ABSTRACT

In Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking Glass*, Humpty Dumpty explains to Alice, “When I use a word … it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” When Alice questions this license, Humpty Dumpty replies, “The question is … which is to be master — that’s all.” The present article offers a lexicon of words that are used by human beings, however unintentionally or ingenuously, to maintain their mastery or prerogatives over other animals. A motivating assumption of the article is that putting on display the verbal menagerie in animal agriculture, animal experimentation, and the rest of the industries and institutions that use nonhuman animals, could go a long way toward eliminating these enterprises, since they are built as much on equivocation as on exploitation.

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“A” is for “animal,” but what is an animal? Perhaps not surprisingly this word/concept is the first casualty of tendentious definition in the animal user’s lexicon. Examining the U.S. government’s Animal Welfare Act, for instance, we learn that:

**Animal** means any live or dead dog, cat, nonhuman primate, guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or any other warm-blooded animal, which is being used, or is intended for use for research, teaching, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet. This term excludes birds, rats of the genus Rattus and mice of the genus Mus, bred for use in research [in other words, an estimated 95 percent of the animals used in biomedical research (Leary and Schaeffer 2011; Smith 2002)]; horses not used for research purposes; and other farm animals, such as, but not limited to, livestock or poultry used or intended for use as food or fiber, or livestock or poultry used or intended for use for improving animal nutrition, breeding, management, or production efficiency, or for improving the quality of food or fiber. (§2132 (g); my comment in brackets)

Thus, according to this definition, almost all animals, including by implication all animals in the wild, are not animals. This naturally reduces the burden of “animal welfare” significantly! There are numerous regulations that pick up some of the slack, so that additional animals do receive some measure of protection in enterprises that receive federal funding (Latham 2012). Nevertheless, the Animal Welfare Act sets the tone for animal welfare in this country; and as we shall see, when one considers the definition of “welfare” in the same context, the burden is reduced even more.
Of course it is not a novel observation that an everyday term can be appropriated for special usage in a misleading way. We even have a term for this kind of use of terms: “Orwellian.” George Orwell himself called it “Newspeak” in his 1949 novel, *1984*, wherein the governing authorities assert that “War Is Peace” and “Freedom Is Slavery.” That was preceded by Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking Glass* (1871), in which Humpty Dumpty puts the point succinctly: “When I use a word … it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.” When Alice questions this license, Humpty Dumpty replies, “The question is … which is to be master — that’s all.” And even millennia before this, it was stressed by Confucius that language can diverge from reality, in his view to the detriment of society – hence his emphasis on the “rectification of names.”

Therefore in this essay I need not take up the general issue of whether language can be perverted from its presumed primary function in order to achieve the opposite, namely, inhibiting communication and understanding. Instead I will cut to the chase and offer a kind of Devil’s Dictionary (taking the cue from Ambrose Bierce) of words used by the users of animals to disguise, however unintentionally or ingenuously, what they – the words and the users – are about. There is no limit to this practice, and I could easily turn this inventory into a book. But highlighting the following sample should suffice to equip the reader with suitable skepticism to continue the compilation on your own. You may also refer to earlier efforts along these lines, such as Davis (2014), Glossary (2012), McWilliams (2012), and especially Croney and Reynnells (2008). I have also recently learned that the writer Jonathan Safran Foer compiled a glossary of a similar nature in his investigative memoir, *Eating Animals* (New York: Little, Brown, 2009). It is my belief, or perhaps faith – and also my fond hope – that a thorough rec-
tification of the names of the verbal menagerie in animal agriculture, animal experimentation, and the rest of the industries and institutions that use nonhuman animals, would go a long way toward eliminating these enterprises, since they are built as much on equivocation as on exploitation.

