1) In the first sentence of his reply, Taylor says he will clarify "what it means to make value judgments from a non-conscious organism's standpoint (or what it means to take that standpoint in making such judgments)." Taylor characteristically conflates these two very different things in an apparent attempt to convince the reader that in saying something about the one he has said something about the other. But in his comment, Taylor does not clarify "what it means to make value judgments from a non-conscious organism's standpoint." He merely reiterates the objective sense of "taking a standpoint" based on knowing what would hinder or help an organism to survive. Throughout my review I agree that this is possible. Where Taylor and I disagree is that he thinks that objective knowledge about
the survival conditions of an organism is enough to allow us to make value judgments from its "standpoint," but I think that value judgments can be made only by and for entities that have self-conscious standpoints.

2) I mean by "moral subject" anything subject to characterization with moral terminology, which does not mean that it must have a subjective standpoint. I am bemused by Taylor's explanation that the possible medical implications of "moral patient" would be more confusing than the considerable subjectival implications of "moral subject." Taylor's text without the ambiguities of "moral subject" would be less persuasive than it now is.

3) Why should we "regard a living thing (conscious or non-conscious) as having inherent worth"? By saying that Cahen gives an analysis of how non-conscious organisms "can be correctly said to be goal-oriented" (my italics), Taylor implies that he has made his point that teleological centers of life have inherent worth. But all Cahen demonstrates about goal-oriented organisms is the objective position Taylor reiterates in his point 1 and that I agree with. Taylor, like many environmental ethicists, assumes the inherent worth of life and works out the implications of that assumption, but fails to show how the assumption can be supported by anything more than intuition.

4) On this point I refer the reader to my review. Beyond that, objective facts are coherent with any moral outlook and thus coherence with facts per se is not a criterion that distinguishes any one moral outlook from any other. The objective fact that the survival of a living organism can be hindered or helped by our actions is just as coherent with the anthropocentric as with the biocentric outlook. Taylor packs a biocentric moral agenda into the phrase "rational justification." But if you take "rational" in a morally neutral sense, then you can find coherent fact-value combinations to "justify" anything.

5) Again, I refer the reader to my review. Which of us is not engaging the other?

6) The substantive point on which Taylor and I disagree is that he contends that worth and value are sometimes intrinsic, while I argue that they are always extrinsic and arise only in relation to self-conscious interests. I hold that a universe without self-conscious entities would have no worth or value. I believe that deviations from this relational interpretation of worth and value as deriving from self-conscious individual interests leads to the dangerous mistake of thinking that such entities as corporations, states, and the "Life Community" have rights and responsibilities.

7) I acknowledge Taylor's protest that he does not hate the human race. But if Taylor agrees that on the disappearance of Homo sapiens there would remain no self-conscious individuals who could think and say "Good riddance!", then what is the rhetorical force of his little story if not that of genocidal misanthropy? Or is it just black humor? If so, as a member of the race that is the butt of the joke, I protest.