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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## FRONT MATTER

vii  |  Editor’s Note
viii |  About the Contributors
xi  |  Article Summaries

## ARTICLES

1  |  A “Velvet Prison” with Chinese Characteristics: The Construction of Culture in Post-1989 China | Keith Goodwin

28 |  The Housewife’s Battle on the Home Front: Women in World War II Advertisements | Caroline Cornell


59 |  Seeing Pennsylvania as the Keystone of the Revolution: Charles H. Lincoln’s Treatment of Ethnicity | Greg Rogers

67 |  Reading Between the Laws: Literary Representations of the French Homosexual, 1942-1981 | Alison Veith

82 |  An America that Could Be: Emma Goldman, Anarchism, and the “American Dream” | Christina Samons

98 |  In Defense of Southern Honor: Preston Brooks and the Attack on Charles Sumner | Daniel Lawrence Slusser
BOOK REVIEWS


BACK MATTER

121 | Acknowledgements

123 | Information for Authors
EDITOR’S NOTE

It is with great pride that I announce the second issue of *The Forum*. When Dr. Trice first invited Katrina Chludzinski and me to partake in this project in 2008, we had bold dreams for what we wanted this journal to become. Two years later, I am happy to say that many of them have been realized.

From the beginning, we wanted this journal to welcome a range of perspectives. Titling our journal *The Forum*, therefore, was no accident—it stemmed from our hope that this journal would provide an outlet for student work irrespective of an author’s major, level of study, or institutional affiliation. With this issue, we have come closer to fully actualizing that goal. While most of this issue’s papers were written by Cal Poly students, we received submissions from students at four different universities and are pleased to include a paper from a recent graduate of UC Berkeley. *The Forum* hopes to welcome students from many other universities in the future.

Katrina and I also wanted this journal to become widely available. Thanks to the help of Cal Poly librarian Marisa Ramirez, *The Forum* is now available electronically via the Cal Poly Digital Commons. This resource is undoubtedly a valuable means for our contributors to share their work with family, friends, and the academic community.

As both Katrina and I graduate this year, this issue marks a turning point for *The Forum*. Though saddened to leave this project behind, we depart knowing that next year’s executive editors will continue to help this journal grow. *The Forum* has come a long way in the past two years and we are eager to see where future editors will lead it. Although it is young, *The Forum* is an important project that not only serves as a necessary outlet for student work, but also epitomizes Cal Poly’s “learn by doing” philosophy and encapsulates the goals of Phi Alpha Theta to promote the study of history and foster intellectual exchange—I hope that it will continue to do so for many years to come.

Keith Goodwin
*Co-Executive Editor*
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

**John Paul Beck** is currently studying for his Master of Arts in History at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. Prior to joining the graduate program, he received both a Bachelor of Arts in History and a Social Science Teaching Credential from Cal Poly. He is interested in art history and world history, which he hopes to teach at a junior high school. Outside of school, John enjoys hiking, tennis, and classical guitar.

**Jeff Blackwell** is a graduate student at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo scheduled to receive his Master of Arts in History in December 2010. He received his Bachelor of Arts in History from Humboldt State University in 2006 and joined Cal Poly’s graduate program in 2009. His scholarly interests lay primarily in the history of the American West—California in particular—and in the environmental history of the West. Jeff is a member of Phi Alpha Theta and the American Historical Association. After graduation, Jeff plans to explore opportunities in academia as well as the private sector.

**Caroline Cornell** is a junior at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo studying for degrees in both English and history. She is also a member of Phi Alpha Theta. Caroline hopes to study history at the graduate level in order to examine issues of race, gender, and social class in greater depth. Afterward, she would like to pursue a career in teaching at the high school level.

**Keith Goodwin** is a fourth-year student at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. Keith will be graduating in June with a Bachelor of Arts in History and a minor in Western Intellectual Tradition. He is interested in both Asian and European history, particularly the relationship between law, politics, and culture. He is a member of several university organizations, including Phi Alpha Theta, in which he has served as an Executive Editor for The Forum since its establishment in 2008. Keith will be attending the Columbia University School of Law this fall.
**Greg Rogers** holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the State University of New York at Geneseo. He will be completing his Master of Arts in History this spring at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. His thesis examines the colony of Rhode Island at war in middle of the eighteenth century. Greg’s research interests include colonial North America (New England and New France), military history, maritime history, and the relationship between war and society. Greg is a member of Phi Alpha Theta and will be begin work on a Ph.D. in History at the University of Maine this fall. In his free time he enjoys socializing, canoeing, and travel.

**Christina Samons** is a recent graduate from the University of California, Berkeley. She graduated in December 2009 with a Bachelor of Arts in Rhetoric and a minor in European Studies. Her academic interests include film, comparative politics, and legal theory. While attending Berkeley, she was an active member of the Berkeley Student Cooperative and volunteered as a law clerk for the Associated Students’ Judicial Council. She intends to pursue a career in law.

**Daniel Lawrence Slusser** completed his undergraduate studies at Humboldt State University and is currently a graduate student at Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo studying for a Master of Arts in History. His studies focus primarily on nineteenth-century American history. He has varied interests within this field of American history, including economic, technological, political, religious, and cultural history. Daniel has professional aspirations to teach at the university level and to express his passion for history through writing.