The Lexicon

**Abuse.** (1) This term is used by animal users, as well as laws that sanction the use of animals, to indicate treatment of animals that is cruel and not a part of standard practice in one or another animal industry. Thus, in response to the release of an undercover video by the animal advocacy group Compassion Over Killing showing “cows that appeared to be sick or lame being beaten, kicked, shot and shocked in an attempt to get them to walk to slaughter,” Dave Daley, a professor at California State University, Chico, is reported by Cone (2012) to have said on behalf of the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association: “We firmly believe that those knowingly and willfully committing any abuse to animals should not be in the business — period.” Meanwhile, the slaughter of the animals and the ordinary conditions of their rearing, including being “branded and castrated without painkillers [and] fed an unnatural grain diet that is very hard on their bodies, causing illness, pain” (ASPCA 2014), do not count as abuse. (2) Another usage refers to treatment that may be cruel but is believed to serve a significant human purpose. For example, in an AP article about the new trend in personalized medicine to buy one’s own animal testing, one cancer patient is quoted: “Animal abuse? I don’t look at it that way. It’s not testing cosmetics. It’s trying to save my life” (Marchione 2014). (An added wrinkle is that there is no guarantee that the testing is valid.) It is fitting that “abuse” is the first entry in the animal user’s lexicon, as a fundamental tenet of the animal rights movement is that all use of nonhuman
animals is, or inevitably leads to, abuse, due to the power imbalance between humans and animals (see e.g. Hall 2010). This would distinguish animal ethics from human ethics, which contains a clear demarcation between use and abuse (Marks 2008).

Aesthetics. The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) uses this term to refer to the response that might be expected of laypersons, and even professionals, who witnessed certain practices that veterinarians are supposed to consider acceptable or even recommended, yet to the layperson, I imagine, might be considered morally outrageous. For example, the AVMA Guidelines for the Euthanasia of Animals deems as “acceptable with conditions” the following “methods” for euthanizing” free-ranging marine animals – “gunshot,” “manually applied blunt force trauma,” and “implosive decerebration” – but cautions that they may “fail to meet aesthetic or other conventional standards” (AVMA 2013, 83-84).

Alternatives. In reputable animal experimentation there is the expectation that “alternatives” will be used whenever possible. However, the term’s plain meaning – that alternatives to animals are being used – has become lost among a host of loopholes (Marks 2012). The most prominent loophole is the use of animals that are “lower”; for example, there is this authoritative pronouncement from Essentials for Animal Research: A Primer for Research Personnel: “Any model system which moves down the phylogenetic scale from the generally acceptable animal model will be considered an alternative” (Bennett 1994). However, not only is this a bait-and-switch use of the term “alternative,” but it also misrepresents biological understanding since Darwin, who wrote, “It is absurd to talk of one animal being higher than another” (from Darwin’s B notebook

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of 1838, as quoted by Costa 2009, 336). Indeed, the very term “phylogenetic scale” conflates opposing views of evolution, since “The Scale of Nature model assumes a hierarchy of lower and higher organisms, while the Phylogenetic model does not” (Rosenberger 2004, Figure 3). Note: The term “replacement” has been subject to the same ambiguity, since there can be so-called partial replacement as well as full replacement of animals in biomedical research. Incidentally, in the lab world, the “lower” animals tend to be smaller and hence less expensive and so used with greater profligacy.

Animal. (1) As noted in the first paragraph, the federal government’s primary legislation governing animal welfare does not recognize the vast majority of animals used for food, research, and sport, nor under the jurisdiction of wilderness managers, as animals. The primary intended beneficiaries of the Animal Welfare Act were probably the animals that Americans view as pets. This usage has also been adopted by pet owners who “love animals” and yet give no thought to becoming vegetarian, etc. (cf. CHICKEN). (2) It is worth noting also that the word “animal” is almost always used to denote nonhuman animals, thereby establishing an artificial boundary between our species and every other animal species on Earth, as if to mean: They are animals, but we are not. This usage, while false biologically, is nevertheless so commonplace that it is difficult for even animal advocates to avoid it (as in the term “animal advocates”!). However, sometimes animal advocates are able to finesse this issue by implicitly including human beings in the scope of “animal,” as when we urge the non-eating of animals.

Anthropomorphize. This term has the straightforward denotation of attributing human attributes to something that is not human, but it also has the connotation that the attribu-
tion is inappropriate. (This is analogous to how the verb “lie” straightforwardly describes the act of saying something that the speaker believes to be false for the purpose of misleading someone else into believing it is true, but also typically implies disapproval of that act.) However, animal users often invoke the word/notion to deny not only uniquely human characteristics to other animals, but also characteristics that we share as animals (or as some type of animals, for example, mammals). Thus, it has long been standard “scientific” practice to disallow the literal attribution of emotions to other animals. This is of course absurd (Bekoff 2007, 5); yet it is the view among some “experts,” and it does help to “justify” treating other animals as mere things for various human purposes. While it may certainly be true that human emotions are distinctive in some ways, it hardly follows that other animals do not have emotions, which may also be distinctive to wolves, cows, chickens, octopuses, salmon, etc., or that we cannot empathize with them qua fellow animals (cf. Acampora 2006).

