


# AQUINAS' INCONSISTENCY ON THE NATURE AND THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS



JUDITH BARAD

Indiana State University

When Aquinas' views on animals are presented by those advocating animal rights,



Jim Harter, *Animals*: 1419  
Copyright-Free Illustrations.  
New York: Dover, 1979

we learn that he was only interested in not treating animals cruelly for instrumental reasons; that is, treating animals cruelly can reduce the sympathy men have for one another. But basically animals are things lacking intrinsic value, to be used by people as they see fit. Now this is one side of the story--a side which barely differentiates Aquinas' disregard for animals from Descartes' disregard. Andrew Linzey declares that "Descartes carried the line of indifference to cruelty to animals (as not wrong in itself), already indicated by St. Thomas, to its logical conclusion."<sup>1</sup> The much neglected other side is that Aquinas holds that animals are ontologically superior to vegetative life which is in turn superior to inanimate objects. But Aquinas' ontological view is inconsistent with his ethical position. If human beings are accorded opposite treatment due to their ontological value (as Aquinas insists), and if animals have more ontological worth than mere things, then animals should be treated differently than mere things.

I will first present the neglected side of the issue, explaining Aquinas' hierarchical doctrine of being and his views on the cognitive and



## PHILOSOPHY

affective life of animals. Then I will turn to his position on the treatment of animals and further explore the inconsistency indicated by his diverse teachings. Finally, I will suggest some implications that might be generated by a consistent Thomistic doctrine.

That Aquinas places animals above mere things can be seen by examining his hierarchical view of being. Beings vary in perfection according as they approach or recede from the perfection of God.<sup>2</sup> The perfection of a being can be measured by its nearness to "divine likeness."<sup>3</sup> Since no creature could ever reflect God's perfection, many degrees of being were created which overlap in such a way that there are no unaccounted for spaces in the structure of being. Aquinas held that diversity makes the idea of degrees necessary, for if one "observes the natures of things" he will find "that the diversity of things is accomplished by means of gradations. Indeed he will find plants above inanimate bodies, and above plants irrational animals, and above these intellectual substances." Aquinas adds, "And among individuals of these types he will find a diversity based on the fact that some are more perfect than others, inasmuch as the highest members of a lower genus seem quite close to the next higher genus; and the converse is also true; thus, immovable animals are like plants."<sup>4</sup> In other words, the lowest species of animals are continuous with the highest forms of plants and the highest forms of animals are continuous with the lowest forms of human nature.

As one ascends the hierarchy of being from the non-living to the living and from vegetative life to animalistic life, the element of freedom increases with each step. Aquinas says that the less developed a thing is, the more likely will it be "fixed to one place."<sup>5</sup> A stone, for instance, cannot move itself from one place to another. In contrast, living things are those which by nature are able to move themselves.<sup>6</sup> Since to live is to be able to engage in self-

movement, the level an entity occupies on the hierarchy of being depends upon the extent to which its activities are immanently determined by the being itself.

Employing this criterion of comparison, Aquinas distinguishes three levels of life: plant, animal and human. A plant acts more independently than a stone because its growth involved absorbing substances from its environment and metamorphosing them into its own substance. But a plant grows, changes, and dies in reaction to outside forces as well as according to its own internal form, which operates on a strictly biological or botanical level. Therefore, of the three levels of life, plants manifest the least degree of novelty in their activities.

It becomes increasingly difficult to enumerate all the kinds of activities an animal can perform, for an essential characteristic of an animal, as opposed to a plant, is mobility from place to place which seems to be purposive. A plant does not move from place to place, but it only moves its components in reaction to various stimuli. Since the lowest species of animals are continuous with the highest species of plants, the least developed animals may be expected to move in a manner similar to plants. Differentiating higher animals from "immovable animals, such as shellfish," Aquinas explains that animals possessing "locomotive powers. . . require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessities of life from a distance."<sup>7</sup> As animal life develops, the sensory-motor system, consisting of muscles, bone, brain, nervous system and the senses becomes more complex and the animal becomes increasingly capable of self-determination. Accordingly, there are degrees within the animal realm itself which manifest increasing spontaneity. In short, animals adapt themselves to new situations in a way which neither plants nor automata can.