**Barbara Healy Stickel** received her Bachelor of Arts in History from Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo in 2009, where she is currently enrolled as a graduate student. She expects to earn a Master of Arts in History in 2011. For over twenty years, she has fished commercially for salmon, albacore tuna, and other species along the Pacific coast of the United States. In 2002, Barbara was recognized by the California State Legislature for her work in support of fishing communities and
sustainable fisheries. After completing her master’s degree, she plans to focus her research and writing on California maritime history.

Allison Veith graduated *magna cum laude* from Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo in 2009, where she received a Bachelor of Arts in English and double-minored in History and Women’s Studies. She currently works at Stanford University, but will be moving to Paris next year to be an *au pair*. In Paris, she plans to continue her study of French culture both inside and outside the classroom. Alison hopes to one day earn her Ph.D. in American Studies and to teach at the university level.
On June 4, 1989, the Tiananmen Square protests transformed Beijing into a virtual war zone. To many in the West, it seemed that China was on the verge of a dramatic revolution that would see the collapse of communism and the emergence of a democratic China. While there have been many changes in China since 1989, Goodwin argues that post-1989 China has been most visibly defined by a profound tension between the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to foster dramatic economic development and modernization and its desire to avoid challenges to its traditional authority. Building upon Miklós Haraszti’s *The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism*, Goodwin argues that the state no longer possesses a monopoly on culture in post-1989 China. Although the state has been successful in reinventing its hegemonic structure and has continued to maintain a large degree of control, Goodwin contends that individuals, groups, and the forces of the market economy have also gained an enormous degree of influence in the construction of culture, and have frequently challenged, if not undermined, the Chinese government’s traditional authority.

In this article, Caroline Cornell analyzes the ways in which American women were portrayed in American media and war advertisements during World War II. As American men left to fight overseas, numerous jobs became vacant, including important factory jobs that were essential to military success. Although many women rose to the task of filling these vacancies, a large portion of women aided the war effort from home. Housewives played a substantial role in the success of wartime rationing and salvaging efforts, the campaign for victory gardens, and the purchasing of
war bonds. While images such as “Rosie the Riveter” predominate contemporary perceptions of the role of women in the war effort, Cornell argues that advertisements during the period suggest that the housewife was crucially important and well respected during the period, especially as the war started to end.


The “China Lobby” was a broad network of people, both foreign and domestic, whose interests coalesced around the goal of overthrowing communism in China following the rise of Mao Zedong. Aided by the anticommunist political environment of 1950s America, the Lobby’s loose affiliation of influential individuals—which included well-financed National Chinese officials, right-wing American political elites, and key associates in the private sector and media—exerted considerable pressure on U.S. foreign policy decisions concerning China. Focusing on the period 1949-1954, Blackwell argues that the China Lobby’s use of political lobbying, sympathetic media outlets, and attacks on critics of pro-Nationalist policy allowed it to effectively promote a pro-Chiang Kai-shek foreign policy.

Seeing Pennsylvania as the Keystone of the Revolution: Charles H. Lincoln’s Treatment of Ethnicity | Greg Rogers

Greg Rogers analyzes Charles H. Lincoln’s The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776, a significant work in the historiography of the American Revolution. According to Rogers, the concept of ethnicity, or “race,” permeates Lincoln’s 1901 book. Rogers notes, for example, that the development of the American Revolution in Pennsylvania is depicted as being an ethnic struggle in which competing blocs of English Quakers, Scotch-Irish, and Germans struggle for political control amongst themselves as well as the British metropole. In this sense, Lincoln’s history marks the first example of the “dual-revolution thesis” later made famous by
Carl Becker. After analyzing the content, historical context, and subject matter of the monograph, Rogers argues that Lincoln’s view of ethnicity and its importance in his work can be attributed not only to the monograph’s focus on Pennsylvania, but also to influences of the Progressive Era and its historiographical approach. Whether or not Pennsylvania and Progressive-Era thinking produced a skewed or inaccurate account of the American Revolution is open to debate. What is certain, Rogers concludes, is that factors of contemporary time and provincial place are just as evident in Lincoln’s text as the broader thesis he pioneers.

Reading Between the Laws: Literary Representations of the French Homosexual, 1942-1981 | Alison Veith

It was not until the turn of the twentieth century that the word “homosexual” began to define a person or state of being. Before appearing in medical discourse and the psychoanalytic work of individuals like Sigmund Freud, the word was associated with a sexual act, not as significant aspect of one’s identity. Considering this lexical transition and the beginning of homosexual identity articulations in France, Alison Veith explores the ways that the French homosexual male defined himself, how historical, social, and ideological factors influenced that self-definition, and, finally, asks what comparisons might be made between the French homosexual and his American counterpart. Focusing specifically on the period 1942-1981—a period in which anti-gay legislation directly imposed a guise of discretion and invisibility on the developing “gay community”—Veith draws on writings by both French and American homosexual men in Paris, not only in order to compare their national and cultural perspective, but to better understand their sense of personal identity, personal sexuality, and personal nationality.
An America that Could Be: Emma Goldman, Anarchism, and the “American Dream” | Christina Samons

The so-called “Gilded Age,” 1865-1901, was a period in American history characterized by great progress, but also of great turmoil as the United States underwent social, economic, and political transformations. Out of this period emerged Emma Goldman, who, responding to the transformations of the Gilded Age, became a well-known critic of both governmental and non-governmental institutions and a controversial advocate of anarchism in the early twentieth century. In this article, Christina Samons analyzes primary sources written by Goldman in order to explain the salient features of her anarchist theory. In doing so, she attempts to reconcile Goldman’s insistence on a return to the ideals set forth during the American Revolution with the historical environment in which Emma Goldman wrote. In Goldman’s opinion, Samons argues, American society had drifted away from the ideal of the “American Dream” due to the institutionalization of exploitation within all aspects of social and political life: namely economics, religion, and the law.

