within the old walled city, started receiving more attention. Planners, architects, and many other professionals and civic leaders, initiated a strong campaign to preserve this city heritage. They were able to convince the members of the People's Assembly, Parliament, to stop future development in the old neighborhoods closest to the city-center pending further study and investigation of the need to preserve the area as a historic district. The outcomes of this effort are encouraging at this stage. But, the economic pressures to develop the area are too strong to ignore.

Old neighborhoods at the edge of the city, outside the old walled part of the city, were not included in the moratorium. Initially, the development pressure in Midan started in the small farms and orchards adjacent to it, but not in the old neighborhoods themselves. In time, the development pressures moved into these neighborhoods and they began slowly losing their urban form. One has to admit that the mixture of the old and the new urban forms, together and superimposed on each other, is producing a city-scape with no urban form. In addition, the strong sense of a community is disappearing after surviving for hundreds of years.

How did this happen? The process started around the forties and fifties when local architects, civil engineers, and a few planners adopted a strict physical planning approach to the development of the city. They assumed, literally, that they were planning raw land, and existing land use conditions did not influence their design.

In addition, a total vision for the future development of the city was lacking. The population growth of the city has consistently exceeded the forecasts made for this growth, including those made for the 1937 and 1963 plans. Thus, existing plans needed continuos updating in order to cope with the ever changing planning environment. A micro approach focusing on the design of subdivisions replaced the macro comprehensive vision offered by the comprehensive plan. Very large residential subdivisions were planned in isolation from each other, and literally as residential areas. Interactions among subdivisions or between different land uses were not addressed. Market demands, initially for convenience shopping, forced the use of side walks for this purpose, and in time introduced such shops in haphazard ways to these areas. Many residents of these new areas still go the old neighborhoods to do their shopping.

Communities that survived for centuries are being lost to this "modernization." This "modernization" process is ignoring the cultural needs to replace these lost communities with new ones that respect communal values and heritage. Most streets, because of the high density, are wide arterial streets. Desirable residential properties are considered to be those located on the arterial. The traditional sense of a quite cohesive Damascene neighborhood is being replaced by major, noisy and polluted arterial. These arterials separate residents from each other. They are quite unfriendly to pedestrians. Kids cannot play in their neighborhoods anymore. Security was the issue in the old days. Safety is the issue now.

Author's Note

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15 THE DISTRICT OF GAMALIYA: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

Madiha El Safty

Foreword

One of the major current concerns of Egypt is the preservation of its old historic sites, that have, over the years, been decaying either through the effect of environmental factors, neglect, old age, or even abuse. This concern, gradually growing over time, has had a significant push recently in the form of direct government involvement. The loss of a rich heritage cannot be disregarded. Action is presently being taken in different directions to preserve, upgrade, and/or restore these historic sites that are spread all over Egypt.

Gamaliya is one such historic site that looms as deserving special attention. It is located in Cairo. This paper approaches the district of Gamaliya, in the context of an area of top priority in the repertoire of historic heritage of Cairo as the metropolis.

Gamaliya District: A Descriptive Introduction

The district of Gamaliya stands out in significance amidst the concerns of Historic Cairo. In 1977, the German Archaeological Institute conducted a survey of the monuments in Gamaliya, assisted by the Center of Documentation for Islamic and Coptic Monuments of the Egyptian Antiquities Organization. Identified monuments numbered 102 , and included not only religious sites but also houses and other buildings of historic value—e.g., in the original Turkish terms, *madrasas* (schools), *khankas* (hotels), *wekalas* (trade centers). (Gamaliya 1, 1994 : p. 32). The location of this rich heritage in the district places Gamaliya among the world's heritage list. At present, the north boundaries of Gamaliya are Bab El Fotouh and Bab El Nasr, while in the south is Bab Zuwaila. East of Gamaliya is El Darrassa and to the west, lies El Geish Street. The district in fact covers the area of the city of Al Qahira as built by the Fatimids in 969. (Gamaliya 1, 1994: p. 4).

It must be noted that Gamaliya is one area of Cairo which encloses an environment of diversified features. As a historic site, its monuments are of great value not only historically but also in terms of their architecture. The district has its fame for Al Azhar mosque, Gamaliya having been the nucleus of the old Cairo of Al Moez. In Gamaliya is also located Al Hussein mosque, which is the current center of religious activities that increase on religious occasions, especially during the month of Ramadan. The number of mosques in the district is 42 (CAPMAS, 1994), most of which are of historic value, and give it an Islamic flavor that is clearly reflected in its social environment.

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Gamaliya is dominated by a Moslem population. The district has one church and two synagogues (CAPMAS, 1994), which used to serve the Jewish community living within its boundaries. In Gamaliya lies the Jewish quarter, which used to be the center of Jewish life in earlier periods of history before their exodus starting in 1948.

The historic sites in Gamaliya include, in addition, a number of old palaces, as well as five public baths reminiscent of medieval times, and which still serve the traditional segments. Other landmarks are Khan Al Khalili Bazar and Al Fishawy Coffee House, both being touristic attractions of special appeal to foreigners and Egyptians alike.

The concern with the monuments in Gamaliya has been part of the broader concern for the maintenance and preservation of historic sites, as apparent in the series of laws issued with this objective. However, while these laws tried to define ancient monuments for the purpose of protecting them, they never laid controls on their use for different functions, their alterations, nor on their surrounding environment (Gamaliya 1, 1994: p. 10).

Gamaliya is also a commercial center. It is a hub of activities for the production and sale of goods, especially those of touristic attraction. Moreover, workshops of various functions are spread all over the area, and may be concentrated in some streets more than others. El Moez street, one of the major roads in the district, includes 147 shops, in addition to the larger stores. In Gamaliya street, there are 127 shops, which are larger in area when compared to those in El Moez street. In addition, the three main streets in Gamaliya constitute many small shops and workshops. Approximately 40% of the workshops in the district work in aluminum manufacturing, while approximately 20% of the stores sell lemons, olives, and onions. Other activities, both commercial and industrial, the latter being basically in metal processing, cover the remaining 40%. (UNDP, 1996).

As a residential area, Gamaliya includes buildings that are, in most cases, decaying because of their old age, environmental factors, and poor maintenance. Data from CAPMAS (1994) reveal that 61.5% of the buildings in Gamaliya were built before 1940, 18% between the years 1940 and 1959, while 14.5% date back to the period between 1960 and 1979. Only 6% of the buildings have been built after 1980. The situation as such reflects the old age of the district. It also reflects the variation in architectural style, as the old crumbling buildings live side by side with the relatively new ones, each representing the style of the era.

One-fourth of the buildings are used for commercial purposes. Residential units are of diversified types and may appear in different forms, such as entrances to buildings, garages, corridors between buildings, as well as *wekalas*, all of which can be classified as informal types of residence.

The reason for using such places as dwelling units is mainly their proximity to the work places of those workers in the shops/workshops in the area. Gamaliya has a number of *wekalas*, which are mostly in poor condition, and may serve different functions in the community; e.g., residence or storage, according to need.

It is interesting to note that some of the old buildings retain the traditional style, which is characterized by a courtyard in the center. This courtyard is multifunctional. It is a meeting place for women and children. It is also a site for social activities. In some buildings, the courtyard is used as a workshop, a shop, and sometimes even a coffee shop. (Gamaliya 1, 1994: p. 62). However, because of the predominance of shops and workshops in the district, as such outnumbering the residential buildings, the commercial character of Gamaliya prevails.

Households may include extended families, nuclear families, or a combination of nuclear families that are not related, but who share one residential unit (Gamaliya 1, 1994: p. 58). The residential community is characterized by a traditional life style for the most part. It follows that the social milieu in Gamaliya is therefore a reflection of the multifunctional character of the physical layout. The social fabric of the area is a dynamic interaction between the residents who are typical of those in a traditional urban community of old Cairo; owners of shops and workshops who are not necessarily residents of the district; workers and craftsmen working for the workshops and shops; and visitors to Gamaliya whether for the monuments or for shopping, both tourists and Egyptians.

Overcrowding is the natural outcome in such an environment, where most streets are narrow and winding. The busy life is also reflected in the combination of pedestrians with traffic; exhibited goods, dumped industrial waste, and heaps of garbage that cover the roads. One major cause for overcrowding the streets is the transportation for commercial purposes, which in many cases leads to complete blockings.

Administratively, Gamaliya is divided into 17 shiakhas (administrative units). Residentially, the district is not of high population density, especially when compared to other traditional urban communities of similar socio-economic characteristics. The major factor here is the presence of historic sites in Gamaliya. As uninhabited units, they therefore reduce the average density per total area.

The approach of this paper takes a sociological perspective. As such, it is based on results of two field surveys conducted by the researcher, using interview schedules and complemented by in-depth observation of the district. The surveys took place at two different periods, with a time difference of about four years. Each of them covered one of the central areas of Gamaliya, which can be considered representative of the district, and where the sample, different in each case, is typical of the inhabitants.

Both studies were part of a broader interdisciplinary project where architects, urban planners, historians, as well as environmentalists were involved. In both cases, the objective was to upgrade the community, using the existing situation as a starting point, with particular emphasis on the needs of

the inhabitants and the particular nature of the district.

The next part depicts the sociological profile of the community as the outcome of the studies to be followed by the proposed plan for upgrading it.

Profile of the Population

Residents of Gamaliya are of the traditional type, for the most part, in line with the general character of the district, its historic nature, coupled with their long period of residence in it, a combination of factors which give Gamaliya its special flavor. Traditionalism here appears in their concern with such norms and values that enhance male dominance, sex segregation, strict religious observance, early marriage for girls, as well as close family ties. Illiteracy prevails among the inhabitants, and typically the rate for female ranks higher in this respect, especially among the older segments. However, there is a positive trend in education, which is reflected in the high enrollment of the young age brackets, still revealing an excess of males over females.

Informal labor is the norm in Gamaliya. Skilled as well as unskilled labor covers a wide range of industrial, commercial, and touristic activities. The fact that the employment pattern is dominated by informal labor is due to the commercial nature of the district where crafts and workshops labor prevail. According to CAPMAS figures, only 37% of the population are in the labor force whereas 63% are outside it. Female employment is low, as consistent with the traditional character of the area, as well as the high illiteracy rate among women. They are, for the most part, restricted to their domestic role. Females outside the labor force constitute 88.4% as opposed to 39% among males, the high representation of those outside the labor force supports the predominance of informal labor. In the 1986 census of CAPMAS, 2,491,000 of the residents were in the labor force as opposed to 4,082,000 outside it. Of the former segment, 324,000 only are women, whereas 2,167,000 are men. In the latter segment, on the other hand, 1,223,000 are males in comparison to 2,859,000 females. The predominant segment of employment is commerce, restaurants, and hotels, as consistent with the touristic nature of the district. The representation of this segment is 380,000 individuals. The services sector follows, and is represented by 376,000 individuals.

Moreover, national statistics reveal a very low representation of professional jobs. CAPMAS estimates show that they do not exceed 5% of the total Gamaliya population. There are two schools in the district, and they cover the three educational levels. Two health centers serve Gamaliya. The first is El Hussain Hospital, which is the teaching hospital for El Azhar University and lies on El Azhar street. The other is Bab El Shaareya medical center which is in Bab El Shaareya Square (Participatory Rapid Appraisal in Gamaliya, Cairo; November 1996). There is also a health center in Belkini mosque, which provides services at a reasonable cost.

An attempt at evaluating the socio-economic status of the community is no easy task, because it includes different strata. However, the general characteristic is one where a low socio-economic status prevails. Studies on the district confirm the predominance of poverty among the population. Although the poor socio-economic stratum represents the majority of residents, there is a variation in this respect that appears not only in different sectors of the district but also among the various segments in the population. Some streets include a destitute community living under conditions of extreme poverty, both physically and otherwise, whereas others may be better off. It is the owners of shops and some workshops that constitute an upper stratum. They are outnumbered by the working stratum. (Gamaliya 1, 1994 & 2, 1995).

In the middle fall the government employees of the medium level, the regular salaried group who gain their prestige from their occupational status, but who do not parallel the rich workshop/shop owners in wealth. The rate of unemployment is high among the males, since, as has already been mentioned, the females are mostly housewives.

Earlier studies of segments of the Gamaliya community, as in the Toumbakshiya area, revealed that the age pyramid is characterized by a relatively high representation of the aging population and a relatively low representation of children (Gamaliya 2). While it is difficult to generalize from this situation to include the whole district, it is possible to discern some indicators of mobility. Old residents tend to remain within Gamaliya, being rooted in terms of housing facilities (however old and decaying), means of livelihood, and probably social ties. The younger generations may move out. This age bracket, it follows, might include those with the higher level of education, hence the high illiteracy rate in Gamaliya. The age pyramid in such communities where push factors are in operation is therefore in total contradiction to that of the Egyptian population at large.

It is important to mention that data for Gamaliya have been based on the CAPMAS census of 1986. Assessment of current data may be possible by using projection techniques for some while it cannot apply-to others because of the probability of certain intervening variables that have to be studied in depth. As an illustration, one can estimate the present population based on the 1986 figure of 7,519,000 for Gamaliya, using the 2.5% rate of annual natural increase. However, one cannot estimate the number of Moslems as opposed to that of Copts, the former being 7,454,000 while the latter is only 65,000. The rate of annual growth might have differed in the two groups over the last decade. The same can apply to the employment pattern and the differentiation between informal and formal labor with the current changes in the labor market, the trend towards privatization and the structural adjustment program. Moreover, the dynamics of mobility in the area have to be considered in demographic estimates of the present situation.

Problems

It is interesting to note that the inhabitants are well aware of the historic sites located in Gamaliya as a major center of Fatimid Cairo, which was constructed within the boundaries of protective walls, in line with the tradition of the time. The district in fact, includes and embodies within its layout a concentration of Islamic monuments unrivaled by any other Islamic city. The attitude of the inhabitants, though reflecting a sincere realization of the historic/touristic value of these monuments, clearly expresses a total dependency on governmental efforts. Community participation is weak. There is a general feeling that the official responsibility of the state requires that it proceed with its restoration activities without any interference with the means of livelihood of the community. In addition, the residents believe that it is their right to receive such governmental service.

Such a situation raises a number of problems. In the first place, government efforts are short of providing total upgrading responsibilities. In the second place, the absence of community participation is a negative position where development pursuits are concerned. In addition, the old, decaying condition of many buildings, coupled with the continuous pollution from the numerous workshops, can be quite destructive to the existing monuments. Delay in taking an active step to improve the situation can lead to hazardous consequences.

Results of the studies on Gamaliya have, therefore, raised a number of points for discussion whereby it is hoped that the attempt to upgrade the district proceed in line with the inhabitants' needs, at the same time bridging the gap between their expectations and the possible practical action to be taken.

It is obvious that the present condition of Gamaliya reflects a number of problems that cover a wide range, cutting across its infrastructure, environment, socio-economic status, and its high value as a site of Islamic monuments. However, the order of priorities in the perception of these problems varies with the different individuals, based on the variation in his/her own agenda according to his/her own list of priorities. In addition, it must be mentioned that the population's perception of problems does not coincide with the existing problems as seen objectively by outsiders. The situation may go to extreme when some inhabitants do not even identify the very obviously persistent problems as such, considering the multitude of these in the district.

Problems of the physical environment range between a poor infrastructure where many roads are unpaved and in bad shape, water cut-offs are frequent, and the sewage system is deteriorated, to the poor condition of many buildings, the neglect of monuments, and the accumulation of solid waste. Overcrowding in the streets, where vehicles of all sorts jam the already congested roads, is one other cause of discontent for the inhabitants.

On the socio-cultural level, the district suffers from an inadequate supply of services—i.e., schools, libraries, or community centers. Unemployment prevails.

A major problem, which may not be high in the inhabitants' list of priorities, but which is of utmost importance is the location of the monuments side by side with the workshops and shops and residential area. This situation is one main reason for the deterioration in the condition of the monuments, and which necessitates immediate action. It is this factor in particular which has aroused the concern not only of different agencies, but more so the government. Efforts are therefore being made to upgrade the district, maintaining the balance between the inhabitants' needs and the high value of the district as a historic site which also has a touristic function, let alone its commercial activities. The multi-faceted nature of Gamaliya makes it no easy task to achieve this objective. The following part includes a plan in this respect, stemming from studying the existing situation of the community and based on the actual living conditions of its population.

Two Proposed Complexes: Commercial and Service

A plan for upgrading Gamaliya has to be based, first and foremost, on its nature as a touristic, historic site. The district includes a number of vacant plots of land of various sizes, and which are not used productively. Some of them contain ruins of old crumbled buildings and rubble of all sorts. The Sustainable Development Program Report (Nov. 1996) on "Participatory Rapid Appraisal in Gamaliya, Cairo" estimates that lots of this kind are eleven in number. Decaying *wekalas* are also found. It is suggested that these areas of wasted land be used to establish a multifunctional center. The idea here is that this center include a workshop where goods of touristic interest be manufactured; shops to sell these goods; and supporting services such as cafeterias, restaurants, and fast food shops, all of which cater to the average tourist at reasonable costs. The suggestion of having the workshops within the center aims at creating an attraction for the tourists that will help in marketing the goods, which should preferably be items of simple local craftsmanship that can appeal to them.

The center as such can serve an objective which is two-fold. On the one hand, it is a commercial center for touristic attraction, which will help the district to flourish. On the other hand, it can absorb the unemployed within the community, including the women. These two segments of the population should be considered target beneficiaries in this respect, considering the relatively high percentage of the unemployed in the district, as well as the low status of women. The provision of income generating opportunities for these two segments is a positive step in upgrading the community.

The situation of women in particular is of great importance in any developmental concerns. As given above, their educational level is low, and their illiteracy rate is high. It follows that their participation in labor is small. An approach to this problem can be achieved through the establishment of a literacy program, that can cater to the illiterate segment in

general, which is clearly dominated by women. It is proposed that this program be part of a broader context, including a number of services for the district. The idea here is to construct a whole complex that embodies a center for literacy and training programs, which targets the whole community, but which is expected to have a majority of women based on the available data; a medical center for primary health care and maternity and child services; and a center for social counseling. The training center can best be planned to serve the needs of the workshops in the touristic center. In this way, a complementarity of activities can be achieved.

This center of services need not be located in proximity with the commercial one, since each of them has a different function. The availability of enough vacant lots facilitates the selection of the sites. However, it is important that this service center be located in a spot easily accessible to the target beneficiaries.

Likewise, a good idea would be to establish a pedestrian area around the commercial center, in order to facilitate its accessibility. Such a step might require replanning of the surrounding sites, but it is a point worthy of consideration.

The service center is meant to upgrade the demographic characteristics of the community. Any attempt at upgrading the physical conditions of the district is meaningless without upgrading the human resources within. Although this survey has attempted a needs assessment approach, it has not revealed the subjects' concern for such services that can help them in this respect, as has already been mentioned. Health and education do not represent top priorities to them. However, these two aspects in particular cannot be disregarded, even if the community is not aware of their importance.

Whereas the establishment of the commercial center can best be done through private enterprise, this service center must be implemented through state effort. The former can attract investors, since it is profit-oriented, while the latter is a responsibility of the government, since it is a non-profit service. However, non-governmental efforts can collaborate, especially with the literacy and social counseling programs. Here they can provide the personnel and act as channels for raising answers in the community.

Garbage: The Endless Problem

Garbage disposal looms as a major problem in the district, and as such tends to overshadow other concerns of pollution, although the presence of the workshops in the midst of the residential area is a major source of pollution that leads to many health hazards, let alone its negative impact on the monuments.

The community needs an organized system of garbage disposal, that proceeds on a regular basis. At present, no such system exists, and heaps of garbage accumulate all over. What can best serve the purpose is an organization outside the governorate structure. However, the current situation requires that garbage collection, if done by private individuals, be formally licensed by the governorate. The survey results have shown that some individuals, although small in number are willing to participate in upgrading efforts. The help of these people can be sought to form any organization that can take over this responsibility, at enough cost to cover the expenses, with no profit-oriented objectives. The resulting environmental conditions, free from pollution, are sufficient profit in this respect. It remains that the governorate facilitate the provision of the license to this organization, through simplified bureaucratic measures.

The organization in charge of garbage collection can make use of the unemployed in the community, especially those who may be unskilled and difficult to find employment. What can facilitate the task is the provision of plastic bags for the households and shops and workshops, where garbage may be disposed, to be collected on a regular basis by the hired personnel.

Garbage containers of large sizes are not a feasible solution. These are normally placed at different location spots in the street. The tendency is, however, that they allow for leakage, spilling, and overflow of the contents, in most cases. Irregularity of collection may be one reason in this respect, but there are other factors of relevance, such as poor maintenance, neglect, and improper use by the people. The end result is a worse garbage problem.

An organized system of garbage collection from the households and shops or workshops is the most feasible solution, if any attempt at addressing the problem successfully is sought.

Relocation

The present physical condition of the study area is a mixture of polluted environment; old, crumbling buildings; and a decaying infrastructure. Some buildings need to be renovated; others have to be totally demolished. The presence of the workshops in the midst of a residential area and a historic site has to be reconsidered. It is suggested that the workshops, especially those that deal with metals and are hazardous to the environment, be moved further beyond the residential segment.

Relocation is no easy task, even within close boundaries. Experience in other cases has shown that relocating people can be problematic. They not only depend on their original site for their livelihood in terms of work, but they are also strongly attached to it emotionally, socially, and psychologically. Relocating them means uprooting them, a situation which is highly traumatic.

In the study area, the need to demolish buildings, as well as move workshops is a case of relocation. Consequently, it has to proceed in a way that does not threaten the security of the people; neither should it antagonize them. In the case of moving the workshops, the step should be taken with enough

caution and persuasion, with no orders being imposed upon the owners. Workshops can be rebuilt in areas further down the district and away from the residential sector , thus serving two purposes. On the one hand, the workshops themselves can, in this way, be renovated and upgraded. On the other hand, they, by moving away, will help reduce pollution in the area. Approaching the owners should proceed along these lines.

Inhabitants of the buildings that will be torn down must be offered an alternative, preferably within the boundaries, in order to avoid any problems in this respect. What can aggravate the situation with respect to the possible hostility among the district population is the spread of rumors related to relocation schemes, that are very much loaded with negative attitudes. This situation necessitates the right approach to the target population, in order to achieve results as close as possible to the desired goals. It is therefore suggested that the target population be prepared for relocation. Some program has to be devised to explain clearly and honestly the objectives of relocation, emphasizing the positive aspects and addressing the negative ones in a straight-forward manner. This task has to proceed jointly through community and government efforts. The former can best be represented by some individuals of special respectable, eminent status as well as of high credibility in the district. The latter should not act through a formal, political role which is most likely to antagonize individuals.

Non-Governmental Efforts

Upgrading efforts in the study area, as suggested, cannot be seen as a government responsibility solely. The government, however, should provide the infrastructure, but the total task is definitely beyond its capabilities. Here is where emerges the need for the collaborative efforts of a non-governmental organization. It is important, at this stage, that a serious organization take over some of the proposed activities. Currently, either no such organization exists, or if it is there, its efforts are not significant enough to be felt.

Gamaliya includes educated, enlightened individuals, especially among the youth segment. There are university graduates who can initiate the establishment of a non-governmental organization (NGO), as well as proceed to implement the different tasks, monitor them, and as such develop a community participation aspect, which is very much in demand. There are also the people who are financially well-off, although their number might be small, but they can help provide some of the required funds.

The NGO is expected to have another important role—i.e., that of raising awareness in the community along different lines. Environment, health, education, employment skills are but examples in this respect. In addition, it can very well help in the required persuasive efforts in cases of relocation.

It is important to mention, however, that the legal and formal procedures required to establish an NGO are no easy task. They are complicated as well as time-consuming. The demand for the organization, on the other hand, should lead the government to facilitate matters for the community and reduce such complicated bureaucratic measures.

Tasks of the NGO should not only center around the initiation of community participation, but more so, a follow-up of the already established activities. One such activity is a campaign for garbage disposal, which was started more than a year ago but has been stumbling because of governmental bureaucracy. It is hoped that an NGO, once established, can, in such cases, act as a pressure group in the community. Its intervention is an attempt to activate the implementation of urban plans in line with the needs of the district, varied as they may be.

Conclusion

This paper approaches the issue of cultural heritage as a current major concern in Egypt, selecting one district which stands out as highly prominent in this context, because of its diversified nature/functions—namely, Gamaliya. The dilemma in the task of preserving its cultural heritage lies in the attempt to maintain the historic legacy of the district as embodied in the numerous monuments included within its boundaries, at the same time addressing the special situation of the large segment of traditional CAIROITES which constitute its residents. Because of the old age of Gamaliya, its infrastructure has significantly decayed. Environmental problems have likewise surfaced. Consequently, the relevant question centers around the means to upgrade the district from a multi-dimensional approach, taking into consideration not only the suffering condition of its physical environments, but also the inferior demographic characteristics of the community. It is along those lines that proposed programs are planned.

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Latin America

16 FINANCING URBAN HERITAGE CONSERVATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Eduardo Rojas

The deteriorated urban heritage of Latin America

Latin America has a rich and varied urban heritage contained in distinctive historic centers that are fine examples of the urbanism and architecture of the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. This heritage forms part of the countries' history and is representative of the different phases in the evolution of national culture. It has received international recognition as the historic centers of several cities, Cartagena de Indias (Colombia), Quito (Ecuador), Olinda, Salvador and Ouro Preto (Brazil) are UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Many other cities of Latin America—like Antigua (Guatemala), Coro (Venezuela) Popayan (Colombia), Lima (Peru), San Luis (Brazil) to name but a few— also have central areas containing monuments with historic and cultural significance. These centers are threatened by the pressures exercised on the traditional pattern of streets and public spaces by contemporary urban development and by the obsolescence of historic buildings. The conservation of the historic centers not only will preserve a repository of the countries' history and cultural memory but also will recuperate for contemporary use a valuable and centrally located stock of buildings and infrastructures.

The stressed urban structure of the historic centers

The foundational layout inherited by Latin American cities is still present in its historic centers and provided the models upon which more modern quarters of the cities were structured. In the cities established by the Spaniards, this urban structure—dating from the late Fifteenth and early Sixteenth centuries—is based on a strict gridiron pattern (Photo 1).[1] Portuguese cities, for the most part, inherited a traditional organic pattern of streets and public spaces that evolved over the years according to the growth of the settlement, the needs of defense and the topography (Photo 2). In both cases, this inherited structure of streets, squares and residential lots— that accommodated urban activities for more than four hundred years—is showing signs of stress and is increasingly incapable of absorbing the demands of urban life in the turn of the Century. The narrow streets are congested and polluted by vehicular traffic, the public spaces are invaded by informal street vendors, the land subdivision constrains the redevelopment of the parcels and often the infrastructure put in place over the history of the city is insufficient (Photo 3). The reduced accessibility and public amenities expel urban economic activities from the historic center, discouraging private real estate investment in the area.

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Photo 1 Quito, Ecuador. An Example of Gridiron pattern.

Photo 2 Quro Presto, Brazil. An Example of Organic Pattern of Streets.

Patterns of obsolescence in the historic buildings.

The architectural heritage in the historic centers includes a vast array of historically and architecturally significant structures. Government buildings, churches and convents, hospitals, military installations and defense walls are often fine examples of baroque and neoclassical architecture and of colonial military engineering while railway stations and port facilities are examples of late nineteenth century industrial architecture. Their existence is threatened by functional and physical obsolescence.

Functional obsolescence occurs when the buildings no longer satisfy the requirements of the original activities (or when their original functions are no longer needed). Examples include old hospital buildings that become obsolete as a result of new medical technologies, historic government office buildings overpassed by the growth of the public service and new office technologies, convents and churches that communities can no longer support, old libraries incapable of accommodating modern-sized book stocks or new information technologies, or railway stations no longer used. The traditional houses of high-income families in the historic centers of cities of Spanish origin are a classic example.[2] These buildings accommodated the domestic activities of extended families well into the twentieth century when changes in fashion and the desire for modern amenities made suburban dwellings more desirable. Once their upper-income homeowners left the historic core of the city, the abandoned houses were used to accommodate commercial and service activities that benefited from the availability of space, central location and low rents. Service activities gradually gave way to low-income families when the space and accessibility requirements of these businesses caused them to move to the second growth ring of the city (areas developed during the 1930s and 1940s). The houses in the historic centers were then turned into slum dwellings with many low-income families occupying a room each and sharing inadequate sanitary facilities. This arrangement served the interests of both low-income families and landlords. The former benefiting from the centrally located though substandard accommodations and the latter by extracting rental income from otherwise useless real estate.

Physical obsolescence—the deterioration of the structure, installations or finishing of buildings—turns them incapable of accommodating the functions they house. Usually the result of poor maintenance, physical obsolescence may also result from natural disasters (like earthquakes or floods) or from the effects of urban development (for instance, heavy traffic that produces vibrations and pollution). Independent of its origins, physical obsolescence turns buildings incapable of accommodating economic, cultural or residential activities leading to their abandonment. Historic buildings and sites are often among the most deteriorated structures in cities, making them extreme examples of physical obsolescence that can only be turned around with significant investments.

Issues confronting the conservation of urban heritage

Reversing the process of deterioration that affects historic centers in Latin America is a difficult undertaking that requires significant changes in the social valuation of urban heritage, in government policies and practices, and in the prevalent trends and fashions in the real estate industry that promote the abandonment and degradation of these assets. Implementing these changes raises several issues including some related to urban policy, like the political and economic rationale for intervention; technical issues, including defining priorities and the more efficient types of interventions, and financial issues, including determining who should pay for the interventions and identifying viable means of cost recovery. Underlaying these issues is the broader question of the division of responsibilities between the private and the public sector.

Rationale for intervention

The market allocates very few resources to the preservation of cultural heritage including the urban heritage. However, communities invest in conservation for a variety of reasons. In Latin America these include the lobbying activities of enlightened individuals or groups, international concerns for the conservation of cultural artifacts and lately, a growing

realization by the communities about the social benefits of heritage conservation. Tourism promotion is often invoked to justify public investment in urban heritage conservation.[3]

Interventions in urban heritage conservation to be effective and useful must not only rehabilitate the physical fabric of the historic centers (public spaces and emblematic buildings) but also revitalize the social and economic processes that can make efficient use of the stock of buildings and infrastructures and maintain them properly. Lessons drawn from past practice indicate that accomplishing these goals require significant changes in the social valuation of the urban heritage. Further, they require putting in place institutional mechanisms capable of promoting collaboration among social actors. Some progress has taken place in Latin America in this direction. A staged progress toward socially shared and more sustainable forms of urban heritage conservation is becoming apparent although still plagued with inefficiencies and impaired by many obstacles.

Urban heritage conservation a limited concern of the elites

In the early stages of the urban heritage conservation effort in Latin America and the Caribbean, the process was led by enlightened cultural elites concerned with the preservation of specific buildings or monumental areas in danger of disappearance due to real estate development pressures (the notable exception is Mexico, where the State was the early leader.) Typical of this phase of conservation are projects oriented to preserve individual buildings of historic or architectural significance. Funding comes from a variety of sources, private and public, the scope of the conservation effort is limited, and the conserved monument is usually devoted to some public use. In this stage, the sustainability of conservation efforts rests mostly on the dynamism of the concerned elites and investments are often lost due to lack of continuity.[4]

This phase often sees the enactment of historic preservation legislation. Severely limiting the owners' development options in historic buildings, and lacking incentives to promote the proper maintenance by owners and tenants, preservation ordinances usually end up having the opposite effect than the intended. Confronted with more profitable uses for the land (even as parking lots) owners of historic properties often left them without maintenance in the expectation that physical obsolesce will force local authorities to order their demolition, thus allowing more profitable uses for the land. While waiting for physical deterioration to run its course, land owners obtain rents subdividing large buildings according to market demands (low income housing, warehousing, repair shops) contributing to the decay of historic buildings and the deterioration of the area.

Even at this early phase in the conservation movement, more comprehensive approaches to preservation regulation may yield better results. The municipality of Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) implemented a detailed plan for the conservation of historic domestic architecture within the walled city. The plan, geared at regulating private investment, was complemented with public investment for the rehabilitation of the walls and the conservation of public spaces. As Cartagena turned into a fashionable resort, the combination of public investment and private demand for historic buildings as vacation homes or tourism facilities attracted unsubsidized private investment to restore many buildings in the historic center. Private investors complain that the rigid building regulations—based on a restricted menu of allowed interventions by building type—unduly restrict the development potential of historic buildings. It is unclear whether the constraints imposed by the conservation plan effectively discouraged private investment in the more fashionable sections of the walled city however, the regulations so far have preserved the character of all areas, including those housing middle-income local families. Professional management of the plan has weakened in later years undermining its capacity to continue preserving the character and monuments of the historic center.

Unsustainable government interventions

A second phase emerges when governments adopt more proactive approaches to conservation passing legislation and creating heritage conservation boards and specialized institutions. However, confronted with pressing social needs, most governments find it difficult to mobilize taxpayer funds to pay for the rehabilitation and upkeep of urban heritage sites. Lack of funds is often compounded by weak institutions and lack of technical skills.

The conservation efforts of Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), (Box 1) and Salvador (Bahia, Brazil), (Box 2) are representative of the programs developed in this phase of evolution of the conservation effort. These programs, based on direct public sector intervention and financing, not only encountered difficulties securing the large volume of public resources required to maintain the sites, but did not contribute significantly to revitalize the economy of the historic districts to ensure the long term sustainability of the conservation effort. They attracted but a limited range of private economic activities mostly related to cultural tourism or recreation. In the case of Santo Domingo, excessive public intervention and overregulation in the historic center discourages private investment while in Salvador recreation and tourism activities expelled residents and craftspeople that used to live in the historic center. It is doubtful whether historic centers can survive only on the basis of tourism and recreational activities whose demand is volatile and may, in economic recessions induce the abandonment of the center by merchants and entrepreneurs. Conservation efforts must strive to promote a wider variety of economic activities (residential, services, commerce and government) to ensure stable demand for space.

These cases did not solve efficiently one of the most difficult issues confronting urban heritage conservation in Latin America and the Caribbean, that is to achieve an efficient balance between the roles played by the public and private sectors. Public interventions narrowed the scope left to the private sector to assume its role in conducting business and making real estate investments in the historic centers. The

Box 1 Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic)

The Patronato de la Ciudad Colonial (Santo Domingo Colonial City Trust) followed a similar approach in its long lasting effort to rehabilitate the historic part of downtown Santo Domingo. Combining public investment in infrastructure and historic building rehabilitation with the strict enforcement of conservation regulations, the Trust succeeded in reconstructing the area into one of the possible interpretations about how the Colonial City may have looked in the Seventeenth Century. Although successful in rehabilitating landmark buildings and establishing first class museums, the endeavor faces difficulties in attracting the private investment required to diversify economic activities. Private investors blame excessive regulations (that limit the use of the buildings and prevent improving vehicular accessibility to the Colonial City), as the major constraints preventing the flow of investment into the area. Inefficient electricity and drainage facilities also hamper development as do the complex institutional arrangements for development control currently split between the Trust, the Institute for Historic Preservation and the Municipality. The upkeep of the restored buildings and public spaces falls entirely under the purview of the central government which provides regular grants to the Trust to cover expenses. This arrangement does not ensure sustainability nor the equitable distribution of costs among beneficiaries.

proactive public sector not only crowded out potential private investments but undertook the impossible task of conserving a vast array of buildings and public spaces with its limited resources.

Urban heritage conservation as a widespread social concern.

In a third, and more advanced phase of the process—still to be achieved in Latin America—urban heritage conservation becomes a concern and responsibility of a wide variety of social actors and derives momentum and dynamism from the interplay of different interest groups and the real estate market. Private philanthropy, civil society organizations and local communities all become involved in the process with clear and complementary roles. The public sector provides the regulatory environment for the other actors and invest in public spaces and infrastructures that create the externalities that attract other investors. As communities increase their appreciation for the urban heritage, the commercial value of some buildings and historic districts increases and their conservation also becomes relevant for commercial concerns attracting private investors that rehabilitate buildings to satisfy the demand for space of a variety of economic activities. At this stage of development of the conservation effort, the most critical issues confronting urban heritage conservation are solved through the fruitful collaboration of the different actors. Key in attaining this stage of development is the consensus in the community about the social and economic value of the heritage, in turn a process that can be assisted by education and dissemination campaigns.

Box 2 Historic Rehabilitation in Salvador (Brazil)

Salvador (Bahia, Brazil). The Recovery Program for the Historic District of Salvador (the Pelurinho) adopted the strategy of heavy public intervention in a reduced section of the downtown area. In the 1993–1997 period, a public entity, the Cultural and Historic Heritage Institute of Bahia, with financing from the state government, rehabilitated more than 300 buildings located in 16 blocks within the downtown area of the city of Salvador (a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site). Using the city blocks as units for rehabilitation, the Institute undertakes all the works on both public and private properties and offers residents the option to stay or collect monetary compensation and move. The Institute also finances free performances by music groups and theater companies to attract customers to the area. So far, it has succeeded in rehabilitating buildings and supporting tourism activities. No significant cost recovery has occurred, and a significant diversification of residential and economic activities has not taken place. The top-down approach to execution achieved physical results at significant cost to the public budget. Still to be tested is the capacity of the approach to promote the economic recovery of the area beyond tourism and the long-term sustainability of the effort.

Photo 3 Salvador, Bahia. General view of the Historic Center. The rehabitated area in the forefront.

Gentrification

Successful rehabilitation of historic districts attracts new residents and economic activities boosting land and building prices. This process, commonly known as gentrification, benefits municipal income and land owners, and boosts economic activities. However, it tends to expel low-income families and less profitable economic activities from the area. There are strong market forces involved in gentrification as buildings are turned into their best and highest use by owners and developers.[5] Further, gentrification generates positive externalities for economic activities interested in locating in

historic centers (for instance commerce, recreation and tourism) contributing to expand demand for space in the historic center, thus to the long-term sustainability of the conservation effort.

Gentrification affects the poorest members of the community that lose access to cheap housing and to the economic and social opportunities offered by the downtown location. Equity considerations require mitigation of the social ill-effects of gentrification, an undertaking that is greatly facilitated by the availability of national or local public programs supporting low-income housing and micro enterprises. Side effects of gentrification may be so significant as to jeopardize political support for conservation. There are but a handful of cases where this problem has been mitigated to the satisfaction of local residents (Bologna in Italy, Barcelona in Spain). In all successful cases, interventions involved significant central government subsidies, a price not many countries can afford.

Urban heritage conservation strategies for Latin America

The Inter-American Development Bank (the Bank) pioneered the support to urban heritage conservation.[6] In accordance with its mandates, the Bank is currently supporting programs and projects that have clear and significant impacts on the acceleration of economic and social development and propel urban heritage conservation activities into the third stage of development described, that is the establishment of sustainable heritage conservation process based on the contributions of all relevant social actors.[7]

The projects are framed within one of the three strategies that the Bank considers appropriate at this stage of its involvement in the conservation effort. These strategies are, the conservation of historic areas with ample involvement of the private sector, urban heritage conservation as a trigger of wider urban rehabilitation processes and the promotion of conservation through incentives and regulation.

Conservation of Historic Areas with private sector participation

This strategy, an approach much favored in Europe, focuses on the conservation of several buildings and public spaces that make up a coherent functional or historic set. The economic rationale for investing in this type of projects is justified on the basis of the existence or option value of the site and its monuments although the impact on tourism is also considered.[8] The cases of Salvador and Santo Domingo suggest that projects to preserve historic areas, when based solely on government resources, are difficult to sustain in the long term. Realization of this shortcoming leads the Bank to promote extensive involvement of the private sector in the financing and operation and maintenance of the conservation works.

The Municipality of Recife (Brazil) achieved some success in attracting private investment to the rehabilitation and conservation of the historic center of the city. Municipal resources were used to improve the public spaces (streets resurfacing, lighting and equipment, infrastructure improvements) and in the rehabilitation of selected buildings (previously acquired by the Municipality). The rehabilitated buildings were lent to private investors that turned the area (the Rua Bon Jesus) into a fashionable entertainment area for the whole metropolitan region. The success of the early entrepreneurs attracted more private investment to the rehabilitation of other buildings in the area. To date, the original public investment is less than one third of the total investment in the area.[9] The Municipality is currently seeking Bank support to undertake another section of the historic center, the Polo Alfandega. It is expected that this new effort will avoid the excessive concentration in recreation and tourism activities that showed the early stages of rehabilitation of the Rua Bon Jesus.

With Bank assistance, the Municipality of Quito (Ecuador) is attempting to forge effective public-private partnerships to rehabilitate the central section of the city's extensive historic center. A mixed capital society operates with resources provided by the municipality, private investors and a Bank loan, to undertake projects that are intended to be sold in the market (see Box 2). The effective implementation of this approach requires long-term commitments on the part of the public and private investors, and the construction of effective private-public partnerships. Cofinancing of investments requires changes in traditional approaches to public financing including the acceptance of a private sector style of decision-making and risk-taking in the use of public funds.

In a project for the financing of urban historic conservation investments in seven cities of Brazil (San Luis, Olinda, Recife, Salvador, Ouro Preto, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo), the Bank is promoting partnerships at different levels. These include collaboration between entities of the public sector (State and Municipal Governments) and between the public and private sectors for financing, operating and maintaining investments in the historic centers for the conservation, rehabilitation or recycling of emblematic buildings for commercial, office, institutional or residential uses. In keeping with the objective of incorporating the different actors into the process in their most efficient capacity, the project promotes public investment in public spaces and in the public component of building rehabilitation and conservation, leaving to the private sector to undertake the rest of the investment. Departing from a widespread practice in Brazil and other countries of Latin America, public investments in buildings devoted to private uses aare contemplated only as demonstration cases and not as the main component. Public resources will also be used to subsidize the rehabilitation of residential buildings owned by low income households. This component attempt at retaining the traditional residents of the historic centers taking advantage of the fact that many still live and work there, although they lack resources to maintain their homes at the standards required by urban heritage conservation plans. However, the project does not propose a solution for low income tenants that probably will be displaced by the gentrification process.

Box 3 IDB-Financed Rehabilitation of a Historic Center. The Case of Quito (Ecuador)

With Bank assistance, the Municipality of Quito is attempting an approach similar to Barcelona's to rehabilitate the central section of the extended historic center of the city. Based on a Master Plan for the Rehabilitation of the Historic Center, the municipality embarked on the implementation of a first phase of investments to turn around the deterioration of the physical and economic fabric of a section of the historic center comprising 72 blocks around Independence Square. The activities under execution include public investment to improve accessibility to the area (restructuring of traffic patterns and provision of parking space), the quality of urban services (using historic buildings to house them) and the quality of public spaces (lighting, signaling and equipment). The investments are complemented with regulations to organize the use of public spaces by informal activities. Actions in the public space are complementary to joint ventures with private capital to rehabilitate historic buildings. A mixed capital company operates with resources provided by the municipality, private investors and a Bank loan, to undertake projects that are intended to be sold in the market. It is expected that the company will be self-sustaining in the future, however, the municipality is prepared to shoulder losses in order to trigger the rehabilitation process. The project under execution, centered on Garcia Moreno Street and Independence Square, is expected to displace only a handful of low-income families who will be housed in previously rehabilitated buildings in the historic center. Future stages of the rehabilitation process may have more significant impacts that are currently under study. The absence of a national low-income housing policy and finance mechanisms is a major limitation for the design of viable solutions to the social ill-effects of gentrification.

Figure 1 Historic Center, Quito Metropolitan Area



Conservation as a Catalyst for Urban Rehabilitation

Urban heritage conservation, when used as a catalyst for urban rehabilitation, offers the potential of generating bankable projects. Experience shows that in historic centers synergies do exist among these processes, involving a dual effect. On the one hand, investments in the conservation of urban heritage buildings and in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and public urban services, generates externalities that attract private investors that perceive profit opportunities in taking advantage of the area's location and attractiveness for certain segments of the real estate market. On the other hand, private investments and the reactivation of residential and economic activities in the centrally located historic areas—a re-centralization process—result in the more efficient utilization of available capital (buildings and infrastructure) with the corresponding positive impacts on the efficiency of cities (for instance, reductions in transportation costs). The economic benefits of re-centralization help justify the investment in heritage conservation, and the revitalized centers contribute to the sustainability of the conservation effort. Heritage-based urban rehabilitation programs offer the potential for productive cooperation between the public and private sectors in achieving development goals that neither of them can accomplish independently. This approach stil requires the careful management of the social impacts gentrification.

Implementation of this approach requires close collaboration between public and private actors. Public-private partnership to plan and execute the projects provides the mutual assurances required for the conservation and urban rehabilitation process to get started and be sustained in the long-term. Adoption of a master plan by the regulatory authority (drawn with the involvement of private investors and the community), provides assurances about the long-term future of the area while private sector participation brings commercial expertise and knowledge of local markets to improve the long-term sustainability of the undertakings. Community involvement in the design and administration of the master plan reduces the chances of conflict. Success in this approach to heritage conservation also requires a strong and sustained political commitment, which results from the strong commitment of the local community to invest in urban heritage conservation and rehabilitation. Success of the strategy also requires an adventurous private sector willing to invest in risky undertakings lured by the expectation of high returns.

One example of this approach is the Urban Rehabilitation Program of Uruguay. As part of this Program, the Bank will support the recycling of the Central Railway Station of Montevideo. The unused facility—that includes the Nineteenth Century terminal building (a registered historic landmark) and the railway yards—is a major source of blight preventing the redevelopment of a neighborhood located less than a mile away from Montevideo's central business district. Bank financing will contribute to investments in the public space and for the preparation of the land for development. It is expected that the private sector will develop a mixed-use (cultural, entertainment and commercial) project in the terminal building and will provide office, commerce, entertainment and residential space in the railway yards. Public investments financed by the Bank will be initiated only after private developers are secured for the station building and the yards.

Figure 2 Montevideo, Uruguay. Master Plan for La Aguada. BTA Architects.

The Preservation of Existing Heritage Buildings or Sites Through Regulation and Incentives

Of particular interest for the long-term sustainability of urban heritage conservation is the promotion of strategies that prevent the deterioration of buildings and public spaces by inducing conservation and maintenance by private owners, developers or users through a properly coordinated system of regulations and incentives. The social impact of this strategy is significant in terms of community ownership of the conservation effort and the permanence of economic and residential activities in the historic areas. The economic development impact of this approach arises from the conservation and use of existing physical capital and from the prevention of costly rehabilitation works. However, this strategy places the burden of financing on the institutions sponsoring the incentives out of the public treasure.[10] This approach, which can be complementary to other direct public interventions, is more feasible in countries with strong local governments capable of designing, executing and paying for the complex array of tax exemptions, land use and building regulations, and direct subsidies involved in this type of

conservation program. There is no ongoing Bank experience based on this approach.

Final remarks[11]

The conservation of the urban heritage is gaining priority in the political agenda of central and local governments of Latin America, a result of the growing awareness of social actors about its cultural and economic value. Experience shows that this effort will be sustainable in the long term only if all social actors interested in the city actively participate in its most efficient capacity. This requires a well-balanced distribution of roles between public and private actors. Achieving this balance is a central goal of the Inter-American Development Bank in its involvement with this relatively new sector of financing. To that effect the Bank is promoting the involvement of the private sector, individuals, community organizations, firms and trade associations and real estate developers. To prosper, this effort requires deepening the embryonic change in the outlook that is taking place in the Region and promote public-private partnerships to undertake tasks that none of the sectors can accomplish independently.

Given the public objectives embodied of this type of projects, and the risk profile of their private investment component, governments will not be able to transfer all responsibilities to the private sector. The government will have to continue participating in the conservation effort providing a stable regulatory environment, financing the public component of the projects and providing the additional guarantees required by private investors to participate. An important goal of the Bank is to put in place institutional mechanisms that ensure these outcomes. In the final analysis, the success or failure of the Bank's effort will be measured more by the lasting institutions and practices it leaves in the countries than by the actual number of buildings or historic centers whose conservation it contributes to finance. The magnitude of the task makes any Bank financial contribution small but enlarges the importance of its institutional development effort.

Finally, the long-term financing in foreign exchange that the Bank contributes should gradually diminish in importance as local capital markets develop and assume the financing of these programs. The Bank is actively promoting the development of capital markets in the region and expects that they will be capable, in the near future, of financing investments with the return-risk profile of urban heritage conservation and urban rehabilitation programs.

Notes

[1] This practice—later codified in the "Leyes de Indias"—produced what some authors consider the only true Renissance cities ever built. According to urban historians, the regular pattern of square blocks centrally organized arround the main square and the regular placement of the main buildings in the square reflex the ideals of the Renaissance where beauty was achieved through a geometry of regular forms and classic proportions. Another interpretation traces the origins of this practice to the military settlements established in Spain in the fifteenth century to consolidate the territory gained to the Arabs in the "Reconquista" wars, in turn a practice that traces its origins to the Roman Acastrum.

[2] In cities like Quito, Lima or Bogota, the combination of domestic and business activities that dwellings had to accommodate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, led to the construction of large three-courtyard houses. The prosperity of Republican years led to the construction of large French-style two-story town homes.

[3] Another motivation can be found in certain cities of Europe and the United States, where historic centers often become fashionable addresses attracting the interest of high-income residents who restore buildings as permanent or temporary residences. A business rationale also motivates private investment. The heritage condition of buildings is sometimes used as a marketing device for commercial developments.

[4] An operational definition of sustainability states that the conservation effort is sustainable when the buildings permanently retain their structural, stylistic and functional characteristics without requiring new investment. This outcome is usually the result of devoting the building to activities and uses capable of undertaking the proper routine and preventive maintenance.

[5] See Vandell, Kerry D., Market Factors Affecting Spatial Heterogeneity among Urban Neighborhoods in *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol. 6 No 1, 1995 (pp.103-139).

[6] In 1974, the Bank approved a loan for US$26.5 million to partially finance an Integrated Tourism Development Project (*Plan Copesco*) that included conservation and rehabilitation works on several buildings in Cuzco, Peru, considered part of the city's cultural heritage. In 1977, the IADB approved a loan for US$24 million to the government of Panama, parts of which (US$14 million) was to rehabilitate and conserve several structures in the historic center of Panama City and the ruins of the first city founded in Panama

[7] Under this approach, the Bank does not support the conservation of individual buildings. The conservation of these monuments for cultural purposes, in as much as it represents the desire of the society to preserve an artifact for its testimonial value, would be better financed through taxes or private donations, mechanisms that better express the community's preference for allocating resources to this purpose. If called upon to finance this type of undertaking, the only rationale for direct Bank involvement, and as an exception, would be as a financial outlet for a government seeking to anticipate a stream of taxes or private

contributions to undertake urgent preservation works for very significant monuments. As lender of last resort, the Bank may use its leverage to promote long term sustainablity of the heritage conservation activities. Areas of concern include: the promotion of legal reforms to set up sustainable institutional mechanisms for the conservation of cultural and historic monuments, encourage private involvement in the financing and execution of rehabilitation and conservation activities and foster local ownership of the urban heritage conservation effort. Recognizing the role of this type of undertakings in the early stages of development of the conservation movement, the Bank may support, by means of indirect interventions (technical cooperation), the passage of legislation and regulations, and the establishment of technical boards to protect significant monuments. These measures will serve while more advanced stages in social awareness concerning conservation are achieved making more comprehensive interventions possible

[8] Existence value is the willingness of the population to devote resources to make sure that the site can be seen by others (in some cases future generations) and option value is the willingness to use resources for the option to see or use the site in the future. These concepts are borrowed from environmental economics and they have been found usefull for the evaluation of cultural heritage investments. See Pagiola, S. *"Economic analysis of investments in cultural heritage"* (Draft), Washington,D.C., The World Bank, June 1996.

[9] Mendes-Zancheti, S. and Lacerda, N., "Desempho do plano de revitalizacao do Barrio de Recife: o caso de polo do Bom Jesus", Recife 1977 (mimeo)

[10] Estimating the correct incentives poses a significant technical problem, particularly in areas under pressure from real estate developers. The question whether the incentives should compensate land owners for the lost rents or simply be sufficient to promote conservation by retaining current uses in the buildings needs further investigation. The conservation impact of tools like the transfer of development rights in the context of urban development in Latin America and the Caribbean, is also worth exploring.

[11] The information and opinion included in this article are those of the author and do not represent the policies and opinion of the Inter-American Development Bank.

17 POPULAR MODERNISM: THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE

Fernando Lara

Introduction:

Brazilian Modern Architecture, although strongly influenced by Corbusier's and the Bauhaus' ideals, achieved a different level of popularity. The outstanding examples of the 1940s and 1950s can be considered a modernist success in terms of popular acceptance. Such acceptance can be perceived in the innumerable elements of Modern Architecture adopted, adapted and applied to middle-class houses in many Brazilian cities during the 1950s and 1960s. In order to frame the analysis of such popular modernism into a broader (international) context, this paper uses Habermas' definition of modernity[1] and Garcia-Canclini's concept of Latin American hybrid modernization[2]. The main goal is to review Brazilian Modern Architecture (especially the later middle-class housing application) in order to discuss, from an architectural perspective, some of the contradictory relationships between modernity, modernism and modernization.

Modernity and Modernization

Habermas uses the term *modernity* to define the transformations in Western society since the late 18th century. According to Habermas, modernity can be defined by the following characteristics:

1. the *"reflective treatment of tradition"* or the loss of tradition's quasi-natural status.
2. the *"universalization of norms of action"*.
3. the *socialization oriented to the formation of ego-identities.*
4. the individual sees his own time as *nova aeras* or new era, in opposition to the previous description of the present as *nostra aerum* or our time.

Modernism before modernity

If we take Habermas' categories that define modernity, we should say that in terms of Brazil, modernity was, at that time, confined to a very small part of the population if we consider all the manifestations that define it. Habermas is the one that presents the categories that define the rise of modernity, but he is also the one that proposes modernity as an inconclusive project. In addition, both Perry Anderson[3] and Detlev Peukert[4] reinforce the connections between modernism and the inconclusive modernity, suggesting that modernism only arises where modernity is not solved, where the old and the new overlap in a unstable manner[5,6]. Although we can state that modernity, not only in Latin America, has been an inconclusive project, the degree of *inconclusiveness* reinforces the idea of an exuberant modernism with deficient

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Figure 1 Oscar Niemeyer, Capela da Pampulha, 1942

Figure 2 Brazilian modernist house

modernization as the most-reiterated hypothesis in the literature of Latin American modernity.

Modernism adopted

Modernist ideas arrived late in Brazil. The curricular reformation[7] at ENBA (Escola Nacional de Belas Artes) in 1930 is considered the starting point in architecture, when Lucio Costa was named Director. A few years later, Costa was responsible for inviting Le Corbusier as a supportive consultant for the design for the Ministry of Education (MEC)[8]. The early Brazilian modernist building that appeared just after, a combination of Corbusiean volumes with sensual curves, called the attention of the architectural media that celebrated such exuberant modernism.

Modernism as the paradigm: the Pampulha's buildings

Supported by the Federal Government and adopted by the emerging sectors of the urban society, modernist architecture was spread all around Brazil. In 1941, Oscar Niemeyer was commissioned to design a series of buildings around Pampulha's artificial lake[9]. The designs of *Capela da Pampulha*, *Casa do Baile*, Casino and Yacht Club, became the paradigm for Brazilian Modernism for decades. The *Capela da Pampulha*, presents parabolic vaults covered by little ceramic tiles (*pastilhas*) and the entrance has a horizontal glazing panel under vertical brise-soleils that filters the light to the interior. Also at the entrance, the inclined canopy sustained by two very thin curved steel columns mark the main entrance. The Casino completes the Pampulha complex. Its free-form canopy supported by thin steel columns and the continuous glass wall on the facade would be exhaustively replicated from then on.

The modernist paradigm reaches the middle class

In Brazil the 1950s are known as "Golden Years" due to their promises, optimism and apparently stable democracy and economy[10]. The working middle class grew in terms of political and economical importance and demanded a modern look, or in other words, a modern facade. Thirsty for any modernity, Brazilian households of the 1950s adopted modernism as the fashionable style for their houses. At the periphery of every major Brazilian city, thousands of small houses were built with modernist facades. The vast majority not designed by architects, those houses present modernist elements re-used, re-adapted, re-applied and re-designed. At their facade compositions, one or two major volumes are defined by different roof slopes. The inverted or reverse-slope roof is the most common, and also used on the canopy or the *varanda*. The *varanda* is normally a covered open addition that serves as a transition from public to private space, used on Brazilian architecture to enlarge the area of shading.

On those modernist houses, the canopy plays the role of the *varanda*, enclosed or not. Both the canopies and the thin steel columns used to support it are directly taken from the Pampulha buildings. Also to protect from the sun and increase privacy, brise-soleils are broadly used. Finally, the modernist houses adopted the ceramic tile as a prominent facade material. Used before by the Portuguese houses of the 17th and 18th century, the ceramic tiles were re-discovered by the modernists on the MEC building, and used plentifully on the Pampulha complex. Launched by the construction material industry, ceramic tiles in rich colors were applied profusely on the facade composition, becaming the trademark of this architectural period in addition to the inverted roof, the inclined canopy and the thin steel columns.

Popular Modernism: Brazilian paradoxical modernity

Given the successful spread and consumption of modernist symbolism in Brazilian housing of the 1950s, such phenomena

may be perceived as successful modernism. What is relevant to discuss from the Brazilian case is the conversion of modern architecture into the predominant aesthetics, its distortions or adaptations and the transformation of modernism into paradigm itself. By doing that it contributed to the formation of a national identity defined in terms of future possibilities, an identity for the *nostra-nova-aerum* (our new time), a combination of modernism, modernity and later modernization. Since modernism does not necessarily imply modernization and is a result of the unstable relation between old and new structures, the simple idea of Latin American exuberant modernism with deficient modernization does not fit into such complex phenomena. The popular response to Brazilian modern architecture is an issue that not only contributes to this discussion but also illuminates its contradictions and fragmented instabilities, like a montage, contradictorily dictating the relation between parts and whole on an image's discourse.

Figure 3 Brazilian modernist house.

Notes

[1] Habermas, Junger. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.

[2] Garcia-Canclini, Nestor. *Hybrid Cultures; Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity,* Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1995.

[3] Anderson, Perry. "Modernity and Revolution", *New Left Review*, 1984

[4] Peukert, Detlev. *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1991.

[5] Anderson, Perry. Op cit.1984.

[6] Peukert, Detlev, Op cit, 1991.

[7] Under Costa's direction, Bauhaus' and Corbusier's ideas were adopted in substitution to the previous Beaux-Art-oriented curriculum.

[8] Working closely with the minister Gustavo Capanema, Costa was responsible for convincing the minister that the winner design in the 1935 competition for the new Ministry of Education (MEC) building was incompatible with the modern ideas they were trying to establish in Brazil. As an arbitrary response to the frustrating result, the prizes were paid but the winning design was discarded. In its place, following Costa's suggestion, Le Corbusier was invited as a supportive consultant for the team of architects commissioned to design the new building.

[9] It is interesting to note that Belo Horizonte's mayor at that time was Jucelino Kubitschek, later the president that built Brasilia.

[10] From 1945 to 1960 the country experienced enormous growth and transformations. The major cities doubled every ten years due to industry expansion and farm mechanization.

USA

18 ETHNIC ENCLAVES: NEW URBANISM AND THE INNER CITY

Udo Greinacher

For over a century, most of the American populace turned its back to the city in its search for a simpler, more harmonious style of life. "The desire to fashion a retreat from the unruly world of power and gain"[1] drove many from the city proper to its outskirts, where they sought tranquillity in a natural setting. As planners, architects, and developers expanded the metropolitan envelope further and further into rural areas, they created the almost seamless sprawl that characterizes the contemporary American landscape. From the City Beautiful elements in streetcar suburbs to towns in bucolic settings by John Nolen, from Garden City designs by Clarence Stein and Henry Wright to the standard postwar suburb, design professionals attempted to marry technological innovations such as the train, streetcar and automobile with the idyllic imagery of the village. This led initially to low-density suburbs with lots of open space, little traffic and unimpaired vistas. These very amenities, however, evaporated as more and more people left the city in pursuit of them. Once an area was developed to 70 percent of its capacity, residents once again experienced crowded and congested neighborhoods, limited opportunities for their children, and many of the vices traditionally associated with urban centers.[2]

As the resulting urban sprawl became more and more unwieldy, many corporations and professional firms relocated to the newest edge cities. This placed them closer to executives' mansions and first rate golf clubs. At the same time they remained readily accessible through their proximity to interstate highways and regional airports. Recent data, however, suggests that some of these suburban downtowns are struggling economically.[3] Like other suburbs, they have begun to experience an increase in crime, traffic congestion and the cost of living. As a result, corporations have left, and office spaces have been reclassified to the lower "Class B" status, thus bringing in lower rent than anticipated. In addition, nearby malls are experiencing troubling vacancies due to the loss of major retailers. In such situations, the cycle of flight, renewal and decline might begin again in a yet more remote location.

New Urbanism, the latest reform movement to address our dissatisfaction with urban and suburban environments, attempts to overcome these ills by redefining the nature of the American metropolis. Conceived as a critique of the auto-dominated suburb favored by American planners and developers since the 1940's, the movement re-introduces the idea of small walkable communities connected by public transit systems and characterized by different types of land uses. The movement's guidelines, the Ahwahnee principles, call for diverse housing types to provide for people with varying incomes. In addition, they stress the importance of a wide range of employment opportunities as well as a mixture of schools, parks and civic facilities within the community.

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They also suggest that the location of businesses and public facilities encourage pedestrian traffic or bicycle use. Furthermore, they recommend that the community have easy access to a regional transit system, and that it cultivate a well-defined green edge to permanently discourage sprawl. Rather than applying these well-conceived guidelines to inner cities as set fourth in the preamble to the Ahwahnee Principles[4] the majority of New Urbanist designers propose new communities that, like villages, have little or no ties to the city proper. Indeed, even though Webster's Dictionary defines urbanism as the "character of life in the cities," it is exactly these areas that are largely ignored.

Although proponents of New Urbanism genuinely attempt to better everyday life, the movement itself has nonetheless generated criticism on several fronts. Nelson Benzing, Professor of Urban Design at the University of North Carolina, Charlotte, argues that "partial achievements . . . [of the movement] . . . must be as rigorously criticized for their shortcomings as they are applauded for their strengths, or they will be adopted as ideal models."[5] He goes on to question whether a town or village isolated from the workplace can ever become more than a Garden Suburb. Indeed, many of what are called New Urbanist communities are nothing more than "dense blocks of suburban housing," in which "developers struggle to establish the crucial businesses, stores, and civic centers that make up true communities."[6] Several other architectural critics and developers argue that communities such as these (5,000 inhabitants or less) are unable to generate enough jobs within walking distance or to support an economically feasible commercial center that would serve the needs of the residents.[7] Due to the relatively low density of most of these communities (about sixteen units per acre[8]), it is highly unlikely that the diversity sought by New Urbanists can be achieved.

Given the narrow range of employment opportunities, commercial establishments and/or religious institutions, residents of these communities either have to exhibit common tastes, beliefs, and customs or commute to other municipalities that cater to their needs. Unless public transportation exists nearby, this mandates ownership of at least one car per family,[9] significantly weakening the New Urbanist criticism of auto-dominated suburbs. Indeed, few neotraditional communities are willing to financially support public transportation. Instead, current taxation and transportation subsidies continue to favor individual transportation, without which the price of a gallon of gasoline would increase by $2.25 at the pump.[10] There are, however, a few cases in which communities support public transportation. In 1994 Portland area residents voted for payroll and gas taxes to pay for the public transit necessary to connect the New Urbanist community, Clackamas Town Center, with the city.[11] Residents supported the project despite the fact that the community's "sixteen units per acre will not support an effective system of mass transport."[12]

New Urbanist communities also face a severe challenge in the marketplace. Unlike conventional suburban tracts, where the promise of large lots in a sheltered environment are enough to lure buyers, New Urbanist settlements are marketed as entire communities. "Well-timed phasing of homes, stores, and other community amenities"[13] becomes crucial to the marketing effort. Unfortunately, the development of community facilities, public transportation infrastructure and service components often occurs before they are economically feasible or sustainable. This huge up-front cost, in turn, raises house prices well above market rate.[14] New Urbanist projects are thus likely to suffer in real estate recessions if the houses aren't sold quickly enough. The communities might fail to attract retail stores (Kentlands, Maryland), lay idle due to the developer's financial troubles (Laguna West, CA), or place retail out of residents' walking distance in order to better serve the surrounding auto-oriented region (Newpoint, South Carolina). These economic challenges force many developers to abandon the wide range of housing types required by the New Urbanist principles. Single-family homes dominate the landscape in many communities (Laguna West), where an economically diverse body of residents can no longer be accommodated. By reducing the variety of housing types, the community is more likely to attract a wealthier and often more homogeneous group of buyers.[15] While these deviations from the original plan might aid the project's success in the marketplace, they certainly undermine the New Urbanist ideals.

New Urbanists have indeed brought forward many sound and relevant principles. Unfortunately, they have still failed to create complete, integrated communities with a wide range of housing and employment opportunities as well as a diverse mix of retail, entertainment and civic services. Furthermore, due to a general absence of public transportation, residents of New Urbanist communities have not become significantly less car-dependent. Is New Urbanism thus perpetuating the low-density, car-dependent, suburban condition, and creating nothing more than a form of *New Suburbanism*?[16] Can the movement possibly succeed in a suburban environment, where the attitude towards auto-oriented real estate development and urban planning prevails? And aren't the movement's efforts to create autonomous communities misdirected, for "much of the populist migration out of villages arose precisely because they were oppressive to the human spirit and otiose as a form of sociopolitical organization?"[17] Given these questions, critics such as William Fulton conclude that "it makes no sense . . . to build neotraditional neighborhoods on the metropolitan fringe while ignoring the decline of traditionally designed neighborhoods in the urban core."[18]

America's cities, although often characterized by urban blight, are equipped with the utilities, amenities, and infrastructure that are integral parts of New Urbanist planning. They offer a range of housing and employment opportunities for a diverse community, as well as the historical, cultural, educational and nostalgic associations that most suburban downtowns and neotraditional communities have been unable to acquire. As a result, recent years have seen the beginning of an urban renaissance, where corporations, rather than moving their offices to even more distant small towns, are expanding their operations in the more dynamic, traditional downtowns.[19] Perhaps the promoters of New Urbanism should shift their focus from settlements at the fringe to the city proper. Rather

than studying suburban prototypes such as Garden Cities, their research could scrutinize inner city districts that have been able to withstand the overall trend of urban flight.

New York's Chinatown is one of a few successful inner-city neighborhoods that continues to thrive as a community. For over 100 years it has provided a place of residence and employment in retail, service and production for Chinese immigrants. Unlike many other ethnic communities—such as Little Italy, German Town, and Irish or Jewish enclave—that made up vast parts of downtown America during the nineteenth century, Chinatown has remained intact. Most urban ghettos that provided refuge for early European immigrants served only as a home for newcomers until they could learn English and adjust to American culture. They subsequently dispersed and integrated themselves into the larger fabric of the city. Even today, however, Chinatown continues to accommodate residential and communal spaces within its compact and coherent layout. As a result, this ethnic enclave enjoys a vibrant streetlife throughout the week, attracts customers and visitors from surrounding neighborhoods and other cities, and experiences dynamic growth in its industries and commerce.[20] With these accomplishments in mind, Chinatown could possibly become a model for the rejuvenation of the American city.

Located between Manhattan's Little Italy, the Irish Five Points, and 'Jew Town,'[21] Chinatown emerged as immigrants fled eastward from the abuse and mob violence that they experienced in the Western States. With the Central Pacific Railroad completed and many of the California gold mines exhausted, over 100,000 Chinese immigrants started to compete with other ethnic groups for jobs as canners, fishermen and industrial or agricultural workers. They earned less than other laborers, thus posing a financial threat, especially to the Irish, who reacted by persecuting them relentlessly. The environment became steadily more hostile, leading many Chinese to move to the more tolerant metropolitan areas on the East Coast.

In New York City, the first Chinese settled around Manhattan's Chatham Square, a neighborhood already host to immigrants and transients. The area's proximity to the docks provided opportunity for employment as well as the security of anonymity due to the large number of seamen roaming the streets. By the turn of the 20th century, the small community of 150 Chinamen had developed into an enclave of about 4000 residents. The three-block area defined by Bayard Street, Doyers Street, Chatham Square and Mott Street housed predominantly small-scale operations: shops, grocery stores, restaurants and laundries.[22] The majority of its residents were male because the Chinese Exclusion Act passed in 1882 excluded Chinese women from immigrating. Interracial marriages were frowned upon, which left Chinese men for the most part unable to marry, start a family or interact with other groups based on children and family life. Assimilation was thus practically impossible. The members of this 'bachelor society' saw themselves as sojourners, who dreamt of making their fortune and returning to their native country. The community reflected this lifestyle in its boarding houses, brothels, opium dens and gambling facilities. Indeed, until the revocation of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, Chinatown remained virtually unchanged.

The years following the second world war saw a steady increase in Chinatown's population and a subsequent expansion of its territory. As the number of its residents grew to 20,000, the area they inhabited expanded from three to seven blocks. During this period, women were once again allowed to enter the United States from China.[23] The new immigrants found employment in the garment industry as well as in the many small-scale Chinese businesses that catered to the needs of the community. Local restaurants flourished as well because more and more workers lacked the time to shop and prepare a meal. By the 1960's Chinatown's population no longer consisted almost exclusively of single men. Rather, much like the 19th century ethnic communities such as Little Italy, or the Irish or Jewish neighborhoods, it housed families who wanted to make their permanent home in the United States. Unlike the residents of other ethnic enclaves, however, the Chinese remained for the most part in their own community, and were not assimilated into the overall fabric of New York City.

The slow stream of Chinese immigrants turned into a torrent with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965. The legislation based admission to the United States on two principles: first, kinship with American citizens; and second, professional skills needed to ensure the growth of the US economy. Consequently, two distinctively different groups of immigrants emerged: 'Uptown' and 'Downtown' Chinese.

Most of the 'Uptown Chinese' immigrated from Taiwan or from major cities on the mainland. Family ties did not play a role in their admission because, through their specialized education, they were able to meet the needs of the American economy. Most were proficient in the English language or were able to acquire proficiency within a short period of time.[24] Those who continued their studies at American universities moved easily into well-paid, white-collar professions. They did not settle in Chinatown but preferred outlying areas where they could more readily become a part of American society. Although reluctant to settle in Chinatown, 'Uptown Chinese' contributed to its economy through their frequent weekend excursions. They traveled to the community to purchase Chinese goods, sample the cooking, participate in extended family celebrations, or visit one of the seven Chinese movie theaters.[25] The sheer number of these visits prompted the opening of the area's first supermarkets, which catered to this clientele by stocking frozen and canned dishes. The advent of these stores did not, however, change the character of the community to a large degree.

Unlike the 'Uptown Chinese,' the majority of those admitted based on kinship came from rural areas in the southern part of mainland China. They had little formal education or training, and lacked the language skills necessary to find work anywhere but in Chinatown. Known as 'Downtown Chinese,'

they lived close to their sponsoring relatives, and sought support from the economic and social network of the enclave. As a result of this large influx of new immigrants, Chinatown once again outgrew its boundaries, and spilled over into what had traditionally been Jewish, Irish and Italian neighborhoods. By 1985 it encompassed 35 blocks and housed 70,000 residents. Five years later its population had doubled, and its territory had expanded yet another five blocks. Most of its residents worked in restaurants or garment factories within the community. These industries sparked the growth of related businesses such as restaurant suppliers, sewing machines repair shops and textile wholesalers. Furthermore, Chinatown's drastic growth created new opportunities for a variety of small-scale businesses that operated on the sidewalk. The constant arrival of new immigrants kept wages low, which, in turn, fueled a tremendous increase in the economic growth of the community.

In order to meet the needs of Chinatown's growing population, an ever increasing number of restaurants opened their doors to the public. Competition was fierce, and some Chinese owners began to deliberately attract the white-collar clientele who worked in the nearby municipal buildings and on Wall Street. As Chinatown's restaurants and specialty stores began to attract many professionals, the community gained respectability, and its reputation changed from slum area to popular tourist attraction.[26] Furthermore, as a reaction to Anti-Asian sentiments during the Vietnam war, many 'Uptown Chinese' professionals moved to Chinatown. They found employment as social workers or in banks and law offices. As a result, Chinatown's make-up gradually changed to include a more balanced mix of residents from all walks of life. Today Chinatown hosts numerous bilingual lawyers, doctors, real estate agents and tax accountants, as well as many banks, four TV production companies, several newspapers and numerous office buildings. Street vendors, small-scale shops and restaurants enliven the area as residents and tourists mingle on the street. In short, Chinatown provides an excellent example of the complete, integrated community proposed by the New Urbanists in their Ahwahnee principles.

Chinatown and New Urbanist communities fulfill these ambitious principles to differing degrees. Both contain housing, shops, work places, schools, parks and civic facilities, all within easy walking distance. Although the types of accommodations differ, both communities offer various types of housing. Chinatown does not offer the single detached home found in New Urbanist communities. It does, however, provide residences from upscale condominiums to inexpensive boarding houses to studios shared by more than one family. This wide range of housing types serves an economically more diverse group of people than those housed in the more limited choices found in New Urbanist communities. Indeed, in many other ways, Chinatown more completely fulfills the New Urbanist requirements for a successful community. It offers a wider range of jobs that include service and executive positions as well as employment in manufacturing and repairs. In addition, it is connected to a much better public transportation network than most New Urbanist communities, which in many cases have failed to implement their transportation plans. Due to its greater population, Chinatown also supports a more diverse spectrum of schools, churches, stores, restaurants and entertainment centers. The sheer number of these establishments in such a small area creates a vibrant atmosphere that draws people from their homes where they join the crowds that mingle on the streets. This picture contrasts sharply with the sedate character of neotraditional neighborhoods.

It should now be evident that inner city neighborhoods can achieve the goals set by New Urbanist planners. Perhaps we should turn our attention to the rejuvenation of these areas rather than creating neotraditional communities on valuable farmland. The American Farmland Trust claims that the compact development patterns proposed by New Urbanists will slow down the conversion of farmland into developed areas when compared to the current low-density patterns of suburban sprawl.[27] Nevertheless, these neotraditional communities would consume huge amounts of open space. Were planners to focus their efforts on inner city districts, however, much of the natural and agricultural land at the urban fringe could be preserved for future generations. The Ahwahnee Principle that "community design should help conserve resources and minimize waste" would also be served should the inner city become the setting for New Urbanist designs. Existing infrastructure (sewage, streets, public transportation systems, schools, fire departments, hospitals, police stations, etc.) could be rejuvenated at far less expense than the cost of creating it anew in an outlying community. If, as at present, the desertion of our cities for new communities at the fringe continues, each generation will fund an entire new infrastructure rather than capitalizing on existing investments.

It is high time that design professionals shift their focus away from the planning of new suburban villages towards the revitalization of inner city neighborhoods. The guidelines for such endeavors already exist in the New Urbanist Ahwahnee Principles. Although these have only been partially implemented in many neotraditional communities, they could most likely be fully realized once applied to the city proper. Chinatown fulfills the guidelines set forth by New Urbanist theoreticians, and could therefore serve as a model for the rejuvenation of the city. Of course Chinatown has over 80 years of history as an ethnic enclave. This has led to the development of strong ties as well as to support systems that might not be found in racially mixed communities. Does this mean that Chinatown might not work as a model for urban revitalization? Only the future can tell. Evidence is strong enough, however, that makes such an experiment worthwhile.

Rejuvenation of the urban environment, however, will not happen overnight. After World War II, many cities implemented drastic urban renewal measures through which much of the small-scale, mixed-use fabric was demolished over a short period of time. Office towers, hotels and parking lots replaced many of the older structures at the core of the city, and convention centers covered multiple downtown blocks. Much of the livelihood of these areas evaporated as its residents were relocated to make room for big businesses.

Although most renewal efforts were focused on the urban core, adjacent older neighborhoods also experienced changes of similar magnitude. As their more affluent residents moved to outlying suburbs, rents and property values declined drastically and much of the 19th century fabric started to deteriorate. Currently, most of these older residential neighborhoods form a ring of dilapidated, vacant or condemned buildings surrounding the Central Business District.

To combat the blight found in these residential neighborhoods, planners should introduce more retail and, in some areas, light industry.[28] Tax exemptions could be used to attract stores and services for the neighborhood residents. This would in turn encourage the renovation and preservation of existing buildings. Absentee land ownership and excessive speculation could be discouraged through tougher ordinances, stricter enforcement of building inspections and heavy fines for any violations. Empty lots could be used for parks, playgrounds, child-care facilities or schools to attract families and to help generate a sense of community. A portion of the tax revenue generated by the Central Business District could fund these improvements, which would go a long way towards revitalizing the neighborhood.

The Central Business District should also be rezoned to allow for a residential/commercial/light industrial mixture. This zoning, in conjunction with tax exemptions on capital investments, would attract new businesses and industries to the downtown area. Because it is vital to the success of the rejuvenation program that residents move back downtown, planners should also reintroduce housing, schools and parks to accommodate them. Furthermore, every effort should be undertaken to attract a variety of specialty retailers. These stores would serve the new residential population as well as the thousands of employees that commute to the inner city. As more and more people shy away from superstores because they want to "go on an errand instead of a shopping excursion,"[29] these stores would undoubtedly attract many customers, and promote a richer, more varied streetlife.[30]

Architects and planners should limit the size of new structures downtown as well as in residential areas in order to conform to the existing fabric rather than destroying its continuity. Street facades should be articulated with great attention to detail so that a visually diverse street space will prevail. If necessary, the storefronts of existing large-scale buildings should be remodeled to fit this standard. All stores and establishments should be oriented towards the street, and in commercial areas sidewalks should be widened in order to accommodate sale racks, outdoor seating or small stands for street vendors. In order to keep the street envelope continuous and to support the visual interest created by the above measures, the city should replace a few on-grade parking lots with parking structures. The remaining lots could either be filled with additional mixed-use buildings or used for parks, open air markets or playgrounds. In addition, the city should undertake every effort possible to provide clean and highly visible public transportation throughout the day and well into the evening.

Should these suggestions be followed, the city could be transformed into a vibrant, exciting environment that would lure its residents back from the suburbs, thus providing it with a broader economic base. The increased tax revenue would allow rejuvenation to continue, which would broaden the city's overall appeal. In short, the cycle of renewal would begin, which could lead to the rebirth of the American city.

Notes

1 Nancy Stieber, "The Seductions of Withdrawal," December 1995, quoted in William Fulton, *The New Urbanism* (Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1996), p.7.

2 Fulton, *The New Urbanism*, p.4.

3 Charles Lockwood, "Edge Cities on the Brink," *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 December 1994.

4 The preamble demands that New Urbanists "first, infill existing communities and, second, plan new communities that will successfully serve the needs of those who live and work within them." For a detailed description of the 1991 Ahwahnee Principles see Fulton, *The New Urbanism*, p.6.

5 Nelson S. Benzing, "Agenda for a New American Urbanism: A Critique of The New Urbanism," in *Proceedings: 83rd ACSA Annual Meeting* (Seattle: ACSA, 1995), p.499.

6 Heidi Landecker, "Is New Urbanism Good for America," *Architecture* 85, no.4 (1996), p.70

7 Edward Robbins, "New Urbanism's Unkept Promise," *Harvard Design Magazine* Winter/Spring (1997), p.61.

8 In a discussion held at the GSD in July, 1996 and published in the *Harvard Design Magazine* Winter/Spring (1997), Andres Duany asserts that "sixteen units per acre is the highest density that works with parking. Beyond that you have to use heroic measures to accommodate parking."

9 According to Peter Calthorpe, each car adds about $ 8,000/ year to the family budget. Landecker, "Good for America," p.68.

10 Stephen B. Goddard, quoted in Benzing, "Agenda for a New American Urbanism," p.501.

11 Landecker, "Good for America," p.73.

12 Alex Krieger, "Urban or Suburban," *Harvard Design Magazine* Winter/Spring (1997), p.52.

13 Fulton, *The New Urbanism*, p. 28.

[14] Single-family houses in the Kentlands were 30% above market rate. Ibid., p.28.

[15] Market research on New Urbanist communities shows that the majority of buyers have a household income of $ 51,000 - 110,000 (60%/**48%**), have no children living at home (73%/**53%**), and are willing to pay more to shop locally (56%/**32%**). Comparative figures of non-buyers are in bold. Ibid., p. 26.

[16] Alex Krieger, quoted in *Harvard Design Magazine* Winter/Spring (1997), p.52.

[17] David Harvey, "The New Urbanism and the Communitarian Trap," *Harvard Design Magazine* Winter/Spring (1997), p.69.

[18] Fulton, *The New Urbanism*, p. 29.

[19] According to Charles Lockwood, the vacancy rate in downtown Boston has fallen to 12% from 19% in 1991. Lockwood, "Edge Cities on the Brink."

[20] According to Min Zhou and John R. Logan, New York's Chinatown serves as a place of residence, a place of work, and as an industrial sector, thus fulfilling the three criteria for an enclave economy. See "Returns on Human Capital in Ethnic Enclaves: New York City's Chinatown," *American Sociological Review* 54 (1989), pp. 809-820.

[21] John Kuo Wei Tchen, quoted in Dolores Hayden, *The Power of Place* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), p. 50.

[22] Arthur Bonner, *Alas! What Brought You Hither?* (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1997), gives the following breakdown of economic activity by 1888: 2000 laundries in Manhattan; 30 all-purpose stores catering mainly to Chinese; 8 restaurants; many cigar markers, few barbers, scribes, merchants, clerks.

[23] In 1950, the male/female ratio was 1.89 : 1 compared to 27 : 1 in 1885. See Peter Kwong, *The New Chinatown* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), p.20.

[24] According to Peter Kwong (1987, p.61), Taiwan tailors its educational system to the needs of the American job market, teaching English in junior high school and encouraging students to study math, physics, or engineering even if their talents lie elsewhere.

[25] See: Bruce Edward Hall, "Ghosts," *New York*, 4 October 1993, for a description of such a visit.

[26] Whether the interest in this enclave was sparked by Nixon's visit to China, or whether the preference for Chinese food was really a reflection of a changing lifestyle amongst urban professionals continues to remain unclear. Peter Kwong (1987, p.34-5).

[27] Fulton, *The New Urbanism*, p.23.

[28] A similar approach is undertaken in East Harlem, NY, where attempts to re-introduce light manufacturing into a depressed residential area are aided by the creation of Empowerment and Economic Development Zones. Companies that move into the manufacturing zone are exempt from city and state sales taxes on capital investment and are eligible for state and Federal tax credits and a 30 percent reduction in their utility bills. *New York Times*, 7 September 1997, p.20.

[29] One retail analyst quoted in Richard Panek, "Superstore Inflation," *New York Times Magazine*, 7 April 1997, p.68.

[30] Diesel Jeans, which opened a store complete with D.J. and coffee bar, or Levis, which offers custom-fit jeans for women, are thriving examples of this new trend.

19 ETHNICITY IN THE CITY: READING REPRESENTATIONS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCE IN INDIAN STOREFRONTS

Arijit Sen

What are the representations of ethnicity in the urban environment?

In the early decades of the twentieth century, tourist brochures and guide books promised that to enter the borders of San Francisco's Chinatown was to enter "another world" to shops full of "strange jewelry" and produce markets displaying preserved foods in "fantastic forms". In these descriptions the distinctive material culture of the ethnic ghettos—architecture, dress, store window decoration, and signs—begin to symbolize the ethnic community.

The contemporary landscape of urban spaces used by Indian immigrants is not limited to a territorially bounded ethnic enclave. In Northern California—from San Jose to Sacramento—dispersed networks of regional retail shopping strips, suburban residences, cultural and religious institutions, and professional offices catering to recent Indian immigrants are spread across the landscape rather than being concentrated in ethnic ghettos. But even in this networked landscape immigrants continue to use distinctive stereotypical imagery—just as in ethnic ghettos—to make the ethnic spaces legible and visually distinct from the urban context where they are located.

Consequently, there is a tendency to see ethnic public spaces solely in opposition to the normative mainstream. Indeed, on first glance, the rhetoric of difference embodied in the material culture may emphasize the dichotomy. I will argue that by reading the manifestations of ethnic spaces in the context of local history and within the context of a larger urban setting, one can uncover the multiple layers and meanings that lay hidden behind these imagery. For example, if we are looking at ethnic stores, we need to set the material representations of difference within the context of the local history of that place, and the backgrounds of individuals who shop and sell in these stores and their history of immigration.

University Avenue in Berkeley runs East-West and connects the University of California campus to Interstate 80. Although University Avenue is dotted with ethnic Indian stores, the street is not an Asian Indian ethnic ghetto[1] and the majority of the patrons as well as the store owners do not reside in Berkeley.[2] The prosperity of these stores depends on the ability of the out-of-city customers successfully identifying the Indian stores from the neighboring non-ethnic stores. The legibility of these spaces as "Indian" become absolutely important because they are not set in the context of the ethnic ghetto.

One of the recurring signs used in the storefronts along University Avenue to represent an Indian store is the image of the Indian woman wearing a sari. A sari is an un-stitched fabric, usually 6 yards long, that is wrapped around the body.

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Female mannequins wearing the Indian sari or the posters of Hindi movie heroines are ubiquitous and have become a way of representing Indian culture—distinct from the American.

The image of the Indian-woman-in-a-sari representing the domain of the ethnic community and homeland is not new. An early example of this image can be seen in a news magazine published in 1920 by the Gadar Party of San Francisco. The Gadar Party was an organization of nationalist Indians in the US, organized to gain independence from Britain. On the cover of their journal was a figure of Liberty blowing the horn of Independence. Here she is shown wearing an Indian Sari. The picture of this presumably Western Anglo woman, was appropriated as a symbol of the Indian nation by changing her dress.

The rhetoric behind the image is reiterated in contemporary movies, media and literature too.[3] Take the example of the movie *Pardes*. The movie poster sets up the binary opposition: Indian soul vs. American dreams. Ganga the heroine becomes representative of the "Indian soul" as she is shown to embody the cultural notions of propriety and domestic values of India.

Similar messages in the mannequins and movie posters on the storefronts tell us only a partial—if not incorrect—story of the culture and social structure of the ethnic group. By associating the image of the woman primarily as a symbol of Indian cultural values these representations render invisible the cultural and class differences those same images can portray.[4]

How can we identify the difference between these stores when the store fronts and material culture from outside look very similar to each other? A map of the Indian stores along University Avenue begins to show us what the storefront design successfully concealed. There is a cluster of stores concentrated towards the western end of University Avenue. Between San Pablo and Sacramento there are hardly any Indian stores. Towards the eastern end there are a few Indian stores that—unlike the former—are more spaced apart.

What do we read of this? Are they random dispersions or is there more to this unique dispersal of stores along University Avenue?

I will examine two representative Indian sari stores located at two ends of University Avenue and show that—despite similar looks—the location of the stores point towards class divisions within the Indian community. To do that we will first need to go back in time and set the story of the Indian stores in the urban history of the City of Berkeley and the history of immigration from India.

In 1866, the area around the University of California campus was called Berkeley. A separate town called Oceanview, with its working-class neighborhoods, thrived on the western plains along the San Francisco Bay.[5] Oceanview was incorporated into the City of Berkeley in 1878.

Berkeley at that time—and even now—was divided into the hills and the plains. As the uninhabited area between San Pablo and downtown was settled during the first four decades of the twentieth century, University Avenue west of San Pablo Avenue became associated with crime and urban blight. This image persists today despite crime statistics that point to the contrary.[6] Going up the social ladder for a working-class resident of West Berkeley meant moving towards the hills. San Pablo Avenue became an imaginary line representing the class divide.[7] Onto this pre-existing context, the Indian store owners laid their own landscape.

By 1910, as a result of the Indian students enrolled in the University, Berkeley had become a familiar name among the few Indian immigrants spread across Northern California. But it was only after the 1965 amendments to the exclusionary immigration laws that the total population of Indian immigrants in Berkeley and surrounding areas became large enough to sustain a local Indian grocery and a dress store. The growing interest in India among the 1960s counter-culture intellectuals also made Indian goods popular among local American consumers.

By 1977, the dress store Shrimati's was the third Indian store to open on University Avenue. Its owner Hitesh Dhupelia, an Indian from South Africa, chose this location because of high property values, proximity of the police and city government offices, and apparent safety of the neighborhood. Shrimati's core Indian customers were skilled, professional, middle-class immigrants who entered the United States under the Third Preference of the 1965 Immigration Act.[8] The Indian immigrant bourgeoisie—as Annanya Bannerjee prefers to call them—favored shopping in the safe downtown neighborhood.

In addition to expensive silk saris imported from India, customers would come to the store to buy cheaper, easy to wash, Japanese artificial-silk saris. In the 1970s and 1980s Japanese fabric was very expensive in India because of an Indian government policy that put a heavy surcharge on imports. Expatriate Indians visiting India would take the Japanese saris as gifts. By 1991, liberalization policies made imported fabrics available—and cheap—in India. As the demand for Japanese fabric declined among the immigrant bourgeoisie, other Indian boutiques selling expensive silks sprang up in San Jose and other South Bay Silicon Valley locations where many professional Indians live.[9] Shrimati's lost its large middle-class clientele to these more famous and well-stocked stores.

The new customers in search of Japanese saris were out-of-towners, many of them from a social class of individuals whose taste differed from that of the professionals. They would compare prices, haggle, and look for deals. In Shrimati's haggling is simply not encouraged.[10] To Dhupelia of Shrimati's, the sari is a sign of one's social class. Therefore he read the change in clientele as a decline in customers with social standing and taste.

Today, we find that despite the deceptive window design, Shrimati's is no longer a sari store. For the last six years the owners of Shrimati's have gradually moved away from the

sari trade to the music and CD business. Given the nature of their business, the sari mannequins near the entrance say nothing of the merchandise inside but serve the sole purpose of marking the entrance window with an easily identifiable sign of an Indian store.

Now let us look at the cluster of stores located on the western side of San Pablo Avenue that has the image of being blighted. In 1978 there was only one Indian store on the western end of San Pablo. The number of stores along this side of the street increased much later—during the mid-eighties. West Berkeley, with its low rent and proximity to the highway, became the preferred place to start new businesses. Today Roopam Saris is one of the five sari stores in this area.

The demographics of the immigrant Indians in the Bay Area was also changing during the 1980s. The new stores responded to these changes. Chain migration—following the initial migration of professionals—now brought businessmen, working-class, and less-educated Indians into the US.[11] By the late 1980s the population of non-professionals had overtaken the number of professional Indians immigrating to the US.

Roopam Saris is part of a larger conglomeration of Indian stores bunched together in close proximity. These are grocery, clothing, jewelry, food, music/video and electronics stores. A store owner described this clustering as an "outdoor mall" and a "one-stop-shopping-experience". During the weekends, Indian families from out of town drive to Berkeley. They park and walk to these stores comparing prices, as they do their weekly shopping. The customers represent a cross section of the community differing in class, age, gender, and background. Most teenage children cluster in music and video stores. The women go from store to store looking for good deals, while older males cluster around the entrance of stores. Parking is free on Sundays. Roopam Saris and other stores west of San Pablo remain open on Sundays for their out-of-town customers while Shrimati's—near downtown Berkeley—remain closed on Sundays.

Once again the gendered images on the storefronts portray the shops as the domain of the homeland—distinct and separate from the adjacent American public realm. The rhetoric of home demands that the modes of propriety, behavior and public transaction expected in the public realm is suspended in the informal homelike atmosphere of the Indian stores. To the customer that means that they can haggle and demand a special low "family" price from the store owners. For the store owners, survival depends on the delicate balance between profitable business and the homelike informality of the ethnic domain. Unlike Shrimati's, stores owners west of San Pablo marketing to a much diverse clientele don't exclude those who haggle. Instead they put up signs proclaiming NO RETURNS, FRIENDS AND RELATIVES NOT ALLOWED BEYOND THIS POINT and FIXED PRICE ONLY to discourage such practices. They place most of the merchandise behind secure counters. As a result, the interior of their store—unlike Shrimati's open and accessible interiors—is built as a series of zones in which physical access is restricted to customers according to their familiarity.

Sari mannequins appeal to specific target clientele. The cheaper mannequins in the Roopam Saris storefront are imported from India. These mannequins are draped with gaudier and cheaper fabric. The mannequins of Sona Chaandi, another sari store a block from Roopam Saris, have a sculpted thin Anglo super-model looks that project a more chic, modern image. This store caters to a younger audience.

To an experienced eye the nature of the sari fabric, the mannequin, the nature of the clientele, and way the woman wear their saris speaks of social class, background and taste. Not only are the fabrics expensive, but the method of draping the saris becomes a sign of culture and grace. For example, bad taste is depicted by gaudy and cheap saris worn too high above the ankle. Saris worn by the bourgeoisie become cultural capital for them during social events. The notion of cultural capital rests on drawing a distinction between those who cultivate a certain taste and those who seem to lack that taste.

The history of Berkeley, rent, property values, and the image of the street set up two distinct zones—one inhabited by the working class while the other one associated with the downtown and the University Campus. The connective tissues of a dispersed ethnic Indian landscape mediates that existing local landscape, and is maintained by a system of legible, repetitious, and coherent signs. These signs mark the Indian stores from their neighboring context and thereby allow for a liberating facade behind which the immigrant individual juggles the conforming notions of assimilation and the freedom to retain difference—on their own terms. For the ethnic entrepreneurs this provides an acceptable economic niche in which he makes a rewarding profit. But are these signs so very liberating as we are led to believe? Signs are as perspectival constructs, open to individual readings and interpretations. In the case of stores along University Avenue, the system of signs become tools that welcome some clients while discourage others. To the outside viewer, the invisibility of these covert exclusionary messages hides how divisions and structures of power work within the ethnic group. The cultural landscape of Indian immigrants that unfolds along University Avenue is a fractured landscape reflecting a social division where the breaks are inflected by taste and social class—that is the availability of cultural capital by the bourgeoisie and the lack of it by the rest. By examining how the nascent ethnic landscape mediates into the existing spatial and cognitive structures of the local urban fabric we can find pointers that help recover the unseen from the hypervisible and enrich our understanding of ethnic landscapes.

Notes

[1] Planned as a street with a mix of residential and commercial uses, University Avenue is promoted as the "entrance to the city of Berkeley" (City of Berkeley Planning Dept.

Publication, 1996).

[2] The Indian immigrants who own stores along University Avenue live away from their shops. For example, Deepak Ajmani of Bombay Music House lives in Hayward, Kirpal Khanna of Bazaar of India resides in Moraga, Manjul Batra of Ajanta Enterprises has built her residence in Walnut Creek, and Jolly Mehta who is a partner-owner of Copy World commutes from her home in Fremont. The owners of VIKS live in central Berkeley far away from their grocery and fast food store in West Berkeley.

[3] In this movie, in addition to using symbolic representations of the ideal Indian woman, a clear difference between home and homeland is also achieved through touristic images of geographic places. The Indian landscape is made of so called domestic images of the village, cluttered courtyard in the village house, merry family festivals, and the ubiquitous image of the women wearing colorful saris set in lush green fields - nature. In contrast America is shown as fast paced, roads with speeding automobiles, themes parks such as Disneyland, slick architecture of tall office towers, and public bars.

[4] Rather these stereotypical images obliterate and render opaque all other information that may tell us how each of these stores are different from one other and how these images may be read differently by different individuals. Borrowing from Arjun Appadurai (1990) one can say that the global landscape of images and ideas are nevertheless *deeply perspectival constructs, inflected very much by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors.*

This is an important point because often what gets lost in the stereotypical imagery is how are these images interpreted differently by different individuals within the immigrant community.

[5] In 1902 an electric trolley went along University Avenue connecting the hills and downtown to the western plains.

[6] Speaking of the West Berkeley neighborhood, Indian store owner Anil Thakkar reminisces, It was a mess when I came in 1984. All these hookers used to hang around.

[7] This was true for many Finnish factory workers who left their working class cottages along 9th and 10th streets to buy homes along streets such as Cowper just East of San Pablo, and then move further along.

[8] Between 1965-69 (INS Statistics) the number of Indian immigrants who immigrated into the United States under the Occupational Preferences category numbered around 10,692 people. Out of that, 9174 came under the Third Preference as skilled professionals. From Indian Immigrants in the United States: Demographic Trends, Economic Assimilation in the Host Society, and Impact on the Sending Society. By Urmila Minocha Conference paper. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Population Institute. (1984)

[9] For example Nalli Sarees, a well known and trusted sari store in India recently opened its Northern California branch in South Bay.

[10] Dhupelia's reluctance to serve these kinds of customers is also reflected by Kirpal Khanna who owns Bazaar of India two blocks away, "We don't expect too many Indians because...When they come to Indian stores they think "Oh.. no.. no.. no.. this is our home town, we gonna haggle"...they expect bargain...and then on top of that they want to return the merchandise after using it for a day or so. So we have over the years lost many many customers."

[11] According to 1979 INS statistics, the total number of Indian immigrants who entered under the Occupation Preferences was 6,753. Out of that 3658 were under the professional and technical preference. The rest were either family members coming under the reunification clause or from the non-professional work categories.From Indian Immigrants in the United States: Demographic Trends, Economic Assimilation in the Host Society, and Impact on the Sending Society. By Urmila Minocha Conference paper. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Population Institute. (1984)

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Primary sources for this work include interviews with many shop owners from the Berkeley area which are Kirpal Khanna, Bazaar of India (June 1996), Hitesh Dhupelia (March 1996), Shrimati's, Jolly Mehta, Copyworld (February 1996), Manjul Batra, Ajanta Enterprises (February 1997), Kumar Batra (February 1997), Deepak Ajmani, Bombay Music House (December 1995), Chabildas Khatri, Roopam *Saris* (December 1995), and Anil Thakkar (December 1995).

20 NEW IFE: REBIRTH OF A NATION

Scott Lawrence Ruff

If asked the question, what is African-American Architecture?, most, if not all people's minds would draw a blank. This is because the African-American culture has yet to fully enter into contemporary architectural discourse. As stated by Cornell West:

> Architecture is the last discipline in the humanities to be affected by the crisis of the professional, cultural and managerial strata in American society. This crisis is three fold: that of political legitimacy, intellectual orientation and social identity.[1]

What is put forth in this paper/project is an effort to begin a serious and critical dialogue as to the nature of an African-American Architecture. Three questions will be addressed in this investigation: 1)Where does one begin this investigation? 2) What principles of design surface as possible tools and guide lines? 3) What is the nature of the space that manifests from this study?

To investigate these questions one must probe deeply into the context of the people, the history which has forged an amalgamation of African cultures into a nation. A history which consists of over three hundred years of slavery and genocide. The varied psychological effects of the traumas of dislocation, alienation, and exile upon the minds and spirits of a people. Also, all forms of cultural expression must be synthesized and used in order to manifest an audible, articulate architecture which communes with the being of all people.

In this investigation architecture of Western and North Western Africa was studied, pattern designs found in African textiles and African-American quilts were analyzed. The vital theories and principles that connect these visual expressions of a people to the music produced and the spirituality lived were identified. The elements and principles that were discovered were then applied to the formation of a State Capital for the city of Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. is currently a territory of the U.S., not part of any state. Also the city has a 70%–plus African-American population.[2] These two factors create an open field in the political realm for the implementation of an African-American (State)ment of true cultural freedom. The freedom to develop as an independent people in relationship with other independent people of the United States and the world.

> I could not conjure my God in this place, and it seemed His failure. Surprise ... overwhelmed me.
>
> Lorene Carey

New Ife is a project that was first conceived when I was a graduate student in architecture at Cornell University. As an undergraduate I struggled with architecture and after a time I

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

Figure 1 Composite analysis of Washington, D.C.

achieved a certain amount of academic success, but by the end of my undergraduate career, I felt much like the above quote, empty. I was still searching for myself in the lessons, and to my dismay couldn't find myself. I had a great deal of exposure to contemporary European thought in architecture. I was even exposed to a great deal of Asian philosophy and design theory, but there were no courses on African-American thought and philosophy in architecture. That became my focus in graduate school: African and African-American aesthetics. Early in my graduate studies I came across an article in Ebony magazine, that was focused upon Jesse Jackson and the attempt at designating Washington, D.C. as a State, the 51st state of the United States of America. As I continued to read the all too short article, too short because of my intense interest, the article began to articulate some very interesting statistics, of the demographics of Washington, D.C. and the City-State's contribution to this nation.

> The District of Colombia has more residents than four states. The residents of the district pay more taxes than the residents of nine states, and they pay more taxes per capita than the residents of 49 states. More residents from D.C. died in Vietnam per capita than the residents from 47 states.[3]

If Washington, D.C. became a state it would be given two seats in the Senate (one of which would almost assuredly be African-American), two seats in Congress and a governor. All of whom, even if they were not African-American would

have to address the issues of the large African-American population of their state. In short, by making such a move the United States would give the African-American culture something it should have been given at the abolition of slavery, political and economic compensation and power. This would commence the healing process, and negate some of the schizophrenic paradoxes which have existed since the nation's inception.

A common question asked is: Why are so many African-Americans in the Washington, D.C. area? Not to go too deeply into a history lesson and discussion on the migration of African-Americans in the United States, the answer exists in the geographic position of D.C. and its political status as the Nation's Capital. The city lies just across, what is commonly referred to as the Mason Dixon line, a line that, in general, separated the free states from the states that practiced slavery. Many freedmen settled here to work and work against slavery. That was the first wave of African-American settlement. The next wave came after the abolishment of slavery, D.C. became a refuge from angry Southerners, in as much that the city was the seat, the heart, of the government that emancipated them. During the twentieth century, the growth of industry and the promise of government jobs became the magnet.

The project begins looking at the area formerly known as Washington, D.C. from the perspective of many African-Americans. To many African-Americans, the design of D.C. was done by not Charles L'Enfant but by Benjamin Bannaker, an African-American mathematician, inventor, astronomer and surveyor of the 18th century. He is recorded as the surveyor of the D.C. area. This misunderstanding of his role in the development of the Nation's Capital is used as a starting point for the design of a new state and state capital. In general the role of a surveyor is to mark the boundaries of a tract of land, to determine shape, extent, contour, position, elevation etc. The area is analyzed from the perspective of its original boundaries, which included the area known as Alexandria, VA., its natural boundaries and its man-made boundaries. In (Fig. 1) a composite of smaller analysis studies is shown. Articulated in this composition are the axis of the diamond shape and the axis that divide the city into quadrants. The water ways, which divide the city with natural boundaries. Florida Ave., once called Boundary Street, separates the federal portion of the city from the general domestic areas. The many open areas of land, such as; airports, parks, etc. The strong line that divides the city racially. Suppressed systems such as the public transportation system. These boundaries, many of which are invisible, are physically articulated/ marked throughout the city, as the implementation of the new State structure. In doing so the work of Benjamin Bannaker is forever visible as an integral part of the development of New Ife, and the Nation's Capital.

