Abstract
Christine Korsgaard argues for the moral status of animals and our obligations to them. She grounds this obligation on the notion that we share a common identity, our animal nature, with them and that animal pain represents a public reason that binds us; nevertheless, her distinctive attempt to enlist Kantian arguments to account for our obligations to animals has a startling implication that she fails to adequately consider: that we have direct duties to plants as well.
Recommended Citation
Bock, Gregory L.
(2014)
"Korsgaard and Non-Sentient Life,"
Between the Species:
Vol. 17:
Iss.
1, Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.2014v17n1.2
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/vol17/iss1/4