In Defense of Southern Honor: Preston Brooks and the Attack on Charles Sumner | Daniel Lawrence Slusser

On May 22, 1856, South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks approached the desk of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner. Declaring Sumner’s recent speech to be a “libel on South Carolina,” Brooks proceeded to brutally attack Sumner with his cane. Looking back on this incident, Daniel Lawrence Slusser examines the personal and political circumstances leading up to the attack on Sumner as well as the cultural forces that shaped Preston Brooks’s personal psychology. Ultimately, Slusser argues, Brooks’s attack on Sumner was representative of culture in the antebellum South and its fixation on the cause of honor—a mentality that would also be influential in the build-up to the Civil War.
A “VELVET PRISON” WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE IN POST-1989 CHINA
By Keith Goodwin

On June 5, 1989, an unidentified man stood alone in front of a row of Chinese tanks. The image, captured by a number of photographers at the scene, was soon scattered throughout Western news reports, which emphasized the power of the individual to stand up to the brute force of an oppressive state—a modern version of David and Goliath. The scene unfolded the day after the Chinese government sent the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Beijing to disperse civilians who had been protesting in and around Tiananmen Square for weeks. Following a previous failure to disperse the protesters in May, the Chinese government deployed the PLA with live rounds and tanks and ordered that the soldiers clear the square by dawn of June 4.1 What ensued was chaos. Beijing was transformed into a virtual war zone with the PLA

openly firing upon civilians, wounding 7,000 and killing as many as 2,600 people.\textsuperscript{2}

Western democratic nations have often viewed the events that unfolded in 1989 as the brutal suppression of a democratic uprising against authoritarian-communist rule. Emphasizing images like the \textit{Goddess of Democracy} and placing June 4 in the context of revolutions that occurred in the Eastern Bloc around the same time, however, tends to obscure the fact that the protesters in Beijing sought reform, not revolution.\textsuperscript{3}

In the twenty years since June 4, 1989, China has undergone a dramatic economic revolution and transformed itself beyond many people’s wildest expectations. While it is tempting to see China’s post-1989 economic development and the diminishing visibility of the state as a micromanaging entity as a response to the events in Tiananmen Square, it is important to recognize that many of the trends that have surfaced in the past two decades were in motion prior to the 1989 protests. Since taking control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978, Deng Xiaoping had begun a process of “Reform and Opening” that was designed to bring about economic development and material prosperity without sacrificing the political status quo.\textsuperscript{4} Nonetheless, Deng’s economic reforms—often characterized as “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”—allowed an increasing degree of cultural freedom, particularly after his 1992 “Southern Tour.” Thus, June 4 is best viewed not as a transformative event in the modernization of China, but as a consequence of tensions inherent in a policy that sought dramatic economic development without the chaos of Mao’s Cultural Revolution or a challenge to traditional party authority. This tension continues today.


This essay aims to analyze the construction of “Chinese” culture since 1989. Although the events of June 4 will be important to this endeavor, this essay does not intend to illustrate the specific contributions of the Tiananmen Square protests to China’s post-1989 cultural development. Instead, this essay looks at the “delicate dance” that has occurred in the last two decades of Chinese history as traditional party rhetoric and government influence have confronted an increasingly pluralistic cultural environment. This is not to say that the previous twenty years have been marked by a simple state-versus-individual conflict. On the contrary, the construction of culture and national identity in post-1989 China has been highly complex and has been the consequence of conflict and interaction between the state, society, and the market economy.

Certainly the hegemonic influence of the state has played a significant role in defining the limits of the interactions and discourses during this period, but just as the state has sought to impose a coherent cultural identity on members of the Chinese community, groups, individuals, and market forces have similarly affected the development of the state. By examining various trends since 1989, I hope illuminate the ways in which this fluid, and often reciprocal, process of cultural construction has been manifested and demonstrate how it has often undermined the state’s dominance in the realm of culture.

**China’s “Velvet Prison”: The Reconstruction of State Hegemony**

Although I ultimately argue that the state does not possess a monopoly on culture in post-1989 China, this is not to say that the Chinese government is no longer a dominant player in the process of cultural construction. In fact, the hegemonic power of the state has simply evolved into a more subtle form since 1989. Geremie Barme’s *In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture* provides a useful line of analysis for understanding this process by applying the work of Hungarian writer Miklós Haraszti—author of *The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism*—to contemporary China. Like post-Stalin Eastern Europe, Barme argues, the state in post-Mao China has tried to
reformulate the social contract such that “consensus replaces coercion and complicity subverts criticism." In other words, the state has tried to co-opt individuals into a “progressive censorship” that effectively makes them a part of the state rather than a voice of opposition.