The strategy used to place the State Capitol, is done with the desire to make a commentary on the centralized and imperialistic organization of the Federal Mall and its relation to the entire city. It is envisioned that the state would be based upon a decentralized scheme, one that would absorb the centralized Federal Mall into its system, but not destroy its strength. This idea comes from the incorporation of concepts of pluralism and multiple hierarchy within the city (ideas derived from the investigation of African aesthetics). In Herman Hertzberger's book, *Lessons for Students in Architecture* he calls this the concept of "Equivalence";

> When something that was a secondary feature in one situation can become the main feature in another, in other words that both features can adapt to specific conditions, then we have a system of values in which there is no hierarchy of importance among component parts. And when, for instance, something in any architectonic ordering, an element or an organization of elements, can perform different functions depending on its placement in different situations, then its value is no longer constant.[4]

Depending on how an element is placed, it can perform a pivotal function, it can become the center of a system in its own right. According to Hertzberger, a system in which primary and secondary elements are recognizable as such cannot but refer to a hierarchy of constant and unalterable values: a system of values which is unequivocal and which consequently precludes interpretation on more than one level.[5]

The design of Washington, D.C. is based upon a French Baroque plan designed by Charles L'Enfant, termed a Grand Manner plan in Spiro Kostof's book *The City Shaped*, in which he states:

> The Grand Manner is not the currency of little towns. It is neither practical nor modest. Perceived as an expansive pattern of sweeping vistas, its relation to topography and prior urban arrangements is arbitrary, its effects often grandiloquent. Typically, behind designs in the Grand Manner stands a powerful, centrist State whose resources and undiluted authority make possible the extravagant urban vision of ramrod-straight avenues, vast uniformly bordered squares, and a suitable accompaniment of monumental public buildings. This is, in fact a public urbanism. It speaks of ceremony, processional intentions, a regimented public life. The street holds the promise of pomp: it traverses the city with single minded purpose and sports accessories like triumphal arches, obelisks and free standing fountains. All this architectural drama subsumes the untidiness of our common routines. Shielded by the spacious envelopes, most of us continue to manage our plain existence, ready to gather into attendant crowds when the high business of the Grand Manner city needs its popular compliment.[6]

Underneath the Grand Manner design lies the orthogonal grid, which has a strong foundation in the design of American cities and in the Greek formation of democratic society. Its homogeneity lends itself well to the idea that all people are created equal. No street is more important than another in its schematic make up and no one point receives preferential positions on diagonal axis or intersecting squares and circles, as is the case in Washington and other cities like Paris. The grid operates upon extremely simple principles, while it clearly sets the overall rules, it is all the more flexible, when it comes



Figure 2 Location of the State Capital

to the detailing of each site. Its economy of means is very much like a chess board, which has an unimaginable number of possibilities.

The design of New Ife attaches on to the highly structured strategy of the grid and decreases its scale, creating a finely meshed fabric that is interwoven into the Grand Manner Plan and the existing city grid. It introduces into the city fabric an extremely tight grid, which is scaled more for pedestrian use than for automotive. Within a State Capital district would exist an ambiguity between a multiblocked mega structure on one level, a grouping of individual midsized buildings and very small-scaled units, all interconnecting in varied ways and levels (improvisational method: variation on a theme). The idea being, that a city is a house, a place made for comfortable formal and informal dwelling.

The program of the State is developed from an understanding of African philosophy, African aesthetic principles (characteristics) and the concept of a social democracy. African philosophy, has three major emphases; that of spirituality, communalism, and pluralism. This leads us to what I call the store front state, the creation of mixed use areas. The state becomes self-sufficient, setting up manufacturing facilities and agricultural space, within the city/state's parameters. Each part of the State network of buildings would essentially be a microcosm of a larger urban scheme. The state areas become the formal manifestation of a government that is for the people, by the people and of the people, in other words it becomes democracy. In placing the domestic, market and civic areas in close proximity, it is hoped that the areas would remain vital during all times of the day and that the tendency of the current government, to neglect lower income areas would be deterred. The State would have to provide proper security and maintenance for its facilities and its surrounding areas, thus providing the same high quality maintenance and security for its neighbors. The program of New Ife will consist of but is not limited to: State Capital, City Halls, state farm(s), Police (security stations), housing, and various market types such as shops and cafes.

After establishing possible location(s) of the State Capital

areas, one area (Fig. 2) is used as a prototype. Its location lies on North Capital St. between Florida Ave. and New York Ave. Conceptually the idea is to place a kente cloth on the site.

Notes

[1] Cornell West, A Note on Race and Architecture, *Keeping Faith* (New York, London: Routledge), 1993, p. 45.

[2] 1990 Census of Population: General Population Characteristics, District of Columbia (U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census), 1992, Table 3.

The percentage is actually 68.5% African-American population, as reported in the census track. I increased the number to account for the large homeless population in the city. These are people the Census Bureau cannot accurately track but abound throughout much of the D.C. urban area.

[3] Laura B. Randolph, What D.C. Statehood Would Mean to Black America, *Ebony Magazine*, (Chicago: Johnson Publications), October 1990, p. 124.

[4] Herman Hertzberger. Equivalence, *Lessons for Students in Architecture* (Rotterdam: Uitgeverij 010 Publishers), 1991, p. 246.

[5] Ibid

[6] Spiro, Kostof. *The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings Through History* (Boston, Toronto, London: Little, Brown & Company), 1991, p. 240.



PART II

CLASS, ECONOMY AND POLITY



Class and Choices

21 URBAN RECONSTRUCTION, DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA: THE CASE OF DURBAN

Brij Maharaj
Sultan Khan

Introduction

South Africa's apartheid legacy is well known and has been widely researched. The impact of apartheid was most acute in the urban areas. The present South African city form had been shaped by the early colonial measures to keep the urban areas predominantly for white use and occupation. As the democratic initiatives of the 1990s gained momentum various strategies were pursued to reverse the effects of racial planning.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate urban reconstruction, development and planning strategies in a specific locality—the city of Durban. Durban is located in the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), one of the most densely populated regions of the country, with one in every four South Africans living in the province. Durban reflected the cutting edge of many problems facing the country, of which the most crucial challenges were the provision of housing and employment. The Durban Metropolitan Council was forced to respond to a multitude of problems and demands as it attempted to come to terms with burgeoning numbers; a depressed economy; rising crime levels; inner city decay; land and housing invasions, and demands for urban land restitution from those dispossessed in the apartheid era.

This paper is divided into four sections. In the first section the apartheid urban legacy is briefly discussed. The urban development strategy of the Government of National Unity is evaluated in the next section. New urban realities and challenges facing post-apartheid cities are discussed in the third section. The fourth section focuses on the Durban case study.

Apartheid Urban Legacy

The history of South Africa since the 17th Century is permeated by the quest for increasing white domination and supremacy over blacks in order to control resources and exploit labour, which reached its peak during the apartheid era (1948–1994). In South Africa the state has played an important role in influencing the spatial and social organisation of society. Africans were denied access to, and participation in, all political structures, and hence had little or no influence on decision-making, especially with regard to the allocation of resources. The establishment of mechanisms of spatial and social segregation, which were actively developed over the past two centuries, assisted in the exploitation and servility of blacks.

In the terms of the 1913 Land Act, blacks were allocated 13 percent of the land. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923

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represented the first Union attempt to control, manage and segregate urban Africans. The rationale for the legislation was based on the findings of the Stallard Commission which contended that the Native should only enter urban areas in order to 'administer to the needs of the white man'. The Group Areas Act (1950) was one of the key instruments used to reinforce the ideology of apartheid, and emphasized separate residential areas, educational services and other amenities for the different race groups.

Despite the apartheid regimes attempts to curb urbanisation through separate development and influx control policies, it failed to contain the growth of cities. Poverty and lack of socio-economic opportunities led to the migration of large number of rural blacks to the cities in search of employment opportunities. Apartheid planning left behind open spaces, under-utilised infrastructure and services. Such areas became the target of individuals and families attempting to gain a foothold in locations close to urban opportunities. Lack of housing led to an increasing number of squatters on vacant land close to cities and suburbs.

The present city form had been inherited from the legacy of apartheid urban planning and was characterized by racially fragmented and discontinuous land uses and settlement patterns, haphazard, dysfunctional and inefficient spatial ordering, land use mismatches, low-level population density and the concentration of the poor in relatively high density areas on the peripheries and the rich in the core intermediate urban areas (Hindson *et al*, 1992:6).

Approaches to Restructuring the Apartheid City

As the democratic initiatives of the early 1990s gained momentum, progressive urban planners in South Africa attempted to reconstruct apartheid cities by pursuing initiatives to reverse the effects of racial planning. These initiatives included *inter alia*, increasing residential densities in the core city, promoting infill on pockets of vacant land which served as buffer zones to segregate racial groups and upgrading crowded townships and hostels. Great emphasis has been placed on restructuring the inner city in the post- apartheid era so that there would be desegregation and integration (Dewar and Uytenbogaart, 1991; Hindson, *et al*, 1992). In order to restructure the apartheid city three development models have been proposed.

Development Model 1: City Infill

During the apartheid era, development planners had left large parcels of vacant land in the form of buffer strips which segregated one racial residential suburb from another. In the post-apartheid era, vacant pockets of land in the inner city had been invaded by squatters living on the peripheries of the city. Infill development would contribute to the cost-effective development of the inner city as resources of the built environment could be integrated into the infill areas at a cheaper cost, benefiting the poorest of the poor (Hindson, *et al*, 1992:12-14).

However, according to Bernstein and McCarthy (1990:64), apart from being an important symbolic intervention aimed at the deliberate reversal of the apartheid planning legacy, infill development would also contribute towards the realization of more compact, efficient and equitable urban form and assist in breaking down barriers to inter-racial movements and communication. However, infill development alone would not absorb all the people living in informal settlements in the inner city, and there would be a need to expand development on the urban fringes (Bernstein and McCarthy, 1990:64).

Development Model 2: Compact Cities

During apartheid planning, the British 'Garden City' and the 'neighbourhood unit' model of urban development was used which focused on residential areas which were spatially separated and isolated from commercial and industrial areas, and comprised of single storey buildings with low density and were dependent on an urban transportation system. In addition, the 'New Town' movement influenced the development of South African cities and led to the separation of suburbs from the city centre. This type of development suited the middle and upper income group who were in a position to afford personal transport to and from the city (Hindson, Mabin and Watson, 1992: iii).

Dewar (1992:249) contends that by compacting the city in the post-apartheid era the following benefits would be derived:

a) a greater range and diversity of economic opportunities would be open to all inhabitants;

b) social and commercial services would be more convenient and accessible;

c) the cost of social and other services would be lower; and

d) the services of a compact system would be available to all, irrespective of class, status or race.

Development Model 3: Inner City Densification

The apartheid experience indicates that low building densities, under-utilized open space and fragmentation increases the cost of housing, services and infrastructure provision. Low density development was inefficient, wasteful and imposed major costs on low income people. According to Dewar and Uytenbogaart (1991:41-46) densities needed to be higher than those characteristic of apartheid planning for the following reasons:

a) higher densities allowed for an efficient and cheaper public transport system;

b) levels of social and commercial service would be increased;

c) higher concentration of people would support the growth of the formal sector; and

d) unit costs of housing, social and other services would be reduced.

It should be noted that densification does not mean high rise buildings or overcrowding. Densification would lead to the maximum use of limited space within the inner city and the maximum use of historical investments in social and utility structures. Also, densification would give the city a mixture of different classes and income groups, and would make the city a hub of activities as compared to the apartheid era when the city was isolated at night as most of the people moved to the surrounding suburbs after work (Dewar and Uitenbogaart, 1991:9; Dewar, 1992:249).

Urban Development Strategies

Against the background of the above approaches, the urban development strategy of the Government of National Unity identified five priority action areas.

Action Area 1: Integrating the Cities and Managing Urban Growth

The urban strategy aims to integrate the cities and towns with special focus on rebuilding the townships, job creation, provision of housing and urban amenities through integrated development planning, reducing commuting distances between the work place and residential areas, facilitating better use of under-utilized or vacant land, introducing environmentally sensitive management of development and improving public passenger transport (*Government Gazette*, No. 16679, 1995:10).

The creation of activity corridors and nodes would assist in integrating the fragmented apartheid city form. Activity corridors and nodes would have the following advantages in restructuring the apartheid city:

a) at a metropolitan level, the traditional segregated residential townships developed in terms of the Group Areas Act would be integrated into the core city;

b) the racial geographical boundaries of suburbs would be integrated with informal settlements, allowing the informal dwellers easy access to resources like health care services, recreation, and schooling;

c) it would generate economic growth as it would draw people, goods and investments from all over the city; and

d) activity corridors and nodes would reduce transport costs, as people would gain easy access to public transport or walk on foot; and it would assist in connecting the infrastructure of the built environment, reducing duplication costs and making housing affordable (Seneque and Brown, 1994:3).

Action Area 2: Investing in Urban Development

Urban Development Investment focuses on upgrading existing houses and constructing new houses; restoring and extending infrastructure services, reducing environmental health hazards, encouraging investment; providing job opportunities and social community facilities (Government Gazette, No. 16679, 1995:10). There are three major initiatives in this regard.

i. The Masakhane Campaign

"Building together now" is aimed at accelerating delivery of basic services and housing, promoting the resumption of payments of rent, service charges and bond instalments, creating sustainable and efficient local government and stimulating economic development (*RDP Newsletter*, No.2 1995:1). Although there has been optimism that the urban strategy would compel citizens to pay for services used, thereby strengthening the tax base of the city, in reality the ethos of non-payment had grown proportionately and the national campaign does not look promising for the future (*Sunday Tribune*, 1/11/1996 - weekly Durban newspaper). It is unlikely that the Masakhane Campaign would prompt people 'who had bravely refused to pay for rents and services of apartheid, will now bravely make financial sacrifices to pay for the services of a democratic government' (*Sunday Tribune*, 1/11/1996 - weekly Durban newspaper). In addition, a government-commissioned report on poverty had found that about 53 percent of South Africans were unable to afford to pay for the services that the Government provides, raising questions about the viability of Operation Masakhane (*Daily News*, 23/1/1996 - daily Durban newspaper). There is also the question of the lack of services which further increases the reluctance of residents to pay for services.

ii. Special Presidential or Integrated Projects

These projects aim at urban renewal in selected highly visible areas focusing on violence torn communities which are in crisis. They aim at the integrated provision of infrastructure, housing, community facilities, job creation and capacity building (Bloch 1995 :25). Projects chosen to date are:

a) Katorus, located in Guateng, focuses on the repair of damaged houses, upgrading of hostels, repair of infrastructure, improved service provision, new housing development and the provision of community facilities.

b) Bruntville in Mooi River has been identified for the rebuilding and upgrading of urban communities affected by violence.

c) Duncan Village in East London and Cato Manor in Durban focuses on integrated development including land servicing and housing programmes.

d) Ibahi in Port Elizabeth has been identified for the provision of infrastructure, commuting facilities and housing.

e) Integrated development and upgrading of Botshobelo and

Thobang communities in the Free State (Bloch, 1995:28).

iii. The National Housing Programme

This programme focuses on the housing backlog by mobilising and harnessing the resources, efforts and initiatives of communities, the private sector and the state to increase sustainable housing delivery (Department of Housing, 1995:20-21).

Action Area 3: Building Habitable and Safe Environments

The strategy focuses on human and social objectives and three areas have been identified.

a) *Social Development* - this would be achieved through community based development and the provision of health, educational, sport and recreational services and opportunities;

b) *Social Security* - would take the form of caring for the aged, children who had been neglected, broken families, provision of social care and services;

c) *Safety and Security* - would be achieved by addressing those socio-economic conditions which perpetuate crime and violence and undermine development (*Government Gazette*, No. 16679, 1995:11).

Action Area 4: Promoting Urban Economic Development

Urban development had to ensure the concomitant effect of generating greater economic activity, maximiz-ing direct employment opportunities and alleviating urban poverty. Local economic development has been identified as an important growth strategy for "post-apartheid economic reconstruction" (Nel and Rogerson, 1996:69).

The transformation phase to a democratic society has been characterised by the "demise of 'top down' regional development planning and an accompanying rise of 'local' economic development initiatives" (Rogerson, 1994:180). Central government control over local development planning has been reduced, with localities assuming greater control over such initiatives. One of the reasons for this was the central state's inability to contribute towards the social support and welfare services which were imperative to address the gross inequalities of apartheid, and it attempted to transfer some of this obligation onto local government and the private sector (Sapsford, 1994). The Centre for Development Enterprise (1996a:31) has suggested that "improving the management of cities and linking local urban management to economic development are vital for coping with the pressing problems of urban development and of expanding economic activity".

Action Area 5: Creating Institutions for Delivery

The primary task of delivery of service was the responsibility of the local government, while the provincial government had to prioritize, monitor and evaluate development. Central government had the responsibility of funding based on national reconstruction and development priorities. In this respect the Urban Strategy emphasizes the need for new local governments to improve administrative, planning and implementation functions through the more efficient utilization of resources (*Government Gazette*, No. 16679, 1995:42). The Urban Strategy emphasizes a strong relationship between private and public sector in the delivery of services.

New Urban Realities

Three distinct processes with regard to the changing racial structures of contemporary South African cities can be identified:

i) The desegregation of the inner city and the limited desegregation of the inner white suburban areas. It should be noted that this type of desegregation of white suburban areas is primarily due to class and wealth instead of race.

ii) The expansion of the black townships on land adjacent to the white suburbs and the expansion of informal settlements on the urban fringes of white suburbs.

iii) The spontaneous growth of informal settlements within more affluent areas (Saff, 1994:382).

It is evident from the discussion thus far that the desegregation of the apartheid city was generally taking place within the inner city and on the fringes of affluent suburbs.

In the apartheid era, squatting and land invasion were generally confined to the borders of townships and the peripheries of the city. In the post-apartheid era there has been an increasing tendency to occupy vacant land within the core city. While this tendency may be viewed as desegregating urban space, it should be noted that this practice was generally amongst the poorest of the poor.

Another urban reality in the post-apartheid era is the decline of the inner city and the flight of capital from the Central Business Districts (CBDs). The high crime rates in the inner city areas played a significant role in the decline of the CBDs. The impact of crime on urban lifestyles is summarised by the following quotation from a weekly newspaper:

> Electrified fences, high walls, steel security doors and gates ... coupled with some of the most sophisticated alarm systems linked to police stations, are common features of the way South Africans live today, barricaded in their homes. Locks, gates, barbed wire and vicious dogs take care of the not-so-poor while those who could ill-afford such defences, put their trust in God (*The Asian*, 15/7/97 - weekly Durban newspaper).

The inner-city areas of Johannesburg were most severely affected, followed by Durban and Cape Town. This has led some to question the wisdom of upgrading the townships at

the expense of inner city growth. According to the Centre for Development Enterprise, a private-sector research/policy organisation,

> it made sense to revitalise central business districts because the infrastructure was already there. Big business may be moving out of central Johannesburg but the inner city has an important new function: it has become the incubator for small black business (*Daily News*, 4/3/96 - daily Durban newspaper).

The South African Chamber of Commerce has similarly emphasised the economic function of cities: "The prime focus must be a city's economic growth in terms of retaining current investment and encouraging new growth" (*Daily News*, 18/9/96 - daily Durban newspaper).

Financial institutions were reluctant to grant loans in inner city areas because of the risk, overcrowding, and the inadequate maintenance of buildings. While the policy of redlining protected the short-term interests of financial institutions, it was likely to adversely affect all parties in the long term. In this regard the Johannesburg Innercity Report noted:

> Thus the fact that an individual cannot raise a bond to buy living accommodation they can afford in the area of their choice not only affects that individual but the person trying to sell the property and all those who already own property in the redlined area. This includes the financial institutions themselves whose existing bonds are placed at risk by the lowering of prices that the redlining precipitates (Crankshaw and White, 1992:13-14).

The Durban Case Study

Durban is one of four urban centres in South Africa, and is also the economic engine of KwaZulu-Natal. About half of the province's population live and work in the Durban Metro's industrial and commercial sectors. However, like many South African cities Durban does not function efficiently:

> Largely due to the legacy of apartheid, its performance tends to be inefficient, inequitable and ineffective. It is characterised by a number of serious development challenges, which include poverty, unemployment, rising crime levels, disparities in levels of servicing, isolated communities, expanding informal housing arrangements and sprawling settlements. These development challenges have to be addressed if Durban is to improve its performance to the benefit of all people, particularly those who have been historically disadvantaged (Williamson, 1996:3).

Since the 1980s there was a massive influx of migrants into the Durban region, and it has often been referred to as one of the fastest growing cities in the world. In 1995 the population of the Durban region was estimated to be 2.3 million (City of Durban, 1995:22). The elimination of influx control legislation, the Group Areas Act and Land Acts and a myriad of other apartheid legislation, has led to urbanisation rates of up to 5.7 percent per annum. This resulted in the city accommodating about 45 percent of the region's population (Tomlinson, 1993:5).

The development crisis in the Durban region is illustrated by the rapid population growth, a slow economic growth rate, housing backlogs, an increasing number of informal settlements, increasing poverty, high unemployment rates and an inadequate supply of basic services to the majority of the population (Pillay, 1996).

Land Invasions/Informal Settlements

During apartheid planning, large plots of vacant land, known as buffer zones, separated white suburbs from black townships. During the 1980s the black townships had experienced an increase in backyard shack dwellings, which expanded on vacant land on the peripheries of white suburbs. The scrapping of the Group Areas Act, violence and crime in the townships, and rising unemployment precipitated movement of people to vacant land in the inner city, and open land occupations and invasions replaced clandestine squatting (Hindson, *et al*, 1994:333).

In the late 1980s, a further stage of squatting began in inner city areas such as Kennedy Road, Clare Estate and Cato Manor in Durban. While spatially the racial impress of the apartheid city was changed by this process, it had little social effect on the new black residents, as they were excluded from access to virtually all facilities and social institutions within the neighbouring white suburbs (Saff, 1994:328).

The illegal occupation of land and houses raised fears and anxieties amongst middle and lower income groups and even relatively better off township residents and this has led in some instances to racial and class based conflict. The expansion of the informal settlements on the fringes of affluent areas had a profound effect on the property values of these suburbs. The establishment of informal settlements on affluent residential fringes had provoked opposition and in some instances stopped development. In Cato Manor, Durban, the residents of the affluent Manor Gardens suburb demanded an interfaced development as compared to low cost housing in order to retain the value of their property (*Izwi*, July 1995:3 - community newspaper). The Manor Gardens residents made it clear that they were not opposed to black housing development on their borders, but were concerned purely in terms of their property being devalued. Although some wanted to sell their properties and move out, banks would not provide finance due to the large informal settlements surrounding their homes.

Land invasions in South Africa have largely taken place on land adjacent to existing townships, on the periphery of urban areas. More recently, the urban poor began moving towards the city-core areas, mainly on land surrounding Indian and colored suburbs.

> Hence, invasions tend to reinforce the broad apartheid geography of the cities rather than fundamentally challenge it. By establishing themselves next to the large townships created in the 1950s, the land invaders reinforce the pattern, created under Prime Minister Verwoerd in the 1950s, of peripheral, segregated African residential areas (Mabin, 1992:21-2).

Under these circumstances Tomlinson (1997:15) has suggested that the obsession with compact cities is misdirected, and maintains that the focus should be on "how to improve the circumstances of low-income households in conditions of urban sprawl".

Land Restitution

The Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 provided a mechanism to address the land dispossession that occurred during the apartheid era. In an era of reconstruction, development and planning, land restitution can be regarded as an opportunity to heal the scars resulting from apartheid planning and forced removals. In Durban, Cato Manor represented one of the largest urban claims (3,000). However, plans are well in advance for the reconstruction and development of Cato Manor into a model non-racial environment. A non-profit Section 21 company, the Cato Manor Development Association (CMDA) was formed to administer the project.

Section 34 of the Restitution Act allows local authorities to apply to the Land Claims Court to prevent restoration of property to original owners who were displaced by apartheid laws, if this was perceived as not being in the public interest. In August 1996 the Durban Metro made a Section 34 application to stop restoration in Cato Manor.

The CMDA's policy framework for the development of Cato Manor envisages the provision of between 30,000 to 40,000 houses for middle- to low-income people over a ten year period, catering for their economic and social needs. Land restoration would impede development progress, therefore the CMDA was in favour of restitution (alternate sites) which would accommodate claimants in its land allocations policy. However, there was no mention of the historically dispossessed in the CMDA's land allocation policy. The CMDA argued that the project was in the public interest because it would deliver affordable housing; provide economic benefits; influence the environment and would be a model for the future. Although there were some impressive plans for the development of Cato Manor, there was little tangible progress in implementation. The Land Claims Hearings were costly and time consuming, and the local authority was forced to negotiate with the claimants.

In Durban the Cato Manor land claims hearings confirmed the need for negotiations and consultation before development plans are drawn for land with potential restitution claims, and that there had to be a compro-mise between restitution and urban development projects. The essence of the Cato Manor agreement concluded in April 1997 was that where feasible restoration would be incorporated in the development plans for the area.

Local Economic Development

The new democratic government recognises cities as 'engines of economic growth', given that urban areas generate 80 percent of South Africa's GDP. A recent report by the Centre for Development Enterprise (1996b:1) has identified Durban as South Africa's "most promising global competitor" because of a "combination of historical and geographical luck, political pragmatism, and the tight focus of local business leaders".

Two well-known LED strategies in Durban are the International Convention Centre (ICC) and the Point Redevelopment Project (PRP). It was estimated that the ICC and PRP projects would create about 6000 to 8000 new jobs in the construction, maintenance, manufacturing and related industries. Also, the ICC would provide 200 direct jobs and 2500 indirect jobs - professional conference organisers, printing and publishing, translators, service industries (*Sunday Tribune*, 30/01/94 - weekly Durban newspaper). It was envisaged that there would be a dramatic increase in international tourism, which would create one new job for every eleven visitors and also bring foreign currency into the country.

The predictions of the number of jobs to be created by the projects was based on high income tourists. However, the tourist industry in the Durban region was increasingly showing a down market trend (Tomlinson, 1993). This was also suggested by the fact that some of the major hotels in the city were being downgraded. The members of the disadvantaged community had few skills, and hence they would not be able to compete successfully for jobs. Hence, there would be limited direct benefits for the disadvantaged communities in the Durban region from the PRP and ICC projects. Grant and Kohler (1996:539) have similarly concluded that the "unrealistic plans which characterise the Point reconstruction programme are problematic and unlikely to benefit those most in need".

Another major flaw in the two projects was that by concentrating only on wealthy, international tourists and convention participants, the large, domestic tourist market (which was now dominating in the city) would be ignored. The rapidly increasing black, low-income tourist population would not be able to afford the expensive facilities that were proposed by the two major development projects. In short, there was a lack of insight into the possible linkages that could be developed between the inner-city development projects and the surrounding neighbourhoods. In order for the community to receive any benefits from the redevelopment projects, there needs to be a direct targeting of benefits to them. There should be local state intervention in restructuring of labour through job creation and job enrichment, for the benefit of local workers and local communities.

Revitalising the CBD

Durban faced serious problems relating to increasing crime levels, urban blight and decay, vacant offices and declining property values in the city centre. The high crime rate was deterring tourists from coming into the city. Tourism was a pillar of Durban's economy. According to planning officials Durban's inner city problems are related to the fact that a "much broader range of demands are being made on the area now than in the past" (*The Sunday Independent*, 17/8/97 - national weekly newspaper, Johannesburg). Many formal businesses were moving out of the city centre and were being replaced by unsavoury activities. A national newspaper, the *Sunday Times* (8/9/96), described Durban as a 'city of sleaze':

> Garish neon signs advertising casinos and escort agencies light up the night in Durban's CBD. Once successful businesses in West Street have closed down and have been re-placed by casinos. Street vendors—all of whom seem to sell the same produce—have moved in en masse. And at the end of the day when their trading is done they leave behind empty crates and rotting fruit and vegetables.

An increasing number of people were moving into the Warwick Avenue Triangle (WAT, an inner-city integrated area which had been neglected during the apartheid era), for basic survival, with a major increase in informal trading. In November 1995 the physical Environment Service unit of the city announced an impressive plan to upgrade the WAT and the Grey Street area in "terms of safety, security, cleanliness, functionality and the promotion of economic opportunities".[1] In supporting the plan the Durban Metro acknowledged that the WAT had been "politically marginalised in the past in terms of physical, social and economic development and investment".[2]

A campaign to 'revitalise and reclaim' the CBD was launched in Durban with the support of the Metro Council, civic organisations and the private sector in September 1996. Part of the strategy was to introduce a zero tolerance approach to crime. However, a major problem was the continued escalation of uncontrolled street trading. More alarming was the revelation that many street traders were acting as fronts for the formal sector (*Daily News*, 27/11/97 - daily Durban newspaper).

Conclusion

The collapse of apartheid in the early 1990s and the imminent prospects of democracy brought about immense pressures for the deracialisation of South African cities. Responding to these pressures, urban planners attempted to reconstruct apartheid cities by seeking opportunities to reverse the effects of racial planning. These opportunities included *inter alia*, increasing residential densities in the core city, pro-moting infill on pockets of vacant land which served as buffer zones, and promoting mixed uses of land and upgrading crowded townships and hostels.

The aim was to avoid the wasteful, fragmented, monofunctional and inefficient planning of cities which was characteristic of the apartheid order. The intention was to ensure that the resources of the built environment were used efficiently in targeting the needs of the urban poor so that they would become economically productive and contribute to the growth of the city as a whole.

In spite of these progressive policy interventions, the rapid increase in land invasions and the proliferation of informal settlements in Durban and other cities demands that the pace of land reform and housing delivery processes increase significantly. The land restitution process can be used as an opportunity to eradicate the apartheid city, provide non-racial housing, compensate victims of forced removals, and contribute to the development of the post-apartheid city.

The LED experience in Durban suggests that greater emphasis should be placed on policies that sustain growth through redistribution. This can be done by implementing linkage policies which guarantees that benefits are channelled directly to the disadvantaged communities. This would ensure that the more pressing problems in the community surrounding the metropolitan area (housing shortages, the lack of services, the huge informal settlements), can be alleviated.

From a planning perspective the problem of inner-city decay needs to be addressed. It would appear that such areas have been neglected by landlords, local authorities and financial institutions in terms of provision of services and amenities. A concerted effort is required from the private and public sectors to halt the physical decay in such areas and to facilitate general upgrading. This will help dispel the negative perceptions of such areas, and help promote residential integration.

In South Africa segregation has been deeply entrenched in the socio-spatial fabric, and is further reinforced by the socio-economic differences between blacks and whites. It was therefore not surprising that the majority of blacks who were in the low-income group were unaffected by the repeal of apartheid legislation. Decades of institutionalised segregation will not be eliminated overnight. In spite of the repeal of discriminatory legislation, the legacy of apartheid will be visible for a long time.

Any attempt to restructure the apartheid city through planned development must take the following into consideration: redistribution of resources; social justice by creating zones of opportunities for those who had been historically disadvantaged; integrating the city so that the resources of the city are accessible to all citizens; and participation of people in the planning process.

Notes

[1] Physical Environment Service Unit Report for Committee, Greater Warwick Avenue and Grey Street Project, November 1995, p. 5.

[2] Physical Environment Service Unit, Report for Committee, Greater Warwick Avenue and Grey Street Urban Renewal Project, May 1997, p. 4.

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22 FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE? PLANNING POLICIES OF MUMBAI IN THE WAKE OF GLOBALIZATION

Arvind Adarkar

Introduction

Globalization is characterised by mobility of international capital. It is not linked to the industrial interests or nation-based productive capital, as existed in the post-war capitalism. This characteristic fluidity of the capital is controlled by one gigantic block of international finance based on quick returns, rather than an independent genuine capital development. This imposes a new International Division of Labour, by the developed nations, based on locating markets in the Third World, irrespective of the needs and relevant issues of the different regions and societies of the Third World.

This phase of globalization is not based on one particular nation. Therefore, to co-ordinate, it needs linkages within the advanced nations, and between them and the developing nations, through major urban nodes. The phenomenon of the post-industrial city is characterised by the post-industrial service economy, supported by the private sector, and accentuated by the liberalization of economic policies embodied in the New Economic Policy (NEP).

In India, a large section of urban researchers and planners, see the city of Mumbai as having potential to become a global city. According to them the city is already showing signs of a post industrial city. It is expected to be a major off-shore financial centre integrating East and West in the globalization process (Sita K. and Gupta K. 1997). The projection has become an agenda for the Indian business and political elite, as well as for the planning authorities of the state Bombay Metropolitan Regional Authority (BMRDA 1996). However, a small section of social researchers do warn us of the dangers of further manipulation by the international capital, of the Third World in general and of the majority of marginalized population in particular; due to the centralised and non-democratic character of a new liberalised economy which wants the control by the State to be reduced to the minimum. (Patnaik P. 1998)

The projections about Mumbai's potential for a global city are substantiated by presenting data regarding the spatial and structural changes in the growth of Mumbai's population, particularly about the shift in the decline and growth in the manufacturing and service sector. The paper examines this analysis, made to strengthen the case for globalization and questions whether there is really any space for globalization in Mumbai, especially the island city and the Central Business District (CBD). It will be seen with respect to the shift of population and densities, the pressure on infrastructure, the redevelopment policies of the state, and the performance and credibility of the private sector.

The second part deals with the politics of vacant urban space

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in the island city in the context of the projected image of the city as a post-industrial city and how it affects the local population. An area called Girangaon (Textile Village),located on the edge of the CBD is chosen as the case study. Identified with 58 textile mills as the main source of livelihood, its predominantly working class population who migrated to the city over the last 150 years has given the city of Mumbai its cultural identity. At present it is undergoing a series of economic, political, social and cultural changes, as a result of the land-use policies of the State which are based on the assumption that the textile industry has become a "sunset" industry.

The paper questions the alleged "sickness" of the mills by tracing the history of the 'Textile Village' and highlights the present agitational struggle by the local population against the forthcoming displacement of the six hundred thousand local population due to the closure of mills and the 'development' of the vacant mill lands.

Brief History of Mumbai

The city of Mumbai was originally a cluster of seven islands as seen in the map (Map 1). King Ashoka (263 to 229 BC) of the Mauryan dynasty was probably the first known ruler of the region. The islands were successively ruled by many Hindu dynasties till 1348 AD, when Bahadurshah, a Muslim Emperor of the neighbouring state of Gujarat, took over. The Portuguese wrested from the Muslims the control of the islands in 1534 AD, and ruled the islands for 130 years. Though they realised the importance of the islands, because of the lack of adequate revenue and their zeal for spreading Christianity, they succeeded little in developing these islands.

The British attacked the Portuguese but could gain a foothold on the islands only after these islands were presented as dowry, at the marriage of the Portuguese Princess Katharine. The British set about in right earnest. There was an increase in the revenue of the islands as the population increased. The islands were made habitable by reclaiming the low lying areas. The land records were set to suit the rulers and British laws began to be applied in these islands.

The island city started prospering at the end of the 18th century. By then the city was established as an important port and was responsible for major import and export activities. Tea was imported from China and in turn cotton and spices were exported. Large-scale trade of opium to China was also being undertaken. However, its export was banned which led the traders to engage in smuggling activities (Rao S. 1997). Hence, from 1805 to 1831, the traders were able to amass immense wealth. By 1850, the city had become a major port with flourishing trading activity.

In 1854, the first textile mill started in Mumbai. In the next 20 years, 15 more mills sprang up and employed 15,000 people. This laid the foundation of a strong industrial base, which was consolidated later by about 85 textile mills. By 1930, India was the second largest producer and the third largest exporter of textiles in the world (Leadbreater, 1993). In 1931, the city of Mumbai had two out of three workers working in textile mills.

The aftermath of the Second World War brought about several changes in the city. The leading textile houses started engineering and petrochemical industries by diverting the profits from the textile industry. This confirmed the status of Mumbai as a leading industrial city, though the decline of the textile industry in the city of Mumbai is noticed only after 1950.

Thus, the city of Mumbai, from a colonial port city, grew initially as a trading city, and later developed as a major industrial city. Between 1960 and 1990, the service sector has been growing at a rapid pace. There has been a marked growth in the information, travel, tourism & hotelling, banking, insurance and other financial services. Today, the city is recognised as the financial capital of India, with population of 9.9 million (as per the census) spread over 169 sq. miles (Map 1, Table 1, Chart 1).

Map 1 Limits of Greater Mumbai



Table 1 Area (in sq. km) of Mumbai city

Part of city		area sq. miles		% age to total
Island City	CBD	26.00	*8.00*	5
	Rest of island city		*18.00*	11
Western Suburbs		82.00		48
Eastern Suburbs		61.00		36
Greater Mumbai Total		169.00		100

Source: Socio-Economic Review of Greater Bombay City 1994-95 R&D Centre: Pg. 30.

Chart 1 Area Distribution in Greater Mumbai



Part I: On the Threshold of Globalization: Projections of Planners

Population and Spatial Changes in Mumbai

The vibrant, dynamic city of Mumbai has undergone many changes in the last 50 years. Presented here are the statistics and data used by the policy makers, the planning authorities and the urban researchers, to state that such changes are not unique, but are part of a larger global pattern, showing signs of a post industrial city, and post industrial service economy, supported by the private office sector. The data relates to the shift of population, the growth rate of population and changes in the employment sectors.

Shift Of Population: Sub-Urbanisation

The administrative and the municipal limits of Mumbai, were limited to the Island City till 1950. Between 1950 and 1957 the limits were stretched to include suburbs and extended suburbs to form what is known as Greater Mumbai. The process of sub-urbanisation accelerated since 1961. The ratio of population of the island city to the suburbs was 2 : 1 in 1961. In 1991, it reversed to 1: 2 (Table 2, Chart 2).

Table 2

Population Distribution: Showing Sub-urbanisation percentagewise

Year	Island City millions	*%age*	Western Suburbs millions	*%age*	Eastern Suburbs millions	*%age*	Greater Mumbai millions	*% age*
1961	2.8	66.7	0.89	*21.2*	0.51	*12.1*	4.2	*100*
1971	3.08	*51.4*	1.72	*28.6*	1.2	*20.0*	6.0	*100*
1981	3.26	*39.8*	2.85	*34.7*	2.09	*25.5*	8.2	*100*
1991	3.2	32.0	3.98	*39.8*	2.82	*28.2*	10.0	*100*

Source: Socio-Economic Review of Greater Bombay 1994-95 R&D Centre: Pg. 24.

Chart 2 Population Distribution inGreater Mumbai



Growth Rate in the Island City

The population of Greater Mumbai in 1991 was 9.9 million. The compounded annual growth rate of population since 1951 decreases but shows an average growth rate of 3.4% during 1961 and 1991. It suddenly drops to 1.9% during 1981 to 1991 (Table 3, Charts 3,4).

The annual growth rate of population of the city and the suburbs shows that the growth of the island city slowed down considerably and for the first time shows a negative growth in 1991 (Chart 4).

The island city, especially the CBD, comprising of A, B, C and D wards (divisions for administrative purposes), shows a decline in the population, in the decade of 1980-90. The shift of population was pronounced in B, C and D wards. In 1991, for the first time, parts of the CBD show a negative growth. There is a decrease in the absolute number of people in the CBD and island city (Charts 3, 4).

Sectoral and Spatial Changes in Employment: Manufacturing Sector

Growth in the employment in the city was sluggish because of economic stagnationin the region, though during 1980–1990 the economy was buoyant in the country (BMRDA 1996).

The comparative picture of sector-wise employment, as per the economic census, shows that the share of employment in the manufacturing sector declines from 43.8% (in 1971), to 36% (in 1980), to 28.5% (in 1990); while the share of employment in the trade sector has gone up from 18.5% to 29.1% in the same period; indicating a shift in the nature of

Table 3

Population, Annual growth rate, Migrants: Greater Mumbai City

Year millions	population	annual growth rate % age	migrants % age
1951	3.0	5.1	79.0
1961	4.2	3.3	51.8
1971	6.0	3.6	48.0
1981	8.2	3.2	47.0
1991	9.9	1.9	16.8 as per census
1991	10.5	2.7	39 % as per UN method *(see note below)*

Source: Socio-Economic Review of Greater Bombay 1994-95 R&D Centre: Pg. 23.

Note : *There are some doubts about the veracity of population figures for 1991 especially with such low figures for migrants. The figures based on the method adapted by the United Nations (urban rural differential method) seem more acceptable. Based on that the population of the city in 1991 would be 10.5 millions, of which 39% would be migrants. The annual growth rate in that case would be 2.7 %.*

Chart 3 Population Growth in Greater Mumbai



Chart 4 Annual Growth of City and Suburbs



economic activities of Mumbai (Chart 5).

The spatial distribution of employment shows that, from 1971 to 1990, there is a decline of 4% in the CBD in the share of the total employment of Greater Mumbai. Rest of the island city shows a decline of 12%. The Island City, including the CBD, showed a total decline of 16%. The employment in the suburbs has gone up by 16% (more than doubled) with the manufacturing sector playing an important role (Table 4).

The employment in the manufacturing sector has gone up in the suburbs and declined in the city. The manufacturing sector, shows shift toward the suburbs, corresponding to the shift of population, observed over the last two decades (Table 5).

Sectoral And Spatial Changes In Employment and Establishments: Office Sector.

The total employment of 2.2 millions in 1980, in Greater Mumbai grew to 2.4 millions in 1990, that is by 10%. The employment in the office sector of 352 thousand in 1980, grew to 628 thousand in 1990, that is by 78%. The percentage of office-sector employment to the total employment grew from 16% in 1980 to 26% in 1990.

The total establishments of 284 thousand in 1980 in Greater Mumbai grew to 423 thousand in 1990, that is by 49%. The establishments in the office sector of 23 thousand in 1980 grew to 42 thousand in 1990, that is by 82 %. The percentage of the office sector establishments to the total establishments grew from 8% in 1980 to 10% in 1990.

During 1980–1990, in the suburbs, growth in the establishments is 53% and in employment is 38%. In CBD, it is 25% and 38% respectively and in the rest of the Island City it is 22% and 24% respectively. As a result, the share of CBD in the office sector establishments has decreased from 51% to 39% and in the office sector employment, from 55% to 47% during 1980–1990.

Projections and Policies

The statistical data of the island city is analysed by the urban researchers and the urban planning authorities for their projections and proposed policies, as follows:

1. There is a shift of population from the island city towards the north, which has resulted in sub-urbanisation. There is a shift of manufacturing sector, corresponding to the above.
2. There is a growth in the trade sector, service sector, and the office sector.
3. These kinds of spatial, sectoral and functional changes are experienced by many other cities of the world, which have transformed into post industrial cities. The post-industrial service economy would be accentuated by globalization with consequent increase in the mobility of the capital (Sita K. and Gupta K. 1997).
4. The city of Mumbai has the necessary support structure to become a "global financial off- shore centre" and to face the impact of the increased international business transactions, increased communications and information flow, and increased international business travelling. It would also be supported by a vibrant private sector (BMRDA, 1996).
5. The island city would be thrown open to the entry of multinationals, international mutual funds, foreign banks and insurance companies who would bring in the necessary foreign capital, giving boost to the office sector.
6. The planning authority of Mumbai, BMRDA, the Bombay Metropolitan Region Authority, had subscribed to the policy of containing the population and urban sprawl in the earlier Development Plan of 1970–90 (BMRDB, 1970) by preventing the growth of office sector in the island city. BMRDA, in its revised plan, reversed the earlier Office Location Policy, to allow the

Table 4

Spatial Distribution of Employment in Greater Mumbai

Year	CBD		Rest of Island City		Suburbs		Greater Mumbai	
no.	%age	no.	%age		no.	%age	no.	%age
1971	515393	33.72	583447	38.18	429424	28.10	1528264	100
1980	707057	32.15	692257	31.47	800069	36.38	2199381	100
1990	715844	29.51	633523	26.12	1076514	44.38	2425881	100

Source: Draft Regional Plan for Bombay Metropolitan Region 1996-2011-BMRDA 1996: Pg. 133.

Chart 5 Growth of Employment in Greater Mumbai



Table 5

Shift of Manufacturing Employment

Year	Island City thousands	Suburbs thousands
1971	446	243
1991	272	417

Source: Draft Regional Plan to Bombay Metropolitan Region 1996-2011 - BMRDA 1996: Pg. 133.

growth of the office sector in the island city in order to facilitate the process set in motion by liberalisation of economic policies.

7. The city, it is said, would create a space for the service sector, as the wholesale markets from the CBD have been shifted to the satellite township of New Bombay (see note 1). The proposed shifting of the diamond and the textile markets is expected to make available additional space. The rest of the island city (excluding CBD) houses the textile mills which are deemed as *sunset* industries. The proposed closure of these textile mills will make available large chunks of land to accommodate the office sector and the "high-tech, non-polluting industries." (BMRDA, 1996)

Is There Space in the City for Globalization?

In the study presented so far, it has been shown how a case is built up to indicate that the city is showing signs of a post-industrial city with a potential to emerge as a global financial and service centre. However, a close analysis of the data, presented by the planning authorities and the researchers, raises doubts about the capacity and the capabilities of the Island city to fulfil the requirements of a global city.

The city of Mumbai is very often compared to the primary world cities such as New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo. However, these cities are located in the advanced industrial countries which allows a smooth transition to the global economy. The secondary cities in the semi-periphery, like Hong Kong, Mexico, Buenos Aires are located in countries which are less advanced. India is not recognised as having an advanced industrial economy. Mumbai therefore has less chances for staking claim to become a global city. It is the political and business elite of Mumbai (the *Indian Merchants Chamber and Mumbai First; see note 2*) that have a vested interest in promoting the cause of a global city.

Population Shift and Existing Densities

It is argued that the growth rate of the population of Mumbai showed a marked decline from 1970, which led to a negative growth in 1991. The actual population of the island city went down by 110,000 people with respect to the population of 1980. However, this average rate of decline which is -0.3% per year is very marginal. The Western cities like New York and London, with which Mumbai is compared to, showed the decline of CBD and a massive decline in the city core. London had lost 750,000 residents and New York city about 820,000. (Dogan and Kasarda, 1988) before the cities rebounded. It is too early at this stage to conclude that the decline of Mumbai's core will further accelerate.

The existing densities in the various wards of the island city are too high to make any effective space available after the shift of 110,000 people. The density of the entire Greater Mumbai is 58,000 people/sq. mile . The island city of which CBD is a part has a density of 118,000 people/sq. mile. One of the wards, the C ward of CBD, has a density as high as 280,000 people/sq. mile and some areas even cross the mark of 500,000 people/sq. mile. It is needless to mention that these densities are too high, by any international standards, to encourage any additional growth of the office sector.

The Office Location Policy and Growth of Office Sector

Given the agenda of globalization, it is necessary again to compare Mumbai with the Western cities. The cities of London and New York lost 430,000 jobs and 500,000 jobs respectively. These cities had a decline both in the residential as well in the commercial sector, whereas in Mumbai there is no decline in the commercial sector. This is a distinguishing feature, as it has happened in spite of the new satellite township of New Bombay, planned to relieve the pressure on the mainland, and in spite of the adoption of other measures, like dispersal of industries to prevent further growth.

The BMRDA, through its special notification in 1977, imposed a ban on any further growth of the office sector in the island city. In spite of this, 170,000 new jobs mushroomed during 1980–1990. These jobs have more than compensated for the population shift of 110,000 people in the same period. The Office Location Policy now stands completely reversed to support the agenda of globalization. This encouragement would lead to further proliferation of jobs in the office sector. Though it is an addition only to daytime density, its pressure on the poor infrastructure cannot be overlooked.

Any further growth in the office sector of the island city, would be at the expense of the residential population of the island city. The residential premises of the CBD, vacated by the shift in the population, largely get converted into offices. A residential premise of 500 sq. ft. occupied by 5 residents, would be replaced by an office which would employ 15/20 people in the same premises. Although, it is daytime population, it means that the ratio of growth in the office sector employment to the people displaced from the residential premises, would be as high as 3: 1. The pressure on the density in the CBD is clear: 105,000 jobs are added in CBD, over 8.0 sq. miles where as 104,000 jobs are added in the suburbs over 87.0 sq. miles .

Pressure on Transport Infrastructure

The proposals put forward by planning authorities to construct new flyovers to bring the commuters to CBD, are not only inadequate for further growth, but would be ineffective because of the tapering wedge-like shape of the island city. The pressure on the transport infrastructure has already reached a breaking point. For example a suburban railway rake with a capacity of 1800, carries 4000 commuters in the peak hours. Between 9 am to 11 am, 110,000 commuters alight at two railway terminals in CBD. The travelling speed on the road has come down to fifteen miles/hour with a fleet of 3000 public buses, taxies, and the private vehicles plying on the narrow crowded streets. (BMRDA, 1996).

Shift in the Manufacturing Sector

The industries did not evolve to an extent whereby the industrial economy could be termed as an advanced economy. In majority of the cases where the manufacturing units have shifted, the reason was to select the soft option of the real estate exploitation, by disposing of their land and assets and retrenchment of workers, is done under the pretext of modernisation.

Instead of modernising, the manufacturing sector is downsizing by subcontracting out the production. This is leading to a growth of small workshops and factories resulting in greater informalization of the workforce. The jobs in the informalized manufacturing sector are poorly paid, unsafe and insecure, which also leads to increased exploitation of female labour, a labour force which can be more easily manipulated. Because of the poor performance by the private sector, the jobs created in the tertiary sector are not compensating the losses of the jobs in the manufacturing sector.

Proposals for Urban Renewal

The wholesale markets from CBD and from the E ward in the island city are planned to shift to the satellite township New Bombay. The wholesale markets of vegetables, steel and iron, have already been shifted, but in the absence of any comprehensive urban renewal proposals for the benefit of the city, the original areas have already deteriorated (Mukhopadhyay T. 1997).

The proposed shifting of wholesale textile markets from CBD to the suburbs has been stalled for fifteen years. The shifting of the diamond market to a Diamond Bourse in the specially designed Bandra-Kurla complex in the suburbs has also run into difficulties (Upadhyay C. 1998). There is no proposal to renew the original areas so that they can be retrieved for the city by way of amenities and open spaces.

Employment Distribution in Public and Private Sector in the CBD

The private sector is expected to shoulder the responsibilities of ushering in further growth of the office sector. The employment in the private sector establishments range from two to twenty people per establishment. Such establishments are 87% in CBD and offer only 26% employment in the office sector. The major 55% employment is in the public sector, i.e. public administration, defence, banking, insurance etc. CBD, presently, is dominantly an administrative centre. The statistics are hinting at the uncertainty of the private sector to support a global financial centre. In view of this incapability, it is feared, that India is becoming a target for the investment of Multi National Corporation (MNC) controlled capital rather than a genuine, independent capital development (Upadhyay C. 1998).

Redevelopment of Slums and Old Rented Structures in the CBD

CBD, the oldest area of the city, has a large number of structures built before 1940, which have outlived their economic and structural life. According to the recent state policy, 19,000 dilapidated structures in the island city will be allowed to be demolished and reconstructed on the same site up to three times the otherwise existing allowable built up area (as per the Development Control Regulations in the city). The additional area generated by the reconstruction will be sold in the open market. In the context of the policy of allowing the office sector in the CBD and also in view of paramounting real estate prices, the residential premises so generated are more likely to be sold for the office use. The impact of this on the density and the infrastructure of the city is not even assessed.

Part II: Fighting a Losing Battle? Case Study of "Textile Village"

An Overview of the areas

The Textile Village occupies the areas of Parel, Lalbaug, Shivri which are adjacent to the CBD and under the E, F, G administrative wards, admeasuring the 18.00 Sq. miles with respect to 8.00 Sq. miles of CBD. The area has 58 textile mills occupying 550 acres of land. The population, predominantly the textile labour force, consists of migrants who were encouraged by the mill owners to come to the city 150 years ago, and were also offered accommodation. The place is fondly referred to as 'Girangaon' (Textile Village) which speaks of the nostalgia of the migrants for their villages back home. These textile workers played an important role in the freedom struggle and continued to make a major contribution in the working class movement. It has produced playwrights, authors, poets and ballad singers who have been instrumental in evolving a culture that occupies a place of pride in the history of Mumbai and in the state of Maharahstra, of which Mumbai is the capital. Today it is not only that the workers face a threat to livelihood but also face the prospects of displacement and destruction of culture, which is very much identified with its geographical location. The textile mills were by and large the only industry till 1931 which shaped the fortunes of the city. These mills laid the foundation of an industrial city, which later grew to be the most important city of India.

Decline of the Textile Industries and the Politics of Mill Land

In 1854, the first textile mill started in Mumbai. In the next 20 years, 15 more mills sprang up and employed 15,000 people. This laid the foundation of a strong industrial base, which was consolidated later by about 85 textile mills. By 1930, India was the second largest producer of textiles in the world and ranked number three in its export. (Leadbreater, 1993). In 1931, the city of Mumbai had two out of three

workers working in the textile mills. 86 textile mills employed 131,000 people out of 178,106 people (73.5%), working in factories (Sita K. and Gupta K. 1997).

After the World War II, the mill owners diverted the profits from the textile mills to set up engineering, chemical, pharmaceutical and petrochemical industries; instead of ploughing the profits back into updating or modernising the machinery.

In 1946, the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (BIR act) was passed by the State, which made it mandatory for only one worker's union to operate in the textile mills. The union called Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh (RMMS), belonged to the ruling party, an arrangement which suited the mill owners. This became possible as the communist trade unions were losing their support base during the pre-independence period.

By 1950, the looms were sold off and the labour was retrenched under the pretext of modernisation and rationalisation of labour, which was never to be implemented. Both the looms and the labour, found their way to the powerloom sector which was earlier exploited by the mill owners, by subcontracting the work to this sector.

In the 60's, the left-wing unions had regained their strength. The mill owners, though with their backs to the wall, succeeded in beating back the left trade unions with the help of the ruling party and a newly emerging parochial party indirectly helped by the ruling party. The same parochial party was later to rule the state.

In the 70's, faulty land use policies of the state (See note 3) resulted in a boom in the real estate prices of the island city. Many of the industries sold their land to make huge profits. However, due to the restriction on the 'change of user', of the mill, the textile industry could not exploit the boom in the real estate market, except by surreptitious means.

Through the 80's, the mill owners continued with the shifting/ selling of looms and retrenchment of the workers. The production was being subcontracted. Though the leftist unions were practically non-existent, workers united under a charismatic leadership (see note 4) and succeeded in keeping the mills closed, in the historic strike of the textile workers in 1982. The State Government and the mill owners managed to diffuse the strike, making 110,000 workers lose their jobs. The percentage of textile labour in the city's labour force came down from 44% in 1963 to 12.5% in 1991. The mill owners disposed off their piled up stocks and kept up the production by subcontracting it to the power loom sector. They could retrench the workers en masse without any compensation. The mill owners were jubilant. "Textile labour has been pushed back"...and "The equilibrium is now in favour of the management". (Mr. Ajay Piramal, Chairman, Mill Owners Association; 1992: Baxi R. 1992)

In 1991, the mill owners, under the pretext of modernising the *sick* mills finally secured the permissions from the State to sell in the speculative market, 2 million sq. ft. of land lying under the mills of the Textile Village. It was feared by the workers that the mill owners would never modernise the mills as the profits from running the mills would never match the profits obtained from the real estate transactions.

This was proved by the response of the mill owners to the New Textile Policy (NTP) formulated in 1985, specially to promote modernisation of the mills. In the policy, a separate fund was created with the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) to disburse soft loans for modernising the mills, along with the liberty to select the product mix. However, only 10 out of 58 textile mills availed of these measures, which would have given a new lease of life to the textile sector. These 10 mills continue to make profits and pay regular wages to the workers till date (Kulkarni S. 1997).

The New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in 1991, scrapped industrial licensing to enable the industry to face the impending competition from South East Asian countries. NTP and NEP should have made a positive difference to the deteriorating textile industry (Kulkarni S. 1997). However, the mill owners chose the option of quick profits from the sale of real estate, over the option of long term steady modernisation.

The above history shows that in a systematic way, the textile industry was made to appear *sick*, in order to enjoy the higher returns in connivance with the politicians and the local Mafia. The urban planners and researchers regard this *sickness* of the textile industry as one of the important signs of an emerging post-industrial city (Sita and Gupta 1997).

Resistance Movement of Workers

Failure of the strike in 1982, demoralised the textile workers. In the otherwise socially and culturally vibrant area of the Textile Village, the depression was evident everywhere. It was only in 1989 that a group of political activists with varied backgrounds encouraged the workers of the closed mills to form the Bombay Girni Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti (BGKSS). Within a span of five years, it succeeded in persuading the managements of the six out of the ten closed mills to reopen and earned the support of like-minded professionals including architects, lawyers, film makers and artists.

The workers, under the leadership of BGKSS, adopted various methods to carry on the struggle. In 1991, a few activists undertook a fast unto death to protest against the closure of the New Great Eastern Mills. Later, when the assurance by the State to re-open the mill proved false, the workers, despite heavy police deployment, scaled the walls and took over the mill to re-start the production. They were evicted after four days by the management in connivance with the police. In June 1993, the management finally recapitulated and restarted the mill. The Modern and the Kamala mills also restarted under the pressure of BGKSS, around the same time.

Later, the BGKSS, led the agitation against the Development Control Regulations (D.C. Rules) of Mumbai which allowed the sale of mill lands and encouraged the closures. In 1994,

half clad workers, to show their plight, marched to the Governor's residence at night, demanding the repeal of D.C. rules, only to face a brutal cane charge by the police. The workers of the Ranghuvanshi Mill and the Swan Mill (both closed down by the owners), formed a workers' co-operative and proposed the take-over of the mill by the labour co-operatives. To avoid this, the management hastily withdrew and restarted the mills. The Khatau Mill which closed down in 1997 has been the centre of agitation of the 6000 workers in the past year. More than 600 workers resorted to fast unto death in May 1997, to demand the outstanding wages. A detailed case study of the struggle highlights the connivance of the state, the political parties, the mill owners and the Mafia, to deprive the textile workers their basic human rights to protest against the injustice (Lokshahi Hakk Sanghatana, 1996).

Emergence of the Mafia

The turmoil in the Textile Village has produced a Mafia which has assumed threatening proportions. The young leadership of the Mafia has emerged from the frustrated textile workers and their children. The mill owner of Khatau mills in Bombay used the Mafia to terrorise workers. The Mafia leaders, on the other hand, have quickly learnt the game and want a share in the real estate bonanza as well as in the political power of the State (Lokshahi Hakk Sanghatana, 1996).

Urban Renewal Proposal of the Mill Lands

A committee appointed by the State, to propose renewal of the area by recycling the mill land, comprised of bureaucrats and planners was headed by a well-known architect and planner, Mr. Charles Correa. Report of the well-publicised committee deals with the problem basically as an urbanscape problem. This can be seen by the suggestion of the committee like creating water fronts and shopping malls in place of mill lands, 'conserving' the north light structure of the mills by converting them into artists' studios etc. The report does not address the socio-economic issue of the people, resulting due to the closure of the mills, nor does it question the closure. More seriously the committee did not find the need to involve the participation of the working class residents of the area in deciding the fate of the land, on which they have lived for three generations.

Cultural Resistance

A group of socially conscious artists and writers from the Textile Village together with their colleagues from the city have formed an organisation called 'Girgangaon Bachao Andolan' (save Textile Village agitation). The organisation has been organising various cultural activities to create consciousness amongst the local population by raising issues of displacement, loss of livelihood, loss of skills and destruction of culture. This group is gaining active solidarity from the like-minded professionals such as the film makers, architects and theatre personalities.

Given the powerful nexus of the industrialists and the politicians on one hand, and the agenda of globalization projected by the planners on the other, a committed group of activists are waging a battle to prevent displacements, save livelihood and retain the cultural heritage of the people.

Conclusion

1. Based on the statistics of spatial, sectoral and structural changes seen in the population and the employment of the city, the policy makers, the planning authorities and the urban researchers, are locating the city of Mumbai on the threshold of globalization, moving towards the post industrial service economy. However they over look the facts a) that the existing population densities are much higher than the international standards, b) that there is almost no possibility of any geographical expansion, c) that the costs for any further enhancement of the public infrastructure, even if possible, would be taxing the economy heavily.

2. The population shift has brought in its wake a loss of jobs, commuting long distances to work, resulting in the deterioration of quality of life of the people and destruction of their culture. Any urban renewal will have to take into consideration these aspects. Due to the lack of any comprehensive perspective, the proposed urban renewal plans result in a piecemeal approach, with total disregard to the majority of population residing in the city.

3. The history of development projects in India has raised many issues. Lack of transparency in the State policies, and lack of people's participation in the decision making process, has resulted in non-percolation of benefits to the majority of people. The people already on the periphery get marginalized further. The question raised by the Peoples Movements at grass root levels is "Development for whom and at whose cost?"

Notes

[1] New Bombay, a satellite township across the harbour, was conceived by architects Mr. Charles Correa, Mrs. Pravina Mehta and engineer Mr. Shirish Patel. The aim was to relieve pressure of population and urban growth on the city of Mumbai.

[2] Bombay First is a group formed by entrepreneur and business elite of Mumbai (on the lines of London First) to work out schemes to make the city into a global one. They strive to put political pressure on State Governments.

[3] In 1976, The government of India passed the ULCRA 1976 (Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976) according to which the government, by paying nominal compensation to the owners of vacant land, could take over the vacant land. The objective was to provide for the poor by way of increased housing stock. The state government neither implemented nor scrapped it. As a

result, there was a short supply of land which pushed the prices of land sky high.

[4] Dr. Datta Samant, a doctor by profession, arose to become a powerful union leader in the city of Mumbai. He became popular by supporting the mill workers and worked towards securing their benefits and livelihoods. He opposed the sale of land which the industrialists resorted to reap profits through the real estate development projects. As a result, he was eliminated, which has left a deep scar in the history of the industry.

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23 CUSTODIANS OF (TRANS)NATIONALITY: METROPOLITAN JAKARTA, MIDDLE-CLASS PRESTIGE AND THE CHINESE

Abidin Kusno

Professor Terry McGee, an expert in Southeast Asian urban studies, in his recent article on the future of the Indonesian city, indicates that

> "Indonesians now live in three main types of housing. The wealthy mostly occupied single-family houses in large developments on the edge of the cities, or high-rise apartments in the city core. The middle class, which now comprised a majority of the urban population, lived in smaller houses in suburbs scattered throughout the periphery of cities, and in upgraded 'kampung'-style houses within city boundaries. For the urban poor, the majority now live in legalized and upgraded squatter settlements, or in low-rise, walk-up, low-income housing." [1]

Professor McGee's outline of the future of the Indonesian city is a very optimistic one. The "future" stratification of Indonesian society, in terms of the types of housing people are using, is seen as a natural outcome of a well-planned development, consequently accepted by all strata of the population and supposedly without any friction. This account, however, when examined across the memories of the nation-state and the ethnic tensions implicated upon class relations in the Indonesian "plural societies," has a special poignancy about it.[2] It gives us a pause to reflect on the processes of spatial segregation generated by ethnic and economic disparities, on the urban riots that recently explode into anti-Chinese violence in many urban centers of Indonesia, and on the ways the nation-state attempts to mend the increasing gap between social groups.[3]

Under this reflection, it appeared to me necessary to locate the "development" of the Indonesian city firmly within socio-political grounds.[4] The present paper attempts to understand the construction of Jakarta as a modern metropolis from a cultural perspective of class and ethnic conflict. I attempt to show the way Jakarta is constructed as a modern metropolis by and for the emerging middle class who is trying to leave behind his/her "kampung" origin[5] (Figure 1). Against the background of "modern" culture, the image of "kampung" has been represented as a space of the "poor" that is very much feared by the middle class who are afraid of falling.[6] As a "negative" space, "kampung" becomes a powerful frame of reference for the city to imagine itself as a well-organized, clean and modern metropolis. Drawing from a recent study by Larry Chavis, an anthropologist of modern Southeast Asia,[7] I extend this cultural construction of the modern city, under the prestige of the middle class, to the problems of national identity and issues of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.

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Figure 1 "Kampung" with skyscrapers at the background.
Source: Hervé Dangla, *Belantara Jakarta*, Jakarta: Centre Culturel Francais, 1996.

Flying Over Kampung: National Honor and the Middle Class Prestige

Anyone who has been to Jakarta will in one way or another, encounter a "traffic jam." The "traffic jam" is perhaps one of the most popular memories and widely shared experience of Jakarta, a problem that always seems to exceed any proposed solution. As two columnists write:

> "For all these years, no matter how often the authorities launch their orderly-traffic campaigns, no matter how many new rules and regulations are introduced and no matter how many new roads are built or enlarged, Jakarta's traffic snarls continue to grow worse, almost by the day... Appeals are made for commuters to use buses, instead of private cars, to commute to or from work. All to no avail, for reasons that must be obvious to anyone who has ever boarded a bus in Jakarta during peak hours... So, zones of restricted traffic are introduced around the city's busiest business areas—the so-called "three-in-one" zones where, during morning peak hours, cars are prohibited from entering unless they carry at least two passengers besides the driver. In response, hordes of "jockeys," street urchins who appear along the streets from seemingly nowhere, offer their services as momentary passengers to motorists intent on beating the law."[8]

In this representation of Jakarta, the surplus of private cars and the excess of street urchins are comple-mented by the lack of discipline in law enforcement. The drivers mostly work in the formal sector of the city, using the highways and

Figure 2 Elevated highways at Tomang, Jakarta
Source: Tempo, June 22, 1991, p.32.

appropriating the excess of the nearby "kampung" youngsters who, in turn, gain extra income as passengers. In this way the urban excess is constituted both by the "kampung" youngsters as well as the riders in private cars who would perhaps have taken public transportation if not for its inefficiency.[9] Excess, hence, is the contradiction of development that produces "inappropriate" activities according to the standard of a "modern" capital city.[10] This surplus of population in the form of street urchins that "appear from nowhere" seems to be outside the spatial order of the city. It contributes to the predicament of Jakarta as a city saturated with "traffic jams" and "chaos."

Perhaps as part of the response to this, in 1995 on the National Awakening Day, President Suharto launched the National Discipline Campaign which promotes discipline and orderliness, for they are "the foundation for a society that is modern and progressive."[11] Following the President's proclamation, more than 2,000 military personnel were distributed on the streets of the Jakarta area. The military was to "take action against anyone violating the city's ruling on sanitation and order" and to "instill a high sense of discipline among the public."[12] Along with this, 14,000 "volunteers" armed with clubs were mobilized to help prevent petty criminals and insure that pedestrians crossed the street properly so as not to interfere with traffic.[13] In addition to this discipline and order, an underground expressway is declared to be built in Jakarta and the building of the elevated highways is to be accelerated.[14]

Central to the state's concern about discipline and order is the overlapping, and not quite often conflictual, interests between the upper-middle-class Jakartans who are concerned with their identity, on one hand, and the government promotion of its ruling ideology of "development" on the other. At this juncture, elevated highways occupy a special position, not least because of their visibility, like a giant roller-coaster stretching over the capital city (Figure 2). The elevated highways are not just a means for decongesting metropolitan Jakarta; they are also a "sign" of progress for a developmentalist regime that measures its achievement through the way the city is represented. Furthermore, they are considered a great achievement of the New Order's technological capability and could therefore also be seen as a monument for the emerging middle class of Indonesia. As the "initiator," Mrs. Rukmana (the eldest daughter of President Suharto), after reviewing this mega-project, points out

> "We are not merely building elevated highways. We have built up the confidence and enthusiasm of the Indonesian contractor services sector in which case they have moved us a class upward. We have successfully accomplished a big task which before was thought to be impossible to be built by our nation."[15]

As the city completes these, a new regime of visuality consolidates itself, altering the spatial experiences of commuters and pedestrians alike. Driving through the elevated highways suggests an experience of flying over the top of the city, escaping from its congested roads and leaving behind the lower classes who are routed through the crowded street at ground level. From this suspended driveway, the details of the urban fabric are transformed into a series of blurred sketches, giving a sense of detachment from the "worldly" street below.

The elevated highway is thus a system of representation that allows certain forms and spaces to be visualized and others to be concealed. It is a kind of fluency that the city provides to create a dream-state of upward mobility in order to overcome the contradictions of "development."

The imposition of elevated highways can therefore be seen as a technique of resolving the urban chaos by adding another

layer of modern infrastructure to the existing sea of unsightly "kampung," which the "city" seeks to negate. As part of the enforcement of law to overcome the lack of urban rationality, the elevated highways have therefore defined the "normal" and the "pathological" of the city. As such, the elevated highways could be seen as a metaphor of the mobility aspiration of Indonesian middle class against his/her "kampung" origin.

This "fear of falling" of the Indonesian middle class could be best illustrated in the discourses of private housing enterprise known widely in Indonesia as the "real estate."[16]

Dream Home: The "Real" Estate and the "Imagined" Kampung

Inseparable from the discourse of elevated highways, the real estate constitutes a new identity for the emerging middle class by offering them an exclusive residential neighborhoods away from "kampung." Starting on the periphery of Jakarta in the early 1970s, and expanding in the 1980s to the surrounding region of Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi, it seeks to represent the attraction of living in a new housing environment.

Urban dwellers involved in these developments since then have increasingly found themselves, in one way or the other, being represented in an idealized "home." Targeted at the middle class or the citizens with some chance of upward mobility, housing exhibitions have been staged quite intensively in the metropolitan city of Jakarta, displaying a discursive (re)construction of linguistic order that contrasts the "modern" house with the living conditions of the "kampung" as hierarchically lower.

For instance, the catalogue of the 1995 Ninth Housing and Interior Exhibition consists of forty-six advertisers (out of 110 participants); keywords in either Indonesian or English such as "location", and "modern facilities" receive the most attention, followed by attributes of the built environment and its images.[17] The three dominant factors that determine the value of a house in Jakarta, namely, location, availability of urban services (infrastructure), and security of tenure (having a registered title), have been carefully exploited by the private housing institutions.[18] These qualities are those presumably outside the milieu of the "kampung." We can see statements, in Indonesian, such as "your dream house with real estate facilities," "live comfortably in a beautiful environment" and "modest house with the aura of real estate," and so on. Furthermore, each "real estate" company inserts a location map depicting the propinquity of its housing project to the center of the city where access to elevated expressways is emphasized. The style of the houses are consciously supra-national. Their names are in English. These extra-ethnic and supra-local identification are hinted to the transnationally-oriented clients. As a manager of a real estate argued:

> "Today, clients want to be international, because of their extensive travels to Europe and the U.S. They are also highly influenced by television. They aren't too keen on ethnic architecture... They want Mediterranean style, Los Angeles style and Beverly Hills styles..."[19]

Figure 3 *Source:* Kongres 35 tahun Pendidikan Sarjana sitektur di Indonesia, Jakarta: IAI.

Figure 4 Security guard of Kelapa Gading "real estate" housing
Source: Hervé Dangla, *Belantara Jakarta*, Jakarta: Centre Culturel Francais, 1996.

This process of knowledge and identity construction in "modern" Indonesia, deprived of any identification with the specific cultural space within the nation, can be seen as assuming a transnational connection, in one way or other, to the market place ideologies of the happy "first world."[20] Yet the sublime imagination of the transnational conceptual space provided by the "real estate" for its potential consumers is presumably realized through the living memories of the "kampung" as well (Figure 3). Though the items promised are varied and the prizes are offered in accordance to the values that can be put on the house, they are all constructed around one basic market requirement: the promise of what an Indonesian architectural historian, has called a "street" architecture;[21] a style of architecture that found itself drawn to the "street" of the "West," as much as it measured itself against the "kampung" with which it exists side by side.

It is therefore plausible to say that the "real estate" industry attempts to construct a "modern" Indonesian, in relation not merely to "developed" countries but, most importantly, to the conditions in the "kampung." The possibilities of escaping from the "kampung," of entering or leaving the built-up area of the city takes the images of power, status, excitement of being located in the extended space of the "city," in gated and guarded enclaves in a suburban landscape segregated by class.[22] (Figure 4).

"Real Estate" or "Perumahan": The Politics of Naming and the Chinese[23]

As metropolitan Jakarta of the 1990s expanded to incorporate its neighbors, creating clusters of what are to be "self-sufficient" pools of suburbia, "baptized" in "English" phrases and installed with expensive hospitals, country clubs, schools, and huge areas of mall space, a curious decree was issued by the government. Approaching the 50th anniversary of Indonesia's independence (August 17, 1995), the Ministry of Education and Culture ruled that the names of all housing estates, apartment buildings, office blocks and shopping malls be represented in bahasa Indonesia, the national language.[24] A lawyer, supporting the government agencies, described the matter in this way:

> "In the business world today, one feels an increasing use of foreign terms while they are available in bahasa Indonesia. For instance, instead of using 'real estate,' one could use 'kompleks perumahan,' 'puri,' 'wisma,' and so on. Using Indonesian terms should be required in the world of education and business... To straighten up the order of language, force and harsh sanction should be applied to those who disobey. If still stubborn, the violator should please leave the Indonesian soil, because as a citizen we are required to follow the instruction of the government, including here the use of bahasa Indonesia as the language of everyday life."[25]

Compliance with the instruction was soon followed. Despite

Figure 5 Riot police prevent workers from entering Medan's industrial area as part of anti-Chinese violence in Sumatra. *Source:* Margot Cohen, "Days of Rage", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 1994, p.14.

costing considerable money, developers changed the names of their projects, from English into bahasa Indonesia. Lippo Village becomes "Lippo Karawaci," Sentul Highland becomes "Bukit Sentul," Citra Garden becomes "Perumahan Citra" and so on. A major developer declared:

> "By using Indonesian names, it also shows that we, in the business sector, have a strong commitment to society, to be the pioneers in promoting the spirit of nationalism."[26]

Behind this event, trivial in itself and of very uncertain usefulness, lay a long and far from trivial story. Questions of name dropping and changing, of foreign terms and bahasa Indonesia, of citizenship and national loyalty, of business and commitment to society and, most critical of all, the sense on the part of government agencies that un-Indonesian components have become increasingly visible in the city, are all caught up in what is considered to be a perennial problem of Indonesians of Chinese descent. The above "dialogue" between an indigenous professional and an Indonesian Chinese businessman was marked by a division, and ultimately, a resolution of what a "modern Indonesia" should be what it ought to look like in a time of a growing gap between the rich and the poor.

Indonesians of Chinese origin today constitute about 3% of the country's 200 million population, yet they are perceived as dominating the country's economy.[27] This has become even more controversial by the enormous physical transformation of the city, in which about 60,000 hectares of land for housing, located on the outskirts of Jakarta, is reported to be controlled by ten large developers, mainly of ethnic Chinese background.[28] The Minister of Housing was disturbed not only by the scale of private land ownership but also by the fact that these developers tend to sell lands merely to speculators or otherwise, to build luxurious houses for the comparatively small number of middle- to upper-class Jakartans.[29] This practice far from conforms to the ideal of the privatization of the housing industry which, according to the Minister of Housing,

> "should be to create housing areas occupied by various groups of mixed professions, economic levels, and social status, based on togetherness and mutual aid."[30]

But in the consuming eyes of capitalist modernity, cheap houses do not make profits and "could be an eyesore for the modern, prestigiously designed compounds."[31] To promote image and social prestige, many of the satellite towns were "baptized" with foreign names and phrases, a representation of exclusivity for the upwardly mobile class.

The cultural orientation of these developers is neither rural nor "national." One might argue that they merely represent the other side of nationality, namely, a desire to pursue material progress like their "foreign" counterparts.[32] Yet, when we look across the historicity of the Indonesians of Chinese descent who control a major portion of the housing industry, their temporal and spatial imagination of Indonesia could hardly be anything other than supralocal.[33] In 1967, after the collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party, accused of having close political ties with China, the New Order of Indonesia banned public representations of Chinese cultural events. Aiming to build Indonesian official nationalism to foster assimilation with the indigenous people, Chinese schools were shut down and the use of Chinese characters in public was made taboo.[34] A logical outcome of this is that

the private business initiatives of this group makes the Euro-American suburb, with its common transnational living style, its defining feature. The source of inspiration for this and the models of representation for their housing industries are supranational. For the dream of Ciputra, the largest real estate developer of Indonesian of Chinese descent,

> "(It is) the world (that) inspires us... All the beauty and harmony in this world are the sources of inspiration to create and innovate special designs that will enable people to enjoy a more colorful and joyous life.[35]"

Yet, as this idea of the "world" city becomes ever more luminous and more absorbing in the sprawl of modern urban life, it becomes increasingly significant as a cultural aspiration of only a particular class. English, as used to represent the aspirations of "modern Indonesia," connotes an international flavor in which only the emerging middle class has a chance to really make use of it. It thus connotes an essential class difference in Indonesia.[36] The widening income gap and the long history of the society's resentment of the Chinese transposes the staging of whatever is "foreign" (such as the English language) into a symbolic representation of Chinese domination over Indonesian society.

The increasing gap between the rich and the poor thus extends into anti-Chinese riots that have become increasingly significant since the 1980s (Figure 5).[37] In 1984, weeks before the commemoration of Independence Day, the commander of the armed forces called on the nation to stop using the term "pribumi" (indigenous) and "non-pribumi" (for the Chinese).[38] Part of this idea of assimilation is to make invisible the ethnic component of the social-economic tension. Following this, many Indonesians of Chinese descent dropped their Chinese names to avoid discrimination and to "publicly" represent themselves as national subjects.

The aesthetic and moral reaction by the municipality to "foreign names" appearing in the cityscape as offenses against nationalism thus overlaps with the masking of "Chinese identities" in Indonesia. By containing them under an "Indonesian" name, a sense of national integration is supposedly felt, social inequity blurred, and discrimination concealed. The campaign against "foreign" representation is, in a strange way, also a protection against the exposure of the "real" conditions of its existence. Nevertheless, the changing of a name (of the real estate) also puts under pressure the cultural assumptions that development is without contradictions.

Notes

[1] Terry McGee, "The Future of Urbanization in Developing Countries: The Case of Indonesia." *Third World Planning Review*, 16, 1, 1994, p. ix.

[2] The notion of "plural societies" was first used by John Furnivall to describe a society in which groups met in the market place, but were separated from each other by his/her living and working spaces. See: John Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy*, Cambridge University Press, 1967, pp. 446-469.

[3] For an earlier account of the relations between the built environment and the class structure of Southeast Asia, see: Hans-Dieter Evers, "Ethnic and Class Conflict in Urban South-East Asia." In *Sociology of South-East Asia*. Hans-Dieter Evers (ed), Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 121-124.

[4] The notion of "development" here means "pembangunan," an ideological keyword of President Suharto's New Order that is essentially based on modernization theory but conducted under an authoritative traditional-like polity. For an account of "pembangunan," see: Ariel Heryanto, "The Development of 'Development,'" translated by Nancy Lutz, *Indonesia*, 46, 1988, pp. 1-24.

[5] "Kampung" here means "the residential area for lower classes in town or city." See: John Echols and Hassan Shadily, *Kamus Indonesia-Inggris*, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1990, p. 258. The same term is also often used to designate a small rural settlement. The linkage of urban "kampung" to the small rural settlement has given rise to a colloquial understanding of "kampung" as "hometown", "native village." The notion of "kampung-an" therefore means "to have no taste, no class", "a country bumpkin", "not like a lady or gentlemen." See: *Kamus Ungkapan Indonesia-Inggris* by Hadi Podo and Joseph Sullivan, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1986. According to Darrundono, an Indonesian town planner, 70 % of the population of Jakarta lived in "kampung" which has an "official" area of only 20 % of the whole city. See: Darrundono, "Penanganan Kampung Pengharapan," *Sketsa*, 06/09, 1991, pp. 76-81. However, "kampung" as a genre consists of various types, ranging from a permanent structure of the middle class to the often force-demolished temporary squatters. For a summary of various types of "kampung," see: Larry Ford, "A Model of Indonesian City Structure," *Geographical Review*, 83, 4, 1993, pp. 374-396. My use of "kampung" here is both "real" and metaphorical. Represented by developers as the space of the "non-modern," "kampung" becomes a trope in which the real estate housing qualifies itself as "modern."

[6] The notion of "middle class" is hard to define. There is a range of possible meanings of the term middle class. I use it to identify what is loosely called the "consumer class." According to Howard Dick, who takes the 1978 per capita expenditure data as the background, the middle class of Indonesia earned Rp. 15,000 permonth. In this account, the middle class of Indonesia is composed of only 16,6 % of the urban population of Java. See: H. W. Dick, "The rise of the middle class and the changing concept of equity in Indonesia: an interpretation." *Indonesia*, 39, 1985, pp. 71-92. For a discussion on Indonesian middle class, see: Richard Robinson,"The middle class and bourgeoisie in Indonesia," in *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile phones,*

McDonalds and middle class revolution. Richard Robinson and David S.G. Goodman (eds), London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 79-101.

[7] Larry Chavis Jr., "Hiding English, the Money, and the Chinese: Building Unity Through Language and Discipline," MA Thesis, Asian Studies: Southeast Asia, Ithaca: Cornell University, August 1997.

[8] Hartoyo Pratiknyo and Rita A. Widiadana, "Jakarta badly needs modern transit system," *Jakarta Post*, January 8, 1995, p. 1.

[9] See also a discussion of Manila from which some of the insights in this paper are drawn, Neferti Tadiar, "Manila's New Metropolitan Form," *Differences*, Fall, 5, 3, 1993, pp.154-178. In this article, Tadiar demonstrates the multiple ways in which the urban form of metropolitan Manila inserts itself into metropolitan lives. The infrastructures of the city, while dominating the cityscape, are subjected to the appropriation of the population.

[10] Recent postcolonial studies have made us aware of this contradictory aspect of the "transfer of technology". Homi Bhabha has argued that the emergence of "modernity" in the late nineteenth century as a sign of Western power constituted the "colony" as an object of modernist discourse, but the very enactment of this process also displaced the representation of its Western domination. See the collection of Homi Bhabha essays in *The Location of Culture*, N.Y.: Routledge, 1994, especially chapter 4, 5, and 6. For the discourse of built environment, see: James Holston, *The Modernist City*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. Holston demonstrates how the deployment of "Western" modernity through the architectural modernist discourse in order to appropriate the postcolony also produced an "inappropriate" transformation. "Once constructed (the modernist architecture and urban planning project) constituted something very different from their imagined city." ibid, p. 96.

[11] "Presiden Suharto Canangkan Gerakan Disiplin Nasional," *Kompas*, May 21, 1995, p.1.

[12] "Military launches discipline program," *Jakarta Post*, May 24, 1995, p. 3.

[13] Budi Winarno et al, "Disiplin Nasional: Tertib Bersama Kader Berompi," *Sinar*, December 9, 1995, p. 83.

[14] The speeding-up of the flyover projects to catch up with the event recently caused a catastrophe when part of a semi-constructed, 500-ton overpass collapsed in West Jakarta at the beginning of a working day killing at least four workers and injuring 18 others. See: *Kompas* and *Jakarta Post*, March 23, 1996.

[15] Siti H. Rukmana, "Teknologi Penghemat Biaya" summary from "Mendobrak Kultur Pesimis," in *Pengalaman Membangun Jalan Layang Tol Cawang-Priok, Jakarta*. English citation from *45 Years Public Work Department*, Jakarta: Public Work Department, 1990, pp. 238-39.

[16] For an interesting study on the American middle class, see: Barbara Ehrenreich, *Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class*, New York: Harer Perennial, 1990.

[17] The housing exhibition has become an important arena for agencies involved in marketing, consulting, information services and the production of architectural knowledge. The year 1994, for instance, witnessed no less than 88 housing exhibitions in major cities of Indonesia, varied in scale, but with similar subject matter. See: *Katalog Pameran ke-9 Rumah dan interior 1995*, (catalogue of the Ninth Exhibition on Housing and Interiors 1995), Jakarta Convention Center, 13-21 January 1995.

[18] These three factors: location, infrastructure, and legality are paramount for the valuation of a residential plot in Jakarta, see Michael Leaf and David Dowell, "The Price of Land in Jakarta," *Urban Studies*, 28, 5, 1991, pp. 707-722.

[19] "RI enters Post-mo in architecture," *Jakarta Post*, Sunday, March 16, 1995, p. 1.

[20] Michael Leaf, "The Suburbanisation of Jakarta: A Concurrence of Economics and Ideology," *Third World Planning Review*, 16, 4, November 1994, pp. 343-356.

[21] Josef Prijotomo, "Tampang Arsitektur Jalanan dan Arsitektur Kampung" (The Faces of Street Architecture and 'Kampung' Architecture), lecture given at PPIA, Surabaya, May 25, 1984.

[22] For a recent discussion on fortified spaces as an outcome of social inequality, see: Teresa Caldeira, "Fortified Enclaves: The New Urban Segregation," *Public Culture*, 8, 1996, pp. 303-328.

[23] I am indebted to Larry Chavis Jr. for the insight and references of this section. See: Larry Chavis Jr., "Hiding English, the Money, and the Chinese: Building Unity through Language and Discipline," 1997.

[24] Emily Thorton, "Name Dropping," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 158, 29, July 20, 1995, p. 74.

[25] Purwanto Setiawan, SH, "Selamat Tinggal Istilah Asing," *Gatra*, June 17, 1995: p. 8 (my translation).

[26] James Riady, "Lippo Group Hails Nationalism," *Indonesia Businsess Weekly*, 3, 26, June 12, 1995, p. 35.

[27] The misleading idea that all Chinese are rich and that they all become rich through a collusion with government officials at the expense of indigenous people has caused endless tension among many people. This knowledge has also been used by the leaders of the state to control the

Chinese by routinely unleashing society's deep resentment as a way to remind them of their precarious position.

[28] The country's ten giant developers control up to 70% of land for housing projects in the Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi (Jabotabek) area. See: "The New Suburbia: Chasing the Indonesian Dream," *Economic and Business Review Indonesia*, 156, April 8, 1995, p. 8. See also: "Gonjang-Ganjing Bisnis Property" (Ups and downs of the property business), *Info Business*, 32nd edition, Year II, 16 July 1996. This issue of *Info Business* has a listing of 20 of the largest property and real estates companies, of which at least 18 can be recognized as owned by ethnic Chinese (pp. 60-61). Ranked according to assets, the seven owners at the top are recognizably ethnic Chinese. The structure of the housing industry in Indonesia thus parallels the structure of Indonesia's private capital in general. Here, the wealthy Chinese and the indigenous capitalist, benefitted from close association with the president's family and the patronage of government officials. These two groups are by no means independent of one another. Their operations are tied together by an intricate network of joint ventures and financially related companies. However, it is plausible to say that investment in housing industry is dominated by Indonesians of Chinese descent.

[29] "Will the Bubble Burst?" *Economic and Business Review Indonesia*, 141, December 24, 1994, pp. 6-15.

[30] Akbar Tandjung, "New Towns and Satellite Cities: Problems and Prospects," *Indonesia Property Report*, 1, 2, 1995.

[31] "The New Suburbia.," *Economic and Business Review Indonesia*, 156, April 8, 1995, p. 6.

[32] Partha Chatterjee argues that the cultural forms of imagining the nation by the nationalist elite are conducted through a separation of culture into the material and the spiritual domains. The very separation offered nationalism a hybrid character. The supposedly "uncontaminated" spiritual domain, instead of opposing materiality, initiated material progress along the trajectory of its "foreign" counterpart. See: Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, Chapter 2.

[33] The identity formation of Chinese in diaspora, according to Aihwa Ong, should be understood in intersecting national and transnational political arena. For a recent discussion on cultural representation of "overseas Chinese," see "On the Edge of Empires: Flexible Citizenship among Chinese in Diaspora," *Positions*, 1, 3, 1993, pp. 745-778. Also: Aihwa Ong and Donald Nonini (eds), *Ungrounded Empires: The Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Transnationalism*, London: Routledge, 1997. For a recent collection on the historical background of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, see Anthony Reid (ed), *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1996.

[34] "Chinese New Year is a family affair," *Jakarta Post*, February 18, 1996: 1. To this date, they are kept away from official involvement in political forum but promoted to engage in the mobilization of national and transnational capital. The negation of the political cultures of the Chinese came hand-in-hand with the utilization of their capital.

[35] Advertisement page of Ciputra, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 22, 1997, p. 51. In her observation of the cultural orientation of the Indonesian businessmen of Chinese descent, Mely G. Tan indicated that Ciputra, among others, pays serious attention to "Feng Shui" (Chinese art of Geomancy). The norms of "Feng Shui" may have gained considerable influence in the Indonesian real estate business, but the forms in which it is publicly represented is "western," instead of explicitly "Chinese." For a discussion on the influence of "Feng Shui" on the business of ethnic Chinese, see: Mely G. Tan, "Feng Shui and the Road to Success: the Persistence of a Traditional Belief System in the Face of Market Expansion," paper presented at the 3rd Seminar on "The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Market Expansion," organized by the Goethe Institute in cooperation with the University of Bielefeld and Gajah Mada University, held in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, August 26-27, 1996. I would like to thank Wastu Pragantha for this reference.

[36] The convergence of "English" and "Chinese" was most clearly represented in the recently built new elite school of Pelita Harapan, built as part of the Lippo Village. It provoked debate as it became the "favorite" school of many of the rich Chinese families, among others, since the youngest students will spend up to 80 % of their time speaking English. See Margot Cohen, "Eton of the East: Elite School Raises the Hackles of Nationalists," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 22, 1993, p. 20, 22.

[37] For a recent upheaval against the Chinese following the financial crisis in Indonesia, see: Margot Cohen, "'Us' and 'Them,'" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 12, 1998, pp. 16-17; For some other occasions see, Margot Cohen, "Under the Volcano," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 13, 1997, pp. 42-46; John McBeth and Margot Cohen, "Tinderbox," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 9, 1997, pp.14-15; Pete Engardio, "Tremors in Jakarta," *Business Week*, August 12, 1996, pp.42-43; Margot Cohen, "Days of Rage," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 28, 1994, pp.14-15; Susumu Awanohara, "Bombs in Chinatown," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 18, 1984, pp.18-19; William Branigin, "Indonesia's Chinese Fear Prejudice," *The Washington Post*, December 10, 1982, p. E 8. Paul Zach, "Indonesians Reflect Area Hostility Toward Ethnic Chinese," *The Washington Post*, June 3, 1980, p. A 12. For the earlier sequence, see J.A.C. Mackie, "Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia," in J.A.C. Mackie (ed), *The Chinese in Indonesia*, London: Nelson, 1976; see also, Anthony Reid, "Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State," in Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid (eds), *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation*

of Southeast Asia and Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997, pp. 33-71.

[38] Susumu Awanohara, "The Perennial Problem," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 6, 1984, pp. 26-27.

24 EXPATRIATE GLOBAL INVESTMENT AND SQUATTER DISPLACEMENT IN MANILA

L. Shelton Woods

Introduction

This paper is divided into two sections. In that way it mirrors its subject—the rich and poor of Manila.[1] The abject poverty in Manila is akin to the ghettos of our planet's poorest nations. Concomitantly, the extravagance in Manila rivals any exclusive area in the world. The chasm between Manila's slum dwellers and the opulent continues to grow. Business pundits have recently suggested, however, that the poor in Manila are gaining opportunities to become part of the "growing middle class" through home ownership.[2] This paper seeks to examine such assertions. Manila's historic roots, growth and the plight of its poor make up the first section of this study. The second half of the paper explores the supposed new privilege of home ownership for the poor in Manila.

Manila in Context

Prior to Spain's arrival, Manila was a small seaport town whose origins date to a twelfth century settlement at the mouth of the Pasig River.[3] Spain captured "Maynila" in 1570 and the European colonizers quickly arrested the spread of Islam on the main island of Luzon. Under Spain, Manila became the locus of political power as the highest Spanish official in the Philippines, the governor general, made Manila his headquarters. Manila's population grew from 2,000 to 34,000 during the first three decades of Spanish occupation. Economically, Manila became the focus of international interest due to the annual Manila/Acapulco trek of the Manila galleons.[4] Chinese-made goods and lucrative opportunities via the Manila galleon trade increased Chinese immigration to Manila. Moreover, ethnically segregated sections in Manila began to emerge.[5]

By the end of Spain's tenure as the Philippines' colonial mother (1898), there were approximately 150,000 residents in Manila. Its population had outgrown the walls of "Manila Proper."[6] Neighborhoods, sharply defined by economic status, developed outside the walled city. The first modern census of the Philippines, 1903, indicated that the National Capital Region's population had grown to 329,000. One-third of this number lived outside Manila proper.

Under the imperial policies of Spain and then the United States, Manila's economic potential was never realized.[7] The United States, in particular, sought to integrate the Philippines' economy with their own. The U.S. used Manila and its specialized products to bolster America's economy. To that end, a broader economic base was not developed in Manila. However, following World War II and Philippine

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independence in 1947, there was a new emphasis in Manila on import substitution rather than export promotion. Consequently, "The main beneficiary of the import-substitution policies was the capital region, whose comparative advantage was increasingly strengthened, largely by means of various monetary and fiscal measures—e.g., exchange and import controls, tax incentives for 'new and necessary industries', and tariff restrictions."[8]

Throughout the twentieth century Manila's population has steadily increased. From 1903–1939 Manila's population grew approximately 3% annually and during World War II it grew at an annual 5% rate. Between 1948–1960 Manila experienced a juxtaposition of growth, i.e., Manila proper grew at a 1.2% rate while Quezon City and Pasay City increased 9% annually during the same period. Dramatic growth took place throughout the capital region between 1960–1970, reaching close to four million by 1970. In 1975 the National Capital Region became designated as Metro Manila. This area encompasses four cities (Manila, Caloocan, Pasay, Quezon) and 13 municipalities (Las Piñas, Makati, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Para–aque, Pasig, Pateros, San Juan, Taguig and Valenzuela). Today this area has a population of over nine million or 15% of the nation's population (40% of the nation's urban population) while its land area of 536 square kilometers makes up about 0.5% of the total land area in the Philippines.

Two detriments in Manila's escalated growth are the increased poverty and the city's environmental crisis. Urban poverty in Manila, like most crises, evolved rather than emerged suddenly. Squatters are part of this story. Following World War II squatters came to Manila and settled in the Tondo Foreshoreland area.[9] The right to live in Tondo was granted in 1956 by Government Act 1597. The Act also provided for affordable housing and the selling of land at five pesos per square meter. But this was a public relations ploy before national elections and it was never implemented. The government also set up the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) in 1947 to try and provide affordable housing for the poorer urban population in Manila. However, by 1969 only 12,000 sites were available for relocated squatter families. The program never worked. As early as 1956 a report on the program identified what the problem was: "...public housing should serve families who cannot afford decent dwellings, and therefore should charge lower rents than private housing. Unfortunately, however, public housing in the Philippines...is financed and treated like private housing and consequently must operate like one."[10] The squatter families could not afford these sites and so they were sold to investors.

The trickle of squatters filing into Manila grew to a steady stream of rural poor looking for relief in the urban setting.[11] There were various laws implemented to try and stem the tide of rural migration into Manila. In 1963, the mayor of Manila declared a new policy wherein public education within Manila would only be provided to children whose parents could claim residence. Parents would have to provide documents including a residence certificate, tax receipt, and affidavits proving they were legally housed in Manila. This ambitious policy was ineffective due to evasion and document forgery.[12]

By the 1970s, when urban poverty in the region could no longer be ignored, new solutions were proposed to alleviate the growing problem. Unfortunately, the resolutions only exacerbated the existing difficult situation. The fundamental problem with proposed solutions was a misunderstanding of urban poverty. Government programs were developed on the assumption that urban poverty was caused by rapid urbanization and modernization. In reality, people left rural provinces because they lacked economic opportunity in that setting. The inability of government policies to deal with rural poverty drove millions to Manila.

Other solutions ignored the historical context of the squatter's presence in Manila. This is expressed in a United Nations' report on population growth in Manila:

> With respect to the implementation of sectoral projects in Metro Manila, there has been a tendency to adapt short-term "quick fix" projects (Henward, 1985). Projects have sometimes been implemented merely to improve visual aesthetics of the city or to reduce the possibility of social and political unrest. In a sector such as housing, public resources have been concentrated on relatively few demonstration projects, which are not part of any long-term shelter improvement programme and which are too expensive for most of the squatter population. There has also been a major conflict between the Government's investment priorities and the basic needs of the majority of Metro Manila's residents.[13]

Draconian measures were at times introduced to squash the visibility of poverty in Manila. During 1974 Imelda Marcos decided to clear out approximately 100,000 squatters so the Miss Universe Pageant would focus on the beauty of the Philippines rather than the poverty in Manila. The next year similar actions against squatters led to the formation of the "Alliance of the Urban Poor of Manila and Suburbs against Demolition."

This adversity only strengthened the solidarity among the poor in Manila. In June 1982 the governor of Manila, Imelda Marcos, gave the squatters one month to leave Manila. Immediately following this proclamation more than a half dozen Manila squatter organizations created ALMA, the Alliance of the Poor Against Demolition.

Squatter proliferation in Manila continues to be evident as three quarters of dwellings in the area are unauthorized structures. By 1990 there were 654 squatter areas in Manila. The growing squatter population is, in part, responsible for the fact that 45% of households in Manila live below the poverty line. Most of these live in make-shift shacks where the average household has 5.2 persons occupying one room.[14]

The employment situation in Manila also reflects the spiral of poverty in Manila. Unemployment stands above 15% while

underemployment is close to 50%.[15] The consequence of these conditions is a difficult existence for over a million squatters. An example of this situation is Smokey Mountain.[16] Smokey Mountain has been the subject of documentaries and books and is well known to those who know of the urban misery in Manila. The genesis of Smokey Mountain was a 1954 decision by the Philippine Department of Public Service to send trash trucks to a location called Baryo Magdaragat where a dump site was constructed. The surrounding squatter residents gave the area the name *tambakan*, "dump site." For more than three decades, millions of people, including children, survived by scavenging the area and selling reusable trash to middle-men. For these squatters, it was their only means of survival.

A second consequence of Manila's over-population is its toll on the environment.[17] In relation to solid waste disposal, 2,650 tons of solid waste is generated daily in Manila. Seventy percent of this waste is collected leaving the rest to be dumped on the roadside or in watercourses. This uncollected garbage plugs drains, thereby exacerbating the drainage system problem in Manila.

Air pollution in Manila is as serious as the solid waste situation. The four main sources of air pollution in Manila are motor vehicles (4,139 tons daily), diesel burning stationary generating plants (4,112 tons daily), more than one thousand industrial firms (3,355 tons daily), and domestic residences who release incomplete combustion products through cooking fuels (394 tons daily). Effects of this air pollution pose serious environmental and health risks.

Drinking water availability has become a crisis in squatter areas of Manila. Thirty-five percent of Manila's population live outside the water distribution service. They get their water from private water vendors, or from ground waters. This has led to an over-abstraction so that the water table now sits at 200 meters below sea level in various parts of Manila. Moreover, today there are dangerous levels of saline intrusion in Manila's water source. Since the primary sewage system in Manila was constructed during 1904-1911 to serve a population of 500,000, it is not surprising that the sewage and water systems intermix during the monsoon season.[18] All of this has contributed to the pollution of waters throughout Manila. Environmental problems have had an effect on the health of Manila's citizens. Nine of the ten leading causes of death in Manila are preventable diseases.[19] Doctors ascribe this statistic to the environmental situation of Manila.

The problems of Manila are overwhelming. Its bureaucracy is an alphabet soup of agencies. Manila is described by its own politicians as an area that lacks an "effective metropolitan form of government to direct planning and development" and an area that traditionally lacks planning.[20] Indeed the above description of Manila rivals apocalyptic imagery of a future world.

The Other Side

The dim social and environmental description of Manila is in stark contrast to the picture presented in the August 10, 1995 *Far Eastern Economic Review* cover story on the rising middle class in Manila.[21] The focus of the article is that new property tycoons have hit the jackpot by playing the Manila real estate market. Their success is reportedly based on the fact that Manila's lower economic class of citizens are now able to afford homes. Mr. Rigoberto Tiglao, the article's author, contends that "The Philippine economy, after stagnating for more than a decade, has recently come back to life. GDP surged 4.3% last year, up from 2.1% the year earlier, and is forecast to grow at least 5.5% this year. New money in the country has enabled increasing numbers of Filipinos to buy homes."[22] However, the increased activity in the housing market does not portend a decline in Manila's poverty class. It is not the poor who are gaining from the real estate market.

Before examining who the new home owners are, some background to housing and land holding in Manila is warranted. The paradox of Manila's real estate is that there is a relative abundance of land for potential residential development. Lack of space is not the main issue for affordable housing in Manila.[23] Unfortunately, land availability has not alleviated the difficulty of housing in Manila. A 1989 Asian Development Bank report concluded: "While there is no overall shortage of land supply in urban areas...the majority of low and medium income families cannot afford to pay for residential land."[24] Four years earlier the Metro Manila Commission came to a similar conclusion regarding the lack of housing for Manila's poor. Their analysis of the situation was that "...there had been virtually no governmental programmes which had successfully addressed the housing needs of the poorest households (i.e., those below the 15th percentile in income distribution)."[25] If housing is at such a premium and there is so much idle land, who owns this land? Until recently this land was primarily in the hands of a few families including the Ayalas, Ortigas, Aboitizes, Laurels, Yulos, Puyats and LaOs.[26] Reportedly, much of these families' enormous land holdings remain undeveloped. In 1964 Charles Abrams noted: "Neither the magnetism of demand for the temptation of profit can persuade the larger landowners to make use of their holdings or to sell to others who will. The situation is most accurate in the environs of Manila, where land poverty exists amid land plenty."[27]

There are different explanations for this reluctance to sell, but at the top is the laxness of collecting property tax from these land-holding families.[28] Ahmad and Stern write that land tax in developing countries has been difficult to collect as "the rich and powerful have been particularly successful" in avoiding it.[29] Real-estate taxes are also difficult to collect as many politicians are part of the landed elite.[30] Robert Wade is right in claiming that the "unpromising conditions" of the archipelago are a case "where the state elite is fused with the business and land owners."[31] Politicians who are not part of this clique quickly learn the power of this group. When Mayor Simon of Quezon City attempted to quadruple the value of

idle property (which still made the property less than a fourth of market place value) to generate more revenue, he was challenged in the courts and defeated in the following year's election.[32]

Manila real estate moguls also hold on to their land as they realize there is no better investment. The closest rival to real estate returns is the stock market which delivers a real 7.0% return compared to the 12.5% real rates for real estate holdings. Lagging behind real estate and the stock market are returns on the money market and jewelry with returns of 3.6% and 5.0% respectively.[33] Consequently, the tax break that land holders receive has made it difficult to break into the Manila real estate market.

However, a crack in the market did take place in the mid 1980s when political instability caused some of the established land holders to sell their property and invest in overseas markets. Waiting to buy the properties were not the poor or middle class but speculators with money to invest, including Manuel Villar, Andrew Tan, and Robert John Sobrepeña. With the success and the stability of the government under President Ramos they continued to buy land from the older land holding families.[34]

As established families sold land or ventured into partnerships with developers, the new property tycoons began building "affordable" housing. "Affordable" housing may be a misnomer since the poor in Manila cannot afford to buy these homes. Corruption and catering to particular buyers have made owning a home out of reach for the majority in Manila.[35]

The new real estate tycoons have also quickly moved into the more lucrative development of commercial building. Commercial space in Makati which was selling for 120,000 pesos per square meter seven years ago now sells at close to 300,000 pesos per square meter. Mega malls, business buildings, and hotels continue to spread throughout the Manila area. But this does not address the squatter problems or the inability for the poor to join in the "new economic boom" of Manila.

The Philippine government, to its credit, has encouraged contractors not to ignore residential building while handsomely profiting from commercial building.[36] Contractors have complied by building houses on 40 square meter lots. Some of these houses sell at around $10,000. Still, the question remains who are buying these houses? Where is this home-owning "middle class" coming from? Certainly not from the squatters living below the poverty level. It is clear that even at these prices, they cannot afford to move from renting or squatting to owning homes.

Three different groups are buying these houses. The first are those who use these houses as investments. There is evidence that those who qualify to buy low income houses are buying them and trying to resell them at a 100% profit. Thus, many who go through the process of being screened and work their way through the political maze of buying government or private low income housing, turn around and sell their homes to those who are too wealthy to qualify for low income housing. Yet as Project Director William Reyes noted in frustration: "But where are they going to live now? What housing can they get with that money?"[37]

The second group, and these investors are particularly interested in the high-end condominiums, are overseas Chinese, mainly from Hong Kong. Prior to Hong Kong's July 1997 transition from Britain to China, numerous wary Hong Kong business folk invested in Manila. These investments have declined in 1998 due to the rather smooth transition Hong Kong has experienced, as well as the economic crisis many Southeast Asia countries currently experience.