*Cattle.* This word, commonly used to refer to cows, bulls, steers and heifers, has a storied derivation, coming from the same root as “chattel” (slave) and “capital” (business wealth). The sense, then, is that the animals referred to are being identified first and foremost as property. Nibert (2013) tells the extraordinary, and horrific story of the “domesecration” of these animals in human history. Analogous labeling serves to remove from our verbal consciousness the animality, sentience, and personhood of other beings we eat and exploit; cf. CHICKEN.

*Chicken.* This word can of course pick out an individual of the species. But for animal users it has also come to be used as a mass noun, to refer to the animal qua food. By this deft maneuver a person who has no regard for chickens can neverthe-
less “love chicken.” (This person might even consider herself to be an “animal lover” because she loves dogs and cats; cf. ANIMAL.) The same goes for “fish,” “lamb,” etc. But chickens are, by number and perhaps as well by living conditions, the most abused animals on Earth (Davis 2009). Wolfson and Sullivan (2004) comment that “From a statistician’s point of view, since farmed animals represent 98 percent of all animals (even including companion animals and animals in zoos and circuses [and, they say elsewhere, animals killed in research, testing, dissection, fur production, hunting, and pounds]) with whom humans interact in the United States, all animals are farmed animals; the number that are not is statistically insignificant” (206). They might just as well have said that all animals are chickens since, by their own tally (226-27), among farmed animals, chickens constitute the overwhelming bulk (8.4 billion out of 8.9 billion in the U.S. alone in 2002, albeit not counting marine animals). So it becomes especially imperative to the animal user to mask their nature as fellow sentient beings.

Cull. A euphemism for killing animals (for the purpose of thinning herds for some humanly-conceived notion of ecological aptness or for human safety, commonly coincident with the desires of hunters). Cf. HARVEST.

Death. The meaning is obvious, but the conception of animal death among animal users is often peculiar. The peculiarity is that animal death, unlike human death, is supposed to have no significance for the welfare of the animal … other than as a pain-reliever. Thus: “In public policy, pain counts for everything. Animal death is only significant in its relationship to pain. Animal euthanasia [sic; see EUTHANASIA] appears only twice in the 1985 amended Animal Welfare Act, both times as a prescription, along with anesthetics and analgesics,
for pain relief” and “there is no evident sense in any of these public policies that killing healthy, pain-free animals is itself to be avoided” (Carbone 2004, 190). A reason often given is that nonhuman animals have no conception of their life continuing and hence can make no plans in which they could have any kind of personal stake; hence death means nothing to them. Surprisingly this argument comes from Peter Singer, who is a champion of not using animals. But he has stated, “Humans are forward-looking beings, and they have hopes and desires for the future. That seems a plausible answer to the question of why it’s so tragic when humans [as opposed to chickens or mice; but see WELFARE for a rebuttal] die” (Singer 2009; my comment in brackets). (Singer does, however, qualify this statement elsewhere: “I am not saying whether this view is justifiable or not; only that it cannot simply be rejected as speciesist, because it is not on the basis of species itself that one life is held to be more valuable than another [but rather the forward-looking capacity, which could be lacking in a human being too]” (Singer 1979, chap. 3; my comment in brackets).) Essentially, on this conception, animals “live in the Now.” Ironically this is sometimes conceived as a high human aspiration, for example, in Zen Buddhist philosophy; yet it would seem odd to discount human longevity on that account. Meanwhile, the animal user’s failure of attribution of forward-thinking to other animals may simply be factually in error (cf. ANTHROPOMORPHISM) and is in any case suspiciously self-serving, since the vast majority of animal use involves killing the animals, usually in their youth (Patrick-Goudreau 2014). See also EUTHANASIA and WELFARE.

Euthanasia. This term is ubiquitous in the literature of animal use, yet its implied meaning therein is odd, to put it mildly, and in two respects. The literal meaning is an “easy death,” and
no doubt animal users have that in mind when using the word. Yet the first oddity is that “easy” in the animal use context is inherently relative, and what counts as such would be quite surprising to the layperson. A perusal of the American Veterinary Medical Association’s compendium on the subject (AVMC 2013) is truly an eye-opener (cf. AESTHETICS above). It becomes clear that the notion is qualified by economic, scientific, and standard-practice considerations. The second oddity of euthanasia’s meaning in animal use is that, even when genuinely “easy,” the death in question may fail to satisfy the further connotation, and perhaps even denotation, that the death is desired by the person or being to whom it is being provided. Furthermore, on the everyday acceptation of the term, the reason the death is desired is not simply that the person or being is in some terrible pain and already suffering from some terminal condition, but also that the person or institution that is providing the service is not itself the cause of that pain or terminal condition.