It would seem, then, that Aquinas and Descartes have little in common regarding

their views on the ontological status of animals. But it has been noted that the concept of instinct is a common link in both of their philosophical positions. "Instinct," in this usage, means "the arrangement by which providence assures the existence of the species, thus looking upon it as a mechanical and uncontrollable impulse, and making individuals into little more than machines."<sup>8</sup> And there is textual evidence to support the correctness of such an observation. Aquinas reasons that "artificial works," such as a clock, are to "human ingenuity" as natural things, that is, animals, are to "divine art." God plans that animals should carry out "intricate processes" by their natural inclinations just as human beings plan that a clock carries out intricate processes. Aquinas supports his conclusion "by the fact that all members of the same species display the same pattern of behavior."<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, Aquinas extends the term "voluntary" to animals insofar as "they are moved towards an end through some knowledge of it."<sup>10</sup> To the extent that both human beings and animals direct their activities towards an apprehended goal both humans and animals are free. But how can Aquinas hold, on the one hand, that animals are little more than machines, all members of the same species acting the same way, and, on the other hand, that they are capable of voluntary activities? This conundrum can be resolved by Aquinas' distinction between three levels of sensitive life ranging from immobile animals lacking a capacity for memory to those whose capacities allow a broader scope of behavioral adaptation through experience.

The first level is that had by animals which have neither hearing nor memory, and which are therefore neither capable of being taught nor of being prudent. The second level is that of animals which have memory but are unable to hear, and which are therefore prudent but incapable of being taught. The third level is that of animals which have both of these faculties and which are therefore prudent and

capable of being taught.<sup>11</sup>

Since the natural tendencies of animals possessing memory and hearing are modifiable by learning and experience, there seems to be little purely instinctive behavior among the higher animals, including the human animals.

Based on Aquinas' distinction, John Deely attributes instinct to those animals at the lowest levels of existence which respond only to immediate sensations and intelligence to those animals which are capable of adapting themselves to diverse circumstances.

What Aquinas is getting at. . . is the distinction between instinct strictly so-called, i. e., between a species dominated by a pattern of behavior which is "species-predictable". . . and intelligence, i. e., species the behavior of which does not seem to be dominated by a gene-determined pattern.<sup>12</sup>

Higher animals do not always respond in a uniform way to identical stimuli, and conversely, quite disparate stimuli often evoke a uniform response. Aquinas' distinction between the three levels of animal life means, then, that only those animals who are at the lowest levels of existence possess instinct in the sense of a completely determinate mechanical operation whereas higher animals are capable of voluntary activity.

Just as Aquinas acknowledged that there is continuity between the highest form of animal life and the lowest form of human nature, he notes a parallel continuity in the cognitive sphere.

Not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature and something else according as it has some measure of participation in reason, coming into contact at its highest level of activity

with reason at its lowest.<sup>13</sup>

In other words, there is continuity between the highest achievements of animal intelligence and the birth of primitive concepts in the human being.

According to Aquinas, the real object of knowledge of both sensory cognition and intellectual cognition is form. But a form needs to undergo a transformation before it can be grasped by a mind. Knowledge results from the disengagement of forms from their particular material conditions. Since forms need to be dematerialized, they can only be received by a mind which is to some extent immaterial itself.

Plants have no knowledge because they only receive forms in a material way. An animal, however, receives forms in a partly material and partly immaterial way. For example, a cat knows certain features of his owner, such as her shape, smell and hair color. The cat abstracts from matter a shape he apprehends but does not apprehend this shape in a way that is completely independent from material conditions. The process of abstraction is incomplete since the cat only knows this shape as it characterizes a particular object and not in general. Nevertheless, the cat could not know his owner at all if he had to receive her into himself in her entire physical being. It is necessary, therefore, that the cat be to some extent immaterial, like the shape which he abstracts.<sup>14</sup>

Aquinas allows animals the ability to think certain kinds of thoughts "because of the need for action."<sup>15</sup> If an animal were not able to think in any way, it would be difficult to see how it could learn anything or apply its own actions with some knowledge of what will result. For example, stating that dolphins "have been shown to be capable of relatively abstract thinking," animal researchers tell of an experiment in which dolphins were trained to perform a new trick for a reward of fish.