The majority who are buying these new houses in Manila, however, are Filipino overseas workers. In fact, it was this group that Villar was counting on when he gambled on Manila real estate: "Always in my mind then was that no matter how bad the economy was, there were more than a million Filipinos working overseas and their most cherished dream is to own a house and lot. I bet on the market and won."[38] The fact that the Filipinos who have the greatest ability to buy homes do not live in the Philippines speaks volumes about the local economy. This phenomena of overseas Filipinos buying homes extends beyond Manila. Ilocos Norte is an example of the economic power of its overseas citizens.

Ilocanos are the third most populous ethnic group in the Philippines.[39] The Ilocano "heartland" is considered the Ilocano provinces of La Union, Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte and Abra. Historically, Ilocanos have had to migrate out of their areas due to their large population and sparse land. William Henry Scott notes: "The historic Ilocano reaction to these conditions, however, had been out-migration rather than agrarian revolt."[40] Ilocanization of adjacent provinces was the Ilocano response to their difficult economic situation. In 1900 Frederick H. Sawyer characterized the Ilocanos in this manner: "Ilocanos—this hard-working and industrious race occupies the northern and western shores of Luzon...the Ilocanos are ever ready to emigrate, and besides the places I have mentioned, there are thousands of them in Manila and other parts of the islands. I have no doubt that there is a great future for this hard, enterprising, and industrious people."[41] It is not surprising that 84% percent of the Filipinos who traveled to Hawaii between 1920 and 1930 were from the Ilocos area.[42] Beyond Hawaii and adjacent provinces, Ilocanos willingly migrated to places as remote as the Mindoro hinterlands.[43]

Because of the Ilocano diaspora, Ilocanos in the Ilocos area receive substantial remittances from their overseas relatives. A survey conducted by H. T. Lewis on personal savings in Laoag, the capital of Ilocos Norte, contributes to the theory of Ilocano economic frugality:

> Thrift, specifically as evident in savings, is considered one of the more laudable Ilocano virtues; it is certainly thought to be so by the twenty-five banks and savings institutions in Laoag. Though no single bank manager

could disclose the total figures in local savings accounts, several of them stated that of all Philippine centers only Manila, with thirty times the population, has greater amounts of savings than Laoag City. The ratio of savings-to-loan transactions in Laoag banks is 15:1.[44]

The Ilocano experience relates to the Manila situation, in that the Ilocanos who have relatives abroad are the most likely to own homes and property. Again, this illustrates the power of overseas money as opposed to the local economy.

Conclusion

Manila presents a picture of extravagant luxury set against a backdrop of what is for many hopeless poverty. The new home construction throughout the area is irrelevant to these poor. Their only hope is to go overseas in order to generate enough funds to leave their situation. Unfortunately, for the poor, the possibility of working overseas is remote due to the amount of documents and money needed to position one's self for such opportunities.

It would appear that the most effective way of dealing with the population and environmental crises in Manila is for the Philippine Government to focus on rural reforms and investment in rural areas which would lead many squatters back to their provinces where new opportunities await them.[45] But at present, the rich are getting richer as they develop Manila for the few. Many who have the power to make substantial changes are benefiting from property development and this appears to be their higher priority.

Notes

[1] In this paper "Manila" is used synonymously with Metro Manila unless otherwise specified. The population and geographical area of Metro Manila versus the City of Manila is explained on page 172.

[2] See "Land Ho!: The business Catchphrase in Manila and Cebu These Days is Reclamation for Expansion." *Asiaweek* 16(1990), 62; "Boom Times: A Manila Realtor Sees Property Prices Soaring like its Highrises." *Asiaweek* 19(1993), 48; Rigoberto Tiglao, "No Guts, No Glory: New Property Tycoons are Riding the Wave of the Philippines' Prosperity," Cover Story, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 10, 1995: 54-58.

[3] More information on Manila's history and society can be found in the following sources: Manuel A. Caoili, *The Origins of Metropolitan Manila: A Political and Social Analysis* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1988); "Manila: History, People and Culture," *Proceedings of the Manila Studies Conference*, De La Salle University, April 11-12, 1986; Ramon Ma Zaragoza, *Old Manila* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[4] For more on the Manila galleons see: Eugene Lyon, "Track of the Manila Galleons," *National Geographic* 178(1990): 2-37; J. Smalley, "Life on Board Manila Galleons," *The Bulletin of the Australian Institute for Maritime Archaeology* 19(1995): 29-32; J. Kathirithamby-Wells, "The Age of Transition: The Mid-eighteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries" in Nicholas Tarling, ed. *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia* vol. I (Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 606-609.

[5] More information regarding the Chinese in Manila is found in Chinben See, *Chinese in the Philippines: A Bibliography* (Manila: Chinese Studies Program De La Salle University, 1990); Teresita Ang, *The Chinese in the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives* (Manila: Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, 1990).

[6] For more on the walled city of Manila see: Pedro G. Galende, *San Agustin: Noble Stone Shrine* (Metro Manila: G. A. Formoso Pub., 1989); Hiromu Shimizu, "Construction and Development of Colonial Manila: Intramurus," *Toyo Bunka* 72(1992): 61-94.

[7] See Cayetano W. Paderanga and Ernesto M. Pernia, "Economic Policies and Spatial and Urban Development: The Philippine Experience," *Regional Development Dialogue* 4(1983): 67-87.

[8] "Population Growth and Polices in Mega-Cities Metro Manila," *Population Policy Paper No. 5* (New York: United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1986), 11.

[9] For more information on squatters in Manila see: Orville Solon, "De Facto Tenure and the Allocation of Land Among Squatters," *The Philippine Review of Economics and Business* 27(1990), 208-220; For information on squatters in the Tondo Foreshoreland area see Ignacio Dayrit, "Evaluation of the Philippine Shelter Program with the Tondo Foreshore Project: Slum Upgrading as Case Study" (Ph.D. diss., University of California Berkeley, 1988).

[10] Cited in R. B. Ocampo, "Development of Philippine Housing Policy and Administration," *Journal of Public Administration* 21(1978), 11.

[11] An excellent overview of rural life in the Philippines is found in Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, *Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village* (California: University of California Press, 1990).

[12] For more on this see Alan B. Simmons, "Slowing Metropolitan City Growth in Asia: Policies, Programs, and Results," *Population and Development Review* 5(1979): 87-104.

[13] "Population Growth," 46.

[14] For more on this see Paul Strassmann and Alistair Blunt,

"Land, Income, Mobility, and Housing: The Case of Metro Manila," *Journal of Philippine Development* 20(1993), 88.

[15] For more on this see Metro Manila Commission, *Technical Paper 5: Employment* (Manila: Office of the Commissioner for Planning, 1985).

[16] A less scholarly but visually moving history of Smokey Mountain is *Smokey Mountain: Ravaged Earth and Wasted Lives* (Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1994); Other information on Smokey Mountain can be found in "Child Scavengers of Smokey Mountain," *Philippine Development* 17(1990): 15-18.

[17] For more on this see Domingo C. Salita and Reynaldo M. Lesaca, "Integrated Study of Environmental Problems of Metro Manila: Air, Water and Land Pollution," *Philippine Geographical Journal* 33(1989): 199-207; "Controlling Pollution in Metro Manila," *Philippine Development* 17(4)1990 17-24.

[18] The situation of the sewage problem in Manila has gotten to the point that "The International Financial Corp., which is the private-sector of the World Bank, agreed to supervise the Philippines' proposed sale of the Metropolitan Manila Water and Sewerage System. The IFC will design an operating and investment plan and oversee competitive bidding. Less than 10% of the six cities and 31 municipalities in Metro Manila have sewerage connections, posing environmental problems and health hazards." Business Briefing, *Far Eastern Economic Review* December 21, 1995, 67.

[19] These preventable diseases include: upper respiratory tract infections, bronchitis, diarrhea, skin infections, parasitism, tuberculosis, influenza, malnutrition and pneumonia. See the Metro Manila Commission, *Technical Paper 7: Health* (Manila: Office of the Commissioner for Planning, 1985).

[20] "Population Growth," 46.

In 1989, Edial Dekker studied in detail how one private northern subdivision of 725 hectares with 1,390 houses was organized in about two decades. He concluded that,

> The case study of this paper showed that there is little reason for optimism with regard to cooperation by the bureaucracy...Of crucial importance was the large measure of discretion politicians and officials enjoyed with regard to their involvement in the housing project and land distribution. This wide room for manoeuvre results from the fact that a strict and clear vision and policy toward the housing problem by the public authorities is lacking...Personalism results in the concentration of land in the hands of those who use land mainly for investment purposes; in this way, personalism enhances the vacancy of relatively scarce land with that, it undermines the functioning of the conventional land market.

Edial Dekker, "Conventional Housing in Manila: The Development of a Residential Subdivision and Governmental Involvement," *Urban Research Working Paper 28* (Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteit, Institute of Cultural Anthropology/Sociology of Development, 1992), 90, 93.

[21] Tiglao, "No Glory" Far Eastern Economic Review, 54-58.

[22] Ibid., 54.

[23] In a report released in 1985 the Metro Manila Commission reported that only 37% of the total land area in Metro Manila was in residential use. Metro Manila Commission, *Technical Paper 10: Land Use* (Manila: Office of the Commissioner for Planning, 1985).

[24] Asian Development Bank, *Philippine Urban Sector Profile* (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1989), 53.

[25] Cited in "Population Growth," 29.

[26] The Ortigas and Ayalas families' strength in land holdings are in the Pasig and Makati areas. How a family comes to hold such property is somewhat explained in the Ayalas' case: "The patriarch, Don Jose Ayala, became Secretary of Justice in 1936 in the pre-independence Commonwealth. He was ex-officio chairman of the Philippine National Bank, a major land development leader. In 1951, Don Jose Ayala lost in the national election for Presidency to another land speculator, Carlos Garcia. When Makati emerged as the nation's financial center where banks, corporation, and related institutions, both national and foreign, established their headquarters, the Ayala Land corporation became the prime developer of Makati." Strassmann and Blunt "Land," 83.

[27] Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1964), 56.

[28] Another explanation for why more idle land is not used for residential housing is given in Howard Henward's study of Manila: "Moreover, because some large parcels of land are inaccessible and others have no access to basic infrastructure or services, private developers and the public sector must now look to the fringe areas to find land at reasonable cost." See Howard B. Henward Jr., "Metro Manila, Philippines: Conflicts and illusions in planning urban development," in John P. Lea and John M. Courtney eds., *Cities in Conflict: Studies in the Planning and Management of Asia Cities* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1985), 25.

[29] Ehtisan Ahmad and Nicholas Stern, "Taxation for Developing Countries," in Hollis Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan eds., *Handbook of Development Economics*, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: North Holland/Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989), 1074-1075.

[30] The Asian Development Bank consultants have noted that "In the Philippines, as in other countries, a tax on idle land

would be politically sensitive." Asian Development Bank, *Philippine Urban Sector Profile*, (Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1989), 55-56.

Also, Angel Yoinco correctly points out that the general idle land surtax has never been collected in the Philippines because of the inability to agree on a definition of idle. See Angel O. Yoinco, "Property Taxation in the Philippines," Paper presented at the International Seminar on Real Property and Land as a Tax Base for Development (Taoyuan, Taiwan: November 14-17, 1988): 10-11.

[31] Robert Wade, *The Economist*, April 4, 1992, 81. Edita Tan comes to this same conclusion: "The most important obstacle to effective implementation of the RPT...(Real Property Tax) remains the case-to-case method of valuation, which makes it physically impossible for local governments to achieve a fair and accurate valuation. The method is also prone to corruption, since each property owner is given the opportunity to negotiate with the assessor on the value of property. This problem, combined with power politics at the local level, works against the implementation of RPT." Edita A. Tan, "Real Property Taxation and its Potential as a Major Source of Local Revenue," in Emmanuel S. de Dios, ed. *Poverty, Growth and Fiscal Crisis* (Makati, Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1993), 169.

[32] See Strassmann and Blunt, "Land," 86.

[33] Ibid., 105-106.

[34] Tiglao notes concerning Sobrepeña's new company Fil-Estate: "Because the partners didn't have vast tracts of real estate, however, they figured the only way they could get a toehold in the market was by taking in as minority partners wealthy landowners such as Chinese-Filipino Jose Yao Campos and the Dy Bun Huat jewellery-family. Fil-Estate developed these old family holdings on a profit-sharing basis." Tiglao, "No Glory," 55.

[35] A new Philippine government program entitled the "Filtering Social Housing Program" was established to try and make housing more accessible to the poor:

The concept for this program is based on the fact that the more affluent have access to private renting or mortgage finance to pursue home ownership.

However, access to low-income housing by lower income groups has been a secondary objective. This is a consequence of the policy of relying on the private sector to provide low income housing because of limited financial resources of the government. The private sector, guided by the principle to gain profit, would rather pursue housing projects that cater to the middle and higher income levels. This accounts for the proliferation of many townhouses and condominiums constructed in Metro Manila and other major cities nationwide.

Alex Cabanilla, "Poverty Alleviation in the Urban Setting," *Philippine Development Magazine* 20(1993), 23-24.

Private developers have attempted to build subdivisions that would be affordable to the poorer in Manila. However, those that apply must often pay middle men an additional 20% interest on the home loans. As one observer notes "Only land scarcity and the monopolistic power of developers can explain such behavior." Strassmann and Blunt, "Land," 101.

[36] Professor Cabanilla notes concerning this: "Under the Contractors Preferential Scheme, big contractors in the Philippines like F. F. Cruz, Consunji, etc, are obligated to participate in low-income housing projects. The only way to do this is to filter the contractor's participation in government projects. This means contractors can only participate in any government project if they have implemented low-income housing programs." Cabanilla, "Poverty Alleviation," 24.

[37] Cited in Strassmann and Blunt, "Land," 100.

[38] Tiglao, "No Glory," 58.

[39] See Juan A. Foronda and Marcelino A. Foronda, *Two Essays on Iloko History* (Manila: Arnoldus Press, 1972).

[40] William Henry Scott, *Ilocano Responses to American Aggression, 1900-1901* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986), 5.

[41] Frederick H. Sawyer, *The Inhabitants of the Philippines* (New York: Scribner, 1900).

[42] See Bruno Lasker, *Filipino Immigration to the Continental United States and Hawaii* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931).

[43] See Volker Schult, *Mindoro: A Social History of a Philippine Island in the 20th Century* (Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1991).

[44] Henry T. Lewis, *Ilocano Irrigation: The Corporate Resolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 28).

[45] For more on this solution see Arsenio M. Balisacan, "Rural Growth Linkages, Poverty, and Income Distribution," *Philippine Review of Economics and Business* 29(1992), 62-85.

25 THE GREENING OF EXIT 7 IN CHAMBERSBURG, PENNSYLVANIA

Jack J. Ford

Introduction and Conceptual Framework

The proposed Exit 7 on I-81 in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania represents a classic study of jurisdictional disputes between an older and a younger community. The established community is the Borough of Chambersburg, one of the original and oldest urban settlements in the Cumberland Valley. The more youthful community is Greene Township, a municipality that appears to function as a young upstart type of suburb.

The proposed Exit 7 is situated at the edge of Greene Township (Figure 1) and less than a mile from one of the last undeveloped tracts of land in the Borough of Chambersburg. The cost of long-term infrastructure improvement would rest with Greene Township while the short-term economic benefits would go to Chambersburg Borough. The Exit 7 controversy reinforces the fragility of infrastructure improvements when a proposed public highway exit straddles a boundary between two communities with conflicting perceptions of space.

The conceptual framework of the controversy rests with a definition of power. Power is time- and space-specific and it produces a certain outcome. (Foucault, 1982, pp.777-95; Morehouse, 1996, pp.46-7). Both Greene Township and Chambersburg Borough have been exercising their decisional power over the Exit 7 controversy for the past ten years. If the proposed Exit 7 were not located near a political boundary, then it is extremely likely that controversy would have been easily resolved five years earlier. Either one government would have wholeheartedly endorsed the proposed exit or the other government would have disallowed it. Either way the project would not have dragged on for over ten years with little signs of immediate resolution.

The boundary nature of the proposed exit provides a chance for each community to publicly air their current views of space and their future community development objectives. The legitimacy of the power struggle is enhanced by each government's continued participation in the debate. The Exit 7 controversy is a power struggle which has cost over $6 million dollars and has pitted various agencies of local, state and federal government against each other.

The Exit 7 controversy also illustrates the complexities and interactions involved in the definition and perception of geographic space. Absolute space is one type of geographic space defined by political boundaries and recognized by the American legal system. Relative and representation spaces are defined by relationships between selected objects like farmsteads, wood lots, roads, trees, transportation routes, cultural and ideological associations (Lefebvre, 1991,p.39). The primary representation space manifest at Exit 7 is a series

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Figure1 Exit 7 Site Map



Source: Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

Public Opinion

of historical agricultural landscapes which straddle the area east and west of the proposed exit (Figure 1).

A cursory analysis of the conflict indicates that space is the focus of the conflict. It is the contention of the author that the Exit 7 controversy focuses on two communities with differing perceptions of geographic space. Greene Township views the proposed Exit 7 as representational space while Chambersburg Borough, assuming the role of the administrative capital of the region, looks upon the proposed exit as a legitimate requirement for regional economic development. A demographic comparison of both communities will substantiate this generalization.

Table 1 Historic and Projected Population Growth Percent Change

Municipality	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000
Chambersburg Borough	-2.8%	-6.6%	2.9%	2-3%
Greene Township	36.7%	20.7%	4.0%	1-2%

Source: Chambersburg Comprehensive Plan, September, 1995.

A Comparison of Two Different Communities

Greene Township and Chambersburg Borough do not share similar development objectives. Greene Township encourages open space preservation which comprises slightly less than

Figure2 Design of Actual Exit



Public Opinion/Tina E. Noll

Table 2 Historic Landscape Criteria General and Contextual Definitions

LANDSCAPE CRITERIA	GENERAL DEFINITION	CONTEXTUAL DEFINITION
Land use	Human Effects on Landscape	Farming Practices
Spatial Organization	Physical Organization of community	Patterns of Roads & Fields; Distances
Response to Natural Environment	Social Customs Defined by Natural Setting	Building Locations; Construction Methods
Cultural Traditions	Interaction with Physical Environs	Building Diversity, Planted Crops
Circulation Network	Transportation System	Farm to Market Roads
Boundary Demarcation	Property Delineations	Tree Lines Fence Rows
Vegetation	Historic Patterns	Crops and Tree Patterns
Artifacts	Vernacular Design	Arrangement of Buildings and Silos
Functional Clusters	Repetition Based on Similarity	Groupings of Farmsteads
Archeological Sites	Past Land Use Practices	Distribution of Roadways, Sawmill,Railroads
Small Scale Elements	Collective Components of Past Activities	Patterns of Road Traces, Fence Posts

Sources: McClelland, Linda F., J. Timothy Keller, Genevieve P. Keller and Robert Z. Melnick. Guidelines for Evaluating and Documenting Rural Historic Landscapes, National Register Bulletin #:30. Technical Information on Comprehensive Planning, Survey Of Cultural Resources and Registration in the National Register of Historic Places. U.S. Department of the Interior. National Park Service. Interagency Resource Division. Author, 1997.

50% of its 34,000 acres. Chambersburg Borough has only 750 acres of undeveloped land, which represents about 17% of its total land area. Hence, Chambersburg Borough needs to carefully manage its short-term land use changes in order to plan.

Demographically, both communities are also quite different (Table 1). Greene Township has had a long history of sustained population growth, reaching a ten-year growth rate of 37% between 1960 and 1970. Recently, its population growth rate has slackened between 1980 and 1990 to about 4%. Chambersburg Borough, between 1980 and 1990, reversed a 30-year decline in its population and grew by 3%. Approx-imately 22% of Chambersburg Borough's 1990 population is over the age of 65 while only 8% of Greene Township's 1990 population is over the age of 65. In addition, Chambersburg Borough also has a larger percentage of adults and children below the poverty level than does Greene Township.

Thus, Chambersburg Borough is best characterized as a community with a historically stagnant population, declining tax base and increased public service costs. In many ways, Chambersburg Borough portrays a demographic profile of an inner city in the Northeast. Given its small area and limited commercial growth, Chambersburg Borough has become a community with few choices. Greene Township, in many ways, acts like a suburban-ring community in terms of its population growth and age-structure. Most importantly, Greene Township is able to provide room for both residential and commercial expansion without sacrificing significant portions of its agricultural landscape.

The differences in the demographics and the development objectives between the two communities have shaped the perceived importance of the proposed Exit 7. Chambersburg needs to improve its tax base and one of the most logical methods is to increase the commercial and residential component of its land base. A tract of undeveloped land less than one-half mile from the proposed exit was once a semi-prosperous farm owned by a blue-blood Chambersburg family. The Borough recently rezoned the land to commercial and residential uses and it currently represents about 50% of the projected vacant land for the next ten years with the Borough. The potential of the tract would be greatly improved by direct access to I-81 (Figure 2). Currently a dirt road connects the undeveloped tract to an area less than 500 feet from the proposed Exit 7(Figure 2). Once the road is completely extended to the proposed Exit 7, then people will be able to reach the interstate within ten minutes from the northern portions of the Borough.

Greene Township, with five times more land than the Borough and two-thirds of its population, is more concerned with agricultural land conservation in the general area of the proposed Exit 7. The most recent comprehensive plan for Greene Township succinctly defines the role of agriculture in the Township and discourages most types of land use change

Table 3 Interpretation of Criteria by Opposing Parties

LANDSCAPE CRITERIA	GENERAL DEFINITION	CONTEXTUAL DEFINITION
Land use	92% farm/wood lot (area inventory)	66% structures-suburb (building inventory)
Spatial Organization	100 to 200 acre farms	1 to 4+ acre residential suburb
Response to Natural Environment	Intensive farming --> limestone outcrops	Grist mills, RR and sawmills gone
Circulation	Pennsylvania cultural area ->	Modern industrial society
Transportation	Roads support agricultural production	Roads support suburban lifestyle
Boundary	Trees and fences define fields	Lawns define landscape
Vegetation	Pasture, orchards, and crop land	Suburban induced vegetation
Artifacts	Farm houses, silos and cemeteries	No agricultural supportive facilities
Clusters	Based on agriculture	Based on single family residences
Archeological Sites	18 prehistoric sites along stream	No intact remains major disturbance
Small Scale Elements	Mill, raceways, cemeteries	Present but disjointed

Sources: *Pennsylvania Historic Resource Form-Data Sheet*. Paula Reed. Preservation Associates, Inc. Hagerstown, Maryland. April, 1995.
Response to Keeper's Request for Individual Eligibility Studies: I-81 Interchange Project. Greene and Guilford Townships. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and Federal Highway Administration, May 1996.

within existing agricultural areas. Green's comprehensive plan encourages commercial development only near existing shopping center and within villages. The current zoning classification in the area for the proposed Exit 7 allows only low density residential and agriculture as a permitted use. Greene Township, based on the development objectives in its comprehensive plan, supports commercial growth, but only when it represents an expansion of the preexisting commercial areas.

A Conflict of Space

Representation space associates particular values within specific territories (Morehouse, 1996, p.47). From the perspective of Greene Township, the existing agricultural area around the proposed Exit 7 emphasizes a value rich historic agricultural landscape. Proof for its historic value came in 1995 when the area surrounding the proposed exit was classified as a historic agricultural landscape and placed on the National Register of Historic Places.

The historic agricultural landscape designation is unique in land-use planning and the designation requires precise and detailed documentation of eleven criteria (Table 2). Most importantly, the contextual definition for each criteria should be visible within the existing landscape. An historic landscape designation does not prohibit private development. It merely restricts the use of federal money.

The 1995 decision by Keeper forced the state highway department (PENNDOT) and the Federal Highways Administration (FHWA) to change the interchange layout and they had to twice redesign the entrance and exit ramps. The historic landscape designation has involved Greene Township and the state highway department in a contentious debate over the legitimacy of the eleven criteria (Table 3). In fact, the debate has divided the communities (Hook, 1997).

Many of the criteria needed for the historic landscape designation define a representation space linked to the American Civil War. The spatial organization, response to the natural environment, circulation network, boundary demarcation, vegetation and artifacts collectively define a symbolic landscape that once functioned in the 19th century as an actual Civil War landscape. The historic legacy of the Civil War is visibly evident today in the Chambersburg area. Travel brochures and pamphlets from the Chamber of Commerce openly brag that Chambersburg was the only northern town destroyed by the Confederate Army. It is also true that the area surrounding the proposed exit was a staging area for Confederate forces prior to the Battle of Gettysburg.

A true representational space rises above the ordinary and the mundane (Morehouse, 1996, p.47). Representational space is an abstract space directly linked by images and symbols. From the perspective of the local residents,

representational space has the capability to become the dominant space for the users (Lefebvre, 1991, p.39). According to opponents of the proposed exit, the area surrounding it represents space where the historic linkages of the Civil War are visible today in the layout of the farms, road, fields and even the wood lots. Any modification of the existing landscape, particularly by the federal government would defame the sacrifices made by thousands killed in the Battle of Gettysburg. Exit opponents believe that the site of the proposed exit is permeated with an historic reality and it needs preservation. Regional economic growth within the Borough of Chambersburg does not justify the destruction of this unique historic landscape.

Conclusions

Many American communities are obsessed by the preciseness of absolute space. Representational space is more imprecise and harder to define its boundaries. Chambersburg Borough views the proposed Exit 7 as a logical extension of their absolute space. Their future economic survival rests with expanding their tax base and if a legal extension of their boundaries could occur, they would do it. However, Pennsylvania law currently prohibits municipal annexation. Greene Township looks at the potential liquidation of an historic landscape by an interstate highway exit as a microcosm of a larger battle facing many rural communities in America. Across the country, representational space has become the first casualty in the battle for regional economic growth.

The Exit 7 controversy is similar to battles waged during Medieval times when the fortified town tried to control the surrounding countryside. People flocked to the fortified city for protection and when the carrying capacity was exceeded, the town tried to extend its control over the surrounding countryside. The surrounding countryside functioned in a subservient role to the fortified town. In the case of the Exit 7 controversy, the surrounding countryside rejects the quasi-administrative control imposed upon it by the Borough of Chambersburg. If Greene Township were to succumb to the wishes of the Borough of Chambersburg, then a unique symbolic landscape may forever be destroyed.

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26 ART AND COMMERCE AS LOGICS OF BUDAPEST'S NEW PUBLIC SPACES

Judit Bodnar

In November, 1996, two items of cultural news stirred public opinion among Budapest's educated circles. A fierce debate that had erupted around the proposed transformation of the art movie theater network ended with the announcement of plans for the restructuring of the network (in operation for six years at that time). This came after several months of bitterness and resentment—a process seen by many as the beginning of the precipitous decline of the institution of art film distribution in Budapest. Meanwhile, the first big shopping and entertainment center—also containing a multiplex cinema—the one-million-dollar, paradoxically named *Pole Center* opened on the outskirts of the city. It made a forceful debut not just on the itineraries of the city's Christmas shoppers but also on the cultural scene. Even the traditional New Year Eve's cabaret of Kossuth Rádió, the public-service national radio station, was broadcast from the new mall. Featuring an American-style multiplex movie theater and several other spots of culture broadly conceived, it was bound to make a clear mark on the map of cultural consumption practices in Budapest.

Privileged sites in the changing urban landscape of postsocialist Budapest are its public spaces. This paper examines these two genres—art movie theaters and malls—that have recently emerged in the city, and recounts their stories in terms of cultural globalization.

The network of art movie theaters emerged in 1989, following a series of organizational changes, starting with the dissolution of the state-owned film company's monopoly on distribution in 1987 and ending with the formation of *Budapest Film*, a company that was running all cinemas in Budapest, that became the property of the municipal government due to political changes in 1989. *Budapest Film* became the legal successor of *FMO*,[1] the capital city's state socialist monopoly film distribution and management company. The idea of creating a separate art movie sphere was conceived as wide scale marketization and privatization pervaded all areas of the economy including the entertainment industry. The initiative came from people who, having worked at the state-owned film company—a state socialist monopoly—now moved to the reconfigured *Budapest Film*. As cultural bureaucrats and managers, they matured during the last mellow and gradually liberalizing years of state socialism. Some, including the general manager of the new company, also had a brief experience with international distributors, having been involved in the creation of a joint stock company by *United International Pictures* (UIP), the first foreign distributor to enter the Hungarian market—a company that was transformed into a fully foreign-owned subsidiary in 1992—as well as *Budapest Film*.

According to the recollections of *Budapest Film*'s CEO, it

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was some high ranking managers' "professional conviction that a network of art movie theaters had to be created to provide the citizens of Budapest with an alternative cultural supply of quality art that should belong to the city in the same way as theaters or libraries do". Relying on the financial and political support of the municipal government and the still existing *Film Authority* at the Ministry of Culture, they started the gradual process of converting some of the city's small cinemas into redesigned, technologically updated art cinemas.

> "We chose a few theaters from among those that only used to be referred to as the 'small and dirty' ones, those that could not have remained cinemas in a market competition and would have been converted into car showrooms or stores. We wanted to preserve them as cinemas, so we had to find a new function for them."

explains one of the progenitors of the Art Movie Network. The establishment of *Budapest Film* and its Art Movie Network[2] in 1989 was possible as a combination of two main factors: the opening up of the movie market that showed the sheer force of global competition and the personal informal network ties of the key actors of this institutional invention to all authorities involved—an asset they had accumulated, largely inadvertently, during their tenure as cultural managers and mid-level cultural bureaucrats during the last phase of state socialism. In this regard, *Budapest Film* is a clear example of one prominent type of institutional transformation isolated in the economic sociology of post-state-socialism; the form that relies on informal managerial asset structures.[3] This process is sometimes lamented, especially in the popular press, as a way in which structures of an uncanny past survive; the irony of the case of *Budapest Film* is that it also reveals a supreme sense of institutional creativity, very much in line with the tastes and preferences of a large segment of the citizens of Budapest.

By 1990, the spectacular success of the art movie theaters became the talk of town. Not only did the number of visitors fail to drop because of the presence of for-profit commercial competition fortified by international capital, but it registered actual increases. With an audience that celebrated the enterprise as a form of lifestyle resistance to the increasing dominance of Hollywood movies consumed with popcorn, *Budapest Film* was also able to make some profit and took special pride in its Art Movie project.

The success of the Art Movie Network is especially remarkable in the context of the fading significance of movie watching on the cultural landscape. Attendance of theaters had been gradually declining since the 1950s. It reached a moderate local maximum in 1985 only to drop quite sharply afterwards (Figure 1). As products of what Lenin called in the early twenties "the most important art," films were screened in more than 300 movie theaters in the city of less than two million in the 1950s. The cultural policy of high socialism that aimed complete provision in the city started to subside well before the collapse of the regime as the state-run national television program took over, during the sixties, many mass entertainment functions provided previously by movie theaters. As cultural subsidies from the state became scarcer during the early eighties, many theaters with low attendance were shut down, especially on the outskirts of the city. It is not surprising, then, that following the radical expansion of the realm of the market in cultural goods in 1989, the number of theaters shrank even more: while in 1989, still 58 theaters operated, there were only 35 in 1996. The geographical distribution of this change shows a further concentration in the inner-city areas (Maps 1 & 2).

Figure 1 Annual Number of Visitors at Movie Theaters in Budapest (Selected years, 1970-1996)



Sources: KSH 1980, KSH 1996 and Nepszadadsag, September 15, 1995.

Map 1 Budapest Cinemas, 1989



○ cinema

Sources: KSH 1989.

Map 2 Budapest Cinemas, 1996



Sources: KSH 1996.

Figure 2 New Films Released in Hungary by Country of Origin (selected years between 1970 and 1995)



Sources: Nepszadadsag, July 5, 1996, p. 15 and KSH 1980, Table 18.

Considering these numbers, the presence of 12 art movie theaters (over one-third of the total) signals a curious strength. This saturation of the movie scene with art movies is unique, even for Europe. (For instance, Berlin—over twice the size of Budapest—has fewer functioning art cinemas, and those are typically in the dilapidated, low-prestige, low-rent parts of town.) Movie-goers in Budapest have a choice of more than a hundred different films each week.

The creation and operation of the Art Movie Network was a creative response to what had been conceived as the irresistible globalization and homogenization of the film market under the aegis of Hollywood. The cultural diversity of new releases that had been gradually declining for some time, as shown in Table 1, shrank radically around 1989. This created a short period when the artistic poverty of the cinema scene and the power of the global market became a concern even for those who had never been outspoken advocates of the arts. The Art Movie Network has not stopped the overall shrinking of the diversity of *new releases* in Budapest (see Table 1 and Figure 2). It is striking, however, that the diversity that does exist is due almost entirely to the Art Movie Network. They do this by presenting a very broad selection of replays of films. Art movie theaters do not show only locally produced films nor entirely art ones. They feature an emphatically multinational selection of 'quality films'—including U.S.-made ones. These art movie theaters represent a resistance to cultural globalization *without resorting to a nationalist code.*

To the contrast of the local *vs.* the global—the apparent distinction of the globalization universe—these institutions oppose a different contrast, rooted deeply in a practical reading of the Frankfurt School's aesthetic analysis, strongly present

Table 1 New Films Released in Hungary by Major Countries of Origin (annual %)

	1982 %	1985 %	1989 %	1992%	1995%
Hungary	16	16	14	13	6
U.S.A.	13	13	36	50	69
United Kingdom	1	3	5	5	4
France	5	6	9	12	8
Poland	4	3	3	0	1
(West) Germany	6	4	3	2	0
Italy	8	6	6	5	4
Romania	5	2	1	1	0
USSR (Russia)	17	16	4	2	1
other	25	31	19	10	7
total annual # of films	192	201	236	190	143

Source: *Népszabadság*, 1996. július 5.

since at least the early sixties due to the theory work of Georg Lukács and his disciples known as the Budapest School of philosophy, the political code of socialist cultural policies, and the practical efforts of state socialist Hungary's vast network of cultural institutions (preserved in the minds, orientations and professional habits of their personnel): the distinction between good and bad art or, the contrast of Kitsch *vs.* high art. The practical reading of this opposition, however, is not a crusader's mercilessness on commercial cinema; only a conviction that the market is not the only valid measure of artistic value and that high art also has to be shown. The creation of the Art Movie Network signals an insistence on "quality" entertainment and high art in the name of diversity. It is not only memories of critical theory but also recollections of marketing classes and a solid respect for the market that explains the operation. With more than three hundred thousand, or approximately 23%, of the city's population (KSH, 1997:356) over 25 years of age having graduated from an institution of tertiary education, the distinction between high and mass cultures is clearly well-established in social circles quite beyond the narrow confines of cultural elites. With national television programming going ever more clearly for the Hollywood segment, and the increasing takeover of the commercial cinema scene by Hollywood distributors and their staple, the Art Movie Network was understood to be an institutional niche where 'quality' was preserved and provided to those interested. With ticket prices 30 to 50 percent *below* that of the commercial movies, the Art Movie Network was available to the most ardent and demanding section of the movie audience in Hungary: students in secondary schools and higher education. (Because of the relaxed admission policies, efforts to control unemployment, and certain demographic factors, the number of full-time students in tertiary education increased by two-thirds in Budapest; the respective figures for secondary schools increased by more than 20 percent between 1990 and 1996).[4] The image and marketing of art movie theaters follow a comprehensive understanding of cultural distinctions and their relationship to consumption. Art movie theaters are a genre that accommodates a certain idea of public space and its audience with the consumption of appropriate movies, internal designs, cafés, bookstores, reading rooms, even alternative designer clothing that can be all located in the cinema, whose consumption element is kept very low key.

As an institution of resistance, the Art Movie Network would have been impossible without globalization—neither its current opportunity structure nor the pressure to use it would exist. Meanwhile, they have carved out their own space and identity by resisting "Americanization" or "Hollywoodization." The Art Movie Network forms an institutional development that insists on the diversity of the cultural process, creating a multidimensional representation of globalization. The institutional setup is a key to its success.

The Art Movie Network's theaters belong to *Budapest Film*. First it was a company of the local municipality, managing theaters owned by the municipality, then it became a joint-stock company in 1993 into which the ownership of the theaters was added. *Budapest Film* has never run all the theaters: It subcontracts most of them to entrepreneurs in contact with the company. They kept three of the twelve art-movie theaters and gave almost complete independence to the managers of the individual theaters. *Budapest Film* looked for devoted people and institutions with professional interests in shaping theaters in their own image and interpretation of film culture. The pool of such partners included film studios, workshops, the Hungarian Motion Picture Foundation, the National Film Archives, and even some previous theater managers. Each art movie theater has its own specialty area, series of films, interior design and aura.

The network's economic survival is ensured by a delicate financial scheme. Management of theaters that can be supported by ticket sales and auxiliary activities is only part of the story. Low rents are just as important: Set around 10–20% of market rents, this form of subsidies has been kept so by cooperation between the municipal government and *Budapest Film*. Further support comes from the company's distribution business. Most of the movies showed by the network are bought and distributed by *Budapest Film*. Although distributors are entitled to commissions of up to 43 percent of the ticket revenues, art movie distribution is not a profitable business. *Budapest Film* distributes 30–35 art films and only a few commercial movies each year. This orientation translates into an annual loss of $ 250–300,000. The company that makes considerable profit on running a few commercial theaters and from leasing others to entrepreneurs, sinks a considerable part of its profit in its art movie mission. The municipal government that had owned the buildings until recently "did not expect the company to realize huge profits, only to manage their assets and provide the citizens of Budapest with a cultural service without requesting further support from them" sums up the general manager of *Budapest Film*. The company as a whole is profitable, in spite of its system of cross-financing whereby the losses from the art movie operation are offset by siphoning the profits from commercial sales.

The public service function and the economic rationality of the company produce a remarkably easy cohabitation quite surprising for an outside observer. Interviews with the managers radiate a conviction that art and commercial theaters cater for two different segments of the market. The management's preference does not lie in taking sides in the contrast of "art" as opposed to "commerce," rather, in a diversity that can be guaranteed only by this "self-subsidizing" scheme. Their managers' professional identity centers around "quality" films, foreign and Hungarian alike. They love movies of any kind that show signs of talent but they are also businessmen who have a keen understanding of the market to the extent that they try to think ahead. They are gifted survivors who found a proper institutional form to capitalize on formerly public assets by bringing former state property into a company that was bound to be privatized eventually. They combine business and pleasure—a mix that leaves some personal element, quite unusual for a business of this size, in their operation. *Budapest Film*'s CEO regularly sits around in the café of their new movie theater and watches the audience while sipping his coffee.

Management is not worried about competition from newly emerging complex entertainment facilities—the malls that accommodate multiplex cinemas—because of their applied, almost Bourdieuian "sociology-of-culture" conviction regarding the split nature of the movie market. Nevertheless, it was *Budapest Film* that opened the first multiplex cinema in Budapest—one that is not quite a multiplex though. In 1995, the company sold some of its real estate property that could not have been run profitably to raise funds for the new enterprise. The three-million-dollar project renovated and redesigned an old cinema on the margin of Budapest's movie strip, in a busy public transport hub with a subway station. The new theater, *Corvin*,[3] has high-tech features: the best available sound system in town and screens in all the six auditoria. Advertisement builds on this image: great picture, sound and comfort. There is more legroom in *Corvin* than in any other multiplex, including those this author has measured in New Jersey. Its grand opening took place in 1996, and it is predicted to bring the investment back in two to five years. "Corvin is not really a multiplex, it is only a multiplex-type of a cinema," claim the owners. They made this point also by naming it *Corvin Budapest Film Palace*. It exhibits many features of a multiplex; it has several auditoria, high-tech projection facilities, popcorn and soda in three different sizes sold in the lobby, first-run Hollywood movies and the paraphernalia that come with their effective marketing, such as *papier-mâché* Disney characters in abundance. But this is encased in a distinctly urban architecture, an interior space design by a chic name designer, that accommodates a small *Rick's Café Americain*, an art-video rental place—another one of *Budapest Film*'s ventures—and has an overall theme that speaks about the global history of cinema. One of the six movies played at a time is usually an art movie and the "Palace" also serves as home for current Hungarian cinematography. *Corvin* is a hybrid just as the company that created it.

> "We wanted to transfer some of our art-movie experience and create a sort of intimacy. Not to relegate it to some feeding-entertaining complex, but to elevate it to some communal space. It may be an illusion..."

explains the general manager of the company. But the elevated palace of a commercial cinema is doing fine.

The creativity of the response *Budapest Film* gave to the twin challenges of globalization and privatization is revealed in the *recombinant institutional form* (see Böröcz, 1993 and Stark, 1996) it represents; it is neither completely private nor entirely public property and it is an economically rationalizing actor with a cultural mission. Its internal system of cross-financing is something that annoys international auditing and accounting companies: it is uncommon and something that is difficult to classify in their logic. This may turn out to be a disadvantage also when applying for loans.

It is this constellation that seemed to end in 1996, generating intense media attention around *Budapest Film* and the Art Movie Network. In connection with its holding-type privatization, *Budapest Film* proposed to abolish its practice of cross-financing and make the Art Movie Network what they call "independent." The idea was to put aside a sum to establish an endowment whose annual interest earnings would be handed out to support art movie theaters in proportion to their art movie content. A board would determine what constitutes an art film. *Budapest Film* emphasizes the financial independence and security it would give the network that, thus, would not depend on the generosity and fortunes of the company. In exchange, *Budapest Film* would abolish rent subsidies and the theaters would pay much higher market rents. The company claims that this would only be fair since the new system would make theaters do better professional work and end abuses of the use of space, such as subletting parts of the theater to businesses whose profile does not fit that of the cinema and charge them quasi-market rents. (Whereas it is a general practice to accommodate auxiliary activities in the building, those activities should be in line with the main genre: small cafés, noncommercial book stores, video rentals, etc. Two art-movie theaters that were located somewhat marginally violated this expectation by subletting space to a sports store, a travel agency and even a currency exchange booth—an unfortunate practice that legitimized partly the "reorganization" rhetoric of the company.)

Disagreement came mostly from the partner institutions running the art theaters. Some movie managers are just as good economists as the managers of *Budapest Film*, although from a younger generation (thus having acquired practically their entire managerial experience after state socialism). While the company was able to present convincing figures to those who worried about the endowment not covering increased market rents, the art movie managers pointed out just as convincingly that inflation—between 15 and 25 percent during the first nine years after the collapse of state socialism in Hungary—may diminish the promised financial security of the network. They see the economic rationality of making rents compatible with the market but argue bitterly that cultural production and consumption have a logic that is distinct from that of the generic, "raw" notion of the market rampant in central European capitalism today. The hybrid institutional form that worked for the company may not be applied for individual theaters.

> "You can't create your own image that takes a long time and run blockbusters and sublet space to a grocery store on the side. Those are incompatible."

claim the theater managers most vehemently protesting the proposal. They picture a stronger art movie market in Budapest with fewer cinemas, which would definitely include the three theaters run directly by *Budapest Film* that attracts almost half the audience of the network (Sznyei, 1996). The cultural consequence of this would be the shrinking of the diversity that makes the network so interesting now. "This will mean the narrowing of culture, a closing of our playground" predict the young managers of the theater that is most committed to independent cinema and to hosting alternative film festivals.

In spite of the excitement this "reorganization for

independence" proposal generated, it was unanimously accepted by the Art Movie Section of the National Cinema Association. There seemed to be a consensus on the overall necessity and direction of changes: "the network had to become more compatible with the logic of the market." And no one could come up with an alternative proposal better than that made by *Budapest Film* that was similarly "European-quality, market-conform, and sector-neutral." This rhetoric rhymes well with that of the general reorganization of the economy radiating from the political sphere. The survival of the two art movies that, being located in private property, are not protected from market-level rents, even today, and are therefore in a disadvantageous position, is fully used in the argument. One should note that one of them is run by one of the promoters of the new institutional arrangement, also an employee of *Budapest Film*, while the other is a small dilapidated cinema that looks very marginal, the only one located in a basement. "We cannot provide a safety net for the network, especially not forever" argues *Budapest Film*. But that is exactly what they have done so far and with great success at that. The essence of the reorganization project is indeed creation of a more market-compatible institutional form that is to make the company a stronger economic actor. A new joint stock company of *Budapest Film* would specialize in distribution, another would handle all real estate of *Budapest Film* and charge art movies higher rents, which in turn could apply for support from the *Budapest Movie Endowment*.

The story is not only about a particular company. Until this proposal for restructuring, the economic and cultural policy of *Budapest Film* simulated the subsidy provisions of the redistributive state on a smaller, more transparent, scale. Now it also simulates the state—this time the east European "runaway state" (Szilágyi, 1997)—that is escaping its former redistributive "duties," abandoning those activities that can be construed in a narrow-minded market logic as undue generosity. Times have changed. The municipal government is shifting from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989) and *Budapest Film* is facing increased competition at the commercial market. The distributors' market has been sliced among fewer but stronger participants. In 1995, more than half of the film distribution revenues went to *InterCom*, a company directly linked to Hollywood studios that buys exclusively their products. Another third belonged to *UIP*, and the rest came from three small distributors including *Budapest Film*.

At the end of 1996, two multiplexes opened in two malls—three-million-dollar projects financed largely by international capital.[6] Five or six further multiplexes are planned now. *Budapest Film* has prefigured the squeeze of the market around its inner city commercial theaters to the extent that they are selling *Atrium*, one of their most profitable and nicest theaters—an architectural gem from the Bauhaus period of Budapest's architecture—and are investing into a new multiplex in an inner-city mall under construction two blocks from *Atrium* that would snatch *Atrium*'s market anyway. The company still cares about art movies and wants to preserve the network. They still support diversity but a kind that is more carefully, and more narrowly circumscribed and controlled, and one that costs them less money. Although a doomsday scenario for the Art Movie Network would be but another typical cry of cultural pessimism, the new constellation will rearrange power and cultural relationships. Some locations and, thus, characteristics, of the present cultural diversity may disappear while others, such as 'high art' that cannot be marketed effectively, may be effectively marginalized. Some art movie theaters may indeed become and remain "small and dirty" cinemas. This would be an outcome quite similar to the "alternative" art scene in western Europe and north America, in spite of the different histories. The story of the network, however, is not over yet, and it remains important no matter what happens later. Those instrumental in conceiving and elaborating the scheme often give credit to themselves by claiming that "in Hungary, where things typically don't work, we managed to *preserve* something that is working." They may well deserve some credit but they definitely misdefine what happened. The network is not a story of preservation. Rather, it is about a creative reconfiguration of strategies of globalization and localization.

In the postsocialist landscape as well as in the conceptual space of localization and globalization, shopping malls are a counterpoint to art movie theaters. Instead of using commercial revenues to subsidize art (as *Budapest Film* has done), malls incorporate all manifestations of art into an overarching, victorious and celebrated logic of commerce. They embody a distinctly different type of public space. Their link to global culture and finance is more subservient and passively-accepting.

What is called in the Hungarian press a "European-quality shopping mall" was constructed in Budapest right next to a socialist-modernist 'shopping center' in the center of a large housing estate with outlets of the supermarket chain *Kaiser's*, the construction materials chain *Bauwellt* and a *McDonald's*. An "American type" service center called *Europark Kispest*—financed mostly by Austrian capital—has emerged on the outskirts of Pest, at a major subway and train station whose aesthetic was already reminiscent of similar establishments on the working-class margins of Vienna. In 1995, a most grandiose and symbolically important project was conceived and begun, a combined "administrative-shopping-entertainment center for the family" called *Pole Center*. The 100 million dollar establishment is housed in a redesigned former Soviet Army garrison in District XV.[7] The progenitors and financiers of the enterprise are North American businessmen and Hungarian emigrés Peter Munk, Béla W. Fejér, Andrew Sarlos and Otto Blau—the developer of the World Financial Center in New York—along with revered Hungarian entrepreneur Sándor Demján, who gained recognition and millions by establishing the East Bloc's first, cooperatively owned, supermarket in a busy traffic center of Budapest in the early eighties. The *Pole Center* was designed as the prototype of an additional 25 multi-functional centers to be erected all over eastern Europe. Following the success of *Pole Center*, the Pole Holding Company announced the opening of additional malls in 12–15 Hungarian towns,

"creating 700 new jobs" respectively.[8]

The *Pole Center* is touted as a place that is all-round "American." The city's public is even told that the separation of ownership and management "followed the American practice."[9] The only "Hungarian feature" of the establishment is that it accommodates a traditional farmers' market.[10] Apart from its grand opening, *Pole Center* has made it to the national news only once, precisely for its "American" character. The announcement that the Center would be open on May Day—a national holiday—evoked strong sentiments from the public: the protest of unions and other interest groups was joined by the Ministry of Labor that declared working on a holiday unlawful and was to fine the stores that would be open.[11]

The second major mall, *Danube Plaza* is in a traditional industrial district of the city—a location chosen mostly because of the convenient availability of a major subway line and as major contribution to the ongoing effort to "upgrade" that neighborhood into a minor commercial center. The most recent shopping mall, built by the same Israeli developers as *Danube Plaza*, has been named *Csepel Plaza* after the district and island of Budapest where it is located and whose name became synonymous with that of *Csepel Iron and Metal Works*, the symbol of socialist industrialization.[12] Apart from stores, Csepel Plaza hosts a multiplex cinema and a game room.

Shopping malls are a novelty in the local culture of shopping. They radiate a clearly western, thus "more advanced," life style and a general sense of abundance to consumers whose appetite had been whet for quite a long time by a socialist shortage economy. This explains partly the lack of resistance that could enforce some variation in the theme of shopping mall or more creative forms of shopping cultures. Ironically, it is the western media that notes the poverty of localization strategies. With respect to shopping malls and megastores in Budapest, even the *Financial Times* observes:

> "Budapest does not learn from western examples...There are a lot of developers in the Hungarian capital today that could not work at home for reasons of environmental and urban planning considerations. Local municipalities short of resources are eager to sell off their real estate, thinking ahead for a mere 3 months, which could cost them a lot later.[13]"

The only registered resistance came from traditional market vendors who occasionally protested the removal of their old market places: competition and higher stall fees tend to make their operation unfeasible. Another genre of resistance has also been reported; an ecological group went to court claiming that the increased traffic due to the construction of the new store of a French shopping chain would reduce the quality of life for 200,000 residents and pollute the environment. The lack of enthusiasm on part of the local government to support the protest took the steam out of the initiative. The attitude of the local government was shaped by the $5 million they received for the land sale; they planned to invest the amount into a new health center.[14]

For five years, the list of investments of more than 10 million dollars in Budapest, has included almost exclusively shopping, trade or business centers and, occasionally, housing parks. In other words, multi-functional service centers (malls) fill the space for communal development projects. They are interesting not so much as new shopping places, but as a new *genre of public space* that has made a forceful appearance in Hungary. As such, they are becoming part of public culture. They figured very prominently in the narrative of a horrible crime story for the first time *as public places* (where one goes for the sake of company). In late Fall, 1997, the Hungarian public was shaken by the brutal murder of a cab driver. What lead to an uproar was not the murder itself but the fact that it was committed almost bare-handed by two fourteen-year-old schoolgirls who were caught almost immediately and answered to the shocked police that they did it in order to get the driver's car (although they were hesitant whether the new car, a Ford, was as good as the old one, a Mercedes, that he replaced on the day of the murder) and to show it off to their friends at *Danube Plaza* where they hang out. In fact, they were caught, while driving to *Danube Plaza*, in a routine traffic check. The only first-hand information released about the two perpetrators to the Hungarian public was an investigative reporter's interview with the two girls' friends whom she found in front of the multiplex cinema of *Danube Plaza*. This narrative indicates how quickly the shopping mall as public space has been *vernacularized* by youth culture. It also reveals how intimately its bundle of images—America, the future, hanging out, consumption, glitz, etc.— is tied to cars. Although *Danube Plaza* is on a major subway line, it is mostly frequented by people who feel safe to leave their fancy cars in the mall's garage instead of the streets, let alone taking the subway.

The spread of malls is of course closely related to the decline of old city centers and the waning of hegemonic downtown shopping (Zukin, 1995)—a vision of urbanity that has been on the defense everywhere. Optimists tend to see in this merely the relocation of public space. According to Rybczynski (1995), for the American citizen who flees the chaos and the challenges of Downtown streets, the shopping mall takes over the function of the street:

> "I think that what attracts people to malls is that they are perceived as public spaces where rules of personal conduct are enforced. In other words, they are more like public streets used to be before police indifference and overzealous protectors of individual rights effectively ensured that *any* behavior, no matter how antisocial, is tolerated. This is what malls offer: a reasonable (in most eyes) level of public order; the right not to be subjected to outlandish conduct, not to be assaulted and intimidated by boorish adolescents, noisy drunks, and aggressive panhandlers. It does not seem much to ask." (Rybczynski, 1995:210.)

Rybczynski's point is well taken. However, in spite of their immense diversification, malls constitute a public space that is very different from the street. The public nature of streets should not be idealized; the pavement in front of the world's

most elegant hotel—tacitly controlled by liveried doormen and bouncers—is a very restricted public space indeed. However, this seems to be an exception rather than the rule while in shopping malls the logic is the reverse.

Streets are publicly owned, and although much of their excitement comes from the commercial spaces they accommodate, their main function is not commercial. Streets are to provide, first of all, free movement, be that target-oriented or just wandering. True, even the archetypical public space, the Greek agora, had a commercial section—a food market—but that was not what defined its nature. Shopping malls merely tolerate noncommercial activities—wandering and 'hanging out'—motivated ultimately by commercial interests. This profile and their location effectively filter their public. Rybczynski's argument about old downtowns and shopping malls mirrors the line of thinking that legitimizes suburbanization. Shopping malls can provide all those features he lists, such as public order, cleanliness, proper maintenance because the problems of 'traditional' public space are removed from the consumers' horizon, they are left behind by the creation of a new frontier.

Malls incarnate the new philosophy of public space: they are thoroughly regulated, protected and confined commercial spaces for the "middle classes." Since there are neither resources nor political desire to design and maintain public spaces that can accommodate an increasingly diverse public, small and controlled islands of consumption simulate some functions of urban public space for those social groups that wish and can afford to transcend the fear and 'inorderliness' that pervades other aspects of urban life. The tension between the increasing diversity of citizens including social inequalities and finding a common denominator for togetherness that is eroding public space is a global concern. There may be several reactions to it but the creation of shopping malls as alternative public spaces in Budapest is certainly a response whose global financial and cultural content is high.

The shopping mall as genre of public space is a conceptual opposite of the art movie theaters, even though both are *new* public spaces. Cinemas that used to play art movies were very one-functional public spaces through which one would pass quickly. Today's art movie theaters are open even when there are no shows, they are places where one can sit around, pass time instead of passing through. In this respect, they are more akin to early twentieth century cafés than to Hollywood-style cinemas. Their coherence is still created by the showing of films, and preferably good ones, but they are more comprehensive as public spaces. The preservation of an old function took place partly by creatively reinterpreting that old cultural position and reconfiguring a niche for the enterprise. Shopping malls are inspired more by the idea of radical rupture and constant expansion. Both draw from legacies of urban modernity but, while art movie theaters reach back to the traditions of observing and mingling in the urban spectacle under the aura of art, shopping malls restrict access through physical distance and a commercial filter.

Art movie theaters and shopping malls are two instances of tension between globalization and localization in the postsocialist city.[15] Both hint that globalization and localization are intimately connected. They also suggest that global cultural flows do not lead to complete cultural homogenization. Cultural phenomena that emanate from global centers go through a process of indigenization in which they become our "own" (Appadurai, 1990). The direction of global flows is very apparent and well-documented for shopping malls. However, the Art Movie Network itself is a strong indication for the hierarchical nature of the global landscape and the limits of indigenization. Art movies draw their selection from the same pool of films as most other theaters all over the world but the timing of openings shows a rigid geographical distribution, in spite of local variations caused by Hungarian films and such curiosities as films by Hal Hartley that open well ahead of the U.S. All east European films travel to Budapest via western Europe or north America in spite of their decades-long intensive presence in Hungarian distribution and film culture, and in spite of previously existing personal professional networks and such conjunctures as the Russian language skills of the general manager of *Budapest Film*. This flow of films is but another reiteration of the center-periphery relationship first addressed by world system theory, then by globalization literature (Wallerstein, 1974; Hannerz, 1996). Centers are not centers because everything originates there but because they are places of exchange, "switchboards of culture" (Hannerz, 1996).

The two genres also show that there is quite substantial room for variations on the strategies of localization. The Art Movie Network subverts globalization on its own ground, by insisting on a more heterogeneous interpretation of it than mere "Hollywoodization." It resists cultural homogenization by refraining from simplistic references to a nationalistic symbolism. It merges local and global under the aegis of "art" and "quality" while creating a new urban identity. Shopping malls unite global and local with less institutional creativity in a nakedly and plainly commercial spirit—contributing to the emergence of new urban identity of a different kind.

Notes

1. The Hungarian acronym *F MO* stands for *F városi Mozgóképüzemi Vállalat* (Capital City Motion Picture Management Company).

2. This institution is called in Hungarian with the slightly anglicized name 'Art Mozi Hálózat' (Art Movie Network) (*Art* is not a Hungarian word but has become part of the urban vocabulary as a borrowing from English. To be noted is its use in the Hungarian of the Network in spite of the available Hungarian equivalent, *m vészmozi*—a name that was used during late state socialism to denote movie theaters featuring films of more demanding taste). For easier reference in this text, I use the English translation of

the name.

[3] C.f., Böröcz, 1993; Sik, 1994; Böröcz and Róna-Tas, 1995; Stark 1996; Róna-Tas and Böröcz, 1997; Eyal, Szelényi and Townsley, 1997.

[4] The number of full time students in tertiary education grew from 34 thousand to 57 thousand and that of secondary school students went from 77 thousand to 91 thousand between 1990 and 1996 (KSH, 1997:204).

[5] *Corvin* is a highly marked location in Hungarian culture. The area immediately surrounding the cinema was one of the three main hubs of armed, predominantly blue-collar resistance to the Soviet invasion in 1956. The choice of the *Corvin* cinema as the flagship of *Budapest Film*'s network thus invokes the heroic image of national resistance and uses a political notion—a decisive break with the past (as recognition of the heritage of 1956 was one of the socialist regime's taboos)—to fix the newly-redesigned cinema in the minds of the Budapest public. As a symbolic reinforcement of this imagery, preparation of the cinema's interior design was commissioned to László Rajk Jr.—the son of László Rajk, the most prominent victim of the Stalinist mock trials, himself a well-known member of the democratic opposition to Hungary's late-state-socialist regime.

[6] The stronger competitor, located in an upscale mall that is closer to both the inner city and the wealthiest suburbs, is a joint venture of *InterCom* and the Australian *Village Roadshow International* owned by Hollywood producer *Andy Vajna*.

[7] *Ingatlanpiac*, August 24, 1995.

[8] *Ingatlanpiac*, June 5, 1997.

[9] *Ingatlanpiac*, August 24, 1995.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *Világgazdaság*, April 29, 1997.

[12] There are 142 companies operating on the territory of the former plant. They together employ twice as many people as the total number of unemployed in the district.

[13] Cited in *Népszabadság*, October 21, 1996.

[14] *Ingatlanpiac*, June 5, 1997.

[15] I define localization as the creation of local identity, the harmonization of physical and moral proximity in a context in which responsibility becomes even more elusive.

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

Public and Private Roles

27 TOWARDS AN INDONESIAN URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Tommy Firman

Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world (following China, India and USA), which recently passed the 200 million mark, is currently experiencing a rapid transformation from an agrarian-based economy to industrial-based economy. The national economic structure is undergoing a shift in its emphasis, from the primary sector, i.e. agriculture, to the sectors of industry and services. The sector of agriculture, which in 1990 accounted for 20.2% towards the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), will contribute only 10.5% by the year 2005. On the other hand, the sector of industry, which contributed only 27.3% towards the GDP in 1990, will share 42.5% by the year 2005 (Firman, 1997a). This basically indicates that the role of cities as centers for industrial and service activities will be getting more important in the future. In fact, major cities, such as Jabotabek (Jakarta Metropolitan Area), Surabaya, Bandung, and Medan have been growing rapidly as the main centers of secondary and tertiary economic activities in Indonesia. This will also affect the growing needs of the community for urban services, which will drive the increasingly important role of the urban areas as service centers.

For almost the last two decades the urban population in Indonesia has tremendously increased at a rate of 5.2% per year, from 32.8 million in 1980 to about 70 million in 1995. The level of urbanization, that is the proportion of urban population over the total population, was only 22.3% in 1980, but in 1990 the figure reached 30.9%, and meanwhile in the year 1995 it was estimated to have reached 36.0%. A projection indicates that the level of urbanization in Indonesia is to reach 41.8% by the year 2000 and 46.0%. By the year 2005, the absolute number will be approaching 87.5 millions and 102.5 millions respectively (Ananta and Anwar, 1994). Such growth of the urban population is indeed inevitable.

To give a general picture, by the end of the Second Phase of the Long Term Development Program, (1994-2019), there will be 23 urban centers with a population over one million in Indonesia, with eleven of them located outside Java, the main island. Five out of the 23 cities will have a population of over 5 million, including Jabotabek (Jakarta Metropolitan Area), the largest urban concentration in Indonesia, which will be inhabited by more than 35 million people by 2019 (Kartasasmita, 1995). Indeed, this will affect the physical development of these cities, including the urban land. In fact, an estimate shows that the additional need of urban land during the period of 1994-2019 will reach 660,000 hectare or about 26,400 hectares per year on the average (Ali, 1997). In short, urban land will continue to become one of the most important issues of urban development in Indonesia in the near future.

Within this context, this article will discuss the broad issues of urban land resource developments in the future, as a

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foundation for policies concerning urban land development in Indonesia from a national perspective, using illustrations from the four largest metropolitan cities, namely Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and Medan.

It is realized from the outset that this article might be too broad in scope, but there has never been a study which explicitly addresses issues of urban land development in Indonesia in a comprehensive view. This study will present an overall picture of challenges to urban land development policy in Indonesia in an integrated manner, as a basis for urban land development policy formulation. In fact, these issues are not only relevant to Indonesia, but also to many developing countries in Asia, notably in Southeast Asia.

Urban land development policy basically refers to government policy in the control, allocation, and utilization of the urban land resources (Archer, 1990).[1] In general the problems of urban land development in the developing world according to Bernstein (1994) and Farvaque and McAuslan (1992) include inappropriate use of resources and lack of political will to solve the problem; overcentralized and poorly coordinated land management institutions; lack in efficiency, equity, accountablity and probity of the administrative systems; inappropriate, inflexible and over-detailed regulatory and legal framework; and reluctance to encourage participation from the urban poor; inappropriate pricing and taxation; inadequate land information; lack of secure tenure; and inadequate infrastructure capacity.

The present study argues that **first**, thus far there have been no explicit, systematic and conceptualized urban land development policies in Indonesia, despite the fact there have been many policies and regulation regarding the use and utilization of urban land. The existing policies and regulation are largely fragmented in terms of objectives, orientation and implementation agencies, and not surprisingly often inefficient, inconsistent and even conflicting with one another. In addition, they are not prepared with an anticipation of urban development in the longer perspective, and instead, often are only piece-meal reactions to situational urban land problems.

Second: Against the conventional wisdom which believes that too much government intervention on land development is not condusive for urban land market to work effectively, the study maintains that the argument is basically not whether the intervention is too much or too little, but whether it is efficient and effective enough to guide land development. In fact, as Dowall and Clarke (1993) argue that without regulations and planning, the land market may generate enormous external costs and fail to produce public space. Parallel with this argument, Koppel (1993) maintains that the increasing concerns about the declining affordability of land for urban low-cost housing and socio-economic consequences of land speculation have evoked calls for more active state intervention and regulation in the land market, with the assumption that urban land policies can solve these problems. Indeed, the role of private sectors in urban development is essential, but in many major cities in Indonesia the activities of private sectors, notably major land developers, tends to be uncontrolled, simply because of many weaknesses in the legal and institutional aspects of urban land development.

Third: Therefore there is an urgent need for comprehensive urban land development policies in Indonesia, which should be based on the anticipation of urban growth in the future. Urban policy reforms eventually need bureaucratic reforms, but this study will focus itself on technical aspects of urban land development, not on political aspects of it, although they will also be discussed as necessary.

Apart from the introduction, this article will be divided into four parts. Part One will review the definition and scope of urban land policy for the developing countries; Part Two will discuss the urban development and its impact on urban land use, whereas Part Three will examine the need for urban land management, notably for the large cities. Part Four will conclude the discussion.

Urban Land Development Policies for Developing Countries

Urban land policy commonly includes policies aimed at affecting ownership; affecting land prices; increasing supplies; affecting the use; and obtaining revenues (Mattingly, 1993), whereas Rakodi (1996) more specifically argues that more broadly, state urban land development policy intervenes with regard to tenure (property right), land use planning and regulation, land taxation as a potential source of government revenue, infrastructure provision and development, and public sector participation in land supply as well as land development. In line with this definition, Darin-Drabkin (cf. Devas,1983) classifies three general types of land policy. First, legal measures influencing private land use decision, such as zoning and subdivision control; second, government land acquisition; third, land and property taxation.

Basically, there are three justifications for government intervention to the urban land markets (Dowall and Clarke 1993): (1) Eliminations of market imperfections and failures to increase operating efficiencies; (2) Removing externalities so that the social costs of land market outcomes correspond more closely to private costs; (3) Redistribute society's scarce resources so that disadvantaged groups can share in the society's output (cf Moore, 1978). The first two justifications aim at increasing the allocative efficiency of land market outcome, whereas the third seeks to improve the equity of it, by allocating the land to the low-income groups. Furthermore, Dowall and Clarke (1993) suggest six necessary actions to be taken for reforming urban land policies in developing countries: first, land market assessment (LMA) aimed at providing an accurate up-to-date data base on the operation of the urban land market; second, decentralization of land management authority; third, deregulation to simplify land-use and development control and to shorten the approval cycle; fourth, curtailing public land development authority which may include restructuring large organizations, privatization, or liquidation; fifth, improvement of efficiency in land market

operations; and sixth, provision of financial, institutional, and spatial structures for installing infrastructure networks.

There are two general mechanisms directed towards achieving optimal utilization of urban land resources in developing world: first, to create and protect the private land ownership rights which will in turn encourage and enable the community and the private sector to use, develop, and conserve their lands; second, to enforce control on land utilization by the government (Archer, 1990). In Taiwan, for example, where urban land policies are formulated on the principle that the existing land value is the property of the land owners, but the increase in land value as a result of development and public investment (different from the investment and achievement of the land owner), is the property of the community (Lin, 1993).

In the case of urban land [in Taiwan], the concept of equalization of land rights was applied not to the ownership of the land but to the increase in land value over time, with part of this increase after a base date being collected by way of taxation. Thus, there is a progressive land value tax (progressive on the increase in value over time), and a progressive land value increment tax, on urban land. The revenues from these two taxes are paid into funds to be used for education, social welfare and development projects (Archer, 1990).

In short, urban land policy deals with planning and implementation of allocation, utilization and control of urban land to achieve efficiency and to improve the equity of land market outcomes. However, this general framework should be put in the context of urban development of a particular country, to result in more relevant and effective urban land policy for the country (see also Bernstein, 1994). With this background in mind, the discussion will next be focused on recent urban development and its impacts on urban land use in Indonesia.

Urban Development and Its Impacts on Urban Land Use

The immense physical development of large cities has affected the changes in the structure of cities, that is, urban

Table 1 Conversion of Agricultural Land to Urban Land in Indonesia 1991-1993 (in hectares)

No.	Province	Converted Land			
		Housing	Industries	Offices	Others
1	Aceh	2,223.1	30.4	95.2	1,006.6
2	North Sumatera	3,636.9	259.9	140.0	750.6
3	West Sumatera	2,891.5	89.6	90.9	1,505.7
4	Riau	1,023.6	516.6	24.5	97.7
5	Jambi	610.1	2.5	6.7	372.3
6	South Sumatera	1,063.0	81.0	143.0	2,288.8
7	Bengkulu	306.3	5.5	8.2	349.5
8	Lampung	1,539.9	72.1	449.7	220.4
9	Jakarta	2,570.3	906.3	139.1	379.3
10	West Java	13,354.5	10,220.1	1,343.4	2,720.9
11	Central Java	4,989.1	1,065.3	637.4	1,791.2
12	Yogyakarta	667.2	30.6	87.4	71.2
13	East Java	7,022.4	2,259.4	970.7	3,497.0
14	Bali	1,310.3	52.7	48.8	203.3
15	West Nusa Tenggara	1,890.3	63.0	305.7	1,216.1
16	East Nusa Tenggara	141.9	-	9.2	39.0
17	East Timor	126.3	5.7	-	7.0
18	West Kalimantan	632.3	-	20.8	498.7
19	Central Kalimantan	27.0	2.7	4.1	53.4
20	South Kalimantan	1,042.6	134.4	114.9	984.0
21	East Kalimantan	1,864.3	35.0	82.5	6,483.4
22	North Sulawesi	476.0	245.8	60.4	142.5
23	Central Sulawesi	995.8	48.5	45.4	141.5
24	South Sulawesi	3,523.9	317.6	362.8	953.1
25	Southeast Sulawesi	658.0	6.6	13.7	165.3
26	Maluku	339.5	0.5	1.2	785.2
27	Irian Jaya	2,522.0	0.5	4.5	0.6
	INDONESIA	**57,987.5**	**16,452.3**	**5,210.2**	**26,774.2**

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (cf. State Ministry for Environment), 1997.

restructuring, characterized by the rapid changes of land use in the urban centers, as well as conversions of prime agricultural lands to subdivisions and other urban land uses in the urban fringe areas, as can be observed today in large cities in Indonesia, such as Jabotabek (Jakarta Metropolitan Area), Surabaya, Bandung and others. The recent development of investment in housing and industrial estates, particularly in the peripheral areas of those cities, has rapidly transformed these areas from prime agricultural land into large subdivisions and industrial estates (see Firman, 1997b). The figure shows that during 1991-1993 the conversion of agricultural land to urban land in Indonesia reached more than 106.000 hectares, covering 58,000 hectares (54.7%) of housing areas; 16,452 hectares (15.5%) of industrial land; 5,210 hectares (4.9%) of offices; and 26,774 hectares (25.3%) of other urban land uses (Table 1).

It is also interesting to observe that about one-fourth (26%) out of the 106,000 converted land was located in the Province of West Java, notably in the *Kabupatens* (Districts) surounding the city of Jakarta. Actually, the new town and industrial estate development in Indonesia is governed by *Keppres* (Presidential Decree) 53/1989, which clearly states that the development should not take place in the preservation and conservation areas or on the prime agricultural land. However, a study on urban development in the fringe areas of Bandung (Firman, 1996), the third largest city in Indonesia, shows there have been many violations of this decree because it is not followed by more technical regulations, whereas the demand for land in the areas is increasing tremendously, following the rapid growth of its economic activities.

Another study of conversion of agricultural land to urban land uses in the outskirts of Bandung shows that not only has it squeezed the agricultural areas, notably paddy fields *(sawah)*, but it also has reduced the productivity of remaining sawah from 4.5 ton per hectare to 3.4 ton per hectare per harvest (Edrijani, 1994). Besides, the harvesting frequency has dropped from three times per year to twice or even once a year. It is suspected that the damages to the tertiary irrigation channels resulted from construction for industrial and housing development in the area, and have in turn affected the cultivation and harvesting patterns.

The utilization of urban land areas, both in the urban center as well as in the fringe areas, is a product of competitions, frequently characterized by 'conflicts' involving the community, the private sector, as well as the local government (see also Surbakti, 1996; Suyanto, 1996). Many once-residential areas, especially slum areas *(kawasan kumuh)* have been converted into hotels, luxurious high-rise apartments and shopping malls. In Jakarta, for example, during 1980 to 1992 no less than 600 new buildings worth above US$ 5 million were constructed, including more than 160 super-markets; 66 condominium towers; and 10 four-and five-star hotels, with estimated total investment of US$ 10 billion (Dorleans, 1994). This development has raised the property businesses in the large cities, which in turn skyrocketed land prices in the Central Business District (CBD).

In the Jakarta CBD, which is popularly known as *Segitiga Emas* (Golden Triangle) Kuningan-Sudirman-Gatot Subroto, the land price has recently reached Rp 7.5 millions (US $3250) per square meter, whereas at the end of 1970s cost only Rp 0.2 million (Firman, 1997b). Meanwhile, the prime agricultural land in the outskirts of Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung had very quickly turned into new housing areas, industrial estates, golf courses, and tourist resorts (see Kustiwan, 1997; and Firman, 1977b).

Furthermore, in cooperation with the private developers, some city government have made plans to overcome the problem of land scarcity and to provide cheaper land prices through reclamation of coastal areas, such as the Waterfront City Project in Jakarta, which will add 2,800 hectares of land to the city of Jakarta within 20 years; Teluknaga Project in Tangerang, to the east Jakarta Metropolitan Area, covering an area of 8,000 hectares; and in East Surabaya. These land development projects are suspected to have local socio-economic and environmental impacts, as they may cause flooding in the surrounding area and destroy the coral reef along the shoreline, while many local fishermen may also lose their primary livelihood (for detail see Firman, 1997b).

In the outskirts of Surabaya, the second largest city in Indonesia, during 1990 to 1995 as much as 2,300 hectare of agricultural land was converted into residential and commercial areas, such as hotels, offices, bank and shopping malls; condominium and apartment. In addition, many residential areas in the city center have been changed into shopping centers, hotels, and offices (Budiman, Verbenasari and Salim, 1997). It can also be noted that the paddy fields in the *Kabupaten* (Districts) surounding Surabaya are substantially decreasing, and have been converted into seven new-towns (sub-divisions) ranging 200 hectares to 1,000 hectares in size, and 28 industrial estates which size range from 15 hectares to 900 hectares. Likewise, in Medan in North Sumatera, the fourth largest city in Indonesia, the urban land use including housing, industrial areas, and spaces for offices during 1980 to 1993 increased by 2,130 hectares, that was from 10,630 hectares to 12,760 hectares, whereas agricultural land decreased from 15,880 hectares to 13,749 hectares during the same period (Data Base of the Municipality of Medan, 1993).

The occupancy rate in many new towns around the large cities built by the private developers is very low, because the luxurious houses there are bought not to be lived in, but only used as second or third houses. From the perspective of land utilization for urban development, this situation is considered inefficient. Considerable land areas in the outskirts of big cities have been acquired by the developers or land speculators, which in turn creates difficulties to establish the land subdivision.

During the last two decades the economic development in Indonesia has rapidly increased the demand for industrial land, especially since the late 1980s, when the goverment permited private companies to manage industrial estate. In addition to industrial estate development, many light manufacturing

enterprises such as electronics, footwear, plastic, have also been developed individually outside the available industrial estates. This development has in turn induced land conversion, notably in the fringe areas of large cities, where most of these industrial activites are located. In short, the conversion process is out of control, as it started with an uncontrolled issuance of location permits as well.

Such developments have in fact raised "conflicts" among various interest groups, notably between the old dwellers and the strong investors, which very often end up with the eviction of the old occupants. The change in land use is frequently accompanied with certain parties attempting to take advantages, through a land speculation business. Land acquisitions by the developers were often carried out with a "negotiated" price but no agreement, which basically put the developers at a "monopsonic" position, as the land owners were not having any other options to whom they could sell their lands. On the contrary, the developers were at an "oligopolistic" position when they sell the land to their consumers. Very often the process of "land transfers" from the land owners to the developers or a certain private parties is "unfairly" executed. Frequently, the first party will have to receive an improper compensation, whereas the local governments tend to "take sides" with the second party. The fact is that the above-mentioned distorted land market condition tended to induce the growth of land speculation, which is getting more difficult to control although through the monetary policies as there is opportunities to utilize foreign investments.

Even worse, the land acquisition process in many major cities in Indonesia usually involves brokers *(calo tanah)* who extract large amount of money as a commision fees and make the process more complicated. A study shows that the *calo tanah* collect about ten percent from the transaction value less than Rp. 100 million, and about five percent otherwise (Dorleans, 1994). This is in fact a manifestation of the lack of a mechanism to control the process of land transfers on 'equal' bargaining positions (see also Ferguson and Hoffman, 1993; Firman, 1997b).

Conversion of agricultural land to urban land areas is a normal part in urban development, however, it is observed that what has been going on at present around the major cities in Indonesia is largely uncontrolled. First, the process tends to become a "land business undertaking." Basically, there are two types of private developers who carry out land development in large cities, notably Jakarta: (1) formal private developers, which are mostly real estate companies developing land on a registered title; (2) the informal private developers constructing building and land development not on registered title (for detail see Leaf, 1990 and Archer, 1994). One of the consequences is that many of the land areas that had been bought for a long time, but have not been developed, become idle, thus there are many of these neglected land areas (tanah tidur: "sleeping land"). Second, the process is taking place at a very large scale, hence the apprehension that it will affect heavily the production of foodstuffs, as well as a squandering in the investment of irrigation at agricultural farm lands, notably the paddy fields.

It should be kept in mind though as Bernstein (1994) argues that there has been no evidence that any country had been able to successfully limit agricultural land conversion without causing high pressure on land prices for other purposes, as was the case in Japan.

> ... Japan has artificially preserved agricultural land, but it has resulted in the inflation of rice prices to seven times the world market price and inflated the cost of residential housing to the highest in the world (Bernstein, 1994, cf. Mekvichai et al., 1991)

Third, it can also be observed that land conversion is not only affecting the prime agricultural land, notably in the urban fringe, but also taking place in many areas which have been designated as conservation areas functioning for water recharge, such as Northern Bandung and *Jalur Puncak* (Puncak Strip) near Jakarta, which may have serious negative impacts to the environment.

From the mid 1980s up until the mid 1995 the National Land Agency (BPN) whose tasks are to manage land records, to process land title and to administer land development, issued nearly 350 permits to large private developers involving more than 80,000 hectare land in the fringe areas of Jakarta. However, thus far only about 40 percent of the total area has been developed while the rest has become abandoned land. Some have argued that this amount of land would be more than sufficient to meet the demand for land for low-cost housing up to 2018, and therefore asked why the BPN still issue permits for land development in this area.

In other words, too many land development permits have been granted in Jakarta Metropolitan Area, but it is doubtful if the developers as permit-holders are able to develop fully this sizeable area, as many of the developers simply do not have enough technical as well as financial capabilities to do so. To a large extent this situation also reflects the absence of a comprehensive urban land policy for the Jakarta Metropolitan Area.

It should also be pointed out that in general, the capacity of the local government to manage and implement the spatial plan *(Rencana Tata Ruang)*, particularly in the monitoring and controlling land conversion, has been inadequate, while pressures from the businesses are immense. The government, i.e. the National Land Agency (BPN), has recognized this problem, and therefore issued a ministrial decree in October 1996 to freeze the granting of location permits in Jakarta Metropolitan Area, but then in early 1997 relaxed this decree by granting the permits to some developers selectively.

In summary, the major cities in Indonesia are experiencing urban restructuring (see also Firman 1994). The city center are transformed to become center of commercial, services and financial activities, whereas the fringe areas are in the process of becoming new residential and industrial areas. This process has triggered land conversion both in the city centers

and in the periphery, and it seems that the process will be more extensive in the near future, as the socioeconomic activities in the urban areas are developing rapidly. The urban physical restructuring is a normal part in urban development, but it seems that at present the process is largely uncontrolled mainly because of the absence of an urban land policy. Bearing this background in mind, the discussion is next focussed on the issues of urban land management in Indonesia in anticipation of those processes in the future.

The Need for an Indonesian Urban Land Management

The management of urban land resources in the future should be aimed at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of land utilization based on principles of "equity" and "sustainability". The ideal aspirations might in turn affect the requirement for 'policy reforms' in urban land utilization, as stipulated in the *UUPA (Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria*—Basic Agrarian Law*)* promulgated in 1961 that the land has its social and functional values, and not a commodity for trading to seek maximum profits. This study will basically address five issues of urban land development, including: land ownerships and transfers; land use development; land taxation; land development institutions; and land administration.

First, the issue of land ownerships and transfers. The basic principle appealed by the prevailing regulations is to prevent excessive "ownership" of urban land as well as inefficient land utilization, which can even become a matter of speculation of certain parties, and in turn disbenefit the public and even widen social disparities. In fact, this matter had been specifically addressed in the Basic Agrarian Law *(UUPA)* which is still very relevant to the present condition, however, the context has shifted from rural land to urban land areas. The fact is that concentration of urban land in the hands of large developers is increasing (see for instance Leaf, 1991), while some developers tend to become rent seekers and land capital gain speculators, resulting in increases in the land price but decreases in the land utilization. This matter should get more serious attentions as the conflicts of economic interests and the likes in urban areas in the future will be getting more complicated in character.

This matter is in fact demanding a long-term policy for the utilization of urban land resources. The policy should contain the principle and control mechanism of land use, including the location permit to the building permit.[2] It should be kept in mind that the location permit first of all is a tool to control land use development, and not a granted exclusive right for land acquisition as has been wrongly practiced at present (see also Archer, 1994). On the contrary, the present land-development permit system in Indonesia essentially reserved the land almost exclusively to the approved developers (Firman, 1997b). Besides, for the authorities, notably the National Land Agency *(BPN)*, the location permits tend to become a tool to collect fees, and consequently processing the location permits is often costly and unnecessary complicated. In many cases the increase in land value due to the construction of public infrastructure did not much result in an increase in public revenues, but it tended to be more profiting the developers than the public itself. As Archer (1993) correctly argues:

> ..., the issue of [land] permits [in Indonesia] has facilitated the assembly and development of much land, but many permits have been issued for excessive areas of land relative to the applicants' ability and/or intention to develop it. This has blocked a large amount of suitable land from urban development and thereby reduced the supply of development land and increased its price, and increased the scatter of urban development.

At present, the national economic development policy is also focussed on attracting foreign as well as domestic investment. This policy has largely pushed the *BKPM* (Investment Coordinating Agency) who is less concerned with the negative impacts of physical development, to grant investment permits to both foreign and domestic investors in order to achieve the national investment targets. Under this circumstances, the location permits as a tool to control land-use development is obviously considered not too important, while the investors should be facilitated by the easiest way to obtain land for their operation, even by relaxing the requirements for location permit if necessary.

In short, the existence of location permit systems as a tool of controlling land development should be maintained, but obviously it needs an extensive review to avoid possible abuses of it, such as for land speculation (see also Archer, 1993).[3] Perhaps, the location permit fees should be to the lowest possible, if not removed at all, to avoid using it primarily as a tool of revenue collection, though it is not a guarantee because there are always possibilities of collecting informal permit fees.

Another important aspect is more "equitable" land transfers. The prevailing mechanism of land transfers at present is giving too much authority to the developers, while the land owners seem to have no options regarding to whom they are going to sell their lands. Even if there are certain mechanisms for negotiating in deciding the selling price, in the realization however, very often the buyers are being "supported" by a certain *oknum* (the Indonesian term for people with a certain capacity, especially with negative connotation). A study shows that 20 out of 23 (87%) of land aquisition cases in Surabaya during 1992-1993 were done in force, not with consensus (musyawarah) between the land owners with the developers (Suyanto, 1996), as the land owners basically were not satisfied with the compensation offered by the developers. It should also be noted that up until now, the compensation given in the form of an amount of money is in fact to compensate the lost assets only, especially land, buildings, utilities, as well as the plants existing on the land, and does not consider the loss of income and the other disadvantages experienced by the land owners due to the land transfers.

Later, in July 1997, the government announced a decree *(Paket*

Deregulasi Juli 97) which no longer allows banks to give loans to developers who are involved in large-scale land development projects, except for those involved themselves in low-cost housing projects, considering the high total amount of property loans, may affect seriously the national economy, as the loans are potentially delayed in the repayment (*kredit macet*: bad loan), which has been the case at present. In the short run this policy may squeeze large-scale land acquisition and land speculation, but in the long run it is questionable if it can cut land speculators significantly, because there are other ways for developers to obtain financial resources, such as mergers or international loans.

Land transfers in major cities in Indonesia are also characterized by the fact that a substantial number of the lands are not registered, and instead have the status of a *hak garapan* (use right) or a *hak girik* (tax letter right) which are rooted in the 1870 colonial agrarian law. These land rights are now considered under the traditional land ownership without legal distinction between them. This also reflects the dualism of land law in Indonesia (Leaf, 1993), which clearly disadvantages the land owners. In fact, the market prices for *hak girik* lands were 78 to 83% of the market value for registered land parcels, whereas hak garapan land were priced even lower, that was, 63-69% (Dowall and Leaf, 1991).

The administration of land acquisitions for the sake of the public facilities and infrastructure development projects is governed by The Presidential Decree *(Keppres)* No. 55/1993. In principle, the Keppres stresses that land transfers for private projects are basically a business transaction between the respective community and the private developers. In fact, the procedures of land transfers for the benefit of the public interest should entail the involvement of the land owners and their associates, the *DPRD* (Assembly at provincial, regional, or municipal level), and of course the executive, both in formulating the utilization of land categorized as public interests as well as in the determining compensation value of the people's land as such that it will at least be capable of improving the socio-economic condition of the respective land owners towards a better quality. It is also emphasized in the Keppres that land acquisition should be implemented through direct deliberation *(musyawarah)* and achievement of consensus *(mufakat)*, and on voluntary basis between the concerned parties. However, the *Keppres* has not touched the procedures of land acquisition for private projects that are still using the old way of lacking empowerment of the land owners.

There should be a mechanism for land transfers that will not physically evict and take ownership of the land from the owners, but the land owners should be positioned as "shareholders" in the project being carried out by the developers (private) on their lands. This is undoubtedly the essence of partnership between the private sector, the community and government in urban land use development. In fact, several techniques for this particular purposes have already been applied in Indonesia, for example through land consolidation, land pooling and readjustment.[4] The management should also be based on the fact that communities are increasingly demanding participation and openness in a more democratic atmosphere.

One of the difficulties being faced in providing land for the development of the public facilities and infrastructures, particularly for low-cost housing, is the scarcity of low-priced land areas. In fact, it has been planned for quite some time that the establishment of Land Banking, that is, a process whereby the land required for particular needs is purchased well in advance of those needs (Devas, 1983), to be managed by the government through the state-owned companies and by the local government through the local government-owned companies. Concepts like *Kasiba* (*Kawasan siap bangun* or Ready-to-be-developed-areas) and Lisiba (*Lingkungan siap bangun* or Ready-to-be-developed-subdivisions), in which the BUMNs and BUMDs are authorized to aquire land to be developed, especially for the low-cost housing projects have been put forward, however, until present there is almost no significant progress in the development, least of all, the implementation of the ideas.

Second, land-use development. Land utilization in the urban area should principally be based on a spatial plan, the *Rencana Umum Tata Ruang* (*RUTR*). However, it seems that with today's rapid growing economic activities, in the attempt to accommodate these economic activities or because of the interests of certain parties, the Urban Spatial Plan has to be 'adjusted' without proper procedures (Firman and Dharmapatni, 1994).

Given the vast urban land use change taking place in large cities, there should also be clear and transparent requirements regarding the process of land use changes and shore reclamations, as these matters have extremely great impacts to the social economic condition as well as the environment. Nevertheless, what is needed in this case will be a transparent mechanism for the change of land use, which is lacking at present. On the whole, this condition also indicates that the *RUTR* or more general, the Law No. 24/1992 pertaining to Spatial Planning should still be followed with the implementation procedures of the urban plan.

A common problem with much urban spatial planning in Indonesia is that it is intended and therefore designed to control urban development in very detail, which obviously cannot be fully implemented by the local government, given many constraints in the available resources to implement the plan. Therefore, the urban spatial planning should be rather guidelines focussed on long-term strategic components of urban development, instead of the physical design of the city in detail as being practiced at present. Another common problem with the urban planning in Indonesia, is that it has rarely been a negotiation process to build up a consensus among various parties and stakeholders involved in the urban development. It is therefore not surprising if only little commitment is given by those parties to the implementation of the plan.

The control of land use planning is difficult in the condition where the urban plan is concealed to the public as has been

the case in many cities in Indonesia. Obviously, disclosing the urban spatial plan to the public has induced land speculations by certain groups which has privileged access to the urban plan. Therefore, urban spatial plan should be made available and accessible to the public, so that it may motivate them to actively participate in urban land development control.

Third, land taxation. Land taxation can serve as an instrument in administering land utilization. There are two different taxes that can be used as instruments, namely property taxes and value improved taxes. Urban land taxation can indeed encourage and promote the use of "private land" and will certainly assist the authorities to develop public infrastructures, which will in turn enhance urban development by communities and the private sector.

It seems that these economic instruments have not been effectively employed to control land utilization in Indonesian cities. As has been discussed earlier, there is even the tendency that land taxes, including location permits and building permits, are more considered as an instrument to collect revenues, rather than an instrument for land use control. Overall, what is needed is a more comprehensive land taxation which take into account the efficiency of land use, services and infrastructure provided by the government, and socio-economic and environmental impacts of land development.

One of the prevailing property taxes at present is the *Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan* (PBB, Land and Building Taxes), which can in fact be used as a control instrument for land utilization, however it turns out to be far from expectations, as it does not refer to the urban spatial plan. Yet, the revenues obtained from the land and building tax *(PBB)* are found to be insignificant in comparison to the profits extracted by the private developers in Jakarta Metropolitan Area. The figure shows that the land and building tax in Indonesia only amounted US $400 million in 1991, whereas in 1986 when this tax was introduced for the first time, government revenue originated from it reached only US $162 million, contrasting to US $71.2 billion estimated land transactions value in Jakarta alone from 1989 to 1993 (Dorleans, 1994).

A study of land and building tax (*Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan - PBB*) as an instrument for urban land taxation indicates that the PBB basically is designed with the objectives of increasing the revenue, while the determination and evaluation methods of it has nothing to do with urban land use planning, resulting in the fact that the PBB simply cannot function as instruments for urban land use control (Parengkuan, 1991). Some shortcomings in the current PBB system include (1) the determination of taxable value does not consider various land use categories; (2) the levy is relatively low compared to it in other developing countries; (3) the system is simply not able to accomodate the change of taxable values.

High property taxes should be imposed on urban land that have not been developed for quite some time. Business transaction taxes on relatively short period land ownership should also be increased to curb the motivations for land speculation. The fact that the Ministry of Finance has prepared the regulation which taxes the transactions of individual land valuing more than Rp. 500 million with capital gain more than 10 percent. Furthermore, the possibilities for implementing the land value tax; land increment tax, location value tax, and betterment levies, should be further studied in the urban land taxation law and regulations in Indonesia. At this point, there should be underlined the principle of property taxes such as suggested by Archer (1990), that is, the property tax charged on urban land should be based on land value instead of on the improved value, and on a realistic estimate of the market value of land, so that the tax will be adequate, equitable and efficient. This principle implies that the property tax system needs to be buttressed by an efficient land valuation system.

Fourth, land development institutions. It should be acknowledged that the institutions for land development are fragmented and lacking of integration both at the local as well as national levels. At the national level, for example, there are at present at least 12 institutions related to land affairs (see also World Bank, 1994), which include the *BPN* (National Land Agency), whose task is to coordinate for land registration, permits and ownership regulation; Ministry of Finance, *Bappenas* (National Planning Board), Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Energy and Mining, Office of the State Minister of Environment and *Bappedal* (Agency for Environmental Control and Management), *Bakosurtanal* (National Coordinating Agency for Surveys and Mapping), Office of the State Ministry for Investment Promotion/*BKPM* (Coordinating Agency for Investment), Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Home Affairs and the local government, who coordinate and control land-use planning and its implementation. Coordination between the different institutions is clearly not an easy task. To give an example, the local government has a city and regional plan, but the ministry of public works has its own road development plan, whereas the Minister of Agriculture has its own irrigated rice field plan, and yet those plans are quite often conflicting with one another.

Considering that the Government, through the issuance of the *Keppres* (Presidential Decree) No. 75/1993, had established the *Badan Koordinasi Tata Ruang Nasional* (*BKTRN*, National Body for Coordination of Spatial Planning) chaired by the State Minister for Development Planning/Head of Bappenas, the possibilities for coordinating land resource utilization by the respective bodies should be studied, without reducing the functions and authorities of the ministries and each respective institutions.

Coordination should of course be implemented at the local level as well. In compliance with it, the Local Development Planning Board *(Bappeda)* of the first administrative level (Province) and of the second administrative level (District or Municipality) should be the institution that can undertake such coordination. It might have been undertaken for different matters, however, very often with constraints and sectoral conflicts which may have in turn resulted in inefficient urban land utilization.

It is realized that establishing a coordinating agency to facilitate bureaucratic interaction might be not an easy task, which also holds true for some other issues which have been discussed: such as public disclosure of planning information and strengthening local capacity for community participation, because all the issues are linked quite fundamentally to the political economy development in Indonesia, including vested interest, but it needs to be done in order to pursue a more effective urban land development in Indonesia. More importantly, it will need a political will from the authorities to improve urban land development and management in the country.

Besides, the need for decentralization in decision making regarding land development is increasingly felt, as in many cases the decision making is very much centralistic in character, and done with no considerations to the specific conditions of the area. In other words, the local government should have more authority in decision making on land development. Consequently, the capacity of local government in this matter should be strengthened. Such institutional building should indeed be supported by the availability of human resources that are capable of managing the urban land resource development, given the fact that the existing condition in many institutions looks apprehensive, the institutions at the local level in particular.

Therefore, a special program should be designed and implemented to upgrade the capabilities of the human resources in urban land management, especially at the local government level. The presence of private developers in urban area development is necessary, and should indeed be encouraged, as Indonesia is basically facing problems of land development such as experienced by other developing countries in general, that is to say "too much government regulation and not enough support of private sector institutions" (Dowall and Clarke, 1993). Therefore, a supporting climate should be developed. One of the main components is of course the availability of a legal assurance for the operation of the private sectors; furthermore, there should be supports of financial institutions that can provide loans for such undertakings, notably for small and middle developers, and the presence of competent construction industries as well as suppliers of construction components. Nevertheless, as has been discussed earlier, what happens at present is that the role of the private sector, especially the large developers, seems to be out of control, because of the weaknesses in the existing system of land regulation and institutions.

Fifth, land administration. Another important matter to note is that one of the difficulties experienced in urban land management at present is the lack of adequate information and data on land affairs to be used as a basis for decision making and planning in general as well as for public services. Most of the lands do not have formal title, while the inadequate land administration has made for high transaction costs and land disputes, particularly in rapidly growing areas such as in the fringe of Jakarta.

Ideally, there has to be a land registration system, covering at least the data on real estate registry, ownership, and rights, in the form of maps, or in other words, there should be provided a national registry of real estate data. Farvaque and McAuslan (1992) argue that land registration can help land markets to work; facilitate the conveyancing process and subsequently ensure the transparency of the transactions; and provide availability of records for land market operation.

According to the records, out of the existing 54 million non-forested land plots in Indonesia at present, only about 30% (16.5 million land plots) were registered since 1961 (Harsono, 1996). As Dowall and Clarke (1993) argue, the lack of clear proof of land ownership will impose substantial costs on the land market, because without accurate ownership data potential buyers should investigate the property ownership prior to deciding whether to purchase the land, as they obviously do not want to be involved in land disputes in the future. Besides, the untitled property owners will not be able to use the land for collateral to apply for loans from banks or other financial institutions, and thus have to find more expensive lending. Fortunately, at present the Government of Indonesia, with the assistance of the World Bank, through the Office of the State Minister of Agrarian Affairs/*BPN* (National Agency for Land Administration), is carrying out a giant project known as the 'Land Administration Project' (LAP), which is essentially a reform in land administration, human resources, and institutions (Harsono, 1996), albeit this registration program may take 25 years to complete. Against the opinion that this seems to be unrealistic considering the size of the task at hand relative to the resource available, this study argues that the program should be started somehow, otherwise Indonesia will never have an appropriate land registration system.

Another problem encountered with the land information in Indonesia at present is the fragmentation of many institutions related to land data, and each institution has its own interests in compiling and documenting the information, which end up with the circumstances in which each institution has its own information systems, and a lack of exchange of information among themselves. Obviously, this has resulted in inefficiency and duplication in land information compilation. In other words, there is a need to improve the coordination among many institutions in charge with land data.

Conclusion

The development of large cities in Indonesia is an inevitable process, and will proceed in line with the social economic development of the nation. Most crucial to be developed is the capacity to manage the emerging problems due to urban development.

One of the main issues that will emerge with the development is urban land resource development. The problem is in designing an effective, efficient, and equitable land resource

management, in accordance with the social functions of urban lands, and therefore there is the need for reforming and reorienting the policies for urban land development in the future (Table 2).

Improving the regulations and institutions should become the key agenda for the reformation, which covers land use control, clear and transparent mechanisms and regulations regarding changes of land use as well as shore reclamation, land transfer mechanisms, taxation that can become incentives and disincentives for land utilization, procurement of land banking, and others. Furthermore, institutional building is necessary for coordination and decentralization of land resource utilizations.

The role of private sectors is central for urban land development in Indonesia. Therefore, assurance for development of their activities and presence of financial institutions that can provide financial loans, notably for small and middle developers are essential. In the future, the government should play a role more as the enabler, instead of controlling urban land development very dominantly (see also Farvaque and McAuslan, 1992). Although this study is about the problems of urban land development in Indonesia, to a large extent it exemplifies the broad challenges to urban land development policy in developing countries in general, which include inappropriate land regulatory and legal frameworks; over-centralized and poorly coordinated land management institutions; inappropriate taxation; and inadequate land information (see also Farvaque and McAuslan, 1992; Bernstein, 1994). The existing urban land policies and regulation in Indonesia are fragmented in terms of orientation, objectives, and implementing agencies, and therefore often inefficient, ineffective and even conflicting one another. In fact, this study has been a lesson which shows the complexity of urban land development problems in the developing countries.

Overall, this study has sought to identify urban land development issues and examined the need for urban land policy in Indonesia in a comprehensive manner. Admittedly, however, it largely focusses itself on technical issues and some policy implication of the issues, but does not much examine the political economy of land development in Indonesia, which is obviously linked quite fundamentally to the technical issues of urban land development which have been discussed. Having realized this shortcoming, the study recommends further studies of Political Economy of Urban Land Development in Indonesia in order to understand better the dynamics of socio-political aspects of urban land development in the country.

Table 2 Issues of Urban Land Development in Indonesia (a Summary)

Issue 1: Landownership and Transfers

Problems
- Uncontrolled land conversion which encourage some developers to undertake land business speculations.
- The prevailing land permit systems which reserve the land almost exclusively to the approved developers.
- Undervalued land compensation and unfair treatment to the landowners.

Objectives
- To prevent an excessive land ownership in the hands of small groups of developers.
- To ensure more equitable land transfers.
- To make the increase in land value benefiting the public

Actions to be taken
- Evaluate the present land permit systems as a tool to control urban land use development.
- Create incentives and disincentives to prevent an excessive land ownership and land trading speculation through a comprehensive land taxation system.
- Develop a mechanism for fairer compensation in land transfers and in land acquisition which will not physically evict the land from the owners.
- Expediate the issuance of land banking regulations.

Issue 2: Land Use Development

Problems
- Inappropriate urban spatial plan adjustment.
- Concealed urban spatial plan.
- Too detailed urban spatial plan.

Objective
- To make urban spatial plan more effective as a guidelines for urban land development.

Actions to be taken
- Focus urban spatial planning on the strategic issues, not on the detailed plan.
- Develop mechanisms for land use change and for land reclamation.
- Disclose urban plan to the public.

Issue 3: Land Taxation

Problems
- Ineffectiveness of land tax as an instrument to control urban land-use development.
- Too much emphasis on land tax as an instrument to increase revenue.
- The increase in land value resulting from construction of public infrastructure did not much result in increase in the public revenue.

Objectives
- To establish a comprehensive land taxation method which takes into account the efficiency of land use, services and infrastructure provided by the government, and the socio-economic and environmental impacts of development.

Actions to be taken
- Assess the possibilities of employing land value tax, land increment tax, location value tax, and betterment levies.
- Improve the *Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan* (land and building tax).
- Impose high property taxes on urban lands that have not been developed for long a time.

Issue 4: Land Development Institutions

Problems
- Fragmented and poorly coordinated land development institutions.
- Lack of decentralization.
- Domination of large private developers.
- Low capacity of the local government institutions.

Objective
- To improve coordination of land development implementation.
- To enhance the local government capacity in urban land development.
- To encourage the role of small and medium developers in urban land development.

Actions to be taken
- Assess the possibility of Badan Koordinasi Tata Ruang Nasional (BKTRN - National Body for Coordination of Spatial Planning) to become a national coordinating agency for urban land development.
- Decentralise more decision making on urban land development to the local government.
- Strengthen the capacity of local planning agency (Bappeda) as a coordinating institution of land development at the local level.
- Encourage local community participation in urban land development.
- Create legal assurance for the development of private sector activities in urban land development.
- Create environment which is conducive to attracting competent construction industry as well as suppliers of construction materials.

Issue 5: Land Administration

Problems
- Lack of adequate information and data on land affairs to be used for decision making and planning in general.
- Only about 30% land plots which have been registered.
- Inefficiency and duplication in land information compilation.

Objective
- To have a land registration system which cover data on real estate registry, ownerships and rights in the form of maps.
- To improve coordination of institutions related to land data.

Actions to be taken
- Expedite the land administration program (LAP)
- Study the possibility of land data coordination.
- Strengthen the institutional and technical capacity in land data administration at both national and local level.

Notes

[1] Archer (1990) stated further that the aspects contained in the development of urban land resources include: Land ownership, tenure and transfer systems; Property valuation and taxation; Provision of network infrastructure; Land use controls; Transport and traffic controls; Provision of social infrastructure; Municipal administration and services; Government land ownership; Participation in private development; Financing property development and investments; "Profession of the land"; Land information.

[2] Developers who intend to aquire and assemble land for subdivision project are required to have location permit *(ijin lokasi)* and land purchase permit to authorize the land purchase and its conversion to registered land title (Archer, 1994:39). As Archer (1993:19) maintains that basically there are five basic functions of land permit systems in urban development: (1) guiding the location of the (formal) private land and building development projects; (2) coordinating the government and the formal private sector development activities; (3) facilitating land assembly for the development projects; (4) facilitating land assembly for large-scale development projects, including new town and industrial estate projects; and (5) attaching appropriate project development conditions to the permits for the land acquisition for the proposed development projects. However, as Ferguson and Hoffman (1993) argue, the existing land development permit systems in Indonesia affect land prices in two respects: first, the systems tend to reduce the price paid by the developers who have been authorized to acquire the land; second, they tend to increase land prices by the end-users. In addition, the permit systems also encourage developers to leave the land idle, thus constraining land supply (see also World Bank, 1994).

[3] As Archer (1993) technically suggested the potential benefits of land permit systems in Indonesia can be improved by several conditions: First, there should be a land use and circulation plan for district and municipality that indicates the proposed network of main road and distributor/collector roads together with the land use zoning, and it should be supported by more detailed plans for the prefered development areas; Second, permits should be issued in stages according to the achievement of developers; Third, permits may have to be attached with several conditions, for instance donation of the land for the public road shown in the official plan, and provision of low cost

housing. In addition, it might also be necessary to reduce the excessive stock of land currently under permits. It can be done first of all by assessing the urban development conditions to identify the priority development areas; secondly, the location permits granted in the priority areas should be evaluated to ensure that amount of land purchased, and progress of development in general is according to the official plan.

[4] According to Archer (1994) urban land consolidation is a technique used for managing and financing the development of selected urban fringe areas, by which groups of land parcels are consolidated for their unified design, servicing and subdivision into a layout of streets, building plots and open spaces, with the sale of some of the plots for cost recovery and the distribution of another plots back to the original landowners. He also argues that land consolidation is a technique for converting rural land into urban land by which a group of neighbouring rural land owners are combined in compulsory temporary partnership for the unified planning, servicing and subdivisions of their land, while the project costs and benefits being shared among the land owners (for details see also Archer, 1987, 1989, and 1993).