While The Velvet Prison focuses specifically on artists, it is equally useful to an understanding of the evolution of society and culture in contemporary China. According to Haraszti, “the velvet prison” is a world in which “[state meddling in the arts] is no longer used to silence opposition to the state but to ensure that intellectuals will more effectively perform their proper role.” Consequently, “heavy-handed methods of the past are pressed into service only when the new ones fail to function properly.” China’s velvet prison thus seems to have its origins in the reforms undertaken following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978. However, as Barmé has noted, Chinese cultural policies in the 1980s were still characterized by a tension between “hard” and “soft” power approaches, as artists and individuals were co-opted into state tutelage but were purged—or even violently repressed—when they stepped outside of tacit boundaries. While Haraszti acknowledges that this alternation of hard and soft power existed in Eastern Europe, China’s hard power continues to manifest itself—albeit in more minor forms—well into the post-Mao period. Chinese society has not been fully coerced into progressive censorship.

China’s velvet prison does not, therefore, fully conform to Haraszti’s model. The events of June 4 and, more recently, the government crackdown against Falun Gong, serve as important reminders that the state has not fully exchanged “sticks” for “carrots.” Generally speaking, however, the past twenty years of Chinese history have not been characterized by the widespread use of brute force to keep the masses in order. In fact, the state has, in many cases, succeeded in co-opting

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7 Ibid.

8 Barmé, In the Red, 8-9.
individual desires by “offering responsibility and a constructive role to those people of quality hungry for power.”

Where China also differs from the model described by Haraszti is in the presence of a market economy. Like the “directed culture” of state socialism, a market economy also creates limitations:

[An employee’s] human rights are severely circumscribed—except, of course, his right to work. He cannot go outside the walls, he cannot wander at will around the factory, cannot say, or write, or organize whatever he wants. In these matters, it is the firm’s interests, conveyed by its owners and managers, that determine right and wrong within the corporate culture...

How is this (admittedly simplified) state of affairs different from state socialism? Only one aspect is truly different: the existence of other companies.

With China’s reforms and the growth of private corporations subject to market forces and demand, Chinese society is now subject to both the impositions of state ideology and the ideology of commerce—a tension made more dynamic by the state’s influence in the market economy. Because of this relationship, state hegemony in post-1989 China might best be conceptualized as a “velvet prison with Chinese characteristics.”

**Directed Culture: Patriotic Education and National Humiliation**

Although having origins prior to 1989, the structure of China’s velvet prison was greatly shaped by the Tiananmen Square protests. Responding to the “June 4 Incident,” the CCP undertook a campaign of “cultural rectification.” The chaos of June 4 and the events that had unfolded in Eastern Europe throughout 1989 led the Party to conclude that the abandonment of Mao’s legacy “was nothing less than political suicide.” Hence, “to renew official ideology and build broad-based national support for the Communist regime” became a central concern.

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9 Haraszti, 26.
10 Ibid., 65-66. Parentheses original.
11 Liu, 55.
for the state in the aftermath of Tiananmen.\textsuperscript{12} Within the Party, however, there was disagreement over how to best reformulate and reassert its ideological influence. On one hand, “conservatives” saw the events of 1989 as a confirmation of their belief that unchecked intellectual liberalization would undermine government authority.\textsuperscript{13} They supported a Neo-Maoist ideology that criticized Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms.

Unwilling to sacrifice the goal of economic prosperity, the Party’s “reformist” wing aimed to develop a new, cohesive ideology to unify the Chinese populace.\textsuperscript{14} What resulted was an ideology that, while not always consistent with the “revolutionary hegemony” that had long formed the backbone of the state, “retained the discursive formations, the formal and rhetorical features, of Mao’s ideology,” and wrapped the Party in the cloak of nationalism.\textsuperscript{15} Such an evolution resembles Karl Marx’s argument in \textit{The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte}. According to Marx, the present was continually infused with the traditions of history. Even revolutionaries, he claimed, attempted to glorify their aims in the language of previous generations. Likewise, the transformation of state hegemony in post-1989 China acted to “conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history.”\textsuperscript{16}

Epitomizing the government response to the ideological decay of the 1980s—particularly the political unrest of June 4, 1989—was a state-led campaign of “patriotic education.” However, rather than assume the form of overt indoctrination, the campaign to instill Chinese patriotism subtly institutionalized state ideology. This is evidenced by the fact that the educational reforms of the 1990s no longer made the

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{14}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{15}] Liu, 55; Zhao, 289.
\end{itemize}
Marxist political science exam a requirement for all college applicants in China. Instead, the state initiated programs like the “I am Chinese” program in universities and a curriculum in all schools that would “portray the Communist state as the embodiment of the nation’s will” and “reassert the moral authority of the party.”

It would be a mistake, however, to say that the patriotic education campaign was purely institutional. Rather, it was a national project that sought to move beyond the “empty slogans” of previous decades and foster a general sense of patriotism that identified the Chinese state with the CCP. In fact, the campaign epitomized 1990s government propaganda in the sense that reforms that were not strictly consistent with Maoist dogma nonetheless sought legitimacy via appeals to Maoist rhetoric. By doing so, the state was able to garner support from those for whom Maoism was a fundamental historical legacy and incorporate those who, while born into the system, lacked such concrete experience. That the 1990s was also a decade in which the state undertook a dramatic reinvention and restaging of the revolutionary “Red Classics” attests to the fact that the patriotic education campaign was part of a larger movement to rectify a mass culture in support of the CCP.

The reconstruction of state hegemony under the umbrella of patriotism also found much success by drawing upon the narrative of “national humiliation.” Prevalent throughout the history of post-Qing China, the discourse of national humiliation “recounts how at the hands of foreign invaders and corrupt Chinese regimes, sovereignty was lost, territory dismembered, and the Chinese people thus humiliated.”