"After several days of training they exhibited every-different types of leaps and contortions, apparently 'realizing' that the forms of behavior they had displayed previously would not be rewarded."<sup>16</sup> The process by which the dolphins come to regard all new tricks as meriting rewards of fish is the way in which human conceptual knowledge arises and from which very basic concepts are directly developed.<sup>17</sup> In addition to perceiving individual rewards, the dolphins must be able to abstract from individual cases, form a general concept and apply this concept to particular situations. Having no need for verbal expression, the dolphins reached a conclusion very much like the proposition "All new tricks issue in rewards."

Aquinas' two general divisions of the senses in both human beings and animals, external and internal, supplies a further link between human and animal life. Aquinas, discussing the function of the external organs, says:

The purpose of hearing is to provide communication between animals. It is necessary that animals transmit their experiences to one another to live; as is especially evident in the gregarious animals whose young are reared by the parent. Hence, too, the tongue is necessary that one animal may communicate, by sound, its feeling to another.<sup>18</sup>

For Aquinas, all human and animal faculties have purposes. And just as humans are endowed with hearing and a tongue to communicate their experiences and feelings, animals have these faculties to communicate their experiences and feelings.

The internal senses are responsible for imagination, sensible awareness, memory and the estimative sense.<sup>19</sup> Both imagination and memory produce sensible impressions but the proper object of memory is past experience

recognized as past, in contrast to the object of imagination, which is simply representation. Aquinas notes that animals in which a sensible impression remains after the sense object is removed "are capable of having some knowledge in the mind beyond sense; and these are the animals which have memory." And just as memory is produced by retaining impressions of sensations, so experience arises "from many things retained in the memory."<sup>20</sup> Since Aquinas admits that animals have experiences and sensations, he must allow that animals can have both painful and pleasant experiences. Observing a cat lying in the sun's rays, I can know just as well as I know in the case of human sunbathers that the center of her felt experience is enveloped by an agreeable warmth. And if someone steps on her paw, I can know that something unpleasant has occurred in her world which is not unlike that which happens in the human world when I jam my finger in a drawer.

Unlike the other internal senses, the estimative sense does not directly depend on the external senses. It is this sense that is responsible for the continuity between animal and human intelligence. By means of the estimative sense an animal is able to apprehend immediately the harmful or beneficial aspects of sense objects and so can try to obtain or eschew them. This sense enables an animal to appreciate an object's usefulness or potential for harm, even when there are not agreeable or disagreeable sensations to suggest this. Thus a sheep may flee a wolf whose hostility it has never sensed not because the wolf's color and shape are noxious but because it perceives the wolf as opposed to its nature.<sup>21</sup> When the sheep flees the wolf, it does so by a kind of spontaneously derived decision which has its source in the estimative sense.

The estimative sense is not only the highest intellectual faculty in an animal but it also directs sensitive appetite.<sup>22</sup> Generally, "appetite" connotes all forms of inclination, including the natural tendencies of plants and inanimate things, and the feeling of conscious

attraction in animals and human beings. According to Aquinas, "some inclination follows every form."<sup>23</sup> Inanimate things do not know what their inclinations are or what kind of changes they will undergo. Aquinas says, "In those things which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being. . . Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite."<sup>24</sup>

Animals will act not only according to the form which determines what they are but also according to the form which determines their cognition. If I shake an apple from a tree, its action will be according to its natural form. Under any given conditions, there is only one course that the apple can take without a violation of its nature. In contrast, if I shake a tree to bring down a cat, he may run away, climb higher, or come down to me of his own desire. Aquinas says, "the good to which natural appetite tends is definite and always the same; but this is not true of the good sought by an animal appetite."<sup>25</sup>

The animal appetite displays marks of emotion precisely similar to those we observe in human beings, showing in diverse ways signs of fear, pleasure, anger and affection; and Aquinas is cognizant of this fact. Attributing familiar emotions to animals, he explains how some of these emotions are evoked:

All the passions of the irascible appetite rise from passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy.<sup>26</sup>

The feelings aroused by the concupiscible appetite concern an animal's normal attraction toward what is friendly to its nature. For example, the concupiscible appetite is responsible for the desire to have sexual intercourse which, Aquinas says, "Even among animals conduces to a certain sweet

friendship."<sup>27</sup> The irascible appetite, on the other hand, involves an arduous attraction and repulsion, since the thing desired is difficult to achieve or the thing feared is difficult to escape. The stresses and strains produced by such situations engender more violent emotions.

