Abstract
In Ethics and The Limits of Philosophy and elsewhere, Bernard Williams presents a formidable objection to utilitarianism. Dubbed the integrity objection, the worry is that utilitarianism is too demanding in requiring agents to abandon their projects in favor of complying with moral injunctions. Elizabeth Ashford (2000) has replied, in part, by arguing that Williams’ account of positive obligation (WPO) is similarly susceptible to exacting burdensome demands on moral agents, such as care for those in emergency situations (pp. 428-431). If these charges of over-demandingness apply to each theory, and if utilitarianism is seen as obligating agents to care for nonhuman animals, then one might ask whether Williams’ theory makes a similar demand concerning nonhuman animals. If WPO obliges moral agents to have concerns for, and have duties towards, threatened nonhuman animals, then WPO threatens Williams' defense of speciesism (Williams, 2011b, pp.77-97). Thus, if WPO requires the inclusion of nonhuman animals into the moral community, then Williams’ critique of utilitarianism will conflict with his commitment to speciesism. Therefore, whether Williams has good reason to exclude nonhuman animals from WPO needs answering.
Recommended Citation
Bray, Nathan
(2025)
"Williams’ Account of Positive Obligation and Speciesism: Extending Ashford’s Internal Argument against Williams,"
Between the Species:
Vol. 28:
Iss.
1, Article 1.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol28/iss1/1