State portrayals of the events of June 4 were frequently framed by this discourse. Liu Baiyu, a senior party novelist, for example, described the political unrest as a consequence of the “wholesale adoption of Western bourgeois values.” Through this rhetoric, the state not only under-

17 Zhao, 291-293.
18 Ibid., 298-299.
19 Liu, 92-93.
mined charges that posited inherent flaws in the existing governmental structure, but also legitimized itself by using a language that had, by all means, become enmeshed in Chinese culture. In fact, through much of the twentieth century, the discourse of national humiliation had been used to construct a China that needed “saving” and to legitimize rule under Mao and the CCP. As Barmé has observed, “While Deng is admired for what he has done for the economy, Mao is revered, among other things, for keeping the superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, at bay.”

National humiliation discourse underwent a revival in the 1990s and formed an integral component to the state-led campaign to redirect domestic energies toward a CCP-legitimating patriotism. This is not only evidenced by the patriotic education campaign’s emphasis on the study of Chinese history—especially its modern history of imperial invasion—and its incompatibility with Western democratic ideals, but also by the reemergence of textbooks linking political unrest to national humiliation. For example, one government textbook read, “Today we are confronted with foreign and domestic enemies who are plotting to force ‘peaceful evolution’ on our country.” These new textbooks were the first of their kind to appear in China since 1947 and were complemented by an array of publications throughout the 1990s that continually invoked national humiliation. By 2001, the discourse of national humiliation would be institutionalized by the state-declared “National Defense Education Day,” which, unlike the previous discourse of national humiliation that promoted the need for a new nationalism, acted to reinforce “proved actions and feelings” in support of the CCP.

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22 Callahan, 183.
24 Callahan, 186.
26 Callahan, 186-187.
27 Ibid., 201.
In many ways, post-1989 state policy was effective in fostering a Chinese nationalism that was both fervent and directed outward in the form of negative perceptions of the West. The belief that China’s failure to secure the 2000 Olympic Games resulted from Western—particularly American—bullying stands as one early example in the 1990s. While it is true that the awarding of the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney was tainted by bribery charges, the assertion of an anti-China conspiracy seems firmly rooted in the discourse of national humiliation. Similarly, the television drama *A Beijinger in New York* and the publication of books such as *China Can Say No* and *The Plot to Demonize China* indicate the growing presence of fervent nationalistic sentiment and the incorporation of Party rhetoric into elements of popular culture during the mid-1990s. This is not to say that individuals were wholly co-opted into the state’s ideology, but the appearance of such works indicates that the discourse of state ideology was pervasive. The revival of national humiliation discourse was also evident during the recent celebration of the PRC’s 60th anniversary, where user-submitted comments on the *People’s Daily* website boasted, “Proud to be Chinese! Never again will China be humiliated by foreign powers! China and Taiwan united will never be defeated!”

The influence of the state on the expression of Chinese nationalism was, perhaps, most visible in the reactions to NATO’s 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing,” Peter Hays Gries presents a number of letters that emerged in Chinese nationalistic discourse. For example, he cites a letter expressing a desire for China to be strong and united:

> Proud to be Chinese! Never again will China be humiliated by foreign powers! China and Taiwan united will never be defeated!

The letter writer expresses a strong desire for China to be strong and united, and this sentiment is echoed in many of the letters Gries presents. The influence of the state on the expression of Chinese nationalism was evident in these reactions, as well as in the discourse of state ideology that pervaded popular culture during the mid-1990s.”

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30 “Blessings to the Motherland,” postings on the *People’s Daily* website, 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the PRC, http://english.people.com.cn/90002/97623/index.html (accessed November 27, 2009). PRC refers to the People’s Republic of China, the government of mainland China which claims to have authority over the island of Taiwan, known formally as The Republic of China on Taiwan.
newspapers following the Belgrade bombing to argue that the outpouring of passionate—if not angry—nationalistic and patriotic sentiments in the aftermath of the bombing should be viewed as “genuine and understandable” rather than as byproducts of government-sponsored propaganda.\(^{31}\) However, while the emotion may have been genuine—and justifiable—the language utilized to express this emotion reflected the state-led patriotic education campaign and the revival of national humiliation discourse.

An article that appeared in the *People’s Daily*, for instance, was clearly framed by the discourse of national humiliation in its emphasis of the continued strength of China in the face of Western aggression:

> The wheel of history will not go backward. This is 1999, not 1899. This is not...the age when people can barge about the world in gunboats...It is not the age when the Western powers plundered the Imperial Palace at will, destroyed the Old Summer Palace, and seized Hong Kong and Macao...China is a China that has stood up; it is a China that defeated the Japanese fascists; it is a China that had a trial of strength and won victory over the United States on the Korean battleground. The Chinese people are not to be bullied, and China’s sovereignty and dignity are not to be violated...US-led NATO had better remember this.\(^{32}\)

Other authors similarly expressed anger over U.S. attempts to humiliate China and argued for China to reassert its sovereignty and take action against the U.S.\(^{33}\) While some might contend that the act of Chinese citizens demanding that the state exact an aggressive response is indicative of a “bottom-up” response, these demands nonetheless act to reinforce the notion of the Party as the “national will.”