In summary, Aquinas holds that since "animals are capable of participating in divine goodness in a more eminent way than other inferior things,"<sup>28</sup> they have more intrinsic value than these things. Animals are beings possessing locomotive powers and manifesting spontaneous actions. Able to think certain kinds of thoughts, they are partly immaterial or spiritual beings. Having the same sense organs we do, animals can communicate their feelings to one another. They can create a synthesis of their sensations and form images of things, and by their memory they can treasure up the acquisitions of individual experience. And their estimative sense gives them abilities bordering on intellectual cognition. Moreover, Aquinas makes it clear that animals have a rich affective life, complete with emotions and desires. In all these diverse ways, animals can have experiences that are similar to many human experiences. Following Aquinas' principle that a thing's mode of activity is proportionate to its mode of existence, if animals resemble humans in their mode of activity, they must resemble them in their mode of existence.

But Aquinas does not recommend that animals be treated in accord with their mode of existence. In fact, he insists that they be treated as mere things. Aquinas contrasts "the intellectual creature" as "master of its acts" with "things which have no domain over their acts" in order to show that creatures that participate less in the divine likeness are intended by God to be subordinated by creatures that participate more in His likeness.<sup>29</sup> Since the intellectual creature alone is free, animals "have the formal character of an instrument because they are not rational." Therefore, Aquinas concludes

that animals are subject to and mere instruments of human beings. "Now, an instrument is not valued for its own sake, but as useful to a principle agent." But if animals are mere instruments, then human animals need have no scruples about using other animals. And we find Aquinas saying this very thing:

We refute the error of those who claim that it is a sin for man to kill brute animals. For animals are ordered to man's use in the natural course of things. . . Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or by employing them in any other way.<sup>30</sup>

It might be objected that even if human animals do approach nearest to the divine likeness, it does not follow that all beings inferior to human are instruments to be used as humans deem fit. Aquinas might agree that this fact alone does not warrant the cruel treatment of animals. But he would condemn cruelty to animals not because of the pain inflicted on them, but because such cruelty may lead people to be cruel to one another. Commenting on the Old Testament, Aquinas suggests that we distinguish between reasons and passion. When humans experience passion, pity is aroused by animal suffering because "even irrational animals are sensible to pain."<sup>31</sup> Animals' very capacity for pain opens up the possibility that they may be treated cruelly. But the only reason not to treat them cruelly or sadistically is because "if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men."<sup>32</sup> Again, we are back to the point that animals are of only instrumental value for human beings.

If animals are mere instruments, they can be killed for food, furs or sport, or experimented upon at the whim of human beings. Aquinas implies this in saying, "He that kills another's ox sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his

property."<sup>33</sup> Should someone privately smash the head of an ox on his own property, Aquinas would be committed to the view that nothing wrong is done to the ox. As far as the ox is concerned, the action is morally indifferent. The only restraint on treating animals cruelly is that if it is too sadistic it might adversely affect the way the perpetrator treats his fellow-men. In short, cruelty or sadism towards animals is not in itself wrong. But how does the practice of treating animals as mere instruments accord with Aquinas' account regarding animal ontology?

Comparing the two doctrines we are confronted with a glaring inconsistency. The instruments that first come to mind are on the order of hammers, that is, mere things. The nature of a hammer is such that we can use or abuse it in whatever way we desire. Having no cognitive or affective life, a hammer is very low on the ontological scale. But why would animals be endowed with all the capacities Aquinas attributes to them if they exist only to be used by humans? Do animals feel sadness, vengeance and joy and experience friendship with one another merely for the sake of humans? Aquinas himself says, "For the purpose of intelligence in animals is to direct them in their actions and passions so as to seek and avoid things according to the requirements of their nature."