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28 EXPANDING THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH CONCESSION AGREEMENTS: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA

Daniel A. Rodriguez

Introduction

In recent years, several countries in Latin America, and around the world, have met the challenge of developing and expanding critical infrastructure by promoting private sector participation in the infrastructure sectors. Recognizing the relevance of the infrastructure sectors for the economic development of firms and industry and the well-being of the population, and given increasing constraints on public budgets to finance these impending needs, governments have sought to shift part of the burden of infrastructure investments to the private sector.

Concession agreements are an instrument for facilitating the participation of the private sector in infrastructure development. A concession agreement for urban transportation infrastructure refers to an arrangement in which a national or subnational government transfers the construction, operation, and maintenance of transportation assets (or the right to do so) to a private entity. This includes infrastructure related to passenger rail systems, busways, and motorways in urban areas. Ultimately, governments retain ownership or the right to supply the service whilst transferring (some) construction and operation risks to the private sector. If concessions are awarded through competitive bidding, they draw economic benefits from creating competition *for* the market as opposed to *in* it (Shaw, Gwilliam and Thompson, 1996).

There are other ways to bring the private sector to the transportation infrastructure market: outsourcing, management contracts, and divestiture by license or sale. For purposes of this paper, these arrangements are not counted as concessions. Other arrangements, such as merely the right to operate in a given market, are commonly called "concessions" but also fall out of the definition scope provided here.

The main motivations for seeking private sector participation in infrastructure projects are found in the poor performance record of state-owned monopolies in its construction and operation. Supporters cite a number of financial and economic reasons. Specifically, most arguments in favor of concession agreements can be summarized as: potential increases in economic efficiency (Gómez-Ibañez and Meyer, 1992 and Engel et al., 1997); an apparent improvement in government's fiscal burden; the availability of an expanded pool of capital that would otherwise have not existed; and an improvement of the public's image of the delivery of public services (Mizutani, 1994).

Critics argue that debates around finance and construction costs, although important, tend to involve transfer payments from one group, say road users or traditional road contractors,

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to other groups such as taxpayers, which by itself may not constitute economic efficiency gains. A drawback commonly cited is that total cost of infrastructure construction and operation may be higher with a concession than with a conventional approach. This is due to higher transaction costs (Tiong, 1995), the cost of higher risks entailed by the private sector, in some instances the lender's perception of lower credit-worthiness of the project promoter, and the risk aversion of investors beyond what a government considers legitimate. The last two costs can certainly be avoided under a conventional public tendering approach (Blackshaw, Flora, and Scurfield, 1992).

In attempting to illuminate the discussion around the effects of concession agreements on economic efficiency and public finances, this paper analyzes the role of overall project risk and the related government-backed risk guarantees on reaching successful closure of a concession deal. Risk and risk-guarantees are characteristics of concession agreements that directly affect the stakeholders involved and ultimately impact the long-term economic and financial viability of a project.

This paper argues that features of large infrastructure projects (such as high capital costs and asset indivisibility) together with urban transport-specific characteristics (such as high intermodal competition and the uncertainty of forecasting demand), and characteristics common to most developing countries, such as incipient financial markets, contribute to a high level of project risk. High risk levels, in turn, severely constrain the ability of finding private financial support for the project. In order to test the validity of the hypothesis, five attempts to develop infrastructure via concession agreements in Latin America were selected. Argentina, the only success story, has awarded subway, commuter rail and a few urban road concessions in Buenos Aires.[1] Brazil and Colombia, in contrast, reached advanced stages in awarding concessions for urban busways in São Paulo and Bogotá, respectively, but the concessions failed to materialize, apparently due to the lack of financial support. The State of São Paulo succeeded in awarding one busway concession. The prominent features of the concession program in each case are analyzed. As a result of the difficulties of reaching project closure, governments can opt for either building the infrastructure through the conventional tender approach or to mitigate project risks by providing risk guarantees. However, government-backed risk guarantees are expected to have far-reaching effects on national budgets and the health of a nation's finances.

Case Studies

The three case studies represent the population of concession agreements attempted to date in Latin America. Additional concession agreements, in these and other Latin American countries, are currently being sought. Abundant information about the process and outcomes of the concessions in Argentina exist due to the program's initial success. Colombia and Brazil's limited success with urban transport concessions may explain the limited information that exists about the process and features of each agreement. The next sections provide a broad overview of the major urban transport concession(s) attempted in each country.

Buenos Aires, Argentina

Passenger Rail Concessions

Since the early 1960s, passenger rail services in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region (BAMR) were organized under Ferrocarriles Argentinos (FA). Under this arrangement, each of the six commuter rail divisions that converged in Buenos Aires was responsible for freight and passenger services. Service delivery problems developed during the 1970s. Contributing factors leading to the service decline included a production-oriented culture with little regard towards customers, increasing competition from bus transport and private auto, and weak rail management executing poor railway investments. A decline in rail ridership was evidence of FA's systemic deficiencies. Simultaneously, increases in income and the subsequent effects on motorization levels contributed to the increase in the demand for road space. By the end of the 1980s, FA passenger rail services had become unreliable, stations were badly deteriorated, fare evasion was remarkably high and accidents were increasing. In spite of population increases of 120 percent over FA's life, railway traffic over the same period decreased to half of its original level.

In 1990, of all state enterprises, FA was responsible for the largest drain on the national treasury—about $1.4 billion annually, of which about 25 percent were incurred by the suburban rail network. By 1991, a fully staffed Railway Restructuring Unit created within the Ministry of Economics and Public Works was in charge of drafting the terms of solicitation and bidding documents for awarding a concession for rebuilding and maintaining the rail infrastructure and providing the transport services. As a whole, the government's objective was to reduce the federal subsidies financing passenger train operations. To this end, the government agreed to fully fund the capital improvement program specified in the call for bids. Therefore, private financing was not directly sought from concessionaires, but rather, the ability to implement a prescribed set of capital improvements efficiently. The fact that the overall level of private capital at risk was low might have proven critical to the success of this concession.

The subway and suburban railway services were grouped into seven bundles to be awarded independently. Concessionaires assumed the risks inherent in most business activities; however, since the system was functional, bidders had some indication about minimum expected usage levels. This reduced the risk level, even though benefits or costs resulting from differences between the demand realized and the predicted demand accrued directly to the operator. Bidding

documents defined the minimum service standards in terms of coaches per hour, frequency, travel times, percent on-time performance, and percent of cancelled trains. Also, maximum fares for standard service and fare increases as a premium for performance were established. Concessionaires had an incentive to exceed the standards set by the government because only then could they claim a fare increase. Chronic failure to meet these standards would result in penalties to the concessionaire. The duration of the concession is 10 years for the six commuter rail bundles and 20 years to the subway and remaining commuter rail line.

Concessions were awarded in late 1992 and early 1993. A voluntary retirement program was put into place to reduce the number of employees; a total of 32,000 workers retired from FA. Contracts were signed shortly thereafter and concessionaires took over operations of the lines during 1994 and 1995.

So far, based on performance criteria, the passenger rail concessions have succeeded in their stated goals. Table 1 shows changes in a few basic indicators for all the rail bundles given as concession. Part of the increase in passengers registered is due to the anti-fare evasion strategies implemented by concessionaires. However, even in the case of the subway, where fare evasion was deemed low before the concession, ridership between 1993 (the last year before the concession) and 1996 increased from 145.3 million to 198.9 million passenger trips. This represents a considerable 37 percent increase in three years. By the end of 1996, year three of the concession, subway traffic had surpassed the forecasts for year eight as stated in the bidding documents.

Buenos Aires Roadway Concessions

Plans called for the main access roads to Buenos Aires to be awarded as a concession concurrently with passenger rail concessions, but were administered through a different office within the Ministry of Economy and Public Works.

The government's aim was to rehabilitate, upgrade, and expand the road system in and around Buenos Aires with the least possible impact on government finances. To this end, the government's effort concentrated on achieving full user cost recovery of the reconstruction costs (Shaw, Gwilliam and Thompson, 1996).

Four main roads have been awarded by concession so far: Acceso Norte, Acceso Oeste, Acceso Ricchieri, and Autopista La Plata-Buenos Aires. With the exception of the latter, all concessions were awarded for existing routes. Therefore, bidders had important information available regarding current demand levels. Selection of the preferred bidder was made based on the lowest toll proposed (the government set a cap on the minimum feasible toll).

The concessionaire would collect tolls from users as soon as all public works were completed. The tolls were fixed in US dollar terms, though collected in pesos. Larger vehicles are charged a multiple of the basic toll, and the rate will be adjusted annually to reflect changes in the US consumer price index (CPI) from September 1993. The toll level in pesos will be recalculated monthly to reflect changes in the exchange rate levels. The bid parameter was the lowest toll; the government allocated the bulk of the revenue and operating risk to the private sector by requiring substantial performance bonds in its favor (Yates, 1994). The average length of the concessions is 22 years and 8 months. Under conditions of the contract, bidders were not allowed to charge tolls until the public works were fully completed.

All contracts except Acceso Norte have been renegotiated to allow toll collection before the works are completed (Acceso Oeste) or to maintain a bilaterally negotiated "economic equilibrium" (Acceso Ricchieri). Construction on the Autopista La Plata-Buenos Aires is ongoing. Acceso Norte has been a commercial success despite the fact there was only one bidder. The concessionaire priced at $1.30 per ride the project risks, which is slightly under the government-determined cap.

São Paulo, Brazil

The São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SPMA) has more than 15 million people in its greater metropolitan area, and covers

Table 1 Operational Performance of Passenger Railway Concessions

	Passengers (million)			Capacity (million car-km)			On-time performance*		
	1993	1996	Δ %	1993	1996	Δ %	1993	1996	Δ %
Suburban Railways									
Mitre	34.4	69.8	103%	16.3	21.7	33%	76	96	26%
Sarmiento	60.5	99.3	64%	20.3	23.7	17%	73	95	30%
Roca	64.9	136.0	110%	26	43.1	66%	81	96	2%
San Martin	21.7	43.5	101%	13.5	15.6	16%	83	90	8%
Belgrano South	2	11.1	462%	2.1	6.4	206%	46	95	107%
Belgrano North	11.8	28.8	144%	8.5	10.5	24%	85	85	0%
Urquiza	16.8	24.7	47%	8.5	9.7	15%	92	94	2%
Subway	145.3	198.9	37%	20.1	26.8	33%	23,165	9,013	-61%

*On-time performance for the subway is measure in minutes, representing the minutes of service disruption

more than 2,000 square kilometers. The region has a well-developed system of bus and rail. Two initiatives for developing transport infrastructure through concession agreements have been spearheaded by different governmental institutions. The *municipal government* awarded independent concessions for the creation of a network of integrated busways running on exclusive lanes. Lagging behind was the *State's program* of integrating municipal bus lines with the state-owned rail-based network using exclusive trolleybus corridors.

Municipality of São Paulo's Busway Concession

The Municipality of São Paulo's objective was to rationalize the network of public and private bus providers by creating 15 exclusive busways totaling 241 km. These busways would operate as trunk routes with bi-articulated buses. Private and public operators outside each corridor provided feeder service. Fare integration was guaranteed.

Contracts with several consortia were signed for a period of 8 years. The consortia selected would prepare the engineering and design works, as well as maintain the road, traffic lights and bus stops. The Municipality would amortize the infrastructure investments and also provide compensation for the operating costs. Costs would be determined by a predetermined formula that takes into account fixed and variable components.

A total of seven different concessionaires were selected to operate nine trunk routes. After having awarded the concession, the selected Consortia had to complete the project funding of their proposals. The Consortia were led to believe that the National Economic and Social Development Bank of Brazil (BNDES) would finance all or most of the project (Rebelo and Benvenuto, 1997). As it happens, the Consortia were unable to find funding for the project. Rebelo and Benvenuto (1997) provide a list of possible reasons why this innovative concession failed; interestingly enough, most of the reasons cited can be considered as consequences of either (explicit and implicit) contract incentives or the risk/reward tradeoffs faced by the concessionaire. These reasons will be covered in more detail in the next section of this paper. A striking reason that falls outside of the two previous categories, is the Municipality's failure to undertake an economic evaluation of the program. In fact, the BNDES argued that the proposed projects were financially but not economically viable. It argued, for example, that the level of latent demand for public transport travel warranted investments in a mode with higher capacity. Similarly, it suggested that the network effects of the investment (i.e., on rail and auto) also decreased the project's attractiveness.

State of São Paulo's Busway Concession

The São Mateus and Jabaquara project is a high-priority connection in the rail/bus integration attempt by the State. By the late 1980's a state public agency, the Empresa Municipal de Transportes Urbanos (EMTU), was made responsible for the development of this corridor. Due to a higher need than planned for public resources, the project was partially implemented in the traditional tendering way. The segregated right of way was built, but the corridor was partly electrified. In addition, diesel trolleybuses, as opposed to electric trolleybuses were selected as a preferred alternative. Currently, a private company provides operations of the corridor under contract (Rebelo and Benvenuto, 1997).

By mid 1990s a concession agreement for the full electrification of the corridor, conversion and expansion of the fleet to electric vehicles, and operation of the service found renewed interest. The corridor's current operations proved the existence of high demand levels. Similarly, private investment requirements were relatively low.

Bidding documents were prepared and a formal request for proposals was distributed. The concession period was 20 years, with the State specifying and enforcing minimum service levels. The State sets the tariff and reviews it periodically "to ensure economic and financial equilibrium" (Rebelo and Benvenuto, 1997); fare revenues accrue directly to the operator and no subsidy is directly provided by the State. The bid parameter was the highest percentage of gross revenues given to the State beyond a minimum 15% for contract management. In addition, the concessionaire has five years to convert the fleet to electric power. The concessionaire began operations in May 1997; no data about the performance of the concession is yet available.

Bogotá, Colombia

Over the last two decades, and despite having the largest bus fleet in the world, Bogotá has faced increasing problems for transporting its 6 million inhabitants. Its high altitude exacerbates pollution problems from traffic volumes and congestion. Confronted with these problems, the local administration decided to invite proposals for a concession to build and operate a mass transit system for the city. The explicit objectives of the concession were to widen public transport coverage by integrating the rail and bus modes, improve the environmental conditions, improve the level of service of transport, and support the development of planned land uses (Buchanan, 1995). Implicitly, and due to the experience of the Medellín metro[2], the local government wanted to minimize the public outlays associated with the construction of a large system and shift as much of the cost escalation risks to the private sector.

The terms of invitation were uncharacteristically vague; the city wanted bidders to be creative in their proposed solutions. Neither specific modes nor technologies nor the scope of coverage of the system were prescribed. Bidders were left to conduct independent demand analyses according to the scope of the solution proposed. The maximum duration of the concession period was 30 years.

Four bids (two heavy rail, one rail/bus, and one busway proposal) reached the economic evaluation stage. A foreign

consulting firm independently developed demand models that were used to evaluate the bids. None of the bids achieved a positive Net Present Value (NPV) in the evaluation (Buchanan, 1995). According to the evaluators, most of the proposal deficiencies stemmed from unrealistic assumptions made by the bidders, overestimation of demand and underestimation of costs.

The local government decided to promote the busway option in the interest of showcasing a major transport investment. The busway proposal (which included four busways) was selected because it achieved the highest NPV (the minimum economic loss). The consortia selected entered in negotiations with the government and substantial modifications to the original scheme were made. The stipulated duration of the contract was decreased to 23 years. Other specifications included charging a flat fare, which would also cover the feeder-distribution system.

In terms of risks, the concessionaire carried all financing risks of the program. The government would not support any part of the investment. Costing evidence would be required to support any requests for fare changes. The basic structure of the financing package was detailed in the contract, including the debt-to-equity ratios. The concessionaire was also asked to provide grant performance bonds to the Capital District for contract compliance, quality of service, payment of salaries, and for stability of the facilities. The total budget was $400 million for infrastructure and 400 bi-articulated buses (Shaw, Gwilliam and Thompson, 1996).

Unfortunately, the unavailability of potential sources of funds coupled with the unwillingness of existing transport providers to collaborate with the busway consortia halted the busway effort. By early 1996 the concessionaire had withdrawn its proposal, and the local authorities decided to develop segments of the busway the conventional way.

Key Features in Urban Transportation Concession Agreements

What made the Argentinean concessions and São Paulo's State Busway concession agreements successful? Why did Bogotá and São Paulo's Municipal Busway concession agreements fail? This section compares the capital investment, duration, exclusivity, tariff authority, and risk characteristics of the concession agreements introduced in the last section. These characteristics, summarized in Table 2, play a significant role in determining the likelihood of finding financial support, and hence, also determine the extent to which government participation in the concession is warranted. We believe they help explain the outcomes of the cases presented.

The way in which elements of a concession are combined is critical since it allocates risks between the government and a concessionaire. Clearly, some tradeoffs are required in combining the elements into a single package. Assessing, to the greatest extent possible, the concerns of the parties and reaching an appropriate balance to reach the objectives of the concession is the ultimate goal of designing the concession.

Table 2 Key Features of Concession Agreements Studied

Project Name	Duration (yrs)	Cost Responsibility	Government Policy Risk	Capital Investment Carried by Concessionaire	Exclusivity	Success
B. Aires Suburban Railways	10	Subsidy from or canon to Authority	Low	Low*	Low	Yes
B. Aires Subway and Railway Line	20	Subsidy from or canon to Authority	Low	Low*	Medium	Yes
B. Aires Access Roads	22.6	Carried by concessionaire	Low	US$160m/ 500m/250m**	Low	Yes
São Paulo State Busway Program	20	Carried by concessionaire	Low	Electrification of 14 km; Acquisition of 22 trolley buses & conversion of existing fleet	Low	Yes
São Paulo Municipal Busway Program	8	Municipality subsidy	Low	1000 buses and 241 km busway*	Low	No
Bogotá Busway Program	23	Carried by concessionaire	Low-Medium	$400m	Low	No

Source: Yates (1994), Rebelo (1997), and Shaw et. al. (1996)
* The government provided the capital necessary to realize these investments.
**Acceso Richieri/Norte/Oeste, respectively. Data for La Plata-Buenos Aires not available

Capital Costs

Urban infrastructure projects tend to have very high up-front capital costs due to the magnitude of the public works involved. In addition, a highway, busway, or railway has high location specificity; the assets involved have little alternative value. Therefore, investors have little comfort in what can be realized if the project fails.

Rail and bus operations assets, in contrast, are mobile (vehicles) or can have different uses (stations). The risks entailed by the lumpiness of the capital investment for infrastructure are compounded by concession schemes, where ownership reverts back to the government at the end of the concession period. As a result, investors will seek to cover their risks by either requiring a higher return or an earlier return on their investment.

As expected, the case studies suggest that the higher the concessionaire's financial commitment, the lower the chances of reaching financial success, all else held equal. Table 2 summarizes key features of the concessions studied. Argentina's rail concessions entailed a high capital investment, but the government specified the investment schedule and provided the funds. Small capital investments (compared to most road concessions) were required in the Buenos Aires' road concessions, mostly due to the repair and maintenance work required. Bogotá's concession investment requirements were considerable, and only comparable to São Paulo's Municipality Busway Program; however, Bogotá's project involved fewer buses and higher capital investment in the construction of exclusive rights of way.

Concession Period

A company must be satisfied that its capital investments can be recouped in a concession. The nature of the investment and the degree to which it is sunk in the current use are very important criteria. Worldwide experience in urban infrastructure concessions concentrates on passenger rail systems and highways, assets with high location specificity. Thus, when a concessionaire makes significant capital investments in a project, the duration of the contract tends to be longer than when the concessionaire is only an operator. The fixed location or "indivisibility" of the major assets, in addition to size and lumpiness of the capital investments, requires long payback periods.

The difference between the concession period of several worldwide concessions, including the five cases studied, are presented in Table 3. The duration of the concession reflects in part the government's a priori judgement of the level of risk of the project, and hence, of an appropriate payback period. However, governments can also arrange for a shorter concession by providing incentives such as tax credits that may make the investment viable (Shaw, Gwilliam and Thompson, 1996).[3]

The cases of Bogotá's and São Paulo's Municipality Busway concessions suggest the effects of asset mobility on concession periods. Most of São Paulo's program involved the purchase of buses, whereas Bogotá's project tied a large part of the capital investment to the exclusive right of way. This explains why the concession periods differ. Argentina's passenger rail involved relatively low investment risk, since the government was providing the capital, and hence the concession is also moderately short.

Lengthy concession periods are an important characteristic for developing countries. Due to market rigidities and structural deficiencies, capital markets in developing countries are inherently volatile; hence capital financing is scarce. Simultaneously, capital financing of infrastructure projects would be desirable in the long run, because bond financing is more conservative (requiring collateral or guarantees) and tends to imply a faster payback.

Exclusivity

Exclusivity is the degree of competition, (inter- and intramodal), for moving goods or passengers over a period of time. Exclusivity is critical because it directly determines the financial viability of a project. The exclusive right to own, construct, or operate infrastructure can be the major cause of monopoly power. Even though governments generally retain the ultimate control of these rights,

Table 3 Concession Duration for Selected Urban Transport Projects

Project	City	Type of Facility	Duration (yr.)
Suburban Railways	London	Railway	5-15
Municipality Busway Program	São Paulo	Busways	8
State Busway Program	São Paulo	Busways	20
Suburban Railways	Buenos Aires	Railway	10
Buenos Aires Subway System	Buenos Aires	Subway	20
Buenos Aires Access Roads	Buenos Aires	Motorways	22.75
Bogotá Busway Program	Bogotá	Busway	23
ORLYVAL	Paris	VAL to Airport	30
Don Muang Tollway	Bangkok	Motorway	30
Melbourne City Link	Melbourne	Motorway	34
Putra LRT II	Kuala Lumpur	LRT	60
Croydon Tramlink	Croydon (UK)	Tramway	99

concessionaires sometimes are given some degree of exclusivity.

Some degree of exclusivity is a result of natural monopolies. The high capital costs and site specificity of investments in urban transport infrastructure projects have some features of natural monopolies. For example, it is common to spatially monopolize the provision of rail transit, since it does not make sense to duplicate the costs in several firms by having parallel rail tracks in competition. In this context, proponents argue that a competitively auctioned concession would allow some of the benefits of competition to be brought to bear in the absence of actual competition. However, it is hard to determine precisely the degree of exclusivity of a transportation service in urban areas. In the case of a rail concession, for example, the degree of exclusivity of a concession is limited by competition from other modes such as private car, buses, jitneys, and walking.

The low degree of exclusivity of urban transport infrastructure projects with respect to other traditional infrastructure projects is key and may help explain the worldwide paucity of urban transport infrastructure concession agreements. Governments are limited in their ability to grant exclusive rights as this would amount to restraining all types of movements in the area in question. In the urban transport context, intermodal competition makes high exclusivity much harder to attain than in rural projects; this in turn makes demand estimation more complex. This means that, all other things held equal, urban transport infrastructure projects tend to entail higher commercial risk than non-urban projects. There are, however, other urban transport infrastructure concessions, such as river crossings, that have more traditional characteristics of natural monopolies with limited intermodal competition. In river-crossing instances, demand can be estimated with more precision and the government can have more control over granting exclusive rights.

The degree of exclusivity observed in the case studies selected does not vary considerably, since all projects are fundamentally urban transport projects. Upon closer examination of the cases, one might select the Buenos Aires Roadway Program as the project with highest exclusivity due to the length of the trips involved. Within suburb-to-center city trips, intermodal competition is generally limited due to the low densities at the trip origin. Information on the other cases suggest that, overall, these projects had low exclusivity.

Tariff Authority

The degree of monopoly power of the concessionaire, the government objectives, and the level of public (or other stakeholder) interest in the particular mode may determine where the responsibility for setting tariffs lies. Tariffs are a critical component because they directly influence travel demand and mode choice.

The low exclusivity of urban transport suggests that concessionaires have some scope in setting fares, although they can be subject to utility rate regulations. However, because tariffs are such a politically sensitive issue, this is rarely the case. Rather, governments, for example, Argentina with all of its concessions, have negotiated a fixed tariff rate in real terms for the duration of the concession. In other cases, such as with the São Paulo busway concession, the state government was responsible for setting and reviewing the tariff as to ensure "the economic and financial equilibrium of the system".

The political nature of tariffs, particularly in urban transport, often leads to tariff levels that are well below what is considered economically efficient. Subsidized consumption of urban roads is certainly an inefficient and perhaps regressive outcome. For example, the Jaisinghpur (India) toll road concession had the toll levels set in the contract agreement. However, after a public revolt in which users refused to pay the specified tolls, the government assumed the debt with the concessionaires. In this case road users had their consumption subsidized by all taxpayers. In contrast, Argentina's decision to allow road concessionaires to levy tolls earlier than planned can be understood as a choice between using either taxpayer or user fees as transfer payments to the private concessionaire.

Project Risks

Since risks should be allocated to those parties that can best control or manage them, concession proponents argue that better economic outcomes can also be achieved with the risk management capabilities enabled by concessions. The underlying assumption is that both the government and concessionaires know which party can manage risks better and how that is achieved, an issue that is not always the case.

Concessionaires face diverse risks: government policy risk, currency and financial fluctuation risks, technology risks and commercial risks. Government risk is related to the use of policy-making powers to respond to market conditions or to advance social or political goals. Actions at different levels of government may affect the viability of concessions. Changes outside of the scope of the contract, or in the legal and political regime, may have negative effects on the concession. Currency risks are directly associated with the financial market and its fluctuations: exchange, convertibility, currency, and interest rate. Indirectly these risks are influenced by government macroeconomic policy and hence the government has some control over them. Technology risks originate from uncertainty about the building and maintenance costs, and the performance of selected materials and technologies.

The concession features described in the previous section (capital costs, concession period, exclusivity, and tariff authority) directly affect commercial risk, which most analysts consider the greatest risk faced by urban transportation concessionaires. Commercial risk captures the uncertainty of demand for the service or facility provided, assuming that the government provides no revenue guarantees. It arises fundamentally from the uncertainty of estimating future demand because demand forecasting is still quite imprecise, and also because it is linked to economic growth, which is

also difficult to predict.[4] The risk is compounded by the fact that investments are large relative to the size of the market, long-term, indivisible, and location-specific, so that there is limited room for adapting to low demand scenarios. In addition, revenue from user fees or the government are fundamental to provide the liquidity necessary to meet debt from contractual obligations, particularly during the first years if the concession. Therefore, demand forecasts have a strong influence on the financial viability of the project.

Analyzing the State of São Paulo's Busway commercial risk experience helps to partially understand the success of the concession. It is clear that the project was less capital intensive than the other cases, because only part of the infrastructure had to be built (poles and catenary for a part of the busway). In addition, the concessionaire took over an existing service that clearly had proven demand (further supported by the fact that the local government agency, EMTU, required a minimum 15% of gross revenues). This not only reduced commercial risk but also allowed the winning consortium to generate revenues using the existing system, thereby reducing the amount to be borrowed for the capital investments (or facilitate debt financing). Similarly, the relative success of Argentina's railway concessions seems plausible since the funds for the capital investments were supplied by the government, and, more importantly, there was proven demand on the existing corridors.

In the case of the São Paulo Municipal Busway unsuccessful concession attempt, Rebelo and Benvenuto (1997) suggest, that the market felt that the risks involved in building and operating the system outweighed the benefits, and that the Brazilian market is not yet prepared to accept such challenge. Even though a concession agreement was signed, no financier approached by the concessionaires thought that the project was the best use of its capital. Bogotá's concession followed a similar development, with the concessionaire carrying most risks. Again, in both unsuccessful cases, estimating the demand was trickier than in the two successful cases, and the capital that the concessionaire (and its creditors) would have had at stake was much higher than in the two successful transit concessions.

Government Policy Alternatives; Are Risk Guarantees Worthwhile?

Faced with high commercial risk stemming from demand uncertainty, project sponsors may favor the alternative of promoting optimistic numbers to persuade lenders and proceed with the project. Governments can also be in the interest of having optimistic numbers to the extent that it improves the project financing chances and reduces the public sector contributions (Cornwell, 1995). This risk of agency "capture", implicitly documented by Pickrell (1990), is not exclusive to concession agreements but also prevalent in traditional infrastructure projects.

A second alternative to reduce risks is to subsidize the construction and/or operations of the system up-front, as it was intended with São Paulo's Municipal Busway concessions. In theory, this reduces the debt repayment burden to the concessionaire and enables acceptance of higher levels of commercial risk. For example, in the Argentine rail concessions, demand projections were not a major factor in the cost side since the subsidies requested and payments required are not a function of demand. From the revenue side, where the concessionaires undertook the risk, demand on most lines has exceeded optimistic expectations. Therefore, full government financing does not necessarily mean zero revenue risk for concessionaires.

A third government alternative to mitigate risk is to provide in-kind contributions such as land, loans at subsidized rates (soft loans), preferential tax treatment, or direct equity participation. Since most of these options can be valued directly at market prices (and interest rates), they are easier to incorporate in a project's financial and economic analysis than other instruments.

A fourth alternative to reduce risk is to provide government-backed guarantees against the different types of risks faced by the concessionaire. Risk and loan guarantees have become a conventional way of increasing the attractiveness of concessions while apparently make them sustainable for the concessionaire in the long run. The State of São Paulo and the government of Colombia could have very well provided revenue risk guarantees to enhance their projects. Risk guarantees can, not only be quite costly to taxpayers, but also generate incentives that run counter to the original intent of concession agreements. Some of the consequences of the use of revenue risk guarantees merit close attention because governments worldwide are continuing to use them without what appears to be an understanding of the full implications.

Government-backed risk guarantees

Government guarantees may bring undesirable consequences of awarding a concession for an infrastructure project. There is a reduction in the incentives of the private sector market for screening projects, a reduction in the incentive to operate efficiently, and a shift of contractual obligations to future administrations.

If no guarantees are given and a project goes awry, project lenders lose because they will face debt rescheduling in due course. If the government assumes some commercial risk by guaranteeing particular usage levels, the burden is shifted towards taxpayers. Such is the case of the Moscoso Toll Lagoon Bridge in San Juan (Puerto Rico). The government assumed most of the commercial risk by guaranteeing to buy back the project if actual traffic fell short of 80 percent of the projections in the first three years of operations and of 100 percent of projections after nine years. The buyback price included all project costs plus 13 percent.

The consequences of government guarantees indicate that they should be avoided whenever possible. If the real objective of the concession is to raise government credibility on the

government's intent of fostering private sector participation in public sector activities, then interim, not permanent, guarantees can be useful. In fact, the rationale for concession agreements relies on the assumption that risks are diversified amongst the different actors. The various risks are ideally spread among the concessionaire, the users and the government (taxpayers).[5] When the government issues risk guarantees, it is implicitly stating that it can best manage the underlying risk, which is certainly not the case in many instances. If a project warrants considerable government-backed revenue guarantees to be developed as a concession, it may be an economically undesirable concession; the government may be better off by developing the project in the conventional way.

Financial Issues Associated With Government-Provided Risk Guarantees

Guarantees entail an often-overlooked cost to the government. This cost is not explicit, but it is real (Mody and Patro, 1996). When a government provides a guarantee, it incurs a contingent liability, that is, a liability conditional on some future event. This liability risk cannot be diversified through risk pooling because performance of most infrastructure projects is often highly correlated with elements of the business cycle (Klein, 1996a). The fact that a cost may accrue in the future is no reason for anticipating that cost today. Benefits of systematic accounting for liabilities include efficient allocation of resources among projects and fiscal soundness.

However, most governments fail to treat in their budget the effect of providing risk guarantees. A risk guarantee effectively shifts contractual obligations to future generations. Under the prevailing cash-based system of budgeting, only cash outlays are recorded. Therefore, while operating subsidies are recorded the date they are issued, as they should be, risk and loan guarantees are not properly taken into account (Klein et al., 1996b). Guarantees are simply not recorded as expenses unless a future claim is received. The result may be a government's balance sheet with enough contingent liabilities to create serious financial problems. Policy-makers have incentives to provide guarantees rather than cash subsidies, as it lets the fiscal position of the government appear better than it actually is.[6]

The core of the problem is that there is no established methodology for assessing the value of government provided guarantees to projects that have risks that cannot be diversified. The most promising methodology views risk guarantees as a put option. At the end of each period, if the concessionaire's revenues are larger than the guarantees, the option expires worthless. Otherwise, the option is exercised and the concessionaire receives a guaranteed sum. In the simplest case, a guarantee can be measured at the present value of expected future payments. In practice this is quite difficult because future payments are a function of parameters that change over time, such as time to maturity, national and regional incomes, and the like. A dynamic model is need to capture these changes, as in option-pricing. Further, choosing an interest rate for discounting the future payments is challenging. The discount rate should account for the market risk that cannot be eliminated, but no methodology is available for estimating the non-diversifiable risk inherent in commercial risk guarantees of infrastructure projects.

In the interest of providing a practical evaluation of the viability of a single concession agreement, as opposed to a portfolio of projects, Blackshaw, Flora and Scurfield (1992) performed a financial simulation of a Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT) toll road. They compared the BOT project versus a tolled highway built by the public sector and tendered the conventional way. Even after adding 1.5 % to the cost of foreign loans taken by the public authority as a result of government loan guarantees, and without considering revenue risk guarantees, they conclude that there is a distinct likelihood that BOTs will not succeed in accomplishing the assumed objective of reducing the net call on the government budget.

Conclusions

If the use of concession agreements, including financing, construction and operations, to develop inter-urban tollways for financial reasons was questioned by Blackshaw et al. (1992), its use for promoting urban transport projects is even more disputable. The fundamental "disadvantage" of urban transport projects is the high degree of intermodal competition (walk, bus, jitney, transit, etc.) that exists. Even though many urban transport projects can be made exclusive (with geographic considerations such as availability of river crossings, or explicitly targeting long trips), the majority of projects face high intermodal competition. High competition in itself is desirable; if choices are priced correctly, they provide efficient outcomes. However, in the context of concession agreements, high competition makes forecasting future demand more uncertain, and hence it significantly increases the level of commercial and financial risk. Argentina and Brazil's successful concessions leveraged the existing demand on the corridors to decrease commercial risk against a low level of capital support.

Package Features

Successful financial closure of a concession agreement is closely related to characteristics of the concession package. The case studies showed the intricate interdependencies among capital investment required, the concession period, exclusivity and the level of commercial risk. Projects with considerable investment support required by the concessionaire, long payback period, and high revenue risk, such as Bogotá's busway program, are more difficult to finance than projects that require small capital and a shorter payback period. The successful concessions studied reached a balance by having relatively low concessionaire's capital requirements while incorporating some degree of commercial risk.

It is plausible that the success of Argentina and São Paulo's State concessions are a result of private sector efficiencies in

operating public transport and implementing capital projects, and being uninvolved in substantial capital funding. In contrast, Bogotá's and São Paulo's Municipal unsuccessful concessions simultaneously targeted private sector (assumed) capital and operating efficiencies by requiring high levels of capital involvement and high levels of commercial risk. It may be sound to further explore the realized benefits or costs of having private sector funds in the development of public infrastructure to test if the distinction between capital and operating efficiencies holds.

The cases had small variations in the level of government policy risk; therefore, the findings are applicable to countries with relatively stable macroeconomic policies comparable to the countries contained in the cases. Most of Latin American countries would classify under this rubric. However, as suggested by the transport concession experiences in Indonesia and Malaysia, government policy risk remains an important variable that should not be overlooked.

Finally, the overall availability of debt and equity finance is critical to project success. This is particularly important for developing countries because they have been suffering from a long-term credit financial squeeze. A shortage of funds means that governments will not invest in projects that would otherwise have been developed had there been a sufficient amount of capital available. Underinvestment has detrimental consequences for future economic growth. It is clear that, with or without concession agreements, support from export lending agencies and multilateral financial institutions is still warranted.

Government's Role

The importance of government intervention with clear objectives and determination for piecing the concession process together is evident. It is commonly thought that a government has fewer decisions to make when promoting a project via concession agreements than with a conventionally tendered project. The opposite is true. A government has to create an adequate framework and climate that are critical to a concession's success. Governments should continue to select projects that are economically viable in the long run as potential concession candidates.

When should guarantees be offered? Since governments rarely, if ever, compute the real price of a concession, it is difficult to make an informed decision on this central question. The first step is to attempt to value the guarantee and treat it as a variable in the project's economic analysis. In that way, the risk of treating private sector participation in infrastructure as a mechanism for bypassing a national budget is eliminated. With guarantees, a government eliminates the need for recurrent financial and managerial support, but in the process may retain the ultimate financial liability. Governments are effectively swapping what is potentially a recurrent liability with a contingent liability, as concessionaires often can find the option to sell back the concession to the government or demand compensation when revenues do not match expectations.

Notes

1 A note on terminology; the term successful concession is used to indicate a concession that was awarded, financed, and undertaken without regard to the economic, financial, or operational consequences it entailed. When the term "unsuccessful concession" is used, we refer to an unsuccessful attempt at developing a project through a concession agreement because the project did not reach financial closure.

2 The Medellín metro was a fiscal disaster for the Colombian government. The system was estimated to cost $US 0.6 billion in the mid 1980s; by 1994, costs had escalated to $US3.0 billion (real dollars). The system successfully began operations in 1996; a concession for the entire operation of the system and the construction of an extension is currently being considered.

3 Mexico's inter-urban road concessions are a prime example of why the concession period is not a measure of risk (and in fact, concession period can be considered as endogenous to the concession). The Mexican government's bid award criteria was the minimum concession period proposed. Not surprisingly, bidders assumed outrageously high tolls, asked for revenue guarantees and minimized on the concession duration. The consequences of Mexico's concession design are well known.

4 For an comprehensive analysis of the errors of demand forecasting in mass transit systems planning in the US see: Pickrell, Don H. *Urban Rail Transit Projects: Forecast versus Actual Ridership and Cost* U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington DC, 1990.

5 The Sydney Harbour Tunnel is a case where the government made substantial grant contributions, and revenue risk guarantees based on projected traffic. The concessionaire only undertook construction and technology risks. Mills (1991) characterized the Sydney agreement as one in which "the company is but an agent of the government...which bears most of the risks and pays all of the costs".

6 Some countries have changed its budgeting and accounting systems for guarantees in order to record more coherently the actual costs of the instrument. The US made the changes in 1990; Canada followed shortly after. New Zealand passed fiscal responsibility act in 1994 (Mody and Patro, 1996).

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29 THE INFORMAL HOUSING PRODUCTION PROCESS IN LATIN AMERICA: CONNECTING THE POOR TO THE CITY

Alejandro Florián-Borbón and Catalina Velasco-Campuzano

"Today, of course, millions of people live in self-help housing and more than half of the population of many Latin American cities live in self-help neighborhoods."

Alan Gilbert, The Latin American City

Introduction

Forty years ago, Latin America was a rural continent; at present, around 75 percent of its population is urban. The mixture of two housing production processes, a formal and an informal one, created and expanded Latin American cities. The former is shaped by the laws of market and protected by the laws of the formal society; they articulate labor and capital, generate a final product to be sold, and constitute the formal urban system. The latter, generated by forces and methods outside the regular frame, provides shelter to rural migrants and poor urban inhabitants.

This informal housing production process consists of the individual or collective occupation (usually invasion) and acquisition of land; the construction of shelter and its constant improvement; and the progressive connection of the dwelling to the public utilities of the city. Building a house is a process that develops at the same pace as the "owner's" progress, and in the majority of the cases implies a lifetime of housing consolidation and improvement. Latin American cities were built, half-and-half, by these two methods: the formal and the informal.

This paper will describe and analyze, from theoretical and multidisciplinary perspectives, the process of informal housing production as a means for understanding the characteristics and dynamics of the "other half" of the housing system. The objective is to expose how developing Latin American cities were built. This paper explains the process of building informal housing, from land invasion and its legalization to full connection to the public utilities and city amenities. This paper attempts to highlight how Latin American people become "formal inhabitants," connecting themselves to urban society which, at present and contrary to other developing areas, constitutes the majority of the continent.

Background and Justification

Urbanization and Informal Housing in Latin America: The Big Picture

Countries of Latin America share a common culture and a common process of development. There is no other region in

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the world where the social, economic and political variables present the degree of similarity that Latin America exhibits, and in which the behavior of the different segments of the population is determined by such common needs and interests.

Starting with the Pre-Columbian cultures—with respect to which there have been established several physical, social and economic links—and including the conquest and colony baton—mainly from Spain and Portugal, but also from France, England, and to a less extent the Netherlands—countries from Latin America have a common past. After independence and the establishment of autonomous political systems during the nineteenth century and in some cases after 1900, countries maintained a similar path and kept the different new nations and their people linked. The Spanish language is perhaps the most valuable asset of the Latin American unit, and even though several nations do not share it—Brazil, for instance—the culture, a mixture of indigenous, black and Iberian elements, is a constant throughout the continent.

In the near past, Latin America faced several waves of international occupation and neo-colonialism, military regimes, Communist influence and its incorporation into the international economic system. In this system, Latin America was a producer of primary goods and later as a provider of manufactured goods.

Today, Latin American countries confront similar challenges and problems. Politically, Latin America is leaving an era of military power, is struggling to establish and consolidate democracy and is implementing a deep decentralization process to transform an inefficient public sector. Economically, Latin America is facing the globalization of the world economy from a disadvantaged position. It faces the challenge of building internal and external markets and at the same time maintaining or constructing macroeconomic stability and steady growth. Socially, Latin America faces deep inequity, revealed by the existence of a "world-class" elite simultaneously with the presence of tens of millions of people without access to health, education, employment and housing.

This situation is evident when an analysis of the physical structure is performed; in forty years Latin America changed from being a rural continent to being an urban one and the Latin American cities that grew are a reflection of politics, economics, social issues and culture. For instance, the capacity of local governments to respond to the demand for utilities from new inhabitants, and the growth of communitary polity which is able to use the city political actors, reveals the link between housing and politics. On the other hand, the incorporation of new labor force into the urban economy, the increase of urban infrastructure propelled by new settlements, and the change in household well-being after achieving home ownership, shows how macroeconomic and microeconomic variables are molded by the growth of the city. Additionally, the class conflict behind land invasion and the fact that settlers become entitled to claim the benefits of being part of the modern society reveal the social transformations of Latin American societies caused by the urban explosion. Finally, the existence of a strong network of communitary cooperation, which made possible the establishment of insurmountable numbers of homes and neighborhoods around the continent, is evidence of the presence of cultural forces able to transform society.

Multiple endogenous and exogenous variables affect the informal housing production process; capturing the complexity is beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, the consequences are even more complex, especially considering that the process is still evolving and that consequences might extend decades into the future.

Considering the limitations, this paper presents the characteristics of the informal housing production process. It establishes the various steps that a family takes, from the moment of arriving to a city into an "inquilinato" (rooming house) to achieving the ownership of a house with full connections to urban services. From this analysis, focused on the physicality of housing, the paper will develop conclusions about the economic, political and social implications of informal housing.

Formality and Informality

To inquire about the characteristics of the informal housing production process, a first conceptual step must be taken: to analyze the so called "informal housing production process". This requires a revision of the concept of informality. A wide set of definitions of, and approaches to, the concept have been used. The one that is chosen determines the scope of the performed analysis. Additionally, considering the various components of housing and informal housing, the perspective from which informality is conceived determines the agents and forces that should be incorporated into an analysis and, of course, the outcomes.

Simplistically and traditionally, informality has been seen as subsidiary, as complementary and as opposite to formality; such approaches limit the analysis of informality to comparison and implicate that every element of one side must have its analogous element on the other. In a Manichean manner and loaded with evident social and political values, formality has been identified as good and informality as bad; formality has been seen as stability and informality as change. An alternative is to decipher the formal and informal characteristics of a particular fact or situation, recognizing the presence of both everywhere. Thus, informality is understood as a reality not totally separated from the formal system, but rather linked to and shaped by it. Informality might be conceived as a structure of action that contains both harmonious (adaptation) and contradictory (resistance) relationships; as a site of power in relation to external disciplinary and control power. These approaches broaden the concept and give light to the present analysis.

Informality has been conceptualized depending on whether it is conceived of as a separate reality or as a part of formality. On one hand, the informal system is sometimes conceived of as an alternative system; it implies that it is a separate reality.

On the other hand, based on the dualistic nature of an urban economy, informality has been divided into two systems: upper and lower circuits, traditional and modern, factory and non-factory, capitalist and subsistence; this approach uses production as the major criterion for the distinction. From a juridical perspective, informality is related to illegal and formality to legal. Finally, formality and informality are regarded as representing the poles of a continuum.

In conclusion, a definition of informality must take into consideration a large number of variables. These include: its origin, either as preceding the formal system or as growing from it; its juridical condition; its relation to the formal system; the participation of its actors in the formal system; time and space factors; the meanings of everyday practices; and the structural location of informal practices in relation to other practices. In this paper further analysis of the informal housing production process attempts to incorporate these variables.

The Informal Housing Production Process

Moving to the City

The first step that a rural migrant makes after arriving to the city is to rent a room in a house or share the dwelling with family members that arrived earlier. Popularly known as "inquilinatos", these multi-family shared houses abound in the medium-low and low-income sections of the Latin American city. They are, as it will be explained later, an important source of income for those already-established families that decide to share their dwelling.

Typically, the inquilinatos consist of several rooms, on some occasions, more that ten if it is an old house or if new stories or divisions have been built. They have communal kitchens, bathrooms and laundries. Inquilinatos are the lowest step in the social ladder, after homelessness. The physical and sanitary conditions are far from good. However, inquilinatos are a bed for nurturing communitary relationships and cooperative efforts. For instance, in inquilinatos, childcare is commonly provided informally at home by neighbors or family members.

New migrants use "inquilinatos" as a place to stay while they learn how the city works and what they have to do to earn a living. The adaptation to the city dynamics is not easy. It depends on the educational level of people and their ability to find a job. The period in which a family or an individual stays in an inquilinato varies, and sometimes people never change their housing status.

The Big Step: Owning a "Home"

Considering that the rent represents an important proportion of the family income, there is always an incentive to move and own a home. Definitely, the housing offered by the formal urban developers is not among the choices which a low-income family has. It is estimated that, at present, the cheapest house available in the market surpasses 100 monthly minimum wages; only middle-income families can afford them, if they manage to save for the down payment. Additionally, the availability of credit is scarce and the requirement to access it—which is usually to already own real estate—is ridiculous.

The other choice is to self-build a house. Most planners would probably agree that the distinctive characteristics of self-help housing is that it always begins as a rudimentary form of shelter lacking all kinds of service and is developed on land which either lacks planning permission or which has been invaded. In a broader perspective, self-help implies that the occupier has built some or all of the accommodation, and in this paper we will use this definition.

Even though the Latin American population has been accommodated through individual efforts historically, self-help shelter has become an increasingly important element in the housing solution. The reason for this trend is, as mentioned earlier, that the poor have no option. With migrants pouring into the cities and with urban populations doubling every ten or fifteen years, the existing housing stock could not cope. Given generalized poverty, the highly skewed distribution of wealth, a land market that is often controlled by private monopolies and a building industry geared to formal construction methods, a proper house is clearly beyond the reach of most poor families. On the other hand, the development of mass transportation, the changing attitude of the state towards informal methods of land occupation, and the growing ability of most governments to provide services and infrastructure, have fostered self-help housing production. The next step towards owning a house after deciding to self-build is to find a plot, and the decision between buying or invading is taken based on the resources available and the assessment of risk.

Land Acquisition

Probably the main element of analysis with respect to land acquisition for informal settlers is the actual structure of land property. Latin America is characterized by large landowners; it knows that a minority of the population owns the majority of the land. Considering that the cities are growing towards the countryside, the urban land has the same structure. In several cities it is common to see large plots of land waiting for a rise in land prices: the popularly known "lotes de engorde" (plots being fattened).

As a general rule, rich and poor live in different areas of the Latin American City. The rich choose their preferred locales and the poor occupy the land that is left over, usually the less attractive parts of the city. If the general pattern of land acquisition is similar between the cities, there has been a great deal of variation. In one city, the poor would be allowed to invade land, in another, invasions would be vigorously opposed. In one city, land could be obtained without cost and elsewhere it would be sold by private developers at a price equivalent to un-serviced land in the more prosperous part of the city.

The particular form of land occupation that has developed

depends upon the local pattern of land ownership, the price of peripheral land, the attitude of the political authorities, the political organization of the poor, the physical nature of the terrain and the pace of urban growth. The most critical element has been the reaction of the state. In some places, the authorities were fully prepared to tolerate invasions or illegal forms of settlement. In other situations, the authorities did not share this attitude.

In addition to those who manage to buy a plot in the formal market, there is a semi-legal (semi-illegal) mechanism to acquire land which is in the hands of those popularly known as "urbanizadores piratas" (pirate urban developers). These "entrepreneurs" are dedicated to "selling" land possession, an intermediate stage among invasion and ownership. Their business consists of invading huge plots of land that they detect as "free" (public, in a legal dispute, owned by foreign people or not looked after) and wait until "bona fide" possession is given to them. Following, they sell the rights to people that only have to wait the legal term to achieve tenure and who are at no risk of eviction. Another "business" of these urban developers is to sell those legal lands that are not destined for housing, protected by the incapacity of the city to design and control land zoning, or by the "approval" of political forces. The presence of these developers is remarkably large, and it shows the economic interests that the informal housing production process inspires. As a complement, and considering that invaded land has a market, it is also common to see "professional invaders", who are dedicated to obtaining land and starting the legal process on a reduced (unitary) scale.

Finally, the people have the option to invade land. In this case, they might be "lucky" and find a plot which is free and where they can settle with the intention to stay, or they can find a way to gather political support from a local public leader or face the police and its force. Once violence is surpassed—often leaving behind deaths and the destruction of the built and household goods—land invaders must start a legal process to acquire the property.

Legalizing the Plot

A legal problem is generated when lands are invaded. Different norms give access to property by different modes, and a long and specialized process is needed in order to solve such problems. Most of the time, the solution is inaccessible and the law protects landholders; sooner or later, some families are evicted and obligated to go back to an inquilinato or to occupy another plot and start the process again.

If the conditions to obtain the title are given, the complicated legal structures that must be utilized to achieve the property rights generate additional requirements. Professional services from a lawyer are needed in order to start and feed the legal process; the high costs of such services, but principally, the accessibility of the low socioeconomic strata to the people who might (or are willing to) help is limited.

Improving the Shelter

Although basic shelters clearly exist in large numbers, they are hardly representative of the bulk of Latin America's self-help housing. The shack is the first attempt of a family to house itself and is normally put up during the first days of land invasion when the settlers have to demonstrate their presence to the authorities. Evidently, some shelters are not improved for several years, although those are the ones located in conflict areas or where the authorities have harassed settlers. Rudimentary shelters are frequent when tenure is uncertain; residents do not improve their dwelling when there is high risk of having it destroyed by the police. A few settlements are always under threat in Latin America.

On the other hand, the majority of self-help homes improve over time. Once the settlers know that they will be left alone, they begin to consolidate. Titles are not absolutely necessary, and signs of authority approval are enough to propel improvements. The offer of electricity or water, the removal of a police barrier from the roads going into the settlement, and even the visit of a local politician suffice to start settlers working on the house.

Wooden or corrugated iron shacks may front some plots but a concrete and brick room is usually under construction behind. The owners spend their spare time constructing the permanent home, and if they do not have enough expertise, neighbors and kin offer expertise. When the owners do not know how to undertake some task, external work is hired; plumbing and electric installations are placed that way. Some tasks require several simultaneous workers, and neighbors usually perform those jobs in a cooperative manner. Installing a concrete roof over the weekend is a regular practice.

The result of the settler's work is that whole settlements are gradually transformed from ramshackle structures into consolidated neighborhoods. Some families develop much faster that others, the critical variable being the availability of money to buy construction materials and hire labor. Families with savings can consolidate their homes rapidly, and those who lack funds remain in a basic hut or fail to move into the settlement at all, continuing to share or rent accommodation somewhere else.

Connecting the House to the City

Adequate shelter requires utilities and initially, a community may steal what it needs. Tapping into the water lines is a regular practice and linking a transformer to the electricity mains is an easy task for a local electrician. Such solutions are unsatisfactory, not long-term sustainable and even dangerous. Provisional electricity networks are easily overloaded, provide low voltage and are likely to be damaged during storms. Informal water networks operate at low pressure and are therefore likely to leak and allow impurities into the system. Such solutions are unpopular with the utility companies who lose revenue and often have to clear up the damage caused by the improvised connections; sometimes, the companies demolish illegal connections or at best come

to an agreement with the settlement to provide the service and charge for the required infrastructure. The local governments are not likely to provide services to these settlements for several reasons. First of all, scarcity of resources, second, in several occasions the areas are not included in the local jurisdiction, and finally, the cities do not have the administrative, technical or physical capacity to cope with the demand.

By any manner of means, the settlements acquire water, sewerage and electricity. One alternative is to obtain investment from the public sector to build infrastructure and receive regular services, the second option is to negotiate sharing the costs and having credit to fund the infrastructure, the third solution is to maintain the illegal connection, and the final alternative is to raise political support. If the city government is weak, if a settlement can manage to obtain political protection from a strong council member, if there is an emergency situation (a flooding or an epidemic case, for instance), people are likely to strike against the city to obtain what they need. Sewerage, water, electricity and access are the principal physical services that the new residents require from the city; however, these are not the only ones. Health, education and employment as well as social and cultural incorporation to the "formal" society are also needs of the disadvantaged population. Those services are not guaranteed by the achievement of housing, and must be searched for elsewhere.

Investing in the House

The process of upgrading the house is slow and long. Considering the poverty levels of these citizens, the pace at which savings are gathered corresponds to their income, which rarely surpasses the minimal wages and sometimes is below it (when people work in the informal sector). However, it is clear that the house is the major destination of investment in the household.

The reasons are, first of all, that "real estate" is the safest investment in the minds of those who prefer "tangible" assets. Second, low-income populations do not have access to regular financial institutions to save and obtain interests (or if they do, the conditions are not optimal, considering the small amounts they are able to save). Third, the upgrading of the house provides a feeling of belonging to the city and the neighborhood in better conditions. Fourth, once the family satisfies its needs, the household focuses its efforts towards the construction of additional rooms that can provide extra income and receive other family members. The construction of additional stories and rooms for rent closes the informal housing production cycle; several families start the business of "inquilinatos" to receive new comers and extra income.

Conclusions

The understanding of this process, where "marginal" people (because of their social economic status, not because of their character of minority considering their proportion among the society) achieve a dwelling, provides information about the relationships between the citizens, the private sector, the political powers and the city administrations. The relationships are informal, but considering the extension in which they take place, it is clear that they are the majority. From the perspective of the people, the process of obtaining a house contributes to incorporating them into society. Additionally, the way in which this population has obtained its housing—in a cooperative manner following each of the steps—shows the people that they are not powerless.

With respect to the political forces, the process shows that poor families have not been passive bystanders in the game. By pressuring the authorities they have been able to improve their chances of obtaining land. Their leaders had to be well-organized and had to understand the local political situation. The invasion of peripheral land might well be permitted in general and sometimes even private land could be occupied, but the results depend on the relationships between the leader and the authorities. Since the authorities would often be divided in their reactions to an invasion, success might well depend on the leader's contacts. The local politicians are also major players in the scene, and after they understood that informal inhabitants also vote, the settlements became a "gold mine" for their purposes.

On the other hand, in the informal housing production process, the "urbanizadores piratas" play the role of the private sector in charge of profit maximization. This shows that behind the informal housing, there is a lot of money, even though each settler individually does not posses significant assets. Additionally, the legal landowners take great advantage of the informal settlements, because once a new neighborhood is established in the outskirts of a city, and its inhabitants have managed to obtain public utilities, the surrounding land prices are multiplied exponentially.

Finally, today, the administrations of Latin American cities are widely aware of the existence of self-built housing, land invasion, illegal connection to public services and political demands from the inhabitants of those settlements. What is more important, the majority of the cities face the situation as a fact to be solved and not as a criminal act to be punished.

A second set of analyses might be generated from the informal housing production process, as observed from multiple disciplines. Economics, politics, planning and public policy all have a say in the topic. From an orthodox economic perspective, the opinion might be that the "irrational" behavior of these urban developers contradicts every law of economics. For example, high risks are taken without proportional expected gains (constructing in invaded or inadequate lands); enormous amounts of resources are incorporated when not needed (using excessive construction material or wasting labor due to lack of knowledge about efficient methods); and disproportional amounts of family income are directed to house improvement, leaving other basic needs unattended.

However, if the production function is adjusted for the scarcity of financial resources and analyzed over a longer period of

time (a lifetime, in some cases), the process is rational. The capacity to invest, pool labor resources and reproduce the cycle, shown by the informal settlers, points towards different paths of study. In a macroeconomic perspective, the effect that these new urban inhabitants have over the city's economic growth is important. First of all, the incorporated labor force nurtured the Latin American industrialization process and participated in the construction of the existing infrastructure. Second, this population consumes and pays direct taxes. From a political point of view, perhaps the major point is to consider the existence of a right to housing, which "normalizes" every mean to achieve it. If a democratic society considers housing as an entitlement of its citizens, a homeless society needs to act against the violation.

In the informal housing production process, planning and public policy acquire the responsibility to incorporate the settlements and to design future incorporations according to the expected growth of new inhabitants. And what is more important, the task of solving the causes of homelessness: poverty and discrimination. It is also important to avoid the abuse of informal settlers from the pirate urban developers, and an urban land reform might be the most expeditious mechanism to take them out of the game, or stop their monopolistic profits.

Once it is socially recognized that informality is a fact, and is not marginal, and that it is a public responsibility to cope with the causes of it, the conclusion will be that intervention is needed. Contrary economic and political trends might respond that the solution is the opposite, but the answer to that position is that deregulation of public institutions and mechanisms is not an alternative because this process has never been regular.

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

Participating in Shaping the City

30 KEREKERE, HIERARCHY AND PLANNING IN FIJI: WHY CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE A PREREQUISITE TO INTERNATIONAL PLANNING

Marc Schlossberg

Economic, social, and infrastructure planning for many developing countries is initiated, funded and supervised by international aid organizations such as the United Nations. One such planning attempt is the Pacific Human Development Report, a 1994 summary document putting forth development recommenda-tions for the South Pacific region. Although seemingly comprehensive (especially to the eyes of planners born and schooled in the West), it overlooks key cultural characteristics of the region which are impediments toward its recommendations. This paper compares the recommendations of the Pacific Human Development Report with the cultural realities of Fiji and highlights why cultural characteristics should be the first data gathered when embarking on an international planning process.

The Pacific Human Development Report (referred to as "The UN Report") is a summary document putting forth development recommendations for the South Pacific region. Written in 1994, it concentrates on human development, rather than physical construction of infrastructure. The UN Report is comprehensive, including topics such as resource allocation, investment and growth, community participation, and decentralization. The purpose of The UN Report is to present a summary of the current problems in the South Pacific and to offer development guidelines to address those obstacles. Specifically, it seeks "to define appropriate development paths for individual countries, development paths that protect and promote strengths of traditional cultures and support systems, while at the same time fostering the improvement of living standards" (United Nations 1994, 3). Once these areas are identified, then the specific countries are to take the recommendations into consideration and to develop plans to address the major issues.

Even though The UN Report attempts to create a regional framework under which specific countries can effectively plan their future, it overlooks key cultural characteristics that may be impediments toward implementation. The report's terminology, focus, and base assumptions are rooted in Western thought, but "to plan realistically you have to either have had experience of, or to possess a sound knowledge of, the kind of life the majority of people lead" (Rokotuivuna 1980, 7). While this approach should not be surprising, since the bulk of the funding for such planning reports come from the more wealthy Western countries (as well as the educational backgrounds of the authors), it does raise the concern of whether the report is actually a useful planning document.

When attempting to look specifically at how the report applies to the Fiji Islands, several potential problems arise. The UN Report was written to apply generically to all South Pacific countries, but the individual cultural characteristics of Fiji differ from other island nations and therefore are not consistent

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with many of the recommendations of the report. The UN Report emphasizes economic growth as the key focus of planning and development although market economics is antithetical to the Fijian way of life. The report also stresses community participation as the key planning methodology to ensure sustained success. By focusing on economic growth and citizen participation, the Pacific Human Development Report will lead to an ineffectual use of resources because this Western bias toward planning fails to consider Fiji's indigenous economic system, hierarchical structure, communal culture and short term focus.

This disparity between the international community's approach toward planning and Fiji's approach is significant because localized development plans often follow the recommendations of international planning reports such as the Pacific Human Development Report. These eventual country distinct plans become the guiding document of all government action (Puri 1989). Thus if the original plan is full of inadequacies and flaws, then the Fiji plans will mirror these same mistakes.

This scenario of indirect imposition of inappropriate international development schemes became very clear during my two years as a Management and Planning Advisor to the Ministry for Regional Development in Fiji. International consultants continuously prepared reports and recommendations for planning and development in Fiji without considering some of the cultural barriers to those plan's successful implementation. The Fijian government often followed the recommendations of such international plans however, because doing so is a prerequisite to obtaining international aid. I was fortunate in that I was given almost three months of cultural introduction, including language training. I then took an additional year to learn about the cultural intricacies and to build relationships with my planning colleagues. And even then, I knew that my Western bias would still come through in my suggestions.

The observations below will in large part be based on personal observation and experience in living in Fiji for two years. Additional support is grounded in international development theory and literature, ethnographic texts of Fijian culture, and essays on predominant Western planning approaches. This critique focuses on the indigenous Fijian community, rather than all of Fiji's citizens, because most foreign planning focuses on indigenous cultures, nearly all decision makers in planning related ministries are indigenous Fijian, and it is the community with which I am most familiar.

The Pacific Human Development Report

The Pacific Human Development Report summarizes the emerging challenges facing the people of the South Pacific and offers many broad solutions. The report does not make country-specific recommendations, but its human development focus draws on examples taken from individual nations. The following are the main topics of the report:

- The Concept and Relevance of Human Development
- Human Development Situation and Challenges
- Investing in Human Development
- Participation for Human Development
- Human Development Strategies

Within these broad subject headings, the report goes on to delineate more specific opportunities for change. Examples of these sub-topics include the role of non-governmental organizations, decentralizing government to better meet the needs of the people, women's participation in development, community participation in the planning process, health, environmental and education issues, and the role of economic growth in development.

The Pacific Human Development Report is a broad-based planning document because it not only talks about the ends of development, but it also discusses the means. Those means are the various planning processes which must be undertaken to successfully implement the report's recommendations. The report draws on many different planning approaches including the incremental, rational, equity, justice, and corporate planning models (United Nations 1994).

Fiji Background

Fiji is divided into about 300 islands with the total land mass equaling the size of Massachusetts. Most of the islands were formed volcanically and thus contain high, steep mountains, lush vegetation, and rich soil. Some islands are mere atolls, rising only meters above sea level. About 70% of the people live in rural areas, some in the interior of the bigger islands, and some in coastal locations. The other 30% (and a growing percentage) live in urban and semi-urban areas with Suva, the capital, being the largest urban center. Suva stands in contrast to the tropical image with its tall buildings, smog-belching vehicles, and general urban feel.

Fiji was a British colony, but achieved independence from Britain in 1970. The population of Fiji is split almost equally between indigenous Fijians and Fijian-Indians (or Indo-Fijians), descendants from Indians attracted to Fiji by the British over a century ago to work in the sugar cane fields. The Indians today continue to farm sugar cane (sugar is Fiji's number one industry and export), but most do not own the land they work because most of the land in Fiji is natively owned and is passed down through blood relationships. (There is a small portion of land which is government owned, and a smaller amount which is free-hold land—anyone can purchase the title to it.) The Indians therefore lease the land and pay rent to the Fijian landholders. A significant disparity between the two races has emerged over the issue. On the one hand, Indians want to own land so that they have some security about the permanence of their farms. On the other hand, the Fijians are envious of the economic resources the Indians have gathered through their farming endeavors.

In 1987, the Indians won a parliamentary majority for the first time. Even though a Fijian was chosen as Prime Minister,

a racially driven, bloodless military coup arose which installed an Indigenous Fijian government that continues to govern to this day.

Besides the political significance, the coup also has had a direct impact on planning in Fiji. The current government, still led by the coup's leader, runs under a new racially biased constitution which favors the indigenous population. As such, the government has developed special programs to assist the indigenous people in many ways, including development, the ability to secure financial resources, and access to education. It is no surprise then, that there is a growing resentment within the Indo-Fijian population because government policies overtly discriminate against them. Combine all of the racial issues with a growing rural-urban migration problem, increasing crime problem, increasing urbanization, an increase in cash dependency by one-time self-sufficient communities, and an economic shift toward an export economy with its associated debt and dependence on foreign aid, and you have a very interesting climate under which to submit an unspecific, broad, culturally neutral planning document such as the Pacific Human Development Report.

There are three primary planning agencies in Fiji: the Central Planning Office (CPO), the Town and Country Planning Department, and the Ministry for Regional Development (MRD). The CPO is a centralized, government wide planning agency which acts as the gatekeeper between foreign aid and domestic development. The CPO of Fiji mirrors other developing countries which have developed similar agencies to take on the relatively new concept of planning (Puri 1989). In most developing countries, then, the CPO becomes the crucial thread between "the legislature, the executive, the ministries, the public enterprises and other specialised government agencies, and...all lower governmental formulations down to the local level" (Puri 1989, 118). When foreign aid is given, the CPO then directs the funds down to the other two planning agencies which are responsible for implementation of programs.

The Ministry for Regional Development is the primary development agency in Fiji. Whereas the Town and Country Department oversees the development in the limited urban and suburban areas, the MRD seeks to provide assistance to 70% of the total population—those living in rural areas.

Critique

Understanding cultural differences are necessary before attempting to create a plan on a particular culture's behalf. These unique cultural characteristics are not only differences, they can be barriers to a Western approach to planning. Each community has its own culture, and if the planning process proceeds without understanding and respecting that culture, then there is a high likelihood that new projects will fail. Such is the case with the Pacific Human Development Report. The critique below divides the issue into two primary categories: 1) the error of emphasizing a Western-based economic system and 2) why Western-styled citizen participation practices are inappropriate.

Economic Growth

The underlying assumption among the many recommendations, suggestions, and philosophies put forth in the Pacific Human Development Report is that sustained economic growth is at the core of what the South Pacific countries should strive for (United Nations 1994). The authors believe that "greater economic growth is a prerequisite for a sustained improvement in human development" (United Nations 1994, 1). Moreover, they see economic growth as the way to share benefits among the people (United Nations 1994). This economic approach toward planning and development is consistent with current domestic approaches toward planning in Western countries where it is seen that the private sector is the unit of solution in communities (Klosterman 1997). In the West, economic growth and development occurred simultaneously, thus it is natural for planners from those countries to view lesser economically advanced countries as also lesser developed (Augustine 1989; Stockwell and Laidlaw 1981). To be successful in Fiji however, planning should "not confine itself to alleged economic development along capitalistic lines" (Ali 1980, 13).

The report's emphasis on economic growth clearly demonstrates an inappropriate Western bias and lack of understanding of Fijian life because the Fijian culture is the antithesis of such an economic system. It has not been uncommon for other planners working in the South Pacific to have similar inappropriate solutions. One scholar on South Pacific development described the typical international planner working in the South Pacific as "overwhelmingly trained not only in one discipline, economics, but predominantly in one sect within it—that of Euro-American liberal capitalist economics" (Crocombe 1980, 1). The structure and beliefs of Fijian culture is much different than Western societies which believe in an economic system based on growth, private ownership, and individual exchange.

This key economic difference between Fijian and Western culture can be explained by looking at the *kerekere* system in Fiji. *Kerekere* (keh-reh-keh-reh) is a system of shared goods based on need rather than ability to pay. It developed as a way for people to equally distribute the abundant food sources to one another based on need. Asesela Ravuvu, a Fijian scholar and ethnographer describes the importance of such an arrangement: "In an economy which is still very much subsistence based, the idea of caring for and sharing with others is an important aspect of the value systems of the Fijian people" (Ravuvu 1983, 81).

The *kerekere* system has its origins in traditional Fijian culture, but it still exists alongside modern Fijian society even with its growing cash economy. If a family is hosting a wedding for a child, they would ask "to borrow" extra food from another family in their same clan in order to provide for all the guests. No IOU is exchanged, it is just understood that at

some point in the future when the situation is reversed, the original giver family will ask the other family for some of its surplus food.

There are larger world implications for not acknowledging the *kerekere* system. One of the main emphases of previous development, as well as the Pacific Human Development Report, is that of rural-based small business. Many rural areas of Fiji lack access to large commercial centers and markets, therefore most villages have some type of small store which sells a range of items from cigarettes to tinned mutton to kerosene. In the 1970s there was even a push for these villages to run the stores cooperatively instead of privately in the hopes that the cooperative structure would better mirror Fijian collective society. Regardless of the ownership method, the result has been the same—the businesses have failed. The main reason for failure is that if someone wants an item from the store all she has to do is ask for it and if she does not have any money, the store owner cannot refuse to give her the item. After a while, the store owner does not have enough money to cover his debts and to buy more stock, so it fails. The eventual result is that an Indian-run store will emerge and succeed (Indians have no obligations under the *kerekere* system), which further fuels the economic disparity and racial tension.

One of the major failings of the Pacific Human Development Report is that being a Western-driven development plan, it fails to recognize the existence of the *kerekere* system alongside the cash-based economic order. In fact, the report's main recommendation to increase sustained economic growth is a clear indicator that the plan may result in failure and a poor allocation of resources. The UN Report even acknowledges the likelihood of failure when it says that "individualistic patterns of development produce conflicts wherever...traditional lifestyles are highly valued" (United Nations 1994, 7). The *kerekere* system is based on the close relationships of the Fijian people and "in a capitalistic economy where great value is placed on accumulation and economising, kinship is a very costly affair...[but] kinship only appears costly when measured with a capitalist yardstick" (Rika 1980, 28-29)—a crucial fact which is summarily overlooked at the Pacific Human Development Report's call for a capitalistic economic growth solution to Fiji's problems. This lack of cultural acknowledgement in the Pacific Human Development Report's recommendations sets up future planning based on the report for failure.

Citizen Participation

One of the recurrent themes within the Pacific Human Development Report is that the report's success should be measured on the eventual impact of programs on human development. One of the report's keys in realizing these goals is to include the Fijian people in the decision-making process. The following are some examples of the citizen participation focus of the Pacific Human Development Report:

- "A dominant theme of this report is the need for a participatory approach toward development" (United Nations 1994, 1);
- "Community development is an indispensable component of a human development strategy" (United Nations 1994, 6);
- "...community participation directly promotes the objectives of a human development strategy. It increases people's choices and vests greater control and responsibility for development in communities" (United Nations 1994, 7);
- "People's participation is essential so that development is generated from within...and that people can determine their own destiny" (United Nations 1994, 9);
- "Participation is the basis...for people to move away from dependency to self-reliance, from being passive recipients of decisions to active role-players in decision-making" (United Nations 1994, 53);
- "Genuine popular participation has to lead to greater control by the people themselves over development activities...participation also implies the empowerment of people to undertake the transformation of institutional structures so as to increase community cohesiveness..." (United Nations 1994, 54); and
- "Unless there is full community involvement...development projects aimed at improving community well-being will fail to be sustained. There is a need to promote greater participation in the development process and to foster greater community involvement in all aspects of development" (United Nations 1994, 69).

While it is essential to include the recipients of development into the planning process (based on my observations, most projects which fail in Fiji do so because there is no local involvement), foreign planning approaches fail to consider the cultural landscape within which this participation must take place and the results are just as ineffective as if there were no participation at all.

These barriers can be overcome and utilized within the planning process, but aid agencies such as the UN rarely spend the necessary time understanding cultural intricacies and altering their planning approaches to work with these differences—it is a bit like the modernistic or positivistic approach toward planning (Beauregard 1997) where it is perceived that there is a single universal approach toward a process and that it is a matter of fitting the situation to the methodology rather than adjusting the methodology to the situation. Planners in Fiji need to spend time with the communities they are trying to serve (Ratuvili 1980) so that they can learn how to customize their ideas to the needs of the Fijians.

The hierarchical structure of the culture, the parallel communal culture, and the short-term focus of the society are the three main cultural obstacles in why Western approaches toward citizen participation are inappropriate in Fiji.

Hierarchical Structure

Citizen participation requires a social structure under which people feel equally free to participate alongside decision makers. In Fiji however, this is not the case. A major impediment toward including the recipients of planning in Fiji is the pervasive top-down social hierarchy (Toren 1990). From birth, Fijians learn to respect authority and withhold action unless sanctioned by that authority. The chiefly system, the church, and the educational system create and reinforce this top-down mentality.

The chiefly system is very strong in Fiji. Most Fijians are still brought up in the village, but even those who live in urban or semi-urban areas still closely identify with the village of their father and the chiefly decisions made there. Most people cannot speak to the chief unless they are spoken to first. It is not even allowed for people to physically rise above the chief's head because it is taboo to think that you are better (or above) the chief in any way. The chief has his advisors, mainly the village elders, but the chief's decisions are final. Other non-chiefly villagers have little voice in the ultimate decisions which effect their village, but this lack of input is culturally ingrained and thus villagers do not feel that they are somehow left out of a decision-making process (Sovaki 1980). This hierarchy is clearly established and reinforced throughout village life and is easy to see when entering a village, yet is unacknowledged by international advocates of bottom-up planning methodologies.

The church is the second arena where the top-down social hierarchy is established. Most Fijians are Christian Methodists while a minority are Catholic. (The missionaries were able to influence such a great number of people by converting the chiefs first. Once the chiefs converted they told their villagers to convert as well, which in general they did.) The village minister is seen as an authority figure and often wields as much power as the chief.

The final main reinforcer of a strict social hierarchy is the educational system. In the schools, principals have complete authority and can act in similar ways as the minister or chief.

One result of all these hierarchical institutions is that people do not usually make decisions without the sanction of an authority figure. When villagers (or planning and development employees) are asked for their input, they wait for their chief (or boss) to tell them what to do. Even in modern office settings, Fijians tend to defer to their superiors and are reluctant to think or act independently. The Pacific Human Development Report fails to acknowledge that barriers exist which would warrant a different approach toward citizen-based planning.

Communal Culture

The collective nature of Fijian society is another cultural barrier toward citizen participation. At first there seems to be an inconsistency between a strictly hierarchical society and one which is very communal, but the two co-exist because day to day life is communal while decision making is hierarchical. Having a communal component may sound like a plus for planning since collaboration and coordination are critical for effective plans, it is not advantageous for planning in Fiji. In the Fijian village, everything is owned by everybody, even if an individual purchased an item with his own money from his own private job. Private ownership of materials (or ideas) does not exist (or at least are not expressed). Similarly, people do not like to stand out in any way. To be viewed as an individual is to be an outcast and this includes expressing individual opinions.

While communal-based societies are conducive to easily identifying development needs because everyone's needs are shared and thus essentially the same, the communal way of thought means that people working in the planning or development fields usually do no take individual initiative. The result is that people who should be involved in planning are really only a group of followers leaving decisions to the boss, a chief, or an outside consultant. Obviously then, ideas are limited to a single individual, and if that person has neither the skills nor the interest in planning (which is often the case for planning employees who are usually politically installed) then the whole planning process breaks down.

Short-Term Focus

"Development planning is the management of resources to expedite progress towards a better social state" (Rokotuivuna 1980, 7) and is therefore longitudinal in nature. Fijian culture however is oriented toward living for the day (Ravuvu 1983). In fact, the whole professional field of planning is impeded in Fiji because in some communities planning is essentially taboo. The main thrust of this taboo is that to plan is to spoil things; rewards come to those who live for the day. There are obviously implications of this type of belief when an agency like the UN develops a planning document with a long-term time frame. In terms of citizen participation, how can people who live for the day be actively involved in a long term planning process? Again, there are ways to work with the culture to address some of these barriers, but the key is to acknowledge their existence which the Pacific Human Development Report fails to do in any meaningful way.

Conclusion

The Pacific Human Development Report is a broad planning document for the South Pacific which identifies primary areas for change. Although the UN Report uses new terminology like "sustained human development" (United Nations 1994, 1) to reflect a supposedly new wisdom in international planning which recognizes the need for self-sufficiency, the report continues in a long traditional of imposed planning which fails to consider the key cultural characteristics of the recipient country. Its approaches toward development merely continue the same types of practices of the past which have led to the continual failure of development projects.

Specifically, the key missing element of the Pacific Human Development Report is its failure to recognize and understand the cultural characteristics of Fiji which are inconsistent with a Western approach toward planning. First, the report neglects to realize that the basic structure of Fijian life is antithetical toward a Western economic system. This omission undermines all other report recommendations because economic growth (a Western bias) is seen by the UN as the means to reach all other ends. Second, failure to see how Fiji's hierarchical structure, communal culture, and short-term focus impacts bottom-up planning undermines the report's main methodology for creating sustainable change. The result of these oversights is that this plan will probably continue in the historical tradition of working against native cultural practices rather than working with them and thus ultimately fall short in its endeavors.

This pattern of international recommendations leading to local failures has led to a great waste of monetary and human resources. Yet the international aid continues to funnel in to Fiji despite the failures. With international planning agencies such as the UN, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund (primarily being led by Western countries) exerting increased international influence, there is however, little prospect for change.

Author's Note

Speculation as to appropriate solutions to the problems mentioned above are difficult. Successful planning can only be achieved if planning efforts fully understand the culture in which the planning takes place. One new method of achieving these goals is the Participatory Rural Assessment (PRA) method. PRA is a community-based planning methodology which involves villagers in their own development process. Designed to take advantage of local knowledge about needs, problems, capacities, and solutions, PRA takes place in the village setting and asks a cross-section of the community to participate in various activities designed to extract information and ideas in a culturally sensitive way. Tactics include soliciting stories from village elders, walking a transect across the village with a small group and asking for a descriptive tour, and developing historical timelines which highlight past developments and identify the impetus for change. This information exchange usually takes place over many days with the planners staying in the village the entire time. By living with the villagers, the planner builds trust with the people and allows them to set the pace—two key elements of building effective working relationships in Fiji.

PRA is a relatively new method, but has been used with some success in Africa and Latin America. On the surface, it seems to be an appropriate approach toward rural planning in Fiji, but I would hesitate to hold it up as a solution. Many methodologies and schemes have been tried in Fiji, each with the assurance from the foreign planners that they were "the answer", and each has either failed outright or led to other significant problems. PRA sounds like the perfect approach, but I am unable to discern whether the methodology appeals to my planning sense or my Western biases. Which is the point of this paper—cultural characterisitcs do matter for successful planning.

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31 THE CITY COMMUNITY: BUILDING BRIDGES TO SUSTAINABILITY

Akhtar Badshah
Sheila McNamee
Jane Seiling

"Living in cities is an art, and we need the vocabulary of art, of style, to describe the peculiar relationship between man and material that exists in the continual creative play of urban living. The city as we imagine it, the soft city of illusion, myth, aspiration, nightmare, is as real, maybe more real, than the hard core city one can locate on maps in statistics, in monographs on urban sociology and demography and architecture. Yet the hard facts of cities tend to be large, clear and brutal."[1]

The Challenge for Cities

Cities in Asia and the Pacific Rim are growing at a staggering rate to a magnitude not contemplated by most planners not all that long ago. The rapid investment in commerce, tourism and industry in the context of infrastructure, globalization, in-migration, and environmental impact has created challenges in Asia and the Pacific Rim. These challenges, if left unapprised, will have politically and socially destabilizing effects as well as lead to an unsatisfactory quality of life. Despite impressive economic growth statistics, there are more poor families in Asia than in the rest of the world combined.

The consequences of poorly managed urbanization have become clear. Cities in the region face shortages of housing, water and power; inadequate transportation; lack of public safety; unemployment and underemployment; increasing traffic; uncollected garbage; and concentrated smog. This phenomenon is even more significant considering the disproportionate concentration of economic activity that is centered in and around cities. Underlying the more obvious causes for this lag are excessive government intervention, lack of investment in infrastructure and skill building, and fundamental problems in the decisioning processes that shape the contours of the local political economy. These challenges include:

- mistrust and the lack of a common perspective shared by key stakeholders;
- absence of a clear methodology to engage the stakeholders in a purposeful and substantive interchange;
- unclear mapping out of strategies;
- lack of leadership to lead and manage the urban decisioning process;
- poor transformation of ideas into solutions and solutions into results; and
- lack of a mechanism to exchange and leverage relevant global experience, thereby increasing the perceived costs—financial and cultural—of locally adapting and implementing solutions tried and tested elsewhere.

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The economic, political and social context in which the city operates is also changing rapidly. The high rate of growth is creating problems that far surpass government resources to solve (generally based on tax and tariff models). The ability to draw foreign direct investment to a city is predicated significantly on government's ability to improve the infrastructure and create opportunities to support new economic activity. Politicians are increasingly being held accountable for their performance by better informed and more demanding constituencies, and central government intervention is disappearing, being replaced by decentralization and devolution policies and creating a need for a new development framework for cities.

Four Major Trends

1. 4.2 billion of the world's 7 billion population in the year 2010 is projected to be in the Asia and Pacific region[2].
2. About half (45%) of all GDP growth globally will take place in Asia. By 2010, it has been suggested, eight out of the world's ten largest economies measured by GDP at purchasing power parity—China, Japan, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and United States of Americaæwill belong to the Asia-Pacific region. The other two will be Germany and France.
3. By 2010, 43 percent of the population in Asia will live in cities[3].
4. 33 cities in Asia and Pacific region will have populations greater than 5 million (compared to only six European cities)[4]. Mexico City, Mumbai, Shanghai and Tokyo will each have 20 million people. Beijing, Dhaka, Jakarta, Manila, Tianjin, Calcutta, and Delhi will have more than 15 million.

In contrast to this bleak picture, local, state and national leaders in Asia and the Pacific Rim are beginning to take up the challenge. Bold moves are being made by some municipal and national leaders to recognize and address issues in ways departing from those that have proven ineffective. The needs for leadership, reorganization of resources, and structural changes to the urban vision are being accepted in cities in Asia and the Pacific Rim. Refocussed initiatives are appearing in city after city, giving rise, not only to hope, but to tangible results.

Mayors and city managers are transcending their traditional roles and embracing new and innovative ways of governing by:

- encouraging partnerships and creatively harnessing the private sector, both domestic and international, NGOs and private voluntary organizations;
- mobilizing and leading the city residents, not only as consumers of services, but as advisors, facilitators and implementors of change; and
- adopting an active procedure for achieving desired consensus in shaping the city's future, as opposed to the current reactive and passive stance.

Multiple Roles of Mayors and City Managers

Mayors and city managers are now invited to see themselves in new, more diverse roles of leadership. These roles involve "gesturing for involvement" of all members of the city community in creating a city that is envisioned and designed by all who are excited about the possibilities of a future not seen as possible in the past. The mayors and managers are now playing multiple roles of entrepreneur, conductor, cook, magician, doctor, inventor and partner.[5] As entrepreneurs, the managers and mayors are working with the private sector to develop both the formal and informal economies. As conductors, they are developing a good ear to discern silent majorities from noisy minorities. As cooks, they are seeking out different ingredients and trying new recipes, creating new possibilities for the future. As magicians, they are balancing multiple complaints and needs against an inadequate budget while hearing and seeing new ways of expanding already stretched resources. As doctors, they are always on the alert for common urban planning "diseases" while seeking the input and involvement of their city-partners in addressing these diseases and refiguring them as potential opportunities—or to avoid them altogether. As inventors, they are creating new processes, partnerships and alliances to seek solutions for old problems and issues that have in the past been accepted as formidable and impenetrable.

The Challenge

The future of our cities could define the future of human development. Our challenge is not to tame cities, but to use every resolve and human ingenuity to make them functional within the limits of nature. Making it happen is a priority challenge facing all governments, city administrations, private sectors and communities at all levels.

The challenge is to leverage carefully targeted education, research and practice to help mayors and city managers to understand and outline their evolving roles, encourage potential partners to step forward, and accelerate the overall process of change. In 1996, mayors from 135 cities around the world declared that it was necessary to bring together all civic leaders to review the social development situation in their city; develop commitment to a common plan of action and review, and, if necessary to improve mechanisms for:

- inter-sectoral coordination of social services at the city level to support communities and families at risk;
- the representation and full participation of poor and minority groups through democratic processes in the governance of the city and particularly in the planning and management of programs which affect them; and
- mobilization and coordination of support from private and informal sector businesses and civil society organizations of all kinds, including training and support for community organizations.[6]

To date, no regional network is bringing together as partners government, business, civic organizations, academia, and media leaders to address the challenge of growth and sustainability in cities of Asia and the Pacific Rim.

Moving to Action—APCF as a Catalyst for Change

To address this need, the *Asia-Pacific Cities Forum (APCF)* has become a reality. The APCF has accepted the challenge to create an action-oriented partnership linking business, government, civic organizations, academia, and media leaders in Asia and the Pacific Rim region. Its mission is to act as a catalyst whereby the partners are able to leverage their respective resources collectively to a degree not achievable individually. APCF's initial role is to assist cities and communities by facilitating the establishment of an activist network among all stakeholders in urban development. In doing so, the optimal assembly of resources will be enhanced to the end of supporting cities in the achievement of their respective sustainable development goals.

A Vision of Citizenship

We would like to outline a vision of citizenship where people are part of the decision-making process in cities and where all members are responsible for actively contributing to the well-being of the city and in achieving an ascending spiral of living standards. APCF sees cities developing through the empowerment of its people so that they can create their own identities and their own institutions. This vision is people-centered, gender conscious and seeks a development strategy that nurtures sustainable and equitable growth. It is based on our experience that people and communities all over the world struggle against civic decay and constantly seek to develop new ways of solving their urban problems.

Amidst all of the gloom one sees in cities there are rays of hope, most visible through an outpouring of promising new development programs. *Underlying the majority of these programs is the conviction that no amount of government or private money will make much of a difference unless the people who now live in squatter settlements and other blighted areas take the lead in improving the living conditions in their settlements.*[7]

We embarked on this journey to develop the notion of a "city community" years ago, differently in our own careers, as educators, researchers and professionals.

The visions of the "city community" were first explored in the book *Our Urban Future: New Paradigms for Sustainability and Equity*[15] (Akhtar Badshah, 1996). During this exploration, by talking to residents, community leaders, local organizations, city authorities and business leaders, it was learned that a vast resource of human vitality and creativity exists that is largely untapped.

It was also observed how, with a little help, civic life regenerates itself and the community is revitalized. However, the conventional solutions that most urbanists develop are missing three vital elements: creativity, energy and, oftentimes, urgency. This is because the most prevalent approach to address the local concerns is a "problem-solving" approach. This problem orientation has its limitations. By the time the problem is identified, the causes analyzed, and the plan of action formulated and implemented, the original problem is often no longer the problem. The community's needs have changed. The community remains in a catch-up mode of solving problems that are based on past needs and complicationsænot focusing on what needs to be done to make a better future.

Inquiry as a Catalyst

New approaches have begun to emerge particularly in the organizational development field. These can allow us to re-evaluate the "problem-solving" approach with an "inquiry" approach and make it possible to expand beyond past limitations to new visions and possibilities of the future. Inquiry focuses on:

- *Discovering*, understanding and valuing unique strengths and weaknesses, and opportunities and threats about their cities, their communities and their work.
- *Challenging* the status quo and thinking outside of conventional boundaries to implement innovative solutions.
- *Creating* social infrastructure, that embodies common values and that are responsive to both internal and external aspirations.
- *Constructing* the future with all of the stakeholders through continuous learning, adjustment and improvisation in the service of shared ideals.

The City Community[8]

The shift in Government's role as providing all functions and services, to empowering citizens to take ownership in the community is the ultimate objective of the City Community theory.

The idea of a "city community" is quite simple. The term "community" has represented connections across groups for centuries. In the context of the city, the term simply calls for the expansion of the decisioning circle to the edges of the community; creating a circle of inclusion that makes it possible for all stakeholders to, first, recognize and be acknowledged as stakeholders and second, actively choose to participate and contribute to the development of their city. The power pyramid of the past is replaced with a circle where leaders still lead but they are not necessarily located in the center of the circle. These leaders knowingly seek the information and involvement of city community members across the circle and extend their invitation to the edges of the circle to include all citizens willing to participate. It is understood that it is through these actions of interdependence across the circle of involvement and inclusion that the successful city community of the future is possible.

The City Community is purposeful and evolutionary with several interrelated and inseparable tasks:



- the development of an administrative system, an environmental system and a relational system that tie to the future vision of the city;
- the development of a communal awareness and understanding of the urgency of the individual and collective role in increasing the livability of the city community;
- develop an awareness and expectation of socially responsible behavior that integrates the logic of the moral city in which all people in spirit and harmony can be hopeful, define their humanity, fulfill their potential and gain the ultimate pride, worthiness, and self respect; and
- the development of larger partnerships and connections, both internally and externally, which impact the common good of the city, the nation, the region, and the world.

Cities are evolving to a comprehension of the "nested nature" of systems. The reality is that the above four developmental tasks are essential to the involvement and empowerment of the citizenry in addressing future challenges. In doing so citizens can achieve higher levels of livability and survivability for themselves individually and the city community as a system.

Like other points in history which cause certain approaches and issues to rise to popularity in our attention cycles and on our agendas, there is a confluence of ideas now occurring which Patricia McCarney has described as an "Assembly of Ideas."[9] This confluence of ideas is partly, but not exclusively, a response to the forces emerging at the global, national and local levels. For example, in the scholarly community we now observe a consideration of new directions in development thinking; within the community of international donor agencies we see a review of experiences and a shift in emphasis; and governments and practitioners alike demonstrate instinctive inward examination to contemplate the re-engineering processes at work around them.

As national and local governments around the world are forced to reduce spending on infrastructure and municipal services, partnerships between government, the private sector and community-based organizations increasingly are seen as crucial to urban development and management. By inviting diverse constituencies to sit at the same table and collectively inquire into possibilities, a shared vision can be formulated and innovative solutions can be found making possible cities that are more economically vibrant, socially stable and healthy with an enhanced and engaged citizenry.

Urban-Decisioning: Enablement to Empowerment

Through empowerment, new citizens may well lead the way to an economically and environmentally sustainable city.

The urban-decisioning framework in the city community is based on the concept of empowerment of all stakeholders to actively engage in making their cities and communities livable. The concept of empowerment is based on the understanding that most human investments, activities and choices, all of which influence the achievement of



The above analogy shows government in three different roles. As the *provider*, government gives the house to the people. By giving citizens the site for the house, the permission to build and the guidelines for constuction, government embodies *enablement*. In *empowerment*, all stakeholders in the community take ownership through knowledge and cooperative action to build their community.

development goals and the extent of environmental impacts, take place outside 'government.'[10] The emphases on "empowerment policies" rather than enablement has received support from the growing recognition that democratic and participatory government structures are not only important goals of development but also play an integral role in the achievement of such development.

Empowerment policies give governments and the people they serve a shared role in setting the framework for urban development while emphasizing a lesser government role in providing the investment. Government has the central role of leadership, creating the environment where change is seen as possible in an atmosphere of openness and urgency. Through empowerment, the people support and expand the multiplicity of large and small initiatives, recognizing that the investments and expenditures of individuals, households, communities, businesses and voluntary organizations are imperative to the achievement of the envisioned city community.

Participation and empowerment are inseparable since popular priorities and demands will exercise major influence on the development of effective and flexible growth-oriented policies. In an empowered environment "citizens" actively pursue the expansion and growth of their broader community context together through alignment, assumption of leadership, and advocacy (promotion) of their welfare and progress.

Sharing a Common Purpose of Livability

People need only be empowered to offer their contributions and creativity to the growth and vitality of the city.

The envisioned city community offers an environment where partnerships are promoted among different stakeholders and advocacy groups. In this new city community pride and commitment are expanded through shared and understood responsibility, trust and accountability. The new city community relationship is based on acceptance and acknowledgment as well as belief in and commitment to the concepts of community. Here the concept of community embraces feelings of respect, concern, connection, responsibility, self-worth, capability, and ownership. Acceptance of city community citizenship generates involvement and increases the spirit of volunteerism to stretch across the circle of inclusion.

According to Gerard Pinchot, "community is a phenomenon that occurs most easily when free people with some sense of equal worth join together voluntarily for a common enterprise."[11] The creation of a process by which diverse groups of participants and communities can pursue their common purpose of livability can become the central theme in the new "city community." This process makes a sense of equal worth possible. Through the process of empowerment and participative implementation, citizens learn that a positive, self-vitalizing civic culture can be created and mobilized to transform a city. *Partners for Livable Communities*[12] identifies five steps which a community can undertake in a

comprehensive urban decisioning process:

Step One: Develop a Community Vision through Public Participation
Step Two: Set Community Benchmarks and Performance Indicators
Step Three: Undertake Comprehensive Action Strategies
Step Four: Adopt a Regional Perspective
Step Five: Establish a Stewardship Body

It is obvious that a rethinking in the way cities are structured and managed will not transform existing city organizations. Rethinking how people think and the language they use to redesign their own thought processes about their cities may begin the transformation. In the end, action must be taken. Creation of an empowering environment in cities through open communication systems connects all stakeholders and partners among the different urban actors.

This will generate action and lead to measurable accomplishments. Partnerships and alliances that will make it possible for advocates to promote the possibility of "cultures of excellence" in our cities.

It is via advocates as "agents of change" that we will be able to eliminate poverty; increase livelihood opportunities for all; develop open systems of urban governance; protect and regenerate the urban environment; and empower women and other disenfranchised groups as valued partners in bringing change to our city community.

Principles of City Community Citizen

The empowered citizen:
- is inclusive, flexible and integrative
- invites social cohesion through collaborative partnerships
- asserts cultural, religious and ethnic identity in cities
- increases social capital by valuing trust, norms, and networks
- encourages women, children, the elderly, and other disadvantaged groups to participate in urban decisioning processes
- is committed to the welfare of the community even in the face of overwhelming challenges
- participates in the setting and realization of goals for the common good
- portrays their city community as an ascending spiral of living standards

Every Citizen is a Change-Agent and a Potential Leader

Working Well in the Circle of Inclusion

It is through actions of city community citizens and the willingness to be change-agents that the circle of inclusion occurs, making it possible to identify new ways of working well together. Within the circle of inclusion, the city community is faced with identifying new ways of working well together. It is through establishing new ways of being together in the city community that partnering becomes possible. Whether they are intra- or inter-city partnerships, there are strong needs for openness, new possibilities, shared opportunities, and the realization that there will be times of confusion and complexity. Within the city community, citizen willingness to participate is seen as imperative to the achievement of citizen-visioned goals.

For this reason, openness will require information and understanding of past strengths, current opportunities and shared visions of the future. Leaders and citizens alike will see the benefits and drawbacks of what is seen as possible; challenges will be seen as opportunities to work together toward the envisioned new cities; and confusion and complexity will be seen through the lens of "working toward a moving target."

To make it possible to deal with a moving target, relationships and multiple partnerships must happen across the city community circle. Partnerships across blurred lines of status and power are possible when all voices are heard and all contingencies actively participate in the governance and revitalization of the city. Behaviors that make effective partnerships possible are based on the following assumptions.

Assumptions for Effective Partnerships[13]

Contribution: All citizens contribute to (or take away) from the well-being of their city community, wherever they are within the circle of inclusion.

Motivation: Positive citizenship behaviors happen when citizens feel significant (important) to the achievement of a better city. To feel significant, citizens 1) are challenged (invited) to perform as contributing partners in bringing change to their city; 2) accept opportunities to be personally empowered to take action from where they stand; 3) feel competent to take action to improve their community. Significance is important wherever the citizen stands in the citywide circle of inclusion.

Decisioning: Citizens understand the need for considering the human, societal and financial elements of making decisions based on consideration of short and long term outcomes for the betterment of the city community.

Relationship: Establishing connecting relationships that work is the responsibility of all citizens. Positive relationships add energy to partnerships at the individual, group, local and global community level.

Leadership: Chosen, assigned leaders still lead, while it is understood that leadership happens at every point in the community circle. Every citizen

has the potential of being a catalyst for betterment and an agent for change.

Accountability: Citizens are willingly and individually responsible and accountable for the process of achievement of the city community vision of the future.

Advocacy: Citizens willingly influence others by promoting their city and their urban partners in the process of change. Advocacy is a catalyst for creating positive economic and societal opportunities that transcend past realities while actively inviting the participation of all citizens into the process of achieving change for their city community.

Good Corporate Citizenship as a Win-Win Proposition

It is evident that governments and municipal agencies alone will never be able to cope with the growing demands. A partnership with the private sector, at least in the urban areas, is no longer an option but a necessity. It is only with the assistance and participation of the private sector that most developing countries will be able to meet the growing needs of urban dwellers and, in the process, address the most pressing sustainable development challenges of the 21st century.

One sector of society that needs to be motivated to become a contributing stakeholder in the urban decisioning process is the corporate sector. Until recently, corporations were not interested in participating in urban reinvestment efforts. Now, however, many are joining with government and community groups as partners in revitalization strategies. In part, this is an acknowledgment that business is a stakeholder in the success or failure of the entire urban region. A corporation's headquarters can be jeopardized by the deterioration of surrounding neighborhoods, and the productivity of its work force threatened when the locale's quality of education is poor and its youth are drawn into criminal activity. Conversely, a community can fall into economic despair if a significant industry experiences financial troubles. For example, many cities have felt tremendous economic impacts after the closure of a factory that employed a large number of citizens or provided crucial income to the city's tax base.

While corporations cannot replace government or community organizations as funders or policy designers, they possess a focused energy and goal orientation that can help galvanize government and community efforts. Where a clear, long-term benefit to all stakeholders is identified, corporate partnerships based on trust, accountability, transparency, and a sense of shared purpose, can be a powerful tool in support of sustainable urban development. Increasingly, they are becoming partners and contributors in efforts to create sustainable cities. How does the private sector play a responsible role in the urbanization process and serve the interest of the community? What kinds of partnerships need to be formed to ensure equitable and sustainable urban environments?

Surprisingly there is also another movement that is taking place. Since the Rio Earth Summit, there has probably been greater and more fundamental change by the business sector's approach to environmental issues than in any other sector. While there are far too many companiesæmajor players as well as millions of small-scale enterprisesæthat are adding to the planet's environmental problems with little thought of their consequences, a growing number of corporations and small businesses have made a genuine and substantive commitment to managing and improving their environmental impacts. For many it is a commitment which recognizes not only the responsibilities, but also the business advantage of environmental leadership.

The Potential Roles of the Private Sector

The private sector has a critical role to play in the drive towards environmental sustainability. It is a role that is threefold. The three greatest sources of environmental problems are poverty, unsustainable production and consumption patterns, and a lack of innovative green technologies. The private sector has a major contribution to make in tackling all three of these issues. They can promote environmental sustainability by:

- Investing in cleaner production and promoting more sustainable consumption patterns.
- Developing products that are "green", consume less energy and materials, and have fewer environmental impacts than conventional technologies and methods.
- Helping to tackle poverty through its contribution to economic and human development.

It is important to note that business can play other roles in addition to generating revenues and seeking profits. They can widen economic opportunity and participation, invest in human capital, promote environmental sustainability and enhance social cohesion. By investing in stakeholder partnerships, with both primary and secondary stakeholders, they can play a valuable role in enhancing a company's reputation, competitiveness, productivity, efficiency, risk

management, innovativeness and long-term survival. Such partnerships can range from:

- Commercially-driven alliances and joint ventures
- Socially-driven alliances and joint ventures
- Ventures which combine both commercial and social objectives

The Societal Benefits of Stakeholder Partnership Increasing Efficiency, Effectiveness and Equity

Public-private partnership can help to achieve greater efficiency by:

- Eliminating duplication of cost and effort
- Pooling scarce financial, managerial and technical resources
- Optimizing "division of labor" and burden sharing
- Decreasing costs associated with conflict resolution and societal disagreement on policies and priorities
- Creating economies of scale
- Promoting technology co-operation
- Facilitating the sharing of information
- Overcoming institutional rigidities and bottlenecks

They can also help to improve effectiveness by:

- Leveraging greater amounts and a wider variety of skills and resources than can be achieved by different groups and sectors acting alone
- Accommodating broader perspectives and more creative approaches to problem-solving
- Addressing complex and interdependent problems in a more integrated and comprehensive manner
- Shifting away from "command and control" to more informed joint goal-setting
- Obtaining the "buy-in" of beneficiaries and local "ownership" of proposed solutions, thereby ensuring greater sustainability of outcomes
- Offering more flexible and tailored solutions
- Speeding the development and implementation of solutions

They can facilitate increased equity by:

- Improving the level and quality of consultation with other stakeholders in society
- Facilitating broader participation in goal-setting and problem solving
- Building the mutual trust needed to work through diverse, often conflicting interests, towards shared responsibilities and mutual benefit

Source: Business As Partners In Development, Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, 1996

The possibilities of the types of partnerships and alliances are as yet being explored. The sustainable benefits from these partnerships are untested. A number of recent partnership-based projects have led to some innovative projects with measurable impacts. These global partnerships have provided

The "4 E's" of Stakeholder Partnerships

City Community "Sustainable Cities"

inspiration and tangible proof that innovation in strategic decisioning and collective efforts can have positive and significant impacts on communities.

Several case studies have been compiled in short synopsis and are included in the appendix of this document.

The potential for social, economic and environmental progress is open to ongoing and constructive interaction by those capable of exercising a positive impact on urban societies. The cities in Asia and the Pacific Rim are expressing an increased and demonstrated interest in pursuing these efforts.

Assumptions about the Private Sector

In order for the private sector to become an ally, contributor, and partner in the task of sustainable development, several myths must be eliminated from the discourse of policy-makers, development practitioners, and business people. Some of the most entrenched myths include:[14]

- Subsidies that distort the economy, preempt a proper role for the private sector, and contribute to unsustainable development strategies occur exclusively in developing countries.
- The potential role of the private sector is difficult to realize in many countries because of people's traditional views regarding what areas are the responsibility of governments and what areas should be left to the private sector.
- Investing in sustainable projects is risky, unprofitable business.
- Market mechanisms alone, if left free to act, will ensure that financial flows become environmentally and socially sensitive.
- Given the right market mechanisms, financial markets will automatically work in support of sustainable development.
- The private sector is, for the most part reluctant to adopt sustainable development practices and is not in favor of economic instruments and environmental standards.

These and other myths highlighted by Luis Gomez-Echeverri represent some of the serious obstacles to a greater and more positive collaboration of private sector in sustainable urban

development. Debunking these myths would be an open way for a more realistic and fruitful interchange. It will also help bring down to reality those who think that the private sector can do everything, as well as those who think that the private sector can never be trusted. As long as these views prevail, the proper role of the private sector will never be fully realized.

The *Asia-Pacific Cities Forum* (APCF) is an attempt to facilitate an ongoing constructive interchange that will hopefully result in a change of attitude that will make governments, communities, international organizations and others more open to the private sector and its potential role in sustainable development.

Conclusion

"The worrisome issues arising from urbanization are within our collective capacities provided we do not shrink from the challenge."

We would like to highlight four messages within the city community framework. There are four main themes that we have developed for your consideration. We hope these will become the framework for APCF and its work.

First Message: To achieve the "city community," government leaders will have to open up the process of decisioning and expand the inner circle to include all of the stakeholders and the citizens.

Second Message: We are moving towards a new development paradigm of empowerment, which includes the expansion of men and women's capabilities and choices, and increases their ability to exercise those choices free of hunger, want and deprivation. It also increases their opportunity to participate in, or endorse, decisions affecting their lives and the resources to implement them.

Third Message: The corporate sector will have to play its role and view cities as their investment and thereby participate in its well being. A healthy city is a healthy workforce, and an educated city provides an educated and trained workforce, leading to increased productivity and possibilities.

