Better Off, But Still on the Farm

calves to remain in the crates, in order to ‘radicalize’ ordinary citizens by confronting them with these horrors. Tactically, then, such an abolitionist should loudly praise this book in order to taint it in the eyes of the agribusiness establishment.

I confess that I’m not much of a purist here, but I don’t know whether that is because I think mass transformation by radicalization is wildly unlikely in this case, or because I’m just a weak-willed compromiser. Adoption of the sorts of reforms championed in this book would relieve vast animal suffering and frustration. Very many animals would be much better off. That is, I believe, a very good reason to hope that BER-MP and even BER-AT get the ear of the establishment. Further, if these became the standard positions of agribusiness, the center of gravity of the debate would have shifted a long way in ‘our’ direction. (Tactically, that might mean that we should denounce this book as violently and luridly as possible as a compendium of sadism, thus drawing the other side to its defense. So suppress this review.)

Read this book.

Notes

1 See, for example, the critique of some research practices on Kantian grounds on p. 47.

2 So much so, in fact, that he complains of “cheap shots” at the noble ranchers (p. 57), and fires off his own cheap shots at unnamed strawpersons (“producing meat protein in fermentation vats”) (p.52).

3 “Cowboying” is depressingly common all over the country, not just in Rollin’s West. On two occasions, agricultural scientists have expressed concern about it to me. It should be noted that they knew they were talking to an abolitionist. Intellectual honesty outweighed political prudence. There are many decent people involved in production animal agriculture.

Response: Seeing Double

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Since a great many people are extremely uncomfortable in a world containing only one Bernard Rollin, Harlan Miller’s suggestion of two Rollins is certainly unacceptable in the better world we all hope to build. In what follows, I will do my best to unify the disparate Rollins that he finds speaking in my Farm Animal Welfare.

Professor Miller is absolutely correct in his assumption that the primary audience for the book is the people who are in fact responsible for contemporary agriculture in the United States—producers, USDA, and agricultural scientists. It was, in fact, USDA that contracted with me for the study that resulted in this book. Specifically, I was asked to explain to USDA in particular, and to the powerful agricultural community in general, why they should care about, attend to, or spend any money to improve, farm animal welfare. After all, these are people who tend to believe

1. that science is ethics-free
2. that the goal of agriculture is efficiency and productivity
3. that if there is any sense to the notion of ethics underlying agricultural practice, it is the moral imperative to produce cheap and plentiful food, and lastly, therefore
4. that animal agriculture is fine the way it is and should be altered only to create greater efficiency and productivity.

Among the few who have reflected on the notion of animal welfare, it is dogma that
5. If animal agriculture is productive, the animals must be well-off.

And these people further put their money where their mouth is—of the some 600 million dollars comprising the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of USDA's budget, and of the 400 million dollars making up the budget of the Cooperative State Research Service (CSRS) of USDA, not one cent was spent on welfare research at the time I undertook this project.

Throughout my 20-year career in animal ethics, most of my work has been aimed at changing the behavior and eventually the thinking of animal users who do not, at least initially, reflect upon the animals they use except as means to an end. I began working with veterinary educators, and was able to change the horrendous practice of teaching surgery through doing multiple survival surgeries on animals (over 20 such surgeries on a dog was the rule in some institutions). I (and three colleagues in Colorado) articulated the concept behind the 1985 federal laws mandating the control of pain and suffering in research animals, and I testified before Congress on its behalf, carrying the support of significant elements of the research community. I was able to galvanize significant numbers of cattlemen to oppose the USDA practice of hot iron face-branding and spaying without anesthesia of Mexican cattle entering the U.S. under NAFTA. I was able to get the two senior researchers at the Colorado Division of Wildlife (hardly a group of radicals) to write a strong letter for PETA opposing the Nature Conservancy's snaring of feral pigs in Hawaii, and so on.

I did not accomplish these and other advances merely by presenting well-articulated moral arguments, though such arguments certainly influenced some animal users. After all, people simply blow-off many arguments they cannot refute, especially when a strongly entrenched ideology tells them that their activities are "value-free" and, a fortiori, "ethics-free."