Further, Aquinas' teleological view of nature does not accord with the view that animals are instruments. He says, "that a thing must be done arises from the necessity of some end."<sup>34</sup> In other words, the concept of teleology implies the concept of duty:

A thing is a matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. . . Now in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another.<sup>35</sup>

Applying this principle to the animal genus,

if an animal has a capacity that is for its own sake yet can be used by human beings, then the end that "takes precedence" should be the end that is for the animal's own sake. The tusks of an elephant are for fighting, and this takes precedence over their use as material for chess pieces. Aquinas holds that if an activity has a natural end, then it is wrong to preclude the attainment of that end. The natural end of an animal is to grow to the state of maturity characteristic of its species; if an activity contributes to the efficient functioning of the animal, then its natural end is to make that contribution. An animal's capacities have value independent of their usefulness to human beings. If this is the case, we do not give animals their "due" by treating them as mere instruments or things, for they have a fundamental right to be treated in ways that indicate respect for their independent value. And insofar as animals use their capacities as they are due, these capacities can be matters of precept.

Now the objection can be raised that if it is wrong to prevent a living thing from fulfilling its natural end for its own sake, then doesn't the cow do wrong in eating grass and preventing grass from attaining its natural growth? But on Aquinas' principles, the grass cannot "know" its end and thus cannot value its activity. If grass has intrinsic value, that value is given it by a knowing being, since grass cannot enjoy its activity. For Aquinas, since only "things endowed with knowledge" can enjoy life,<sup>36</sup> "the full meaning of enjoyment applies to rational creatures, something short of this to animals, but nothing of the sort to other creatures."<sup>37</sup> An animal values its activities by its very enjoyment of them, knowing the end their activities lead to.

The fact that animals are beings endowed with knowledge is also the basis for attributing rights to animals and not to plants. Turning to Aquinas' doctrine of rights, we find him distinguishing two fundamental kinds:

The natural right. . . is that which by its

very nature is . . . commensurate with another person. Now this may happen in two ways: first, according as it is considered absolutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her. . . Secondly, a thing is naturally commensurate with another person. . . according to something resultant from it, for instance the possession of property.<sup>38</sup>

Aquinas proceeds to place the right of animals as part of the natural right. "Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural is common to us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration."<sup>39</sup> Since Aquinas maintains that animals have natural rights considered absolutely, rights belong to them as something more than the property of human beings. Note that his differentiation of animals from property in this passage directly conflicts with his statement that killing another man's ox is only wrong insofar as it is a sin against another's property. Here he insists that an absolute right is what is due to any creature capable of apprehension. By establishing that animals have absolute rights, Aquinas is establishing that how animals should be treated cannot be decided without considering their rights.

Aquinas not only establishes that animals have absolute rights; he also provides a way to determine what particular rights belong to animals. Animals participate in the same eternal law as human beings, but since human beings, unlike animals, can discover the precepts of the eternal law, Aquinas calls human participation in the eternal law "the natural law."<sup>40</sup> Human beings become aware of the precepts of the natural law by examining their natural inclinations, for their inclinations reveal those things which complete their natures. Accordingly, the natural inclinations of human beings form the basis for designating the particular precepts of the natural law

proper to them. Thus a precept based on the natural inclination to "live in society" would be "to avoid offending those among whom one has to live."<sup>41</sup> Human beings share some of the same inclinations that animals have, such as sexual intercourse and the education of offspring.<sup>42</sup> Like human beings, animals are capable of acting from such inclinations and obtaining the goods to which they lead. Since human beings and animals have inclinations to pursue goods completing their natures, and since human beings are granted rights based on their natural inclinations, perhaps animals capable of apprehension should also be granted rights on the basis of their natural inclinations.

It is true that Aquinas does not draw this conclusion, but it seems that inconsistency requires him to do so. For Aquinas must either say that animals have rights due to their intrinsic natures or that they have no rights because they are on the same ontological level as property, human artifacts or any mere thing. The adoption of the latter position would entail major modifications in Aquinas' epistemology, metaphysics and teleology. In contrast, adopting the first position would require only minor modifications in relatively peripheral issues. Human beings could still remain at the summit of earthly creation and have correspondingly more rights than animals. But having more rights does not mean that any time a human being wishes he or she may violate an animal's rights. "More rights," in this sense, means that since a human being has more natural inclinations than an animal, he or she has rights commensurate with those inclinations that an animal does not possess. For instance, animals lack and human beings have the right to vote, the right to worship as they please and the right of free speech and freedom of the press.

