Abstract
In animal ethics, some ethicists such as Peter Singer argue that we ought not to purchase animal products because doing so causally contributes to unnecessary suffering. Others, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, counter that where such unnecessary suffering is not causally dependent on one’s causal contributions, there is no duty to refrain from purchasing animal products, even if the process by which those products are produced is morally abhorrent. I argue that there are at least two plausible principles which ground the wrongness of purchasing animal products produced by morally abhorrent means. First, respect for the wishes and dignity of animals who have been wrongly tortured and killed requires treating their losses as losses, and not exploiting the ‘spoils’ of their losses. Second, we ought to refrain from rewarding wrongdoing, which we fail to do when we purchase wrongfully produced animal products.
Recommended Citation
Hereth, Blake
(2016)
"Animals and Causal Impotence: A Deontological View,"
Between the Species:
Vol. 19:
Iss.
1, Article 2.
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol19/iss1/2