Fourth Message: To achieve empowerment and an improved and sustainable quality of life in cities there must be stakeholder partnerships. These partnerships achieve greater efficiency, improve effectiveness and increase enrollment and equity.

It is not being suggested that "city community" status will be attainable in the short term. The suggestion is that multi-stakeholder partnerships can help promote the status of the city community. This is an effort to transcend traditional roles while seeking previously unseen possibilities in the future and is significant to the purpose of the establishment of the *Asia Pacific Cities Forum*. Moving away from the problem-solving mode of managing our cities and making it possible for new partnerships and alliances to be established both within the circle of inclusion and across city and country boundaries creates opportunities for propositions of a future that is hopeful.

This is an extraordinary time in cities. It is increasingly clear that neither governments nor communities can meaningfully solve their "urban problems" independent of one another. Establishing global network linkages of people, institutions, resources, and information to nurture a sustainable, city community is now possible. The *Asia Pacific Cities Forum* invites you to explore with us the myriad opportunities for creating new visions of accelerated change processes for the cities of the Asia and the Pacific Rim.

Case Study 1:

The Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan[15]

For well over a decade, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) called the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) has demonstrated that, when community interest and resources are mobilized, low-income settlements can greatly improve their own access to environmental services, health care, and employment. Located on the northwest periphery of Karachi, Orangi is the largest of the city's approximately 650 low-income settlements known as *katchi abadi*. Orangi was first developed in 1963 as a government township of 500 hectares, but it has since swelled to 3,200 hectares with an estimated population of about 800,000 living in 94,000 houses.

OPP's approach is based on the conviction that people organized in small groups can help themselves, and that if social and economic organizations within a community are strengthened, services and material conditionsæsuch as sanitation, schools, clinics, and job trainingæwill begin to improve, as will employment opportunities.

OPP started its work in Orangi in 1980 with a low-cost sanitation program, and spent the next four years working with all segments of the community one lane at a time æorganizing residents into groups of 20 to 40 familiesæ to build trust and confidence that OPP was going to be a permanent part of the community. With this approach, between 1981 and 1993 Orangi residents under OPP guidance installed sewers serving 72,070 of the 94,122 houses. To achieve this, community members spent more than US $2 million of their own money and OPP invested about US $150,000 in research and extension technologies.

After the initial success of the low-cost sanitation project, OPP staff undertook other projects that included: health and family planning for low-income women where OPP introduced mobile health training teams to train local women to become health activists for the neighborhood. Through

this approach 3,000 low-income families benefited and more than 95% of these children are immunized, 44% of the families practice birth control and infant mortality fell from 130 per live births in 1982 to 37 in 1991.

In 1984, OPP introduced the Women's Work Centers (WWC) to provide support and training for women stitchers and to eliminate the male contractors that paid the women substandard wages, often mistreating and sexually harassing them. The WWCs were set to deal directly with the suppliers and customers and OPP lent them machinery and supplies and assisted them in contacting clients.

In 1986, the home improvement program was introduced where the quality of bricks and roofing material manufactured by the local building material suppliers was improved by providing them with training, new machinery, and new appropriate technology. In this program also the local masons were trained to properly use these new materials. The end result being that most local building material manufacturers have been trained and most of the bricks and roofing material being sold to the community is very high quality.

OPP's approach to community development offers a model of how communities can assume responsibility for services formerly considered the responsibility of government. In none of these programs did OPP see its role as the provider of a particular service. Rather, the approach was that of empowerment of the community through effective partnerships, offering education and technical support.

Case Study 2:

The Citra Niaga Urban Development Project, Samarinda, Indonesia[16]

The Citra Niaga Urban Development Project is a successful land-sharing and urban renewal project involving government, a private developer and community partnership. The project redeveloped a slum in the city center located next to the port into a commercial complex with kiosks and stalls for the pavement traders who were living in the slum, new shop-houses, and a shopping complex. The owners of the shop-houses who had legal rights and the pavement traders who did not, were both accommodated in this project. The project has become the focal point of the city, where people gather in the evenings for shopping and entertainment. The project also provides a mix of commercial activity in keeping with traditional Asian markets.

The project was developed by the city authorities in order to solve the problem of rural migration and the resulting street hawkers that were choking the city streets. Utilizing land-sharing, the city authorities were able to address the issue of slum consolidation and urban renewal of central city land.

The formation of a cooperative and their participation in all aspects of the scheme was important in its success. The innovative aspect of this scheme was two fold: the involvement of the local government, the central government, and the private sector; and the process undertaken to ensure the participation of families who occupied the area and had been selected to be part of the new scheme. The NGO worked closely with the community in identifying what their needs were, explaining the scheme to them, and showing them how they would improve their economic conditions at a cost no greater than what they had been paying to the local slumlords for water and other services. The project design reflects the traditional goteng royand, or mutual aid lifestyle, with cluster development for the commercial street hawkers and shop-houses. The scheme was planned as a self-cost recovery, self-sustaining and profit-making venture.

Citra Niaga serves as a model for successful land sharing, with people of all income levels accommodated, while ensuring the rights of the payment traders. In reclaiming prime land for public use, it not only managed to upgrade a crowded squatter settlement, but also developed a public plaza and shopping center in the heart of the city, and reestablished the link between the harbor and the city. It was financially viable, creating a profitable business venture while including the usually ignored social and ecological aspects. Citra Niaga demonstrates that even in small towns profits can be made if projects are well thought out and if innovative financing schemes, through a mixture of cross-subsidy and self-finance, are used.

This combination of creative land-sharing and urban renewal has produced a scheme which is not only financially successful, but has also provided that mix of commercial activity which is in keeping with the traditional Asian commercial fabric. Citra Niaga has therefore achieved a truly Asian urban development, and its relevance to other developing countries in terms of creating a shopping complex, a city center, squatter upgrading and an appropriate environment cannot be underestimated.

Case Study 3:

Ecological Waste Management, City of Manila, Philippines[17]

This is an innovative community participation and advocacy program to transform attitudes towards refuse disposal in crowded markets in low-income neighborhoods. This process was facilitated through extensive community organizing and financial incentives and with support of a wide range of stakeholders, including local government and private enterprise.

Metro Manila is a region of contrasts that in many ways epitomizes environment and development issues of urban centers in the developing world. The metropolis generates over 6300 tons of solid waste daily, but its sanitary landfills can accommodate just over half that amount.

In the ecological waste management approach being introduced in Manila, composting and recycling generate

income from what is normally considered "waste." This income helps make the approach attractive to communities, and sustainable as a waste management scheme. The reduced volume of waste decreases the cost of collection and disposal, thereby saving money for national and local governments and the local community.

Ecological waste management is currently being implemented in one of the municipalities (Sta. Maria). Here one of the local businessmen set up a company called Assorted Wastes and Recycling Enterprises Inc. (AWARE) which entered into an agreement with the local government to process the bio-degradable wastes coming from the public market (which accounts for about 40% of the town's solid waste) into organic fertilizer. A local ordinance was passed mandating the segregation of wastes within the market. The market master enforces this. The town also allowed free use of a part of their dumpsite as the processing area. One of the town's compactor trucks brings the segregated wastes to the processing area where the employees of AWARE then mix them with other wastes (such as pig manure, burned rice hulls and sawdust) to make them into organic fertilizer (within 45 days).

The Sta. Maria Economic Development Foundation, an NGO, assists with the IEC. (They now sell their fertilizer (which has been tested by the Bureau of Soils and Water Management and certified by the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority) to farmers' cooperatives at P155.00 per 50 kilo bag. Recovery is about 50%. Recyclables are also received and sold. The residuals are dumped in an open dumpsite.

The project in Sta. Maria has been very successful and AWARE has been hired as the project consultant for other sites in Metro Manila. The main role of AWARE is to transfer the technology used and identify buyers of the organic fertilizers that will be produced by the plant.

Case Study 4:

Environmental Management Project in the City of Ilo, Peru[18]

This is an exciting story of formerly antagonistic industry-community relations becoming constructive through pragmatic negotiation and fair play. Situated on the southern coast of Peru, Ilo has grown rapidly, increasing from a population of 4,000 in the 1950s to 70,000 in the 1990s. This has led to a chaotic development due to the lack of planning by the city authorities. Further problems include air pollution and seawater contamination leading to a depletion of traditional fishing activities. There has also been a depletion of drinking and irrigation water due to the use of excessive amounts of water and control of the water source by the refining industry. Moreover, the population growth has encroached on the land used by the mining industry creating tensions all around. Over time these problems were exacerbated leading to dangerous levels of animosity between the community and the industry.

In the late 1980s an Environmental Management Committee was set up to diffuse this tension and develop a comprehensive plan to correct the problems and develop workable solutions. This committee included representatives of Southern Peru Ltd. (the mining company), the fishing industry, universities, the municipality, the community, and the health department. One of the first aims of the committee was to set up clear pollution norms. Working with all of the stakeholders the committee was able to get central government recognition and persuade the industry to accept its responsibility and agree to undertake environmental clean up. In return the community agreed to channel its protest through municipal proposals. Both sides agreed to enter into negotiations with transparency and pragmatism.

This process of negotiation was slow and faced many obstacles. However, by acknowledging that all the negotiating parties were responsible for the solution, the obstacles were slowly overcome and a number of solutions proposed. The two most important were:

1. An Environmental Plan for Southern Peru Ltd., including a basic agreement whereby the company invested $100 million in partnership with the government in projects for environmental protection. This included the development of two industrial and urban wastewater treatment plants, a plant for sulfuric acid, an installation of refuse disposal site and sanitary fill, a reforestation program for the region, and controls to stop sea pollution were established.
2. An Urban Development Commission established to reorganize the General Plan of the city, with the task of: reconfiguring the mining rights of the land; restructuring the urban space and integrating the railway tracks by developing more pedestrian crossings, and building vehicular overpasses; and building parks and playgrounds.

One of the major successes of this partnership has been the development of a city vision for the future that takes into account the rights of all of the stakeholders. The Ilo project shows that all players involved can change a situation of confrontation if there is frank recognition of different interests and a willingness to accept responsibility.

Case Study 5:

Comprehensive Community Development – The Atlanta Project, Atlanta (TAP)[19]

One of the most ambitious community projects ever undertaken by the corporate sector, The Atlanta Project (TAP), was initiated in 1991 in the U.S. city of Atlanta, Georgia by former President Jimmy Carter. TAP matches 20 "cluster" neighborhoods in the city with corporate partners. The project's goal is to empower citizens to solve problems that they identify in their neighborhoods and to foster lasting connections between neighborhoods and government agencies, non-profit service organizations, and the business

community.

TAP's comprehensive approach focuses on six major areas: community development, economic development, education, housing, health, and public safety. Several local and national philanthropic organizations have stepped forward to support the project, as have more than 3,000 individuals and organizations representing 100,000 potential volunteers. TAP hired "cluster coordinators," residents of the cluster neighborhoods, to encourage a true "bottom-up" approach to problem solving. In addition 22 corporations with local offices agreed to provide an executive, each of whom is paired with the cluster coordinator and neighborhood steering committee for five years. Some corporate partners have provided additional in-kind donations and other support.

The corporate sector partner in each neighborhood is responsible for helping the community prepare a strategic development plan that reflects the community's priorities and capitalizes on its assets. The long-term commitment and intense level of involvement expected of the corporate partners are essential features of the project.

Notable success stories include the collaboration of TAP, the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce and seven area financial institutions in the creation of a US $11.5 million loan fund to help newly formed and start-up businesses receive funding and support. Over 70 loans have been made, creating 130 new jobs and helping to retain 233 existing jobs in TAP neighborhoods. Volunteers from Arthur Anderson, a multi-national management consulting firm, helped convert a vacant store in their TAP neighborhood to an "Insiders' Teen Center," which provides a constructive and supervised environment for neighborhood children to spend their free time. Arthur Anderson staff also participated in a massive immunization campaign, knocking on doors, handing out information, and helping to administer vaccinations to nearly 1,000 children.

TAP's innovative approach to community development has been noted as far away as South Africa. More than 100 international delegations have visited the Carter Collaboration Center in Atlanta to learn about the TAP model and its many community-based success stories.

Case Study 6:

Broadway Triangle Urban Renewal Project æ Williamsburg-Brooklyn, New York City[20]

An exciting corporate urban renewal project has been initiated and supported by Pfizer Inc. as part of their ongoing commitment to the Williamsburg community. Williamsburg was the site of the original Pfizer plant, however, over the years the community has fallen prey to urban decay, blight, and loss of jobs. Rather than abandon Brooklyn in the face of urban decay, Pfizer used its resources and talents to improve the neighborhood around its plant. In 1984, they started a four-phased urban renewal project in collaboration with the New York City's Public Development Corporation.

Pfizer began working with the city and local community groups to develop an urban renewal plan that would be sensitive to the neighborhood's needs while maintaining its traditional residential/industrial mix. In 1984, in partnership with the city's Public Development Corporation, Pfizer announced the Broadway Triangle Urban Renewal Project. With Pfizer's support, 300 units for lower- and middle-families earning $25,000 to $53,000 a year will eventually cover the site, under a program sponsored by the New York City Department of Housing and Preservation and the New York City Housing Partnership.

Education is another critical focus of the plan. Through the New York City Join A-School Program, Pfizer's Brooklyn plant became a corporate partner of nearby Eastern District High School. Company volunteers work-one-on-one with students as mentors. In 1992, a new bilingual public elementary school was opened in a former Pfizer administration building. Started with the Beginning with Children Foundation, this school is becoming an important model of a public-private partnership aimed at improving public education. One of the innovative aspects of this program has been Pfizer's concern to bring other corporations and businesses to relocate to this area. Arlington Press Inc. became the first tenant in the industrial park, investing $1.8 million to renovate a Pfizer owned building and employing more than 80 people.

A sustainable feature of this project is that other organizations have joined the renewal effort. The New York City Partnership has designated the Broadway Triangle a "pilot site," eligible for special assistance in housing, schools, job creation and public safety. The Enterprise Foundation has agreed to rehabilitate 200 city-owned, low income housing units within a 14 block radius of the plant. And along with Pfizer, other companies such as: Brooklyn Union Gas Company, American Express Company and the Federal National Mortgage Association have provided financial support.

By 1998, Pfizer's total investment in the Williamsburg community will amount to $50 million. There will be 300 units of affordable housing, a bilingual public elementary school, and the completed industrial park will have 400,000 square feet of low-rise space for light industry, creating as many as 500 permanent jobs.

Recently fifty trees were planted each honoring a child from the neighborhood. Pfizer's vision is that 20 years from now, when the trees are strong and beautiful, the children will be mature and successful and the neighborhood will be well established as an example of how a corporation and its people can work with a community to make a difference.

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32 LISTENING TO THE SUBALTERN: THE ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL WORK OR, NOTES TOWARDS THE PEDAGOGY OF THE INDIA STUDIO

Vikramaditya Prakash

I speak today as an architect, and as an architectural academic. My submission is in the spirit of interdisciplinary dialogue. My imagined audience is the professional and academic architects working in and on South Asian Cities, although I am, of course, concerned with addressing issues of globalization that string all of us in the loop.

In December 1996, I attended two related conferences in Jakarta, Indonesia—"The Future of Asia's Cities" and "Tradition and Modernity: Contemporary Architecture in South East Asia and Beyond". The first conference, organized by the Asia Society (Akhtar Badshah), was inaugurated by President Suharto and consisted of a series of high-power panel discussions amongst senior government officials, influential developers, World Bank representatives, powerful bankers, along with architects, planners, academics and development activists. The scale and amount of building that is taking place in South-East Asia is mind-numbing. Far from being an exceptional extravaganza, the twin towers in Kuala Lumpur for instance are only the latest outgrowths of a huge colony of skyscrapers that now are crowding all the major cities in the region. By all projections, this building boom is expected to continue unabated, and consequently the urban population of the region is expected to double in the next 10 years. (With the anticipated emergence of China as a superpower of a new kind, it is not unexpected, then, that world's tallest building will be in Shanghai at the dawn of the new millennium—designed by KPF.) Dependent on their point of view, the panelists at this amazing conference saw the staggering changes anticipated in the future of Asia's cities, as looming horizons of crisis or, more often, of opportunity. (Some of those might be rethinking after the latest "bust" in South East Asia, but at that conference the general intensity of the debate was staggering, and given the dollar amounts that were discussed, frightening.)

The second conference, on "Tradition and Modernity," was confined to academics mostly from University of Tasmania and Indonesia earnestly debating the relevance of traditional and modern architecture for the emerging architectural profession of the region. Since most of the colossal amount of work in the area is done by American or Australian firms, this conference seeked to legitimize and empower local professionals by setting the terms of a meaningful debate. As its title suggested, this conference aspired to a negotiated peace between conceptions of "tradition" and forces of "modernity", aspiring, perhaps, for a balance of the kind articulated by Kenneth Frampton and others under the general rubric of "critical regionalism."

In contrast with the numbers and forces that were discussed at the first conference, the timidity and impotence of the concerns of the second were mind-numbing, and debilitating.

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It was so obvious that a handful, or even a reasonably large number, of well intentioned architects, urban designers and planners working with the general agenda of preserving local identity by historic preservation strategies or by designing buildings that use local materials and work with traditional urban forms may produce occasional examples of good design, but they are certainly not going to in any way challenge the dictates of a globalizing economy.

I came back feeling, therefore, that to understand the full impact of the development that is going on today, one needed something of a paradigm shift of a kind that is still unclear to me. And I was left with the question, that if the future of Asia's cities is being decided in the board-rooms of power where ethical responsibility is gauged by returns on investment, how are we as academics and professionals to forge an adequate response and alternative? In that context, I could not but help think that what we might need to resort to was the discredited modernist idea of alternative master-planning. I felt that perhaps we needed once again that large-scale thinking that can anticipate new cities, that can furnish coherent visions for the new mega-cities—master-plans that can rival the plans of the developers, in the off chance that we might yet have our dreams.

And yet, as the long history of modernism in both the West and in the Third-World has taught us, this enterprise of master-planning runs the serious risk of being ineffectual or, worse, counterproductive. Modernist plans have always ended up serving hegemonic interests. There may be occasional successes, and there certainly are ways of contextually re-locating the complexities of modernist planning interests in the Third World. But, by and large, the postmodern and postcolonial critiques in specific, and historical evidence in general, have unquestionably established that, around the world, modernism was unable even to un-stage its colonial inheritance, far less realize its decolonized utopian visions.

Thus, if globalization today demands a master-planning response to stand the possibility of being effective, we find ourselves in the clutches of an ethical dilemma where there is a "right" on both sides of the ideological battlefield, the *dharmakshetra-kurukshetra*, raising the familiar old question of modality of ascertaining right action in the field of seemingly equivalent choices. Charles Correa in *The New Landscape* articulated this dilemma as follows:

> "To do this in the context of the Third World, the architect must have the courage to face very disturbing issues. For what is your moral right to decide for ten thousand, for a hundred thousand, for two million people? Then again, what is the moral advantage in not acting, in merely watching passively the slow degradation of life all around?"

To understand our choices, and since I know something of Indian history, let me elaborate the first half of the dilemma by rehearsing the critiques of India's state-sponsored project of modernization. The critical issue turns on the question of the ethics of representation; representation both in the political sense of "speaking for" and the aesthetic sense of re-presenting, "saying anew". In India the Nehruvian project of modernization did not work because the people, the representative citizens, were not involved in the process. Laurie Baker, the English architect who has practiced on a small scale in southern India for the last 40 odd years, voiced this simply by starting a speech sponsored by the Indian Institute of Architects on the topic "Architecture and the People" with the following:

> "The subject given to me is architecture and the People. Did the promoters mean *the* people, or could they have said architecture and People? Saying *the* People implies that we architects are in one category and the people are in another."
>
> (G. Bhatia, *Laurie Baker*)

In India the architects and planners are considered "professionals", and in terms of our colonial and modern legacy, they *are* in one category, and the people in another. That is what it means to be professional, i.e., to be not untrained. Consequently, modernism, not only architectural but also economic and institutional, certainly produced great deal of professional expertise, but failed to stage decolonization because its elitist, top-down framing never enabled it gain the legitimacy to properly represent, speak for, the people in whose name it was exercised. The failure here was not of the translation, but of the transfer of idiom, caught in the replay of the colonial web of professionalism.

In addition the modernist epistemological claims failed to gain legitimacy because they did not translate. Modernism, to drastically condense postcolonial critiques, was ultimately Eurocentric. Its aspirations, however laudable, were located in the European Enlightenment that, however influential, was ultimately born of Judeo-Christian lineage. This is the issue of aesthetic re-presentation, the saying anew, where the saying anew amounted to a re-saying of a Eurocentric epistemology. This issue is more complicated, and one could of course delineate the modalities of the translation of idiom here, through a discussion of the ready incorporation of the Eurocentric idiom in the postcolonial episteme of the Third World. Such translations, like those colonial, help re-construct postcolonial identity but are unable to offer strategies for effective resistance to counter neo-colonial processes such as the globalization that we are witnessing today.

That the European Enlightenment and its offspring may help frame, but is not likely to stage, decolonization in the Third World is chronicled in stories of resistance as, for instance, in Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva's influential text on women's ecological movements, *Ecofeminism*. In this book, Mies and Shiva's central contention is that all the significant grassroots movements that have resisted globalization over the last 40 years or so, have their ideological origins *not* in academic writing or in global narratives such as those of Marxism, but in the coherences and contingencies of the everyday lives of the people, particularly of the women, that are affected at the nether reaches of patriarchal, capitalist, neo-colonial,

globalizing and other hegemonic processes. They demonstrate that women around the world, under great bodily and emotional threat, have repeatedly resisted the destructive erosion and transformation of their daily eco-lifeworld and have done so, not only because they have felt economically exploited, but more so because such hegemonic processes directly and indirectly threaten and destructively rewrite the ecologically informed coherence of the epistemological life-world that sustains their individual and social sense of selves. Gayatri Spivak, drawing on Foucault, might call this epistemic violence.

Ecofeminist movements are thus properly subaltern, in the sense that they properly represent the unrepresented. Their subaltern text thus suggests that the effects of globalization, as also its resistances, are best understood by the concatenation of multiplicitous micro-battles in which in the known and familiar experiences of subaltern life worlds are pitted against European commodities-based epistemologies of the capitalist economy. This subsistence perspective, or the survival perspective, as Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva call it, is the "life producing and life preserving work" that not only "is a necessary pre-condition for survival" but, with increasing ecological destruction, they moreover claim "can also show a way out of the many impasses of this destructive system" (M. Mies and V. Shiva, p.297-98).

The subaltern movement thus is not only about the locations of resistance, but is also, and more importantly, about the location and description of development alternatives. It will be instructive here to link the lessons of *Ecofeminism* to the arguments of the "Subaltern studies group." Like Maria and Vandana, the subaltern historiographers located the loci and contours of other historical resistance movements, not in the global narratives such as nationalism, but in the small scale efforts of the innumerable subaltern experiences. The descriptions and forms of such subaltern resistance, they argue, are rarely identical to their re-writing in superimposed narratives, such as nationalism.

In the claims of both the eco-feminist world and that of the subaltern historiographers, thus, we have the documentation of the workings of processes of hegemonization whose lessons for thinking effective strategies of resistance we will ignore only at out own peril. The principal lessons, from the pedagogical point of view are that, first, effective and lasting resistance to hegemonic processes will only be offered by those whose lives are directly and irreparably threatened, and these are the majority, not the minority; and second, that such resistance, although it is an economic and political "issue", is organized around episte-mological and ideological fault-lines, as it were, and not those directly economic and political. This is not an idea that is that different from the classic Marxist conception of the role of ideological processes in society, but I think that unlike Marxism that posits ideology as the superstructural effect of foundational economic relations whose ultimate emancipatory goal is "freedom of choice", subaltern thinking links economic and ideological issues in a fundamental bind whose conceptions of emancipation are *accessible only through the contingent* construction of the epistemological life-world of the subalterns. The ideal of necessarily working through the contingent constructions of the epistemological life-worlds of the subaltern, thus necessitates the effective participation of subaltern and other marginalized groups as the prime participants and movers in any development process not only to ensure the proper addressing of developmental gains, but also to facilitate the effective maintenance, re-production and relevant transformation of their life-worlds. The latter is critical since the survival of subaltern epistemes, as *Ecofeminism* suggests, may be critical to the survival of all.

If this is a difficult ideal, it is necessarily so, and it is perilous to ignore it. Is it possible then, to return to the question that I began with, to address the subaltern perspective, and its critiques of modernism, in the process of producing effective alternatives for the cities of South and Southeast Asia in the throes of globalization? Is it possible to think of subaltern master-planning?

At first blush, the subaltern perspective does suggest that the professional practice of architecture and planning, given its operative location in the epistemological life world of the urban elite, is inherently ideologically suspect. This is certainly a plausible claim, and its logical conclusion is that the only viable way for an urban elite to act is as facilitators of self-empowering subaltern development processes. Master-planning, since it is always in some sense from above, seems out of the question.

I was born and brought up in Chandigarh. My father worked with Le Corbusier on the Capitol Project, and was the Principal of the Chandigarh College of Architecture where I studied to be an architect. Even as I was indoctrinated into the high ideals of Le Corbusian and Nehruvian modernism, there was always a sense that these ideals must be radically questioned. But the mid-70s, and certainly by the 80s when I was studying architecture, both the Nehruvian project of economic and cultural modernization of India as also the project of architectural modernization, were loudly criticized and considered to have failed India. As the Nehruvian state lost legitimacy and collapsed under Indira Gandhi, the Indian polity moved towards sectarian, religious and linguistic division conflict that all but undermined the one-nation secular conception of the nation. It was in this context that Indian architects attacked Chandigarh as too "Western" and initiated the search for an "authentic" Indian architecture. Suspicious of these searches of authenticity and still confused about the reasons underlying the failure of modernist ethics, some of us younger architects ended up questioning the very project of Architecture with a capital "A", and moved into what is known as the "development sector" working with NGO's in search of what I can now call as subaltern architectural practice. But later as my best friend moved even further away into ecological water management, I moved to academics in the United States, and this is the reason that the ultimate political effectivity of subaltern agency as a strategy of resistance has continued to haunt my concerns.

While the jury is still out, I have some provisional suggestions.

I think the limitation of the subaltern perspective is that, whether it is acknowledged or not, it relies on a blind faith in the ultimate victory of the subaltern, like the Marxist relied on the ultimate victory of the proletariat. This faith not only potentially mystifies and fetishizes the subaltern, but more importantly runs the tremendous risk of simply being proven wrong. We have seen the destructive transformation of life-worlds before, and we may see them again. The march of history is rarely the story of progress, as we well know.

Perhaps simply in the name of certain caution, but more likely in that of a still unclear realism, let me here invoke the well-known ecological slogan as instructive of that modality of thinking and action that might be necessary for our survival. This is a modality that links two epistemologies not in an hierarchical but a constitutive embrace—"Think global, act local"—where the local and global are allegories of each other. Perhaps the subaltern rewriting of this slogan might be the displaced inversion, "Local acting is global thinking". In this rewriting, global acting is opposed in the name of a local acting as thinking, that integrates into the interests of that global ecological idea, survival of the species. In between, within the folds, then, would lie the articulation of professional work, not just master, not just facilitator.

In conclusion let me sketch some of the two major turns of this re-thought professional practise.

The first is obvious. If we are interested in architecture/planning and people, if we wish to learn from and participate in the learnings of the ecofeminist worlds, if we wish to see our work informed by and participant in the daily eco-lifeworld of the subalterns—we cannot afford to act from the outside as top-down professional-individuals; we must listen and participate, and necessarily include community participation in the field of necessities that determines any planning process. The Badshah paper (this volume) has listed processes that facilitate this, those that develop the city community, move towards an empowerment paradigm, incorporate the corporate sector in sustainable urban development, and develop multi-stakeholder partnerships to achieve greater efficiency, improve effectiveness and increase enrollment and equity in our cities. If such partnerships include subaltern representation, their importance cannot be understated.

But partnership, and this is the second, is not only a matter of non-elitist practice, but it is also a matter of locating resistance through the epistemological categories of the subaltern. Thus, from the beginning we must think of our professional work as not the process of singularly legitimizing a "correct" way of doing things, but that of mediating the "correctness" of ways of doing things, of various relevant epistemologies. What is needed, then, is an ethical framework of action, rather than a list of ethical prescriptions. This argues for a different conception of professional ethics, where ethics is not the work of legitimizing a particular fixed world view, but is the more contingent situational based ethic that can effectively negotiate a field of choice. Such an operative ethic can be cast in the mould of a pedagogical strategy, a way of learning, that discloses responsible action through the contingent but irrefutable logics of situational imperatives. Situational imperatives is the contingent logic of responsible action, given as ethical frame—*kshetrakarmanvidhiyetah*—rather than a morality. It is the ethics of action given by proper learning in the field of choices. Put differently, it is an ethical logic by which the "correct" answer can only triangulated in the field of contingent necessities, but it is important to be able to identify the field of these contingent necessities.

Professional practice as inscribed by this kind of learning locates our work and identities as social individual, rather than as the traditional autonomous professional. As such we can work to generate master plans, but, like the concensuses of democratic process, we must see our plans are negotiated through subaltern life-worlds as contingent solutions. (What may be correct and adequate, may not be so later at a different time and different juncture.)

One way to open such a field of action, I will suggest, is through the establishment, especially in a world turning in the wake of globalization, of viable institutional structures, with proper representation, that can repeatedly assess the changing world, and respond adequately by proposing alternatives. Perhaps we can start by rethinking the forms and roles of professional bodies, academic centers, journals, think-tanks and the like. The responsibility of the profession as well as the academic community must be to help establish and staff such institutions and pedagogical programs. Such institutions will hopefully not only provoke and sustain debates, but in the longer run, such institutions have a greater chance of sustaining themselves in a meaningful and accountable manner, than the more short-term ones of grand plans or small-scale grassroots activism.

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

Ways of Knowing Space

33 MICROCOSMIC RESEARCH AND GLOBAL AWARENESS: RETHINKING THE LOCAL HERITAGE

Ray Bromley

The globalization process, initiated by the fifteenth-century European voyages of discovery, has had massive and irrevocable effects. On the negative side, it has been associated with colonialism, imperialism, wars, forced migrations, slavery, genocide, and the eradication of a wide range of ecosystems, species, communities, and cultures. On the positive side, it has been accompanied by considerable economic growth and technological progress, a growing worldwide concern for democracy, human rights and individual freedoms, massive voluntary migrations, reduced morbidity and mortality, and the emergence of cities and neighborhoods with high levels of ethnic diversity and cultural syncretism.

The ordinary neighborhoods of world cities provide a remarkable opportunity to stimulate world awareness and local economic development through examination of local realities. The many-faceted character of the globalization process, experienced over an extended period of time, leaves neighborhoods with numerous historic sites and buildings, and with a great variety of potential historical and cultural artifacts. Documenting, preserving and collecting these elements of local heritage can be an important source of local pride, a mechanism to stimulate local consumption and reinvestment, a means to establish external linkages, a stimulus to tourism, a source of jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities, and a fount of global educational material for local residents.

This paper proposes an action research method called "microcosmic research," which can be used to uncover the links between a neighborhood and the wider world, to examine how world events, migratory streams, economic pressures and cultural trends have affected the neighborhood, and to consider how the neighborhood has impacted on the world. Information sources can be highly varied, including field surveys, historic and contemporary censuses, oral histories, diaries, newspaper clipping files, old photographs, architectural surveys of local buildings, books by local authors, and a great variety of local artistic creations. Microcosmic research can be used to awaken the economic development and educational potentials of globalization at the local level, and also to encourage respect for cultural difference, and a genuine appreciation for diversity.

I developed the concept of microcosmic research during the course of a research project summarizing a century of neighborhood history in the Bronx Community Board Six (CB-Six) area of New York City. The first published product (Bromley 1997) describes a bureaucratically-defined locality and cluster of neighborhoods which has never been a center of elite residence or corporate decision-making, but which has a remarkably complex history of immigration and of ethnic

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and religious succession. The area's economy and population have been influenced by all of the major world conflicts, crises and booms of the twentieth century, and the area has had numerous fictitious, real and potential impacts on world history, through education, entertainment and the mass media, through mass murder and attempted assassination, and through immigrant organization in support of former homelands. CB-Six has a special place in history: of silent cinema, cartoons and soap operas; of zoos, expositions and fairgrounds; of the Roosevelt Presidency and the aftermath of the Second World War; of Robert Moses' most titanic expressway; of doo-wop and punta music; of mass murder and the Mariel Boatlift; of Little Italy legends; and of the Jewish, Albanian and Garifuna diasporas. If we add in the great variety of nations, religions and architectural styles represented in the neighborhood, and the global links of Fordham University, the Bronx Zoo and the Botanical Garden just to the north, there is significant potential for global learning and local economic development based on heritage tourism and the creation of new economic niches.

Like all old neighborhoods, CB-Six has unique features, but I believe that many other old, diverse urban areas could generate an equally complex history, with a rich variety of links to global processes and events. My concern in proposing "microcosmic research" as a concept and tool is to develop a simple approach to local history, cultural diversity and economic development, which can be applied in schools and colleges and by community groups and local governments. The approach should be capable of involving local residents and of being directed by them. So as to broaden the base of participation, numerous different skills should be involved and the language used should be simple and free from intellectual jargon.

Microcosmic research seeks to understand the links between neighborhoods and the wider world, considering those neighborhoods as both affected by global processes and trends, and also directly influencing those processes and trends. It assumes that globalization is deep-rooted, multi-faceted, and syncretic in character. Microcosmic research uses the neighborhood as a means to understand and order the wider world. The neighborhood is viewed as a microcosm of the world, and the strands of local history and ethnic succession are viewed as resources. In turn, those resources are treated as comparative advantages and the bases for market niches in an intensely competitive world. Ideally, microcosmic research is "action oriented", generating policies and projects to overcome neighborhood problems of disinvestment, blight, poverty, unemployment and inter-ethnic tension.

Migration generates physical, financial, cultural and emotional links between migrants' origins and destinations. Most cities which have experienced rapid growth have had major inflows of migrants. Many cities have also served as springboards for emigration. Microcosmic research is most likely to be fruitful in urban areas of countries which have experienced large-scale immigration or emigration over several decades. It is particularly appropriate for urban neighborhoods of major metropoli and capital cities, and for multi-ethnic neighborhoods which are relatively old, predominantly residential, have not undergone widespread urban renewal, and are not in a state of total collapse.

Research Methods

Microcosmic research uses a wide variety of research methods derived from various academic disciplines, and from such hobbies and professions as photography, sketching, genealogy, journalism, popular culture, and local history. Typical sources include: field surveys of streets, buildings, institutions and activities; local maps, directories, and property records; censuses; archives of documents, photographs, drawings, and newspaper clippings; oral histories; ethnography; photography, tape and video recording; and, literature, art and music originating in the area. Ideally, information is stored locally and made publicly accessible.

The microcosmic approach mixes historical and contemporary information, qualitative and quantitative data, pure and applied research, participatory research and individual projects. It also mixes and interrelates a variety of different backgrounds and academic specializations, including history, geography, sociology, anthropology, international relations, planning, architecture, social welfare, education, and public health. The aim is to find and diffuse information which can contribute to the knowledge, pride and identity of the community, and to the prospects for local economic development. Local information centers and websites should be developed, usually based at local libraries, schools and historical societies. It is vital that all studies done on the area—from books to newspaper articles, theses and official reports—be deposited in several obvious places, and be catalogued and indexed. If microcosmic research is to succeed, the familiar old complaint that "the communities studied are the last to see or receive the documents written about them" must be laid to rest forever.

For microcosmic research to succeed, it requires and encourages constant attention to global links and great awareness of, and tolerance for, human diversity. It usually also requires a flexible definition of city, area, or neighborhood, considering everything within a certain zone, but also examining the immediate vicinity. The most interesting links are sometimes on or across the border, and local events and patterns often cannot be understood without looking at a wider area. Border zones are generally better than borderlines, and maps should be continued to the edge of the frame, so as to incorporate fragments of adjacent areas, rather than stopping all the lines and distributions at the city, area or neighborhood limit.

In studying the people of the city, neighborhood or area, it is important to consider those who have died, those who have left, and those who are leaving, as well as the resident population. They and their descendants are part of the neighborhood heritage, and they represent an obvious potential market for local goods and services. Heritage tourism has become a major source of revenue for countries and regions

like the Irish Republic, Scotland, Southern Italy, and Portugal, and it generates a lot of business for America's Chinatowns, Little Italys, Irish pubs and ethnic restaurants. Old personal homes, ancestral homes, and places of birth, education, worship, recreation, marriage, death and burial can all be of interest, as can anything which symbolizes the feel of the old neighborhood.

The most obvious potential institutional participants in microcosmic research are local libraries, local schools and colleges, local religious communities and places of worship, local non-profit organizations concerned with community development, and local businesses and business associations. In addition, of course, it is important to allow the participation of interested local residents without institutional affiliations, and of academic researchers and project teams who take a special interest in the city, area or neighborhood.

In many cases, higher-level interest, support or sponsorship may eventually come from municipal government, state government, federal/national agencies, foundations, think-tanks, municipalities and organizations in areas which have sent/received migrants, universities, corporations, trade unions, human rights organizations, and architecture, preservation and local history organizations. Some local libraries, schools and community organizations have developed considerable experience of fund-raising, grant-getting and the formation of strategic alliances. In principle, all such external links are desirable, but it is important to develop local capacity and leadership in parallel with the gradual establishment of external links.

The key models and sources for developing microcosmic research methods are characterized by their simple style and their focus on research which can be conducted with little or no external funding. Investigative journalism may provide a model (Evensen 1995), especially when it focuses on neighborhood history (Jonnes 1986) and transfers its documentation to a local library.[1] Most research should be "grounded" (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and qualitative (Burgess 1984, Wiseman and Aron 1970), with theories emanating from the data gathered, rather than driven by the logic of hypothesis-testing, sample frames and social surveys. Ethnographic methods, including participant observation and oral history, are enormously useful (Salmen 1987, Slim and Thompson 1995, Van Maanen 1988), supplemented by the tools of local history (Danzer 1987, Kyvig and Marty 1982). The interface between architectural history and social history is a particularly fruitful field for neighborhood studies, as illustrated by the pioneering works of Dolores Hayden (1984, 1995). Field survey methods are also very valuable, including the rich tradition of British regional survey and mass observation (Fagg and Hutchings 1930; Madge and Harrison 1939), of the New Deal Works Progress Administration writers and photographers (WPA Federal Writers' Project 1939), and of William H. Whyte's 1970s street life project (Whyte 1980, 1988). Finally, photographers interested in documenting the characteristics of supposedly ordinary peoples and neighborhoods are of great importance (Wagenvoord 1976), especially when they pioneer new topics or document change through time (Jackson and Vergara 1989; Vergara 1995).

Microcosmic research can serve as a means of empowerment, enabling local people to gather information about their neighborhood and giving them a place in history. Neighborhood studies may lead on to analyses of city, regional and national sources. Neighborhood researchers gain the know-how and information to work with, inform, learn from, and exchange materials with, professional journalists and academic researchers. For many, the experience of gathering information will stimulate a desire to bring about positive changes in the neighborhood, city and nation. It will increase citizen and voter participation, and for some, it will lead to neighborhood and community activism. Activists can turn their new-found research skills to investigating corporations, property titles, code compliance, tax arrears and the administration of public services (Hartman, Keating and LeGates 1982; Hofrichter 1993; Medoff and Sklar 1994). This information can then be used to resist evictions and new projects which will damage the neighborhood, to petition for housing and environmental code compliance, to demand sanctions against delinquent landlords and corporations, to resist service cutbacks, and to develop projects for affordable housing, community policing and enhanced public services.

Why Now?

"Think globally, act locally," is a much-quoted maxim encompassing the microcosmic research agenda. The ongoing globalization process constantly poses new challenges and opportunities. New information technologies provide near-instantaneous communication with almost every country on earth, and access to unprecedented volumes of information. They also provide remarkable opportunities to develop graphics, communication and design skills. World awareness, willingness to tap global networks, ability to build strategic alliances, and the capacity to innovate and adapt to constantly changing circumstances are all vital! Yet, how can ordinary people escape from the humdrum realities of life: home, street, school, workplace, junk food and TV, and the endless media parade of crime, scandal and celebrity gossip? There is no simple or universal answer, of course, but any activity which encourages participation, creativity, and the linking of the local area with the wider world is certainly relevant. If "diversity" can be understood and appreciated in the process, if tolerance and mutual appreciation can be fostered, and if young people can be encouraged to overcome apathy, to inquire and to volunteer, then a solution is well on the way.

Though historically-oriented, microcosmic research differs from conventional local history because it runs through to the present. It focuses primarily on the last 150 years and tends to increase in detail and complexity as we move towards the present. It is not rooted in the official history syllabus. In most of the U.S., for example, this syllabus emphasizes the Revolutionary War, the Constitution, the Civil War, and the Presidency. The conventional syllabus is political and military, with a tremendous emphasis on the origins and institutions

of nationhood. In contrast, the microcosmic agenda places primary emphasis on the local and the global, and on immigration, cultural pluralism and syncretism.

Though geographically-oriented, microcosmic research differs from conventional world regional geography, with its rapid survey of every part of the globe, continent by continent. The world is not reviewed region-by-region, or topic-by-topic. Instead, it is explored, using concepts of identity, heritage, migration, network, flow, diaspora and syncretism.

Microcosmic research involves young people as well as older people, and it consciously seeks to involve people of every ethnicity, national origin, age, gender and religion, so as to diversify the range of perspectives and links involved. In general, breadth of coverage and social inclusion are preferred to in-depth case studies. The concepts of "landmark," "preservation" and "heritage" are tremendously widened, to include all environments and activities which give character to a place. These include monuments, landscaping, public art, places which are ugly but memorable, buildings and businesses representative of popular and minority cultures, social clubs, houses of worship, cemeteries, and notorious crime sites.

The fine-grained detail and local color of microcosmic research helps participants to abandon traditional classificatory categories, and to recognize mixed, complex and personally-defined identities. Aggregate descriptive categories like Asian, African and Hispanic have little meaning, and often perpetuate simplistic stereotypes. People may be of mixed descent or origin, and national, ethnic, religious, class or regional origins may be more important to the people being described than any official category. Meeting black Hispanics, East Asians from the Caribbean, Cherokees, Kurds, Rastafarians, Israelis of Iranian, Russian and Ethiopian origin, and Chicanos whose ancestors lived in what is now the United States before the Mayflower landed, can induce a healthy skepticism about official aggregate categories and a new interest in human diversity. A look at any major Western European national or club soccer team, or their U.S. equivalents for soccer or baseball helps to illustrate this process. What used to seem simple, obvious relationships between nationality, race, language, name, religion, appearance, behavior and tastes are no longer so clear, and increasing numbers of people don't fit the classic stereotypes.

Policy Dimensions

For microcosmic research to achieve its full potential, substantial public support is needed for local libraries, historical societies, and schools. These key institutions need a new infusion of resources, and a major reorientation of their agendas. Some changes can take place slowly, incrementally, and through local initiatives, but most will depend on higher-level policy decisions to favor microcosmic research. Public libraries will need to expand their files of newspaper clippings, local photographs, sound recordings, video materials and neighborhood artifacts, to make more of this material permanently available through microfiche, multiple copies and albums, and to strengthen their websites and outreach to local schools and community centers. Schools will need to develop and test new experimental curricula, based on two key maxims: "know and plan your neighborhood;" and, "use your neighborhood as a key to learning about the world." These curricula would introduce children to maps, photography, census data, computer atlases, simple forms of GIS and CAD, e-mail and web-searching, classic reference sources (e.g. Thernstrom 1980), and the possibility of careers in such fields as planning, architecture, engineering and landscape architecture.

Building on the enhanced support for local libraries, historical societies and schools, legislation and institutional support for landmarking, historic preservation, and adaptive re-use of historic structures would need to be strengthened. The quantity of effort is important, but the direction and diversity of effort is also crucial. Interest is needed in the preservation of unique landscapes and streetscapes, as well as in the preservation of individual buildings. Similarly, interest is needed in preserving and adaptively re-using a range of environments, significant to peoples of different ethnicities, religions, social classes and national origins. Old neighborhoods can benefit enormously from measures to encourage community reinvestment, to outlaw mortgage and insurance redlining against areas which are mixed-use, mixed-age, and mixed-race, and to modify tax codes to favor rehabilitation and adaptive re-use over new construction.

One of the simplest ways to link microcosmic research and local economic development is to encourage the emergence of new concentrations of ethnic enterprise, and primarily of restaurants, bars, clubs, specialized grocery stores, public markets, and food wholesaling. These would be located in areas with substantial populations or notable existing businesses of a particular ethnicity. "Little Greece," "Little Brazil," "Little Thailand" and other concentrations can emerge, following the highly successful model of U.S. Little Italys, and of Chinatowns in quite a wide range of countries. The aim would be to develop prosperous concentrations of small businesses with a strong ethnic flavor, to cater to their own co-ethnics in the city, to attract persons of similar ethnic descent who have migrated to the suburbs, and to attract tourists seeking a real ethnic flavor. In some cases, these concentrations might become Business Improvement Districts, and in most cases they would require significant changes to local plans and zoning ordinances.

In some cases, neighborhood character and business can be promoted by reviving traditional markets, or by establishing new farmers' or artisans' markets. A weekend street market, or the authorization of a few street vendors, may help to give the neighborhood character, and to make more goods and services available to local residents. Sports practices and tournaments may also be useful to neighborhood revitalization, especially when the sports are minority concerns with strong links to the neighborhood. Just as polo, croquet and bowls marked the elite English enclaves of

yesteryear, hurling, sapo, jai alai, cricket and field hockey can mark contemporary ethnic concentrations. Also important are annual festivals held in parks, plazas and community centers, block parties, and national and religious parades. All these institutions assert neighborhood character, help to maintain the identity and pride of particular communities, and attract visitors and some purchasing power to the neighborhood.

Microcosmic research may reveal international links which can be used to build connections and obtain foreign investment or technical assistance. Sometimes, they can also lead to formal "place-twinning," linking the neighborhood, area or city to somewhere in a foreign country, and encouraging exchanges. At worst, of course, twinnings are just taxpayer-subsidized tourism for local officials! At best, however, they can attract donations, develop a broader tourist base, and provide the basis for exchanges of messages, materials and pupils between schools. In studying international migration, schools and libraries can benefit enormously from twin institutions in the other country. Joint research and exchanges of documents and photographs can strengthen the information base on migration and encourage more people to seek their roots and find their long-lost relatives.

As neighborhood leaders become more conscious of a neighborhood's ethnic heritages and identity, demand will grow to express this character through innovative urban design features. Flags, banners and illuminations may help to give character, but there are also more permanent opportunities to symbolize ethnic identities through paving, street furniture, public art, color schemes, and architectural designs for buildings. When done effectively, such schemes will emphasize the distinctive character of the neighborhood and awaken the curiosity of casual visitors to learn "why is this place different?" Together with historic buildings, streetscapes and landscapes, distinctive neighborhood design features may be instrumental in attracting film crews to use the neighborhood as a set for television or movies. As well as bringing a little business, filming in the neighborhood can provide useful publicity, attracting future tourism.

Part of the authenticity of an ethnic concentration is the widespread use and general fluency in the language of that ethnicity. As well as giving an ethnic flavor to a place, immigrant languages can potentially serve as an economic development opportunity. As globalization gathers momentum, multilingualism will be at a premium in the next few decades. It is well known that the key to linguistic fluency is "complete immersion," the opportunity to develop language skills during extended periods of conversation with native speakers. In many cities and neighborhoods with substantial numbers of recent immigrants, native speakers who could do low-budget translations or provide complete immersion experiences are available and anxious to increase their incomes. With an appropriate body to organize, publicize, and handle payments, cities like London, New York and Los Angeles could offer wonderful translation services and complete immersion language-learning opportunities. In many cases, dates and times could be chosen to avoid clashes with pupils' and native-speakers normal work schedules, and business could be channeled to local ethnic restaurants. In some cases, local schools and colleges could be used after-school, at weekends and during vacations, and in a few cases paid homestays might be arranged with families willing to board a language-learner for a few days.

Conclusion

Microcosmic research is not a universal panacea. Many of its ingredients have already been tried in a few places and projects, and their successes have helped to inspire the concept. As already outlined, microcosmic research is appropriate for certain types of cities and neighborhoods, and not for others. It requires sustained support and significant policy changes. Some of its benefits can be achieved in individual communities if community leaders give their wholehearted support, but many of its benefits require broader changes at the city, regional and national levels. Hopefully, a few pilot projects will be started, and they will eventually inspire some cities and one or two national governments to try this approach. In turn, their successes may inspire others.

Microcosmic research will achieve its immediate objectives if it enhances local pride and global awareness, improves inter-ethnic relations, and stimulates local economic development through increased employment and consumption for neighborhood residents, an increase in the number and turnover of local small businesses, and a growing flow of outsiders visiting and making purchases in the neighborhood. In the longer term, microcosmic research can help both to revitalize and preserve the neighborhood, and to stimulate the imagination of those involved in the research process. That enhanced imagination can lead to community activism and further revitalization, to higher levels of education, to new forms of entrepreneurship, and to new achievements in the arts, sport and technology.

The traditional vision of an old, multi-ethnic urban neighborhood was that of the slum—a place that most of its residents would leave at the first possible opportunity, and a place that government and the elites considered ripe for demolition and renewal. Microcosmic research can change that old vision to a new one; a vision of a unique place with significant resources and potential, an active community thinking strategically in the global arena. It can help to make urban neighborhoods dynamic and distinctive again, presenting a real and vibrant alternative to the suburbs and exurbs.

Notes

[1] Jill Jonnes, whose *We're Still Here* (1986) is a wonderful resource for Bronx neighborhood studies, donated all her research materials to Special Collections, Lehman College, CUNY.

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34 THE SPACE ON THE EDGE: DICHOTOMOUS PERCEPTIONS OF PLACE

Máire Eithne O'Neill

Foreword

This study explores spatial learning patterns. The focus of the study addresses varying perceptions of the rural fringe surrounding growing towns or metropolitan areas. Dichotomous perceptions of this edge tend to create tensions between population groups. This conflict and lack of understanding complicates the process of growth, and may unintentionally lead to the destruction or degradation of qualities of the landscape that both parties had valued. Traditional residents of these areas who make a living off the land, (farmers or ranchers), and new residents, who commute to places of work, may not share the same topistic (place) learning patterns. This may lead to widely varying understandings of the landscape, and to distinct value systems with regard to land use. The modes of topistic learning explored are visual, haptic or kinesthetic, and sociological. Perceptions of the same rural landscape may vary because they are founded on distinctly different learning patterns. This contrast of perspectives leads to a duality of values about appropriate land use, and ultimately to lack of understanding or empathy between these groups. By investigating and understanding how sub-cultural groups learn about and perceive their local landscape, planners and designers may operate from a more informed standpoint. They may plan for growth or change which conserves critical and highly valued patterns of the landscape. The methodology of this study may serve as a model for the examination of topistic learning patterns in any physical setting, and between various cultural groups. It has potential to assist in the urban planning process by increasing understanding of place identity and territoriality of conflicting groups in adjacent urban neighborhoods in an inclusive way.

Introduction

Examination of the process of growth in American cities ultimately leads to the transformation of the rural fringe. Dichotomous interpretations of the rural fringe create tension or lack of understanding that complicates growth, and sets a stage for conflict. For what reasons do different groups have various understandings of the same physical environment when they share an interest in dwelling in that place? It is not clear to what degree people respond to the physical attributes of place, and how their experiences in a place determine their feelings about it.

The focus of concern in regionalism (when new development occurs in an existing environment) has been on interpretations or translations of historic regional typology, to establish (or re-establish) a place with strong local identity. One of the

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assumptions of regionalism is that such an identity can be physically manifest in buildings or sites. A second and related assumption is that the characteristics designers interpret as creating this sense of identity are the same as those aspects that will inspire the loyalty and identity of the inhabitants of the area.

In our concerns for regionalism, though, we also need to consult the existing population. We tend to consume farm and ranch land on the metropolitan fringe with residential development that, at best, satisfies the aspirations of the individual buyer who usually arrives from outside the area. In the Gallatin Valley of southwest Montana, for example, rich farm land is being consumed by rapid, low-density residential growth. People are attracted to the open space of the area as a relief from more congested environments. However, the development that results from their presence is transforming the rural character that attracted them. It was the desire to define what "rural" means that motivated the following study of how people go about perceiving rural places. The methodology developed for this study, however, has potential application in any setting, to understand specifically how people learn about the environments they occupy.

Purpose

The purpose of the following study was twofold: to describe the perceptions that farming and ranching families develop of their immediate physical environment, and to determine their topistic[1] (place) learning patterns. As an architect and educator, I was interested in how people acquired and interpreted experiences in a physical setting that contributed to their perceptions about the place. Further, I sought to find out what characteristic people-environment interactions led to strong feelings of belonging in a place.

Learning Theory

Learning theory suggests that people develop varying perceptions because of selective attention, and because individual differences in learning patterns determine modes of perception. Educators and psychologists have done some study on how certain modes of learning operate in spatial perception. We may apply the examination of learning patterns and selective attention to learning about qualities of place (topistics).

The haptic system is educational psychologist Piaget's significant addition to space perception theory. One sense organ dominates each perceptual system or sensory modality, with the exception of the haptic system that makes use of multiple senses for highly integrated information.

When Piaget introduced the term, "haptic perception" into the study of environmental perception, he revealed a holistic way of considering our experiences of the physical environment.[2] The term *haptic*, from a Greek term meaning "able to lay hold of" describes the various sensibilities of the body to its position in the physical environment, and to its own condition. This approach to environmental perception goes far beyond visual spatial perception, and involves the integration of many other senses, such as touch, positional awareness, exertion, balance, sound, movement, and the memory of previous experiences. There are multiple sources of sensibility, most of which have no single "sense organ," but are distributed throughout the body: The layer just below the skin, the joints and tendons, the muscles and ligaments, the blood vessels, and the inner ear.

According to James Gibson, a wide range of the experiences produced from these sources are not "namable sensations," and hence researchers had tended to overlook them.[3] Bloomer and Moore contend that we learn most of what we know and feel about the physical environment through haptic perception and our basic orienting system.[4] Modes of learning that people use to acquire this holistic understanding of their surroundings requires more study.

Methodology

The following methodology allows for the examination of topistic learning patterns in any contested terrain. It has potential application for an inclusive examination of topistics of various cultural or socioeconomic groups. This interdisciplinary study (incorporating methods from historical geography, sociology, and education) illustrates the connection between topistic perceptions and learning patterns. The method provides multiple avenues for data collection, and for triangulation in the analysis. Case studies of specific bounded sites included interviews with the occupancy group and graphic documentation of selected sites. In open-ended interviews occupants were invited to describe the place where they lived or worked. Past configurations of the sites were mapped and graphically reconstructed from the occupant's knowledge. This produced a *perceived* historical geography for analysis.

The interviews were analyzed to reveal modes of topistic learning: visual, haptic, and two distinct sources of social learning, cultural knowledge and family stories. This was done by constructing a matrix that delineated how a person's perceptual mode varied, depending on the subject matter (see figure 1). Each instance of perceiving a part of the physical environment was recorded as a tick mark in one of the perceptual categories. The four subject-matter groupings down the left side consisted of particular building elements, building and landscape relationships, natural elements, and the larger scale geography. This tool made it easy to draw comparisons between individuals and groups.

Figure 1 Sample matrix constructed for analysis of interview data.

Site 1	Visual	Haptic	Social: Cultural	Social: Family stories
Perception of design attributes of bldgs / structures:				
Bldg. character	IIII		II	
Bldg. age		I		IIII
Form	II			I
Plan	IIII	IIII		IIII
Surface				
Openings	III			I
Circulation	I			
Structure / constr.	IIIIIIIII	IIIIIIIIIIII	I	IIIIII
Color	I			
Materials	IIIII		I	I
Scale	I	I		
Function	III	IIIIIIIII		IIIIIIIIIII
Other				I
Percept. of relation-ships (bldgs/land):				
Proxim. of struct.	I	III		
Site plan org.	IIIIIIIIII	IIIIII	III	II
Struct. / topog.	II			
Ditches				
Roads / railrd.	IIIIII	IIIIIIIII	III	IIIIII
Views (out/in)	II		I	
Land use	II	IIIIIIIII	IIIII	IIIIII
Boundaries	III	IIIII		
Livestock	II	IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII	II	IIIIIIIIIIIIIII
Perception of natural elem.:				
Season / weather		IIIIIIIII	III	IIIII
Natural water	IIIII	IIIIII	IIIIIII	II
Lone trees	I	I		
Topography	IIIIIII	IIIIIIIII	I	I
Vegetation	III	I		I
Ground texture		IIIIIIIII		
Wildlife			I	
Size / ownership	I	II	IIIIII	IIIIII
Perception of larger region:				
Neighbor	IIII	II	IIIIII	IIIIIIIII
Town	I	II		IIIIII
Gallatin Valley			IIII	
S.W. Montana				
Montana	I	I	III	II
Agricult. West	I	II	IIIIII	

Figure 2 Comparison of perceptual modes of three family members at site #1.

Figure 3 Comparison of perceptual modes of three family members at site #2.



Findings of Sample Study

An investigation in southwest Montana involved interviews with third-, fourth-, and fifth-generation ranching families (see Figures 2, 3, & 4). Those interviewed revealed that it was a combination of their physical work and a localized folklore that formed the basis of their perception of the natural and built landscape. This population perceived and understood their places very clearly in terms of the overall site plan organization, and formed a clear and persistent cognitive map. Analysis of perceptual modes, using the matrix, revealed that haptic perception was by far the dominant form of perception among this group. Ranchers learned about their places by their physical activity on the land and among the buildings, not by seeing them. It also showed that a shared body of local knowledge, about people, farming, ranching, and the history of the area formed the basis of a local folklore that tied families and community together in their location.

As the interviews were analyzed for perceptual modes, it was often the verbs used that revealed the way in which a person perceived and understood their environment. Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate comparisons of three family members

Figure 4 Comparison of perceptual modes of three family members at site #3.



interviewed at three different ranch sites. The analysis revealed that visual knowledge played a surprisingly minor role in the place knowledge of Gallatin Valley ranchers.

Ranchers relied most heavily on the haptic system of sensing touch, movement, position, and balance. They learned by doing physical work, year after year, in the same hay fields and in the same barns. They based their perceptions on engagement with the land, the weather, and the buildings. They expressed a detailed, tactile knowledge of the topography and the ground conditions:

> "It's pretty bad sometimes when you're outside feeding...with the snow, and the wind blowing, and the mud is this deep...it gets pretty bad."

They intimately understood the texture of the ground at different times of the season. They knew the topography from the tilting of the tractor, or the flow of their irrigation water. They also understood their buildings and fences from the standpoint of the physical labor it took to construct and maintain them, rather than from how they looked.

Analysis of the perceived historical geography of specific sites over a span of eighty-five to a hundred years illustrates the persistence of cognitive mapping from one generation to the next (Figures 5, 6, & 7). This was achieved by mapping the remembered site plan at approximately thirty-year intervals (temporal cognitive mapping). The earliest iterations of these plans dated to 1890. The existence and position of buildings from this period was information passed verbally from earlier generations (although occasionally a photograph existed to reinforce this information). Whether the site plans produced this way from interview data are historically correct is not as important as how they illustrate the *perceptions of the past*.

What these plans show is that ranchers tended to maintain a consistent understanding of the site plan organization as buildings were added, demolished, or moved. As they recalled more distant periods in the past, their knowledge was less complete, but their mental construct of the overall organization and site circulation was consistent with the present organization. In other words, through their memory of the past, and through stories handed down within the family, ranchers expressed a high degree of continuity in their temporal cognitive mapping of their places.

Consistency between past and present configuration may or may not have been historically true, but it is significant that the occupants' perceptions suggested that the organization of the place had not fundamentally changed in the course of a century, even though up to twenty buildings had been added, demolished, and often moved. When an individual forms a cognitive map in the mind to understand a complex place, that appositional scheme identifies multiple simultaneous relationships rather than linear relationships, and is an entirely spatial form of thought.[5] It is significant that the development of a cognitive map is dependent on motion and circulation through and around the place, because the process of evolving a cognitive map may be closely linked to the process of acquiring haptic perceptions.

A localized cultural knowledge played a large part in how ranchers understood their places. This knowledge varied from the siting of buildings, to water rights, to local railroad history, or changing farming practices and technology. A locally shared knowledge contributed to community understanding between neighbors who participated in similar work.

Ranchers appreciated the early siting and orientation decisions that their predecessors had made in the establishment of their ranches. They felt that historic concerns for water, drainage,

Figure 5 Mapping of site #1 reconstructed from interviews with family members. Note the similarity of site plan revealed in family memories of the earliest configuration.



1997- Site 1- Site plan at the time of study



1960- Site 1- Site plan recalled from memory of interview participants



1930- Site 1- Site plan recalled from memory and reconstructed from family stories



1890- Site 1- Site plan reconstructed from family stories

Figure 6 Mapping of site #2 reconstructed from interviews with family members. Note the similarity of site plan revealed in family memories of the earliest configuration.



1997- Site 2- Site plan at the time of the study



1960- Site 2- Site plan recalled from memory of interview participants



1915- Site 2- Site plan reconstructed from family stories



1890- Site 2- Site plan reconstructed from family stories

shelter, and accessibility were timeless siting qualities, which they continued to appreciate. Understanding of historic water rights was also an important factor in place knowledge, and was often challenged. The history of local railroads and spur lines played a major part in the perceptions of many ranchers, because of the corporation's methods of appropriating and disposing of land.

Ranchers frequently referred to members of the family as they talked about their places and their work. There were no clear boundaries between living and working on the ranch. Family and ranch work were parts of an inseparable whole. A shared narrative of family stories, handed down, not only informed ranchers about earlier buildings on the ranch, or the nuances of a particular hay field, but they contributed heavily to an accumulated knowledge about the place:

> "When my grandparents were running the ranch the threshing crews from all over all stayed here, up in the barn. My dad remembers that."

The way in which ranchers managed their places visibly reflected their shared world view. They interpreted diverging world views of new neighbors by their visibly differing land use.

> "Then he went along our fences and put no hunting signs on our fence, so nobody would trespass on his ground. You just drive down the road and you see what's going on."

Ranching families expressed the sentiment that they derived their self-identity from their geographic place through their actions and interactions:

> "There's a little bit of you in every fence post, every staple that you drive, every nail that you put in...everything that you do is a little part of you."

Family and self were deeply tied to location through work and stories linking them to a specific past in that place.

Figure 7 Mapping of site #3 reconstructed from interviews with family members. Note the similarity of site plan revealed in family memories of the earliest configuration.



1997- Site 3- Site plan at the time of the study



1960- Site 3- Site plan recalled from memory of interview participants



1930- Site 3- Site plan recalled from memory and reconstructed from family stories



1915- Site 3- Site plan reconstructed from family stories

Conclusion

In this particular study of a rural environment pressed by sprawling development, only one group was studied. The methodology presented here, however, would be useful in determining and analyzing the place learning patterns of two or more groups in the same setting.

Ranchers based their place knowledge on a history of practical experiences that were fundamentally participatory. Visual perception and esthetics did not play a prominent role in their understanding. A history of participation and involvement of the family within a community that shared interests and work was critical in linking the individual's own identity with the geographic place. They based their community and connection with the landscape on what Yi Fu Tuan calls the "steady accretion of sentiment,"[6] which they evolved largely from experiences, and not from seeing.

These results suggest that planners, developers, and architects can protect the identity of place for Gallatin Valley ranchers only by looking well beyond visually based solutions for new development. This has potentially profound implications for growth planning, if the cultural heritage of the farming and ranching population is to be protected at all. By investigating and understanding how any sub-cultural group learns about and perceives a local environment, planners, designers, and economists may plan for growth that conserves critical and highly valued patterns of the landscape. This method of examination of perceptual patterns is an opportunity to get us closer to understanding the concerns and priorities of various groups in the contested terrain of development.

Notes

[1] E. V. Walter, in *Placeways: A Theory of the Human Environment*, describes *topistic* as an adjective associated with *place* as *spatial* is associated with *space*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), p. 21.

[2] Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, *The Child's Conception of Space* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1956).

[3] James Gibson, *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems* (London: Houghton Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966).

[4] Kent Bloomer and Charles Moore *Body, Memory, and Architecture* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977).

[5] David Stea "Program Notes on a Spatial Fugue," *Environmental Knowing*, ed. Gary T. Moore and Geginald G. Golledge (Stroudsberg, PA: Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross, 1976), p. 111.

[6] Yi Fu Tuan *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1977), p. 33.

35 MAKING PLACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY CITY: ACCELERATING THE SEARCH FOR HARMONY BETWEEN EMERGING VALUES OF GLOBAL CONSUMERSHIP AND TIME-HONORED VALUES OF VERNACULAR, FAMILY, AND HUMAN SPIRITUALITY

James Chaffers

Point of Departure: A Shifting Global Terrain

Crafting an enabling language that bridges cross-culturally by highlighting human "commonness" and human "capacity"—rather than perceived *differences* or perceived *deficiencies*—may well emerge as the primary task facing 21st century place makers. Such a language is challenged to accomplish its mission within the context of a changing global order variously defined and described, in part, in the following ways:

> Certainly our experiences of the world are in flux. Some changes are perceived as global in nature; others, as changing the nature of experience around the globe. Representations of global change are changing, and the whole of professional discourse is changing. Indeed, discursive analysis would "deconstruct," in a rather pervasive change, our conceptions of virtually all of the above.[1]

> The paradox of the current world conjuncture is the increased production of cultural and political boundaries at the very time when the world has become tightly bound together in a single economic system with instantaneous communication between different sectors of the globe. In order to disentangle these contradictory trends, it is necessary to place the construction of cultural demarcations and political boundaries being erected between groupings of people within the context of contention for political power and control of productive resources, including labor power.[2]

With an eye toward addressing the above paradox, "there is a proliferation of theorizing of how globalization and global change are transforming the construction and negotiation of identities, in a continuous churning and renegotiating of boundaries of difference and "otherness."[3] Flowing from these theoretical debates, some recent observations by Saskia Sassen regarding new orders of global complexity, hierarchy, and differentiation, are central to our discussion. Sassen notes: "A canopy of emergent global cities have become sites—or perhaps frontiers—for a new order of dramatically intensified financial speculation/manipulations that are increasingly transnational and detached from productive manufacturing and industrial activities, as well as from their own respective hinterlands."[4] Reflecting on the broader social and political significance of such cities, we are reminded that a curious inversion of classical economic theory is now occuring. "It is 'capital'— that of global financial (fictitious) capital and transnational corporations—that is mobile and labor that is now immobile and captive behind national boundaries or frontiers. Increasingly, entire nation-states have themselves become instruments of the discipline of the marketplace,

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ensuring the quiescence of their populations and institutions to the rigors of free-market capital and the harsh disciplines of global finance."[5] Put succinctly, "...current corporate accumulation of capital is increasingly global, de-territorialized, de-spatialized, mobile, and unbound from geo-political nation-states and geographic communities."[6] Boundaries which used to define who were suitable labor and at what, are being dissolved and renegotiated by global capital as it roams the globe in search of low-cost labor. Third-World children and the disenfranchised within the First World are increasingly working under conditions which had been forcibly put outside the pale of human treatment by the struggles of labor unionism.[7] Simultaneously, processes of global economic change are increasingly rendering enormous numbers of people and vast territories simply "irrelevant" to the process of global accumulation.[8]

(Re) Capturing the 'Spirit' of Human Well-Being

A Deep-rooted Ideal for Navigating Present Disjunctures, Dislocations, and Conceptual Divides

Given the brutal and destructive violence reflected in mounting evidence of economic hegemony, human rights abuse, ecological disruption, etc., there is some temptation on my part to highlight the more apparent contradictions of current globalization processes. However, it is important to remember that the overarching motivation for global economic enterprise is sustained by its earlier promise for the ages—i.e., the elimination of wars and the eradication of human poverty. Prevailing contradictions notwithstanding, globalization's deeper goal of moving humankind from poverty to prosperity can be traced to a life-affirming philosophy of "human well-being." If "well-being" can yet serve as a worthy ideal, my preference is to focus our professional energies on bringing its essential qualities to fruition. In short, the challenge of developing *performance* criteria for human well-being appropriate to a new millennium serves as an organizing theme and conceptual barometer throughout this essay.



A philosophy of human well-being is sustained by an underlying belief that every human being is valuable and necessary. It follows that this philosophy is sustained by the more explicit belief that any lasting relief from war and poverty on a global scale is best pursued through a fundamental protection of individual human rights and the promotion of individual enterprise. Understandably, a philosophy of "well-being" further suggests that the protection of human "rights" and the promotion of human "enterprise" is key to global prosperity.

Within *market*-driven democracies around the globe,
(America's market democracy in particular . . .)

a
philosophy
of
human
"well-being"

has generally
been translated
into
the following twin goals:

(attaining)
Material Sufficiency

"Financial"
Independence

through

entrepreneurial
relationships
aimed at achieving
rising levels of
"prosperity";

(a)
lifelong goal
crafted from the belief that a sufficient
accumulation of personal *material* wealth is
the key to human happiness—i.e., that
rising material *prosperity* will resolve
all social and political problems

. . . a deep respect for

individual
enterprise

and

(ensuring)
Individual Integrity

"Rights"
Protection

family
relationships
of
common
"responsibility";

(a)
lifelong goal
crafted from the belief that one's pursuit
of *personal* happiness is the basic law of life—i.e.,
that the *advancement* of one's individual self
within one's family of kin and friends
will advance the whole of society . . .

. . . a deep respect for

individuality
within "family"

Carried
to an extreme,
internal *im*balances
arising within the
above goals
result in

daily
practices

of:

Material(ism)

an
exaggerated
pursuit
of
material
well-being

i.e.,

"material indulgence"
beyond
requirements for
economic
self-sufficiency
and
financial
integrity

and

Individualism

(an)
exaggerated
pursuit
of
individual
well-being

i.e.,

"self-indulgence"
beyond

respectful
'individuality'
and
responsible
self-expression

J. Chaffers
Jan '98

Within the context

of

City

[Middle English *cite*, from Latin *civis, civitas, citizen, citizenry*]

a
people-made
"invention"
of

ideas
(concepts)
and
philosophies)

people
(indvividuals
and
organizations)

things
(artifacts
and
infrastructure)



a
philosophy
of
human
"well-being"

gains
expression as
(an)
enabling
reservoir
of
resources and **relationships**
historically developed
within

a

yin-yang

of

(evolving)
Human
quests
for
Individual
Initiative
(self-governance)
empowerment

(evolving)
Human
quests
for
Material
Sufficiency
(entrepreneurialship)
enterprise

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Jan '98

MAKING *PLACE* IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM . . .

En(vision)ing the City as a Balance of Opportunity and Civility

Over the past half-century—essentially, since the end of WW II—the central planning principles guiding globalization processes have been drawn from an uncompromising preoccupation with values of economic logic, material accumulation, perpetual economic growth, etc. This professional preoccupation has served to further sharpen an *either*/or view of

the
City;

either as a "commodity" offering unparalleled economic opportunity *or* as a primary expression of human "community." Within a given city, the extent to which the former view prevails is the extent to which a fundamental imbalance within its collective of resources and relationships is likely occurring.

Within the context of local city space/place and a philosophy of human "well-being," such an imbalance could be described as:

an *over*development of "material" relationships sustaining **Finance**

linked with

an *under*development of "human" relationships sustaining **Family**

Reflecting on our task of *place* making in the 21st century, I have come to describe the above 'finance/family' relationship as one of a **consumer**ship/**citizen**ship imbalance—as shown below. To achieve greater harmony and balance between our dual obligation as citizen-consumer, I am suggesting that activities of place making in the new millennium will need to facilitate a more resourceful and creative exercise of our collective citizenship powers.

consumership
win / lose
competition
"survival of the *fittest*"
(**consumers** defined by their material/ commercial relationships and what each owns)

Finance

citizenship
win / win
competition
"*everyone* advancing"
(**citizens** defined by their *human/ spiritual* relationships and what each shares)

Family

J. Chaffers
Jan '98

Seeking

to

Craft

"Performance"

Criteria

for

Human

W e l l - b e i n g:

we start with the premise that
every human being is
valuable and necessary
and the belief that
each of us is universally
deserving of equitable
access to fundamental
'r e s o u r c e s of o p p o r t u n i t y'...

. . . for:
active
participation
in the
exercise
of

Personal
Em(power)ment

Our
Capacity
for
"individual initiative"
and
self-expression

rooted in . . . our Spirituality
achieved
(through)
designs
respecting
of
intuition,
and
personal
faith

and

informed by . . . our Education
achieved
(through)
designs
of
intellect,
and
factual
knowledge

. . . for:
active
participation
in the
development
of

Human
Enterprise

Creating
Opportunity
for
"Individual Initiative"
and
financial reward

via
partnerships
of

Governance
Stewardship
in
pursuit
respecting
human
dignity
and
justice

and

Industry
Entrepreneurship
in
pursuit
of
prosperity
and
purposeful
work

of

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Jan '98

Public Family

(a)

pioneering cornerstone
for
common empowerment and enterprise

p r o v i d i n g

"Physical and Psychological Security"

a global/personal (sense of **identity** • a global/personal sense of **belonging** • a global/personal sense of **ground**)

p l a c e

Spiritualship • **Personal**ship • **kin**ship • **Friend**ship • **Citizen**ship • **Steward**ship

a preeminent expression of comm**unity**—i.e., a unique bond of human 'spiritus';
specifically, a primary medium for one's lifelong development as a more human, human being—i.e.,
the medium through which each of us grows to understand that our (individual) well-being
is impossible apart from the well-being of others and of nature; as well, the
medium through which each of us grows to understand that our (individual)
well-being is further enriched as we engage ourselves in ever-more
challenging thresholds of caring, sharing, and trusting:

1
. . . as in
relations
of
*Spiritualsh(**i**)p:*

(the)
lifelong rewards gained
from seeking harmony with
one's universal Self; rooted in
one's spirituality and one's
relations with the
universe

*Self / **Universe***

2
. . . as in
relations
of
Personalsh(i)p:

(the)
lifelong rewards gained
from seeking harmony with
one's individual Self; rooted
in the concept of Selfhood
and one's relations
with Self

*Self / **Self***

3
. . . as in
relations
of
*Kinsh(**i**)p:*

(the)
lifelong rewards gained from
exercising one's individual capacity
to care, share, and trust within a
human network of Kin; rooted in
the idea of 'kin family' and
one's relations with
other Kin

*Self / **Kin***

4
. . . as in
relations
of
*Friendsh(**i**)p:*

(the)
lifelong rewards gained from
exercising one's individual capacity
to care, share, and trust beyond one's
universal/individual self and one's ties
of kin(ship), across a broadened
human network of Friends;

*Self / **Friend**(s)*

5
. . . as in
relations
of
*Citizensh(**i**)p:*

(the)
lifelong rewards gained from
exercising one's individual capacity
to care, share, and trust beyond one's
universal/individual self and one's ties
of kin(ship) and friend(ship) into an
arena of self-governing Citizens;
rooted in the idea of individual
citizens working collabora-
tively to achieve a
bond of "civic
family"

*Self / fellow **Citizen**(s)*

6
. . . as in
relations
of
*Stewardsh(**i**)p:*

(the)
lifelong rewards gained from
exercising one's individual capacity
to care, share, and trust beyond one's
universal/individual self and one's ties of
kin(ship) / friend(ship) / citizen(ship)
into an arena of planetary Stewards;
rooted in the idea of "human family"
and a conscious quest for
global harmony

*Self / fellow **Steward**(s)*

Development Cycle of Primary Family Relationships

J. Chaffers
Jan '96

MAKING *PLACE* IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM . . .

Weaving Textures of "Well-being" from Fabrics of Public Family, Designed Space, and Contextual Vernacular

C
r
e
a
t
(*i*)
on:
the

source,

wellspring,
f o u n t a i n h e a d
of all existence and capacity;
specifically, the **source** of all
*re*generative / *re*cycling
processes . . .

Env(*i*)ronment:

a way of perceiving and comprehending
Creation
such that its totality can be selectively engaged and
organized as a *resource* for human activity; that whole of Creation
(evolving independent of human perception and human tools of assessment)
within which life—in all of its forms—is sustained . . . or diminished,
depending upon the "quality" of human intervention

Space:

a human conception of "environment" as a quantifiable totality—i.e.,
as the infinite extension or deformation of a three-dimensional
(geometric) field upon which life's daily experiences unfold;*
a way of perceiving and comprehending "environment"
such that its totality can be selectively engaged
as a *resource* for human activity.

Designed
Space:
a human conception of "space" as a manipulatable
resource; specifically, as a *resource* capable
of being selectively engaged and (re)-
organized such that it sustains
human activity.

Place:

(a)
volumetric
composite of
spatial/spiritual
relationships
drawn from:

(explicit)
Elements
of
Spat(*i*)al
Definition
and
Comprehension:

'Paths
'Edges
'Districts
'Nodes
'Landmarks
'Parks

(K. Lynch)

(implicit)
Thresholds
and of
Fam(*i*)ly
Engagement
and
Accountability:

Spiritualsh(i)p
Personalsh(i)p
Kinsh(i)p
Friendsh(i)p
Citizensh(i)p
Stewardsh(i)p

(J. Chaffers)

in such way
as to achieve a
"designed space"

of
spiritual, cultural,
and
environmental
harmony

J. Chaffers
Jan '98

* Greider, 1997.

MAKING *PLACE* IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM . . .

Weaving Textures of "Well-being" from Human Spirituality

and Collective Journeys of Education

Sp(*i*)r(*i*)tual(*i*)ty:

[Latin **spiritus**, the "force of life"]

one's inherent capacity of em(**power**)ment—i.e.,
an 'inner wellspring of self-transformative power' drawn
from one's uniquely personal link to the energies of Creation:
a link that binds one's individual human life to the
whole of others, nature, and the un(*i*)verse; specifically,
a link — accessed directly through intuition and faith — that opens
oneself to Creation's wisdom and to deeper truth(s) of reality;
more specifically, the source of one's (*i*)dentity and ind(*i*)vidual
creative powers within the larger universe; broadly speaking,
the source of one's inherent capacity to be self-
gu(*i*)ding and self-d(*i*)recting—i.e., a source
of inner wisdom not to be confused
with organized religion or with
the institutional church;
in sum, the source of one's
pride of being, one's capacity for

generosity, and one's deep sense

of connectedness to a greater whole;

i.e., the inspirational founta(*i*)nhead for all

that guides and directs one's individual life—

one's **dreams**, one's **aspirations**, one's **ideals** /

one's **myths**, ones's central **beliefs**, one's **fears**;

the deeper root that sustains one's moral-ethical

orientation, the source of one's capacity for

"education" and *self*-transformation.

Educat(*i*)on:

a tool for lifelong
learning;
(a)
journey
of
self-discovery;

(a)
journey
traceable to **educe**:
to draw out; elicit; evoke; evolve;
from Latin root, **educere** —"to lead";
from Middle English,
educaten —"to lead out";

(a)
journey
"...to know and to lead oneself";

(a)
journey
necessarily
focused as much on:

the development of one's **character** (spiritus)	as on	the development of one's **competence** (skills)

J. Chaffers
Jan '98

MAKING *PLACE* IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM . . .

Binding a 'Passion for Possibilities' with One's Own Moral Compass

If I'm buying those shoes from the factory in Indonesia where I know those kids are being abused, what's my moral obligation to those young people there?*



Development Cycle for Anticipatory Practice

. . . "being responsible"

J. Chaffers
Jan '98

* Greider. 1997.

Glossary
for
Vanguard · Anticipator

Vanguard (Fr., avant-garde / a-vant garde): in the forefront; leaders 'by example'
Anticipator: one who weaves *fore*sight with *far*sight to create path-breaking possibilities

en · er · gy 1. The transforming / transformative **power** medium of Creation's *(re)*generative / *(re)*cycling processes. 2. a *(re)***source** that can neither be created nor destroyed, but can be transformed.

Comm(**unity**): [Middle English *communite*, from Old French *comunete*, from Latin *communitas*, from *communis*, COMMON.] a common bonding **energy** of the universe; a bonding **energy** whose capacity for human bonding is tapped directly through the medium of human collaboration—ie., through the mutual exchange of caring/sharing/trusting relationships.

Lest we forget, we do not *create* (ie., "make") community;
rather, we open ourselves up to this unique bonding
energy through relationships of "family"—
lifelong commitments of
caring - sharing - trusting;

"c o m m u n i t y,"
in a very real sense,
c o n t i n u a l l y
*(re)*makes
us.

Vision: an expression of one's inherent human capacity to *en*vision—ie., to imagine possible futures and desired relationships not yet spiritually-present or materially-real; the medium through which each of us translates our capacity for *(en)*visioning *ideals* into practical *ideas* for daily living.

(dreams honed to a point of action)
dream + plan = vision

Leadersh(*i*)p: [... *not* to be confused with the idea of *being led* by 'leaders' or with *leading* others ...] rather, one's inherent **capacity** to *care* for oneself and others in ways that serve to **inspire**; an inherent and **active** quality of *caring* which each of us must choose to exercise (in our own unique way) if we are to make our vision(s), real—ie., if we are to move from "problem" to possibility.

(caring enough to ***act***)
vision + care = leadership

Having
Ideals:
("being idealistic")

. . . not so much a quest for utopian perfection,
as an open-ended "commitment" to liberate oneself
from an over-reliance upon the *known* understandings
of conventional wisdom; a process directed essentially
toward changing or transforming one's *self* as the
surest means for changing or transfsorming one's
"environment"— one's cities, included;
most importantly, a process of inquiry
rooted in self-discovery and the
belief that one *can* act
to make one's
ideal(s),
"real"

J. Chaffers
Jan '98

Vanguards
for
"Well-being"

Our Present
Task . . .

To gain
a view of ourselves
as

vanguards of well-being
committed to a global development
of "public family" as potentially the
most effective means for addressing a
deeper
spiritual . cultural . environmental
c r i s i s
unfoldidng beneath the
urban *face* of global change;

in seeking to expand
concepts of 'family'
to one of
public
f a m i l y,
each of us is obligated
to participate actively in
at least three spheres of well-being:

Spiritual	Cultural	Environmental
W e l l - b e i n g		

(as)	(as	as)
Personal	Professional	Global
Guide	**Advocate**	**Visionary**
paying attention to linkages of	paying attention to relationships of	paying attention to bonds of
self and	**service** and	**ecology** and
"spirituality"	**"opportunity"**	**"communality"**
self /universe	**self** /others	**self** / nature
the Spiritual **(personal)**	the Intellectual **(practical)**	the Existential **(planetary)**

P u b l i c F a m i l y

P l a c e

J. Chaffers
Jan '98

Making Place in the New Millenium . . .

Learning from Detroit

My own personal introduction to the subject of urban *place* making occurred some years ago in the midst of my design practice in inner-city Detroit. I was invited to assist in the evaluation of a municipal proposal intended to introduce several dozen units of prefabricated housing systems into an intensely urban neighborhood (high-density, racially and ethnically-mixed) on Detroit's near-West side. Accompanied by sophisticated charts of lifecycle cost analyses suggesting ease of maintenance and other positive benefit-to-cost ratios, municipal architects argued that the proposal offered these long-time City residents an opportunity to dramatically increase their housing stock. A rather lengthy architectural presentation followed, promising compatible site planning, sensitivity to public and private space, a reasonable diversity of materials, facades, and sections, and the latest in prefabrication construction technology. Upon completion of the architects' presentation, the neighborhood's leadership caucused and returned to share its decision. Expressing genuine appreciation for the professional expertise and advice that had been offered, this grassroots body had nonetheless decided that it would "pass up" (i.e., not accept) the city's offer. The logic of this decision was hardly understood by any of us professionals at the time, but the reason given by this richly diverse slice of residents was quite succinct — "We are building *families*, not houses."

Recognizing that family is one of the more enduring and ideal social models we still have, this Detroit experience was a formative moment in my professional journey of self-discovery. As an architect and urban designer, I was specifically reminded of the need to perceive housing as a quality of relationships far richer than its physical aggregation. I was also reminded of the need to continually enlarge our concept of family—beyond its *kin* dimension; particularly, as relates to requirements for human 'well-being' and the more extensive relationships of "public family." Reflecting deeply on my oversights, I knew, also, that it was due time to revisit the guiding principles and assumptions of my earliest education in the academy. In short, this formative moment marked the beginning of a humble search for a renewed balance of understandings—a search wherein I am continually seeking to look inward and outward at once.

Part of my search for balance was a decision to commit my talents and energies to the families and leadership of this geographic area of the City. A personal partnership between myself and what is descriptively known as the G.R.O.W. area of Detroit is, this year, entering its twenty-first year of fruition.

Culture:

(an)
e v o l v i n g / e n a b l i n g
r e s e r v o i r

of
"v a l u e s"

through which each of us makes continuing
c h o i c e s
about our own intended self-development
and about our own
broader commitment to the well-being of
nature and to the life quality of others;

metaphorically-speaking,
(a)
"filtering lens"

of
"u n d e r s t a n d i n g (s)"

(that we choose to believe)
and through which we
perceive, reflect, and
act upon our surrounding
"quo" - ante and our
"status" within

. . . The G.R.O.W. Experience

Born out of a crisis of land dispossession—when the construction of a major freeway artery through its geographic heart resulted in the forced relocation of some 200 of its families—GROW has transformed itself. Specifically, over a period of several decades, the GROW Land Association has grown from a loose collection of home owners, individual businesses, and competing block clubs into a cohesive community force of some 1,500 central city residents.[9]

In its earliest years, the leadership of GROW made two fundamental strategy decisions that have allowed it to hold its course when practically all other central city neighborhood associations have ceased to exist. First, GROW's criteria for screening public and private offers of support is rooted in the idea that "GROW is building *families*, not houses." Time and again, this strategic filter has allowed for decisions on the basis of shared values and longer-term aspirations, rather than on the basis of expediency. Second, at a time when it had more than its fair share of industrial pollution, clogged alleys and uneven (often, non-existent) enforcement of city codes and ordinances, GROW recognized the primacy of land and the longer-term value of land ownership as the foundation from which it could best address its immediate ills. This led GROW to make a landmark decision to challenge—and successfully amend—the City of Detroit Master Plan for Long Range Land Use.[10]

GROW's twin theme of "land and family" has not only served as an unprecedented challenge to centralized municipal master planning, it has also been a means of healing across generations and among all ethnics within the GROW neighborhood. Working collaboratively and with little fanfare, GROW residents have set in motion a chain reaction that gives tangible meaning and expression to the idea of "citizens—'many hands'—caring for a city."

This caring beyond individual parcels of lawn is perhaps best illustrated in GROW's most visually prominent activity to date, the transforming of its public alleys. With paint, patch and collective human energy, GROW residents have cleared and embellished block after block of this unique public resource. Free of automobile traffic—and now increasingly free of glass, rats, and other debris—family picnics, block club basketball, and children's play are increasingly common sights in GROW's alleys.

After gaining City Council approval for its proposed network of alley parks, bikeways, and garden paths—principally, by ensuring that garbage pickup crews and emergency vehicles can still navigate its alleys—GROW residents, themselves, are now the only potential obstacles to an unfolding plan of implementation. In this regard, the task of petitioning hundreds of individual residents whose backyards border on an alley, remains a major design and educational undertaking. But, the unprecedented scope of this grassroots initiative to gain legal approval for modifying individual portions of alley easement has provided the inspiration for individual residents to exercise "citizenship" in a manner never before experienced (in "the City"). It is precisely this kind of collective risk-taking that serves to create relationships sustaining of "public family."

Opportunities for extended "face-to-face" contact—beyond kin, friend, and ethnic circles— coupled with opportunities to exercise individual initiative to achieve common goals (a "common caring") continue to have an inspiring effect on a broad cross-section of GROW residents. This "common caring" has resulted in daily expressions of personal pride, public trust, and public sharing. In turn, these relations of sharing, trusting, and caring continue to transform the physical character of GROW's public alleys, while also facilitating the collective exercise of a more resourceful and compassionate citizenship.

By creating and responding to unique opportunities to be innovative and to *direct* change, GROW residents are giving daily expression to the citizen-bonding concept of an active "public family" and to its reciprocating twin, a 'cared for' public space. In so doing, GROW residents are also actively contributing to a unique and unfolding chapter of *place*-making at urban environmental scale.

As I reflect on my ongoing GROW experience, it is increasingly clear to me that crafting physical space in such way that it resonates with sustaining qualities of "family" and human "spirituality" is a requirement that lies at the conceptual heart of *place* making; whether here in the United States or at other points around the globe—as in towns and cities within the Republic of South Africa.

G l o b a l
Social Crime:
[...not bounded by national boundaries...]
crime that takes root in the absence of social justice;
specifically, crimes of mass disenfranchisement and or mass
ecological destruction that serve to violate our essential humanness
and/or the essential *non*-renewable resources of nature; more specifically,
the **violation** of equitable access to common opportunities fundamentally necessary
for human well-being—particularly, those resources of "opportunity" being created
with some significant degree of public subsidy; further, a *systematic* denial of fair access
to resources and/or relationships needed to address such essential human requirements as
health care, physical safety, and the opportunity for active participation in meaningful
relationships
of
labor
and
"work"

Making Place in the New South Africa

Seeing the Whole, to Transform its Parts

Reflecting on my sojourns to South Africa, I am flooded with images of pain. I am also flooded with images of possibility. Upon further reflection, I am reminded that such dualities (pain and possibility/ hatred and hope/ bondage and freedom, etc.) have a common global presence and are often embedded on opposite sides of the same coin.

In keeping with the spirit of dualities, my experiences suggest that if new possibilities are to be achieved—beyond legacies of pain and disappointment, hatred and fear, disempowerment and discrimination—we are obligated to develop strategic models for life and living that go beyond the relatively limited visions of a post-Apartheid society.

I raise the issue of vision and strategic modeling here because, as I traveled among a broad cross-section of South African citizens, the most common and recurring theme in almost all conversation was the idea of *post*-Apartheidism; specifically, their continuing reference to "*post*-Apartheid" as something qualitatively different and richer than systems of apartheid—i.e., a need to develop *post*-Apartheid cities, *post*-Apartheid health and transportation systems, *post*-Apartheid universities, etc. My sense is that as long as we continue to use "Apartheid" as our standard of measure, the possibility of liberating ourselves from its "old modes of thinking" is made considerably more difficult.

While all South African cities are littered with the legacy of Apartheid—i.e., the fragmentation and systematic separation of race and income groups through discontinuous and dysfunctional land use patterns (creating immense social divisions, haphazard and inefficient access to urban facilities, and the concentration of black South Africans in remote residential areas with few economic opportunities)—we must somehow overcome our present preoccupation with its resulting evils. In short, a "conceptual leap" in the way that we think about South Africa's future is now required.

Thus, as we exercise individual initiative to transform the system of Apartheid, each of us is challenged to engage the truth of a larger reality—namely that, failure in any part(s) of a "system" inevitably points to some deeper imbalance in the

whole (of that system).

Therefore, to speak of transforming the "system of Apartheid" (as we must), is to recognize immense structural contradictions in all of its primary spheres of human relationships; i.e., longstanding crises in South African social, political, *and* economic pactices must be creatively addressed at one and the same time. Particularly, with respect to its utilization of human resources, what we are obligated to address is an entire "cultural system" in bankruptcy. Thus, to fully address the demands of a South African cultural crisis, each of us is required to stretch our imaginations to develop the most comprehensive understanding that we can of a *healthy* human system—a 'healthy' South Africa—in order that we might better understand the deadly roots of its illness.

Stated another way, any commitment to the collective task of creating "post-"Apartheid environments wherein policies of Apartheid will not be tolerated, is really a commitment to the larger task of envisioning more *humane* ways of living, wherein policies of Apartheid will not be necessary.

Making Place in the New Millenium . . .

A Point of Present Closure

Through this essay, I have suggested that *place* making practices will ultimately be judged by their capacity to creatively bind the more specific programmatic requirements of human physicality in a grander spatial dance with evolving *aspirations* of human spirituality. In effect, whether one's primary professional circle is education, practice, or policy (or collaborations between) or whether one's more specific interests lie in architectural design, physical planning, cultural heritage, revitalization, Gender/Class/Ethnicity relations and/or globalization, it will be of great importance to visualize in one's mind's eye, the following:

Notes

GROW (**G**rass **R**oots **O**rganization of **W**orkers) is a private-sector not-for-profit association comprised of four distinct ethnics: German/Polish/African/Hispanic. The GROW neighborhood covers approxi-imately 1.2 square miles. One-third of its land area is comprised of public alleys, with another one-quarter now existing as cleared vacant lots. (It is notable that the leadership of GROW has come to view vacant lots as unique opportunities, rather than as cause for despair.) Residents of this central-city Detroit neighborhood worked collaboratively among themselves and with students of architecture from the University of Michigan to craft the first comprehensive neighborhood master plan ever adopted as part of the *official* map and text of Detroit's Long Range Land Use Master Plan. Much credit for the success achieved in the initial stages of implementation of the GROW Plan must go to Carl Levin—then, President of the Detroit City Council and now, the Senior United States Senator from the State of Michigan.

- Much of this essay and all 'graphic totems' are excerpts from a forthcoming text, *Space Spirit*, by the author.

[1] Escobar. 1995.

[2] Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc. 1994.

[3] Stranahan. 1997.

[4] Sassen. 1994 Hoogvelt. 1997.

[5] Escobar. 1995. Greider. 1997.

[6] Saul. 1992. Sassen. 1994. Hoogvelt. 1997.

[7] Stranahan. 1997.

[8] Hoogvelt. 1997.

[9] GROW (**G**.rass **R**.oots **O**.rganization of **W**.orkers) African/Latino/Polish/German ethnicities.

[10] The resident-developed 'GROW Master Plan' was the first such conceptual plan adopted in the history of the City.

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Stranahan, Mark. 1997. *"Internalizing Frontiers."* One, among an emerging series of position papers focused on contemporaty discursive analysis within the context of global planning and development. (As a small note, I would add that Mr. Stranahan is a gifted and refreshingly talented architect and former student who continually adds to the depth and breadth of my knowledge.)



Regional Effects

36 RAMAYAN TO GLOBALAYAN: TRANSFORMATION OF NASIK

Sulakshana Mahajan

Introduction

Nasik is an important city of Maharashtra, economically and socially the most advanced state in India. Geographical proximity to Mumbai (economic capital of India) has influenced its growth in post-independence years. Developments of the past two decades have completely transformed this traditional pilgrimage centre into a vibrant modern metropolis and Nasik is poised to become a metropolis with global links. New Nasik has emerged out of the dreams, hard work and enterprising spirit of local and migrant people.

Development of multiple economic activities in and around Nasik has this common theme of people's initiative and actions and a spirit of constant learning and innovating through experiences of regional, national and global sources and experimentation. The spirit of adventure can be traced to the mythology of Lord Rama who chose the riverbanks of Godavari, the present Nasik, as his home in exile. Nasik thus became a city of pilgrimage and acquired the status of the Benaras of South India.

Global connections of Nasik have been traced back to the second century BC. Archaeologists have established its links to the Roman Empire through trade. Buddhist stone-cut caves dated 175 BC and Chamar caves of the Jain period still attract large numbers of visitors. Muslim, Maratha and British rulers governed this city in the last 500 years. Each period left its cultural and architectural imprints on the city fabric. Additions of modern activities and functions to the city has not undermined the traditional role of Nasik as a pilgrimage centre but the old built form is rapidly decaying and is getting consumed in the commercialisation.

This paper studies the growth of Nasik and its surrounding region based on industrialisation. It also considers the city growth in relation to the process of urbanisation, changing trends and patterns of settlements of the Indian subcontinent.

Globalisation based on new technological developments will have a great bearing on the future course of urban development and its significance for the Indian people. Concepts like the formation of the global village will have revolutionary impacts on the human society. I am tempted to name this as the period of Globalayan, a period of transformation of world into a global village whereby cities like Nasik will have a greater role to play.

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Nasik and Surrounding Village Settlements Before 1882

Villages Merged within City Limits



1. Makhamalabad Gaothan
2. Mharsul
3. Adgaon
4. Gangapur
5. Anandvalli
6. Nasik
6a. Panchavati
7. Nandur Dastak
8. Manur
9. Panchak
10. Basak
11. Eklehra
12. Pimpalgaon Bahula
13. Chunohala
14. Ambad Kh
15. Kamatwada
16. Satpur
17. Pathardi
18. Wadale
19. Vadner
20. Deolali
21. Vihit
22. Chehedi
23. Degaon
24. Samangaon
25. Kotamgaon
26. Dadhegaon
27. Pimpalgaon Kham

A Brief History of Nasik

Nasik Before 1882

Nasik is located on the nine peaks of Deccan plateau. The River Godavari flows through the centre of the City. The left bank area, known as Panchavati, is believed to be the land chosen by Lord Rama for his stay in exile. There are a number of temples and a cave supposed to have been used by Sita, wife of Lord Rama. Tapovan, a small forest area for meditation, is located nearby. Traditionally the families staying in this part of the city are engaged in religious activities.

The Muslim population settled on the right bank of Godavari, when Nasik came under Muslim rule in 13-16th century. An old Gadhi (fort of smaller size) with walled enclosure was constructed by the Muslim Rulers. Prior to Muslim occupation of the city there were as many as 200 large and small temples on both the banks of the River Godavari. These temples used to be busy with religious activities throughout the day all round the year. During Muslim rule, they lost their glory and were slowly transformed into ruins. Yet Nasik held on to its position as an important pilgrimage centre for Hindus.

Peshavas from Pune won control of Nasik in the 17th century. They took keen interest in the renovation and development of Nasik city. They invited various craftsmen to construct temples and buildings. They encouraged traders to settle and start business in Nasik. The city flourished during this period. Many old temples in ruin were renovated with large donations from the trading community and the rulers. New temple complexes were constructed in the 17th and 18th Century in Nasik and its surrounding villages such as Trimbakeswar, Chandvad, Sinnar and Anjaneri that are within 20 km radius. Large residential buildings called Wadas (houses with courtyards), including those for the Peshava, were constructed. Most of the new development of this period took place on the

Right Bank of the river.

After prolonged fights in the region, the British occupied Nasik towards the second decade of the 19th Century. In 1818, the Nasik district area completely came under British rule. In the next few decades the British rule was consolidated. Subsequently new administration based on the British model was successfully implemented in the district.

Nasik was given the status of a town and municipal council was established in 1865. Even in this period Nasik continued to be a religious centre. The Brahmin community of Nasik was very influential. The British administration on many occasions had to bow to the wishes of the Brahmin community. Construction of a railway line joining Mumbai was the most significant development of the 19th Century. But Brahmins opposed its entry into Nasik city on religious grounds. Finally the railway line was realigned to a distance of 10 km from city and the station was named as Nasik Road (1865)! However, resistance to the construction of a bridge across the River Godavari was successfully defused. Tram was another addition to the city, which became necessary due to the distance between city and Railway station. Highway connecting Mumbai to North India passing through Nasik was constructed replacing earlier Bullock cart track.

In 1882 Nasik was appointed with a local self-government by enactment of municipal law by the British rule. The author considers the history of modern Nasik to start from this year.

Nasik after 1882

The last decade of the 19th Century and the first fifty years of the 20th Century were turbulent. All countries of the world were affected by the events of this period such as world wars, economic upheavals etc. Urbanisation in India based on industrial production had started in the late British period. Port towns like Calcutta, Mumbai, and Chennai (Madras) became the first industrial towns. Population of these cities grew rapidly due to the multiple economic activities but the progress of urbanisation in this period was not steady. In the first half of this century, epidemics like plague (1911) and influenza (1918), the first World War (1914–18), and the great world economic depression of the 1930s were responsible for this irregular process of urbanisation. Urban population declined in the face of these global events. On the other hand, rapid urbanisation took place in the second World War period in 1939–1946 due to the required increase in industrial production. Another spell of rapid growth in the Indian urban population took place in 1947 due to the large number of refugees after partition of the country.

Till 1947 Nasik was a small and relatively insignificant town. Population of Nasik in the first five decades of this century multiplied more than four times (refer to Graph 1). This growth in population was primarily due to the administrative functions of the city as a district headquarters. Establishment of the India security press in 1925 and the currency-note press in 1928 were the only major additional functions requiring a workforce. Military cantonment areas at Deolali and artillery centre at Nasik Road, were established in the war period (1918). All these additions were outside the then city limits of Nasik, located about 8–10 km away, near the railway station of Nasik Road. Introduction of electricity in 1929 did bring about certain changes in the city. Dadasaheb Phalke of Nasik, the pioneer of Indian cinema, produced the first Indian film in 1913. Cinema theatres became great entertainment centres of the district.

Main economic functions continued to be religious tourism and related trade, the two traditional activities related to Nasik. Brass and copper utensils and gold and silver ornaments were produced in Nasik, but the production was home-based. The agricultural production in the district was limited to a few traditional crops and grape, the fruit for which Nasik was famous. Despite the renowned quality and variety in types of grapes, the production was limited in volume and its contribution to the economy was insignificant.

Expansion of Nasik

Population reached 52,000 (1941) mainly due to migration of people to Nasik. Traditionally migrants always settled on the Right Bank of River Godavari. They occupied land tracks on the periphery of the development during the last Peshava period. The traditional Panchavati area of Nasik carried out its religious functions quite insulated from new developing areas.

The settlement pattern of this new area development was based on the British planning principles. The road connecting Nasik to Mumbai became the new focal point of city with its new imposing stone structures constructed in neo-Gothic style, set back from roads and providing tree-lined avenues in the administrative area. The British residential quarters were large bungalows set in landscaped gardens, located away from office areas. Buildings for District Court, Collector offices, Police headquarters and large buildings housing war offices and town hall were part of the administrative complex. Indian professionals like lawyers, doctors, administrators and neo-rich planned their residential area near this administrative complex. Smart residences in Art Deco style, which were popular in Europe, appeared in the city. British rule introduced formal education and many schools were constructed. Closely packed buildings, narrow streets and multiple dwellings dominated the traditional settlement. Bungalows with gardens, set back from the streets, became popular in the new residential developments. Residents of the new settlement were influenced by British education. They were conscious of modern city development. This new class of people was active and influential in political and social movements of the period. They had close contacts with cities like Mumbai, Pune and the outside world. This area later became the centre of political movements and independence struggles. Direction of growth away from the old city towards Mumbai and Pune is symbolic. The growth of city in this direction continued even after Independence.

With the establishment of the British rule came the diverse cultural and religious groups of people. The Parsees, the

Graph 1 Growth of Population in Nasik



Christians, and Hindus from cities like Mumbai and Pune contributed to the growth. A major cultural addition was that of the English language through the introduction of formal education. The Irani (Parsees) restaurants became attractive new meeting places. Bread and bakery products introduced by them became very famous. Missionaries constructed churches on the periphery of the city. A public garden called Jackson Garden was introduced. The cultural diversity of the migrant population made the city change its basic attitudes. It contributed by expanding the cultural experiences of people and making them aware of new ideas, philosophies, languages, cultures and religions, opening up new opportunities for interactions and change.

The idea of independent democratic India also was nurtured in this period and environment. Nasik played a major part during the Independence movement. It had its share of glorious fights against British Rulers. Violent events like assassinations as well as peaceful encounters of the period have proud place in the history of Nasik. During the Struggle for Independence, Nasik and Nasik Road became famous due to the central jails where hundreds of freedom fighters and national leaders including Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi were held prisoners.

Growth and Diversification of Nasik after 1947

Population

Population of the then Nasik recorded the highest ever growth rate between 1941–51. Growth rate of 85% in this decade took the total population figure to nearly 100,000. This growth was the result of the partition of India. The population growth rate started rising steadily after 1961 and Nasik recorded more than the average growth rate for India in two decades, between 1971–91. In 1982 the city limit was expanded and Nasik acquired the status of a metropolitan city with a population of 432,000. The growth rate of 63% for the decade 1971–81 continued in the decade 1981–91. In 1997 the population reached the figure of more than 900,000 and is expected to cross one million before the next century.

