that only the reflexively self-conscious can have a genuine welfare is the Michael A. Fox of The Case for Animal Experimentation. He there claims that it is "completely spurious" to speak of the lives of those who are not reflexively self-conscious as "more or less 'full,' 'satisfying,' and so forth," since these beings cannot "reflectively evaluate the quality of their lives and find them a cause of satisfaction or regret" (pp. 28-9). Because of their lack of reflection, Fox says that their "pleasurable experiences are not valuable to them" (27), and in general "their lives also cannot have intrinsic value or value to themselves" (48). Fox's view implies that, in a crucial sense, such beings cannot fare well or ill because they are unable to care about what happens to them. (Fox does continue to use the word "welfare" on occasion when referring to those he believes are not reflexively self-conscious. He also grants that "it would be meaningful to say that it is in their interest (accords with their observed preferences) to have pleasurable experiences repeat themselves" (27). But as the implied reductionism in this quote, in addition to the previous quotes, indicates, this is "welfare" and "interest" in a very attenuated sense of these terms at best.)

Although Fox makes all the above claims about nonhuman animals, they apply rather more accurately to very young or impaired humans. Before we decide that the lives of babies and the severely senile cannot be "more or less satisfying," let's consider their "observed preferences" when they are cuddled or beaten. Don't they give every indication that they are satisfied or greatly distressed by what is being done to them? Must they be able to tell themselves "my life-quality has now taken a distinct down-

ward turn" in order to be dissatisfied by a beating? Apart from language, a tortured baby and a tortured normal human adult display remarkably similar "observed preferences." How can Fox account for this? Doesn't the principle of parsimony suggest that both care about what is happening to them?

49. Regan, op. cit., 324-5. I strongly disagree with the way Regan applies this principle, however. He says that "no reasonable person would deny" that the death of a normal human is a greater harm to that human than the death of a dog is to the dog. He suggests that we ought to throw the dog out of the proverbial lifeboat if there isn't sufficient room on board for all the humans and the dog. This seems to be a totally uncharacteristic touch of human chauvinism in Regan's part. For a thoughtful discussion of this problem, see Henry Cohen's review of The Case for Animal Rights in Ethics & Animals 5/1 (1984): 11-4.

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