providence of others.”⁴ On the other hand, although it could be cogently argued that *agape* is not unambiguously present in Plato’s *Dialogues*, it is clear that *agape* is present in Bonaventura’s admonition that we should not make the mistake of believing that “it suffices to investigate without wonder, examine without exaltation,...know without love.”⁵

There are at least two aspects of the historical grounds for drawing the agapetic attitude into current philosophical reflection. First, I have suggested above that the view that investigative capacities increase when they are fired by the zeal of the agapetic attitude may become for us a philosophical hypothesis (i.e., not dogma, axiom, decision, or expression of preference) and as such may be assessed, developed, and defended by reference to our concrete experience with it. Second, if support for this hypothesis can be found, then this event may help introduce into philosophical inquiry an endeavor to find in the history of philosophy accomplishments which have value for us today, even though they were conclusions of minds educated within a culture incommensurate with ours. Willingness to assess the hypothesis concerning the permanent value of the agapetic attitude could give new import to historical studies and to societies dedicated to these studies.

Finally, those of us who teach and publish our philosophical reflections may have significant effects on the values and intellects of others. And one way we can plant the seeds of more adequate philosophical

thought is by assessing for possible integration into our reflection aspects of our everyday lives that are of proven value to us yet are often ignored or rejected by philosophical inquiry. For some of us the importance of our agapetic attitude toward the higher animals is a prime example of highly valued aspects of our concerns upon which in our day philosophical significance is not often bestowed. And in this essay we have noted several areas of philosophy that might benefit substantially from attention to this attitude: the philosophical need for adequate observation of experience, issues of realism/anti-realism, investigative roles of the thinker’s attitude toward his inquiry, and the improvement of our attitudes to other-than-human aspects of nature and above all to the higher animals.

Notes

¹ See, for example, the “ethos” of Jacques Derrida’s “I have forgotten my umbrella.”

² Plato, “Symposium” in *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. by B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), Vol. I. p. 334.

³ *Ibid.*, page 331. (Steff. 206)

⁴ Plato, “Republic”, Book VII. p. 779. *Op. Cit.*

⁵ Saint Bonaventura, *The Mind’s Road to God*, trans. by George Boas (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), Prologue, p. 5.

SILENT VOICES CAN NEVER BE STILLED

I stare at tree-covered mountain across the way,
Shuddering at repeated volleys.

In those woods walks beauty
That can’t be destroyed or dragged out by hunters.
They’ve cheated themselves —
The corpses on car hoods are devoid of the Presence
Still in the woods,
Shadows walking quietly with those who come in peace.

Betty Jahn