People migrating to Nasik are largely residents from rural areas of the district and other parts of Maharashtra. They come in search of higher education and better job opportunities. A number of migrants are industrial workers and employees from other towns who have migrated with their production units. Migration from other states is relatively less. In recent years the number of people choosing Nasik as a place to settle after retirement is growing. A few of the migrants are people who have returned from other countries after a lifetime career to settle in Nasik thus re-establishing old links with the country and their familes. All these people with their knowledge in diverse fields are contributing to the new emerging cityscape. With migration, the composition and culture is rapidly changing.

City Boundaries

The growth in population necessitated the expansion of the city boundary from time to time to help provide and extend urban services to the people occupying the peripheral villages and make more land available for an urban population.

- In 1881 the then Nasik town area was just 5 sq. miles (13 sq. km).
- First expansion in 1931 took this area to 7.75 sq. miles (20 sq. km).
- In 1951 the city boundary expanded to encompass area of 18 sq. miles (47 sq. km).
- Further expansion (1982) of city limits covered an area of



110 sq. miles (287.22 sq. km).

- This increase in the area works out to 22 times in one hundred years. The population grew 30 times in the same period.

Industrialization of Nasik City and District

Independent India had a grand industrial development agenda. Science, technology and industrial production was given a priority in the development strategy. Policy framework devised by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was the driving force. Before independence, India had very few industries using modern technology for producing goods. Colonial rule had restricted industrial growth. Most of the population (90%) residing in rural India was poor and the pressure on agriculture was unsustainable. Industrialisation on large scale based on modern technology, which had brought material wealth in western countries, was seen as a remedy. Barring a few ports like Calcutta, Madras and Mumbai, modern industrial culture was totally absent. Government planned large public sector industries for production of basic goods. A policy of decentralisation of Industrial investment was promoted for balanced urban growth. But private capital investments were limited to existing metropolises and larger towns as the infrastructure for industries was inadequate in other areas. Central and state governments devised policies for creating new industrial growth centres. Results of all these policies are now seen in the case of cities like Nasik.

Some people of Nasik shared this dream and started working towards the industrialisation of Nasik. These people were mostly those who had participated in the freedom struggle. Initiative and efforts of such people resulted in the Government acceptance of the proposal for an industrial estate in Nasik. The first industrial estate NICE (Nasik Industrial Co-operative Estate) was formed in the cooperative sector in 1962. In the same year, Maharashtra State government also responded by declaring MIDC (Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation) Industrial Estate at Satpur village, 7 km from Nasik. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited established a unit for production of MIG fighters at Ozar, a village 20 km from Nasik. This production facility in the public sector was established in collaboration with the then U.S.S.R in 1964. In 1967 SICOM (State Investment Corporation of Maharashtra) adapted Nasik as its growth centre. All these events brought Nasik on to the industrial map of India.

Forming an industrial estate was one thing and attracting investments another. NICE had to undertake the arduous task of attracting entrepreneurs. Local residents, traders and professionals, having no experience in industrial production were convinced and pursued to put money in new ventures. In 1960 Satpur was a small village without even a post office, telephone or electricity. Constructing buildings, roads and

other infrastructure proved a Herculean task for the pioneering entrepreneurs. Next on the agenda of NICE was an effort to attract large private sector investment, preferably with international collaboration. NICE was rewarded in its efforts when MICO (German multinational) and ABB (Swedish multinational) established their production units. The industry that came to Nasik was mostly engineering, electrical and pharmaceutical.

Satpur Industrial Area became fully functional in 1970s and soon all the plots were taken up by small, medium and large enterprises. The thermal power plant at Eklahra near Nasik Road greatly contributed to the power demand of industries. The success of Satpur MIDC, created demand for additional industrial plots. In 1980 MIDC declared a second industrial estate at Ambad, a village located on Mumbai-Nasik road, 10 km from Nasik. All plots in this industrial area are occupied today. NICE has also developed special plots for a women's cooperative and a building with small workshops for women entrepreneurs. Special premises are also donated for the training and production facilities for mentally handicapped persons. Cooperation and support of industry to various local welfare institutes has given a boost to many social schemes.

Success of NICE and NIMA (Nasik Industrial Manufacturers Association) at Satpur and Ambad was repeated at Sinnar, a small town 22 km from Nasik. A cooperative industrial estate developed by local initiative in 1982 was followed by formation of MIDC Industrial area at Sinnar in 1988. This area is in the process of development. Additional Sinnar area is being developed as a mega industrial estate with state of the art facilities. Trans-national industrial companies are invited to locate their production centres here. Global, experienced development agencies are also invited to plan and execute the project. A residential township will be developed along with this. Sinnar was once famous for its Bidies (type of hand rolled tobacco stick). Today it is planning for the future high-tech industries.

Nasik can boast of an industrial region producing goods from pins to aeroplanes! Industrialisation has boosted the spirit of Nasik district. Each Tehsil (an administrative unit of district) is planned with a mini industrial estate, including the tehsils where the population is predominantly Adivasi (tribal and aboriginal). There are now 12 cooperative industrial areas besides the MIDC estates. The district is expected to create 100,000 industrial jobs in near future (Table 3).

Agricultural Growth

Agriculture and related activities generally do not form a part of an urban economy. It was not considered for growth in the case of Nasik. But development and progress have many surprises. Nasik has been lucky to have this.

Traditionally Nasik had been famous in India for its grapes. Onion was another agricultural crop. Besides these two cash crops, agricultural production of Nasik was insignificant. Main problems faced by the farmers was the lack of irrigation facilities and limited cultivable land. The land in Nasik region is mostly barren and rocky. Cultivation was limited to the monsoon season. Though many pulses, oil seeds, and grains like wheat, jawar, bajra and rice were cultivated, the yield was poor. The agricultural sector did not contribute much to the local economy. Cultivation of vegetables and fruits was limited. Dairy and poultry were also underdeveloped till the last few years due to absence of services to the farming community.

All this has changed significantly in the last 10 years. Investments, irrigation schemes, electricity, new technologies like drip irrigation, better seeds and other inputs are contributing to an increase in production. Educated and trained farmers with a business attitude are seeking and creating facilities. Immense potential has been created for agro-industries through this sector. Grapes of all varieties for table consumption or for making resins, grape juice, grape wines are cultivated by farmers on a small scale as well as by large plantations developed through corporate joint ventures with French and Australian companies. Due to systematic promotion efforts and facility creations, farmers are capturing European grape markets. Cold storages, pre-cooling, packing and processing units are growing in number. Necessary information is being generated and visits to other potential markets in the Middle East, south-east Asia and Europe are becoming common for farmers. Cultivation of onion, the traditional cash crop has been expanded for growing export markets. White onion powder, popular in U.S. and Europe, is from Nasik and neighbouring Jalgaon district known as North Maharashtra regions.

Strawberry is a new crop becoming popular due to potential export and growing demand in national market. Large-scale plantations have been undertaken by French Biotech Ltd. in Dindori Tehsil of Nasik. Orient Sericulture (Tata group) has 1000 hectares of mulberry plantation. Traditional Paithani (a kind of rich silk sari produced on handloom) production has been revived at Yeola and craftsmen are rewarded by great market response to the products. Traditional paithani design has been adapted by a designer for aircraft!

Nasik was once called Gulshanabad (city of roses). Now roses from Nasik are exported to the Middle East. Floriculture projects have emerged where the exotic varieties popular in European markets are grown. Nasik is taking advantage of growing local demand for flowers. There are many such farms, small and medium in size within the city limits of Nasik. Farms and farmhouses within city limits and the surrounding areas make Nasik a unique city.

Interdependence, interaction, participation and mutual support given by residents, agricultural and industrial producers is an important factor in the evolution of urban rural relationship. Synergy of the agricultural and industrial sectors holds great promises of change in the future of Nasik but they can only be realised through the growth of the service sector. This sector is growing at a much faster rate and its role in local and national economy is ever increasing in importance.

Service Sector

Business, Trade, Commerce and Financial Sector

Banking, finance, insurance, legal, taxation and accountancy services, engineering support, trading of raw material and finished goods, packing and forwarding, warehousing, transport services, security, maintenance and computer services are needed for the growth and development of industries. This sector has grown in Nasik in the last 30 years. Nationalised banks have 69 branches in Nasik city while the remaining district has 232 branches. Many other co-operative and private sector banks also operate in the district. 512 bank branches in the district offer various banking services which were totally absent at the time of independence.

Regional offices of major financial institutions like MSFC (Maharashtra State Finance Corporation), SICOM and major banks are located in Nasik. Two major banks have started specialised branches for hi-tech agro finance. HDFC (A major private sector housing finance corporation) and SHRICOM housing bank have their branches in Nasik. NAFED (National Agricultural Finance and Export Division) handles most of the agricultural export.

In order to facilitate and boost growing export from the region, a container freight station has been started by central warehousing corporation and custom duty clearances have been arranged for in Nasik (earlier this used to be done at Mumbai)

Tourism

Tourism has been a traditional function of the city. Visitors come to the city on auspicious days in large numbers, to have a dip in the River Godavari. Godavari is known as a holy river of south India comparable to the Ganges. People assemble in great numbers at Nasik every 12 years. This fair is known as Kumbha Mela. The last Kumbha Mela was held in the year 1992 when about a million people visited Nasik

In normal years tourists visit to perform certain religious rites on banks of Godavari and at the numerous temples. The arrangements for their stay are made in the houses of the priests or with the people of common caste. Lodging places constructed with donations from rich people known as Dharmashalas provide comfortable and affordable accommodation.

Modern tourist hotels were introduced in the British period. Today hotel industry is flourishing in Nasik. Tourists come from distant parts of India. Facilities demanded and provided for are growing at great speed and variety. Tour operators are bringing tourists in great numbers. They are helped by growth in transport infrastructure.

Beautiful old temples of Shiva at Trimbakeshwar, Kala Ram at Nasik, and Devi (Goddess) temple in the hills of Saptashringi attract a large number of devotees. Modern temple complexes like Mukti Dham and the church at Nasik road have become new attractions for tourists. Sai Baba temple at Shirdi in the neighbouring district attracts people of all faiths. Industrial expansion and activities have created a great demand for business hotels. India's leading chain of Hotels, The Taj, has constructed a smart 70–room well–appointed five–star hotel, having fully equipped modern business centre with conference rooms, recreational and health facilities and speciality restaurants in plush landscaped setting. Motels and holiday resorts are cropping up around the peripheral areas, serving a large number of travellers and holidaymakers.

Housing Construction

A growing population created a demand for housing. CIDCO (City Development Corporation), established by the government of Maharashta to develop the twin city of Mumbai (New Bombay), started its work for New Nasik in 1979. A township planned by CIDCO has been located between two industrial estates of Satpur and Ambad. This township provides various types of houses and plots for private development. Total area of approx. 400 Ha. houses 30,000 families besides all other amenities.

Housing construction in the private sector is booming and has become a large business. All types of construction, such as single-family houses, apartment buildings and small colonies, are mushrooming in the city. Old city residential areas with their typical 'Wada' structures are on the way to extinction. Land prices have increased steadily. All old residential areas are becoming increasingly congested and old street pattern and topography of the city poses challenges. All the same, slums as well as providing affordable housing in sufficient numbers is a problem.

Nasik is now expanding in all directions along the main arterial roads. The housing areas and commercial establishments, shopping, and services like schools, hospitals etc. are in the same zone. Business activities in the city mostly consist of small establishments employing not more than 10 persons. The vast service sector employment is created through such establishments. There are many advantages. Most people go home for lunch. Two–wheelers are very popular and provide cheap transport. The leisurely pace of the city is in contrast to the lifestyle of Mumbai and has attracted many from such cities.

Infrastructure

Nasik has been blessed with a number of small rivers besides the River Godavari. A number of dams constructed in the last 50 years have improved the availability of water. But the delivery system of this vital resource needs much improvement. Electricity is supplied by the State grid and is presently sufficient. But demand is growing faster than the supply. Many industrial establishments are now allowed to generate their own power through captive plants, which means more power is available to the city.

Nasik could develop to such size and at such speed due to the

advantage of its location vis-a-vis Mumbai. The distance is 185 km. The present capacity of road and rail links is grossly inadequate. Traffic has grown phenomenally in last few years. More than 60 % of trucks and containers travelling on the road have their destination beyond Nasik but have to pass through the city. Alternative road plans have not yet materialised. Demand for more trains to Mumbai is also pending. Hence the load on the road transport is great.

Air link to Mumbai is a problem due to lack of a civil airport. Air force and Mig Factory airports are not presently permitted to be used for civilian purposes. Plan for an airport may be realised in future if finance is made available.

Telecommunication link is the most vital infrastructure that will decide the growth of software industry in Nasik. Modern telephone exchanges are providing new telephone connections. Direct satellite link for data communication is essential. Telecom department of the Government of India is planning for efficient and reliable digital connectivity in the near future. Nasik is hoping to take advantage of this and expecting to attract Information Technology firms.

Development of infrastructure is going to be the most important factor for the growth and development of Nasik. Large capital investment required in this sector is a major problem. Most of these services are provided by the public sector agencies. Recently efforts are being made to seek private sector participation in improving these services.

Social Sector

The rapid growth of the city has given boost to the social services like education, health and medicine, social welfare, sports, entertainment, arts etc.

Higher-level education in various streams such as engineering, computers, management, commerce, medicine, pharmacy, architecture, agriculture, etc., is available in Nasik through various colleges and institutes. The Y. B. Chavan Open University of Maharashtra is located in Nasik. Recently the Government has announced setting up of the Medical University of Maharashtra, which will be located in Nasik. Most of these facilities have been added only in last two decades. Number of doctors, hospitals, health centres is steadily growing and large number of people from the district depend on the city for variety of services.

Salient and Interesting Facts and Features about Growth and Development of Nasik After 1947

- The population growth rate of Nasik has been constantly more than that of urban India, Maharashtra and nearest metro city of Mumbai between 1971–1991. Growth rate of Nasik (57% and 67%) is highest among the top 4 cities of Maharashtra. Mumbai (38% and 20%), Pune (48% and 47%), Nagpur (40% and 27%), between 1971–81 and 1981–91 respectively.
- Nasik has grown from a population of 21,490 in 1901 to 722,139 in 1991. The growth rate between 1901–1991 works out to 3260% which is higher than most of the top 34 cities! It took Mumbai 157 years to grow from a base population of 70,000 in 1744 to a million in 1901. Nasik will have achieved this within a short period of 55 years starting from 1945 in year 2000.
- Malegaon city of Nasik district was famous for its handlooms and power looms. It was the largest industrial town of the district. In 1971 Malegaon, had more population (191,847) than Nasik (176,090). But in 1991 Nasik population (725,000) more than doubled that of Malegaon (342,595).
- Total population of Nasik Tehsil in 1991 was 826,303 and urban population was 733,224. This means that 88% of the population of the Tehsil is urban.
- Nasik was the seventh largest city in 1947 in Maharashtra after Mumbai, Pune, Nagpur, Sholapur Ahmadnagar and Amaravati, all having industrial activities. Now it is fourth. In 1981 Nasik was the 47th largest town in India. In 1991 Nasik became the 34th largest town in India.
- Nasik is an industrial city but has 13% working population in the primary (i.e. agricultural) sector; that is more than any large city of Maharashtra. Nasik has the second highest working population in the service sector (27%) next to Aurangabad (31%). Hence Nasik is listed in "Industrial cum service" category as per the definition of functional categories of Census of 1991 (Table 6).
- Growth of Nasik has given boost to the growth of other towns in the district which are closer to Nasik like Sinnar on Nasik Pune road, Igatpuri and Ghoti on Nasik Mumbai road and Ozar on Nasik Agra road. All are within the distance of 40 km. Urban growth of Nasik district is concentrated in the southern part of the district and almost 62% urban population is concentrated in the 4 towns of Nasik, Igatpuri, Sinnar and Ozar, all the tehsils contiguous to Nasik Tehsil.
- Industrial activities of Nasik city and district have grown dramatically. In 1971 there were 394 industries in the district with total employment of 19672. Most of the employment in the private sector was in home-based production. About 7,000 persons were engaged in Bidi making (rolling of tobacco in leaves). In 1997 there are 7896 small-scale industries and 174 large and medium industries providing total employment to about 66,000 workers. Small-scale industries provide employment to about 32,500 persons. Large numbers of industries are of engineering units, followed by electrical, electronics, plastic moulding and agro-based industries. The industrial sector is not dominated by or dependent on one or two large-scale plants. The industrial sector is much more diversified and independent. Public-sector employment in establishments like Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (7,800), Currency note press (5,000), India security press (6,000) is significant.

The role of industry in greening of the area has to be acknowledged. Once barren and dry landscape of the areas surrounding the city is provided with green cover by conscious efforts of the industrial community.

- The development plan of Nasik City has 2100 ha.area allotted for industrial use, which is 14.09% of developed area and just 7.31% of the gross town area, while 44.14% of the gross town area is in the no development zone. This is the zone in which agricultural farms are located. The industries are located in exclusively planned areas and their growth is regulated through development control regulations. The industrial estates are planned with environmental concern and common effluent treatment plants are planned for them (Table 2).
- There are strong links between growth and human development. Growth and diversification of economic activities of Nasik city has demanded growth of skilled and trained manpower. The nature of industries and the service sector in Nasik is primarily based on such human skills. The demand today is largely met by the facilities created in last two decades. Literacy rates and women's participation in education and the work force are indicators.
- At the beginning of the Twentieth Century this orthodox Hindu pilgrimage centre was rocked by the conversion of caste Hindus to Christianity. It was also a great event when the famous Kala Ram Temple of Nasik was forcibly entered by the then untouchables under the leadership of Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar (1922). Today the religious image and role of religion in Nasik is limited though important. The secular image of Nasik is the result as well as the cause of the successful transformation of Nasik.
- Historically Nasik was never a capital city of any kingdom, was never a rich business town, neither was it a rich agricultural bazar town or had industrial establishments like sugar factories and textiles. It does not have a powerful political lobby. It is a people's town and was once known as a town for common people 'Janasthan'. Today residents of Nasik proudly remember this name.

Some Reflections on Nasik Cityscape

- In 1982 physical boundaries of Nasik encompassed 22 times more area than that in the year 1881. The city space today is dominated by the new city developments. The quality of new cityscape definitely needs the touch of creative artistic hands. Physical plans of Nasik City were developed through the government town planning department and other planning authorities like MIDC and CIDCO. No leading architect or planner has been involved in its inception. One can witness the functional quality of the land use but there is total absence of planners' aesthetic vision of a city. Today Nasik is economically rich but lacks the aesthetic quality found in its development of Maratha rule or later British rule.
- Old parts of Nasik including the administrative and residential areas developed during the British period and some of the developed areas witness the typical overcrowding of Indian cities. Narrow streets of old residential areas are far too inadequate for the commercial use they are converted to and the vehicular traffic is choking them. Small vendors, hand carts, animals, cycles, scooters and pedestrians are engaged in constant battles over space. Public transport systems are grossly neglected and are inadequate. Most of the people prefer scooters and motor cycles for obvious reasons even though safety is at stake. But these provide the cheapest mode of transport. It also helps the flexible work schedules of working persons and the lifestyles of people.
- The development of new commercial buildings, restaurants, hotels, shopping centres try to go beyond stark aesthetics to attract attention but they lack authenticity and aesthetic values. Few efforts of architects can be termed partially successful and one of them is the new building of the Nasik Municipal Corporation. It is an apt symbol of the success and aspirations of transformed Nasik.
- Nasik has large service sector employment and it is headquarter of the North Maharashtra region comprising of four districts. It has presence of large number of banks, financial and insurance companies, marketing offices of many organisations, private sector organisations besides government and administrative offices. But it has no central business district as is common to many towns and the offices are spread throughout the city, merging with residential and industrial spaces or located along the main transport corridors.

  The life style of the people is also not dominated by the clock. Flexible working hours, part-time work schedules, home-based work places and home-based income generation activities are quite common. Most of the people do not travel long distances to work (Nasik area is roughly 20 x 14 km) and tensions of large metropolises are quite absent.
- Slum population and areas are not absent in the city but the population and areas are limited.
- That Nasik has many attributes of modern urban town with many advantages and choices of life styles is a common perception. That is the reason a large number of people are attracted to Nasik in last few years. Nasik can be termed as a successful example of growth with development and diversification including agricultural activities integrated in the city. It is an example that vindicates the policies adapted by India for industrialisation and decentralisation with public and private sector participation.

Urbanisation Trends : Nasik, Maharashtra and India

- Growth and development of Nasik is significant for understanding the process and trends of urban growth in India. Nasik has grown much faster than in the last two

Graph 2 Growth Rate in India, 1951 to 1991



	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991
All India	41.43	26.43	38.21	46.38	36.48
Maha. State		17.57	40.74	39.99	38.85
Mumbai		39.93	43.81	38.05	20.41
Nasik		35.16	36.68	57.4	67.65

decades when urban growth rate in Maharashtra and India are declining. That decline in growth rate of Mumbai in this period is significantly low can be seen from Graph 2.

- Urban centres in India are growing in numbers. There are about 3700 urban centres of which 555 are growing faster than the national average urban growth rate. Of these 30 are in Maharashtra. Pune is the only city in Maharashtra beside New Delhi and Bangalore with a population of more than 1 million growing faster than the average.
- Most of the fast-growing urban centres are the ones which had less than 500,000 population in 1981. Nasik falls in this category.
- From the facts it can be inferred that the rapid growth of urbanisation and its concentration in large metros after Independence is arrested and urbanisation is more decentralised than ever before. Reasons for this reversal have great bearing on the future course of urbanisation in India.
- The position of Maharashtra as the most industrialised and urbanised state of India is now challenged and many states are competing for a larger share of both. States like Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, through their systematic efforts, are developing rapidly.
- Within Maharashtra, there has emerged great competition among cities for attracting industrial investment. Governments also offer large incentives to industries for location in rural areas. Industries are also helped by new communication technologies, growing transport facilities, and other infrastructure development like power and water.
- It is unlikely that growth of Nasik will continue at the same rate as it nears the figure of one million in population. The reason is that many other growth centres are offering advantages of infrastructures, and locations near working populations, near raw material and locations of consumption. The recent completion of Konkan railway along the coast of Maharashtra is opening up many new areas for development and its impact will be much greater for the future course of development in Maharashtra than any other single factor.
- This process of rapid development of a few urban centres in early periods of industrialisation based on modern manufacturing processes and decentralisation and dispersal of growth in later period is not a unique phenomenon in India but is an ubiquitous process observed in most developed countries. What is significant in India is that the process of centralisation and decentralisation is compressed in a shorter period.

Future of Urbanisation in Globalization Era

GLOBALISATION in simple terms is explained as the creation of a global village. This concept is the product of new technological revolution in fields of electronics, computers and speedy communication through satellite technology. All these are supporting the dispersal of all human activities, most important being the economic, social and political activities. They are changing the methods of production of goods and their movements across the locations within the countries and the world. Concentration of goods production in urban centres, mostly near the port towns, separation of rural agricultural production and industrial production of cities, irrational and wasteful movement of raw materials, finished goods, agricultural products at great environmental costs were products of three centuries of Industrial revolution. But the systemic nature of all the human interactions are becoming clear with the result that all countries of the world are becoming interdependent in this era of globalization. Globalisation will have many new opportunities for countries like India.

All sectors of the economy, especially agriculture can benefit from new technologies, knowledge-intensive management, processing, preservation, marketing and environmentally friendly techniques, better infrastructure accessibility, and services like finance and crop insurance. Increasing productivity, multiple crops, and agriculture-based local industrial facilities will affect the employment potential of rural areas. In countries like India, large populations can continue to be supported on agriculture with better economic returns. The need for migration of the rural poor to urban areas will be greatly reduced.

Industrial production will be geographically dispersed across the country and the old equation of Industry and growth will change. Trend of diminishing employment in industrial sector of large metropolises has already started which will be further strengthened. Industrial investment was seen as the vehicle of development in past. Today investment in infrastructure is directing the growth. The direction is away from large metro centres.

Large cities will not vanish immediately, but their economic position will be challenged. Service sector employment as witnessed in developed countries will be the dominant sector of large metropolises in India. The service sector will also grow faster in small and medium towns and pressure on

metropolises will be greatly relieved.

The concept of a city as such will still have large attraction but the scale and form will undergo dramatic change. Environmentally, this trend is a positive trend and will be beneficial in the final analysis.

Conclusion

Study of growth, diversification and transformation of Nasik reveals a trend that challenges common notions of the urbanisation process in India. The developments of last two decades show a totally different trend from that observed in three decades before. The focus of urban development in India needs to be shifted from experiences of large metropolises of Calcutta, Mumbai and Chennai that had emerged and flourished during the period when trade, commerce and early industrialisation directed the process of urbanisation. Dispersal and diversification of urban growth observed in last two decades vindicate the policy adapted by India after independence for a more balanced economic and physical growth. That this trend is likely to be strengthened in near future and will be assisted by new technologies can be seen from the case study of Nasik. Globalisation is a process that has the potential to support and speed up this trend of "counter urbanisation" as suggested by Peter Hall (1997). Arguments, projections and models based on the urbanisation trends observed in the early industrialisation period will prove grossly inadequate, redundant and futile like the forecasts based on future population growth in India made 5,10, or 15 years ago. How these projections made by United Nations Population Division for Calcutta and Mumbai have proved totally wrong (Table 7). It is essential to analyse the failures of these projections and reasons behind them.

The aim of all developmental issues, including that of urbanisation, is to provide basic services to all, to reduce poverty and control the degradation of the life and the environment. Transformation of Nasik in last fifty years has been successful in this direction. It has many positive and healthy aspects about it which need to be strengthened further. Globalisation provides one such opportunity.

Table 1 Sectorwise working population of Nasik City in 1981 & 1991

Sr.no	Occupation	YEAR 1981	YEAR 1991	PERCENT 1981	PERCENT 1991
1.	Cultivators	9872	13043	7.68	5.77
2.	Agri.labourer	9764	11840	7.61	5.23
3.	Primary sector	19656	24883	15.39	11.00
4.	Household industry	3963	65804	3.08	29.12
5.	Tertiary sector	104875	135286	81.63	59.98
6.	Total workers	128494	225973	29.74	31.15
7.	Total non workers	303554	499368	70.26	68.84
	TOTAL	432044	725341	100.00	100.00

Table 2 Land use distribution in Nasik City

LAND USE	AREA IN HA.	% OF DEVELOPED AREA	% OF TOTAL AREA
Residential	7500	50.34	26.11
Commercial	363.68	2.44	1.27
Industrial	2100	14.09	7.31
Public/ semi public	728.10	4.84	2.53
Transport and communication	2265.31	15.20	7.89
Garden /recreation	428.42	2.88	1.49
Public utilities	172.46	1.16	0.60
CIDCO	398	2.67	1.39
Military	943.7	6.33	3.29
Water bodies	1067.18		3.71
No development zone	12755		44.41
TOTAL	28721.85		100

Table 3 M.I.D.C and other Industrial areas in Nasik district

Sr.no.	Name and location	Area in Ha.	Establishment year
1.	Satpur M.I.D.C, Nasik	636.98	1962
2.	NICE (Nasik Co-Op Ind.Estate)	135	1962
3.	Ambad, Nasik	519.55	1880
4.	Malegaon co-op.Ind.area, Sinnar	24	1982
5.	Sinnar M.I.D.C.	520	1988
6.	5 Star Ind.Estate, Sinnar	7047.01	1992
7.	Mini M.I.D.C., Peth	5.46	1992
8.	Mini M.I.D.C., Dindori	32.22	1992
9.	Mini M.I.D.C., Vindchur	18.91	1992
10.	Co-Op.Ind.At Yeola	7.88	Info.unavailable
11.	Co-Op.Ind.At Igatpuri	17.5	Info.unavailable
12.	Co-Op.Ind.At Chandwad	55	Info.unavailable
13.	Kalwan	35	Info.unavailable
14.	Manmad	357	Info.unavailable
15.	Satana	82	Info.unavailable
16.	Malegaon	190	Info.unavailable
17.	Sinnar co-op.Ind.area	374	Info.unavailable
18.	Pimpalgaon	37.2	1992

Table 5 Growth trends of 5 decades after independence for all India, Maharashtra State, Mumbai and Nasik

Census year	All India	Variation %	Maharashtra	Variation %	Mumbai	Variation %	Nasik	Variation %
1951	62,444,000	41.43	92,010,00		2,967,000		148,573	
1961	78,937,000	26.43	11,163,000	17.57	4,152,000	39.93	200,814	35.16
1971	109,114,000	38.21	15,711,000	40.74	5,971,000	43.81	274,482	36.68
1981	159,727,000	46.38	21,994,000	39.99	8,243,000	38.05	432,044	57.40
1991	218,000,000	36.48	30,540,000	38.85	9,926,000	20.41	725,341	67.65

Table 6 Distribution of workers as per categories in selected cities of Maharashtra

City	Population	agriculture %	Industrial %	Trade and commerce %	Transport communication	Services %	Functional classification
Mumbai region	12,596,243	1	42	24	11	22	Industrial
Pune Region	2,493,987	3	43	18	8	27	Industrial
Nagpur	1,664,006	4	33	23	13	27	Industrial
Nasik	725,341	13	36	16	7	27	Ind.cum services
Solapur	620,846	3	52	18	7	20	Industrial
Aurangabad	592,709	8	35	18	8	31	Ind.cum services
Jalgaon	241,293	15	27	22	9	27	Ind.cum services
Ozar	47,538	25	46	7	3	19	Industrial

Table 7 Projections v/s actual growth of population in metro cities of India

Metro city	Population (million)					
	1970		1980		2000	
	Projection	Actual	Projection	Actual	Projection	Likely
Calcutta	7.1	7.03	9.5	9.19	16.6	13.2
Mumbai	5.9	5.97	8.5	8.24	16.0	11.91
Delhi	3.6	3.64	5.9	5.79	13.3	12.4
Madras	3.1	3.17	4.4	4.28	8.2	6.83

Source: United Nation world population trends and Policies 1983
(Note: Projection for year 2000 is worked out on the basis of growth rate of respective cities in the years between 1981-1991)



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37 EXPLAINING REDEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG

Ann Susnik
Sivaguru Ganesan

Introduction

Sustainable urbanism can be read as successful urban redevelopment. Our research indicates that Hong Kong is possibly a most favorable locality for this. This work is presented in three main sections: arguments for success in the recent redevelopment of older urban areas; findings from empirical analysis of structural determinants; and discussion on globalization and sustainability in the long term.

We argue that Hong Kong's recent redevelopment is a model of success. Evidence draws in part on private sector redevelopment activity. This activity has been quantified from a survey of historical trends of building demolitions and occupancies between 1984 and 1993. The contention of *success* is also supported by case-study findings of positive outcomes for the majority of persons displaced by two, block-scale, comprehensive urban renewal schemes.

An empirical analysis of structural determinants for redevelopment in older urban areas is revealing. Statistical association used trends, correlation coefficients, control variables, and multiple regression analysis to establish causation. Multiple non-policy determinants were approached as independent variables. Housing is at the forefront in building volume terms, with higher education, employment in service occupations, and income having the strongest influence on building stock upgrade.

Discussion of long-term viability in development and redevelopment aims at the global nature of financing urban construction, and the implications from current Asia-wide economic meltdown. Directions for future research can be found in the concluding remarks.

Success in the Recent Redevelopment of Hong Kong's Older Urban Areas

In a city state like Hong Kong, relatively strong control over labor in-migration combines with low unemployment. Other given features are a mass public rehousing program and positive outcomes from what Yucekus and Banerjee (1998) might refer to as *blackboard* planning, or, in more formal terms, comprehensive renewal. These atypical features remain under Special Administrative Region (SAR) status newly assigned by the PRC. Still, Hong Kong is referred to by Choe (1998) as an exemplary Asian city. Comparable cross-regional conditions include high-density built form and rapid economic growth. Crowding is famous. Yet even in external density terms (persons per square kilometer), other Asian localities are near neighbors (Hong Kong 5453, Singapore 4481, Taiwan

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557, South Korea 443, PRC 122, Canada 3) (*Europa World Yearbook* 1994). A strong economy also makes it an interesting place. Recent growth (average, real GDP growth between 1985 and 1992, in percent) figures support linkage to its regional counterparts (South Korea 8.5, Taiwan 7.7, China 6.0, Singapore 5.9, Hong Kong 5.6, UK 1.5, US 1.1, and Canada 0.3) (*Europa World Yearbook* 1994). One context where Hong Kong's sustainable urbanism could be prototypical is the upcoming Yangtze Basin plan. Over two hundred cities are expected to be rebuilt (Citizen 1997). Region-wide interest in Hong Kong's urbanization is therefore clear.

Most of the research reviewed on redevelopment in Hong Kong is over a decade old (Drakakis-Smith 1976, Ho 1984, Fong 1985, Leung 1986, Pang 1992). A gap in research lent support to a pilot study of redevelopment activity. Recent redevelopment activity was observed to be strong for both the private and public sectors. Privately owned housing, and housing managed by the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HKHA) shared equally in the total 1.75 M units at the end of 1994 (Rating and Valuation Department 1993). Supply rates were also fairly balanced with net growth rates for each sector around 3 percent, historical and projected, from 1992 to 2001 (HKHA 1993). The redevelopment of obsolete HKHA estates appeared strong, with an annual average rate of 30 percent of residents rehoused from 1989 to 1994 being under the 'reprovisionment' category (HKHA 1994). The private sector redevelopment of Hong Kong's older urban areas was then investigated in greater depth.

Our findings revealed increasingly active redevelopment of Hong Kong's older urban areas by the private sector. From sample data (Buildings Department) between 1984 and 1993, in the private sector alone, redevelopment activity in urban districts is estimated at daily rates of 1.5 buildings demolished, and 1.3 buildings newly constructed. Redevelopment by the private sector has also been increasing in urban areas. One estimate finds that prior to 1986, buildings demolished remained below 500 buildings per year. From 1987 onward, this value has not dropped below 700 buildings per year. Future expectations for private sector-led redevelopment of Hong Kong's older urban areas remain high. Since the stock of buildings more than thirty years old will double from 20 percent to 40 percent during the next twelve years (Hong Kong Standard 1997).

Trends in building type reveal housing activity as primary, with some commercial building activity replacing housing. From the same sample (1984-1993) of demolition data, it is estimated that tenement type dwellings and apartment type dwellings accounted for, on average, the majority of building types demolished, at 70 percent and 17 percent respectively. From occupancy data, only an estimated 50 percent of total usable floor area was dedicated to domestic type occupancy. Twenty percent was dedicated to commercial use. A trend towards increasing shares of commercial space and decreasing shares of housing space is further suggested. When the first (1984-1988) and last five year figures (1989-1993) are averaged and compared, the share of space intended for commercial occupancy rises from 16 percent to 31 percent. In contrast, the share of space intended for domestic occupancy declines from 61 percent to 38 percent. Trends include infill or single-building redevelopment, and medium-rise structures being replaced by high-rise form. This spatial transition accommodates an improvement in floor area per person, where decreasing household size, increasing self-containment of households, and increasing unit size is readily observed (Census and Statistics Department 1981 1991, Rating and Valuation Department 1984 1993). One estimate placed displacees between 10,000 and 20,000 persons annually on account of private sector redevelopment. However, this mobility amounts to only 5 percent of estimated annual moves between 1976 and 1981 (Census and Statistics Department 1981). Findings on displacement are comparable to documented statistics on involuntary mobility in the US.

Redevelopment by the private sector, infill or otherwise, is complemented with small but increasing activity by Hong Kong's urban renewal agencies, the Land Development Corporation and the Hong Kong Housing Society. In 1994, this public/private development sector held only a two percent share of the total housing units. In the near future, local planning will likely enhance this sector's share of Hong Kong's redevelopment further, by way of an Urban Renewal Authority scheduled to commence operations in 1999 (Hong Kong Standard 1997). The public/private sector has a history of redevelopment activity in areas of need overlooked by the private sector due to uncertain profit margins. Advantages are land resumption opportunities, subsidization, and zoning. Case studies involving a total of nearly 8500 displaced persons revealed that living conditions for a minimum 55 percent of the population improved. Case-study findings are detailed elsewhere (Susnik and Ganesan 1997). In brief, displacement outcomes usually meant relocation to a building with better infrastructure and quality of construction, internal densities decreasing from nine to four persons per housing unit, increased open space and other amenity provision, a reduction in monthly rental burden to one sixth of the original expenditure, and rehousing in mostly neighborhoods of equivalent status. Other gains observed for those affected by the renewal projects are home ownership and elderly shelter opportunities. The redevelopment housing provides more 'sandwich class' housing at subsidized rental rates or purchase price, increases internal space provision from 8 sq.m. per person to 15 sq.m. per person, and stabilizes the housing stock in central urban districts. Through phasing, in-situ elderly housing is increased. Specifically augmented is the quality of life of beneficiary mature households through *aging in place* (Pollack 1994) and *independent living* (Wister 1989) factors.

This completes our presentation of evidence in support of Hong Kong's success in the recent redevelopment of its older urban areas. The remainder of this paper is aimed at providing issues for consideration by localities faced with an increasingly obsolete building stock, and global economies.

Possible Structural Determinants of Redevelopment

This section, built upon Clark's (1994) *synthesis*, serves as a preliminary but quantitative presentation of the possible causes of urban redevelopment for Hong Kong. The main research question was, what structural forces determine Hong Kong's redevelopment activity. New production, the shift from industrial to service sector growth, is recognized as transforming building stock in urban areas (Smith and Williams 1986, London 1992, Frey 1993). Real estate as a variable of causation is essentially reflected in the shift in capital investment to central city property development (Cox and Howard 1973, Feagin 1982, Bourne 1993). Social transition is also believed to influence building upgrade. The in-migration of residents with higher social status to inner cities is currently at issue (Zukin 1982, Smith and Williams 1986, Filion 1991).

From background theory, the following independent variables were analyzed:

> Real estate - office rental rates and purchase price, housing rental rates and purchase price, and housing stock and supply;
>
> Production - services/manufacturing shares, office and factory space, and residential patterns by industry of employment; and
>
> Social factors - income, occupation, education, employment status, living quarter type, and tenure type.

Data on building demolition and new occupancy activity is obtained from monthly statistics on permits issued by the Buildings Department, Government of Hong Kong. The description of redevelopment is based on type, frequency, and location of building demolition and occupancy consents issued. Quantitative data are again for the ten-year period between 1984 and 1993. In the case of data on causal factors, data were retrieved from the Rating and Valuation (RVD) and Census and Statistics (CSD) Departments of the Hong Kong Government. Most independent variable figures are for the ten-year periods fluctuating between 1981 and 1994.

There were limitations to this study based on inconsistencies between the various sources of data. Inconsistencies in data are due in part to differences in geographic district delineation. To overcome this difficulty, an agglomerated system of districts for identifying attribute populations was used. Due in part to this procedure, the sample size, i.e. number of districts compared (n) becomes limited in size to 16 or, in the case of purchase and rent prices, below this. Several approaches were used to overcome these limitations: testing causal factors with a diversity of attributes; exploring longitudinal data; and combining three tests of statistical association. The results are therefore fairly reliable.

The dependent variable, redevelopment, has several possible causal relationships among real estate, production, and social factors. Correlation analysis produced moderate to strong results for most bivariate associations. A comparison between the results for service industry workers relative to persons in service occupations was warranted. Service industry workers include: services; wholesale and retail trades, restaurants; hotels; transport, storage, and communication; and financing, insurance, real estate and business services (Census and Statistical Department 1991). Service occupations are: professional, technical, and related workers; administrative and managerial workers; clerical and related workers; sales workers; and service workers (Census and Statistical Department 1991). Service occupation employment appeared to produce consistently strong results with redevelopment activity. For service industry workers, association reduced from strong to moderate between 1981 and 1991. Other inconsistent results were for office purchase price and rental rates. Where association to redevelopment appeared strong for purchase price, it was weak for rental rate. These two factors do not always move in tandem. More so, contrasting results may be attributable to limited redevelopment for office space in certain districts. Additionally, the status of *owner occupancies* revealed an increase in statistical association to redevelopment from moderate to strong between 1981 and 1991. This differential is likely attributable to the substantial increase in home ownership opportunities over the ten year period.

A partial correlation coefficient analysis was also revealing. Among production, real estate, and social factors, nine attributes resulted in Pearson's r values of 0.7 or better for the first data set (1981 or 1982). Four or more control variables were introduced into the relationships between these nine attributes and redevelopment activity data. When control variables were introduced, the argument for possible causality among certain attributes strengthened. In addition, a hierarchy among determinants was suggested. It would appear that, foremost, social factors are partially causal to redevelopment activity. After control variables were introduced, the following three variables produced the strongest links to redevelopment: higher education, service occupation, and service industry employment. What became clear is that while attributes of real property development may be arguable as impetus behind redevelopment activity, they appear to be contingent on transitions in society and production.

Multiple regression analysis was used to test support or dismissal of results from correlation and controlled correlation analyses. Four equations were run. The attribute *higher education* retained the strongest influence on demolition activity, with the highest estimated coefficient at 28.7. In the second equation run, with the former variable omitted, *above median income* is highest with an estimated coefficient of 3.6. Similarly, *service occupations* ranked third in relative priority, with an estimated coefficient of 9.3 in the third equation run. In the fourth run, *housing stock* produced the highest estimated coefficient at 1.3. The following argument is thereby put forward.

Social factors are the impetus behind redevelopment in Hong

Kong's older urban areas. Empirical analyses of structural factors point to a hierarchical order, with increased education as most important, followed by growth in personal income, and finally service occupation employment.

Discussion: Economic Globalization and Sustainability in the Long Term

The issue chosen for discussion is, can Hong Kong's redevelopment be sustained in the long term? In response to this dilemma, this discussion attempts to link structural determinants of redevelopment to economic globalization. The prevailing Southeast Asian currency crisis is addressed.

A basic demand for trade, financial and insurance services has long underpinned Hong Kong's strong economic ties to the mainland and other Asian Territories. In the last two decades, this demand has stretched into technology transfer needs and information technology. Education and advanced professional training is vital in this context, and the beneficiaries invariably enjoy a higher income and a better social status. The more affluent households demand upgraded residential space, and boost demand for recreational, commercial and all forms of modern services. The real estate sector responds with more intensive use of land, high rise structures, which, in recent years, has taken the form of mixed use layouts and developments promoting mixed uses within the same building. New and more educated recruits to the service sector use more office space per capita. The information revolution further increases the space occupied by those in service occupations. Investment in real property, whether in new projects or in redevelopment activity, will follow only when upward social mobility of the residents is established. Our analysis confirms this understanding. Still findings also indicate that elements of real estate, in particular, the allocation of land for competing uses, as well as the land pricing mechanism, remain important to the causation model of redevelopment. For example, it would seem that housing is a major force within redevelopment. Yet the cost of office space is approximately twice that of residential space in inner or central urban areas. Because Hong Kong emulates a city-state, with a fairly good transport network, many households are attracted to cheaper residential location within a reasonable distance of service employment centers. Developers of office, hotel, or other commercial uses are able to offer higher prices at the government land auctions. Thus, commercial space is replacing housing in older urban areas, a primary force being the higher price. The issue of sustainable urbanism through the redevelopment of older urban areas may therefore be complemented by discussion of economic viability in the long term.

The ability of Hong Kong to generate resources for development or redevelopment depends crucially on its economic ties with the mainland. With the rapid development of Guangzhou in South China and Shanghai, Hong Kong's service sector would face increasingly stiffer competition, but at the same time, benefit from regional economic agglomeration. It makes sense to view Hong Kong's future as part of South China. Streeten (1989) draws our attention to greater interdependencies in the world economy. Government policies elsewhere impact on interest rates, exchange value, and inflation in developing countries. A balance in payment crisis in a developing country will mean deflation, increased cost in local currency repaying local and foreign debts, and corporate bankruptcies for many. Social demands upon the governments of developing countries have increased. Ability to satisfy them is handicapped by IMF policies on third world debt management, and US monetary policies which often tighten credit and increase the value of the US dollar.

Stewart (1992) reinforces this contention. Many countries in the Southern Hemisphere need foreign exchange injections to keep their economies growing. The 1997 Asian stock market crisis has focused precisely on this issue. South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand together owe US $379 billion to foreign debtors. Hale (International Herald Tribune, January 3, 1998) argues that South Korea's debt crisis is the result of an effort to maximize industrial production. In this article, Robert Broadfoot claims that "in Thailand, it was corruption, in Indonesia, nepotism, and in Korea, a warped relationship between business and government, that led to gross asset misallocation." South Korea's president-elect, Kim Dae Jung, has said that he is committed to replacing the "corrupt connection between business and political power." The analysis of Hale, however, claims that of the US $379 billion that is owed by these three countries, US $294 billion is owed by the private sector, mainly by companies that made use of political access to invest in "excessive and unprofitable" industrial, real estate, and infrastructure expansion. Bangkok's Golden Town is a monument to wasteful urban construction. Thailand's biggest residential project, financed by foreign loans, intended for 0.5 million people, stands abandoned as at January 1998. It is difficult to argue against the plan to build housing units on such a large scale in a city with acute housing shortages, but it is the high foreign resource content and the resulting prohibitive costs that have led to its abandonment.

Stewart (1992:10) emphasizes "the generalized foreign exchange shortages in the South" but excluded specifically South Korea and Taiwan from this difficulty in 1992. Within a period of only six years, South Korea is on the verge of bankruptcy, clearly unable to pay its foreign debt as originally scheduled. New loans from the IMF and other lenders are primarily being used for debt servicing, and not for purposes of productive investment or healthy consumption. As South Korea had enjoyed several years of favorable trade balances, the inescapable conclusion is that foreign exchange was used indiscriminately for conspicuous consumption, unproductive investments; i.e., projects that failed to generate adequate foreign income during their operations, and imports of raw materials to service local industries, where these enterprises were earning little foreign exchange. Similar difficulties are seen in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Even a country that enjoys a favorable trade balance for several years, such as China in the recent past, can have its stability

threatened within a few years, if correct investment policies are not followed for the economy in general, and in particular for the huge urban real estate sector. Essentially, foreign debt and investment flow from overseas must be used to strengthen the long term productive capacity of a nation's economy, especially in those sectors where necessary capacity increases cannot be achieved by the use solely of local resources. Foreign investment will slow down when the rate of return from the stock and property markets, or other financial instruments, begin to fall. When export markets shrink, following minor contractions in the economies of the US or the European Union, local currencies begin to depreciate, making the real rate of return decline even more. Subsequent inability to pay foreign debts threatens the stability of a local currency, poses the danger of imported inflation in construction, collapse of construction demand, loss making by construction and real estate firms, slow down of the urban economy and long-term loss of jobs.

Urban construction by itself is a large industry, justifying its own development strategy. A strategy must serve the principal macro-economic objectives related to growth, productivity, income distribution, saving and employment creation. Streeten (1981) correctly points out that "models that have been evolved in different historical and physical settings cannot be directly transplanted into entirely different cultures, or can be transplanted only at a cost." What is also referred to is mounting evidence that combining traditional and modern features can lead to successful developments. In the last three decades, output has grown twice as fast as employment in developing countries (Bhalla 1992). There is a need to adopt a technology for urban development that represents a prudent mix of foreign and local resources. Importing of foreign technologies to serve productivity and capacity needs in selected industries or new economic activities will coexist with a mass of capital saving and labor intensive activities. A key resource is international finance capital ne-cessary to procure advanced technology and other resources for innovations and modernization.

Urban construction tends to attract a greater proportion of a nation's foreign debt than its share in GDP would justify. Foreign debt is incurred by a combination of one or more of the following:

1. Foreign direct investment in a project requiring reparation of investment and profit at a later date;

2. Loans of various forms such as bonds issued overseas, commercial paper, loans from foreign banks raised by local investors;

3. Foreign exchange required during design and construction such as direct import of materials, equipment, among others;

4. Foreign exchange utilized during manufacture and distribution of building materials and other services for design and construction, furnishing and maintenance;

5. Overheads and profit of foreign design and construction firms; and

6. Foreign expenditures incurred during recurrent operations of the venture.

Development policy should therefore take a long-term view of a country's foreign exchange situation, and recommend an affordable level of foreign exchange availability to the urban development sector. An affordable level could well be the sum of two components. Allocation of foreign exchange to the sector should be in proportion to its contribution to the GDP. To this may be added the net foreign earnings from construction intensive projects, that is, annual earnings in foreign currency from a project minus the annual equivalent of the foreign exchange used in the development of the project, as well as net savings in foreign exchange resulting from the project's operation. It is quite possible that construction and related physical infrastructure could legitimately demand up to a quarter of all foreign exchange used for urban development.

In practice, the foreign exchange content of the market value of many urban ventures such as high-rise office and commercial buildings, hotels, and luxury residential blocks reach up to 75 percent in many Asian cities. With the exception of hotels during times of tourist booms, they seldom earn enough revenue in foreign currency to repay their debt. It is unwise, for example, to spend on an entertainment park up to 70 percent of its building cost in foreign exchange, if it will generate only 10 percent of its revenue in foreign currency. Such ventures could have a negative impact upon the trade balance, current account balance, as well as the overall balance payments of a country. The above condition is made worse by all forms of malpractice. Corruption increases investment cost by 10 percent or more, reduces investment return by a similar margin, and reduces a business's ability to repay local and foreign debt.

What lessons can be drawn from the severe Asian crisis for sustainable urbanism for Hong Kong and South China? No region in the world has grown faster than South China, including Shanghai and Hong Kong in the last twenty years. Joint business ventures between foreign and local parties that supply design, construction and development services, as well as commercial building and infrastructure projects were among the principal beneficiaries of foreign direct investment. Favorable trade balances and a healthy foreign reserve have helped China to maintain exchange rate stability so far, and minimize Asian contagion. An optimum level of foreign investment in urban construction should be maintained in South China, including Hong Kong and Shanghai, such that the overall balance of payments in all of the PRC is not adversely affected. Ganesan (1979, 1994) has addressed the practical implications of this strategy for the construction sector in developing countries.

Conclusions

It is hoped that Hong Kong's model of successful redevelopment will challenge others to initiate comparative research elsewhere. Hong Kong itself experiences no foreign exchange shortages. One interesting comparison could be made where, unlike in Hong Kong, there is a contrasting foreign capital base to the economy, and real estate and construction investment. Other factors that could be incorporated into comparative analyses may include the following: weakness in control over rural to urban migration, higher unemployment, differentials in public housing stock or comprehensive renewal opportunities, medium to low density built form, and finally reduced economic growth.

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38 THE POLARIZATION EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE STATE OF QUERETARO, MEXICO

Juan Carlos Trejo Jiménez

Introduction

In 1986, Mexico began the process of opening its economy. In 1994, NAFTA began to operate. Such macroeconomic policies have had a strong effect in the spatial distribution of investment and population in Mexico.[1] This paper intends to show the polarization effects globalization is having on the state of Queretaro, Mexico. While the capital of the state transformed from being a traditional town to a regional metropolis in less than 40 years, peripheral municipalities remain critically undeveloped. The paper begins with a description of the processes that affected the capital city's development. Then, it delineates the case of a small municipality located in the central area of the state. After describing the differences between both of them, the author suggest the creation of intermunicipal coalitions as a means to promote a more balanced development. The key element to reach that objective is political consensus.

The History of Queretaro City

Spaniards founded Queretaro City in 1531, next to an Otomí settlement.[2] The location of the city contributed to the commercial, agricultural and industrial prosperity of the city. Queretaro played an important role as a link between the mining cities, located further north, and the agricultural cities in the center of Mexico. Such a role made the city a center of the tobacco and garment industries as well as a center for the distribution of industrial products. During the Spanish colonial period, Queretaro was a first-order religious center. Most of the monastic orders established centers in Queretaro to evangelize on behalf of the Spanish crown. The establishment of many convents in the city set the base for Queretaro's culture. Besides their evangelization duties, friars began to give general instruction to people. All that made of Queretaro a great cultural center.

The city of Queretaro has played a significant role in the national history. It was the home of the conspirator group which planned the independence movement. Later in the nineteenth century, during the empire of Maximiliano, the city was the scene of the confrontation of liberals versus conservatives. The confrontation ended with the execution of Maximiliano in 1867; after that war, the city was practically destroyed and society was very fragmented by political ideologies. In 1882, the construction of the railroad accelerated commerce and communications with the capital of the country and with other cities as well. The reactivation of the economy resulted in the construction of infrastructure for development; for example, the system for the distribution of potable water, and the first hydroelectric plant of the state.

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During the years of Mexican revolution (1910–1916), Queretaro went through a period of economic stagnation and a little population decrease. When the revolution ended, Venustiano Carranza, president of Mexico at that time, designated Queretaro as official home of the Congress which was in charge of writing the new constitution. During that time, the federal government invested in widening streets and renewing historical buildings. Due to the world economic depression of the 1930s, economic and demographic growth of the city stagnated once again. In the following decades, and under the influence of the Second World War, and the industrial development of the country, Queretaro lived a period of economic growth in close relation to the capital of the country and as an important agrarian center.

Nowadays, the location of Queretaro City continues to give it an important role in the national economy. The city is located 110 miles northeast of Mexico City, along the freeway Mexico City-Leon. The city is immersed in a highly populated region called El Bajío, which constitutes a net of important cities and secondary towns.

Queretaro City and the Industrialization Policies of the Federal Government

The City of Queretaro has benefited from several policies of the federal government designed to improve the distribution of economic activities and population in the country, and to avoid the excessive concentration of activities in Mexico City. Table 1 shows how Mexico City concentrates almost half of the industrial production of the country.[3] The first of such policies was the Program for the Promotion of industrial Zones and Cities in 1970.[4] The program had two basic objectives: to stimulate Mexico City's decentralization and to reduce regional inequalities.[5] The criteria for selecting the cities benefiting from this program were: a) use of existing infrastructure and natural resources; b) equity in the distribution of the benefits of industrial development; c) urban and industrial decentralization; d) grouping of industries by affinity.[6]

The first industrial park in Queretaro was built in 1972. According to Aguilar Barajas (1993), Queretaro's industrial zone was one of the most successful in the country. Although many authors concur in claiming that the industrial zones' program was not successful in promoting decentralization from Mexico City,[7] Aguilar Barajas (1993) points out that much of the industrial development of Queretaro City from 1960 through 1980 was due to the decentralization of industries from Mexico City. During those two decades, Queretaro transformed from a traditional town to an industrialized city. Following is a description of the physical transformation experienced by the city at that time.[8]

Table 1 Distribution of industries in Mexico (1930–1980)

	Number of Plants (percent)	Gross Production (percent)
1930		
Mexico	100.00	100.00
Mexico City	6.80	28.50
Rest of the Country	93.20	71.50
1940		
Mexico	100.00	100.00
Mexico City	8.70	32.10
Rest of the Country	91.30	67.90
1950		
Mexico	100.00	100.00
Mexico City	20.00	40.00
Rest of the Country	80.00	60.00
1960		
Mexico	100.00	100.00
Mexico City	29.90	46.00
Rest of the Country	70.10	54.00
1970		
Mexico	100.00	100.00
Mexico City	27.90	46.80
Rest of the Country	72.10	53.20
1980		
Mexico	100.00	100.00
Mexico City	29.50	48.00
Rest of the Country	70.50	25.00

Source: Garza (1986)

Queretaro, the Traditional Town (Up to 1960)

From 1900 to 1940, the population of Queretaro city was stable. In 1940 the city had a population of 37,000 people. Beginning in 1940, the population grew at a rate of 3.9% and in 1950 the city had 50,000 inhabitants. The center of the urban area presented a high population density which decreased gradually towards the periphery. Most of the population lived in the downtown area. At the edge of the city, residential areas with low density began to appear. The streets in the new neighborhoods continued the reticular pattern from the historic center.

The city was clearly delimited by the road belt (Figure 1). At this time, there were neither illegal settlements nor projects for the construction of social housing.[9] The downtown area was the administrative, cultural and commercial center of the city. Land values decreased from downtown to the periphery. There were neither subcenters nor industrial zones. Income groups lived mixed in traditional neighborhoods. Land use was mixed.

The Fragmented City (1960 -1980)

The city experienced accelerated population growth. Between 1960 and 1970, the average annual growth rate of the population was 5%. In 1970, the population was 113,000. In the next decade, the population almost doubled and was 217,000 by 1980.

During the first decade, population density was increasing until fast spatial growth outwards began. There emerged new low-density residential areas in the periphery. There were also peripheral residential areas with high density, especially next to the industrial zone, where the first social housing neighborhoods were built. The new residential neighborhoods present the first curved streets, breaking the traditional reticular pattern. The city transcends the growth limits established by the road belt. The first irregular settlements appear in the periphery (Figure 2).

Urban commercial corridors emerge and in 1978 the first shopping mall was opened. Three years later, a new shopping mall was established. The commercial importance of the central area decreases. The highest land values are not found in the central area anymore. Now, the most expensive land is the one on the new commercial corridors and on the exclusive residential areas. Real estate speculation begins which results in many vacant lots in the urban area, especially in the residential areas with middle and high income. The first industrial park in the city was built in 1972. Social segregation by income group began to be present. A new freeway to Mexico City was built in the late 1960s. A regional airport was built.

Queretaro in the National Urban Development and Housing Program (1984)

In 1982, Mexico faced a severe economic crisis as a result of the international crash of oil prices. The crisis resulted in a reduction of new investment.[10] However, Queretaro City kept growing, thanks to several programs promoted by the federal government.

The new economic reality obliged the government to change its development strategy. Before 1981, Mexican government

Figure 1 Growth Model of Queretaro City (1940–1960)



Figure 2 Growth Model of Queretaro City (1960–1980)



was planning to administrate abundance, because, thanks to the oil exports, the economy of the country was doing very well. After the crisis, the government had to plan more but with less resources. It was necessary to direct investment towards strategic points instead of creating new development poles as had been done in the past.[11]

The National Urban Development and Housing Program (1984) established the development of medium-size cities as a priority. Investment was going to be directed towards cities with a population between 100,000 and 1,000,000. The government classified those strategic cities according to their economic vocation: a) agricultural centers; b) industrial centers; c) tourism centers.[12]

Also, the plan defined a smaller group of cities and urban corridors as critical zones. Such areas presented the following characteristics: a) demographic growth exceeding the growth of urban structures; b) fast growth expectations; c) a key role in the national economy.[13] Queretaro was included among those critical areas. Thanks to that, the city was one of the major recipients of federal investment from 1983 to 1989.[14]

Decentralization of Mexico City after the Earthquake

The big earthquake experienced by Mexico City on the 19th of September, 1985, gave new strength to the decentralization arguments. Now, excessive concentration of economic activities was not only an obstacle for the development of the country. It was also a threat because people realized that a natural catastrophe could destroy half of the economic activities of the country.[15] Garza (1996) argues that the key question at that time was: "Why to take such a risk if, earthquake or not, it is convenient to reduce the growth of Mexico City?"

In the years after the earthquake, Queretaro received several government offices which were decentralized from the capital city. In the research realm, Queretaro became the new headquarters of the Mexican Institute of Transportation, the National Institute of Metrology and the National Institute of Fiscal Instruction. In the cultural sphere, it acquired the National Ballet Company. The establishment of those institutions in Queretaro contributed to the cultural diversity of the city.[16]

The Commercial Opening and the 100 Cities Program

In 1986, Mexico began the process of economic opening. According to Graizbord (1996), trade policies in Mexico have had a greater effect than the policies especially designed to promote economic decentralization. The author says that, under the import substitution model, economics of scale were very important for industries. With the economic opening, the benefits of economics of scale decrease and economic decentralization becomes not only possible but desirable.[17]

In 1993, shortly before NAFTA began to operate, the federal government set up its urban development strategy to reinforce the competitive position of Mexican Cities. The program had the name of 100 Cities because it was intended to spur development in 100 strategic cities.[18] The 100 Cities program assumed that migration would flow towards the cities where the commercial opening had a significant impact. It was needed to provide those cities with enough infrastructure to accommodate the immigrants.[19]

Richardson (1995) made an analysis of the cities that were going to benefit from NAFTA, based on the types of industries which every city had. According to him there were going to be winner sectors and loser sectors. Queretaro's industries were within the winner sectors. So, the city was expected to grow very fast. Therefore, it was not surprising that Queretaro was included in the 100 Cities program. The program provided strategic cities with funds for projects such as: historic building restoration, church restoration, solid waste management facilities, cadastral modernization and urban development plans. Table 2 shows the amounts invested in Queretaro through this program.

Table 2 Distribution of industries in Mexico (1930–1980)

100 Cities Program Investment in Queretaro	
1993	71,400,000.00
1994	47,990,000.00
1996	17,980,000.00
1997	21,400,000.00
1998	26,428,000.00

Source: The Ministry of Social Development at its Queretaro Office

The Transformation into a Regional Metropolis[20]

The programs described above, contributed to the transformation of Queretaro from a traditional town into a regional metropolis in very few years. In the late 1980s Queretaro city began to "absorb" some of the neighbor communities (Figure 3).

Nowadays, the urban area of Queretaro City incorporates four different municipalities. The fastest demographic growth does not occur in the municipality of Queretaro but in the neighboring ones. New industrial zones are built in the municipality of El Marques, along the freeway to Mexico City. Many private universities began to operate in Queretaro City and new research institutions are being established. There are two subcenters in the city. The North Center has been occupied by low-income housing. The South Center resulted from private investment and is intended to become a regional

Figure 3 Growth Model of Queretaro City (1980–1994)

service center. It is going to be complementary to an industrial corridor from the city of San Juan del Rio to Queretaro.

New parks and sport facilities were built in the city. Also, demographic growth attracted private investors of the entertainment industry; Queretaro has modern movie theaters and shopping malls. Because of the cultural diversification, the city offers a variety of shows including concerts by the Philharmonic Orchestra and many other attractions such as theater plays and art exhibitions.

The Polarization of Development at the State Level

Queretaro has always been an important city. As was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the location of the city has been key for its economic progress. Therefore, it would be false to argue that globalization is the cause of the big differences in development between the capital of the state and the other communities. However, all the investment Queretaro is receiving because of its role in the economic modernization of Mexico has widened the gap between the capital city and the peripheral municipalities. If, as pointed out by Richardson (1995), Queretaro is going to keep growing as a result of NAFTA, the polarization effect will be bigger. Currently, the capital of the state concentrates 50% of the industries in the state, 72% of the workers registered in the social security system and 45% of the population.

While Queretaro became a modern city, the rest of the state remains critically underdeveloped. Unfortunately, there has not been much research on this matter. Hence, the author presents the case of Ezequiel Montes, a municipality located in the central area of the state, as an example of what the situation is in the rest of the state of Queretaro.

The Case of Ezequiel Montes, Queretaro

Ezequiel Montes was founded in 1861 by 7 families who came from Queretaro City. Because of its location within the state, Ezequiel Montes became a commercial center for the center and northern regions of the state. In 1995, the municipality had a population of 25,605 with an average growth rate of 3.43%.[21] Although Ezequiel Montes is one of the fast growing municipalities in the state of Queretaro, it presents serious deficiencies in infrastructure, public services and urban amenities. The author organized a focus group session with some youth from Ezequiel Montes who migrated to Queretaro City to understand in what way Ezequiel Montes does not satisfy the expectations of its population. The first reason to migrate, according to these youth, was the lack of educational opportunities. Most of the inhabitants of Ezequiel Montes cut their education after Junior High. There are two high schools in town but the academic level is very low. Therefore, students who plan to go to college, go to the capital of the state, searching for better education that will allow them to get admitted to the university.

The second reason to migrate is the lack of job opportunities. According to these youth, Ezequiel Montes is not an attractive place to work, because there is no diversity of jobs; almost all the businesses sell the same thing. Furthermore, most of the businesses are family enterprises and the important jobs are taken by the relatives of the owner. It is very difficult to get a good job there. People who graduate at the University of Queretaro cannot come back because there are no jobs for them in their hometown. They have three options: a) accepting a low paying job, b) starting their own business, c) migrating to search for better opportunities. Following in importance, they identify the lack of recreation facilities as the third reason to migrate. "There is nothing to do there". Other problems identified by them are: environmental pollution, lack of cultural activities, deficiencies in public safety service, heavy traffic due to the lack of adequate zoning, bad health services (there are no hospitals) and a very ugly urban image.

Duties of the Municipal Government

According to the Mexican legal system, municipal governments are in charge of providing public services such as: water and sewer, public markets, slaughter houses, solid waste collection, cemeteries, public safety and public spaces.[22]

The municipal authorities also have to "formulate and manage urban development and zoning plans". This faculty allows local governments to take part in all matters related with land use management, territorial reserves, construction permits, etc.

The Municipal Organic Law of the State of Queretaro

This law imposes on local governments the obligation of forming a *Municipal System of Social Participation*. The main objective of such a system would be to *"open spaces of participation for the development of the community"*.[23] The municipal organic law allows/obligates municipal governments to prepare Integral Development Plans and Sector Programs. Other faculties and obligations of Mexican local governments include:

- To establish a municipal entity for the control and evaluation of public expenses
- To formulate the Municipal Income Law every year[24]
- To promote the social and cultural well-being of the population

Besides the pressure imposed by the many responsibilities local governments have, municipalities are facing a growing supervision by society. This is due, in part, to the fact that the municipality is the first place where a citizen can go to ask for the satisfaction of his/her basic needs such as primary services and public safety.

The universe of facilities and obligations listed above, plus a closer watch by citizens, imposes on local authorities the obligation of searching for new finance schemes and organizational forms which allow the municipality to increase efficiency (because resources are scarce) and to legitimize their decisions (through social consensus).

Facing those challenges is difficult, especially for small municipalities, which have neither large budgets nor specialized human resources to plan development. Besides their own limitations, small municipalities compete for the attention of the state government with the municipalities included in the industrial corridor Queretaro-San Juan del Rio. Municipalities within this corridor concentrate 70% of the state population, 76% of students registered at Junior High level and 94% of the workers registered in the social security system. Also, those municipalities generate 78% of the solid waste generated in the state and extract 87% of the water from different sources.[25] In the presence of such a concentration, the state government might minimize the importance of the problems in the rest of the state, because it takes into account only the magnitude of the problems relative to the total numbers for the State. For example, the Municipality of Ezequiel Montes, represents only 2% of the state population; it has only 1.93% of students at Junior High level and 1% of the workers registered in the social security system. The municipality generates a mere 2% of the solid waste at the state level and extracts 1.5% of the water.

The above example makes very clear that, if Ezequiel Montes wants to get additional resources from the state and federal levels, neither the amount of its economic activities nor the seriousness of its problems would be the best argument. What Ezequiel Montes should do, through its plans and programs, is to show the existing development potential in the region, and to explain how larger amounts of investment in the area would contribute to the well-being of the State's population. Adopting a simplistic view of resources redistribution, by claiming that the municipality must receive more resources to promote equality within the state, would be a big mistake. As Garza (1986) claims, the relationship between the socio-economic structure and territorial phenomena has to be taken into account in the process of policy design. The author argues that it is not enough to identify the problem of excessive concentration of economic activities; planners must understand the causes of that concentration if they want to be able to reduce it.

Going back to our original problem, a municipality like Ezequiel Montes does not have specialized human resources to elaborate development plans which convince other levels of government that investing there is a good decision. Moreover, hiring a consultant to solve each problem would be too expensive considering the limited budget of the municipality. There is a vicious circle: the municipality cannot get more resources because it does not have an integral plan and because it does not develop productive projects. On the other hand, the municipality does not have an integral plan nor does it develop productive projects because it does not have resources.

To break that vicious circle, the author suggests, as an alternative, the coordination of efforts among municipalities. The author named this: *Intermunicipal Coalition for the Development of the Semi-arid Region of the State of Queretaro*. Five municipalities would be included in this coalition. Mexican legal system allows municipalities to form coalitions for a better provision of public services.[26] Following is a description, from the author's point of view, of the advantages an intermunicipal coalition would bring to individual municipalities:

Expansion of Horizons

A traditional municipal government works very hard to solve problems within its jurisdiction. That's the reason for its existence. However, there are problems which, although present within the municipality, have their origin elsewhere. Some other times, two or more municipalities share a problem

or one municipality may cause a problem to others. The creation of an intermunicipal coalition would help to reduce conflicts among municipalities. Also, it would be a powerful instrument to solve shared problems and to take advantage of external opportunities. In this way, the horizons of a particular municipal administration expand in terms of spatial jurisdiction, by taking into account the regional realm.

Time is the other important aspect of municipal government horizons. A traditional local authority is concerned with the situation of its municipality during three years.[27] This is good because mayors try to do better than former ones. However, the author argues that it is possible for the mayor to make things better in the future as well through the promotion of a long term culture. So, the municipal authority horizons would expand in time which would result in the sustainability of development.

Increase in Efficiency

When a municipality promotes development, it is limited by its resources. It may produce important and significant changes but always less than what it could produce joining efforts with others. With an intermunicipal coalition results would be regional. This is due to the fact that each municipality has different resources which can be put together for the common benefit.

Promotion of a Balanced Development

A municipality can raise the living standards of its population based on determination to improve capacity for negotiation and creativity. It might be assumed that a fast-progressing municipality does not have any incentive to associate with others where progress is slower. In the short run this may be true; however, the situation changes in the long run. If a municipality progresses very fast, it will retain its population. Furthermore, it will tend to attract population from neighboring municipalities. This would provoke a very fast population growth making problems more complex. Hence, in the long run, a municipality will do better if its living standards are similar to the ones of its neighbors.

Access to New Funding Sources

Individually, a municipality is limited to the traditional funding sources: its own resources, and state and federal transfers. Having an intermunicipal coalition may open many doors for local governments. If they have qualified personnel working for them, municipalities can seek links with national or international organizations interested in promoting development. In this way, the money invested in the coalition will be recouped through enhanced access to new funding sources.

What is Needed to Begin

Before this coalition can work, a political consensus on the benefits of working together has to be in place. It is very important to take the political aspects into account if this is to succeed in the future. Currently, this proposal to create a municipal coalition is being negotiated at the state level and among different municipalities in Queretaro. Hopefully, the intermunicipal coalition will be working very soon, trying to balance development in the state of Queretaro.

Notes

[1] See Graizbord (1996)

[2] The Otomíes were the ethnic group who lived in the region.

[3] See Garza (1986)

[4] For an explanation of the difference between an industrial zone and an industrial city, see Aguilar Barajas (1993)

[5] See Garza (1989)

[6] Ibid.

[7] See Garza (1989) and Graizbord (1996)

[8] The description was taken from PUEC-UNAM (forthcoming)

[9] Social housing means the houses built through government programs.

[10] See Pradilla Cobos (1995) and Quintanilla (1996)

[11] Conolly (1989)

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] See Aguilar, Adrián G. And others (1996)

[15] See Garza (1986:232)

[16] Data taken from PUEC-UNAM (Forthcoming)

[17] See Graizbord (1996)

[18] See map in the appendix

[19] See Castro (1995)

[20] Taken from PUEC-UNAM (Forthcoming)

[21] Data taken from the Integral Development Plan 1998-2000

[22] Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution

[23] See Chapter II of the 4th title of the law

[24] This law establishes how much money a municipality will get during the year and the sources it is going to get the money from.

[25] Data taken from Secretar'a de Desarrollo Econ—mico (1996)

[26] Articles 115 of the Constitution and 34 of the Municipal Organic Law of the State of Queretaro

[27] According to law, a person can serve as mayor for three years without the right for immediate reelection

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39 GROWTH AND METAMORPHOSIS OF BOMBAY THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES OF GLOBALISATION

Sulabha Brahme

"Today's Chinatown sweatshops and Third World child labour factories are the functional equivalent of colonial slavery."[1] The slave hunt and slave trade launched in the 16th century by the British and European merchants was so flourishing that by 1770 profits derived from slavery furnished a third of the British capital formation.[2] The colonial loot was the other major source of British capital accumulation. The British East India Company founded by London merchants received in 1600 the monopoly of British Trade with India. The trade involved procurement from Indian handicrafts men, often by force, of cotton-piece goods and other merchandise for export to Europe. The Company earned huge profits through this loot and trade, its dividends varying from 100 to 250 percent per annum.[3] The plunder of India provided capital for the development of industrial capitalism in Britain. In the nineteenth century the economic drain of India continued ruthlessly in the form of heavy taxes, home charges, cost of military and wars, tribute and plunder. After the Industrial Revolution in Britain, India provided a 'captive' market for the rapidly expanding British manufacturers, held captive through tariff and duty manipulations. British capital investment in India, together with intense exploitation of Indian labour, backed by the forces of the Crown, represented the third source in the system of imperial robbery. [4]

Bombay (Mumbai, the original name was resumed by the Government in 1995) and Calcutta were the main British outposts in India to organise the plunder of the countryside and channelise it to Britain.

Birth of Bombay

Bombay Island (Map 1)—a group of seven islands separated by tidal marshes (which were reclaimed, and a single island was formed by the nineteenth century)—was ceded by the Portuguese to Britain in a matrimonial and military alliance concluded in 1661. This Crown property was transferred to the East India Company in 1667. Bombay's excellent natural harbour which faced the mainland across Bombay Bay provided safe anchorage in all seasons.[5] It served as a naval base and a port of transhipment for the merchandise brought from Surat in Gujarat to be re-exported to Europe. As the Industrial Revolution gathered momentum in Britain, Bombay became the main outlet of export of cotton from Gujarat and neighbouring parts to England and export of opium to China, and import of mill-made British cloth to India. The huge profits accumulated through loot and trade financed the military activities of the Company and the company subsequently succeeded by 1818 in annexing a large portion of Western India and grouping it into Bombay Presidency. State administrative functions were added as the Company decided to move the capital of the Presidency from Pune to

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Map 1 Bombay Island



Bombay.

Cotton textile industry was established in Bombay from the 1850s by Parsi and Gujarati capital. The first railway track was laid down from Bombay in 1853 and the railway was extended to cotton-growing tracks of Gujarat and Khandesh supporting expansion of textile industry in Bombay. The development of overseas communications, the opening up of the Suez Canal in 1869 made Bombay the 'Gateway of India'.

The growth of Bombay city resulted in the displacement of Island's inhabitants, the Kolis (fisher folks), Agris (cultivators) and Bhandaris (toddi-tappers). Fishing sites, salt marshes, coconut and palm orchards and rice-fields were lost with the onward march of Bombay. The ship-building industry and building construction in Bombay and sleepers laid along hundreds of miles of railway track required enormous quantity of timber. To meet this demand, the Collector of the adjoining Ratnagiri District removed in 1829 all the earlier restrictions on tree felling.[6] Within a period of 20 years the district was stripped of its rich extensive forest cover with disastrous consequences. The torrential rains washed the bared steep slopes with fury, eroding rice fields and depositing heaps of silt in the mouths of rivers. Consequently the riverine and sea trade was ruined. The district that had exported rice was forced to export impoverished peasants to Bombay. Supply of cheap labour to work in the docks, in railways and in textile mills was thus ensured. In 1911, two-thirds of the total Bombay mill workers were from Ratnagiri district.

City of Migrants

(Refer to Table 1) The trade and industrial potential attracted to Bombay, business communities mainly from Gujarat: Parsis, Marwaris, Jain and Hindu Gujarati Banias, Bohras and Khojas (Muslims), and from outside India, Armenians, Jews, Arabs, Persians, Europeans. At the top of the hierarchy were the British masters.[7] Parsis collaborated with the British in most commercial enterprises as middlemen, brokers, agents, contractors. Parsi master-builders helped develop a ship-building industry in Bombay. Maharashtrians formed half the population of Bombay. The literate castes of Brahmins and Prabhus served as clerks and filled the lower echelons of the bureaucracy while the toiling *shudra* castes—Kunbis, Sutar, Lohar, Teli, Chambhar, Mahar etc.—worked as mill-hands, artisans, labourers and coolies.

The city, from its inception though a part of Maharashtra, was an international city with its fortunes fluctuating with the world trade and economic developments and harboured a cosmopolitan population (Table 2) multilingual, multi-religious, with marked ethnic diversity. This sowed the seeds of a demand for the creation of an independent Bombay City state in the Post-independence period and the "sons of the soil" controversy from the mid 1960s. The consequences of these tensions and conflicts are discussed in a subsequent section.

Table 1 Population of Greater Bombay and Migration (figures in '000)

Year	Bombay City	Suburbs	Greater Bombay	Decennial net Migration	Migration (as % of total increase)
1901*	776	71	928	- -	
1911	979	82	1149	350	158
1921	1176	118	1380	400	172
1931	1181	141	1398	75	441
1941	1490	205	1801	400	99
1951	2329	510	2984	950	80
1961	2771	1037	4152	600	52
1971	3070	2167	5971	885	49
1981	3285	3523	8243	1100	47
1991	3175	4168	9925#	1200	46

Notes : * Earlier population estimates (year, population in '000) - 1715, 16; 1780, 114; 1816, 222; 1864, 817; 1872, 644; 1881, 773; 1891, 822.

This Census estimate is an under-enumeration. If migration figure of 1200,000 is adjusted, the corrected estimate is 10800,000 persons.

(Source : Population Census of India for various years)

Table 2 A Linguistic Composition of Greater Bombay (figures in %)

Language	**1881**	**1901**	**1921**	**1931**	**1951**	**1981**
Marathi	50.2	50.6	53.4	49.4	43.6	45.7
Konkani	4.4	0.5	2.6	3.4	4.6	
Gujrati	20.0	20.9	19.4	19.9	18.4	14.4
Kutchi	6.8	5.1	3.1	0.1	1.5	
Hindi	12.6	15.6	15.0	17.4	19.0	21.6*
South Indian languages	2.2	1.5	2.5	3.3	7.7	7.8

Note : * Including Urdu 9.4%.

Table 2 B Religious Composition of Greater Bombay

Religion	**1881**	**1901**	**1921**	**1951**	**1981**	**1991**
Hindu	65.0	65.5	71.4	71.8	75.0*	73.7*
Muslim	20.5	20.1	15.0	14.5	14.5	16.9
Christian	5.5	5.8	6.8	7.3	4.8	4.4
Jain	2.2	1.8	1.9	2.8	4.2	3.6
Parsi	6.3	6.0	4.1	2.4	negligible	negligible
Others	0.5	0.8	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.4

Note : * including 5.7 Buddhist population (Mahars converted in 1956) for both years.

Table 2 C Ethnic Diversity of Bombay (Figures in %)

	1780 @	
Community	Bombay Fort	Mahim Town
Muslim	25	8
Christian	21 *	42
Parsi	9	negligible
Hindu	42	44
Koli #	10	14
Bhandari #	6	5
Kunbi Agri #	1	10
Bramhin-Prabhu	5	2
Baniya Wani etc.	7	3
Sutar Lohar etc.	9	2
Panchkalshi #	4	8

	1931
Community	Bombay City
Muslim	17.2
Christian	8.3
Parsi	4.6
Hindu	68.0
Koli #	0.5
Mali	2.6
Kunbi Maratha #	17.9
Bramhin	3.7
Baniya Wani etc.	5.7
Mahar	5.8
Other depressed	3.3

Note : @ Data excludes soldiers and labourers

Natives,

* British 3%, Portuguese, Armenians 7%.

(source for Table 2 : Population Census of India for various years)

Plunder of India Through Bombay

The British and the Indian merchant community of Bombay amassed huge wealth through the drain of countryside via plunder of agrarian economy, ruin of artisan industry and super-exploitation of labour.

Plunder of Agrarian Economy

The British rulers changed the indigenous land system, created a new class of *Zamindars* or landlords, allies of the British. Under the new system the peasants were crushed under the triple burden of heavy revenue to be paid in cash, onerous land rent and interest burden that increased with each famine year. Peasants were coerced into cultivation of cotton, indigo, jute and other cash crops, reducing the area under food crops. Foodgrains were exported even in famine years. All the forest areas were brought under Crown ownership dispossessing indigenous tribal population and peasants from their traditional rights. Plantations, mines, factories displaced peasants by thousands. The resources of the countryside were thus forcefully harnessed for the growth of British industry in Britain and in India, in addition to the direct tribute imposed on the peasantry in the form of land revenue, salt tax and excise duties. The peasants paid the price for the prosperity of British industry and business, in terms of millions of famine deaths,[8] starvation and immiserisation.

Ruin of Artisan Industry

Before the British rule, only half of the Indian population was dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and the rest was engaged in weaving cloth, metal and leather industries, food processing, pottery, transport, trade, administration, military service etc. By tariff discrimination, the British textile industry was built and the prosperous textile industry in India was devastated. Between 1815 and 1832 the value of Indian cotton goods exported fell from £1.3 million to below £10,000 and the value of English exports to India rose from Pounds 26,000 to 400,000 which was equal to 25% of British cotton goods export.[9] The ruin of all the highly skilled centuries old manufacturing and related trades was so complete that millions left the cities and moved to the villages. Consequently the dependency on agriculture rose from 50% to 70 percent. Famines forced sections of ruined peasants to migrate to new cities like Bombay where they were super-exploited.

Super Exploitation of Workers

The wages of the workers were so low that they could not afford even the bare necessities of life, viz, two square meals and hygienic shelter. The workers in Bombay were squeezed into chawls that comprised single room tenaments (100 sq.ft size) accommodating often more than one family forcing people to sleep by shifts. They lived under extreme over-crowding, filth and squalid misery. Incidence of sickness and mortality was very high due to malnourishment and congested and unhygienic living conditions. Malaria, tuberculosis, cholera, plague took heavy toll. Infant mortality in Bombay was 298 per 1000 births in 1926 and it was as high as 577 per thousand in one-room tenements.[10] Such inhuman squeezing of the workers delivered super-profits in the hands of British and Indian business and industry. Grandeur and glitter coexist in Bombay with widespread squalor and distress, from its inception, to date.

Parasitic Metropolis

Bombay with a share of 1.5 percent of the total population of India in 1991, has a share of 40 percent in the total joint stock companies in the country and about 55 percent of the cheque clearances in India are effected through Bombay. Bombay Stock Exchange is the prime exchange of India and Bombay is the head quarters of the Reserve Bank of India. It is the prime port of India handling 42 percent of the import-export trade. About 25 percent of taxable income of the country originates from Bombay. In relation to Maharashtra, Bombay accounts for over 80 percent of the financial and business dealings and dominates the state economically (Table 3). Being a colonial city, Bombay never forged organic economic relations with the hinterland. In fact, the growth of the city had been at the cost of the countryside. Millions of rupees from the State resources spent on tinkering with the ever growing problems of the city water supply, garbage and sewage disposal, commutation of people, roads, transport of goods etc., if judiciously invested in rural development would

Table 3 Concentration of Economic Activity in Bombay

	Total Population 1991 ('000)	Population (%)	Share in Factory Employment (%, 1994)	Share in Joint Stock Companies (%, 1991)	Share in Commercial Bank Credit (%, 1994)
Bombay-Thane	15175	19.2	46.1	84.6	83.3
Rest of Konkan	4201	5.3	4.0	0.3	0.7
Pune	5533	7.2	13.5	7.0	4.9
Rest of Pune-Nashik	23830	30.2	20.2	4.2	5.3
Aurangabad	2214	2.8	3.3	0.8	0.7
Rest of Marathwada	10586	13.4	2.6	0.3	1.4
Nagpur	3287	4.2	4.4	2.2	1.7
Rest of Vidarbha	14111	17.9	5.9	0.6	2.0
TOTAL	78937	100	100 (=1225,009)	100 (=61,679)	100 (Rs 429 Billion)

(Source : *Statistical Abstract of Maharashtra* 1994)

help arrest impoverishment of the rural areas from where Bombay draws thousands of men[11] because of the centralisation of economic activity in Bombay. The Government, however, added to the concentration by launching Backbay Reclamation Scheme at the southern tip and permitting sky-scrapers. The overcrowding and the consequent physical and moral degeneration of the population in the ever-growing city has had its backlash on the hinterland as well. The concentrated wealth in the city makes such fine showing that it distracts attention from appalling squalor and degradation of the conditions in which the majority of the Bombites live.

MAP 2 Bombay Metropolitan Region



Over time, larger and larger territory of the adjoining districts of Thane and Raigad is being added to Bombay (Map 2) dispossessing peasants, fisherfolks, artisans and adivasis. As foreign and Indian business and capital are concentrated in Bombay, it draws working people of various vocations from all over India including a large population of single males. Bombay always had disproportionately high percentage of men in its total population (Table 4) that imposes heavy price both on the men living alone in the city away from their family, and the women-folk and children left back in the villages.

The cosmopolitan nature of Bombay gave impetus to the rise of 'Shiv Sena' or sons of the soil chauvinistic organisation in Bombay during mid-sixties. The target never was the foreign or non-Marathi business or industry but it was always the clerks and workers employed in the organised sector. With the rise of Hindu chauvinism during the 1990s the Muslim population of Bombay was targeted and they suffered heavy losses, both in life and property after the demolition of Babri Masjid at Ayodhya[12] in U.P. on 6 December 1992. Muslim migrants from Bangladesh are living under perpetual threat. The spectre of Hindu Chauvinism looms heavily over the Muslim population in Bombay keeping the situation ever explosive.

Table 4 ***Sex Ratio in Bombay (figures in females per 1,000 males)***

Year	Sex Ratio	Year	Sex Ratio
1864	539	1931	545
1872	612	1941	576
1881	663	1951	596
1891	595	1961	679
1901	617	1971	716
1911	529	1981	772
1921	524	1991	827

Note : Figures up to 1921 are for Bombay city and from 1931 for Greater Bombay.

(Source : Population Census of India for various years)

Squeezed Toiling Millions

Greater Bombay in 1991 had about 10 million population. Nearly 40 percent of these are forced to live in slums as they cannot afford any housing accommodation due to sky rocketing land prices and high construction costs. They are forced to live amidst rotting garbage, pools of sewage, and in the absence of latrines in a highly polluted and stinking atmosphere. During the rainy season many of the slums get flooded. Besides, the population of pavement dwellers is ever increasing. About two million live in old, dilapidated, unhygienic congested chawls and other one room tenements. As the city had been developed on a very narrow elongated island strip with the concentration of Central Business District (CBD) and Government secretariat and administrative offices at the southern tip of the island and the residences are located in the suburbs and extended suburbs, daily commutation to place of work spending two to three hours, in travel is the fate of the working people of Bombay. About four million travel daily by bus and suburban trains under extremely overcrowded and hazardous conditions. The city is strewn with garbage, filth and is heavily polluted because of the alarming increase in the private motor cars that are choking the roads.

Globalisation of the 1990s

In 1991 the Government of India accepted the structural adjustment programme of the IMF and step by step removed

much of the former restrictions on the entry of Multi National Corporations (MNCs) in India, purchase of land and immovable property by foreigners, made the rupee partially convertible, devalued the currency, drastically reduced import duties and export restrictions. Bombay, the colonial metropolis, experienced the largest impact of these policy changes. The land prices in Bombay, the internationally coveted metropolis, skyrocketed. Prices of offices and flats at prime locations at the southern tip of the Bombay Island reached levels even higher than those ruling in other metropolitan centres. Within a span of a couple of years prices increased two- to three-fold.[13] Consequently, housing, even in the extended suburbs turned to be beyond the means of the salaried class working in Indian firms or government. They are thrown to far-flung areas involving daily commutations of 4 to 5 hours. The salaries and perks offered by the MNCs are five times or more compared to the government salary levels. As a result the gulf between the rich and the ordinary is fast widening.

The pace of modernisation and computerisation in industry and in services, particularly financial services got accelerated due to the entry of MNCs in all the fields and consequently fresh recruitment has virtually ceased. Schemes of retrenchment are prepared by many companies and even closure is eminent in several factories. Textile, the oldest and the largest industry of Bombay, has been facing crisis since the 1980s, as many of the textile mill owners squeezed the industry and diverted these funds to other businesses. They are no more interested in running the textile mills as they can procure windfall profits through the sale of the mill lands situated at the prime location of Central Bombay. Surreptitious land sales are already under way, foiling the workers' desperate attempts to save Girangao, the mill town. The number of textile workers in Bombay has declined from about 0.20 million in 1980-81 to 0.13 million in 1990-91 and currently the employment is about 0.6 million workers. Employment in metal and metal products industries went down from about 0.1 million to about 0.05 million over the decade, and the total industrial employment in the Bombay Metropolitan Region decreased from 0.81 million to 0.53 million[14] and the decline continues.

The work force in Bombay continues to increase while the organized sector employment is declining under the forces of globalisation. The retrenched workers and the new entrants have to seek contractual, temporary or casual work, engage in petty trade or service, or join the underworld activities. Reportedly there is a marked increase in the underworld employment during the last five years. The illicit employment avenues are collection of protection money from shops, offices, factories, levy on various transactions like sale of land, flat, purchase of car, flat etc, extortion under threat, theft, robbery, smuggling and trade in drugs, illicit liquor business and gang wars. With the growth in land speculation, money and financial speculations and corruption during the last five years the amount of unaccounted money (black money) is soaring, supporting the growth of underworld activities. The productive activity in Bombay is on the decline because of the spread of MNCs and the Indian industry in many cases is shifting to assembly or franchising.

The dealers in land and other property, commission agents, brokers, middlemen, advertising firms, consultants, and other intermediaries are making quick money because of the flow of the global capital in Bombay. So also the export and import traders, dealers in foreign exchange, money and stock market speculations, builders, wholesale and big retail merchants, contractors and transport companies are accumulating large profits. With globalisation imported luxuries have been flooding the Bombay market. The glitter and pomp of the rich elite, entrepreneurs and business community—foreign and Indian—with palatial flats, luxury cars, sparkling jewellery, foreign wines and perfumes, living in ivory towers under police or body guards' protection, stands in sharp contrast with the masses huddled into filthy slums suffering every kind of deprivation, insult, indignity and constantly under threats of accidents, eviction, or retrenchment. The global media with glittering fashion shows and advertisements flashing round the clock is adding to the sense of deprivation; there is a wide gulf between the electronic media-projected dream and the reality. Increasing joblessness, mounting inflation, growing frustration under the impact of globalisation are accentuating ethnic, class tensions and conflicts. The chauvinistic Shivsena in Bombay is targeting the most deprived and degraded sections at the end of socio-economic ladder, the dalits, erstwhile untouchables and Muslims. The Shivsena-Bharatiya Janata Party combine is in the power in Maharashtra since March 1995 and are using both the official force as well as the underworld muscle power against these sections increasing the tensions in the city.

Threats of Breakdown

The situation in Bombay is explosive physically, socially, financially, and economically. Physically because the railway transport system fails almost every alternate day as the system is old and over-burdened to a breaking point; there is so much increase in the squalor and filth that outbreak of fatal epidemics looms on the horizon; the increasing number of private cars and lorries are choking the streets and pollution levels have crossed safety limits in many parts of the city. With the ambitious plan to attract more and more foreign capital the Shivsena-BJP combine has a plan to develop quickly the Bandra-Kurla complex as the new CBD and to have a new private international airport. The shifting of a large part of the sea trade to the new Nhave-Sheva port across Thane creek and the setting up of a new town, 'New Bombay', during the 1970s stimulated outward shift of the working population from Bombay Island. In Bombay Island, well-equipped public hospitals, colleges and schools, libraries and museums, parks and sports grounds have been developed by the wealthy Parsi and Gujarati merchants when they amassed huge profits during the American civil war (1861-65) through cotton exports and in the opium trade. As a result of the shift of the population from the Island these excellent public facilities are lost to the public. Eventually these may be turned private for the elite class. Hardly any public facilities are

available to the working people at the new suburban locations. The problem of such imbalance between the available facilities and the residential nodes is getting accentuated with the shift in the business, industrial and transport nodes of Bombay, increasing the hardship and deprivation of the working masses. The sky-rocketed land prices due to free entry of foreign money and the competition over the possession of the built-up space in prime locations have increased the conflicts between the builder lobby and the tenants and the residents of old chawls and buildings who are largely Maharashtrians. This situation is exploited by the criminal gangs increasing the insecurity in the lives of the common man. The scramble over space for business and residence, and for pavements (which are occupied by the hawkers and pavement dwellers) is increasing ethic and class tensions in the city. To this explosive situation fuel is added by gang wars.

Bombay is the financial capital of India and the ambition of the ruling classes is to elevate it to an international financial centre like Hong-Kong. Today the financial and foreign exchange markets are volatile. After the recent financial crisis in south Asia, the Asian economies are under great strain. In India the Rupee is not yet fully convertible, but since the flow of hot money is considerable and the Rupee is shaky, the risk of overnight outflow of foreign funds is real. As more and more people, under the impact of globalisation are roped into the speculative, international dealings, the risk of collapse threatens many in Bombay. Since the productive base of Bombay is narrowing and the parasitic underworld and speculative base is expanding, the danger of economic and financial collapse of Bombay under the international or Asian crisis situation is growing. The economic collapse, under the already explosive social and political situation in Bombay, can be catastrophic for Bombay and for the country.

The seeds of Bombay's decline were sown in its birth as a colonial city. As a colonial city Bombay grew apace because of its connectivity to the rest of the country and the world, its position as the commercial and financial nerve centre and its cosmopolitan out look. However, under globalisation the costs of real estate in Bombay sky-rocketed, the resulting unemployment that pushes the growth of underworld activities is making Bombay more insecure and risky for the business world. At the same time, masses of rural unemployed from all over the country continue to pour into this city by thousands with the hope of making a living. Added to it, is the natural increase in the population of this megalopolis with over ten millions inhabitants. The city inevitably grows but with this the problems of slum and pavement dwellers, over-congested traffic and pollution, crime and filth. The present phase of globalisation welcomed warm-heartedly by the rulers of Maharashtra may not prove to be a blessing but a blow because of the growing contradictions between the designs of the chauvinistic rulers of Maharashtra and the forces of globalisation that are leading to accentuation of the parasitic and lumpen character of Bombay and devastation of the countryside.

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3 Joan Beauchamp, p. 17.

4 Ibid, p. 11.

5 Meera Kosambi, *Bombay and Poona: Socio-Ecological Study of Two Indian Cities 1650-1900*. University of Stockholm, 1980, pp. 30-31.

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7 Meera Kosumbi, *Bombay in Transition*. Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm, 1986 p. 36,37.

8 Between 1800-1850 there were 1.5 million famine deaths, while during 1850-1900, according to Official estimate over 20 million famine deaths were recorded. W. Digby, *Prosperous British India*, 1901.

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13 Sulabha Brahme, *Impact of SAP on Land Resources and Food Security in Maharashtra*, Shankar Bramhe Samaj Vidnyan Granthalaya, Pune, 1996.

14 Draft Regional Plan for Bombay Metropolitan Region - 1996 - 2011, Bombay Metropolitan Regional Development Authority, Bombay 1995, pp 142-43.

40 TAIWAN'S URBAN SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

Jack F. Williams

As Taiwan nears the millennium, roughly half a century has passed since Japanese colonial rule ended and Taiwan embarked on a new era of development as a de facto independent state. Properly speaking, Taiwan has moved beyond the "newly industrialized economy" (NIE) label that has been attached to it for some three decades or more. Taiwan's industrialization is no longer new, nor is its urbanization process. Taiwan's urban system and urban development process reflect the island's transition from "developing" to "developed" status (at least as defined by the OECD). Taiwan is now in the latter (or terminal) phase of the urbanization curve, in which the rate of urban population growth decreases, reflecting in part a similar slowing of the island's overall population growth (currently hovering at just under one per cent per year).

Thus, some fifty years into Taiwan's modern transformation from former Japanese agricultural colony to quasi-independent industrial powerhouse, this is an appropriate time to examine Taiwan's urban system from a variety of perspectives, to see where its urban development process stands in terms of both positive and negative characteristics, and to attempt to discern future directions and options. This topic is also timely given the fact that very few Western geographers or others concerned with urban issues outside of Taiwan have studied Taiwan's urban development, especially in an ongoing basis. Although Taiwan admittedly is a relatively small island and discrete geographical region of just 24,000 sq. km., the entire industrialization and urbanization process experienced by much larger Western countries, such as the United States, has been condensed in Taiwan both spatially, in a very small area (about the size of Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island combined, or slightly larger than China's Hainan Island and about half the area of the island of Sri Lanka), and temporally, in the space of a few decades. Thus, Taiwan's urban development experience is not only interesting in and of itself, but also for what it can tell us in a comparative sense with other Asian countries and with Western countries, which is the focus of this conference.

Taiwan's Urban Development, 1945-1995[1]

By 1940, just before the impact of World War II began to be felt in Taiwan, the island's urban population was about 10-12 percent of an islandwide population of just under six million, concentrated in a few modest-sized towns and cities (only four over 100,000, led by the capital of Taipei at about 160,000).[2] By 1950, after a decade of military and political turmoil, with the Republic of China (ROC) government now in exile on Taiwan, the island's urban population had swelled to about 25 percent, fueled largely by the huge influx of

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mainland refugees and Nationalist government forces that fled to the island in the late 1940s. Taiwan was on the threshold of its modern industrial transformation. By 1995, Taiwan's total population was 21.3 million, of which more than 80 percent lived in urban places. The largely agrarian, rural-based economy and population had been transformed into an overwhelmingly urban/industrial nature. The story of Taiwan's "economic miracle", and the political transformation that came along later in the 1980s and 90s, has been well documented in innumerable studies.[3] Because of space and time limitations, let me just briefly summarize the key developments that relate directly to Taiwan's urban and regional development through the five decade period.

In the 1950s the ROC government embarked on a development strategy that focused first on agriculture and food processing, accompanied by textiles and import-substitution manufacturing. Although farmers started to prosper, because of land reform and other measures, urban migration began in response to job creation in the cities, especially in the Taipei region, secondarily the Kaohsiung area. Urban population soared at three times the rate of total population growth. By 1960, Taipei had 1.8 million in its metro region, while Kaohsiung had less than half that.

During the 1960s Taiwan passed the 50% urban population mark as the economy took off under an export-promotion strategy that saw formal U.S. economic assistance end in 1965. Export processing zones in Kaohsiung and Taichung, among the first in the world, heralded a new approach to industrialization in Third World countries. Taiwan's economy moved into more sophisticated products, including electronics, plastics, optical equipment. Taipei was the focal point of industrial development still, with its total population reaching 2.8 million by 1970, a 67% increase over 1960. Number two Kaohsiung reached 1.1 million in 1970, a growth rate equal to that of Taipei. Taipei's growth in this decade was in part a response to an expansion of its municipal boundaries. In 1966, Taipei was elevated to the status of a special municipality and its boundaries were pushed outward in 1968 to annex six townships surrounding the older central city. Taipei's exceptional growth in this period can also be attributed in part to its unusual political status, as the 'provisional national capital' of China. The ROC government maintained large operations in various ministries, employing thousands of people, to fulfill this role. Many of these bodies, and the buildings they occupy, are really larger than would be required to serve just the island of Taiwan. Moreover, the government built a new planned city for the provincial government, headquartered in Chung Hsing New Town just south of Taichung in central Taiwan. This city served the province of Taiwan, while ostensibly Taipei served the larger national interests, even though Taiwan had no effective control of the vast mainland.

In the 1970s Taiwan underwent further industrial transformation, with special emphasis on heavy industry (chemicals, petrochemicals, iron and steel, automobiles, and other basic goods). Kaohsiung received major government (and private) investment, but Taipei outdistanced Kaohsiung's population growth rate, increasing from 2.8 million to 4.3 million by 1980, while Kaohsiung grew only to 1.67 million. Total population growth for the island had slowed, but was still at a high 2.1%, while urban population grew by 5% or more a year. The urbanization rate reached 66% by 1980.

Taiwan's urban system was dominated then by the four major metropolitan regions of Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung, and Tainan, in that order (Taichung surpassed Tainan in the 1970s). The Taipei metro region contained 25% of Taiwan's total population, while Kaohsiung had 9%. Taichung had just over 7% and Tainan about 4%. The four metro centers collectively accounted for over 8 million people, or some 45% of the island's population.

By the mid-1990s, the Taipei metro region had a total population of about 5.6 million, of which some 2.6 million were within Taipei Municipality itself, but a majority population of just under 3 million were located in the urban areas of the surrounding Taipei basin.[4] This meant that Taipei had about 26% of Taiwan's total population in its metro region.[5]

This leads us directly to some needed commentary about the issues of urban primacy, rank-size distribution, and balanced regional development. The few Western authors who have examined Taiwan's urban system over the decades have generally agreed that Taiwan has been able to avoid true urban primacy, at least the extreme situation such as that found in the Philippines with Manila, or in Thailand with Bangkok. Pannell argued that Taiwan has never had an "exaggerated primate condition of urban development" in spite of the fact that it exhibited (at least still so in the early 1970s) the five conditions typically associated with urban primacy in underdeveloped countries: (1) small area and dense population; (2) low per capita income; (3) export- or agriculturally-based economies; (4) high population growth rates; and (5) a history of colonialism.[6] Speare et al. came to much the same conclusion in their study completed in the mid-1980s.[7] Nonetheless, it is important to note that these, and other, authors focused primarily upon a statistical determination of primacy, and noted that Taipei was only about two times the size of Kaohsiung, and that Taiwan had a relatively normal rank-size distribution of cities. While that is all true, nonetheless, Taipei does exhibit some characteristics of functional primacy, in part because of its peculiar or artificial role as the so-called "provisional national capital" of the ROC and the distorted pull that role has exerted on migration within Taiwan over the decades. Although the government no longer pedals this line in public (since admitting several years ago that the ROC, in fact, has no governmental control of the mainland), there is no question that Taipei is the political, cultural, educational, and business center of the island, and as such continues to be the prime attractor of migrants, as it has since the 1950s. In some ways, Taipei is the "New York" of Taiwan. Thus, it is incorrect to simply state that Taiwan has no urban primacy.

The statistical data reveal some interesting patterns. Table 1 shows population growth for the four planning regions in

Table 1 Population Growth of the Four Planning Regions in Taiwan, 1956-82.

Region	1956		1971		1982		1995		Growth Rate (%)		
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	1956-71	1971-82	1982-95
Northern	2.84	30.2	5.23	34.9	7.35	39.8	9.04	42.4	84.2	40.5	23.0
Southern	3.20	34.1	4.95	33.0	5.70	30.9	6.24	29.3	54.7	15.2	9.5
Central	2.96	31.5	4.18	27.9	4.76	25.8	5.41	25.4	41.2	13.9	13.7
Eastern	0.39	4.2	0.63	4.2	0.64	3.5	0.61	2.9	61.5	1.6	-4.7

A= Population in millions
B= Percentage share of total population

Source: Urban and Regional Development Statistics (CEPD, Urban and Housing Development Department, 1996), various editions.

Table 2 Measures of Regional Inequality

Region	Shares of GDP (%)		Per Capita Increase By Region (Index)	
	1976	1992	1976	1992
Taiwan	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	49.8	50.4	140.3	118.3
S	27.9	28.0	82.6	94.5
C	19.8	19.4	71.2	78.0
E	2.5	2.2	61.2	76.2

Source: Urban and Regional Development Statistics (CEPD, Urban and Housing Development Department, 1996), pp. 168, 169.

Taiwan, for the years 1956, 1971, 1982, and 1995. Although these regions encompass several counties each, because of the small size of Taiwan each region is focused around one of the four metro areas, with the exception of the Eastern region (which has the two modest towns of Hualien and Taitung anchoring the two ends of the elongated region). Thus, the North is centered around the Taipei metro region, the Center is focused on the Taichung metro region, while the South is primarily centered on the Kaohsiung metro region, with Tainan as a nearby secondary urban focal point. As of 1995, the North had 42% of Taiwan's total population, the South had 29%, the Center 25%, and the East less than 3%. Note the contrast with 1956, when there was actually much greater balance between the three major regions and the South was the largest. While population growth rates for all four regions have slowed since 1956, the North has slowed the least, resulting in its increasing dominance in terms of population, although not necessarily in economic importance, as Table 2 reveals. The North's share of Taiwan's GDP barely changed between 1976 and 1992, as was true for all four regions. On a per capita income basis, however, there was a significant improvement between 1976 and 1992 in terms of lessening the inequality, even though the North was still well ahead of the other three regions.

