Postprint version. Published in Journal of Economics and Business, Volume 34, Issue 2, May 4, 1981, pages 135-142.
NOTE: At the time of publication, the author Michael L. Marlow was not yet affiliated with Cal Poly.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1016/0148-6195(82)90026-1.
Competition in financial markets has been the subject of many studies in the area of market structure and performance. This paper analyzes the differences in mortgage rates between unit banking and branch banking states to consider the likely outcome of interstate banking on competition. A model of interest rate determination is developed which suggests that, at least in the mortgage market, interstate banking will, ceteris paribus, decrease competition if it lowers the number of competing firms and increases deposit concentration levels. Support is provided for the argument that only those states under statewide branching laws may receive more competitive environments from the spread of interstate banking.