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\(^{32}\) Han Zhongkun, “Zhongguo, bushi yibajijiu [This is Not 1899 China],” *People’s Daily*, May 12, 1999, translated and quoted in Gries, “Tears of Rage," 32.

\(^{33}\) Gries, “Tears of Rage,” 33, 37-40.
The presence of anti-Western patriotism underscored by the discourse of national humiliation is also evident in Peter Hessler’s firsthand account in *Oracle Bones*, which describes protesters shouting “Down with American imperialism!” and directing their anger at local American businesses like McDonald’s.\(^3^4\) Hessler also recounts conversations with local Chinese who rebuked the United States’ perception of itself as a world police power and occasionally brought up the legacy of the Opium War in the midst of venting their anger.\(^3^5\)

Thus, the reconstruction of state hegemony in the 1990s—what I call a velvet prison with Chinese characteristics—was fundamentally underscored by the ideology of patriotism and national humiliation. Just as Haraszti argues that socialist governments in Eastern Europe utilized “relics” to present themselves as the guardians of tradition,\(^3^6\) the CCP has also sought to exercise a monopoly on patriotism in order to direct such sentiment toward state legitimization and the support of Party authority. As seen in incidents like the Belgrade bombing, this policy had a significant impact on public discourse and the shaping of post-1989 culture. However, by invoking the ambiguous ideology of patriotism, the state also created a considerable “gray” area for cultural discourse—one that, by allowing a certain degree of tolerance for dissenters, also allowed individuals to transform the state and, therefore, to challenge the state’s attempt to exercise a monopoly on Chinese culture.

**THE PRAGMATIC SHIFT:**

**PUBLIC DISCOURSE WITHIN THE VELVET PRISON**

Although the state has acted to reinvent and reassert its hegemonic position, it does not possess a monopoly on cultural construction in post-1989 China. In part, this stems from the nature of the ideology of patriotism, which, as an ambiguous concept, has created a considerable “gray” area for public discourse. While the state has sometimes acted to visibly define the scope of patriotism through the use of force, events in post-1989 China tend to indicate that so long as China’s leaders or the

\(^{3^4}\) Hessler, 14-17.

\(^{3^5}\) Ibid., 22.

\(^{3^6}\) Haraszti, 111.
THE FORUM

authority of the Chinese Communist Party are not publicly attacked, all sorts of discourses are tolerated.37

In *The Velvet Prison*, Haraszti argues that although state socialism prescribes certain rules, the artist is not inherently constrained: “In our eyes the state represents not a monolithic body of rules but rather a live network of lobbies. We play with it, we know how to use it, and we have allies and enemies at the controls.”38 Likewise, post-1989 Chinese society has also been characterized by discourses articulated in the framework of state ideology. By doing so, individuals in China have been able to exact change on the state itself. Although changes may be minor and incremental, they nonetheless undermine the state’s attempt to exercise a monopoly on culture.

There are a number of reasons for the transition to a more “pragmatic dissent” in post-1989 China. A general fear of chaos and disorder seems particularly important. While many have written about the Party’s desire to avoid a return to the disorder of the Cultural Revolution or Tiananmen protests, few have acknowledged that the general population also has a vested interest in national stability. Chinese students, for example, became increasingly involved in the Party and less likely to voice idealistic opposition to state policy after the June 4 protests as self-interest and career advancement became predominant factors.39 Likewise, economic reform has left many individuals less willing to sacrifice the stability of the state, which is often viewed as an important source of material gain.40

Despite being less visible, this pragmatic approach has created profound developments in contemporary Chinese culture. By exploring three particular events—the publication of *China Can Say No*, the development of “cultural t-shirts,” and the “nail house” resistance to

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37 Liu, 57, 73.
38 Haraszti, 78-79.
government redevelopment—I hope to show how public discourse has operated within China’s velvet prison to counter the state’s attempts to monopolize Chinese culture.

**China Can Say No: Directing Nationalism at the Party**

Published in 1996, *China Can Say No* criticized Western—particularly U.S.—influence in China and became a major commercial success. Described by *Newsweek* as “a shrill anti-U.S. polemic,” the book was initially supported by the Chinese government as a genuine reflection of public opinion. Indeed, *China Can Say No* was so successful that it spurred a whole wave of “say no” literature that echoed the growing anti-American nationalism emerging in the 1990s. Actively trying to co-opt the discourse into the framework of pro-Party ideology, the state often confined negative reviews of such “say no” literature abroad to places like Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Yet, despite seeming to reflect the state’s patriotic and national humiliation rhetoric, *China Can Say No* undermined the government monopoly on nationalistic discourse. By projecting themselves as the embodiment of popular opinion and making claims that, essentially, made demands of the state, the authors of *China Can Say No* and other “say no” literature challenged the traditional dominance of the Party. Ben Xu remarks, “While [popular nationalists] direct their attack explicitly against foreigners, the present government is held implicitly to account for yielding too readily to foreign political and commercial demands and for surrendering China’s national dignity in the process.” It was this aspect of the “say no” literature that ultimately resulted in an about-face by the state, which openly criticized *China Can*...

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42 Peter Hays Gries, “Popular Nationalism and State Legitimation,” in *State and Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation*, 180-194 (see note 40), 186.