Comparing just the Taipei metro region and the Kaohsiung metro region for 1995, the data show Kaohsiung slipping further behind Taipei in population. Taipei municipality, as already noted, had 2.64 million people in 1995, while Kaohsiung municipality registered 1.4 million. Kaohsiung has long suffered from an inferiority complex. Even though it is the center of Taiwan's heavy industrial base and the second city of the island, it remains basically a blue collar, roughhewn town, in contrast to Taipei's cosmopolitanism and sophistication, a Cleveland or Pittsburgh next to New York. People in Taiwan who can do so prefer to live in the Taipei area.[8] What holds Kaohsiung back? The mayor, Wu Den-yih, can name many: insufficient central government investment, lack of administrative control over the harbor (the Kaohsiung Harbor Bureau is under the provincial government[9]), insufficient cultural resources, serious pollution problems (unlike Taipei, Kaohsiung's problems stem primarily from industry, not automobiles).[10] The Taiwan government's ambitious APROC plan, intended to make the island an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center, could have beneficial implications for Kaohsiung, which would have to be one of the principal players in that plan, particularly because of its port, the largest and most important in Taiwan. The opening of the door to direct shipping with the mainland, by allowing third parties to sail directly from Xiamen to Kaohsiung (with certain restrictions), is a step toward that APROC goal.

One might conclude, thus, that urban primacy, in some respects, is increasing in Taiwan, although to be sure the degree of primacy is still relatively small compared to many developing countries. How has Taiwan managed to slow, if not altogether stop, the development of urban primacy, in spite of having the key indicators, as already noted, for primacy? The answer lies, I believe, in the development policies Taiwan followed from the 1950s onward, and the rapid success of the government in promoting industrialization, rural and urban prosperity, and slowed population growth.[11] If Taiwan had not successfully done these things, it is quite likely that Taipei would have become a bloated, overbounded but

economically underdeveloped primate city filled with hundreds of thousands of squatter migrants forced out of overcrowded rural areas, in a pattern all too familiar in the Third World today. Actually, the more likely scenario is that the ROC would not have survived militarily and politically and would have been absorbed by the PRC. In that situation, Taipei probably would have remained a relatively secondary provincial city, something like Xiamen in Fujian province, at least until China's opening up under the New Open Door Policy that started in the late 1970s.

More specifically, Taiwan was quite successful in promoting rural industrialization, which brought job opportunities to the farmers rather than waiting for the farmers to move to the cities. This policy was part of the government's efforts at balanced regional development, a planning approach that began to take off in the 1970s. Industrial estates developed by the government for private investors to locate in were built primarily in rural counties, not the major metro regions. The positive effect was to transform the majority of farmers into part-time farmers, thus lowering the gap between rural and urban incomes and keeping excessive migration away from the big cities. Simultaneously, the government embarked on a long series of massive, expensive infrastructure improvement programs aimed particularly at improving the transportation systems of the island, so that urban centers would not have excessively attractive advantages in transportation access and thus pull too much industrial investment toward the cities. These projects included such things as the North-South Freeway, electrification and other improvements of the main West Coast railway, rail and road links to the Eastern part of Taiwan that ended the physical isolation of that area (although this enhanced access did not significantly increase the attractiveness of the East for industrialization), major improvements in secondary and local roads, port improvements, new airports, and so on.

Policy failures occurred, nonetheless. Two significant examples include the new port at Taichung, and the new town movement. The Taichung Harbor project was started in 1973 as a system bringing port and industries together in a regional development center that would not only give Taiwan a third major port (to take some of the pressure off Kaohsiung, especially) but also help promote the growth of the Taichung metro region.[12] Unfortunately, the port has failed to live up to expectations, for a complex mix of reasons, including not paying enough attention to detail in growth-center planning, failure to commit enough resources to bring the project to fruition, and improper coordination among the parties involved in the project.

In the case of new towns, Taiwan first attempted new town planning and development in the late 1970s.[13] Also as part of the push for more balanced regional development, the government decided to try to introduce the new town concept as originated in Britain and widely used there, especially after World War II in the Greater London area. Taichung Harbor New Town, part of the harbor project discussed above, was one of these new towns, along with Linkou (near Taipei), Chengching (near Kaohsiung), and Nankan (also near Taipei). The results of these new towns have not been impressive, for many of the same reasons found in the relative failure of new towns elsewhere in the world (including the U.S.), especially the failure to develop true economic self-sufficiency in the new towns and hence their remaining at the level of bedroom suburbs at best (Linkou is the most successful of the lot, but even it falls far short of original goals). In spite of their relative failure, the government had plans to build 19 more new towns during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1991–96), including Tanshui New Town, which has a target of 200,000 people by 2014.

Within the metro regions, a pattern familiar to Western cities has also occurred in Taiwan over the decades, in terms of migration patterns.[14] In the 1950s and 1960s the migratory flow was a net movement from rural areas to the large central cities, especially Taipei. By the 1970s, however, migration had shifted to a net movement from rural areas and large central cities to intermediate cities, particularly those cities adjacent to Taipei and Kaohsiung. That pattern has basically continued to this day, albeit at a slower rate. Thus, in the case of Taipei, satellite cities such as Panchiao, Yungho, Sanchung, Chungho, and Hsinchuang, have all experienced explosive growth, increasing their individual populations several times over during the past 20–30 years. For example, Panchiao is the largest satellite city of Taipei today, with a population over 530,000; in 1951 Panchiao had a mere 30,000 people, but by 1983 the figure had jumped to 454,000. Chungho and Sanchung are vying for second place, each with over 380,000 population; Chungho had only 24,000 in 1951, but 304,000 in 1983, while Sanchung was at 39,000 in 1951 and 343,000 in 1983.[15] While these growth rates are indeed significant, it should be remembered that the growth almost certainly would have been even larger without the various measures aimed at balanced regional development. This suburban growth was the consequence of cheaper land in the suburbs, congestion in the central city, improved transport (especially highways), mass ownership of motorized transport (initially motorcycles, then later automobiles), and rising incomes encouraging families to seek better quality and larger housing. The only difference from the U.S., at least, was the absence of racial conflict as a push factor encouraging the middle and upper classes to migrate to the suburbs.

Key Urban Issues Facing Taiwan: The Next Half Century

What then are the key urban issues facing Taiwan as it approaches the new century? There are obviously a great many issues, but space limitations require me to focus on just a few key ones.

Urban Planning

The overarching problem is how to institute real urban planning. Taiwan actually has been in the planning business since the 1950s, when development plans were initiated for Taipei and the other three major metro regions. Larger

regional plans began to evolve from the 1960s onward. Those plans have been modified and updated numerous times since then, but the plans themselves have been implemented only partially and often unsuccessfully. One of the root causes of this limited degree of success lies in the high cost of land and the difficulties of land acquisition, which tend to stymie the best of government plans and efforts.[16] This is very observable in the contrast between Taipei and its suburbs. As one editorial put it, "Panchiao today is Taipei of the 1970s."[17] This refers to the fact that Panchiao, and other satellite cities, tend to exhibit the random street patterns, poor architecture, lack of order or planning, dirt, and general ugliness that was once the case for much of Taipei (not to suggest that such defects are close to elimination in the bigger central cities of Taiwan). Urban redevelopment has brought some order, modernity, and even pockets of beauty to parts of Taipei, when it was easier and cheaper to acquire land. An example is New Taipei, the eastern district that has developed largely in the last 20 years, focused around Tunhua Road and Hsinyi Road with the International Trade Center. In any event, the suburbs have yet to catch up with the core city. The task gets harder, but it is not hopeless when there is the political will.

Transportation

Nowhere are the difficulties of planning more evident than in the case of transportation, both interurban and intraurban. Taiwan's dramatic success in economic development over the past decades was due in substantial part to vast improvements in the island's transportation systems, greatly increasing the ease and efficiency of moving people and goods between and within cities.[18] Good transportation is essential for success in any developing country. No wonder thus that Taiwan continues to put great emphasis on further infrastructure improvement. As already noted above, Taiwan has had a series of major infrastructure improvement projects underway since the 1970s. Some of these have succeeded, some have not. In general, however, over the years the projects increasingly have been plagued with management chaos, scandalous delays, and massive cost overruns.[19] For this reason, the government recently has been pushing increasingly for linkups with private participation in these projects. The scope of the current construction roster is staggering—some 634 projects estimated to cost US$233 billion, even after being sharply pared back from original plans. The list includes as the centerpiece the high-speed rail line linking Taipei and Kaohsiung, a rail line linking Taipei's international and domestic airports, industrial parks to be built on government land, incinerators, recycling plants, private power plants, and a new urban rapid-transit system for Kaohsiung.

Transportation is what concerns us here, however, and one of the troubled major projects currently is the high-speed 345 km. rail link between Taipei and Kaohsiung. This largest-ever public works venture in Taiwan's history is now scheduled to be completed by 2003; private investment (out of an estimated total cost of $18 billion) has been targeted at a minimum of 40%, in a collaborative approach known as "build-operate-transfer" (BOT). Based on the experience of both the Taipei and Kaohsiung mass rapid transit systems (MRTS), however, critics are skeptical about the prospects for smooth public/private collaboration on the high-speed railway. For one thing, high-speed railways are notoriously unprofitable in almost all countries where they have been built. That fact, plus the dismal experience in Taipei and Kaohsiung (see below), contribute to the worry that the government will be unable to attract sufficient foreign investors to meet the government's minimum capital needs, and even if they do the relationship will bog down into acrimony and construction delays.[20]

The Taipei MRTS has become perhaps the most infamous public works project in Taiwan's modern history. The idea for a MRTS goes back at least to 1972, but unfortunately Taiwan did not get serious about the matter until the 1980s. In 1987, the Department of Rapid Transit Systems (DORTS) was established under Taipei's city government to take full charge of planning and building of the MRTS. A multinational consortium of American, French, and German companies got the contract to build the system.[21] The initial MRTS network is designed to meet the transportation needs of eight major corridors in metro Taipei and strengthen the links between downtown and suburbs in a system covering a total of 88 km. Within that system there are to be eight lines (to Tanshui, Hsintien, Mucha, Nankang, Panchiao, and Chungho, plus a short maintenance line in the center).[22] Beyond this initial system, originally supposed to be completed by 1997–98, an expanded system with lines to all the other suburban centers, including CKS International Airport, was to be completed by 2021.

From the beginning, however, DORTS suffered a string of problems because of difficulties in acquiring land, shortages of skilled labor, and horrendous troubles with the foreign contractors. Especially troublesome has been the relationship with Matra Transport, the French builder of the Mucha line.[23] Construction began in 1989 and the opening date was supposed to be 1993; the Mucha line did not open until March, 1996. Railcar fires, tire blowouts, and fissures in the elevated platform's support pillars were among the technical problems the government complained about. On the management level, the two sides' relationship completely broke down, and the Taipei city government still owes Matra nearly $84 million.

The Tanshui line finally opened on March 28, 1997 (and is expected to give a strong boost to development of the Tamsui area, which has a population already over 90,000). The Hsintien and Chungho lines are now scheduled to open in 2000; the Nankang and Panchiao lines in 2001. The Tucheng line will begin in 2004; no target date has been set yet for the Neihu line.[24]

Not only has the MRTS system taken far longer to complete than originally planned, and cost far more than predicted, but all sorts of other concerns have been raised as well. First, the cost of riding the system is not cheap; the highest charge on the Tamsui line is $2.91 per ride. Officials claim the fares are

being kept to the lowest possible level, but the fares are even higher than what one pays in some U.S. MRT systems, hardly a way to entice people to give up their motorcycles and cars for the MRTS. Undoubtedly, the huge cost overruns in building the system have been a contributing factor to the high fares. A second problem is public concern about the safety of the system, after the widely publicized technical problems with the Mucha line. A third concern is whether the MRTS will actually do the job it is designed for, that is, reduce reliance on private transportation within Taipei. DORTS claims that the system initially will absorb 36% of the daily commuter load of metro Taipei, and will expand to absorb 51% by 2021; American consulting companies put the figure closer to 20%.[25] If the Americans are right, Taipei will be in big trouble in the next century, with a white elephant MRTS not fulfilling its purpose.

Kaoshiung, unfortunately, has not fared any better so far in its efforts to develop a MRTS.[26] For the estimated $7 billion Kaohsiung MRTS, an international consortium known as International Transit Consultants (ITC) won the consultancy contract to design the system. In a repetition of Taipei's experience, however, the two sides got bogged down in mutual mud slinging, acrimony, and complete breakdown of trust. One would think officials there would have learned from Taipei's experience, but Kaohsiung's situation suggests that Taiwan's problems with MRTS (and perhaps other public works projects) is culture-based, rather than scientific or technical in nature.[27] The result was cancellation of the contract with ITC in 1995 and a year or more of delays and legal maneuvering by both sides. Planning of the MRTS has yet to be done, let alone the start of construction. Kaohsiung's experience, like that of Taipei, highlights the fact that Taiwan is not yet a truly developed country, in terms of adhering to internationally accepted practices in awarding and implementation of contracts. Taiwan officials and the foreign companies were operating from quite different cultural bases and with very different ideas about regulatory, contractual and procedural practices.

Even if the MRTS works in Taipei, Kaohsiung, and elsewhere eventually, dealing with road traffic problems is likely to continue to be a big headache for Taipei and other cities, and for Taiwan as a whole. To solve the problems of inter-urban road traffic, the government has already begun the second North-South Freeway, paralleling the older freeway, sections of which first opened in 1974.[28] That freeway greatly improved north-south movement along the west coast, but as in the experience of the U.S. and other countries, the better the roads the more traffic generated. In other words, the freeway became clogged to capacity within a decade, contributing to the high death rate on Taiwan highways (19.23 traffic-related deaths per 100,000 people each year, compared with just 6.1 in Japan).[29] Thus, in 1985 Taiwan decided to build a second northern freeway, starting in Taipei and running south to connect with the existing freeway near the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park (108 km.). As with other recent public works projects, because of difficulties in land acquisition and shortages of labor, the second freeway proceeded much more slowly than the first. Because of land acquisition problems, the highway also had to be routed through mountainous country to the east, extending along the periphery of urban areas. This added to the construction cost, with many tunnels and bridges, not to mention concerns raised about slopeland erosion problems (a long standing issue in Taiwan, particularly associated with agricultural practices[30]). The remainder of the second freeway, from Keelung all the way to Linpien in Pingtung county at the southern tip of the island, was originally targeted for completion by the end of 1998 (at a total accumulated investment of nearly $17 billion, about nine times the cost of the first freeway).[31] That target date has now been pushed back at least to the year 2000 just for the section from Chunan to Nantou in central west Taiwan.[32] No mention is made of the extension further southward, which probably will not be built until sometime in the next century. Even with the second freeway, Taiwan is likely to always experience severe congestion on its freeways and lesser highways, simply because of the high population density and nature of the urban/industrial system.

Within the major cities, especially Taipei, the intraurban traffic problems are the stuff of legend. Traffic chaos is virtually endemic to most modern Asian cities today; hence, there is no need to go into great detail about this. Taipei simply exhibits the problems to an extraordinary degree. Taipei also demonstrates a remarkable inability to resolve the problems.[33] As of 1994, Taipei had over 638,000 automobiles, over one million motorcycles, not to mention some 3500 buses and at least 36,000 taxis; each month an additional 10,000 vehicles join the fleets.[34] To make matters worse, the number of parking spaces available in the city is far below the number of vehicles.[35] The MRTS construction makes the already congested streets even worse. One result has been rampant disregard for traffic laws and courtesy. Cars and motorcycles are parked anywhere a space can be found. Every conceivable violation of traffic rules can be observed just standing on a street corner for a short time (assuming one can find space to stand, since many sidewalks are nearly completely used up as motorcycle parking lots, with itinerant vendors occupying what little space might remain).

The MRTS, even if underutilized, certainly will take some of the strain off the surface roads. But the MRTS is not a panacea for traffic woes. Among the widely discussed cures for the mess: better coordination among the government bodies involved with transportation planning and traffic regulation; much stricter enforcement of traffic laws (the Singapore model is much admired); improved bus service simultaneously with measures to discourage automobile and motorcycle ownership (or at least usage within the central city), i.e., making such ownership and usage punitively expensive.[36] Experts seem to share the opinion that building more and better roads, or more parking spaces, is not the answer; rather, planners should seek to keep as many cars and motorcycles out of the city as possible.[37] It sounds fine in theory, but in Taiwan's case the highly liberalized and contentious political atmosphere today does not bode well for such authoritarian methods.

Environmental Protection

Environmental protection is one of the most pressing problems for Taiwan's urban areas, and a topic I have addressed in detail in other publications.[38] Although Taiwan appears to be on the comeback in terms of certain types of pollution or environmental degradation a decade after creating the Environmental Protection Administration, the process of restoring a quality environment has just begun. Air pollution is one of the most serious problems, especially in the cities, because of heavy traffic and high concentration of industrial plants. In Taipei, 95% of the air pollution is from vehicular exhaust. As of December, 1994, there were 16.5 million vehicles registered in Taiwan, and between 1983 and 1993 the number of passenger cars increased 2.75 times, while the number of motorcycles rose 50%.[39] Equally serious problems exist with water pollution, land subsidence, solid waste disposal, and hazardous waste disposal. Space does not permit going into detail on these. The government has adopted a large-scale program of studying and measuring these problems, developing programs and policies for dealing with them, and begun to institute specific measures to clean up problems and prevent future occurrences. All things considered, I am cautiously optimistic about Taiwan's long-term prospects for resolving its environmental problems. I base this optimism on a number of factors: (1) the high educational and technological levels of the people of Taiwan; (2) the rapid slowing of Taiwan's population growth; (3) the relatively small size of Taiwan and hence manageable dimensions of the problems; (4) the relatively moderate size of Taiwan's cities, and absence of a huge mega city (with all the problems implied) on the scale of a Manila, Bangkok or Jakarta; (5) the large amounts of surplus capital that Taiwan has, plus a high, and rapidly rising, standard of living; (6) the growing environmental consciousness of the Taiwanese people; (7) the profitability of environmental cleanup, and hence opportunities for natural Taiwanese entrepreneurship.[40]

Historical Preservation

Unfortunately, in the rush to develop countries tend to pay little attention to the record of the past. As a result, historical preservation is seldom seen as one of the major issues facing urban planners. It should be, however. After all, cities are the repositories of culture. People live in cities not just to work but to enjoy life. Reminders of one's cultural heritage are essential to a whole life. Taiwan's experience in this regard is no different from most other countries, of course. Only after development was well underway, and much of the past already obliterated, has historical preservation finally begun to find an audience in Taiwan.

Historical preservation started in the 1970s with an effort in academic and cultural circles to preserve the Lin An-tai homestead, dating back to 1783, in Taipei. Since then, the movement has been slowly gaining supporters and projects. Currently, the ROC Ministry of the Interior has designated 280 sites in Taiwan as national relics, of which 24 are in the "first class", 48 in the second, and 208 in the third class. Among the more important structures, besides a large number of temples, are several major buildings in downtown Taipei built by the Japanese; the landmark structure is the former Governor-General's Headquarters, and still used by the ROC government as its headquarters. Fortunately, it is still possible to see remnants of the Japanese era in Taipei and other places on the island, but the sites are diminishing. One of the more controversial sites has been Minchuan Street, in Sanhsia, a suburb of Taipei. The 200-meter long street is considered historically valuable for its 102 family houses built in 1916 during the Japanese colonial era and classified as a third class site. Government policy is to exempt owners of designated historic sites from paying taxes on them and the land they occupy, as a compensation for maintaining the cultural heritage, but this tax exemption is not always enough to satisfy the people who occupy such sites. Local residents of Minchuan Street ended up pitted against each other, some arguing for preservation, others for modernization.

One is reminded of the experience of Beijing, a far larger and grander city, which has seen so much of its cultural heritage destroyed in the past, and now increasing numbers of people there lament the irreplaceable losses, most notably, of course, the great city wall of Beijing that was dismantled under Mao's orders starting in the late 1950s. Can Taiwan learn from the mainland's mistakes? Is it really too late anyway?

Many problems stand in the way of historical preservation: (1) Money is always in short supply. Government appropriations are insufficient to cover all the sites, and there is not much private sector support. (2) Second- and third-class relics are the responsibility of the cities or counties where they are located, but local governments would rather spend money on more practical public works. (3) Public indifference is still pervasive, even though the number of enthusiasts for preservation has increased. (4) Skilled craftsmen capable of restoring old structures are in short supply, and few young people want to learn such trades nowadays. (5) Irresponsible domestic tourists obstruct the work of preservation, by looting, littering, or defacing historic sites; it is ironic that foreign visitors are often more interested in protecting and enjoying local historic sites than the residents, who tend to be preoccupied with making money and the stresses of daily life.

Taiwan's experience in this regard seems to repeat a pattern one can note in many other developing countries. In the typical development model, it appears that a country has to give full attention to development and significant raising of material living standards before there is time and interest by government and public in the nonmaterial quality of life, including environmental protection, historical preservation, and other qualitative aspects of contemporary life. When interest is finally aroused, however, it typically is grassroots, that is, from the bottom up, not the top down. Hard-core activists publicize a cause or issue, arouse larger public opinion, often followed by demonstrations and petitions to the government, which then responds with policies and action to correct the problems and meet public demands. This is exactly what happened in Taiwan with environmental cleanup

and historical preservation, and, to some extent, with transportation and other aspects of urban and regional development.

Conclusion

The issues for Taiwan's future urban development might be summarized by making reference to a provocative, and subjective, recent article in *Asiaweek* that supposedly measured and compared Asia's "Best Cities", using 22 statistical indicators that carried different weightings.[41] Several Japanese cities made the list, including Tokyo which was named the best Asian city of all. Two cities in Taiwan were picked, with Taipei ranked 11th, and Kaohsiung 14th among the 40 cities in the list, which included every Asian capital east of Kabul, with minor exceptions (e.g. Pyongyang was not measured). In larger nations, the ranking included another major metro area besides the capital. While one can argue about the criteria used to measure a city's "livability", and how to quantify some of those measures for purposes of comparability, nonetheless, Taiwan's two key cities probably ended up with higher rankings than some people who have lived in Taipei or Kaohsiung would be willing to grant them.

An editorial published in Taiwan, by the Taiwan government itself, may have described the reality best by referring to Taiwan's cities as "cities with rough edges".[42] The comparison was with U.S. cities, such as Chicago and St. Louis just after the completion of the railways, and the excitement, disregard for official restraints, and frenetic entrepreneurship that characterized those cities long ago, similar to what one sees in Taiwan's cities today. This is an apt description of Taiwan's urban places in the 1990s, as the island hovers on the brink of "developed" status and major structural changes are occurring or planned for the economy, at the same time that the political system continues to evolve at a dramatic pace. In a manner of speaking, the Republic of China on Taiwan is having to reinvent itself, to reflect changing political and economic realities, and thus it is hardly surprising that the cities have rough edges indeed. The challenge facing Taiwan now—its government, planners, and citizenry—is how to take the rough edges off the cities and truly bring Taiwan up to international standards. Look at the dramatic improvements in Japan's cities today, compared with the 1960s and even 1970s; Taiwan should be able to do at least as well in the years ahead.

Notes

[1] For an earlier study by the author, see: Jack F. Williams, "Urban and Regional Planning in Taiwan: The Quest for Balanced Regional Development," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* (Vol.79, No. 3, 1988), pp. 175-187.

[2] Alden Speare, Jr., Paul K. C. Liu, and Ching-lung Tsay, *Urbanization and Development: The Rural-Urban Transition in Taiwan* (Westview Press, 1988), p. 18.

[3] Those wishing to investigate this literature could start with: J. Bruce Jacobs, Jean Hagger, and Ann Sedgley, *Taiwan: A Comprehensive Bibliography of English-Language Publications* (LaTrobe University, Australia, and Columbia University, 1984).

[4] Calculated from data in Urban and Regional Development Statistics, Republic of China, 1996 (Executive Yuan: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Urban and Housing Development Department).

[5] This is admittedly a broad interpretation of the metro region for Taipei,in that it includes Tanshui, the coastal port town that has now become effectively a bedroom suburb and recreation site for Greater Taipei, with the completion of the MRT to Tanshui, and Keelung, the northern port that has served the Taipei region since the Japanese era.

[6] Clifton W. Pannell, "Development and the Middle City in Taiwan," *Growth and Change* (Vol. 5, 1974), pp. 21-29.

[7] Speare, Liu, and Tsay, op. cit.

[8] Jim Hwang, "Boomtown or Bust: Kaohsiung City Profile," *Free China Review* (September, 1996), pp. 5-13.

[9] The recent decision by Taiwan's government to gradually phase out the provincial government has not only created a storm of controversy in Taiwan but could have major implications for the two "national" level municipalities, Taipei and Kaohsiung.

[10] "Heart Trouble: Kaohsiung City Profile," *Free China Review* (September, 1996), pp. 14-17.

[11] This view is reinforced in: Daniel Todd and Hsueh Yi-chung, "Taiwan: Some Spatial Implications of Rapid Economic Growth," *Geoforum* (Vol. 19, No. 2, 1988), pp. 133-145.

[12] Daniel Todd and Yi-chung Hsueh, "New Port Developments and Balanced Regional Growth: A Taiwan Example," *Geoforum* (Vol. 21, No. 4, 1990), pp. 421-433.

[13] Philip Liu, "New Towns, Old Problems, Bigger Plans," *Free China Review* (August, 1991), pp. 26-31.

[14] Probably the definitive study to date on migration in Taiwan is that by Speare, et al., op cit.

[15] Jack F. Williams and Christopher F. Sutherland, "Taipei Basin, Taiwan: Land Use, 1983," map supplement to the Annals, Association of American Geographers (Vol. , No. , 19), pp. .

[16] See, for example: : "Growth Outruns Policies," *Free China Review* (August, 1991), pp. 12-18; and "City Life," *Free China Review* (June, 1996), pp. 30-33.

[17] "Edge Cities," *Free China Review* (February, 1992).

[18] Shih-lung Shaw and Jack F. Williams, "Role of Transportation in Taiwan's Regional Development," *Transportation Quarterly* (Vol. 45, No. 2, April, 1991), pp. 271-296.

[19] Julian Baum, "Private Property," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (March 27, 1987), pp. 42-44.

[20] Peter Harmsen, "Railway Slowdown," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (July 25, 1996), pp. 50-52.

[21] Irene Yeung, "A Slow Start to Rapid Transit," *Free China Review* (March, 1991), pp. 20-25.

[22] An Introduction to the Rapid Transit Systems of the Taipei Metropolitan Area (Taipei: Department of Rapid Transit Systems TMG, n.d.)

[23] Ken Chiu, "Matra Withdraws Officials Amid Rail Closure Dispute," *Free China Journal* (June 7, 1996), p.4.

[24] Weiling Liu, "Tamsui Mass-Rapid-Transit Line Opens," *Free China Journal* (April 3, 1997), p. 4.

[25] Yeung (March, 1991), op. cit.

[26] Julan Baum, "Off the Rails: Disputes Stall Taiwan's Second Mass-Transit System," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (July 18, 1996), p. 73.

[27] Janis Connolly, "Double Trouble: Taiwan's Second Mass Rapid Transit Project Is On The Rails," Topics (Taipei American Chamber of Commerce) (September, 1996), pp. 27-31.

[28] Philip Liu, "Stuck On The Freeway," *Free China Review* (March, 1991), pp. 30-35.

[29] Osman Tseng, "Auto Insurers in a Crunch," *Free China Review* (August, 1991), pp. 49-53.

[30] Jack F. Williams, C.Y. Chang, and C.Y. Wang, "Land Settlement and Development: A Case Study From Taiwan," *Journal of Developing Areas* (Vol. 18, No. 1, October, 1983), pp. 35-52.

[31] Philip Liu (March, 1991), op. cit.

[32] *Republic of China Yearbook 1996* (Government Information Office), p. 230.

[33] Jim Hwang, "Sliding toward Gridlock," *Free China Review* (March, 1991), pp. 4-13.

[34] ROC Yearbook 1996, op. cit., p. 231.

[35] Winne Chang, "Taipei Parking Blues," *Free China Review* (March, 1991), pp. 26-28.

[36] "Transportation Tensions," *Free China Review* (March, 1991), pp. 14-18.

[37] "City Life," *Free China Review* (June, 1996), pp. 30-33.

[38] Most recently: Jack F. Williams, "The Quality of Life in Taiwan: An Environmental Assessment," *The American Asian Review* (Vol. 14, No. 3, Fall, 1996), pp. 79-105.

[39] "Environmental Protection," (...cchome.com/info/yearbook/nf_html/chl3_1.html)

[40] Jack F. Williams, "Quality of Life," 1996, op. cit.

[41] "Asia's Best Cities," *Asiaweek* (October 25, 1996).

[42] "Cities with Rough Edges," *Free China Review* (August, 1991).

41 A SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION DESIGN

Cathy L. Antonakos

Introduction

In industrialized nations, transportation systems depend on global resources for their support and growth. Yet this dependence has resulted in environmental and social imbalances that are now large and pervasive. It is widely accepted that motorized transportation is not environmentally sustainable, yet there is little discussion of the sustainability of modern transport from a social perspective. This paper presents a multi-disciplinary perspective on transportation and society, discussing the potential for new transportation and land use designs to diminish unwanted social impacts from traffic and inequities in transportation systems.

First mass-produced in the early 1900's, automobiles quickly became popular as they relieved travelers of dependence on public transportation systems such as trolleys and trains and enabled people to live in homes further from central employment areas. In the U.S., the dream of unhampered mobility grew as new roads were laid out and access to automobiles increased. Roadways designed under the assumption of auto travel guided development patterns for years to come. In the 1950's and 1960's, federally-funded highways in the U.S. were promoted as part of the system of national defense. The models used to guide highway development focus on moving cars into and out of cities via high-speed, high-capacity roadways (Pas 1986). Although outdated, the development patterns and transportation system designs established with the advent of freeways and widespread use of automobiles continue today, and travelers in industrialized nations around the world are entrenched in auto-dependent lifestyles. The loss of quality of life due to dependence on the automobile has resulted in an emerging recognition of the need for change, but tools for change are still in limited supply.

Current efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases worldwide identify motorized transport systems in the industrialized world as a major source of pollution. In fact, the focus of our efforts to "fix" transportation lies in the environmental realm. The social impacts of modern transportation and methods for dealing with them are often overlooked. The assumption of equal access to private vehicles for all subgroups of the population prevails in allotment of global and national resources for motorized transportation (Schaeffer and Sclar 1980). Motorists experience distortion of speed and space (Illich 1978), and as a result of decades of dependence on automobiles, people anticipate urban designs that facilitate auto transport. Commuters experience stress when driving in congested areas (Novaco, Stokols and Milanesi 1990), and people now spend more time driving longer distances than they did ten years ago (Downs 1992).

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Methods to reduce social impacts from transportation include special transport services for special populations, traffic-calming street designs, new land use patterns to facilitate non-motor travel and use of public transportation, and traffic management technologies to reduce emissions and improve traffic flow. Yet even with improvements in design and improved traffic management, trends toward increased travel, congestion, and dependence on automobiles for transportation are likely to continue (Downs 1992). This paper addresses the question of whether transportation design, in its current form, is socially sustainable, and examines the issue of how much influence innovative transport design can have on society in coming decades. A summary of social issues related to transportation is presented, and design solutions intended to reduce social impacts from transportation are described and discussed.

Social Issues and Transport Design

The question "is modern transport design socially sustainable?" can be answered in part by examining several key aspects of transportation and society: 1) the transportation needs of special population; 2) the influence of transportation on perceptions of urban space and expectations of urban form; 3) the influence of the transportation system on community spirit; and 4) the health implications of modern transportation.

Transportation for Special Populations

Perhaps the earliest recognized social impact from modern transport in the U.S. was that entire subgroups of the population—who did not have access to automobiles—were left out. They had few options, and special transportation systems had to be devised to support them. We effectively devote a large proportion of the world's resources and generate much of the world's pollution to support only people with auto-mobility. It has long been recognized that transportation facilitates economic activity; so to use resources to provide speedy transport for the most productive segment of our population may seem appropriate. Limited attention is given to people without access to cars, through public transportation and special transit services, in some areas. But these transportation services, in effect, further segregate people without auto-mobility from the rest of society. Current transportation design may result in entrapment to a life of poverty for some segments of the population, while limiting access to basic goods and services for others.

> Not only jobs but also services, health high among them, are out of reach of those without transportation...Dealing with an unsound transportation system affects choice, health, welfare and livelihood to further paralyze the poor. (Kay, 1997, p. 42)

A similar sentiment is expressed by Engwicht (1993), in discussion of the plight of handicapped individuals.

> When I visited Groningen in the north of Holland, I was only there for three hours yet saw three people in wheelchairs using the streets or bike lanes...The significance of my Groningen experience did not hit me until I reflected on my visit to Los Angeles...I could not recall seeing anyone in wheelchairs using the streets of Los Angeles. Nor could I recall seeing anyone using wheelchairs in Paris or during two days in London. In Groningen, I realized that one of the most insidious side effects of car-based transport systems was its contribution to segregation and the loss of social diversity. (Engwicht, 1993, p. 29)

Sprawling development, and the dependence on automobiles that comes with it, works for people who are mobile, and who can accommodate longer travel distances and more time spent on the road. But we have yet to realize the long-term impacts of current transportation planning on land development and traffic patterns (Manning 1984), so it is difficult to project the impacts of this planning on populations with changing demographic characteristics. In particular, it is unlikely that aging baby-boomers in the U.S. will want to live in large homes on large lots, far from goods and services. Rather, the aging population is more likely to drive less, to drive shorter distances, to avoid highways, and to drive at less congested times of day (Benekohal 1994), but planning efforts rarely consider changing demographic profiles in the design of transportation systems.

Perceptions of Urban Space and Expectations of Urban Form

Several generations of individuals have now been raised in dependence on automobiles for transportation. We lack exposure to alternative ways of living, and this leads to expectations that the current patterns of development and dependence on automobiles for travel will continue. Alternative modes of transportation are perceived as inconvenient and undesirable, and receive little attention in the planning process. Distorted perceptions of space result from high-speed travel, perceptions that influence our expectations of how urban spaces should be arranged, and how they should function to support us. As expressed by Ivan Illich:

> Past a certain threshold of energy consumption the transportation industry dictates the configuration of social space. Motorways expand, driving wedges between neighbors and removing fields beyond the distance a farmer can walk...The habitual passenger cannot grasp the folly of the traffic based overwhelmingly on transport. His inherited perceptions of space and time and of personal pace have been industrially deformed...he has lost control over the physical, social, and psychic powers that reside in man's feet...left on his own, he feels immobile. (Illich, 1978, p. 121-122)

In fact, high-speed travel is used to travel longer distances, not reducing the amount of time spent traveling (Manning 1984). So with increased travel distances, and increased congestion, travelers are spending more time in their cars—and more unpleasant time—than they did ten years ago (Downs 1992). In the U.S., the unchanging American dream leads to a continued provision of homes in outlying areas, on large lots, far from commercial and employment centers. We expect more of the same and are resistant to change. Our experiences and resulting perspectives on transportation, in conjunction with the high profits sprawling land development patterns bring to developers, all but ensure further increases in congestion and greater travel times in the future.

Spending so much time in cars, physically removed from our outdoor suburban and urban worlds, also leads to detachment from these areas—a loss of ownership of public space (Engwicht 1993). The appropriate design scale for people traveling in cars differs from that for people traveling on foot (Rappoport 1991). Yet planners tend to choose the scale appropriate for the majority of travelers, losing opportunities to design pedestrian-friendly environments, thus making pedestrian travel less inviting.

Community Spirit

How do current transportation designs affect our community spirit, in the places where we live, work and shop? We are experiencing a rapid change in our landscape, with loss of farmland and open space in outlying areas near suburbs. People have become increasingly segregated, with the poor locked into inner city areas, and the wealthy located in far-off suburbs. Parents bear an increasing burden, as they drive to work, drive to run family errands, and serve as chauffeurs for their children, while living in suburbs that make all of these travel activities still more burdensome by design. The elderly often reside in special facilities, apart from the rest of society. In cities, people can feel quite isolated despite higher living densities and less segregated communities, due to the overwhelming impact of heavy traffic in their midst (Appleyard 1981). And stressful commutes, in conjunction with the anonymity motorists experience, in recent years have led to frequent incidents of violence among drivers.

Community Health

The health implications of modern transport have long been recognized: loss of life, permanent disability, and property damage resulting from auto accidents; long-term health effects from exposure to harmful chemical emissions in congested areas; and the often life-threatening effects of exposure to toxic emissions for people who suffer from respiratory illnesses. Motor vehicle design and roadway designs have been improved to reduce the hazards from driving. And new fuel-efficient technologies are emerging. Yet the increase in the number of vehicles and the larger proportion of minivans and sport utility vehicles with poor fuel efficiencies on the roadway undermine progress toward improving air quality. Until new technologies for substantial reductions in emissions appear in force, the problems related to auto-generated pollutants will remain. Even then, with greater numbers of vehicles on the road and more miles traveled per vehicle, the hazards from driving and the total level of global emissions attributable to automobiles may not decline, but increase.

Driving-induced stress is also a growing problem. It has been found to elevate drivers' blood pressure levels after commutes in congested areas, and produces still higher blood pressure readings among people with the longest commutes (Novaco, Stokols and Milanesi 1990). Although "road rage" is a common experience, prescriptives to reduce it are targeted only at motorists. We are told to adopt stress-reducing behaviors while driving, and some commuters now telecommute to avoid traffic. Though helpful, these strategies fail to consider change in transportation design as a means to reduce stress.

Transport Design around the World

Many of the undesirable social impacts from automobiles have long been recognized in European cities. There, physical limitations on development led to an earlier call to restrict automobiles in densely populated areas. Innovative traffic control techniques are now used to reclaim a desirable atmosphere on residential streets and to enhance safety for children, pedestrians and bicyclists. Germany has adopted a *traffic-calming* strategy, with 30 kilometer per hour speed limits on some streets, and narrowing of lanes to create space for bike paths and trees. In The Netherlands, the *woonerf* (living yard) is a redesigned residential street with one road surface for all activities—walking, playing, driving and parking. Barriers prohibit through-traffic, landscaping forces cars to weave along the streets, and safe play spaces for children are provided (Homburger et al. 1990). These designs have been very successful, demonstrating that traffic behavior can be influenced by street design, with a positive outcome for people in heavily-trafficked areas (Eubank-Ahrens 1991). Evaluations of these projects have included traffic speed, noise level, air pollution, parking, and street activity, as measures of success.

> In Denmark, The Netherlands, and Germany, the temptation to calculate a financial rate of return is usually either resisted altogether, or set within the context of wider evaluation methods which emphasize subjective as well as objective criteria. For the Vinderup through road scheme (Denmark), the finding that 72 percent of residents found the town easier to move about in, for example, was considered to be more relevant to judging overall success than the finding that average motorist journey times had increased by nine seconds...Such investigations help to reveal the true success of schemes in meeting the objectives of traffic calming. (Pharaoh and Russell 1991, p. 104)

Transit villages, also referred to as satellite communities, are being developed in various locations around the world (Bernick and Cervero 1997). In Stockholm, planning for the metropolitan region carried out in the 1940's and 1950's led to establishment of a number of successful small cities on the outskirts, linked to the central city by rail. Within these cities, pedestrian and bicycle travel are common due to careful land use planning, though the majority of employed residents still commute by rail outside of the satellite city to work. Population in each city ranged from approximately 25,000 to nearly 100,000 residents in 1990. Similar patterns of development have been applied around Tokyo and Singapore, and transit villages are now appearing in some locations in the United States. (Bernick and Cervero 1997)

The keys to success in these programs include: 1) attention to social and economic issues in transportation planning; 2) public policy initiatives to generate change; 3) restrictive public control over land development; 4) policies to restrict auto use; 5) incentives for development around transit centers; 6) public relations programs to influence public attitudes about the proposed change; 7) careful design planning; and 8) evaluation of both the safety of the new designs and citizens' perceptions of the impacts of these changes on quality of life and travel experiences.

Changes in Transportation Planning and Community Design in the U.S.

In the U.S., some progress in considering society in transportation planning has been made in areas where citizens have created political forces to fight transportation and land use plans. In Portland, Oregon, citizens' groups rallied successfully in the 1970s and 1980s to limit development and overturn plans for highway expansion. Despite fast growth, planners and legislators in Oregon have worked to create a livable city that supports use of public transportation as well as walking and bicycling, and limits sprawl through establishment of an Urban Growth Boundary (Kunstler 1993; Lassar 1989). Regional governance of the area's development has in large part made possible the successful development of public transportation in the region.

In a growing number of places in the U.S., planners have worked closely with architects to create *neotraditional developments*—communities with central downtowns and mixed land uses that support walking. These land use patterns effectively reduce reliance on the automobile within the development and limit its impact on the community (Nolan 1997; Pollan 1997; Southworth 1997). As compared with most suburban developments, neotraditional communities are more compact and integrated. The designs are patterned after cities built in the early 1900's that we now consider to be traditional neighborhoods in established communities in the United States.

New initiatives to develop *transit villages* are also being promoted with success in many areas (Bernick and Cervero 1997). Public-private partnerships bring commercial development into the area around a mass transit center. Multi-story residential buildings provide housing appropriate for people with different income levels. And residents within the village can travel to and from transit stations on foot. Shopping and entertainment provided within the village afford residents less dependence on automobiles for a variety of activities.

Traffic calming and integration of land uses are key elements in these designs, though several conditions seem to be required for their success: 1) the presence of a public resource widely perceived as worth preserving, or a sense that quality of life for residents of a community should be regained; 2) an initiative on the part of a developer; 3) a public-private partnership to foster economic growth and social health; and, 4) in some instances, coordination between planning agencies at the local and regional levels.

Evaluating Design Solutions for Industrialized Nations

What is the potential for improved transportation system design to positively influence societies? *Traffic-calming* designs do create a more pedestrian scale, though they have only a local effect, and may merely shift traffic to nearby roads. Yet they can benefit all people on the street, especially the elderly, the physically handicapped, and young children who are less able to manage in high-traffic areas. These designs effectively slow traffic, changing perceptions of urban areas, and supporting pedestrian travel. They may also improve community spirit by increasing the aesthetic quality of an area and pedestrians' perceived safety.

Transit villages have the potential to reduce auto travel and improve quality of life in areas where it is pressing to do so, but, again, these developments have mostly local impact and are appropriate only in areas with mass transit. What is striking about transit villages, though, is that in the U.S., a couple have sprung up in the midst of low-income areas. Special efforts have been made to include social issues in the planning process, in community rebuilding efforts in these areas (Bernick and Cervero 1997). Moreso than any of the other transportation designs discussed, transit villages appear to have the potential to provide physical and economic mobility for low-income groups in cities. And, if properly planned, these communities could provide comfortable housing for people with physical handicaps, and the aging, who would benefit from ready access to mass transit and close proximity to a mix of land uses. Transit villages may improve community spirit by providing a better quality of life for urban dwellers.

Neotraditional designs may be effective in reducing auto travel for the people who live within the community, at least for some trips; but they typically offer few jobs within their borders, and tend to be located at the suburban fringe. They may provide special benefits for families with young children,

as the streets are relatively safe for play and travel by foot. In theory, these designs would also benefit handicapped and aging populations though, for the most part, these neighborhoods are populated by small families. Neotraditional designs may also have a favorable influence on perceptions of street environments, and foster a slower pace of travel within the community. Improved community spirit is a key aim in these projects.

Though each of the proposed solutions has limitations and all are expensive to implement, they can collectively confer significant benefits to modern society. The problem with transportation improvements aimed at reducing congestion, improving traffic flow, or providing alternative travel choices for people who are now heavily dependent on cars, is that these projects may merely siphon off more public funds to benefit motorists, without benefitting people who have limited mobility (Krumholz 1978). And, for a variety of reasons (Downs 1992), it is unclear whether congestion-mitigation technologies will in fact reduce congestion in the long run. Yet, traffic-calming, transit villages and neotraditional designs at least have the potential to benefit all people. Unlike technological systems and special transit services, design solutions for transportation are compelling as, once in place, they have the potential to continue to produce social benefits with minimal upkeep.

Conclusion

There is an indisputable need to change the design of transportation, in conjunction with new patterns for land use development. With a growing desire for change and examples of new transportation and land use designs in place around the world, efforts are now needed to evaluate the effectiveness of these designs from a social perspective. As new technologies such as gasoline-powered fuel cells emerge and are promoted to reduce environmental impacts from automobiles, the focus on social issues may become still more important. In developing nations, in particular, there will be opportunities to embrace gasoline-powered fuel cells, in effect leaping over the internal combustion engine that is now the mainstay in industrialized nations. Although fuel-cell technology may reduce some of the automobile's environmental impacts, it will not reduce the environmental and social costs from construction of supportive infrastructure, nor the environmental impacts from manufacturing of vehicles. The social impacts of developing motorized transportation systems in areas where non-motor travel is an integral part of society should not be ignored. In the industrialized world we face the flip side of this coin—trying to fit public transport and non-motor transport into environments designed only for cars. In the U.S. as compared with other industrialized nations, the lack of regional control over land use development and strict public policies aimed at curtailing the use of automobiles (Downs 1992) may undermine the success of compact and integrated land use development, and successful development of public transit (Bernick and Cervero 1997).

Is the modern transport system sustainable from a social perspective? The material presented here suggests the social costs of modern transportation design are increasing, and that many cities in their current form will not remain socially or economically sustainable. Pressure to find alternatives and reduce the stress of driving will likely grow with increasing traffic. Even with innovations in design, the impacts of the patterns of development that are now established will persist well into the future. It will be some time before we understand the extent of the influence of new transport designs and land use patterns on society. If these new developments and redesigned environments become merely oases or refuges for suburbanites who commute daily in congested conditions, then the success will be only partial. But if these new designs are embraced along with comprehensive efforts to steer land use development and transportation design away from further dependence on automobiles, and to desegregate society, then the impacts may be far-reaching. It seems quite plausible that as exposure to alternative designs increases and the elements of successful designs become established, the demand for these alternatives will also grow, and the political and economic support for them will also likely increase.

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

Housing Issues and Gender

42 HOUSE TYPES AND HOUSING USES IN KUMASI, GHANA

Irit Sinai

The use of homes not only for shelter, but also for income generation through informal-sector activities, is a widespread phenomenon in many cities in developing countries. A woman can cook in her kitchen and sell meals in the market or at street corners, and a family store or workshop can be located at home. Such activities are highly prevalent in cities where self-employment in the informal sector is high (Fass, 1987).

Using the home for income-generation activities is more widespread in some cities than others. A 1981 survey of Colombo, Sri Lanka, which excluded squatter settlements, showed that a quarter of all dwellings housed a home business (Strassman, 1987). Strassman also discusses surveys in Peru and Zambia, suggesting that home enterprises are more widespread in poorer, smaller cities. In his survey of four Bogota communities, Gilbert (1988) found stores everywhere in homes. A 1987 survey of a South Delhi settlement demonstrated that 20.3% of all housing was used for income generation. Over half of these were wholly or partially rented out, while the remaining households operated business, service, or manufacturing enterprises (Raj and Mitra, 1990).

Little is known about the characteristics of households that use their homes to generate income. Most of the scant literature on such activities focuses on the characteristics of the business rather than the household (see, for example, Tipple, 1993) and ignores economic activities that are not visibly a part of a business, such as cooking food to sell elsewhere and storage. Strassman (1987) studied the effect of gender and location on income of home-based enterprises, and concluded that the type of goods or services produced by a home business determines its income less than its other characteristics, such as location, floor space used in the business, customers, and education of the person who runs the business.

In a previous work I studied the socioeconomic and housing characteristics of households engaged in home-based economic activities in a traditional West African city Kumasi, Ghana (Sinai, 1998). I showed that households undertake such activities regardless of location, tenure arrangement, and income. Larger households with older but less educated heads use their housing for income generation more than other households. Migration history also distinguishes the two groups. The longer migrants are in the city, the more apt they are to use their home for income generation. Of the housing variables examined, only three seem to discriminate significantly between the two respondent groups. First, residents of self-sufficient houses (single-household houses or apartments) use their homes for income-generation less than compound dwellers. Second, households using the home for income-generation occupy more rooms, but their housing

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quality is not as good as that of other households.

Here I examine the characteristics of households that use their homes to generate income in different types of housing, using the same data.

The Data

The data were collected in a survey conducted in 1996 in the Kumasi Metropolitan District. Data collection involved detailed interviews of 596 household heads. The questionnaire asked about housing quality, location characteristics, the use of housing for income generation, and economic and demographic characteristics of household heads.

Data collection employed a two-stage sampling design. In the first stage, 31 city blocks were selected. Enumerators then systematically listed every household residing in the selected blocks. Out of 3,133 listed households, 617 were systematically selected. Of these, 596 were successfully interviewed. Recent migrants and households that had recently moved within Kumasi were oversampled. The data are, therefore, weighted in the forthcoming analysis, and all results in the text, tables, and figures of this paper refer to weighted data. Household heads only were interviewed.

Housing in Kumasi

Kumasi lies within a dense rain forest, about 260 kilometers from the capital, Accra, and the Atlantic coast. The metropolitan area of about 150 square kilometers is estimated to have a population of nearly a million, making it Ghana's second largest city (Korboe and Tipple, 1995).

About half of Kumasi's residents live in traditional compound houses. Typically, a compound house is a one-story series of single rooms surrounding a square courtyard. Entrance to most rooms is from the yard, which provides a center for daytime activities and interaction among compound residents and offers security (Korboe, 1992). Most compound rooms have a small veranda on the courtyard side, and some have an additional entrance via a veranda that opens directly to the street (Tipple et al., 1997). A typical compound house covers about 100m^2. Three sides of the compound consist of 10–16 rooms. The fourth side often includes a bathroom (usually a cubicle with a small drainage hole at the base of the wall), kitchen (a shelter open on the courtyard side, used for storing cooking utensils), and sometimes a bucket latrine (Willis and Tipple, 1991).[1] All households residing in the compound share these cooking and bathing facilities.

A variation of the single-story compound house is the multi-story compound, with two or more floors. The upper floors are reached via a staircase in the courtyard. Each floor has a veranda facing the yard and rooms on the upper floors are accessed from it. Kitchen, bathroom, and bucket latrine are usually found at each level, shared by all households residing on the floor. A good example is the largest house in my sample. This is a three-story compound house, consisting of 56 rooms, three of which are used as shops. The remaining 53 rooms are occupied by 45 households over 200 people (assuming average household's size of 4.8 persons) in a 100m^2 plot. This building is by no means the largest in the city while most multi-story compound houses have two or three floors, some have four, five, and even six floors. About a quarter of Kumasi's population live in multi-story compound houses (Korboe, 1992).

The remaining quarter of the population occupy three types of housing: villa-type house; a small sector of government-built houses; and employer-provided housing. Villas, like compound houses, are large. However, a typical villa house does not have a courtyard, and resembles large single-family houses in the U.S. Government-built housing comprised about 7% of the city's rooms in the early 1980s.[2] Some estate houses are rows of single rooms, while others are small detached or semidetached bungalows, plus some substantial villas (Tipple and Willis, 1992). Most of these units were initially for rent, and tenants were given an option to purchase them (Tipple and Owusu, 1994).

Finally, large employers often provide housing for their workers at nominal rents. The houses range from rows of 4–5 rooms sharing kitchen, bathroom and toilet facilities, through single family houses for senior staff. An example is the University of Science and Technology. When I was there, the university had a staff of about 2,500. About a quarter of them were living on campus.[3] Faculty live in 2–4 bedroom single-family homes, smaller than the typical villa in the city. Senior staff usually live in self-sufficient apartments. Junior staff reside in various types of miniature compound houses. Their living conditions are better than those of compound dwellers because they have cold showers and flush toilet, and because they share these and the outdoor cooking areas with fewer households. While only one block in the sample is employer-provided housing, a number of houses in the sample are owned by employers in other types of blocks.

All of these housing types are represented in the sample used for this study. In the analysis, houses in Kumasi are categorized into single-story compound, multi-story compound, and self-sufficient houses. Self-sufficient houses are defined as one-household residences, not sharing cooking and bathing facilities with other households.[4] Villas, by definition, are self-sufficient. Some government estate and employer-provided houses are self-sufficient, and some are not (considered here single-story compounds).[5]

Although Kumasi is a large city, it is a collection of villages. Except for the very center of city, which is densely built, small tracts of undeveloped land within the city boundaries are still used for subsistence or market agriculture. Most villages have a core area of traditional compound houses (larger villages also have multi-story compounds). Urban sprawl surrounds them in the form of villa houses. A typical example is the village of Ayeduase, adjacent to the University of Science and Technology, about eight kilometers from the roundabout

which is considered to be the center of the city. According to the 1984 census, the village had a population of 1,834. I expect that today the population is much larger, because of a higher density in the existing compounds and because of all the new development around them. The village consists of seven city blocks of compound houses, two of them very old, built of laterite (processed mud), and the rest newer, built of cement. There is one two-story compound in the village, the rest are single-story. Around this traditional core is a large area of 12 city blocks of villa type houses that keeps expanding towards neighboring villages. Maps drawn in 1992 by the Land Valuation Board of the Kumasi Metropolitan District show 110 residential properties in the traditional compound blocks, and 8 more under construction. In the new blocks of the village, the maps show 67 residential houses, and 107 more under construction.

Housing Uses in Kumasi

Out of 596 households in the survey 144 (24.2%) use their home for income generation. Virtually every compound house in Kumasi is used for income generation by one or more resident household, but often households residing in other types of housing also undertake such activities. This makes Kumasi an ideal location for the study of households that use their homes for income generation. Almost all economic sectors are represented, with the exception of heavy industry. Table 1 shows the type of economic activities undertaken at home.

Renting rooms to others is different from other economic activities taking place in the home since it is passive it does not require work. Many landlords have a job, and renting rooms to others is not the only income source for the household. Households that rent rooms to others have another common characteristic they are home owners. Of the 105 respondents (17.5%) who own their homes, 40 households rent rooms to others. To prevent bias in the results, renting rooms to others is excluded from my analysis.

The variables

Three groups of variables are used to compare households that use their home for income generation and those that do not, in the three housing types: socio-demographic characteristics, economic characteristics, and housing and location characteristics. Note that socio-demographic characteristics, other than household size, refer to the household head. The-mean-of-goods-owned index is used as a proxy to measure household wealth. Income information in Ghana is notoriously unreliable. Several surveys found that income questions produced figures that only averaged

Table 1: The economic uses of housing in Kumasi

Economic use of housing	n
Prepare food to sell in the house, to shops, in the market, or in the street	56 9.4%
Manufacture something other than food, to sell to shops, in the market, in the streets, or on order (for example, furniture, cement blocks, soap, clothing, shoes, and artifacts)	20 3.3%
Operate a shop in the house or yard	21 3.5%
Repair in the house or yard (e.g., radios, sewing machines, watches)	5 0.8%
Provide services from the home for pay (e.g., hairdressing, shoe shining, day care services)	10 1.7%
Raise livestock or grow fruit trees in the yard to sell produce	4 0.7%
Store things for later sale in the market or street (petty traders sell their wares by carrying it on their heads for people to see; since the quantity they can carry is limited, they store surplus merchandise in the house).[a]	39 6.5%
Rent rooms to others for pay	40 6.6%
Total[b] 24.2% of all households in Kumasi	144 100.0%

[a] There are probably more than 39 petty traders in the sample, but many cannot afford to have surplus merchandise. They buy in the morning what they sell during the day, so they have no need for storage space in the house.

[b] Many respondents specified more than one activity, so the numbers sum to 195.

about 40% of reported expenditures. These studies consider expenditure information more realistic than income information (Tipple et al., 1997). Possession of consumer goods is often used as a relative measure of household wealth and is considered reliable. The index used here is based on ownership of a fan, sewing machine, radio/cassette player, television set, refrigerator, and a car. These goods represent a wide range of costs, and it is perceived that most Kumasi households would wish to own the full set if they could afford to. The index was calculated based on estimated costs of these goods and the relative frequency of ownership of each good by sample households. Tipple et al. (1997) introduced the mode of calculation in their study of wealth and home ownership in Kumasi and Berekrum (another city in Ghana). The index ranges 0 to 1, with a mean of 0.13 and a median of 0.03 (showing how poor the majority of respondents are[6]).

The housing quality index is a modification of indices used in other housing studies (Johnson and Nelson, 1984; Lacey and Sinai, 1996; Muoghalu, 1991). Housing quality indicators included in the index are the materials of the roof, walls, floors, and windows; the availability of water and electricity; the types of toilet and cooking area used; accessibility to a veranda; and the number of households sharing bathing and cooking facilities with the responding households. The scores of all indicators were normalized and summed. The final housing quality index is a continuous variable ranging from 39 to 95, with a mean of 68.5 and a median of 69.

The dominant form of residence arrangement in Kumasi is renting. More than 60% of households in the sample rent their rooms, mostly from private landlords (18 respondents rent their dwelling from a government agency or from their employers). Another common form of residence in Kumasi is rent-free family housing, an arrangement resulting from the traditions of the Asante people, the ethnic majority in Kumasi. Asantes have obligations to members of their maternal lineage. Social convention does not allow a house owner to resist requests from lineage members for a room in the house they have a right to a room (Willis and Tipple, 1991). As a result, it is very common for people to occupy rooms rent free in houses owned by a lineage member. About 21% of households in the sample enjoy this arrangement. In the analysis, owners and those living rent free in family-owned housing are contrasted with renters (the base category).

As a result of the sprawling nature of development in Kumasi, neighborhoods cannot be easily classified by income. All income groups are represented in most areas of the city. This means that indicators often used to classify quality of life in communities are not useful. For example, a 200-year-old laterite compound house can be on one side of the road and a huge villa housing a single family on the other. The former has no latrine and one water tap in the yard, shared by numerous households; the latter has running water and a modern kitchen. Both share the same access road, both can smell the same public toilet (although only the residents of the compound use it), and both are located at the same distance from schools, health facilities, and markets. Two indicators are available in the data that can be used to characterize neighborhoods: the area of the city (core of periphery) and accessibility. The core area of Kumasi is surrounded by a circular road. Of the 31 blocks selected for this study, eight (25.8%) lie within the circle and 23 in the periphery. Since core area blocks are densely populated, the eight blocks account for 48.1% of respondents[7]. Neighborhoods can be divided into those lying within the core area and those in the periphery. To measure accessibility, respondents were asked about walking time to the nearest public transpotation route[8], and how long it took them to reach the markets used most often and the work location of the household member who earns the most income.

Who Lives Where

Standards of living in compound houses and self-sufficient villas or apartments are quite different. Households residing in compounds usually occupy just one or two rooms, have no running water in their dwelling, and share cooking and bathing facilities with many other households. In contrast, households living in villas occupy the whole house, and enjoy running water, modern kitchen and bath. This implies that villa dwellers have higher incomes than compound residents, which is confirmed in my data. Table 2 shows the characteristics of residents of the three housing types: single-story compound, multi-story compound, and self-sufficient housing.

Clearly the characteristics of single- and multi-story compound dwellers are quite similar, contrasting with residents of self-sufficient houses[9]. Households residing in self-sufficient houses are larger (mean household size 6.08, compared to 4.81 and 4.91 of single- and multi-story compound residents respectively); their heads are much better educated than compound dwellers only 6.4% of household heads residing in self-sufficient housing have no formal education, and 62.9% completed at least partial high school education; they are wealthier (triple the goods owned index value of compound dwellers); a smaller proportion of them use their home for income generation; their housing quality exceeds that of compound dwellers (note that housing quality is better in multi- than single-story compounds); they occupy more rooms; almost half of them own their dwelling; and only 7.3% reside rent-free in family owned housing. Self-sufficient houses are less accessible to work and markets than compound houses of both types, but single-family compound houses are less accessible to public transportation

Multi-story compound dwellers share their yard and cooking areas with many more households than single-story compound residents which may affect their use of their homes for income generation. The data confirm that residents of single-story compounds use the yard and veranda for income generation more than rooms in the house; residents of multi-story compounds use their rooms more. Therefore multi-story compound dwellers clearly use the yard and verandas less than single-story compound residents. Therefore dwellers of single- and multi-story compounds are examined separately in the following analysis.

Single-Story Compound Dwellers

Discriminant analysis is used to compare the characteristics of households residing in single-story compounds, in which at least one member use the home for income generation, to other single-story compound residents. *Discriminant analysis* is a multivariate statistical technique that can be used to study the differences between two or more groups of respondents. The results show that single-story compound dwellers undertake income-generation activities in their home, regardless of their income (goods owned index) and tenure arrangement, and that their housing quality is not affected. The characteristics that most discriminate between single-story compound households that use their homes for income generation and those that do not is household size. Households that use their home for income generation are larger (mean 6.08 persons) than other households (mean 4.41 persons). This is not surprising. Larger households consist of more members who can work from the home (even older children can work after school) and can contribute to the higher income needed to sustain more people.

Number of occupied rooms also distinguishes strongly between the groups. Households that use their homes for income generation occupy more rooms (mean 1.84) than households that do not (1.42). This also makes sense, since the use of housing for income generation requires space.

Age and education of household head have smaller discriminating power, but they are still important. Heads of households that use their homes for income generation are older (mean 48.4) than other household heads (mean 44.7). Intuitively it seems that older household heads have larger households, so it is household size that explains the effect of age. However, the correlation between age of household head and household size is only 0.272, and the effect of household size is controlled for in the multivariate analysis. Household heads who use their housing for income generation are less educated than the heads of other households. While 31.9% of household heads who use the home for income generation have no formal education, only 24.9% of other household heads have none. Similarly, only 5.3% of household heads who use the home for income generation have an education of O-level of higher, compared to 16.4% of household heads that do not use their homes for income generation. It is well established in the literature that informal-sector workers are less educated than formal-sector ones (Sethuraman, 1981). But education here is of the household head, who is not always the one using the home for income generation through informal-sector activities.

Other factors that discriminate somewhat between single-story

Table 2 Characteristics of residents of different housing types

Characteristic and significance level[a]	Single-story compound house n=402	Multi-story compound house n=140	Self-sufficient house n=54
Socio-demographic characteristics			
% male household head*	68.7%	57.7%	66.5%
Mean age of household head	45.54	45.58	45.95
Mean household size**	4.81	4.91	6.08
% household head with no education***	26.6%	16.2%	6.4%
% household head with O-level diploma or higher[b]	13.8%	23.3%	62.9%
% migrant household head***	66.3%	52.1%	78.2%
Mean length of stay of migrant household head in city (years)	21.93	25.46	20.33
Economic characteristics			
Mean of goods owned index***	0.10	0.12	0.37
% use home for income generation	23.6%	25.2%	12.9%
Housing characteristics			
Mean of housing quality index***	64.41	72.91	87.55
Mean number of occupied rooms***	1.52	1.38	3.77
% own their dwelling***	16.8%	5.6%	54.5%
% reside in rent-free family housing**	22.1%	25.0%	7.3%
Location characteristics			
% live in core area of the city***	44.9%	100.0%	37.5%
% travel time to work 15 minutes or less***	39.9%	43.9%	25.1%
% travel time to market 15 minutes or less**	65.7%	72.8%	51.2%
% walking time to public transportation 5 minutes or less***	54.0%	75.5%	71.4%

[a] For means, this is the significance level of F-test comparing the means. For percentages, this is the significance level of c^2 of crosstabulation. ***, **, and * denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.

[b] In Ghana, the O-level diploma is given part way through high school.

compound residents that use their homes for income generation and those that do not are migration, gender, and location. Migration itself does not discriminate between households that use their homes for income generation and those that do not, but length of stay of migrants in the city does. The longer migrants are in the city, the more they tend to use their homes for income generation through informal-sector activities. In the multivariate analysis, the value of this variable for nonmigrant respondents is age. Examining migrants only, we can see that this relationship is held when controlling for age. For single-story compound migrant household heads younger than 30, the mean length of stay in the city is 12.77 for those using their home for income generation, compared to 10.31 for those who who do not. Similarly, for ages 30 and up, the mean length of stay in the city is 26.5 for migrant household heads who use their home for income generation, but only 24.9 for those who do not. These findings indicate that for single-story compound residents in Kumasi, informal-sector jobs are not a transition stage on the way to finding formal-sector positions. Another factor influencing these results is Ghana's improved education system in recent years. As in most developing countries (Zachariah and Condé, 1981), migrants in Ghana are often young adults, who are better educated than young adults 10 and 20 years ago. This means that recent migrants are, on average, more educated than migrants who have been in the city longer, and better education means easier access to formal-sector occupations.

Not surprisingly, female-headed households use their homes for income generation more. Moser (1987) showed that in developing countries women have a triple role in society child care, community participation, and income-earning work. Using the home for income-earning activities allows them to accomplish the three roles as is clear in these data. Among single-story compound dwellers, 37.3% of households that use their homes for income generation are female-headed, compared to 29.4% of households that do not.

Finally, location of the house (city core or periphery) discriminates between the groups, but accessibility to markets and public transportation does not.

Multi-story compound

Discriminant analysis is used to compare the characteristics of households residing in multi-story compounds, in which at least one member use the home for income generation, to other multi-story compound residents.[10]

The effects of household size, education, gender, and length of stay of migrants in the city are similar to those observed for single-story compound residents. Larger households, female-headed households, households with less educated heads, and households that have been in the city longer, use their homes for income generation more[11].

There are, however, some differences between the variables that discriminate between households using their housing for income generation and those that do not among single- and multi-story compound houses. First, number of occupied rooms, a strong discriminator in single-story compound houses, does not discriminate between households that use their homes for income generation and those that do not in multi-story compound houses. Second, accessibility to market and public transportation, not a discriminator in the analysis of single-story compound dwellers, does discriminate between households that use their homes for income generation and those that do not among multi-story compound residents. Households using their homes to generate income live in less accessible locations.

To understand these findings we need to remember that while 140 respondents live in multi-story compound houses (23.5%), they reside in just two city blocks (out of 31 in the sample). Both blocks are in the city's core, but one is more central than the other. The first block is part of the community of New Asafo (76 respondents, 54.2% of multi-story compound dwellers). New Asafo market is within the community, on the main road about three blocks away from the sample block. The block is also within about 15 minutes walk to Central Market, one of the largest markets in West Africa, and to Kejetia, Kumasi's main transportation depot. All major public transportation routes in the city merge in this depot. The second block is in the community of Bantama (64 respondents, 45.8% of multi-story compound dwellers). It is within the city's core area and ensely populated, but it is about a 10–15 minute car ride to Central Market and Kejetia. A household in Bantama wishing to go to almost anywhere in the city needs to take one taxi ride to Kejetia, and another to its destination. Households residing in New Asafo can walk to Kejetia, and save transportation expenses. As a result, rooms in New Asafo are hard to come by, explaining why there is no difference in the mean number of rooms occupied by households using their homes for income generation and those that do not in that community. In Bantama, the mean number of occupied rooms is somewhat larger for households that use the home for income generation (1.44) than for other households (1.25). In New Asafo, on the other hand, both groups of households occupy, on average, the same number of rooms. This shows that although number of occupied rooms does not discriminate between the groups in multi-story compound houses, households that use their homes for income generation occupy more rooms, when they can, in this house type, too. Unfortunately, none of the single-story compound blocks in the sample is as central as New Asafo, so direct comparison is impossible.

Multi-story compound households that use their homes for income generation live further away from the markets they use and from public transportation, but there are some differences between residents of the two blocks. The block in Bantama is on a major transport route, parallel to it. Respondents residing on the road side of the block need only to go out the door to get public transportation. Those living on the far side need to walk around the block. This is reflected in the data, where most respondents (87.8%) walk five minutes or less to the nearest public transport route, regardless of whether they use their homes for income generation or not.

The block in New Asafo, however, is perpendicular to the nearest major road, about two blocks away from it, so more respondents need to walk longer to reach public transportation (only 62.6% walk 5 minutes or less). Clearly, households in the block that use their homes for income generation walk longer to public transport than other households.

The data also reflect that New Asafo is more accessible to markets than Bantama. There is a small market within the community, and Central Market is a short walk from there. In both communities, however, households using their homes for income generation use markets that are further away from their home than other households.

Thus, households residing in multi-story compound houses that use their homes for income generation live, in both blocks, in the part of the block that is further from markets and public transport. A possible explanation is that this gives them a larger scope for their businesses. For example, a women who makes her living by going to the market each morning, buying some vegetables, and selling them to her neighbors from her room, will have a more thriving business if she lives further from the market. And because she lives in a multi-story compound, she has more neighbors to sell to. This may explain why accessibility discriminates between households using their homes for income generation in blocks of multi-story compounds but not in blocks of single-story compounds. The larger number of households per house makes for a larger potential clientele in less accessible houses.

In both single- and multi-story compounds, households that use their homes for income generation enjoy lesser housing quality than other households. The difference is more pronounced in multi-story houses, where housing quality is a strong discriminator between the groups. In single-story compounds housing quality does not discriminate between the groups, but the effect is in the same direction households that use their housing for income generation have inferior housing quality compared to other households. It is tempting to think that housing quality is lower because the house is used for income generation. However, recall that housing quality is measured as an index of the quality of the physical characteristics of the dwelling, such as materials that different components are built off. These cannot be directly affected by the fact that the house is used for income generation.

Self-Sufficient Houses

Only 54 (9.1%) of sample households resided in self-sufficient houses. Of these, only eight households used their homes for income generation. These numbers are not sufficient for statistical analysis. However, by observing the characteristics of these eight households, compared to other households residing in self-sufficient housing, we can make some observations as to the differences between households that use their homes for income generation and those that do not in self-sufficient housing. Table 3 shows how the eight households use their homes for income generation. Table 4 shows the characteristics of the eight households residing in self-sufficient dwellings that use their housing for income generation. For comparison, the right cell of Table 4 shows information on households residing in self-sufficient housing that do not use their housing for income generation.

Clearly, the eight households that use their home for income generation vary a lot. Still, some common threads can be seen. First, household heads who use their housing for income generation are younger. All but one are below the average age for household heads in self-sufficient housing. This is in contrast to the older age of household heads who use their housing for income generation in single-story compound houses. While in compound houses female- headed households use their homes for income generation more than male-headed ones, in self-sufficient housing seven of the eight

Table 3 Households residing in self-sufficient dwellings

Household A
Household head is a minister. He preaches at home, and also farms at home. His wife cooks kenkey[a] in the yard.
Household B
Household head is a trader. He takes public transport to work (30-59 minutes travel). His wife cooks fufu[b] in the house and sells it in front.
Household C
Household head is a herbalist. He repares and sells medicines at home, using a room exclusively for work.
Household D
Household head is a teacher. He drives a car to work. In addition, he cuts timber and sells it. His daughter cooks kenkey in the house.
Household E
Household head is a government official. He takes public transport to work (30-59 minutes travel). His wife raises livestock in the yard.
Household F
Household head is a self-employed mason. His wife operates a small shop in front of the house.
Household G
Household head used to be a primary school teacher. He is now a student. He owns a taxi and works part time driving it. His brother drives the taxi most of the time. A relative is a seamstress sewing in the house.
Household H
Household head sells fish in the street and stores them in the house. An adult son tailors in the house.

[a] Kenkey is a local dish made of ground corn.
[b] Fufu is a local dish made of cassava and plantain.

households that use their homes for income generation are headed by men. Also in contrast to compound dwellers, in self-sufficient housing household heads who use their homes for income generation are better educated than other households.

Another common characteristic of households residing in self-sufficient housing that use their homes for income generation is that they are larger than those that do not use their homes for income generation. Thus, household size may differentiate between households that use their homes for income generation and those that do not in all three house types.

As for housing characteristics, the mean number of rooms occupied by the eight households that use their homes for income generation is 4.7, compared to only 3.6 for households not using their homes for income generation. At the same time, housing quality of households that use their homes for income generation is lower, on average (mean 80.6), than housing quality of households that do not do so (mean 88.6), among residents of self-sufficient housing (only household A has a housing quality index value that is higher than the average for households not using their home for income generation among residents of self-sufficient housing). Thus, more occupied rooms and inferior housing quality may also be common characteristics of households that use their homes to generate income, compared to those that do not, in all three housing types (although housing quality is only marginally inferior in single-story compound houses). This is particularly interesting when we recall that average housing quality and number of occupied rooms differ for residents of the three housing types (see Table 2).

Conclusion

The use of housing for income generation is common in Kumasi. Households undertake such activities in all parts of the city, regardless of income and tenure arrangement. Gender, education of household heads, and length of stay of migrants in the city differentiate between the groups in all three housing types, but the direction of the effect is different for compound dwellers and self-sufficient housing. Age discriminates between the groups in single-story compound and self-sufficient housing, but in different directions. Location accessibility differentiates between households that use their homes for income generation and those that do not only among multi-story compound dwellers.[12] Residents of this housing type who use their home for income generation reside in somewhat less accessible houses.

If we trust the results regarding self-sufficient housing dwellers (given that the sample is not sufficient for multivariate analysis), then it is not surprising that so many discriminating factors have a different effect on households residing in self-sufficient housing, compared to compound houses. Recall from Table 2 that self-sufficient housing residents are quite different from compound dwellers, in that their households are much larger, they are better educated and wealthier, they enjoy better housing quality and occupy more rooms, and many more of them own their house. It is interesting, therefore, to explore the three factors that affect households in all three housing types similarly.

First, households that use the home for income generation are larger. This is not surprising. Larger households include more members who can work from the home and can contribute to the higher income needed to sustain more people. Second, in all three housing types households using their homes for income generation occupy more rooms (with the

Table 4 Characteristics of households residing in self-sufficient dwellings

	Use the home for income generation								Do not use the home for income generation
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	
Male	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	34.7% males
Age	47	43	36	42	46	40	22	49	mean 46.46
Household size	6	7	11	8	6	7	5	9	mean 5.80
Education of household head	JSS[a]	JSS	JSS	JSS	University	JSS	High School	JSS	17.2% with JSS or higher
Migration history	23 years	27 years	8 years	1 years	17 years	non migrant	7 years	36 years	75% migrants; mean 20.58 years
Tenure	owns	owns	owns	rents[b]	rents[b]	owns	rents[b]	owns	52.9% own
Number of rooms	6	2	6	4	3	3	5	6	mean 3.64
Housing quality index	94.7	71.4	65.4	87.8	88.3	87.7	88.6	88.26	mean 88.58
Core area	No	No[c]	No[c]	No	Yes	No	No	No	33.5% in core

[a] Junior Secondary School
[b] Households D and G rent from private landlord; household E rents from employer
[c] Most remote block in the periphery

exception of one block of multi-story houses that is very central, so that additional rooms are harder to obtain). Third, housing quality of households that use their homes for income generation is inferior to that of other households, in all three housing types. This suggests that perhaps households that use their homes for income generation invest more in occupying extra rooms, so that they have more space to use for their business, at the cost of not improving the physical characteristics of the house. They can afford one type of expenses but not the other. If this is the case, than this housing choice is not only shelter-related, but it is also a business decision. Further research is necessary to determine if that is indeed the case.

Notes

[1] Residents of compounds without latrines use public toilets or the bush.

[2] Information was given by K.S. Mensah, area director of the State Housing Cooperation Ltd., in a personal interview.

[3] Information was given by Mr. Baga, a senior officer in the Estate Office of the University of Science and Technology.

[4] Note, that this definition does not include sole use of toilets. Many Kumasi houses do not have toilets. Their residents share public toilets or the bush with hundreds of other households. If they do not share cooking and bathing facilities with other households their residence is considered here to be self-sufficient.

[5] The sample includes one block of government estate houses. Built as small single-family homes, many have been expended since. Four out of nine estate houses in the sample are self-sufficient. Extensions to the other five houses turned them into compound houses of sorts. They are not shaped like traditional compounds, but they house several households that share facilities. They are therefore considered here to be single-story compound houses.

[6] The index is heavily influenced by the inclusion of cars, which are much more expensive than any other good in the index, and are owned by less than 10% of respondents. Excluding cars from the index results in an index with a mean of 0.27 and median of 0.12.

[7] Since households were selected systematically from a complete listing of all households residing in each block, core area residents were not oversampled, so these figures represent higher density.

[8] Public transportation in Kumasi is in the form of taxies and vans that travel the main arteries, picking up and dropping off passengers on demand.

[9] But note the higher proportion of female-headed households in multi-story houses, and that average age of household head is about the same in all housing types.

[10] All multi-story compound houses in the sample are in the core area of the city, so this variable is excluded from the analysis.

[11] Among multi-story compound dwellers: (a) The mean household size for households using their home for income generation is 6.84, compared to 4.24 of other households; (b) 64.2% of households that use their home for income generation are female-headed, compared to only 34.7% of other households; (c) 29.6% of household-heads who use their home for income generation have no formal education, compared to 11.4% of other households. Similarly, only 17.9% of household-heads that use their home for income generation have accomplished an education level of O-level diploma or higher, compared to 25.2% of other households; and (d) The mean length of stay of migrant household heads younger than 30 is 18.58 if they use their home for income generation, and 14.16 if they do not. Similarly, for migrant household heads 30 or older the mean is 33.62 if they use their home for income generation, and 26.42 if they do not.

[12] Location accessibility was not examined for self-sufficient housing residents, because of the great variability among the eight households that use their homes for income generation.

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43 GENDER PLANNING AND HOUSING IN MASAYA, NICARAGUA: A QUESTION OF ACCESSIBILITY

Beth Patton

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to determine the accessibility of a Nicaraguan housing project, MASINFA (Masaya Sin Fronteras), to low-income women by evaluating the program's inclusion criteria and efficacy in delivering houses. My inquiry will determine if the use of gender planning will improve MASINFA's housing program. My analysis will be formulated through two levels of questions posed to 50 individual women and 10 men:

1. Based on socio-economic status, can women meet the program's inclusion criteria when considering the women's:

    a. income level—financial ability to pay for house.
    b. job stability—security of income generation.
    c. land ownership—legal and social capacity of tenure.
    d. family structure—potential for additional sources of income.

2. How effective is the project in delivering houses to women in regards to:

    a. division of household labor—productive and reproductive roles.
    b. level of participation—degree that women participated in construction.
    c. family structure—family members to aid in construction process.
    d. reliability of project funding—MASINFA's ability to continue project.
    e. timetable for completion—amount of time for gestation of housing.

The above categories of analysis are derived from gender theory perspectives in relation to designing and implementing development projects, MASINFA's participation requirements, and personal observations of women's roles and responsibilities.

The Setting

From pre-Columbian times until the present day, Nicaragua has been subject to a constant and often violent interplay of internal and external forces. Exploitation, rivalry, and conflict are dominant themes of Nicaraguan history. Nature has also contributed to this pattern with earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and hurricanes disrupting efforts to achieve national development. Also affected by Nicaragua's conflictual past is the role of the state. In Nicaragua the government, amidst international and domestic pressure, has rarely worked for

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the interest of the masses. Instead, it has served the interests, both foreign and domestic, which perpetuated the rule of whatever faction was currently in power while the majority of the population has lived in extreme poverty. As a result, Nicaraguan history is tainted with tragedy and conflict, leaving a feeling of cynicism concerning the government and deep distrust of foreign influences and intentions (LaFeber, 1983: 12).

Located at the geographic center of Central America, Nicaragua is the largest country in the region and its physical characteristics have long drawn the attention and captured the imagination of outsiders. The country has abundant and rich agricultural lands, considerable potential for geothermal and hydroelectric energy, important timber and mineral resources, and conveniently located waterways which have been considered for the location of an interoceanic canal. In addition, Nicaragua, unlike some Latin American countries, is not overpopulated. Although it has an abundance of arable land, Nicaragua's population is relatively small, consisting of 4 million inhabitants.

Currently Nicaragua is suffering from an economic crisis of an unprecedented magnitude. After over a decade of recession and eight years of a draconian economic reform program mandated by foreign creditors, including the implementation of structural adjustment programs, 70 percent of the population is living in poverty and unemployment and underemployment have risen to 60 percent. Housing conditions in Nicaragua exemplify this economic crisis. In Nicaragua, 83 percent of the existing houses were built through the process of self-help construction and many families live in inadequate one room houses built of wood and cardboard, with tin roofs and dirt floors (Morales, 1996).

Housing Policy

The Third World housing situation is characterized by population growth and by the commercial market's inability to provide affordable housing for the majority of the population. State intervention in this market has in most cases had little effect in improving the housing situation for the majority. As a result, people in need of housing have to provide their own housing through the process of self-help (Harms, 1992: 37).

In the typical laissez-faire response to housing needs common throughout Latin America, the state limits itself to regulatory actions and provision of enough public sector housing to quiet social unrest (Williams, 1985: 383). The result is that the private sector reaps the direct profits from the construction of private housing and much of the subcontracted public housing. The private sector also benefits from the reduced labor costs and the increases in land value that are generated by public sector investments in infrastructure. The informal private sector, primarily the poor, is left to provide for itself (Williams, 1985: 383).

Population and Project Description

The city of Masaya is located 29 kilometers southeast of the national capital, Managua, forming an important nucleus of the metropolitan zone of the nation. The municipality of Masaya is the third most populated city in Nicaragua and one of the most densely populated areas of the country, with a population density of 675 inhabitants per square kilometer. Masaya is also the center of Nicaraguan folklore and is nationally famous for its artisan production. The population of Masaya has grown from 45,000 in 1971 to 120,856 in 1996 with 80,051 urban residents and 40,805 rural residents. Of the total population of Masaya, men represent 48.81 percent and women 51.19 percent. These percentages are representative of the national population composition for men and women of 49.01 percent and 50.99 percent respectively (Alcaldia Municipal de Masaya, 1996: 5 and INEC, 1996: 14).

Figure 1 shows the population distribution of women and men for the city of Masaya in 1996. For females the most populous age group is 15–19 (12.9 percent) and for males the most populous age group is 10–14 (16 percent). The large proportion of the population who are 18 years of age or younger indicates that a high demand for housing will continue in Masaya and Nicaragua as a whole.

Figure 1 Masaya Population Distribution 1996



Source: FIDEG, 1996:12.

Of the women interviewed their age range is 25–76 and the modal age is 39, indicating their physical potential to participate in the construction process of the project. The age range of the men interviewed is 28–65 and the median age is 46, again of the age physically capable of building houses. In terms of marital status 58 percent of the women are partnered, signifying that they are either married or have a companion, 38 percent are single, and 4 percent are widowed. These percentages are higher than national averages in regards to marriage/stable partner—47.89 percent, but similar in terms of the number of single women—38.34 percent, and number of widowed women—4.67 percent (9.1 percent were listed in INEC survey as being divorced) (INEC, 1996: 16). Of the men surveyed 90 percent (9) are partnered and 10 percent (1) are single.

Knowing the marital status of the sampled female population illuminates either a potential for financial and domestic support or a possible socio-economic burdening caused by additional responsibilities. Thus, a woman's marital status may explain her ability or inability to participate in the housing project in terms of time commitment and financial resources.

The average number of children of the females interviewed is 4, which is similar to the national average of 4.17 (Morales, 1996:15). The average number of children in the household of males interviewed is 3.

For the entire sampled population, the average number of persons per household is 6, which is slightly higher than the national average of 5.7 (INEC, 1996: 18). Again, the importance of knowing the structure of the family lies in determining members of the family who can participate in the construction process or assist with domestic chores to enable the woman to participate in the construction process. My data challenge the concept of the male-headed nuclear family norm. Although 58 percent of the women are partnered, 68 percent are the head of their household, discussed below.

Project Description

MASINFA—Masaya Sin Fronteras (Masaya Without Borders)—is a non-governmental organization that was created in 1990 by former members of the Sandinista mayoral staff of Masaya after the electoral defeat of the FSLN. Although MASINFA was originally located in a room of a solidarity worker's house with only one paid staff position, today MASINFA is a well known organization with eleven full time staff members, including an armed guard.

After the triumph of the Sandinista revolution in 1979, Nicaragua received a substantial amount of technical and monetary aid from sympathetic governments and international solidarity organizations. The mayoral office of Masaya benefited from this support when a "circulo de amistad" was established with cities in Europe and the United States. However, with the election of the conservative UNO coalition in 1990, there was uncertainty as to the future of the solidarity movement in Nicaragua. In an effort to maintain the relations formed between the mayoral office of Masaya and international solidarity organizations, the "circulo de amistad" was legalized as the association MASINFA.

The requirements to participate in MASINFA's housing project, which began in 1992, are 1) to have title to land; 2) capacity to pay for the house; and 3) and to need a house. In addition, project participants must give their land as collateral against the debt for the house and agree to pay the cost of the house by signing a legal contract. There are three house models—41 meters, 32 meters, and 20 meters—which cost $2,600, $2,200 and $1,600 respectively. An applicant's income and thus ability to pay determines the size of house she/he may receive. The payment term is sixteen years and, depending on the size of the house, the participant pays the equivalent of $13, $11, or $8 each month.

MASINFA refers to the construction process as "ayuda mutua" by which families are divided into groups of five to form a brigade. Each brigade builds five houses under the direction of a mason and brigades are grouped by five and supervised by a "mano de obra." An engineer who is a MASINFA staff member supervises the entire project and provides technical assistance. Project beneficiaries are required to participate in the construction two days a week until their brigade has completed all five houses. If beneficiaries are unable to participate in the construction, they are able to hire a worker to represent them at the construction site.

For the initial housing project there were two "etapas" or stages. The first stage, called Vivienda, Progreso, Solidaridad, involved building 214 houses in nine barrios (neighborhoods). The participation criteria of capacity to pay was not strictly enforced when beneficiaries were selected. As stated by MASINFA's director, "selection of beneficiaries of the first 214 houses was made with the heart, and the capacity to pay of the beneficiaries was not predicted" (Fernandez, 1997: a). With the second group of houses built beginning in 1994, inclusion criteria guidelines were strictly followed in terms of income level and capacity to pay.

MASINFA has facilitated the construction of 268 homes in Masaya. The majority of the beneficiaries, 162 or 60 percent of the participants, have been women. The goal of this project is to create a revolving credit fund from the payments made for the first 257 houses built. However, only eleven houses have been built from the credit fund because 70 percent (180) of the low income participants and 17 percent (7) of middle income participants are not paying for their houses (Ruiz, 1997).

Gender Planning

Women and men have different social and economic positions within the household and varying control over resources. They not only play different and changing roles in society, but also have dissimilar needs. With the emergence of the literature on women and housing during the past decade (Dandekar 1993; Moser 1987), several arguments have arisen for the

need for policy makers at local, national, and international levels to focus on women's specific shelter needs. The arguments rest on two key points: 1) globally there has been a dramatic increase in women-headed households; and 2) the importance of housing in women's lives must be considered in housing design.

However, the traditional modernist stance of planning analyzes and practices from a reality that is male, white, and bourgeois. Thus women's experiences and needs are not considered in the planning process or outcome because their theories and knowledge are not considered legitimate sources of information. This exclusionary tradition, based on white male reality, has resulted not only in errors of analysis in planning theory but also projects detrimental to women because of the failure to theorize and interpret knowledge and reality in a multiple and pluralistic manner. Within this traditional discourse, planning methodology has been characterized as a trans-historic, linear, apolitical, and technical set of procedures in which its institutions are neutral and acting in the public good (Hooper, 1992: 50 and Moser, 1993: 7).

Carol Moser (1993) describes the recent development of gender as a planning discourse. Moser begins her description with the concept of women in development. The term women in development, or WID, was coined in the early 1970s by the Women's Committee of the Washington D.C. Chapter of the Society for International Development. This committee consisted of a network of female development professionals who were influenced by the work on Third World development undertaken by the anthropologist Ester Boserup. The term was adopted by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in their Women in Development (WID) approach for development (Moser, 1993: 2).

The underlying rationale is that women are an untapped resource who can provide an economic contribution to development and thus ensure a more successful process through "productive" participation. WID focuses mainly on women in isolation from development by promoting measures such as access to credit and employment as the means for integrating women into the development process.

Moser continues her discussion by describing a more recent paradigm shift in gender planning which recognizes the limitations of focusing on women in isolation and instead promotes the need to look at gender and development (GAD). This focus on "gender" rather than "women" is based on the concern that the problems of women were perceived in terms of their sex, or their biological differences from men, rather than in terms of gender, the social relationship between men and women (Moser, 1993: 3). The GAD approach maintains that to focus on women in isolation is to ignore the real problem, which remains their subordinate status relative to men. In insisting that women cannot be viewed in isolation, GAD emphasizes a focus on gender relations, when designing measures to "help" women in the development process.

The distinction between WID and GAD is essential for the creation of development policies. To focus on the incorporation of women into the "productive" economic sector is to ignore the reasons why women are not considered to be contributors to this sector. By acknowledging the fact that a male controlled and defined society has subordinated women to men, a first step is made in designing development projects that are appropriate for rather than detrimental to the needs and interests of women.

The Incorporation of Housing in Gender Planning

This need for gender planning applies to housing. Most governmental and non-governmental housing programs seldom reflect an awareness of the heterogeneity of family structures or the increase of women-headed households. Planning, therefore, must disaggregate households and families on the basis of gender while identifying housing needs. For a housing project to be accessible to low-income women, inclusion criteria must be set in accordance with women's income level, land ownership capability, job stability, and family structure. For housing to be effectively produced, the division of labor in women's households, women's family structure, and their level of participation must be considered in addition to the reliability of projects' funding and timetable for completion. Accessibility in this analysis refers to not only the women's ability to participate in the project, but also their ability to sustain participation. The concept of participation includes activities such as attending informational meetings, building the houses, and paying the debt of the house.

Not until 1985 was the connection between women and shelter strongly detailed in a United Nations document when the world conference for the UN Decade für Women (1976–1985), meeting in Nairobi, adopted the "Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women." At this stage in the development of gender planning, it is important to note, the emphasis was on including women in the housing process rather than shaping policy specific to women's needs (Aliyar and Shetty, 1993: 18).

During the last decade, however, when most of the literature on women and housing has emerged, several arguments have been put forth for the need for policy makers to focus on specific shelter needs related to women. Work in this domain has detailed the extent to which women have been excluded from housing provision and has shown that the specific needs of women have been disregarded from current housing policy and programs (Dandekar, 1993:14).

Figure 2 Annual Income Distribution



Source: Survey Data

The Case for Gender Planning: Inclusion Criteria

Income

Accessibility to housing is often assumed by project designers to be equal for men and women, and is only differentiated across income lines. This assumption has served to make income the primary and at times the sole basis for assessing housing needs of family units. The data gathered from the surveyed participants, however, reflect women's lower socio-economic status when compared to men.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of income among the sampled population. When averaged, the annual income of the women surveyed is $786 as compared to the men's average annual income of $1353. Another important observation is that when asked, "How much do you earn a month or each week", most of the men responded with a monthly salary, yet most of the women gave a range of weekly salary. This seems to reflect the high number of women who earn an unstable income in the informal sector as compared to the majority of men who earn a stable wage in the formal sector.

Job Stability

Related to the issue of income is job stability. With 76 percent of the women surveyed employed in the informal sector, their employment and earnings may be unstable. My assumption that their income is unstable is based on the women responding with a range of weekly income when they were asked "How much do you earn each month or week?"

In terms of job stability or employment opportunities my research results support the concept that women's access to housing programs is potentially limited because of their inability to show proof of a steady income. With weekly income varying and no formal documentation of employment, women's participation in the informal sector may prohibit project participation. Although attempting to earn an income in the informal sector may contribute to an unstable income, flexibility of work hours may enable women to more freely participate in the construction of homes.

Access to Land

An important issue to consider when planning and designing housing projects is the criterion of land tenancy. Most housing projects, whether public or private, require that the participant own the land on which the house is to be built. However, tenure is traditionally given to men as household heads, even where women have primary household responsibilities (Moser, 1993: 52). A staff member of the Centro de Mujeres in Masaya stated that it was unusual that women own land in Nicaragua because of the machista society and male-oriented laws (Moreno, 1996). However, my data contradicts this notion. As Figure 3 shows, when both female and male participants were asked, "In whose name is the title to the land," 82 percent responded that the land was in "her" name while 18 percent responded that it was in "his" name. An important factor in regards to land ownership of the participants is the origin of the land tenancy. The majority of the land where MASINFA houses were built was distributed under Ley 85 and Ley 861 by the Sandinista government in 1990 before leaving office.

Figure 3 Land Title



Source: Survey Data

Family Structure

Another standard used to measure accessibility of inclusion criteria is the participant's family structure and the potential for economic support. The composition and structure of families has changed dramatically throughout the world, yet, the failure by policy makers to recognize that households are not comprised of a homogenous nuclear family is still widespread (Moser, 1993; 16).

Family structure can show how many potential wage earners are in a household, which affects its ability to pay for the house. Of the women surveyed, the average number of people per household is 6. The average number of children is 4 and their mean age is 17.

For the 50 women surveyed, 58 percent were partnered (either married or had a companion) and 68 percent responded that they were the head of the household (Figure 4).

Structural Importance of Housing for Women

Another factor contributing to the importance of women's participation in the design and planning of housing is their income generating work which includes home-based production and food production. With the increase of women in the informal sector, many women support their family through home-based production such as sewing, ironing, washing, and by maintaining a "venta" (store) in the front of their home. As part of the informal sector, street food vending has become a major source of income for women around the world. Home food production is both a source of family food and a source of income. Of the surveyed population, 16 percent of the women use their home for income generating activities such as sewing, child care, and food production.

The importance for women of house design was expressed by the women interviewed. When asked "If you could change anything about the housing project, what would you change?" 36 percent (18) of the women answered "the structure and construction of the house." Other responses included "payment policy" 44 percent (22), "tenure" 4 percent (2), and "nothing" 16 percent (8).

In sum, MASINFA's housing project is accessible to the majority of surveyed women because of their family support and land ownership. However, the majority of women's income levels and job stability do not meet inclusion requirements.

The Case for Gender Planning: Efficacy of Housing

Division of Household Labor

Division of household labor is an important factor in the analysis of efficacy of housing because it is imperative that planners understand the productive and reproductive roles and responsibilities of the beneficiaries.

In regards to productive work, work done to earn an income, the majority of the surveyed women are employed and participate in the informal sector (Figure 5).

The project requirement of participating in the construction process two days a week forces women to choose between income generation or construction participation. In either case, a woman may lose income by missing a day's wage or by having to hire someone to represent her at the construction site. The survey results indicate that 12 (32 percent) out of 38 women who earn a wage missed work to participate in the

Figure 4 Household Head of Female Participant



Source: Survey Data

Figure 5 Female Employment Levels



Source: Survey Data

construction and 9 (18 percent) of the 50 women hired someone to work in their place.

Women's reproductive role, such as domestic work and child care, is also a key factor in determining accessibility. There is potential for women's domestic work to be negatively impacted when participating two days a week in self-help construction. Of the women surveyed, almost half (46 percent) spend all day doing domestic work and another 26 percent devotes all their mornings to domestic work (Figure 6). These results represent a potential for women's domestic work to suffer from construction participation. Yet, when questioned whether their participation negatively affected their domestic work, 68 percent of the women answered that it did not.

A reason why most participants' domestic work was not affected is the support from family members. When asked "Who does the domestic work" 38 percent said they did the work alone; 44 percent stated that they, with help, did the domestic work; and 18 percent responded that their daughter did all the domestic work.

If women also have to care for their children during the day, project participation may be difficult. When asked, "Quien cuida los ninos," (who takes care of the children) the majority of the women surveyed are the primary care givers for their children. When asked who cared for their children during the building of houses, 48 percent of the women surveyed responded that "it was not necessary" to find alternative child care.

A final analysis of women's productive and reproductive roles (Figure 7) demonstrates that these responsibilities deterred some women from participating in building houses. For instance, 33 percent of the women surveyed did not participate in the construction because of their child-care responsibilities while 30 percent of the women did not participate because of their wage work.

Participation Level

One of the most important determinants of efficacy and thus accessibility of a project is the level at which women participated in the construction process. Traditionally women are not employed in the construction field, which may deter their participation or level of participation when building homes. Added to this analysis is women's ability to participate in construction when considering their productive and reproductive responsibilities. When asked, "What was your role or part in building the houses," 52 percent of the women responded "como ayudante" (as a helper). They described tasks such as carrying blocks, mixing cement, and carrying water. Their participation was equal to that of the men as all workers helped the brick mason to construct the houses. However, 48 percent of the women said they did not participate building houses.

Figure 6 Amount of Time Spent for Domestic Work by Female



Source: Survey Data

What is pertinent to this

Figure 7 Reasons for Not Participating in Construction



evaluation are the main reasons why 48 percent of the women surveyed did not participate—lack of child care and wage work. Without a support system, either familial or project sponsored, only half of the women can participate. This is a weakness of MASINFA's project design.

Family Structure

Family structure and composition are important factors when analyzing a project's efficacy in providing houses. The requirement of beneficiaries to participate in the construction of homes could potentially affect the extent to which women can participate in the construction process and the rate at which the houses will be built. With 68 percent of the women surveyed responsible for supporting their families, they may need to rely on a family member to participate in building houses. This was the case with the majority of the females surveyed. When asked, "Did other members of your family participate in the construction process," 71 percent responded "yes" and 21 percent responded "no."

Timetable

A project's effectiveness in producing housing is largely determined by the time necessary to complete the construction. The surveyed participants were asked two questions to determine the time necessary for project completion, these included: 1) How long did you wait after submitting your application for the construction to begin?; and 2) How much time was necessary to build the house? Of the 27 women who responded with a numeric answer, the average time spent waiting to begin construction in addition to time spent building the house was 7 ½ months. Except for one participant, those who did not provide a numeric answer responded that the process "fue rapido" (was quick). The work brigades completed five houses at a standard rate of 3 months (Cruz, 1996:b) so that the average project completion is less than a year. I feel the time frame of the project is effective in delivering houses.

Reliability of Project Funding

The initial 257 houses built were funded by a donation from the European Coordination. It is the programmatic intent of MASINFA that the house payments received from participants be put into a revolving credit fund for continuation of the project. However, the economic situation in Nicaragua, in addition to the "no pago" (no pay) campaign sponsored by the Movimiento Comunal de Nicaragua, has resulted in 70 percent of the first phase participants not paying for their house. As of July of 1997, only eleven houses have been built from the revolving credit fund and no houses have been built since 1996. At this point MASINFA's program is not efficient in providing houses because of a lack of reliable funding creating an inability to provide houses for qualified female applicants.

This analysis illuminates a main point that for many female participants it was the support of their family that made the program accessible. To conclude, MASINFA's lack of gender planning has affected the accessibility of the housing project to many women.

Recommendations

From a gender perspective, different housing systems present various opportunities, constraints, and advantages for low-income women. Project based approaches (as for example, directed by an NGO like MASINFA) have possibly the greatest potential to increase accessibility to housing for women. MASINFA's housing project has existed for only five years and it is at an evaluation stage in the life of the project. The following are recommendations that I suggest MASINFA would do well to consider for increasing its accessibility to low-income women based on inclusion criteria and efficacy of housing.

Inclusion Criteria

Income

- Awareness of the fact that the majority of women work in the informal sector and, therefore, lack solid proof of capacity to pay should be taken into consideration. I suggest that MASINFA needs to be more flexible in an applicant's proof of income which would allow more women to participate in the future.

- MASINFA should establish a micro-enterprise related to

the construction process such as brick making, and wood cutting. This type of business would supplement the women's incomes during project participation in addition to ensuring that the women have another source of revenue for house payments.

Efficacy of Housing

Division of Labor

- Because a lack of child care prevented several women from participating in the construction process, I recommend that MASINFA organize child care provision for female participants. By providing a support system for women's domestic responsibilities more women will be able to participate in building homes.

Level of Participation

- Involve women participants in the designing of houses and construction process. Women's structural housing needs for income generating activities and their domestic roles should be considered.

Reliability of Project Funding

- Allow participants to pay for house in a stable cordoba rate instead of U.S. dollars. The default rate of the women beneficiaries will most likely decrease, MASINFA's revenue will increase enabling provision of housing for women, and project philosophy of requiring participants to pay for their house is maintained.

Through this study, I have determined the accessibility of MASINFA's housing project to women based on inclusion criteria and efficacy of delivery housing. Problematic aspects of MASINFA's housing project in regards to accessibility to women have been described. The importance of this research is the proof that gender planning is a legitimate paradigm of planning discourse and the incorporation of gender planning is pertinent to the accessibility of housing projects. Although my analysis and recommendations are specific to MASINFA, this research illuminates aspects of gender planning that should be taken into consideration when planning and designing a housing project.

Notes

[1] Ley 85 is the law of "Transmission of Property of Housing and other Real Estate Belonging to the State and its Institutions" in which the state guarantees the right of property to all Nicaraguans, occupied by assignment, possession, renting, or any form of ownership. Ley 86 is entitled the "Special Law of Legalization of Housing and Land" in that people who have been occupying lots with the purpose of building homes on the lots, acquire by this law the right of property.

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44 WORKING WOMEN'S HOSTELS IN INDIA: EXTENSIONS OF FAMILY CONTROL OR EXPANDERS OF URBAN CHOICE?

Kameshwari Pothukuchi

In India, even today, the dominant set of relationships within which women acquire and can claim shelter is the family. These relationships entitle them to shelter as an extension of the family's cultural roles in protection and control of women. In this scheme, it is considered proper and even expected for women to claim shelter from more distant family sources if nearer ones, for any reason, are unavailable or unwilling to provide shelter. The strength of this patriarchal association is in its corollary—that few non-family alternatives exist from which women may obtain shelter. Only recently has the concept of shelter obtained in exchange for cash—through market relations, that is—has taken off on a much broader scale for Indian women. Until recently, acceptable non-family forms of shelter were restricted to young girls in boarding schools, destitute women and a narrow range of female occupations that employed migrant women (nurses from Kerala, for example).

This study offers an in-depth study of the opportunities and limitations of working women's hostels—one such acceptable, non-family form of shelter. This paper will examine, from the perspective and experience of their residents, the extent to which hostels extend and reinforce patriarchal family structures and the economic, social, and political opportunities they provide to women.

Working women's hostels have burgeoned in large cities around India to exploit the market demand by female migrants who have access to cash but not, because of distance from their families, to shelter. Facilitative or regulatory public policies have been slow to catch up, although municipal provision of women's hostels is not uncommon in cities. Working women's hostels can be found in other parts of Asia as well where large numbers of female migrants flood to cities (Foo 1987; Matsui 1989).

Based on a study of 126 women in 12 hostels in Bangalore, India, this report contributes important insights into hostel life and living and the doors hostels open (or do not open) for women who migrate to Bangalore. Over the past two decades, Bangalore has experienced a high degree of female autonomous migration (that is, migration that is not associational or family-based). The 1981 Census, the first that disaggregated female migration by reason for migration, reported that there were 22,000 female migrants, who had resided in Bangalore for 4 years or less, who migrated there education or employment. While the corresponding 1991 statistics have not yet been made public, at a conservative 20 percent increase this figure would be over 26,000 in 1990.

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Hostels as a source of shelter

Hostels are an attractive shelter alternative for single women migrants—attractive, that is, to the women and their families as well as to the community at large—because they are typically single-sex, collective residences; they tend to be cheaper than renting rooms in private homes; they provide food; and are considered to be safer as well. Safety is often attributed to the presence of a "warden" who simultaneously is responsible for the physical and moral protection—and control—of the women. While hostels tend to be common residential sources for male migrants as well, neither are they characterized by the same degree of personal and social control and restriction, nor are hostels the only socially acceptable alternative for men. Men not only have greater latitude to seek other shelter alternatives, but also higher possibility of securing them.

