rests of the weak derives from our self-interest and the possibility that we might become one of the weak. [11] "There, but for the grace of God, go I" is the motive for fairness in this moral scheme. So, it could be argued that since we need not fear becoming cattle, Rhesus monkeys, etc., this motive cannot be extended to cover our dealings with animals.

In response, we may note that, like other proposed egoistic origins for morality, this one fails to distinguish morality from prudence and does not fit with everyday moral psychology. For example, my moral outrage at the injustice of the apartheid policies in South Africa does not derive from any concern I have about becoming a South African black. There is no more chance of that happening than there is of my becoming a Rhesus monkey. In my own case, and I do not think that I am unusual in this, it is not any sort of self-interest but something like David Hume's "disinterested sentiment" or a deontological sense of fairness being intrinsically valuable which is the origin of my moral concern about injustices in South Africa and other parts of the world remote from my daily life. Thus, self-interest does not set the boundaries of our concern with justice.

Similarly, if, as seems to be presumed in the construction of Rawls' original position, the merely logical possibility that I might have been born a South African black is somewhat of importance for developing the principles of justice which I should respect, then the same sort of merely logical possibility that I might have been born a Rhesus monkey or some other animal should suffice to extend these principles of justice to animals. Although the "people" in Rawls' original position are gifted with considerable information and reasoning ability, it does not follow that their principles of justice apply only to the informed and the intelligent. Those principles are to cover even "the least among us," and this opens the door to animals being among the possible incarnations which those in the original position must (logically) be prudentially concerned to have protected against exploitation. It will not do to object that we cannot know "what it is like to be a bat," to use Tom Nagel's famous example, and, therefore, cannot determine exactly what is needed to protect animals' interests against abuse. Even if we cannot directly experience the pleasures of other life forms, we can, if we will make the effort to observe animals closely, come to understand which ways of life provide them more enjoyment and fulfillment, and such common sensical understanding is all that is required for the protective reflections carried on in the original position. [12] Therefore, Rawls' analysis of the original position does not provide a basis for refusing to extend our moral concern with correcting the arbitrariness of nature to our relations with animals.

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Each word expressed an aspect Of the Mind incarnate In all things that were named. Language was sacred and sanctifying. For in its beginning there was the word And the living word was God. In every word that was a name There was also divinity: Stone, bone, soil and seed Were holy things Like water, fire and wind, All aspects of the living whole Whose spirit breathed in sacred places; In the valleys, deserts, mountains, Forests, oceans, lakes and rivers, And in all living things Called, recalled and known by name. In the naming of these things They were incorporated into the human mind, And the sanctity of being Was experienced in word and song and prayer.

Consequently, the egoistic dimension in Rawls' theory of justice does not provide good reason to believe that our moral concern with protecting the weak against the strong and other issues of justice must (logically) be restricted to intra-human relations. Unless some other, morally significant justification can be provided for respecting the natural order which leaves us the strongest species, that order is no less arbitrary and no less in need of correction by principles of justice than were the "natural" hierarchies envision by Aristotle and the Victorians.

Thus, the apparent unfairness of our consuming animals is not shown to be mere appearance by the natural contract, the natural order, or the idea that animals should