43 Ibid. 187.

Say No in December 1996, cracked down on the proliferation of “say no” literature, and banned the book’s sequel, China Can Still Say No.\textsuperscript{45}

Although the state ultimately suppressed the “say no” craze, these works still influenced the state’s development. Attempting to buttress its position as the embodiment of the nation’s will, government efforts to co-opt the expression of popular nationalism simultaneously required the state to infuse itself with “nonofficial discourse.” After reversing its position on China Can Say No, for example, the Party sought “to persuade the people to let the Party maintain its leading role in Chinese nationalism and foreign policy-making.”\textsuperscript{46} The publication of China Should Not Play ‘Mr. No’, for instance, praised the “righteous anger” of popular nationalists while also claiming that “emotion cannot substitute for policy.”\textsuperscript{47} While proclaiming the ultimate authority of the state, the response’s legitimization of popular nationalism also undermined the government’s claim to a monopoly on cultural construction—although citizens could not make policy, they could enter the debate of nationalism and exert pressure on the state.

“Cultural T-shirts”: Wearing the Nonofficial
Predating the “say no” craze, the appearance of so-called “cultural t-shirts” in Beijing in the early 1990s demonstrates the ability of “dissident” discourses to affect the state. The cultural t-shirts that appeared in 1991 were largely the work of entrepreneur-artist Kong Yongqian. Although he insisted that his widely successful t-shirt designs were not intended to be politically provocative, Kong’s shirts, in effect, used “nonofficial colloquial language to communicate sentiments that many people shared but were unable to give voice to in public.”\textsuperscript{48} In this regard, Kong’s shirts were an undeniably populist and nationalistic project.

In June of 1991, Kong was detained for questioning by the Chinese police, who told him that his shirts were the most serious political

\textsuperscript{45} Gries, “Popular Nationalism and State Legitimation,” 188.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Barmé, In the Red, 149.
incident in Beijing since June 4, 1989. His shirts were subsequently banned and his unsold merchandise was confiscated and destroyed. Yet, in the face of government opposition, Kong defended his shirts with patriotic language, arguing that he was simply trying to create an inexpensive product that reflected Beijing sentiments rather than those of Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the United States.

However, Kong’s t-shirts still possessed a populist element that profoundly threatened the state. According to Geremie Barmé:

The shirts would also provide people with an opportunity to release pent-up emotions and frustrations, regardless of whether they were personal, social, or political. It was this dimension of the t-shirt craze—that of a popular, unspoken conspiracy of self-expression writ in large in satirical and ironic terms—that the authorities may well have found unsettling.

As a “passive” mode of expression, Kong’s shirts allowed people to vent their opinions in a safe, non-confrontational manner that made it difficult for government authorities to silence. Moreover, by informalizing individual expression and allowing individuals to have control over nationalistic expression—in ways that often satirized official state rhetoric—Kong’s shirts significantly undermined the Party’s control over national identity discourse and weakened its ability to impose an ordered, cohesive national identity.

From the state’s perspective, Kong’s t-shirt designs were not only a challenge to state authority, but were also harmful to socialist morality. While detained, Kong’s interrogators scrutinized every detail of his designs, whether it was imagery that, they felt, projected the state as evil or his orientation of a particular Chinese character that they believed to be a reference to the Cultural Revolution.

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49 Ibid., 145.
50 Ibid., 151.
51 Ibid. 156.
52 Ibid.,161-162.
The t-shirt “Making Ends Meet,” which featured a large pocket containing documents such as a monthly bus pass, cloth and grain rations, meal tickets, a name card, and a secret bank account record, was of particular concern to the police, who accused Kong of being an anti-government activist. Suspicious of his inclusion of outdated government documents, many of which dated from the Mao period, the police chided, “You’re resentful of the government’s long-term policies, aren’t you?...Why do you despise the socialist system so much?” 53 While Kong defended his design and the inclusion of such outdated documents as an act of nostalgia, his work can nonetheless be seen as subversive for recalling images of China’s more austere past during a period in which the state preferred to emphasize the population’s dramatic material gain. In a similar manner, other t-shirt designs also subverted government ideology by borrowing commonly used government catchphrases.

53 Kong Yongqian, unpublished manuscript, translated and quoted in Barmé, In the Red, 162.
phrases—often satirizing official responses to the June 4 protests in the process—and by highlighting elements of Chinese society that officials often denied or preferred to ignore.

Kong’s shirts were eventually removed from the market, but, curiously, he was released from detainment after paying a small fine—a seemingly minor punishment for what the police had called the most serious political incident since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Meanwhile, similar, though less provocative shirts remained on the market. In fact, the government even tried to co-opt the t-shirt craze in support of its bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. However, the “barbed cynicism” still persisted in these cultural t-shirts and thus gradually became enmeshed within mainstream culture. While the “dissidence” may have been scaled back, these shirts nonetheless weakened state control on cultural construction and forced the state to accommodate exhibitions of individuality that had emerged outside of official culture.

“I Have a Responsibility to Protect this Place”: Challenging China’s “Urban Renewal”

Urbanization and “urban renewal” have been defining features of China’s road to “modernization” as the state has sought to remove “impediments to progress” and transform China “from a backward agricultural country” into an advanced industrial nation. In the years leading up to the 2008 Summer Olympics, Western media became fascinated by the wave of redevelopment sweeping across China. Images such as the Chongqing “nail house” were depicted as embodying “the discontent of people who are suddenly uprooted, told that they must make way for a new skyscraper or golf course or industrial zone.” In fact, The New York Times found the Chongqing nail house unusual for the reason that the owners were able to “hold out” for so long in a


country where many were arrested or even beaten for protesting eviction from their homes.\textsuperscript{56}

However, what is most intriguing is not that they resisted so visibly, but \textit{how} they framed their resistance. When asked about her resistance by the \textit{China Daily}, owner Wu Ping boldly stated, “I wanted to safeguard my dignity and lawful rights.”\textsuperscript{57} Coupled with the fact that the owners waved the PRC flag atop their home, the struggle emerged as a form of patriotism. The owners projected themselves not as opponents of the state, but as fighting to uphold the integrity of the state by using the law to obtain adequate compensation for a house that had been passed down through generations.