Hostels can vary significantly in their offerings, administrative structure, and costs although the quality of shelter seems to have a lower minimum than costs. At its worst, one hostel in Bangalore was run by a tyrannical brother of a Catholic nun on property owned by her. Rooms were crowded pens with bunks in rooms divided by rickety partitions, and with little space for storage of personal items, and little natural light or ventilation—a situation not unusual in hostels in general. However, hostel staff were repeatedly terrorized by physical and verbal abuse, all of which created a powerful environment of fear so that residents were fearful of talking to me despite interview locations distant from the hostel. Residents typically used this hostel as a temporary way-station while waiting to get into better hostels.

On the other end of the quality spectrum is a hostel that is run by a local feminist organization, providing decent accommodation; reasonable food, facilities and rules; and cordial relationships between management and residents characterized by mutual respect and open communication. All that was lacking, from my perspective, was a mechanism for formal participation of residents in hostel decision-making, although the residents seemed not to particularly care. This hostel had a governing board consisting of women professionals and activists who saw shelter for women as a great need in the community.

Most hostels are well located with respect to the city's commercial and administrative districts, and close to major bus routes. The down side of this generally advantageous location is a seeming disregard for the health and safety of residents in the location of a few hostels. Governed by land use policies that are less stringent than for family-oriented residential buildings, hostels can be found in the middle of busy commercial districts and in basements of commercial buildings. Often they are so overcrowded as to pose severe health and safety risks to their residents.

The following scenario was more common than hostel administrators like to admit. In a display of gracious hospitality, a group of women in one overcrowded hostel offered me tea while I interviewed them. They pulled out a kerosene stove from under a two-tiered bunk-bed of which there were three in a room no bigger than 10 feet by 10 feet. Flammable nylon saris were hanging between the bunks, right above the stove on which tea was being made, making me fearful of my and their safety. Hostels which provide cooked meals typically do not permit kerosene or electric cooking stoves, but these rules are rarely enforced, and women often cook on their own to supplement bland hostel food, lacking in nutrition.

Hostels also vary in their design and spatial arrangements. Most have rooms occupied by between 2 to 8 women, with collective bathrooms on the floor or outside the main residential building. Bathrooms and toilets are often under-provided, shared by anywhere between 3 to 15 or more women. In one rather well-designed hostel, rooms opened out into a corridor wrapped around an internal courtyard. In this hostel, rooms were shared by 3 women to a room and had a bathroom attached as well. The owner of this hostel also owned two other somewhat dreary and overcrowded hostels in other parts of town, and must have requested a better design for the one that was to be adjacent to her own quite lavish-looking home. The most overcrowded hostel I was in during my field trip had 8 women in 4 bunk beds in each room of no more than 80 square feet. Most hostels also had collective dining rooms, a waiting area, and facilities for washing and drying clothes. Some, better organized, ones also had spaces for study and watching TV, although the dining room typically served these purposes.

Hostel costs can also vary quite a bit. During my initial study in 1994, hostel costs ranged from a highly subsidized Rupees 300 plus food (with food costs determined monthly by resident committees based on collective decisions for meals, amounting to between Rs. 150 to 200 each month), to a gouging Rs. 1,200 for quality no better. At the time of research then, Rs 100 officially equaled approximately $4. Most hostels were in the Rs. 500-800 range, which included food. Relative to wages which ranged from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 3,000, these costs were not out of the ordinary for the city, and in some cases, quite reasonable for the amenities they offered. In a review in late 1996, costs rose by between 10 to 20 percent, with greater increases for meals.

Most hostels are privately owned and managed, several by only a handful of women entrepreneurs who have discovered shelter for women as an unmet urban need and with great potential for huge profits. Four of these hostels are owned by the same individual. One hostel that, for reasons that are unclear, now has become abandoned,[1] was municipally provided, while another privately developed also received tremendous government subsidies and private donations. Despite this, however, this hostel was notorious for being among the more expensive ones, suggesting a high level of arbitrariness in price-setting and lack of government monitoring of prices in publicly subsidized hostels. Four were provided by local women's organizations, some of which were charitably oriented and therefore had lower prices. A few hostels were also attached to Catholic schools and convents; study of these was typically denied. The local YWCA had

two hostels, although one has recently been turned into an upscale guest house for mostly foreign tourists, thus rendering it inaccessible for middle-class working women. One hostel subsidized by the Dutch embassy was attached to a training institute for textile design. This hostel, while spacious and otherwise well provisioned also had western-style toilets with which the women were extremely dissatisfied!

Who are hostel residents?

Tables 1–6 document basic socio-demographic data for hostel residents. Most of the residents were between the ages of 20 and 29 (91 percent); almost all had 12 years of education or more (98 percent), with 78 percent possessing a baccalaureate or higher degree. Most were single (92 percent), while a handful were married (3 percent of 125 women) and divorced or separated (also 3 percent). Two persons of the 125 who responded to this question were widowed. Of the 117 who were not students, the majority earned between Rs. 1,000 and Rs 3,000 (US$ 40 and 120 in 1994).

Most come from families that are comfortable placed, economically speaking. Most (89 percent) came from households with monthly incomes of over Rs. 3,000. Hence, hostel residents of the majority of hostels in Bangalore are single, well-educated, employed, and come from middle class families. However, close to half of all women (47 percent), who responded to this question, contribute money to their families' coffers. In informal small group discussions, several women indicated that this money was being pooled for their dowries. Most of the residents were from the states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh, with Karnataka, the home state, dominating.

Residents prefer hostels over extended kin-based shelter

In almost all cases, the move to the city followed the securing of jobs and school admissions. Hostels were typically identified and a "seat" secured before the actual move occurred, usually by the intervention of a friend or relative already in Bangalore. Hostels were chosen as the preferred form of shelter in most cases, almost without consideration of alternative, family-based options in cases where these were available. For example, one in four respondents had members

Table 1 Age of hostel residents

Age	Number	Percent
Under 20	6	5
20-25	80	63
26-30	35	28
Over 30	5	4
Total	126	100

Table 2 Marital status

Marital Status	Number	Percent
Single	115	92
Married	4	3
Div/Separated	4	3
Widowed	2	2
Total	125	100

Table 3 Education

Education	Number	Percent
Secondary	2	2
Secondary plus 2	25	20
Bachelor/Equivalent	47	38
Master/Professional	49	40
Total	123	100

Table 4 Income (Students excluded)

Monthly Income	Number	Percent
Less than Rs 1,000	17	15
1,000-1,999	52	44
2,000-2,999	29	25
Rs 3,000 or more	19	16
Total	117	100

Table 5 Family income

Monthly Income	Number	Percent
Less than Rs 3,000	13	11
3,000-4,499	35	30
4,500-5,999	30	26
6,000 or more	38	33
Total	116	100

Note: Rs. 25=$1 (official 1994 exchange rate)

Table 6 Contribute income to household?

Contribute income?	Number	Percent
Yes	58	47
No	66	53
Total	126	100

of their extended family—uncles, aunts, cousins and so on—who lived in the city. These family members were, however, only seen as resources in an emergency, and were often requested to look in on the women in the hostel, rather than provide shelter on an ongoing basis. This is contrary to expectations of women's access to shelter through kin-based systems.

When asked why the women preferred to seek shelter in hostels despite the availability of extended families in the city with whom they could stay, a variety of reasons emerged. The most common theme was that women and their families did not want to become involved in the mutual, reciprocal relations of obligations and favors with their extended kin. Shelter, in this view, therefore was better obtained in exchange for a specific, known sum of money, in a single transaction, rather than through a system of reciprocal networks of family obligations which may be less unitary, have more uncertainty, and greater unpredictability in when they "came due."

Furthermore, women preferred receiving services such as meals and laundry in exchange for cash rather than implicitly in exchange for labor and household participation that would inevitably be expected of them in a family situation. In one interesting case, a newly married woman from New Delhi insisted on living in a hostel rather than at her mother-in-law's home as would be expected, while she and her husband searched for a house for themselves. It is important to remember that this pattern is typical of middle class segments of society characterized by a greater access to cash and lower dependence on reciprocal kin networks, the latter being more common to lower-income households. Whether poorer migrants seek family-based shelter in greater proportions than their middle-class counterparts, however, is a question that falls beyond the scope of this study, as does the issue of if or how middle class women who do seek family-based shelter differ from those who choose to reside in hostels.

Open-ended questions explored the contributions of hostels to women's lives and the limitations hostels posed to their aspirations for their futures. Three major themes emerged in how women perceived hostels' functions in their own lives: one, hostels as extensions of family networks of caring and nurturing; two, hostels as sources of institutional control (often in forms that were similar to family functions); and three, hostels as providing a foothold in the city for personal, social, and economic opportunities.

Hostels as extensions of family

Most women were escorted to the hostels by male kin—fathers or brothers—who also mediated the interactions with the management. The process of application to a hostel often requires the identification of a local "guardian" and letters of reference attesting to, among other things, the high morals of the candidate. Hostels may also be identified and places secured in them through friends and acquaintances from their hometowns who already live in the hostels. So, when hostel admission is obtained, many women enter into familiar networks of friends and kin who preceded them in the hostel.

Having friends and acquaintances from their hometowns was mentioned by almost 40 percent of the respondents to be a highly satisfying feature of the hostel in which they lived. These previously existing networks and those created soon after entry into the hostel effectively substituted for family, providing relief from the monotonous routine of hostel life and work, opportunities for recreation, sharing of labor and resources, and for looking out for one-another in times of sickness and difficulty.

This sense of comfort and of familial relationship was enhanced when the institutional arrangements were flexible and accommodating of the women, and when wardens—the typical title for managers—were friendly and approachable rather than strict enforcers of hostel rules. In especially two hostels run by progressive women's groups, the management was perceived to be responsive to women's needs and complaints, and the manager or warden herself was described as flexible, approachable, friendly, and fair. This is quite rare; too often managers are more circumspect in their interactions with owners and board members than with residents, a phenomenon I witnessed in several hostels. Managers in many hostels were considered by their residents to be bullies, partial, authoritarian, and even corrupt.

Living in hostels also renders conflict-free relationships with extended kin who live in the city. Many women, who have members of their extended families in town, spend weekends and festive occasions there, and bring back pickles, sweets and other goodies to supplement their insipid hostel food. Many women also broadened their networks through co-workers and fellow students who lived with their families in the city. In this way, hostels permit an extension of the psycho-social and material support provided by families.

Hostels also extend women's relationships with their own families in substantive and qualitative ways. For example, nearly half of the women contribute to their family incomes. These contributions are predominantly used to enhance family consumption and thereby quality of life and status, build the human capital of siblings by enabling their higher education, or simply to accumulate their own dowries. In several informal focus groups that were convened to elaborate on the quantitative data, residents admitted to a sense of pride for their ability to contribute, and recognition and respect from family members arising from their contributions. Several women also indicated an improvement of their own situation within their families, reduced restrictions on their mobility and behavior, and greater say in family decisions.

Hostels as sources of institutional control

Hostels, however, are also not unlike the restrictive and controlling patriarchal family, albeit the nature of restriction may differ. For example, the extreme surveillance they experience on their movements and conduct, the restrictions

on dress and behavior, the monitoring of visitors and the limits on overnight stay outside the hostel are familiar family-based controls for Indian women. However, control experienced in hostels can be more oppressive in the cold, anonymous, and institutional nature of its expression. On some occasions, hostels offer new forms of control as well.

Unlike the emphasis on reproductive roles[2] within families, and the greater social permission (and pressure) to combine these with external wage-work for middle class, especially single, women, hostels permit only productive roles of their residents. This is clearly both an advantage as well as a disadvantage for the women. On the one hand, they are spared of the need to be on call to provide household labor as is expected of them in conventional family settings, and can purchase meals and other amenities. However, it is also important to remember that some of the relief that hostels provide women in narrowing their domestic obligations occurs only by shifting these burdens onto low-income hostel staff—generally women—who cook, clean, and maintain the hostel.

On the other hand, because hostels explicitly and without exception permit roles to women only in production, women can live in hostels only to prepare themselves for the labor market or participate in it. Without exception, hostels disallow children of residents, spouses and any roles in active reproduction in their environments. As such, hostel living is universally expected to be temporary—until the woman is married or finds an alternative form of social security (for which there are few non-family sources). This curtailment of roles and activities implicitly upholds the patriarchal family's role in all the responsibilities and privileges—such as they are—related to marriage, family life, reproduction, and security in old-age. Even the four married women who lived in hostels left behind husbands and children whose needs were served by husbands' kin, usually the mother. Thus hostels may be conceptualized as exploiting the social permission women have to separate themselves from their families to accumulate income before returning them to the family upon their marriage. Any reproductive responsibility that a woman wishes or has to undertake, involving others, during her stay in the hostel simply has to be carried on elsewhere—entailing a physical impossibility or an enormous expense for most women.

Restrictions on roles as a form of control are further bolstered by restrictions on length of stay. Hostel residence is typically restricted to three to five years, and shorter in some cases. This seems to serve many purposes. One, residents are not allowed to get too comfortable or so secure in their stay as to raise the possibility of long-term security or long term reciprocal relationships with other residents or between residents and management. Only in a few exceptional cases is this rule broken. One woman in her mid-fifties, for example, had her extended stay (over 12 years) in the women's hostel made possible by a charitable decision by board members in response to her abandonment by her married brothers following the death of her parents.

Two, restrictions on stay also permit greater arbitrariness in management decisions. One YWCA guest house raised their price from Rs. 15 a day in 1988 to Rs 150 a day for a room in 1993 and charges even more today. In one stroke, this action removed this hostel from the pool of shelter resources available to working women in the city.

Figure 1: Sample of hostel rules[3]

Residents will be required to furnish a letter of reference from a local guardian within one week of gaining entry into the hostel. Those who fail to do so will be asked to leave.

Residents will be required to maintain personal hygiene and keep their rooms clean. Rooms will contain no food or other items that will attract ants and other insects.

Residents will be required to take their morning coffee and meals by 8 AM and their evening meals between 8 and 9 PM on all days. Daily lunch will be provided at the time of the morning meals, for which residents must furnish appropriate, sealable containers. Residents are urged not to waste food.

No complaints about food and hostel routines will be entertained.

Residents will keep silence and maintain decorum at all times in the hostel; no shouting, loud music, singing, or running around will be allowed.

Residents will be dressed decently at all times in traditional clothes; short skirts, pants, or tight-fitting clothes will not be allowed.

Residents will stay in their rooms after lights-out; residents seen wandering outside their rooms after lights-out will be given a warning.

Residents who receive three warnings will be asked to leave the hostel.

Residents will be required to stay inside the hostel between 7 PM and 7 AM. Those who wish to leave for work or college earlier or stay away later must furnish a letter from their employer or principal certifying the need for leaving early or arriving late.

Hostel gates will be locked at 10 PM for the safety of residents. Residents who return after 9 PM will receive a warning.

Residents will be required to complete a night-out slip two days in advance for any night or nights they wish to stay outside the hostel. The warden reserves the right not to grant a night-out. Anyone taking a night-out without the prior authorization of the warden will be asked to leave the hostel immediately.

Three, limits on stay generally constrain women's claims to shelter outside family contexts and once again force their dependence on family sources because few are able to buy independent shelter. Thus hostels are designed to complement rather than replace the family as a source of shelter for women. The women get this message loud and clear. Even the minority who wish to obtain alternatives to oppressive family environments know that their only real alternative would be to seek collective, private solutions with other, like-minded women—a strategy in which only a persistent few succeed.

Even the messages women get from their family and peers in the hostels confirms this. Over half (52 percent) of the informants who were asked about their future plans over the next five years responded that they expected to be married in the next one or two years. Marriage was universally expected to cause exit from the hostel as a matter of norm, and almost everyone expected to marry in the not too distant future. The older resident who could not, or chose not to be married, garnered much pity from residents in general. Many women also complained (with good reason) against the isolation of hostel environments from family networks, of the dull meals, and the physical discomfort of dirty bathrooms and rushed, rigid routines. Women were all too aware of the lack of sources of long-term security outside family settings. All this resulted in an environment in which hostels were simply not perceived as long term shelter options.

In their rules and in their rigid enforcement, hostels clearly overstep the need for protection and get into active control of residents. Figure 1 provides a sampling of rules from one of the more progressive hostels. Hostels often unreasonably require residents to be back by 7 or 7:30 PM showing tremendous ignorance of the work, study, and transportation needs and patterns of the women. Restrictions on visitors, elaborate permission processes for weekends out, rules for behavior and dress, and restrictive hostel routines (such as lights-out by 10 PM) only enforce the sense of isolation and institutional control.

Within the hostel, residents often complain of the difficulty of maintaining privacy in the hostel due to overcrowded conditions, lack of secure storage, and social pressures to conform. Thefts and petty quarrels are not uncommon. When combined with the inability of the city outside the hostel to provide an "escape" or relief, this sense of containment and oppression can be quite acute, although not as prevalent as one would have expected from a superficial examination of hostel environments. Hostel residents often are also captive consumers of basic supplies such as food, milk, fuel, and cooked food and can be fleeced by surrounding merchants for these. And finally, hostel residents complain of stereotypes within work places and neighborhoods of them as loose and immoral for choosing to live outside family settings. These external relations, while contributing both to objective conditions of control and women's subjective perceptions of control, however, seem not to trouble residents as much as internal ones—with other residents and with management. Presumably this is because women's experience of the public *world was limited and constrained to* begin with; hostels simply provided a continuity with these previous experiences.

Hostels are therefore, unquestioning of the primacy of family relations and obligations socially prescribed therein for women. They explicitly define their space to coincide with the gap between residence with family of birth and family of marriage during which women may be permitted to engage in wage-work to provide for their family's sustenance, status, and social mobility. Hostels thus exploit changing gender norms for accumulation on the part of hostel providers, and for consumption and accumulation for women's current or future families (through dowry). Forty-seven percent of the 117 women who answered this question said yes when asked if they contributed cash to their households.

At the same time, in denying women the opportunities for long-term residence, providers of hostels seem to contradict market pressures to exploit demand for independent housing for growing numbers of women who now have incomes. When seen in the light of increasing numbers of women who enter into wage-work every year, and in the absence of any public form of social security for women aside from family-based assistance, the contradiction unwraps itself as sound business. In other words, for a finite total hostel capacity, hostel providers have few worries of diminished demand; nor, given restrictions on length of stay, do they have to worry about potential defaults in rent payments when a woman has to stop working for any reason or take a break from work.

Hostels provide women a foothold in the city

It would be inaccurate, however, to say that this is all that hostels are: extensions of the family; institutions that reinforce the primacy of family as a source of shelter and resources for women; and institutions for new forms of control of women through restrictive internal practices, limits on roles, and denial of long-term residence. From the perspective of women, hostels also serve extremely positive functions. By providing a foothold in the city, they expand the universe of social, economic, and political opportunities for women.

Hostels enable residence in the city—an opportunity otherwise unavailable to autonomously migrating women—to further their education, gain access to more remunerative employment and also increased choices in employment than in their places of origin. They help women, by facilitating non-family residence, gain a sense of autonomy from family networks, increased personal capacity, and a greater sense of freedom. Finally, in bringing women together who may share interests, hostels facilitate collective strategies to gain access to shelter and other urban services.

Comments such as the following were not uncommon in response to open-ended questions related to the benefits and attractiveness of their stay in Bangalore:

- I need a job; mine is a farmer's family. I can't do that kind of a job any more. Here I can work in a job that I like.
- I have studied here, and I am familiar with the city. (Living

in Bangalore) is better than my village in Chittoor (in Andhra Pradesh). Plus I can study more here if I want.
- I have a diploma in computers. Here is where the jobs for my skills are.
- I am used to living alone now. I can utilize my time the way I want, I am independent of thought and action and I couldn't do what I wanted at home.
- I want to experience the city by myself.

In almost all cases, stay in Bangalore, the city, was perceived as congruent with residence in working women's hostels. Residents clearly did not perceive alternatives beyond living with family and living in hostels. Options such as renting a room with a family, collectively renting a house, or even independently owning a place—difficult as that is for anyone—were not part of the shelter universe of most of the women interviewed. Only a handful of more seasoned "hostelites" were aware of the possibility of collectively renting, and prepared as well to rent a house all by themselves.

In response to the question of whether or not the kind of job women currently held in Bangalore would have been available to them in their home-towns or at wages they currently obtained, the response was overwhelmingly in the negative. Holding a well-paid job in Bangalore not only increased their sense of personal autonomy and freedom, it also improved their relationship within their families and the latter's status in the community. Women appreciated the expansion of their economic and social choices, notwithstanding their awareness of the limitations that hostels posed.

One in five women who were interviewed reported that their stay in hostels enabled them opportunity to experience urban life on their own, away from protective, restrictive, dependent family environments, or alternatively, to escape from abusive family relationships. Even among those women whose families approved of or at least did not object to their stay in the hostel, sentiments expressing the freedom, mobility, and autonomy that the hostels provided were fairly common. One woman who was orphaned found living with her brother oppressive due to conflicts with her sister-in-law. She has since moved to her current hostel and her relationship with her brother's family has improved, absent the daily friction over responsibilities and chores.

In bringing together women from diverse backgrounds and experiences, hostels also promote a greater consciousness, through dialogue and reflection, of the situation of Indian women and their root causes. These opportunities are typically not available in smaller towns where communities are homogenous and women are relatively isolated in family settings. I was an observer as well as a participant in several spontaneous group discussions that analyzed the portrayal of women in the media, the struggles of some women in their homes and workplaces, their relationships with other women and men, and so on. In a couple of cases during my three-month stay in hostels for the duration of this study, women mobilized to seek changes in hostel policies on issues of concern to them. One such policy related to lock-outs, in which women who did not return to the hostel before its "lock-out" time were effectively locked out, endangering them even further.[4]

Hostels also provide opportunities for local women, who are active in the boards of organizations that provide hostel accommodations, to effectively use shelter for women as the starting point for their activism. These women, who are often professionals in diverse fields, see their activities related to the provision and management of hostels as a base from which to advocate for increased choices for women in cities—choices that will help them gain a measure of control over their own lives. Local women's organizations in general are aware of the importance of decent, affordable shelter in opening up the city for women, especially migrant women.

Hostels then clearly provide a social space in the city for migrant women, and enhance choice and opportunity in a whole range of social, economic and political areas. However, these functions occur in a larger context characterized by the lack of alternatives for women for shelter and services. In the face of the absence of other meaningful shelter alternatives, hostels will also remain the powerfully restrictive, oppressive and controlling institutions they are for a significant proportion of the women who seek shelter in them.

Theoretical contributions

Policy-oriented research on gender and housing displays a concern with the need to enhance shelter choice and provide shelter that is both effective for and empowering of women. The set of issues related to effectiveness calls for housing that allows women, especially poor women, to perform effectively their socially prescribed roles in production, reproduction and collective consumption through appropriate location of settlements and integration of land uses (Moser and Peake 1987, Tinker 1993, Kusow 1993, Mahajan 1993, among others); that is well designed to be culturally sensitive to gender needs and issues (Brydon and Chant 1989, Dankelman and Davidson 1988, Waltz 1988, Imamura 1988); and that accommodates a variety of household structures and arrangements beyond the dominant nuclear family model (Pothukuchi 1993; Chant and Ward 1987; Chant 1997; Varley 1993). Arguments for effectiveness have central to them the need to involve women in planning and design of settlements, and to recognize the social disadvantages that women experience in effectively negotiating their own shelter arrangements (Moser and Peake 1987).

The second set—related to empowerment—typically centers around enabling greater control of women over their shelter, and through it, over their lives, households, and communities (see for example the cases in Moser and Peake 1987 and Dandekar 1993). Enhanced shelter security through ownership, legal titles, and secure tenure for women; innovative designs and decisions to help break the gender divisions of labor; the role of participatory women's organizations to advocate for policies to help integrate needs for effectiveness and empowerment for women through

shelter, are some of the issues that have often surfaced within the empowerment rubric.

The typical frameworks for effectiveness and empowerment in women's shelter are helpful for understanding the role that hostels play in providing non-family sources of shelter for women, and for identifying policies to improve alternative shelter environments for migrant women. They, are, however, inadequate in completely explaining hostels in their contexts, and indeed, may be enriched from the elaboration this study offers these frameworks.

In restricting the roles of women to those in production; in the over-crowded, under-provided, and often unsafe environments and poor amenities they offer; in their institutional control; and in disallowing any participation by women in decisions, hostels, by and large, are rarely effective environments for the women in the ways that effectiveness is commonly discussed in the literature on gender and shelter. They explicitly disallow women the ability to combine productive and reproductive work on the cultural premise that unmarried women have few reproductive burdens that cannot be displaced onto other family women, especially mothers or wives of brothers. Hostels also do not permit diversity of household structure, although women, through their resourceful use of hostels, find new relationships of care, assistance, and relief.

Neither are they empowering in quite the sense embodied in more recent discussions of empowerment in connection with women's shelter. Oppressive in their variety of forms of control; disallowing women long-term residence let alone offering secure tenure; reinforcing of the family as the appropriate source of shelter and social security; and unresponsive to the needs and concerns of women, hostels can be quite disempowering as shelter alternatives or shelter relationships.

Yet, from this study, hostels appear to be at least partially effective as well as empowering. Their effectiveness and empowerment stem, most importantly, from providing a socially acceptable place to be beyond the family, and by providing a foothold in the city to engage in education, employment and other activities otherwise inaccessible to young women. By allowing an extension of more familiar and hospitable caring and nurturing networks of family and friends; providing the basic needs of survival even if at very dissatisfactory levels; helping women earn wages with which to contribute to their family survival and social mobility; and by facilitating experiences in autonomy otherwise unavailable to women, they allow women to extend their personal, social, economic, and political universe without losing connection to the familiar and comfortable.

Hence, this study indicates that shelter frameworks that discuss policy issues related to effectiveness and empowerment need also to incorporate issues related to female migration, life-cycle stage, and the need for autonomous interactions by women in arranging for their own shelter. They need to consider flexibility and choice in women's desires to pursue only productive or reproductive activities, or a combination of both over time, without being threatened with loss of shelter or without being constrained to family sources for needing this flexibility. They also need to be informed of ways in which cultural norms continue to be incorporated in more modern arrangements, a dynamic that shifts the requirements for effective and empowering shelter. Most importantly, discussions of autonomous shelter for individual women cannot be separated from discussions of long-term social security so that women are not forced to return to family sources for support and sustenance when the labor market is unavailable or unable to provide the means for sustenance and support.

Hostels do expand personal, social, and economic choice for the women who use them, for the duration of their use, and this aspect of non-family shelter needs to be supported and expanded, while at the same time mitigating some of the limitations that hostels present. Hostels are the restrictive, controlling and oppressive environments they are because of the lack of choices for women in shelter. This is where action by public and women's organizations is needed. But first, it is important to ask what women valued and were satisfied with in relation to their hostels.

Policy Recommendations

The hostels that consistently received the highest ratings, often by residents of other hostels, had some of the following common elements to them:

1. They were affordable, or reasonably priced relative to the amenities that were provided (indicating that women were willing to make some price-quality trade-offs);
2. They offered decent amenities in terms of the amount and quality of living and storage space, cleanliness and maintenance, decent meals and other basic needs, and an environment secure from theft;
3. They had a management structure that was fair, flexible, accessible, and responsive;
4. They offered opportunities to build congenial relationship with other women, managers, and with staff; and,
5. They were located conveniently to work, study, or relatives' homes

Practically all hostels receiving high ratings were run by women's organizations which had social commitments to women's shelter, going beyond the profit-motive, and had mechanisms for communicating with women and responding to their needs and concerns.

Several recommendations for planning and policy emerge from this study. These are in three major areas:

a) direct government action relative to hostels and housing. In this category, municipalities could:

   - provide systematic documentation and analysis of the need for shelter among migrant women

- provide increased hostel accommodations, directly or through subsidies to private parties
- enforce building codes related to crowding, minimum living and storage space, natural lighting and ventilation, and basic amenities such as sanitation, water supply, and food
- regulate hostels to prevent extortionist pricing
- regulate management practices to ensure their responsiveness to resident needs and concerns, possibly by creating mechanisms for monitoring by local women's organizations
- disallow discrimination by age, marital status, parental status, in hostels

b) public and private support for feminist and community-based organizations that provide shelter for women in general but migrant women in particular. These may include

- public support to women's and community-based non-profits to provide hostels or other forms of collective alternatives, including technical assistance in development, wherever necessary
- expanding the range of shelter alternatives by these organizations that would provide long-term shelter, reproductive roles, and resident participation in decisions
- encouraging the development of women's housing cooperatives, and other alternatives that would give women control over tenure and title
- eliminating monopolistic pricing by local merchants selling basic amenities to hostel residents by organizing resident buying clubs
- providing forums for women who wish to come together to exchange information and advocate for improved shelter policies
- providing forums for hostel providers to exchange lessons and experiences on women's shelter needs and advocate for gender-sensitive urban policies

c) changes in hostel structures, policies and contexts. The market for shelter for migrant women is bound to become more competitive as more and more providers seek to exploit the burgeoning demand by women with access to cash. This may force private providers to become more competitive and improve the quality of their shelter. By studying women's needs in and issues causing satisfaction or dissatisfaction in hostels, hostels may improve their offerings without government regulation. At minimum, changes may involve

- improving the provision and quality of basic amenities such as food, water, and sanitation
- providing more living and lockable storage space per resident
- eliciting the participation of women in ongoing management and other decisions important to the quality of life in the hostel

To conclude then, hostels serve many functions, including extending the family's emotive and nurturing relationships, imposing new forms of control of women to keep them in their place and, simultaneously, expanding women's personal, social, economic and political universes. It seems possible, as discussed above, to enhance the opportunity aspect of hostels and mitigate the control aspect. Private hostel providers, non-profit women's groups, and policy, all have a role to play in implementing the requisite changes. However, progressive women's organizations that already provide decent shelter amenities at affordable prices and responsive relations, may be the place where change will both, begin and be substantial. These organizations already have shown a commitment to women and recognized the importance of shelter in developing women's autonomy and capacity, and need to be supported.

Notes

[1] Upon enquiry, it appeared that the scale at which the hostel was organized proved to be its undoing. Most hostels offer shelter to between 50 to 100 women. This hostel seemed to be designed to accommodate over 500 women; it is possible that the hostel was not provided with the requisite administrative and management supports. I was forbidden from entering this massive, 5-storey structure by a resident guard.

[2] The nature of reproductive burdens for married and unmarried Indian women clearly is distinct in a context where child-bearing, even sexual activity, outside marriage is strictly proscribed for women. For unmarried women, reproduction typically involves participation in family care, including care for siblings, domestic work in cooking and cleaning, and unpaid labor in subsistence or production activities. Married women, on the other hand, are expected to bear children and provide domestic services for their families.

[3] This selection has been compiled from rules derived from different hostels, some of which have them posted prominently in dining and other meeting spaces. Language has been adapted to maintain confidentiality promised to hostel managements to enable the study. In reality, the warden has enormous discretion over the enforcement of rules; some residents manage consistently to get around them by maintaining good relationship with wardens.

[4] On the whole, however, it must be noted that residents rarely voice dissatisfaction to hostel administrators. The overall scarcity of hostel accommodations, the higher cost of more reputed hostels, and the long wait-lists for the affordable ones run by women's organizations keep residents in their place. Residents often simply adjust to the situation, avoid those responsible for oppressive conditions, or collectively provide alternatives to satisfy unmet needs, especially in food.

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45 SURVEILLANCE, CIRCUMSCRIBER OF WOMEN'S SPATIAL EXPERIENCE: THE CASE OF SLUM DWELLERS OF CALCUTTA, INDIA.

Mallika Bose

Introduction

The confinement of women to the domestic (private) arena and the location of political and economic power in the public sphere has been a major theme of western feminist research and theory (Sharistanian, 1989). The distinction between private and public spheres was used to explain and account for the relative position of men and women in psychological, social, economic, and political aspects of life (Chodrow, 1974, 1978; Ortener, 1974; Keohane, Rosaldo, & Gelpi, 1982; Sanday, 1974). Subsequent research revealed that the private-public sphere model over-generalized the experience of some (mostly white middle-class western) women to all women and in the process denied the varied experiences of different groups of women (Bloch, 1978; Bourguignon, 1980; Kelly, 1984; Kurain & Ghosh, 1981; Lewis, 1977; Sudarkasa, 1976).

The private-public sphere model has been used extensively to understand the position of women in Indian society[1]. Much of such research focuses on the economic status of women, and the impact of development efforts on women's lives. Rather than modifying the private-public sphere model to reflect the experiences of different groups of women in India, I argue that the notion of surveillance is a more suitable construct for explaining women's experiences in India. Based on the life-stories of 63 women, this paper explores the role played by surveillance in shaping women's spatial experience and their lives.

This paper is organized into four sections. In the first section I discuss the methodology used for this study. The second section assesses the applicability of the private-public sphere model to account for the experiences of the women of this study, while the third section presents specific observed patterns of behavior that can be explained by the notion of surveillance. The fourth section consists of a discussion of the different characteristics of surveillance as observed in this study, and concludes with some questions that warrant examination.

Methodology

I used a qualitative case study approach to collect data from women living in four adjacent slums (Dehiserampur Road, Auddy Bagan, Darapara, and Topsia-Shibtala) and one squatter settlement (Azad Mohalla) in East Calcutta. Of these five locations, Azad Mohalla, Darapara, and Topsia-Shibtala were the three major study sites[2]. Since this research was designed as a naturalistic study, the initial boundaries of the study developed from the phenomenon being investigated. During my first field trip (summer, 1994) I visited and spoke

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to several researchers, planners, activists, government officials, and members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in development activity in the slums of Calcutta. Through these contacts, I visited many slums and spoke to several women slum dwellers. This greatly improved my understanding of the lives of women slum dwellers. The data for this study was collected during my second field trip (January – July, 1995). I was introduced to the slum dwellers at the five sites by officials from two NGOs that have been working in this part of Calcutta for over 15 years. After the initial introduction I used a chain sampling strategy to interview 63 women from a variety of backgrounds and circumstances. A semi-structured interview format was used to collect information about: 1) basic demographic data of respondent and household; 2) particulars about other family members; 3) particulars of physical features of home environment; 4) respondent's daily activity schedule, and information pertaining to 5) income earning activities; 6) division of labor; 7) women's position in the family; and 8) spatial issues. In addition, I conducted repeated ethnographic interviews with 11 of the 63 interviewed women. Observation (casual, systematic, and participant) of women's activities and field notes were the other data collection techniques. Content analysis of interview data and field notes utilizing the method of unitizing and categorizing (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) was the major data analysis technique.

The Private-Public Sphere Debate and the Experience of Women Slum Dwellers in Calcutta

In this section I briefly summarize the salient features of the private-public sphere debate and then assess its ability to account for the experience of the women of this study.

The Private-Public Sphere Debate

In 1974 Rosaldo posited that "an opposition between 'domestic' and 'public' provides the basis of a structural framework necessary to identify and explore the place of male and female in psychological, cultural, social, and economic aspects of human life". Following this assertion, a significant proportion of feminist research and scholarship explored the ramifications of the private-public divide in women's lives. However, subsequent research indicates that in spite of being able to account for women's conditions in a variety of circumstances, this formulation universalized the experience of some women, and in the process homogenized the category 'women' (Sharistanian, 1989). Critics of the private-public dichotomy model point to the inter-connections between the private and public spheres (Ackelsberg, 1988; Bookman & Morgan, 1988; Pateman, 1989; Phillips, 1991), and illustrate the inadequacy of the private-public separation model to explain non-western situations (Mies, 1982; Mohanty, 1997; Sharma, 1990).

Responding to this criticism, Lofland (1989) proposed a three-way private-parochial-public characterization of space. In Lofland's conceptualization, the private realm is characterized by "ties of intimacy among primary group members who are located within households and personal networks," the parochial realm is characterized by "a sense of commonality among acquaintances and neighbors who are involved in interpersonal networks that are located within 'communities' ", while the public realm are those "non-private sectors or areas in which individuals in co-presence tend to be strangers or only categorically known to one another" (like salesman and customer).

Another important refinement of the private-public characterization of space is the notion of multiple publics. Fraser (1992) points out that the public sphere as conceptualized by Habermas implicitly assumes the existence of an unitary public sphere, in which status differentials are bracketed (or set aside momentarily) by people of different status when they participate in it. But since in reality the dominant class usually develops the rules of communication and discourse, status differentials cannot be effectively disregarded and the single public sphere model ultimately works to the disadvantage of subordinated groups. More importantly, the single public sphere model does not provide subordinated groups with a space in which they can meet and organize without being under the supervisory gaze of the dominant group. Instead, subordinated groups find it to their advantage to create and make use of alternate publics, or subaltern counterpublics (Fraser, 1992). Subaltern counterpublics refer to multiple parallel and differentially empowered discursive arenas where members of subordinated groups engage in dialogue amongst themselves and formulate alternative interpretations of their identities and needs. The notion of multiple publics in a class-stratified society like India is particularly pertinent when examining the lives of women from low-income groups, since they are disadvantaged by their class as well as gender affiliation.

Critique of Private-Parochial-Public Characterization of Space

The private-parochial-public (P-P-P) conceptualization of space is useful in explaining some of the observed patterns of behavior of the women of this study. Even though the majority of interviewed women use a range of settings in the parochial domain and some women frequent settings in the public realm, women's activities tend to center around the private (domestic) sphere[3]. In addition, women face increasing opposition to use settings located away from their home environments. The differentiation of the parochial domain from the public sphere is useful in pointing out that women use settings in the parochial domain frequently with limited opposition from family members. Thus the P-P-P characterization, by differentiating the three domains, is able to account for the home-centered nature of women's lives and the opposition women face when they want to use settings away from their home environments.

The life-stories of the women of this study illustrate that women's use of settings in the parochial and public domain is shaped by their domestic roles. Women enter the parochial and public sphere as sacrificing mothers and dutiful wives, identities that are formed in the private realm. Furthermore, women find it difficult to use settings in the parochial and public domain due to their domestic responsibilities. In response to such constraints women use private settings for wage work, and use the same setting for reproductive and productive activities at different points of time. Thus the private (domestic) and public spheres are not mutually exclusive (Ackelsberg, 1988; Pateman, 1989; Phillips, 1991) as implicitly assumed by the P-P-P model. Since in the P-P-P conceptualization the private sphere is synonymous with domestic activities (consumption), and the public with wage work (production), women's wage work in the private sphere is not recognized. By focusing on the separation of the private and public spheres, this model perpetuates the male-centric view of women as homemakers and men as breadwinners.

The range of settings used by women varies with stage-in-family-life-cycle, household structure, household size, and economic necessity. Young unmarried women, and married women in child-bearing years are subject to greatest spatial confinement, married women with several children face fewer restrictions, while widows and abandoned women face the least restrictions. Women with young children living in nuclear families find it difficult to use settings located away from their homes due to childcare responsibilities. Women living in extended families are usually subject to strict spatial control. On the other hand, women living near their mothers can count on them for support with household work and childcare. Consequently they often have time to engage in wage work in settings outside their homes. Extreme economic distress legitimizes women to leave their homes and engage in wage work in the parochial and/or public domain. However, once the crisis subsides women are expected to retreat to their home environments. Thus women's use of settings is determined by a variety of factors that changes across time. The P-P-P characterization is unable to account for these complex variations in women's experiences.

In spite of regular use of settings in the parochial and sometimes public domain, women identify the "home" as women's setting and the "outside" with men's settings. This is indicative of the existence of a rift between ideology and reality. The conventional P-P-P characterization of space stresses the existence of this ideological separation between private and public worlds, and by stressing this differentiation, the private-parochial-public conceptualization of space helps to perpetuate the separation of the spheres rather than bridge it.

Implicit in the P-P-P conceptualization of space is the notion that power is equally distributed in all public settings. It perpetuates the notion that once women gain entry into public settings they obtain access to power and resources in society. In contrast, this study illustrates that public settings frequented by the women of this study (like market places, roadside shops, and hospitals) are not the repositories of important information or power/resources. Such settings differ greatly from public settings of government institutions, financial organizations, and educational facilities. By assuming that all public settings are endowed with equal power, this characterization is unable to account for the differentially empowered publics that exist in society. Thus this conceptualization promotes the false idea that once women begin to use some public settings, they will have access to the resources/power available to other groups in society. In fact by failing to acknowledge the existence of differentially empowered publics, the P-P-P characterization helps to further subordinate minority/marginal groups in society.

Similarly, private and parochial domains are not universal categories. The private domain of the women of this study consists of a single room, while that of women of middle and high income groups would be much larger. In addition, the resources available in the private domain would differ greatly across socio-economic classes, by virtue of social links, access to information through public media (television, newspapers), and information technology (computer, internet). In the same way, parochial domains of distinct groups may differ in their geographical location, physical size, and available power/resources. This indicates that the private, parochial, and public domains are dynamic categories that need to be identified and defined for different groups at a certain point in time under specific circumstances. Thus the private, parochial, and public categorization of space is useful for analyzing women's lives only when it is contextually embedded in the specific historic circumstances of the group in question.

The above discussion reveals that even though the private-parochial-public conceptualization is useful in carving out the parochial realm between the private and public spheres and illustrating that the parochial domain is an arena of intense activity, it cannot account for the many complex and dynamic ways in which different forces interact to shape women's use of settings. Ultimately the private-parochial-public characterization of space represents and helps to perpetuate a male-centric world-view of society. In fact the notion of surveillance, rather than the P-P-P characterization of space better explains many observed patterns of behavior.

Surveillance

From the age that girls attain puberty to the time that they get married and continuing on till they become mothers of several children, women's behavior and spatial movement is strictly regulated. Looking closely, one discerns that the confinement of women to their homes and the strong tendency of enclosing women into sex-segregated settings are connected to the desire of keeping women under constant surveillance. Young girls are closely monitored by parents, while young married women are under the close scrutiny of their spouses and in-laws. At Topsia-Shibtala, Farah Nissan went so far as to say she and her daughters engage in home-based petty piece rated work since it keeps her daughters busy at home while at the same time allows her to keep an eye on them. Since her daughters

are young, Farah Nissan does not want to leave them at home unsupervised. This monitoring extends to neighbors, ensuring that in their homes and in settings located in the settlement and immediate neighborhood women are under constant observation. This aspect of life prompts Farah Begum (of Azad Mohalla) to remark: *"You know what happens over here—whatever you are eating—people watch; what you are wearing—they watch and then talk about it."* Thus it seems that women are constantly under the watchful eyes of others, be it their fathers, mothers, spouses or even neighbors. It is important to point out that women are subject to the supervisory gaze of men as well as women.

In the next few pages I use the concept of surveillance to explain the spatial experiences of the women of this study. Specifically, I describe four observed patterns of behavior and then explain the particular phenomenon in terms of the concept of surveillance.

The Parochial Domain as a Domain of Intense Activity

Phenomenon

Almost all interviewed women (89%) engage in a variety of productive and reproductive activities in the parochial realm of their settlement and immediate neighborhood. Other than cooking, a variety of regular reproductive activities involve use of settings located in the settlement (fetching water, washing dishes and clothes) and immediate neighborhood (grocery shopping/marketing). The majority of women engage in home-based productive work (44%), closely followed by those engaging in wage work requiring use of settings in the parochial (34%) and public realms (32%) respectively[4]. About half (54%)of the women who engage in work in the public domain are widows and women who have been abandoned by their spouses. The rest are married women with three or more children. In addition, the husbands of two of these women are sick and cannot engage in regular work (Ainab Bibi of Darapara, and Farida Khatun of Azad Mohalla).

Furthermore when the working women were asked about their job preference, 47.5% of the women reported that they would like to engage in home-based work, while another 22.5% reported that any question related to their preference for wage work is irrelevant since the only kind of productive activities they would be allowed to engage in are home-based jobs. Many of the women engaging in wage work in the public domain report that they engage in selling activity as a last resort, and would gladly begin some other job with comparable pay in their home environments. Additionally all the women who work as unpaid labor in household enterprise help with those activities which are situated at home or in the settlement, leaving other activities that require use of settings in the public domain to the men. This suggests that women face considerable opposition to engaging in wage work outside their homes and the opposition is most intense when such work involves use of settings in the public domain instead of the parochial domain.

Explanation

When women engage in home-based productive work there is little or no chance of improper behavior on their part as unrelated men are very unlikely to visit them at home, especially when who visits whom is common knowledge in the densely populated slums. Settings used by women for reproductive work in the parochial domain consists of settings like the neighborhood market and grocery store, water tap or tube-well in the settlement, and the adjoining courtyard or area in front of their door step. Settings used for productive work in the parochial realm include the houses of families in the neighborhood, neighborhood grocery store, courtyard, roadside stall, neighborhood market, and neighborhood factory. With the exception of the domestic service workers who work in the houses of families in the neighborhood, all other settings in the parochial domain used by women are such that they are under constant observation by known people. In other words, when women engage in activities in the parochial domain they are under the watchful eyes of neighbors/acquaintances who have the potential of reporting any improper activities that the women might engage in. This serves as a check against the occurrence of any improper male-female interaction.

The women who engage in selling and manufacturing activity have to frequent settings located in the public realm for buying the products that they sell. Such settings extend from different markets in relatively distant parts of the city (like Seladah, Mechua, Burrabazaar) to fairgrounds located outside the city and suburbs of Calcutta (like Baraipur and Arambagh). Markets and fairgrounds are public settings where the women are strangers to other users of the settings or only categorically known to one another. In such a setting women are not subject to the watchful gaze of neighbors, and hence there is a greater possibility of the occurrence of improper behavior on their part. Given the vigilant nature of the parochial environment, and the absence of social control (exerted by watchful neighbors, relatives, acquaintances present in the parochial domain) in the public domain; women do not face as strong an opposition to engaging in work in the parochial realm as settings in the public domain[5].

Strong Spousal Objection to Wife's Domestic Service Work

Phenomenon

Even though domestic service work is located in the parochial realm (immediate neighborhood), there is strong opposition from spouses when their wives want to engage in domestic service work. Ainab Bibi's (of Darapara) husband would not allow her to engage in domestic service work even though he allowed her to start a retail sari business from her home which requires her to visit a market in a distant part of the city

(Burrabazaar) once every 15 days or so. Aliya Begum (of Topsia-Shibtala) engages in home-based petty piece rated work since her husband has threatened to leave her if she engages in any kind of work outside her home. He is even more resistant to the idea of her engaging in domestic service work. Amina Begum (of Azad Mohalla) does not earn any money since her husband will not allow her to engage in domestic service work and that is the only type of work readily available in her neighborhood. Amina said that her husband would allow her to engage in work that was deemed respectable even outside the home but not domestic service work. However she could not explain what she meant by "respectable." It is also significant that 4 of the 5 women who are victims of domestic abuse engage in domestic service work against the wishes of their husbands. The evidence seems to suggest that even though domestic service work is located in the parochial realm women face strong opposition to engage in this kind of productive activity.

Explanation

One reason for the low preference for domestic service jobs is that such jobs are menial, subject to the idiosyncrasies of the employer, and impure[6] as per Hindu conceptualization of purity. In this instance, since the women are predominantly Muslim, Hindu conceptualizations do not have any bearing. Additionally, since men are not particularly concerned when their wives engage in menial and low paid home based work, this factor alone cannot account for their disapproval to domestic service work. Neither can the opposition to domestic service work be fully accounted for by the locational aspect of settings used for domestic service since women do not face such opposition when they engage in a wide variety of other activities in the parochial domain. A probable explanation has to do with surveillance.

In domestic service jobs women have to work in the homes of their employers. So even though the women are working in the parochial realm, it is in an enclosed space with no scope of surveillance from outside the employer's house. This increases the possibility of improper behavior. Additionally, even though the employer's house is located in the parochial domain for the employee, it is the private realm of the employer. This points out that singular characterization of space as private, parochial, or public, is problematic. Especially in light of a long history of sexual exploitation of women of lower class by men of the higher classes (Lessinger, 1989), men do not want their wives to engage in domestic service work. Thus spatial containment in settings with no scope of surveillance is deemed to be potentially dangerous for women.

Women Engage in Activities in the Public Domain Collectively

Phenomenon

The data from this study indicates that women face opposition to the use of settings for reproductive and especially productive activities located in the public domain. Selling and manufacturing activities require women to visit settings located in the public domain. Such activities are even more suspect as it involves some amount of interaction with men. An analysis of women's use of settings in the public domain reveals that women often use such settings collectively, in pairs or larger groups. When women need to visit the hospital for their children, they usually take along a sister, mother, or (female) neighbor. Tasks like buying clothes for children for the holidays are often taken over by fathers, or women go to stores accompanied by their children and/or spouses. Similarly when pursuing productive activities in the public domain, women try to do so collectively. For example, Nilufer and Bilkish Begum (of Azad Mohalla) collectively go to the Assembly of God Church soup kitchen daily to get lunch, and Nahid Banu (of Darapara) goes with a group of women from the settlement to sell the toys that she makes in various fairgrounds located in different neighborhoods of Calcutta and even outside the city.

Explanation

Since settings in the public domain are mostly occupied by unknown people, such settings do not afford surveillance and consequently problematizes women's engagement in productive activities in public settings. In order to circumvent this particular problem, women have developed a system of mutual surveillance by collectively engaging in work. Unlike the parochial realm, settings in the public domain do not contain acquaintances/neighbors who can vouch for women's action. In response to this situation women engage in activities in public settings collectively and in doing so watch over one another and build social accountability for each other's actions. By engaging in activities collectively, women can testify for each other's behavior and at the same time thwart the advances of potential harassers. This is an example of a case where women have used the phenomena of surveillance to their advantage to engage in activities in public settings. This phenomenon has been reported by Lessinger (1989) and coined as "social chaperonage."

Women's Use of Busy Versus Relatively Quiet Public Settings

Phenomenon

All the women (except Akhtari Bibi) involved in selling ventures have to visit different markets to buy the products that they sell. However, the time-consuming selling part of the venture is always situated in the settlement or immediate neighborhood (that is the parochial domain). Additionally, a significant proportion (54%) of the women who engage in productive activities in the public domain are those who are either widows or abandoned by their spouses (legitimizing condition). Even with the presence of such legitimizing factors, some differences were observed in their use of settings in the public domain. Nahid Banu, a 37 or 38 year old widow, visits different markets to buy the products needed for her toy manufacturing and selling venture. She sells the toys in

different parts of the city and even settings located outside the city with a group of women from the settlement. However she does not sell the toys door-to-door in different neighborhoods. Similarly Sabina Bibi is not allowed (by her husband) to sell the toy drums that she makes in different neighborhoods. As a result she is limited to making the toy drums during the Muslim holiday season when due to greater demand, wholesale buyers are ready to come to her home and buy the toys. Curiously, Sabina does not face opposition from her husband in engaging in selling fruits and home-made snacks in the settlement. She takes the train to a suburb of Calcutta (public domain) to buy the fruits at a good rate and then sells them from a basket on the roadside in front of her home.

Explanation

Why do the women face stiffer opposition to engaging in activities in some settings and not others, even when both are situated in the public domain? A difference between the settings described above has to do with the degree of publicness and the number of people in such settings. Markets are busy places teeming with people, while neighborhoods in different parts of the city are relatively quiet and the streets may even be deserted sometimes. Even though a distant neighborhood may be part of the public realm for the women in question, they form part of the parochial realm for the people of that particular neighborhood. This is another example of the ambiguity of the characteristics of a setting with reference to different user groups.

Again a probable explanation may have to do with the phenomena of surveillance. Markets are truly public spaces filled with permanent shops, make shift stalls and full of people. Even though the people in the markets are strangers to the women, by their very presence they thwart improper male-female interaction. In a society in which improper interaction between women and unrelated men is taboo, such behavior is not condoned in public spaces like markets. On the other hand, if women were to visit different neighborhoods to sell their products door-to-door, the streets in such neighborhoods may be deserted and once in someone's house there is the added possibility of improper male-female interaction and sexual harassment. Thus truly public spaces are deemed safer for women in comparison to those places that are relatively secluded, even if they are located in the public domain.

This also supports the existence of multiple publics in society. It indicates that different public settings differ not only in terms of the amount of power and resources (Fraser, 1992), but also according to the number and type of people in such settings. The ease by which women can gain entry into public settings is related to the type and amount of people inhabiting such settings. Crowded public settings are preferred over sparsely inhabited public settings due to reduced scope of surveillance and social control associated with the latter. Similarly the presence of known others makes it easier for women to use public settings, again by increasing accountability through social policing.

Discussion

The earlier section illustrates the omnipresent nature of surveillance. Women are either confined to the private domain of their homes, or subject to the watchful eye of neighbors and acquaintances in their settlements and immediate neighborhoods (parochial domain). Even though the public realm provides the possibility for anonymity, the existing social structure does not allow women to visit settings in the public domain without any justifiable reason and reduces their chances of achieving spatial mobility. Furthermore, women are socialized to feel uncomfortable and out of place in the public realm making it even more difficult for women to enjoy spatial freedom and independence. Thus women are subject to varying degrees of surveillance by men and women constantly.

However there are no absolute rules forbidding women to use settings located in the parochial or public realm. The boundary delineating the settings accessible to women changes with the specifics of their circumstances. For instance in times of dire need (legitimizing condition) women can go out into the public domain and even engage in work that involves some interaction with men (like selling activity). However when the economic situation improves, the requirement of male-female interaction avoidance asserts itself and women have to change their behavior accordingly. Surveillance ensures that women conform to the socially mandated acceptable behavior with reference to their stage-in-family-life-cycle and their specific circumstances. Since the rules governing women's appropriate behavior are not absolute, they seem less rigid and overbearing and consequently much more difficult to challenge and attack. By being flexible, surveillance wins the support of the very people it oppresses.

This brings us to the disciplinary nature of surveillance observed in this study. Women who live within the confines of their home environment and do not express any desire to achieve independent spatial mobility are rewarded by being considered as model women upholding the prestige of their families, while those who do venture or attempt to venture out of their home environments without justifiable reasons are severely punished. In this study, the punitive measures associated with disregarding the dictates of spatial restrictions varied from incurring the anger of husbands, threat of being abandoned by spouse, to domestic abuse and social stigmatization. Furthermore, those women who go out of their homes in their capacity as sacrificing mothers do not gain in status, but bear the shame of exposing their family's poverty. Even then, they are not spared from surveillance. However I observed that surveillance does not safeguard women against intra-family conflicts like domestic abuse. This suggests that surveillance over women is motivated not by the benevolent desire to protect women but rather to control their freedom of behavior and movement and maintain the patriarchal power structures of society.

Through surveillance, conformity to existing social norms is

noted and rewarded, while non-conformity is punished. Since the forces of surveillance are not exerted by a formal external agency like the police but by family members, relatives and acquaintances, the roots of surveillance are integrated within society. The very people who are disciplined by surveillance also watch others in their efforts to discipline them. The notion of surveillance is so closely integrated into the socialization process that it is considered natural/normal. This guarantees constant and continuous surveillance.

The different elements of surveillance, namely, its omnipresent nature, its flexibility, the simplicity of structures needed for its enforcement, and its disciplinary characteristics all echo the attributes of the Panopticon[7] (Foucault, 1977). Existing socio-cultural mores ensure that women are spatially confined to their home environments and/or sex segregated settings. In addition, women who venture out of their homes for legitimized activities are under continuous surveillance. Like the Panopticon, this serves two purposes: 1) all information about women is known, while at the same time 2) women do not have access to information about men (the group in power). Thus very much like the prisoner in his/her cell, women as a group are isolated and denied access to power[8], and at the same time they are under constant surveillance preventing them from organizing themselves against the existing power structure of society. Even though many of the elements of surveillance observed in the study echo the characteristics of the Panopticon it differed from this formulation in other ways. The type and amount of surveillance women were subject to varied according to stage-in-family-life-cycle, family history, and economic need. Furthermore, the nature of surveillance possible in different settings were linked to the attributes of and the number and type of people in such settings. Thus further research is necessary to identify and then analyze the different dimensions of surveillance as experienced by women in Calcutta, India.

Even though women face severe spatial restrictions, the seeds of overcoming the barriers posed by the existing social system may also lie within the city. The fact that women have invented ways of using surveillance to their advantage (like collectively engaging in activities in the public domain) to make use of opportunities in the city is an indicator of their ingenuity. The city by its vastness, congregation of different types of people (race, class, and ethnicity to name a few), and various opportunities give women the power to circumscribe the disciplinary gaze of patriarchal social structures (Wilson, 1991, 1995). This opportunity that the city holds for women has not gone unnoticed. It has prompted men to portray the city as a potentially dangerous place for respectable women. Urbanization has been held responsible for loosening the morals of modern society and blamed for the breakdown of the traditional belief system. The ideology of the dangerous is evoked to justify the need to protect women by enclosing them in their homes and other gender segregated environments. However, even though the city provides new opportunities for the sexual exploitation of women and for voyeurism, the opportunities that it affords women should not be underestimated. How can women take advantage of the different opportunities available in the city? How can policy makers and development agencies help women to gain a fair share of the opportunities of the cities? These are important questions that need to be pursued.

Notes

[1] One branch of this type of research focuses on socio-cultural mores that confine women to their homes and in doing so intensifies the separation between the public and private spheres (Agarwal, 1989; Beteille, 1975; Jain & Banerjee, 1985; Kalpagam, 1986; Lessinger, 1989; Nanda, 1976; Standing, 1985 & 1991); while another branch examines the different ramifications of the sexual division of labor, the phenomenon of the reserve army of labor, and other economic consequences that are linked to the private-public sphere debate (Anker & Hein, 1986, Banerjee, 1982, 1985a/b, 1991; Bardhan, 1987)). I should point out that this list is not comprehensive, rather it is representative of the large amount of literature on women in India.

[2] I interviewed 18 women at Azad Mohalla, 14 women at Darapara, and 22 women at Topsia-Shibtala. At the insistence of the NGO through which I had established contact, I interviewed 4 women at Auddy Bagan, and 6 women at Dehiserampur Road.

[3] For this study the home is considered as the private domain, settings in the courtyard, settlement and immediate neighborhood as the parochial domain, while settings at the city level and beyond comprises the public realm.

[4] The three categories do not add up to 100% since of the 41 women engaging in productive work, 4 engage in two jobs simultaneously.

[5] However I should point out that even those women (of this study) who do use settings in the parochial domain do so out of necessity. Judging from the response of the women to the query 'whether they would continue to work if their economic circumstances improved,' it is likely that most of them would retreat to their homes when they do not need to worry about basic survival.

[6] This refers to the washing of soiled dishes and clothes of unrelated people.

[7] The Panopticon consists of an annular building with a central tower. The tower is pierced by windows that open into the inner side of the ring. The peripheral annular building is divided into cells which extends through the entire width of the ring. Each cell has two windows, one on the inside corresponding to the window of the tower, and another on allowing light to come in. A supervisor in the central tower can watch the prisoner who is like a black figure against the light of the window.

[8] Throughout history it has been the privilege of the dominant class to scrutinize and be informed about the actions of the lower class. However since women belong to different classes, the class differences amongst women should not be underestimated. Nonetheless, women of each class are subordinate to the men of that class and subject to the disciplinary gaze of men of that specific class.

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46 GENDER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY SERVICES IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

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Introduction

The main objective of this paper is to investigate changing configurations and forms in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's cultural heritage and how they affect women's needs in regard to services, amenities and specific facilities. The study of women's role in Saudi society describes the interrelationship between gender and the environment and it opens up the analysis of the sphere of activities that are directly relevant to women's education and productivity. The development of Saudi women's education started with the establishment of the first girls' school in Saudi Arabia in 1956 and has evolved over the years affecting women's role in the Saudi society.

Authors of the book, *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, (1974) note that there were a quarter of a million girls in full-time education. Before 1960, girls' education was generally limited in scope and haphazard in organization, available only in the larger cities such as Jiddah, Mecca, Medina and Riyadh. As it was not socially acceptable for a girl to go out of the house on her own, she would receive lessons from a private tutor or in a small group known as a *Kutab*. Sufficiently wealthy families would employ for their daughters private teachers who lived with the family and in many cases acted not only as tutor and advisor, but also as nurse and companion to the children.

In the late 1960s, more organized teaching groups started to appear, and private schools spread to other cities. The girls who learned at these schools or privately in their homes took the same exams and received the same certificate as boys, but mixed education has not been adopted in Saudi Arabia.

In 1959-60, the first group of girls studying at the school were able to present their primary school certificates. As the Saudi Government approved girls' education in the same year and opened some of the first state primary schools, the need then arose for intermediate (junior high) schools. In 1960, classes for teaching students at the intermediate level were opened. In 1963, the first group of girls graduated from the intermediate school (the equivalent of the 9th grade in the American system).

Intermediate education was taken over by the Government for the first year and the school followed the program of the Ministry of Education with the help of a very small staff, most of whom were not adequately qualified. At the end of the school year 1964-65, the first group of secondary school students graduated from Dar el-Hanan, seven in sciences and one in arts subjects. They were the first group of girls to graduate from any regular school in the Kingdom. At that point the need for a better building was urgent and work started

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on the new school which now exists. By 1966, the year in which the school moved to its new location, the intake of students had risen to 620, rising further to 1,050 in 1973.

In 1969-1970 the Administration of Girls' Education opened a Teachers' Training College in Riyadh. By that time, a fully developed administrative staff had been established and girls were able to follow a well-planned educational program at all levels. Furthermore, the government invested responsibility for girls' education in a group of religious leaders who formed what is now known as the Administration of Girls' Education. This body is effectively a Ministry but remains independent of the Ministry of Education. Education for women is now available in every village, town and city. According to the statistics about girls' education, there are 500 communities with schools for girls, well over the target of 300 set by the five-year plan ending in 1975. School construction projects in hand by 1975 would, when completed, provide the government school system with 129 elementary schools, 30 intermediate schools and 10 secondary schools.

One of the difficulties involved in the rapid expansion of education is the recruitment of enough people with sufficient academic qualifications willing to become teachers. Therefore, a considerable number of non-Saudi teaching staff had to be employed. However, in the next decade the non-Saudi staff are to be replaced gradually by local staff. Today women's education development has enlarged to a great extent trying to enable the Saudi woman to enlarge her capabilities to the fullest, and to put these capabilities to the best use in social and cultural issues. Thus, female education makes up a vigorous program of learning for the young Saudi woman. In addition, many Saudi universities are holding several international and local symposia with the aim of providing Saudi women with their special needs, particularly in the field of cultural and environmental control and environments within the context of congruence and opportunities. Currently, there is a great deal of concern about Saudi women's interdisciplinary role in contemporary development.

Theoretical Framework of the Study

The theoretical framework of this study is based on an in-depth exploration of the relationship between the historical evolution of women's education in Saudi society and their degree of contribution in the process of development. Therefore, we tried to capture the seeds of changes especially in the field of education, and interrelate these changes with the technological, economical, social, and cultural development and, in turn, women's role in the society. Contemporary Saudi women understand that economic growth based on the petroleum boom is not enough and what is needed is education, responsibility, awareness, and ability to communicate in a developed society which respects all Islamic rules. This understanding indicates the need for community services that can enable women to further pursue their education, develop experiences in different fields, and get the chance to socialize and have some recreational facilities.

Thus, a responsive approach to women's needs would be the creation of community centers and related services that must be built, taking into consideration culture and religion as well as career responsibility. Therefore, we aimed in this study to indicate that there is a need for women policy makers and academics in contemporary Saudi society to work together to bring about political and economic reforms in community design, especially in Saudi society, where culture and religion are the two most important concerns for its structure and design. In light of these ideas, much of the literature on modern cultural formation focuses on both ecological and cultural dimensions and how they affect women's needs, which is one of our major concerns in this paper. On the other hand, Western feminist literature interrelates women's needs to socio-spatial transformations, with the goal of strengthening their role in the environment by creating community centers for women's activities and the development of their education.

Literature Review of Community Centers

Most of the literature on "community centers" has to do with stimulation, maintaining, and deepening a "sense of city", the loss of which is so universally lamented. Community centers are also characterized by their unique role in the creative use of leisure time and for a variety of different activities. Eugene and Barbara Sternberg (1971) note: "We have developed, through the initial study, an 'allergy' to 'standards' in the field of community centers. This is not merely a reflection of an innate bias, but grows out of real fear that we may choke off the urgently needed, new solutions to unprecedented community needs and problems by the familiar process of laying down minimum standards which then become the maximum allowable facilities." They indicate that new ideas should be embodied in the design of community centers in order to meet individual and social priorities, values and needs.

Assessing the Need for Saudi Women's Community Centers

The use of community facilities in the environment necessarily entails a greater emphasis on gender and women's role in Saudi society. The architect Tariq Al-Haj, when asked about the recent direction for architectural projects in Saudi Arabia, was quoted in *Al-Bina* magazine as follows: "Architectural projects in Saudi Arabia nowadays are mostly directed towards multi-functional centers which are serving more than one purpose."

As has been mentioned earlier, the first preliminary school was established by the Government of Saudi Arabia for Saudi women almost thirty-eight years ago, and the progress for educating women since then has multiplied substantially. Fifteen years later, women played a strong role in serving

their community. During that period, the first higher institute for community services for women was founded in Riyadh. The Department of Higher Education started its activities in the academic years 1980/1981 with three specialties: Serving individuals, serving the society, and organizing the community. The main objective of the community institute was to propagate social awareness which is based on Islamic foundations and assessment of Sharia law in women's community fields in different Saudi environments. The institute also aims to train Saudi women who would work as community supervisors in schools and office establish-ments. Other purposes for facilitating this institute were to provide educational programs for aged Saudi women and to support women who take part in studies of environmental research. The study in this community institute consists of four academic years. The institute provides a diploma in community service after accomplishing the examination test of the second year. This diploma, along with a Bachelor of Community Service, is handed to those who further their education to the fourth year. These are some of the objectives we can name which are tailored by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and relate to the first creation of community services for women in the Kingdom. Recently, this Women's Community Institute has expanded its wings to two sectors, one serving the King Saud University and the other administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. This privately-owned complex is the Community Center for Women in Riyadh (Manahil Center) that serves educational, cultural, and recreation purposes.

In the Eastern Region of the Kingdom where we have applied this study, community services have been facilitated as individual institutes, such as the two philanthropic centers in Al-Dammam and Al-Khobar. However, when combined with other recreational and educational sectors, they are either too expensive (e.g. Fatat Al-Khalij Community Center, Al-Khobar) to allow admission for a woman with low to medium income, or they do not attain the quality of service required.

From the earlier analysis regarding women's needs in Saudi society, it is clear that it was difficult to track down and procure good materials about community centers. There were few case studies which fulfilled most of the major components of the building. Therefore, a live case study was one of the most supporting sections which was added to assess the need for community centers. This study put emphasis on social and planning philosophies and on architectural and environmental considerations. Furthermore, it should be added that the formulation of specific standards for community centers tend to create new forms of associations, particularly among women, and to enlarge and strengthen their access to resources.

Case Study Analysis: Fatat Al-Khalaij Community Center, Al-Khobar

Fatat Al-Khalaij Community Center (The Gulf Arabian Women's Community Center) in Al-Khobar was constructed almost ten years ago. The concept of the Fatat Al-Khalaij started 30 years ago when a group of women decided to establish a small women's community in a house in Al-Khobar as a source to serve the community. Fatat Al-Khalaij has come a long way from that day. As the need for the facilities in this society is very much in demand, the management now is working on an expansion project that will be built on land adjacent to the existing building. The society has already bought neighboring houses to expand its facilities and waits optimistically for the new project to be built.

The building is three stories high with an atrium naturally lighted with domed skylights in the center of the building. The structural system of the building is made out of a steel skeleton system, with central air conditioning in all its spaces except for the w.c., storage and kitchens. A general fluorescent lighting system is distributed equally along the entire building with slight variations in some parts: for example, in the library incandescent spotlights are distributed along the geometrical shape of the library with dimmer switches and two central domes in the atrium which give natural lighting.

The users of the building are dived into four categories: 1) administrators, including managers, teachers, and division heads; 2) students of the computer, English, tailoring, and The Holy Qura'n classes; 3) staff members, including maintenance staff and janitors; and 4) visitors.

The ground floor is used for administration and classes, including child care training, kindergarten and pre-school. The central atrium of the ground floor is used for children's activities such as painting, games, clay sculpturing or book reading. This area is supervised by several members of the society. The first floor includes the main administration office for the whole society, division offices for Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, the Computer Department and Art Society. It also includes three English classes, one child care class and one meeting room. The second floor opens up to a reception desk. It also includes three computer classes and one stitching and tailoring class. The basement floor had been divided with internal partitions to include two more kindergarten classes. When the Society needs to use the ceremonial hall located in the basement level, all the activities in the basement, including a massage room and a weight room, are shut down. The ceremonies usually occur after seven o'clock in the evening. The gym weight room is then transferred into a back stage for children to dress up.

Other services for women in the Eastern Province are limited to private clubs such as Sun-Set Beach Club or residential compounds or Saudi Aramco; whereas, health education and awareness should be one of the most critical issues, especially when looking at the percentage of cardiovascular diseases in the Saudi women's community. According to a family medicine specialist working in Aramco Hospital, Dhahran, when asked about the percentage of health and food intake related diseases in the women's community who are treated in Saudi Aramco Hospital, "All of the diseases are related to them. The first three very distinct diseases are obesity, diabetes, and high blood pressure." Because of this reason in

particular, a women's community center, which covers all social, cultural, recreational and humanitarian needs of women in the Saudi community, would be essential in the Eastern Region and would be a source of encouragement for women to serve their community and to release the social pressure. A diversity of information sources was sought for this paper so as to obtain as much information as possible about how women use and perceive the community center environment in order to met their cultural and social needs in contemporary Saudi society.

Research Methodology

Thirty-two questionnaires were administered to the users of the building. The questionnaire was divided into four major parts. The first three parts asked users to grade specific characteristics of the building from one (highest) to five (lowest). The first question probes how the users perceive the Fatat Al-Khalaij as a building in general. The second question allows the users to give their personal opinions on how the interior of the building fits their needs and in what way the interior design satisfies their social and educational requirements in general. The third question determines how much satisfaction is given by the personal spaces used by those who live in that environment over a longer period of time. Finally, the fourth part of the questionnaire is subdivided into several sections concerning the personal background of the users. Initially, seventy questionnaires were distributed to different categories of users, but only thirty-two were returned. The small number of completed questionnaires made the analysis difficult because the last section of the questionnaire, which asked for background information, was mostly not answered. In addition to the questionnaires, participant observation methodology was used to observe women's behavior in the community center in their everyday living environment, and personal interviews of students and office staff members were also done.

Findings

Through the analysis of the questionnaires, space user sheets, personal interviews, and participant observation, several issues concerning space programming, circulation patterns, desired and undesired qualities in spaces, and environmental behavioral patterns were concluded. Results indicate that women of different age groups, backgrounds and professions were strongly interacting with each other. In general, the women found pleasure in serving the community and their children. Women in the administration department preferred to work as groups at work stations in one room, instead of dividing each unit with high partitions, furniture or plants. Groups of three to five were observed. The results show that women in Saudi society crave to interact among themselves. Based on societal and cultural values, they prefer not to associate with men unless they are family members or they need to contact them for professional purposes. Thus, Saudi women today are trying to reassess their existence in psychological and social terms to serve their surrounding environment on the micro and macro scale through international science, technology, and developments in various educational, social and cultural fields.

Further analysis of the questionnaire indicates that the most common complaint was that the space was not sufficient for the number of students the community center accepts. It is a normal phenomenon: the preliminary programming of the building accepted only twenty students in one class, whereas the existing classes sometimes consist of as many as thirty.

The English class students complained in the questionnaire about the noise interference from girls talking in the corridors while they were in their class. One of the design failures was locating benches to sit on around the parapet wall of the atrium on the second floor and just opposite to the classroom doors. In addition, observation of the interior of the building reveals that the central atrium mass is quite large and, due to reflective interior surface finishes such as marble, the sound echoes to the entire central area of both the ground and the first floors. In addition, the space function in that particular area is for children's activities which are very noisy. It is recommended that, by applying more sound-absorbing materials to the internal surfaces, the building's noise reflectance level may be controlled. Also, the primary problem of lack of space in the building would be taken care of by constructing the expansion project. The current problems in the existing building should be avoided while the expansion project is materialized.

The importance of this analysis is with respect to its applicability to future community center designs. Furthermore, the results of this study are related to Eugene and Barbara Sternberg's (1971) ideas that, "We are not professionals in community design or operation: we are laymen with experiences, interests, and concerns," "You must know where you came from before you can know where you are going." Following this idea, this study points out how the lack of sense of community within the region in the Saudi Kingdom indicates the need for proposing antidotes to cure this problem within Saudi society. An unpublished thesis research in the Interior Architecture Department, King Faisal University in Dammam, indicates the effect of women's involvement as decision-makers in the housing environment and, in turn, in all aspects of social and cultural life. Thus, based on the results, further research is needed for the development of community centers, whether inside or outside the region, to get a better understanding of the problem and, consequently, to improve the quality of women's lives. In addition, the community center will be a source of education, whereas education has become a necessity and not a choice to get the knowledge that can enlighten our world.

Findings of this study led to a proposal for a Woman's Community Complex located in the Western Region of Bahrain in Hamad town, 20Km from Manama. The center includes three major functions. The first function is educational, the second one is recreational and cultural, and the third one is social work and health-care facilities. In

addition to these three major functions, the center is also provided with supplementary facilities for members of the center; e.g. nursery, pre-school, a playground for the children, and an administration area. The project incorporates suggestions obtained from our research and was proposed to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The results of this study have indicated the real need for multi-functional community centers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There is a clear emphasis on women's growing concern and involvement in all aspects of contemporary Saudi society. The fast-paced changes and competitive nature of the current social, technological, and economic climate all over the world, and especially in Saudi society, demands that Saudi women be prepared for the challenges that manifest themselves in such an environment. A wide range of political and intellectual factors, such as a self-sufficient environment for women, will enable them to enhance and improve the quality of their life. With this in mind, we recommend the building of many community centers for women that can provide them with services at both micro and macro scales.

It is our belief that the provision of such centers will secure many environmental facilities and enable the growth and prosperity of the users. Furthermore, the flow of changes and community development in Saudi society indicate the real need to enhance and improve women's education, responsibility, awareness, ability to communicate and participate in the economic growth of contemporary Saudi society.

References

Dunipace, Robin, Rhona Hanbury, Anthony Lejeune, Rosamund McDougall, Angels Milburn, Charlotte Odgers, Jane Rawlinson, *Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Stacey International, 1977.

Shafiq, Al-Mohammad: *Community Center, Harnad Town, Bahrain*, King Faisal University, College of Architecture and Planning, final graduation project, Department of Architecture, Dammam, 1996/1997.

Sternberg, Eugene and Barbara, *Community Centers and Students' Unions*, 1971.

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

DAY 1 THURSDAY, 26 FEB 1998

4:00pm	Registration	Slusser Lobby
5:30-7:00	Reception	Slusser Gallery: 1102 Art & Arch Bldg (I)
6:00-6:30	Welcome:	

Hemalata Dandekar, Conference Chair, University of Michigan
James Snyder, Acting Dean, College of Architecture and Urban Planning
Mayor Ingrid Sheldon, City of Ann Arbor

Registration, Orientation and Conference Concerns
Overview of Gallery Exhibit: *Lisa Iwamoto, Craig Scott*
Overview of Film, Book and Poster Exhibits: *Catalina Velasco, Trisha Miller*

7:00pm	Informal dinners with panelists and moderators (on your own)	
9:00pm	Film: *CITY LIGHTS (Charlie Chaplin)*	Lorch Hall Auditorium (120 Lorch)

Sponsors:

College of Architecture and Urban Planning, The University of Michigan
The International Institute, The University of Michigan
The Center for South and Southeast Asia, The University of Michigan
U.S.Department of Education, National Resource Center Grant for South Asia
The Office of the Vice President for Multicultural Affairs

Chair: Hemalata C. Dandekar

Credits for Conference Organization:

Book Exhibit	Trisha Miller with assistance from Kenneth Lo
Film Festival	Trisha Miller with assistance from Francesca Rojas
Poster Exhibit	Catalina Velasco, Thana Chirapiwat
Graphics, Layout and Design	Thana Chirapiwat
Panel Design and Arrangement	Naresh Bhaskar with assistance from Thiphasone Phimviengkham
Webmaster and Poster	Francis Garcia
Finance and Administration	Dorathea Dootz with assistance from Sandra Patton
Travel and Lodgings	Jodi Forester
Hosting and Facilities	Mary Anne Drew
Audio Visual Support	William Manspeaker

DAY 2 FRIDAY, 27 FEB 1998

8:00-8:30 Breakfast — Room 2106 Art & Arch Bldg (B)

8:30-10:00 **PLENARY**

PANEL 1 — Room 1: 2104 (A)

Launching the Themes

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning & Internationalization*

ANTHONY D. KING, Department of Art History, State University of Binghamton
Beyond the Post-colonial: India's 'International' Suburbs

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

HECTOR EDUARDO ROJAS, Inter American Development Bank
Financing Urban Heritage Conservation in Latin America

Theme 3: *Gender, Class, Ethnicity and Globalization*

KENNETH E. COREY, College of Social Science, Michigan State University
Electronic Space: Creating and Controlling Cyber Communities in Southeast Asia and the United States

Moderator/Discussant: HEMALATA DANDEKAR, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

10:00-10:30 Coffee — Room 2106 Art & Arch Bldg (B)

10:30-12:00 **SESSION 1**

PANEL 2: Art, Commerce and Sustaining the Historic City — Room 1: 2104 (A)

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

RAHUL MEHROTRA, Urban Design Research Institute, Bombay, India
Bazaars in Victorian Arcades: the Conservation of Bombay's Historic Core

JUDIT BODNAR, Center for Russian, Central and East European Studies, Rutgers University
Merging Global and Local: Art and Commerce as Logics of Budapest's New Public Spaces

EAMONN CANNIFFE, Manchester School of Architecture, UK
Parasites and Prostheses: Globalization and Urban Space in Manchester

Moderator/Discussant: MICHAEL KENNEDY, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan

PANEL 3: Preservation, Revitalization and Multiculturalism — Room 2: 2216-2219 (D)

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

RIAD G MAHAYNI, Department of Community and Regional Planning, Iowa State University
Preserving Old Neighborhoods of Damascus, Syria

MIN-CHIH YANG, KUAN CHU WEI, Department of Architecture, Chaoyang University of Technology, Taiwan
Urban Revitalization and Cultural Memory: Taipei's Urban Renewal Policy Regarding Wan-hwa

MADIHA EL-SAFTY, The American University in Cairo, Egypt
The District of Gamaliya in Cairo: a Socio-Economic Perspective

Moderator/Discussant: MICHAEL BONNER, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Michigan

PANEL 4: Sustainable Development and Participatory Management — Room 3: 2222 (C)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

ASEEM INAM, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan
Crossing Boundaries: Local Planning, Global Learning

JANE SEILING, Akhtar Badshah, Sheila McNamee, Asia Pacific Cities Forum
The City Community: Building Bridges to Sustainability

VIKRAMADITYA PRAKASH, Department of Architecture, University of Washington
Listening to the Subaltern: Acting as Social Individuals

Moderator/Discussant: MARGARET DEWAR, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

12:00-1:00 Lunch (On your own)

1:00-2:00 **PLENARY** — Room 1: 2104 (A)

JOHN FRIEDMANN Department of Planning, Policy and Landscape, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
The Common Good: Assessing the Performance of Cities

2:15-3:45 **SESSION 2**

PANEL 5: Squatter Housing and Urban Spaces in Transition — Room 1: 2104 (A)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

SURABHI DABIR, Leslie Newman, Ruben Flores, Housing Assistance Council
Building Communities in the Border Colonias Region: Past Approaches and Emerging Challenges

BRIJ MAHARAJ, Department of Geography, University of Durban-Westville
Urban Reconstruction and Development in the New South Africa: the Case of Durban

IRIT SINAI, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Housing Development and Housing Uses in Kumasi, Ghana

Moderator/Discussant: GILL-CHIN LIM, Department of Urban Planning, Michigan State University

PANEL 6: Ethnicity and the Global-Local Connection — Room 2: 2216-2219 (A)

Theme 3: *Gender, Class, Ethnicity and Globalization*

RAY BROMLEY, Department of Geography and Planning, SUNY at Albany
Microcosmic Research and Global Awareness: Rethinking the Local Heritage

UDO GREINACHER, School of Architecture and Interior Design, University of Cincinnati
Ethnic Enclaves: New Urbanism and the Inner City

EDWARD RAMSAMY, Africana Studies Department, Rutgers University
Trends, Transitions and Implications of the World Bank's Urban Development Agenda

Moderator/Discussant: ROBERT MARANS, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

PANEL 7: Historic Districts and Cultural Continuity — Room 3: 2222 (C)

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

EVAWANI ELLISA, Department of Environmental Engineering, Osaka University, Japan
Redesigning the Historic Core Area: Urban Design in the Former Colonial City of Medan, Indonesia

PIRASRI POVATONG, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan
The Urban Palimpsest: Transformation of Bangkok and Its Palaces During the Colonial Era

YONA GINSBERG (Trisha Miller), Department of Sociology, Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Religious City, Secular Metropolis: Bnei Brak, Israel

Moderator/Discussant: LAURA SWARTZBAUGH, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

3:45-4:15 Coffee — Room 2106 Art & Arch Bldg

4:15-5:45 **SESSION 3**

PANEL 8: Urban Form in a New Century — Room 1: 2104 (A)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

NIHAL PERERA, College of Architecture and Planning, Ball State University, Indiana
The Restructuring of Colombo's Urban Form in the 1980's and 1990's

SARA LISS-KATZ, Hellmuth, Obata and Kassabaum, San Francisco
Plan for Fort Bonifacio, Philippines: Setting New Standard for Urban Design in Southeast Asia

JOHN VAN TAO SZTO, The Jubilee Arts Center and Foundation, New York
Asian Centrality and the Geopolitics of Space: Politics and the Disappearance of HongKong and the Reappearance of Shanghai

Moderator/Discussant: BRIAN CARTER, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

PANEL 9: Cultural Memory and Urban Values in Transition — Room 2: 2216-2219 (D)

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

JAMES CHAFFERS, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan
Accelerating the Search for Harmony Between Emerging Value

DORIAN A. MOORE, Architect, Ontario, Canada
In the Trenches: Rethinking Urbanism, Ethnicity and Space

AMITA SINHA, Department of Landscape Architecture, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Design of Settlements in Vaastu Shastras

Moderator/Discussant: ANNETTE LE CUYER, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

PANEL 10: Historic Preservation and Heritage Conservation — Room 3: 2222 (C)

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

TIMOTHY SCARNECCHIA, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan
The Kasubi Tombs World Heritage Site in Uganda

KANINIKA BHATNAGAR, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan
Globalization in the Cause of Urban Conservation: the Historic Urban Centers of Amber and Agra, India

PRIYALADA DEVAKULA, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan
A Tradition Rediscovered: An Interpretive Study of the Traditional Thai House

Moderator/Discussant: CARLA SINOPOLI, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

7:00-9:00 Banquet Dinner at the Michigan League (Advance Payment or Invitation)

Welcome: *David W Cohen, Director, International Institute*
Robert W Marans, Chair, Urban and Regional Planning

Remarks: *Lana Pollack, President, Michigan Environmental Council*
Representative Liz Brater, State of Michigan
Congresswoman Lynn Rivers

Thanks: *Hemalata Dandekar, Professor of Urban Planning*

9:00 PM Film: *MANHATTAN (Woody Allen)* Lorch Hall Auditorium (120 Lorch)

DAY 3: SATURDAY, 28 FEB 1998

8:00-8:30 Breakfast Room 2106 Art & Arch Bldg (B)

8:30-10:00 **PLENARY**

PANEL 11: Reiterating the Themes Room 1: 2104 (A)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning & Internationalization*

ALEJANDRO FLORIAN BORBON, Colombian Institute for Housing and Urban Reform, Colombia
Social Production of Shelter with Non-Economic Rationality and the Achievement of the Right of Housing: How Latin American Cities were Built

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

TRIDIB BANERJEE, Emel Yucekus, School of Urban Planning and Development, University of Southern California
Xidan Street, Beijing: Reading and Writing Urban Change

Theme 3: *Gender, Class, Ethnicity and Globalization*

SANG-CHUEL CHOE, Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Seoul National University, Korea
Search for an Asian Urban Paradigm: Cultural Dimensions of Urbanization

Moderator/Discussant: HEMALATA DANDEKAR, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

10:00-10:30 Coffee Room 2106 Art & Arch Bldg

10:30-12:00 **SESSION 4**

PANEL 12: The American Experience Room 1: 2104 (A)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

JACK J FORD, Department of Geography-Earth Science, Shippensburg University
The Greening of Exit 7 in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: Preserving Agricultural Land or Promoting Economic Growth

ROBERT M ARENS, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Colorado at Denver
Reinventing the Psyche of American Cities: Detroit as Paradigm?

MAIRE EITHNE O'NEILL, School of Architecture, Montana State University
Learning About the Space on the Edge

Moderator/Discussant: ROBERT GRESE, School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan

PANEL 13: Urban Systems and Socio-Spatial Change — Room 2: 2216-2219 (D)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

JACK F. WILLIAMS, Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University
Taiwan's Urban Systems in Transition

CATHY L. ANTONAKOS, Center for Nursing Research, University of Michigan
A Social Perspective on the Future of Transportation Design

GAVIN SHATKIN, Department of Urban Planning and Policy Development, Rutgers University
Globalization and Spatial and Social Change in Phnom Penh, Cambodia

Moderator/Discussant: JONATHAN LEVINE, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

PANEL 14: Contested City Space in Maharashtra, India — Room 3: 2222 (C)

Theme 2: *Cultural Heritage, Revitalization and Development*

ARVIND ADARKAR, Adarkar Associates, Bombay, India
Fighting a Losing Battle? Planning Policies of Mumbai in the Wake of Globalization

SULAKSHANA MAHAJAN, Architect, Thane, India
The Transformation of Nasik City

NANDITA GODBOLE, Department of Landscape Architecture, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Bombay: Open Spaces and Growth

Moderator/Discussant: PRADEEP CHIBBER, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan

12:00-12:45 Lunch — Room 2106 Art & Arch Bldg (B)

12:45-2:45 **SESSION 5**

PANEL 15: Gender and the City — Room 1: 2104 (A)

Theme 3: *Gender, Class, Ethnicity and Globalization*

MALLIKA BOSE, College of Architecture, Georgia Institute of Technology
Surveillance, Circumscriber of Women's Spatial Experience: the Case of Slum Dwellers in Calcutta, India

BETH ANN PATTON, University of New Mexico
Gender Planning and Housing Masaya, Nicaragua: A Question of Accessibility

KAMESHWARI POTHUKUCHI, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, University of Wisconsin
Shelter and Empowerment: A Study of Working Women's Hostels in Bangalore, India

MOSHIRA EL RAFEY, HANADI BUKHARI, College of Architecture and Planning, King Faisal University, Saudi Arabia
Gender and the Development of Community Services in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Moderator/Discussant: NEERA ADARKAR, Architect, Bombay, India

PANEL 16: Global Investments and Local Space — Room 2: 2216-2219 (D)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

SHELTON WOODS, History Department, Boise State University, Idaho
Expatriate Global Investment and Squatter Displacement in Manila

ABIDIN KUSNO, Department of Architecture, Binghamton University
Custodians of (Trans)nationality: Metropolitan Jakarta, Middle Class Prestige and the Chinese

GREGORY PRICE GRIEVE, Jennifer Chertow University of Chicago, Illinois
Questioning Modernity: The Nepalese City of Bhaktapur's Cyasi Mandap

SULBHA BRAMHE (Francesca Rojas), Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, India
Growth and Metamorphosis of Bombay through Four Centuries of Globalization

Moderator/Discussant: GAYL NESS, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan

PANEL 17: Housing, Urban Dynamics and Environmental Management — Room 3 (2222) (C)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

GUOQIANG SHEN, Department of Planning, East Carolina University
Spatial and Temporal Dynamics of Housing Development and Population Growth in Urban China

DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, Transportation Research Institute, University of Michigan
Expanding the Urban Transportation Infrastructure in Developing Cities Through Concession Agreements: Early Lessons from Latin America

ERIC ZUSMAN, Department of Asian Studies, University of Texas at Austin
A River Without Water: Examining the Influence of Agricultural and Urban Growth on Water Shortages in the Yellow River Basin

JUAN CARLOS JIMENEZ, Mexico
Polarization Effect of Globalization on Queretaro, Mexico

Moderator/Discussant: MITCHELL RYCUS, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

2:45-3:15 Coffee — Room 2106 Art & Arch Bldg

3:15-4:45 **SESSION 6**

PANEL 18: Land Development and Urban Management — Room 1: 2104 (A)

Theme 1: *Architectural Design, Physical Planning and Internationalization*

TOMMY FIRMAN, Department of Regional and City Planning, Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia
Urban Land Development Issues in Indonesia

SIVAGURU GANESAN, Ann Susnik Department of Architecture, University of Hong Kong
Explaining Redevelopment in Hong Kong

CARLA CHIFOS, Center for Environmental Assessment and Policy, University of Cincinnati
Successes in Sustainable Urban Environmental Management of Secondary Cities in Indonesia

Moderator/Discussant: JOHN NYSTUEN, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

PANEL 19: Ethnicity, Streetscape and Cultural Identity — Room 2: 2216-2219 (D)

Theme 3: *Gender, Class, Ethnicity and Globalization*

ARIJIT SEN, Department of Architecture, University of California at Berkeley
Global Images, Local Imaginations: the Use of Geographical (Place-)Images in the Construction of an Immigrant Cultural Landscape

RAYMOND ISAACS, School of Planning, University of Cincinnati
Canaletto's Dresden: Rebuilding a Lost Urban Image in a Time of Rapid Change

SCOTT L. RUFF, Department of Architecture, Hampton University, Virginia
Defining an African-American Architecture: Proposal for a New State Capitol for the Current Territory of Washington D.C.

Moderator/Discussant: EMMANUEL-GEORGE VAKALO, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

PANEL 20: Public Space and the Sense of Place — Room 3: 2222 (C)

Theme 3: *Gender, Class, Ethnicity and Globalization*

KIKA THORNE, ADRIAN BLACKWELL, Department of Architecture, University of Toronto, Canada
Interruptions in Public Space

NARESH K. BHASKAR, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan
Global Terrorism and the World City

ROBERT COWHERD, School of Architecture and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: Cities of the Asian Pacific Region

Moderator/Discussant: CRAIG SCOTT, College of Architecture and Urban Planning, University of Michigan

4:45-5:30 **PLENARY** — Room 2104 (A)

Summary Remarks: Arvind Adarkar, Surabhi Dabir, Tommy Firman, Sara Liss-Katz, June Komisar, Brij Maharaj, Rahul Mehrotra, Nihal Perera

Closing Remarks: Hemalata Dandekar

7:00 PM Film: *THE BICYCLE THIEF (Vittorio De Sica)* — Lorch Hall Auditorium (102 Lorch)

8:45 PM Film: ZAN BOKO — Lorch Hall Auditorium (102 Lorch)

DAY 4: SUNDAY, 1 MARCH 1998

8:45-9:00 Continental Breakfast

9:00-12:00 ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION: THE GENDERED CITY — Room 2147 Art & Arch Bldg (G)

Sponsored by the Institute for Research on Women and Gender

Opening remarks and perspectives: *Neera Adarkar, Moshira El Rafey, Sulakshana Mahajan*

Moderator: *Hemalata Dandekar*



FILM SERIES AND BOOKS EXHIBIT

TITLES FOR THE SYMPOSIUM FILM SERIES

FEATURE FILMS

The Bicycle Thief by Vittorio De Sica
Blade Runner by Ridley Scott
Chinatown by Roman Polanski
City Lights by Charlie Chaplin
La Haine (Hate) by Mathieu Kassovitz
Manhattan by Woody Allen
Metropolis by Fritz Lang
One, two, three by Billy Wilder
Playtime by Jacques Tati
Roma by Frederico Fellini
The Sheltering Sky by Bernardo Bertolucci
Zan Boko by Gaston Kabore

DOCUMENTARIES	*Year*
Across the River	1995
Berlin, The Symphony of a Great City	1927
Back From the Brink: Saving America's Cities by Design	1996
Le Corbusier	1970
The Developing City	1992
The Good Society:	1992
Part I (Atlanta)	
Part II (Los Angeles)	
Holding Ground: The Rebirth of Dudley Street	1996
Indonesia: Urban Development in Jakarta	1996
Inside the Global Economy 10: Developing Countries	1994
Manhatta	1921
Man With A Movie Camera	1928
Mean Streets: Centuries of Urban Living Seen Through Art and Literature, (5-8)	1991
The New Urban Renewal: Reclaiming Our Neighborhoods	1997
The Pacific Century Series:	1992
The Future of the Pacific Basin	
The Two Coasts of China: Asia and the Challenge of the West	
Poletown Lives	1983
Public Housing	1997 PBS Series
Rien Que Les Heures	1926
Reinventing the City: New York and Los Angeles	1996
20/20 Vision: Managing For A Liveable Habitat	1992
William Julius Wilson: Solving Black Inner-City Poverty	1994

FILMS SERIES

FEATURE FILMS

Location: LORCH HALL

Thursday February 26, 1998
9:00 P.M.

CITY LIGHTS
87:00 min.

Bittersweet tale of The Tramp who meets a blind girl selling flowers on the street. He is so taken by her that he attempts to raise money so that she may have an operation. Written, directed by and starring Charlie Chaplin. Virginia Cherrill co-stars. Silent with musical accompaniment.

Friday February 27, 1998
9:00 P.M.

MANHATTAN
96:00 min.

Cerebral comedy classic focuses on a successful comedy writer (Woody Allen) who engages in a series of romances with two very different women following the break-up of his marriage. Features the cityscapes of New York and the music of George Gershwin. Diane Keaton and Mariel Hemingway co-star. Directed by Allen.

Saturday February 28, 1998
7:00 P.M.

THE BICYCLE THIEF
90:00 min.

Italian Neo-Realist classic concerns a man and his son who search desperately to find the man's stolen bicycle, somthing he badly needs if he is to keep his job as a bill-sticker. Directed by Vittorio De Sica. In Italian with English subtitles. Academy Award winner, Best Foreign Film.

8:45 P.M.

ZAN BOKO
94:00 min.

Drama focuses on the technological innovations underway in Africa and the conflict between tradition and change. Set in Burkina Faso, the story begins in a small village where traditional ways and values are maintained. Tinga, a peasant farmer, loses his ancestral land to a wealthy businessman. Yabre, a journalist, attempts to expose Tinga's victimization, but is stopped by a corrupt government who insist that modernity will bring economic success. Directed by Gaston Kabore.

DOCUMENTARIES

Location: 2210 A&AB

Friday February 27, 1998

Part 1: The City's Imprint
10:00am Manhatta (1991) 9 min.
10:15am The Man with the Movie Camera (1928) 67 min.
11:30am Le Corbusier (1970) 46 min.

12:00am Discussion Room 2207

Part 2: Local Space Amidst a Global Environment
1:00pm Indonesia: Urban Development in Jakarta (1996) 20 min.
1:30pm The Two Coasts of China: Asia and the Challenge of the West (1992) 60 min.
2:30pm Inside the Global Economy: 10 Developing Countries (1994) 60 min.

Part 3: Redefining City Space
4:00pm The Developing City (1992) 20 min.
4:30pm Reinventing the City: New York and Los Angeles (1996) 50 min.
5:25pm 20/20 Vision: Managing For a Livable Habitat (1992) 27 min.

Saturday February 28, 1998

Part 1: Urban Revitalization
10:00am Back From the Brink: Saving Americais Cities by Design (1996) 60 min.
11:10am Holding Ground: The Rebirth of Dudley Street (1996) 60 min.

12:00pm Discussion Room 2207

Part 2: Community Perspectives on Development
1:00pm The Good Sociey: Atlanta and Los Angeles (1992) 60 min.
2:10pm The New Urban Renewal: Reclaiming Our Neighborhoods (1997) 180 min.

Part 3: Dynamic Urban Spaces
4:00pm Manhatta (1991) 9 min.
4:10pm The Man with the Movie Camera (1928) 67 min.
5:15pm The Future of the Pacific Basin (1992) 60 min.

http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/cases/index.html

Sponsors: The International Institute, The Center for South and Southeast Asia, The College of Architecture and Urban Planning

City, Space and Globalization Book Exhibit Book Titles

Listed Alphabetically by Publisher

Bantam Doubleday Dell

1. By the Lake of Sleeping Children, Urrea
2. Edge City: Life on the New Frontier, Garreau
3. The Other Side of the River, Kotlowitz
4. There Are No Children Here, Kotlowitz
5. The Urban Muse: Stories on the American City, Stavans

Bernan Associates

1. Big Emerging Markets, International Trade Administration
2. European Cities in Search of Sustainability, Mega

Blackwell Publishers

1. Cities of Tomorrow, Hall
2. The Culture of Cities, Zukin
3. Development Theory, Preston
4. Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development, Friedmann
5. End of Millenium, Castells
6. Ideology and Cultural Identity, Larrain
7. Informational City, Castells
8. Globalization and World Society, Spybey
9. Postmodern Cities and Space, Watson
10. Postmodern Urbanism, Ellin
11. The Power of Identity, Castells
12. Readings in Planning Theory, Campbell
13. Readings in Urban Theory, Fainstein
14. The Rise of the Network Society, Castells
15. Third Space, Soja
16. The Urban Order, Short

Cambridge University Press

1. Aging & Social Policy in Australia, Borowski et al.
2. Australian Cities, Troy
3. The Economic Growth of Singapore, Huff
4. Educating Australia, Marginson
5. A Field of One's Own, Agarwal
6. Footloose Labour, Breman
7. Living Feminism, Bulbeck
8. Social Change and Cultural Transformation in Australia, Jamrozik
9. Sustainable Energy Systems, Dovers
10. Women in Modern India, Forbes

Columbia University Press

1. All the Nation's Under Heaven, Binder and Reimers
2. China's Transition, Nathan
3. Ethnicity, Security, and Separation in India, Chadda
4. Great Cairo, Stewart
5. Liberalization and Foreign Policy, Kahler
6. Losing Control?, Sassen
7. Rainforest Cities, Browder and Godfrey
8. Sex Among Allies, Moon
9. Street Politics, Bayat
10. Within the Circle, Rugh

Duke University Press

1. Culture, Power, Place, Gupta and Ferguson
2. The Cultures of Globalization, Jameson and Miyoshi
3. Exile and Creativity, Suleiman
4. Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, Barlow
5. The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, Lowe and Lloyd
6. Postcolonial Developments, Gupta
7. Questions of Travel, Kaplen

Harvard University Press

1. Assisting Development in a Changing World, Perkins
2. Blue Dreams, Abelman
3. Environment and Development in a Resource-Rich Economy, Vincent et al.
4. The Making of Urban Europe: 1000-1994, Hohenberg
5. Resources, Values and Development, Sen
6. Trading Up, Vogel

Humanities Press/OXFAM

1. Basic Accounting for Credit and Saving Schemes, Elliott (Oxfam)
2. Changing Perceptions , Wallace (Oxfam)
3. Development and Patronage, Eade (Oxfam)
4. Gender and Poverty in the North, Sweetman (Oxfam)
5. Gender in Development Organizations, Sweetman (Oxfam)
6. Half the World, Half a Chance, Mosse (Oxfam)
7. Microfinance and Poverty Reduction, Johnson and Rogaly (Oxfam)
8. The Other City, MacGregor and Lipow (Humanities Press)
9. Women & Urban Settlement, Sweetman (Oxfam)
10. The World Guide (New Internationalist)

John Wiley & Sons

1. Beijing, Sit
2. Buenos Aires, Keeling
3. Cities, Capital and Development, Simon
4. Cities for Citizens, John Friedmann
5. Dublin, MacLaran
6. Ecological Design and Planning, Thompson and Steiner
7. Environmental Housing in Third World Cities, Main and Williams
8. Global Manufacturing Vanguard, Maynard
9. Havana, Segre
10. Paris, Noin and White
11. Regenerative Design for Sustainable Settlement, Lyle
12. Rome, Agnew
13. Seoul, Kim and Choe

MIT Press

1. Architecture and Disjunction, Tschumi
2. Borders in Cyberspace, Kahin
3. Development, Geography and Economic Theory, Krugman
4. Event Cities, Tschumi
5. Government Politics & Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, Brown
6. New Forces in the World Economy, Roberts

New York University Press

1. Geography of Perversion, Bleys
2. Heroic Desire, Munt
3. Immigrants & the American City, Muller
4. Representing the City, King
5. The Urbanization of Injustice, Merrifield

Routledge Press

1. Global Finance and Urban Living,
2. Living the Global City,
3. Urban World, Global City,
4. Urbanization, Colonialism and World Economy,

Russell Sage Foundation

1. Asians and Pacific Islanders in the U.S., Baringer, Gardner and Levin
2. Budapest and New York, Bender and Schorske
3. Ethnic Los Angeles, Waldinger and Bozorgmehr
4. The New Second Generation, Portes

University of California Press

1. City, Scott
2. City in Literature, Lehan
3. Making the Invisible, Sandercock

University of Chicago Press

1. Identities, Appiah and Gates, Jr.
2. In Whose Image?, Simone
3. The Magical State, Coronil
4. Mema's House, Prieur
5. On My Own, Yoon
6. The Politics of Difference, Wilmsen and McAllister
7. Tomorrow, God Willing, Wikan

University of Minnesota Press

1. Culture, Globalization, and the World-System, King
2. Modernity at Large, Appadurai
3. Reconstructing Architecture, Dutton and Mann

Westview Press

1. City-States in the Global Economy, Chiu
2. Colonial Bridgehead, Reimer
3. Courtyards, Markets, City Streets, Sheldon
4. Latin American Policy in International Perspective, Macdonald
5. Macau: The Imaginary City, Porter
6. Mexico Megacity, Pick
7. Third World Cities in Global Perspective, Smith

World Resources Institute Publications

1. Green Fees, Repetto et al.
2. "Second India" Revisited, Repetto
3. Transforming Technology, Heaton et al.
4. World Resources 1996-97 (Oxford University Press)

City, Space, and Globalization presents ways in which globalization affects the built environment of people in cities around the world. Architects, urban planners, geographers, historians and sociologists address topics ranging from transportation to historic preservation, from housing for different population sectors to economic change and city growth patterns. A significant common element of these papers is their shared concern with the ***life space*** of city fabric, beyond economics, beyond world markets and world trade. This life space is the neighborhood and community space of city residents. It refers to memory, to history, to tradition in the face of homogenizing global forces.

"I call this listing of criteria a *minimum agenda* for the "good city". Although it does not place extraordinary demands on existing institutions, it does entail a vibrant civil society, an active praxis of democratic citizenship, and an independent press... The criteria are thus intended to be used by the citizens of each city–its organized civil society–as a tool for mapping...existing states of affairs, and for setting an agenda for civic struggle and action."

John Friedmann: The Common Good: Assessing the Performance of Cities.

"East Asian cities compress enormous changes into a brief time span. ...A walled city has been opened to give way to a sprawling metropolis. Vernacular architecture and a traditional urban facade coexists with international and eclectic ones without intended harmony. Once-sacred and celestial cities have become secular and terrestrial ...in this era of globalization, they begin to throw doubt on the Western urban paradigm and to trace back to their own identity from their historical and cultural heritage."

Sang-Chuel Choe: A Search for a Cultural Paradigm of Urbanization in East Asia.

"...while it is possible for people, ideas, memories, images, or movable objects to be located (almost) anywhere and to move around at will, immovable objects, such as buildings or the spaces of city squares, have to be fixed, to be located. And they are fixed in particular places, most often in cities, which are situated in nation-states. There is, therefore, a basic contradiction that has to be dealt with...*transnational* spaces...still located in *national* space."

Anthony D. King: Writing the Transnational: The Distant Space of the Indian City

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