I defend a new argument against raising and killing sentient non-human animals for food: It is immoral to non-lethally impair sentient non-human animals for pleasure, and since raising and killing sentient animals for gustatory pleasure impairs them to a much greater degree, that also is immoral. This argument is structurally analogous to Perry Hendricks’s impairment argument for the immorality of abortion. Proponents of the anti-abortion argument have to be, on grounds of moral consistency, proponents of the anti-meat eating argument: the very same considerations they appeal to to justify their anti-abortion impairment argument apply to the impairment argument against raising and killing sentient non-human animals for food. I explain how the argument defended here is distinct from other pro-vegan, pro-vegetarian arguments.
Bobier, Christopher A.
"Extending the Impairment Argument to Sentient Non-Human Animals,"
Between the Species:
1, Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol25/iss1/1