is the threat of coercion undermining the free giving of consent; to overcome this objection to the use of prisoners, scientists would have to show that certain rights of prisoners outside the experimental situation are not violated. Analogously, to make the case for conscription of animals, scientists would have to work to protect their rights in nonscientific contexts.

Exemplary research is research which is most defensible ethically. Thus attention to the conditions under which research might be exemplary is a promising route to pursue, though, as I have argued, the specification of those conditions is more difficult than appears at first. Once the moral status of animals as beings with independent value is recognized, the position of animals in exemplary research is nonetheless, as Nelson has argued, ethically questionable, especially if we appeal to communal goods or obligations to the community to justify conscription.

"Pastoral"

Chickens don't scratch in the yard;
their world is a crowded cell.
No need to peck at anything,
they haven't any beaks.
Sow is immobilized for life;
she's a living breakfast machine.
The horses stand like statues of bone,
with icicles on their hooves.
Cow is full of penicillin;
her baby's in a small, dark crate.
There is no Old MacDonald,
just a corporate plan for Hell.

— Kathleen Malley

Letters to the Editors

Dear Editors:

The identification of my name under my article "What A Jew Should Do," in *BTS*, Summer, 1989, with the organization Jews for Jesus, struck me with the same hilarity Mark Twain felt reading his obituary in a newspaper. His response became memorable: "Reports of my death have been wildly exaggerated." I wish I could match that. My response will have to remain standard, though it has an historical resonance:

I am not now, nor have I ever been, a member of or associated with Jews for Jesus. My organization is Jews for Animal Rights. Our goals and methods are traditional and available to all Jews.

— Roberta Kalechofsky
Jews for Animal Rights

The Editors sincerely regret the foregoing error.

A Reply To My Critics

The nastiness of Professor Schwartz and a serious misunderstanding on the part of Ms. Kalechofsky do not inspire one to want to reply. I fear, however, that if I say nothing, readers will be left with the impression that I am unable to defend myself. Reluctantly, I begin.

It is true that I thought Schwartz was a "reform" Jew but my article was not, as Ms. Kalechofsky claims, based on the premise that Schwartz is "reform" and Rabbi Bleich "orthodox." Much of my piece sketches a history of the development of doctrine and it is during that sketch that I try to make clear my basic premises, which are as follows. Devout Jews need nothing more than the Torah if they are intelligent as well as devout. I painted a picture of the growth of the Mishnah and Talmudic scholarship as the effort of certain Jews to usurp the right of "lay" Jews to think for themselves. I drew an analogy with certain Catholic prohibitions upon "laymen," circa 1000 C.E., not to read the Bible. Implicit in my paper is the idea that there is no injunction in the Torah itself to take the Mishnah and Talmud as more holy or about as holy as Torah itself. I presented excerpts from classical "sages" that strike the unprejudiced Jew who has no axe to grind as absurdities on their face. Example: that we may torture a dead king's horse as a way of paying respect to him. As a philosopher, I am committed to the idea that people are only free when they stop slavishly accepting the opinions of "greater persons" and think every important issue through for themselves.

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