of this mutual participation in *physis* simply as some sort of ecological solidarity. Nor is it clear to what extent *this* continuity between human and animal provides a compelling basis for moral concern, nor what specific moral choices would be implied.

There is a sense in which Heidegger’s presentation of human being in the world is still overly disembodied. Heidegger is not concerned with how human history is intertwined with ecological histories nor with the ways in which ecological interactions (much less economic and political interactions!) might inform the specific ways in which we would dwell. And while it is true that his earlier accounts of the structure of *Dasein* and his later accounts of dwelling describe an embodied existence, they are still notably abstract and cerebral.

Heidegger is concerned with death but not the physicality of death; he is not concerned with human existence as gendered existence; he is not concerned with the sensual, fleshly experience of the body, especially the experience of the body in pain. This is, I think, where Heidegger falls short as a source of help for animals, as well as for an interhuman ethics. I agree with Foltz that Heidegger’s analysis of technology is valuable as a way of articulating what is horrifying about practices of “factory farming,” as a way of naming the ontological violence that is involved, and as a way of recognizing that factory farming is part of a larger picture of how we relate technologically to other beings. It may not be enough to say that factory farming is wrong, but it is not enough to say that factory farming is wrong, but it is not enough either to name the ontological horror of technology without also naming suffering and injustice. In a now notorious, unpublished essay on technology from the late 1940’s, Heidegger compared agribusiness to the Holocaust:

Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, in essence the same as the fabrication of corpses in the gas chambers and concentration camps, the same as the blockades which starved out whole countries, the same as the fabrication of hydrogen bombs. (Schirmacher, *Technik und Gelassenheit*, p. 25)

Horror at the ontological violence of technology is not enough, and the potential for heedful concern and respect in letting-be may be far too fragile and subject to corruption. In Chaim Potok’s novel *The Chosen*, Reb Saunders makes the hard choice of raising his brilliant but initially cold son Danny in silence, so that in that silence, Danny might hear the pain of the world and so learn compassion. People, animals, the very earth cry out in pain. Such an awareness of the depths of injustice and attunement to the suffering of the world may provide the best and only hope, for the animals and for us.

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**Errata**

The following corrections are to Professor Evelyn Pluhar’s “Arguing Away Suffering: The Neo-Cartesian Revival,” which appeared in the Winter 1993 number.

1. The last sentence of the text (p. 39) *should have been* these two sentences instead:

“The *ad hominem* fallacy is indeed to be avoided, but one cannot help wondering if Descartes and his modern counterparts would have argued as they did had they not had such powerful incentives to deny nonhuman suffering, ranging from vivisection to theodicy. Most significant of all, perhaps, is their shared vision of human superiority, a vision that has nailed many nonhumans to the scientific cross.”

2. The following note *should have been added* to the very end of the text:

“My thanks to the Institute of Arts and Humanistic Studies for funding a one-course teaching release during the fall of 1992. This manuscript was written during that time period.”

3. Footnote 43 (p. 40) *should have read*:

“He cites studies claiming, e.g., that opiates affect “the psychological context” of the brain rather than the nerve messages. We now know that opiates work by releasing neurotransmitters that bind with brain receptors. Significantly, all vertebrates share this physiological mechanism.”

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