in our own anthropocentric interest to do so.

There is no incompatibility in defending the individual dignity of persons (and animals) and claiming that our ultimate obligations are to the future in a superpersonal sense, to God, S3, again, if there is such:

The whole idea that our final obligation is to groups of animals, whether human alone or (as I would say) human and subhuman, is to my mind utterly inadequate. Here all religions largely agree. If the cosmos has no value, neither, by any rational standard, do animals or persons. The parts are for the whole, the ephemeral for the abiding. And the only aspects of the whole that we can influence or benefit are future aspects. I call this doctrine contributionism. (Hartshorne, "The Ethics of Contributionism").

That is, the rational aim of human life, at least, when our transitoriness and divine everlastingness are considered, is to contribute value to the whole of things, to the cosmos, including the value of present happiness in individual humans and animals.

Bibliography