Postprint version. Published in Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Volume 8, Issue 1, January 1, 2009, pages 1-25.
NOTE: At the time of publication, the author Laura Hosman was not yet affiliated with Cal Poly.
1his article examines the bargaining interface between petroleum-rich developing countries and large multinational corporations, with an application to the case of Kazakhstan, formerly a Soviet Republic. In the analytic narrative tradition, this ankle combines a case study with an extensive form game, applying Theodore Moran's dynamic bargaining theory, which posits that, over time and through repeated interaction, developing countries do better for themselves, incrementally improving their outcomes through bargaining and strategic interaction, thereby advancing along a learning curve. The application of this theory is systematized through the utilization of game theory; an extensive game modded on strategic, iterated bargaining behavior between the two actors is introduced. 1his dynamic game allows for the recalculation of strategies based on the players' revealed moves, allowing for the concept of learning while doing. The game is then applied to Kazakhstan's particular situation. The application of Moran's theory through the use o fa generalizable game provides a method for resource-rich developing countries particularly those in the nascent stages of developing these industries to systematize the negotiation process and accelerate their ascent on a bargaining learning curve.