There is, in fact, as Plato pointed out, only one way of successfully changing people's moral positions—that is by "recol lection"—showing them that what you wish to convince them of ethically is a logical consequence of what they already believe but have not thought through properly. (Hence, Socrates' notion of a moral philosopher being a "midwife.") One may be able to teach empirical material, such as the state capitals; in ethics, one can only "remind." This is exactly what I did with veterinarians; I showed them that their behavior in animal use was severely at odds with the notion that animals are worthy of moral concern, a notion that brought most of them into veterinary medicine in the first place! In the ensuing years, veterinary colleges have moved to embrace, rather than eschew, many animal welfare concerns. This is also the task I have employed successfully with Western ranchers, who are steeped in the ethic of husbandry that Dr. Miller somewhat cavalierly dismisses. The result can be seen in a remarkable pair of editorials about my work in The Western Livestock Journal (May 15 and May 22, 1995), reiterating rancher commitment to respecting animals' nature and attacking industrialized, confinement agriculture as morally unacceptable.

But what of those who are insulated from recollection of their own ethics by an ideology that says their activities are value-free? Here I borrow a notion from Hegel, namely that at least part of a philosopher's job is bringing to articulated awareness current movements in social thought. If the reconstruction is correct, people will agree with one's articulation; if not, you will be ignored.

It is easy to convince even those who prima facie deny the relevance of ethics to science (1) that in society there exists a consensus social ethic reflecting what society believes is right and wrong and (2) that this ethic in fact determines our laws and social policies. Further, it is easy to show sub-groups of society, i.e., those in professions such as medicine, law, veterinary medicine, agriculture, research, etc., that even though their professional status grants them certain privileges and autonomy, society expects them to behave in accord with the social ethic, i.e., to regulate themselves the way society would tell them to behave if society understood enough about the profession to regulate it! Failure to do so accord leads to loss of autonomy; vide the laws regulating animal research that passed when society realized that animal researchers were not behaving in harmony with social expectations.

It is for this reason that, in this book, I remind agriculturalists and agricultural scientists that society is growing increasingly concerned about animal treatment, and also of what form that concern is taking. (I believe, in fact, that it is moving towards the ethic I outlined in my Animal Rights and Human Morality.) I do not see why Dr. Miller does not applaud this ploy, as it at least gets this population that has ignored animal welfare to consider the issues in a positive way. Nor do I understand his derisive comment, "Worried about
floodings? Build a levee and buy insurance. Worried about animal welfare concerns? Change some practices and fund some research." Isn't changing the practices of confinement agriculture exactly what those concerned about animal treatment ought to be after? And isn't research the only way to effect change in agricultural practices that have been entrenched for 50 years and are highly successful economically? Even the most complete but rational abolitionist should, in the world we must deal with, applaud incremental change that benefits the animals.

Nor do I see why Dr. Miller is so cynical about pre-industrialized, husbandry-based agriculture. While such agriculture was certainly not perfect from the point of view of the animal, at least it had to respect the animals' needs and natures to work, something industrialized, high-tech confinement agriculture does not need to do! Peter Singer and Jim Mason, Ruth Harrison, and the Swedish public which moved to abolish industrialized agriculture have all made similar points.

The bottom line is that my approach works to make things better for animals. On the strength of my report, USDA specifically included (and funded) animal welfare projects for the first time in its competitive grants program. It has also held major conferences on “farm animal well-being.” I was able to address 150 USDA leaders on the wrongness of the face-branding, and garner their complete agreement. They are considering making me an “ombudsman” for animals. By the same token, the Colorado Cattlemen opposed the face branding of Mexican cattle, despite the fact that the National Cattlemen’s Association supported the practice—surely a courageous and moral act. They have further spearheaded the U.S.’s strongest bill on “downer cattle,” currently passing through the Colorado Legislature and something I helped to catalyze.

There are many very able people who eloquently advocate for animals and help sharpen the thinking of those already concerned about animal treatment—Peter Singer, Steve Sapontzis, Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar, Dale Jameson, Stephen Clark, Gary Comstock, and Harlan Miller are notable examples. There are very few people who work directly with those who use animals and those who initially scoff at or flatly reject both moral criticism and talk about animal welfare or animal rights. Someone needs to get them to recollect the moral legitimacy of issues of animal treatment. That is my job, and most people in the animal movement see the need for someone operating on that front, although few wish to do so themselves. I would like to continue to do that job without constantly being accused, directly or indirectly, of “selling out.”

I have a great respect for Harlan Miller, for his strong dedication to animals and for his work. And I am also grateful to him for his careful review, which is thoughtful, fair-minded and very sensitive to the points I have tried to make. I hope only to convince him that, in finding two Rollins, he may be staring too closely at the page and thereby seeing double. If he moves a little further away, perhaps he will again see one.

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