Thus, for example, it would be strange indeed to refer to capital punishment by means of painless drugs as euthanasia, even though every effort may have gone into making this an “easy death,” since the further conditions – of the person desiring the death and its not being imposed by the very institution that is ameliorating it – are not met. Similarly, it would be downright bizarre to refer to the gassing of concentration camp inmates in Nazi Germany as euthanasia, even if pains were taken to make this the “easiest” death possible under the circumstances (for example, by telling the victims they were headed for the showers), for, again, those two further conditions were not being met. Yet in the case of, say, animals killed in the biomedical research laboratory we are told time and again that they are undergoing euthanasia … even though the same two conditions are not being met (or at least the condition of the euthanizer not being also the party responsible for the occasion of it, since by
this time animals who have undergone certain experiments or animals who have been bred for experiments may indeed desire nothing more than to die). In a word, the animal user’s use of “euthanasia” slyly restricts the concept to the means while ignoring the ends. Cf. Beck (1993) and see also DEATH and WELFARE.

**Harvest.** A euphemism for killing animals (for some human use of this “resource”). Cf. CULL.

**Health.** There are various occupations and initiatives that are concerned with the health of nonhuman animals, including animal health, One Health, and of course veterinary medicine. Yet, contrary, and indeed perversely so, to lay intuition and plain meaning, health in all of these contexts is often subsumed under a contradictory rubric, namely, exploitation. Thus, it is imperative to keep farm animals healthy, but not for their sake: rather for the sake of the farmer’s profits and the consumer’s health. For example, Cooper (2011) reports on a new effort to develop more effective vaccines against “an infectious bronchitis virus (IBV) that is the biggest single cause of economic loss in the U.S. poultry industry. …IBV restricts growth in broiler chickens and reduces egg production in those that are laying. Like most bronchial diseases, it spreads rapidly in the dense living conditions found on most commercial poultry farms.” So the goal is to keep the animals “healthy” so that they can continue to live under the most miserable and disease-inducing conditions imaginable (and then be slaughtered). Similarly, it is imperative to keep lab animals healthy, the better to have them available for experimentation. Here the notion of “healthy” is especially straitened since the animals may otherwise be induced, by breeding or surgery or drug or pathogen administration, to be sick! As with EUTHANASIA (q.v.), then, context
is critical for maintaining a full appreciation of the concept in question; just as “euthanasia” seems inappropriate for a death not desired by the subject, so “health” seems inappropriate for a condition that conduces to the subject’s injury and destruction. See also WELFARE and VALUE.

**Humane.** Seemingly a term of approbation, there is irony in the very concept, since a cold-eyed comparison of the way human beings treat one another and the way other species – the “beasts” – treat their own would hardly be flattering to ours. But this internal irony is quite eclipsed by the term’s use by animal users, for they label all of the cruelty and death that are routinely inflicted on the tens and hundreds of billions of nonhuman animals by humans year after year as … humane! How is this possible? “Humaneness” has come to be defined in terms of various guidelines that themselves incorporate a relativity to possibility and necessity, which concepts in turn have been defined by various animal-user interest groups. Thus, in the animal lab, “humane” means that an experimental protocol has been vetted for its scientific cogency and found to necessitate a given use of animals (see Francione 2007 for a critical discussion of “necessity” in the animal lab setting); in this way, almost any degree of distress imposed on an animal – not to mention, her almost inevitable DEATH (q.v.) by guillotine (Carbone 2004, chap. 9) or other means – can be justified as humane if it is not possible to carry out the experiment otherwise (Marks 2011c). So there is this from the Animal Welfare Act:

… the withholding of tranquilizers, anesthesia, analgesia, or euthanasia [sic] when scientifically necessary shall continue for only the necessary period of time. (§2143; my emphases)
And here are some examples (from Linden 2007, and previously cited in Marks 2011a) of actual experiments that presumably passed the necessity test for humaneness:

So what role does neuronal activity play in wiring up the brain? . . . first, we’ll consider a mutant mouse created in the laboratory. . . . It turns out that, ultimately, this mouse is a disaster: it dies at birth because it cannot control the muscles used for breathing. (70)