On the other hand, the veal industry provides an example of how a contemporary practice would violate a consistent Thomistic position. Depriving veal calves of solids and iron means depriving them of eating what they

are naturally inclined to eat. Taking them from their mothers at the age of one to three days old deprives the cow of the right to educate her young and the natural inclination to "mother" it. Forcing calves to stand in one position for their entire lives is a violation of the freedom of movement which is natural to all higher animals. Finally, raising the calves in darkness frustrates their inclination to know and experience the world around them. In all these ways, Aquinas must admit, in the interest of consistency, that calves' rights are being abrogated. Although to say this much would require little alteration of Aquinas' philosophical system, it would not only correct his inconsistency but would also dissolve one source of support for the disregard of animals rights that has had so much influence through the ages.

#### NOTES

1 Andrew Linzy, Animal Rights (London, 1976, p. 12.

2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols. (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981), I 44, 1.

3 St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, translated with an introduction and notes by Anton C. Pegis, 5 vols. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), III 97.

4 Ibid. I will restrict the use of the term 'animal' throughout the rest of this paper to the higher vertebrates.

5 Aristotle's De Anima with the commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries with an introduction by Ivo Thomas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), Book II, Lectio 3.

6 Ibid., I 18, 1.

7 Ibid.

8 Elena Quarelli, Socrates and the Animals translated by Kathleen Speight (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), p. 35.

9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I 13, 2 ad 3. It is noteworthy that Descartes also compares animals to clocks. Cf. Discourse on Method and Meditations, translated by Lawrence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1960), p. 43.

10 'Voluntary' is a derivative term and can be extended to things where there is some share in volition through activity which is really like it. Accordingly, voluntary activity is attributed to animals insofar as they are moved towards an end through some knowledge of it. Ibid., I-II 6, 2.

11 S. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, translated by J. P. Rowan, 2 vols. (Chicago: Regency, 1964), I Lectio 1, n. 13.

12 John Deely, "Animal Intelligence and Concept Formation" in The Thomist, vol. 35, January 1971, p. 62.

13 St. Thomas Aquinas, On Truth, translated by R. Mulligan, B. McGlynn, R. Schmidt, 3 vols. (Chicago: Regnery, 1952-1954), 25, 2.

Elsewhere Aquinas says, "Man's superiority to the beasts in animal shrewdness and memory does not result from anything proper to the sensitive part, but from an affinity and closeness to intelligence which, so to speak, flows into them. These powers in men are not so very different from those in animals only they are heightened." S. T. I 78, 4 ad 5.

14 Aquinas, On Truth, 22, 3.

15 Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, I Lectio 1, n. 14.

16 Bernd Wursig, "Dolphins" in Animal Societies and Evolution, with an introduction by Howard Topoff (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1981), p. 86.

17 Deely argues that according to Aquinas animals apprehend the "accidental universal" whereas human beings can also apprehend the "essential universal." pp. 72-74.

18 Aristotle's De Anima, III 13, n. 874.

19 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I 78, 4.

20 Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, translated by F. R. Larcher with a preface by James A. Weisheipl (Albany, New York: Magi Books, 1970), II Lectio 20.

21 Ibid.

22 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I 81, 3.

23 Ibid., I 80 1.

24 Ibid.

25 Aquinas, On Truth, 22, 3 ad 3.

26 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I 81, 3.

27 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III 123.

28 Aquinas, On Truth, II 3, 3 ad 3.

29 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III pt. 2, 112.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., I-II 99, 1.

33 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II 102, 6 ad 8.

34 Ibid., II-II 44, 2.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., I-II 11, 2.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., II-II 57, 3.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., I-II 91, 2.

41 Another example Aquinas uses is that a precept based on the human inclination to "know the truth about God" would be "to shun ignorance." Ibid., I-II 94, 2.

42 Ibid.



Now 80 Pages!

Not only the best writing on ethics and animals, but fiction, poetry, and autobiography by leading animal liberationists too!

\$15 from San Francisco Bay Institute, P.O. Box 254, Berkeley, CA 94701  
Sample back issue \$3.00



Quarterly Journal of Ethics

"*Between the Species* is a must for anyone who feels we have to toss away our old conceptions about animals as ... not deserving ethical treatment, and find a way of relating to them as, perhaps, peers."

Jim Swan (*Shaman's Drum*)

Contributing Editors include Peter Singer, Michael Fox, Bernard Rollin, and Tom Regan.