The standard lab cage is deadly boring: for the rat it’s like being in solitary confinement. (77)

Similar phenomena have been observed in laboratory monkeys that have sustained [presumably by surgical intervention] bilateral damage to the temporal lobe: they may try to eat grossly inappropriate nonfood items (such as a lit cigarette). (88; my comment in brackets)

Most interestingly, subjecting a mother rat during pregnancy to moderate stress (confinement in a clear plastic tube under bright lights) can reduce the levels of testosterone in the developing fetus. (181)

A grisly set of experiments with rats showed that total sleep deprivation will cause death in 3–4 weeks. (186)

So to speak, then, it is not the dog of non-cruelty that wags the tail of what constitutes humane treatment, but rather the tail of “scientific necessity” that wags the dog of what constitutes humane treatment. Furthermore, the “scientific” character of what is necessary or possible also likely involves calculations of monetary cost. This could be especially relevant to the living conditions or “husbandry” of the animals outside of the
strictly experimental setting; see, e.g., Chapter 5 of Carbone (2004) for a critical discussion of the “science” that went into determining acceptable cage sizes for laboratory animals. See also WELFARE.

**Model.** In animal experimentation, an individual animal who has lost his or her identity as a living being by being transformed, by both language and physical intervention, such as breeding or surgery, into a stand-in for some human organic system or disease. Thus for example:

When animal models are employed in the study of human disease, they are frequently selected because of their similarity to humans in terms of genetics, anatomy, and physiology. Also, animal models are often preferable for experimental disease research because of their unlimited supply and ease of manipulation. … Despite their genomic similarities to humans, most model organisms typically do not contract the same genetic diseases as people, so scientists must alter their genomes to induce human disease states. (Simmons 2008)

The underlying rationale is self-contradictory; for on the one hand, the type of animals chosen relies on their similarity to human beings, whereas on the other hand, their being chosen depends precisely on their not being human beings.

**Necessary.** See HUMANE.

**Replacements.** See ALTERNATIVES.

**Sacrifice.** This term has undergone an interesting full-circle in the history of its usage. We may imagine that in the begin-
ning there was animal sacrifice (including human animals) to the gods, suggesting that the subject of sacrifice is another. In other words, the agent of sacrifice performs it, but is not herself making any sacrifice, all the less being sacrificed. (Strictly speaking, no one is making a sacrifice, since we do not normally suppose that the animal in animal sacrifice is offering himself up voluntarily.) Indeed, the sacrifice is presumably for the sake of the agent and others, propitiating the gods for human benefit. By the time Jesus comes along, however, “sacrifice” has taken on the more modern meaning of the agent of sacrifice being the one who is making a sacrifice. Presumably Jesus rendered up himself for sacrifice in the sense of giving up something of value to himself (his very life in this case). This is also the natural sense of “sacrifice” in everyday language, as when one sacrifices for the sake of one’s children … or even sacrifices one’s own enjoyment of ice cream sundaes albeit for one’s own sake (to lose weight). But with the advent of biomedical experimentation on animals, “sacrifice” has returned to its roots in animal sacrifice; for now once again the agent of the sacrifice is not being sacrificed nor even making a sacrifice but is instead sacrificing another, and usually for presumed human benefit. Only the gods have been omitted; animal experimentation is animal sacrifice without the “making sacred” (the word’s literal meaning; I suppose a religious person might even call this use of God’s creatures a desecration). Thus this typical statement by a medical researcher: “I fundamentally believe that relieving human suffering or disease of children is worth the sacrifice of mouse lives” (Distler 2009, quoting Yale Prof. Marina Picciotto). I submit that statements like this tend to bring along the everyday connotation of willingness and active participation by the animal who is being sacrificed, thereby hiding his helplessness and exploitation beneath a shroud of unsought and unfelt ennoblement.
Value. Yet another term that lends itself to a fatal equivocation, “value” (the verb) can mean appreciating the inherent worth (or “value” the noun) of something or someone, or, alternatively, the instrumental worth (also “value”) of something or someone. For example, you may value your cat as inherently worthy of your love and admiration just for being who and what he is, or you may value your cat instrumentally as a good mouser (or both). Unfortunately this distinction is lost on many animal users, who can – conveniently for public relations purposes, and even to salve their own conscience – sincerely affirm their “valuing” of other animals, when apparently what they mean is only that they can get a lot of use out of them. It would be nice to believe that even this would be enough to assure the proper treatment of animals as if they were also valued in themselves. And this claim is also made by animal users, for example, by animal experimenters who argue that better data will result from happy and healthy lab animals, and by animal farmers who argue that better (tastier and healthier and safer) food will result from happy and healthy farm animals. But in this not-best of all possible worlds, such correlations cannot always be assumed, and even if correct are not always implemented, and even if implemented, hardly ever go far enough. An example of the latter is the simple truth that, in order to fulfil the promise of their instrumental value, almost all of these animals are killed in their youth (Patrick-Goudreau 2014).

Veterinarian. In the popular mind a veterinarian is a person who values animals for their own sake and dedicates his or her professional life to promoting their health and welfare. But this is a misconception, at least if one judges by the Veterinarian’s Oath, which begins:
Being admitted to the profession of veterinary medicine, I solemnly swear to use my scientific knowledge and skills for the benefit of society through the protection of animal health and welfare, the prevention and relief of animal suffering, the conservation of animal resources, the promotion of public health, and the advancement of medical knowledge. (AVMA 2010; my emphasis)

A careful reading of that passage reveals that the way in which animals are professionally valued by veterinarians is purely instrumentally. (Cf. HEALTH, VALUE, and WELFARE.) This is underlined by the further elaboration of the Oath in the AVMA Animal Welfare Principles, with pride of place going to this one:

The responsible use of animals for human purposes, such as companionship, food, fiber, recreation, work, education, exhibition, and research conducted for the benefit of both humans and animals, is consistent with the Veterinarian’s Oath. (AVMA 2012)

None of this should come as a surprise if one simply reflects on one’s naïve assumption about the nature of the veterinary profession. In the simplest terms: Although a veterinarian’s patient is an animal, a veterinarian’s client is a human being, who pays the bills. Veterinary medicine did not come into existence as a charity or a welfare movement; the very word “veterinary” is derived from a word for draft animal or beast of burden. The profession is clearly premised on the “use” of animals, as the first Principle indicates; furthermore the profession conceives animals as “resources,” as the Oath itself states. (This point was made even more explicitly by the earlier use of the
term “livestock resources” where the Oath now says “animal resources.”) Question: What percentage of veterinarians are vegetarians? Although the motivations of individual veterinarians obviously vary, with more and more entering the field to minister to the needs of companion animals and the clients who love them, the fact remains that the veterinary profession is the great enabler of animal exploitation (Marks 2011b). If the American Veterinary Medical Association were to declare its opposition to animal agriculture, animal experimentation, animal circuses, zoos, breeding, etc., most of these operations would be shut down overnight.

Welfare. This is a key term that is commonly employed by animal users in concert with “HUMANE” (q.v.). But, as always, everything depends on how the term is defined. Thus, a schema dubbed “The Five Freedoms” has established itself as a touchstone of animal welfare worldwide. Originally conceived by the Brambell Commission in the UK in 1965 and simply summarized as the freedom to “stand up, lie down, turn around, groom themselves and stretch their limbs,” these were subsequently codified by the UK’s Farm Animal Welfare Council as follows:

**Freedom from hunger and thirst**, by ready access to water and a diet to maintain health and vigour.

**Freedom from discomfort**, by providing an appropriate environment.

**Freedom from pain, injury and disease**, by prevention or rapid diagnosis and treatment.
Freedom to express normal behaviour, by providing sufficient space, proper facilities and appropriate company of the animal’s own kind.

Freedom from fear and distress, by ensuring conditions and treatment which avoid mental suffering. (FAWC 2009)

Conspicuously absent is the freedom to go on living! But of course how could such a freedom be granted in the context of animal agriculture, etc.? Hence again we see the tail wagging the dog, in this case, our desired use of animals partially determining what constitutes their welfare. As previously noted (see DEATH), some thinkers have gone so far as to question whether death per se has any moral significance for most nonhuman animals; but this position certainly has its objectors – see e.g. Simmons (2009) and Yeates (2010). The “Five Freedoms” schema seems arbitrary from an ethical standpoint and obviously subservient to strictly human interests. (Not to mention that they are honored largely in the breach, as is indicated by this proviso: “These freedoms define ideal states rather than standards for acceptable welfare.”) This is indicative of the fundamental paradox of “animal welfare,” namely that it presumes animal use. But animal use may simply be incompatible with animal welfare.

References