Peter Hessler provides a similar example in his profiling of Zhao Jingxin’s struggle to resist the demolition of his home in an old \textit{hutong} neighborhood. Like the owners of the “nail house,” Zhao justified his resistance in patriotic rhetoric, exclaiming, “This house is older than the

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

United States of America!” It was not a matter of money, Zhao explained to Hessler, “As a Chinese person, I have a responsibility to protect this place. I won’t leave willingly.”

Zhao’s suit against the government was one of many that occurred in the late 1990s. According to Hessler, successful suits received prominent coverage as a sign of government fairness. However, most failed and were never heard about in the public sphere. Irrespective of the inconsistent government response, the fact that citizens were able to use state rhetoric to question the government for the sake of their own personal interest represents a challenge to the state’s control over patriotic and cultural discourse. Not only must the state co-opt discontent through material reward (e.g., a new apartment and lofty financial compensation), but the state must also respond to challenges that demand that it to exemplify the rhetoric it has propagated to fortify its own legitimacy. That the proliferation of “nail house” protests spurred the passage of a new property law in 2007 indicates the extent to which the individual’s use of state rhetoric against the state has forced the Party to make incremental changes in order to maintain its hegemonic position.

**Culture Commercialized: Forces of a Market Economy**

Of the major trends in post-1989 China, the emergence of a vibrant market economy has been among the most visible and profound. While Deng Xiaoping tried to downplay the ideological contradictions of creating a quasi-capitalist system in a socialist state, the introduction of a market economy nevertheless exerts new forces on China that act on both the state and society.

Liu Kang has described popular commercial culture in China as a “new battleground” of culture and ideology wherein battles are waged

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58 Hessler, 177.
59 Ibid., 178.
60 Ibid., 181.
through “symbolic acts.” Similarly, Arif Dirlik has pointed out that China’s economic reforms have “changed life at the everyday level in transforming the habits of consumption—of culture no less than the commodities of everyday life.”

In addition, economic reform has significantly altered the ways in which citizens interact with the government. The state’s pragmatic approach towards economic development—which has, by all means, become a form of performative legitimacy—has allowed a considerable degree of freedom that influences not only the state-society relationship, but also the ways in which traditional state ideology is received. As Liu argues, “Political demystification and economic decentralization have drastically reduced the authority of the CCP leadership...[state ideology] is reduced to nothing more than political rhetoric in an increasingly pluralistic society.”

Yet, state influence still pervades commercial culture. The success of foreign corporations in China, for example, has simultaneously produced both “Westernization” and resistance. Reflecting the post-1989 nationalistic fervor, many Chinese have sought to develop competing brands and enterprises that more accurately reflect the “Chineseness” of economic reform.

In this regard, the forces of the market economy have become enmeshed into the construction of cultural identity and may come into conflict with the ideology of state-led patriotism and fears of renewed national humiliation.

**Symbolic Battles: Ideology and Advertisement**

A significant result of China’s market reforms has been the growth of private advertising. While advertising is often a manipulative act, Barmé has observed that in China, “[targeted advertising] was a marked contrast to the previous ways in which people were targeted”—commercial culture created a sense of “consumer empowerment” in which the

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62 Liu, 84.
64 Liu, 57.
consumers felt less like a product of state propaganda and more like an individual being catered to. However, consumer culture in China was neither a byproduct of propaganda nor a triumph of individualistic market forces. Instead, it became a realm of hybridized culture in which state rhetoric was present but often refashioned for the purposes of material gain.

While market reforms diminished the role of the state in the economy, the state has not remained neutral. In fact, it has often acted to funnel commercial culture into areas that reinforce state objectives. Jing Wang, for example, argues that “weekend culture in China is first and foremost an official discourse born from well-calculated state policy.” With the emergence of a number of consumer publications in the mid-1990s, the state acted to “[educate] the masses about how to consume cultural and commodity goods, and, above all, how to consume leisure itself.” Augmented by the introduction of a forty-hour workweek, the state’s leisure discourse promoted activities requiring capital expenditure in order to develop a culture of consumption that furthered economic growth and affirmed the Party’s role as a competent government. It was a culture that promoted “lifestyle shopping” and, infused with the ideologies of patriotism and national humiliation, became the source of the “modern construction of the spiritual civilization.”

However, as the state has acted to maintain its hegemonic position in post-1989 China, it has had to compete with trendier elements of global commercial culture that tend to enjoy greater mass appeal. In response, the state has tried to “modernize” its messages, using, in one particular case, neon slogan boards, computer images, and ad displays in Beijing to deliver the messages of a new “spiritual civilization” campaign. Influenced by the nearby success of “Kong-Tai” culture, the

66 Barmé, In the Red, 238.
68 Ibid., 74.
69 Barmé, In the Red, 240-241; Wang, 80.
70 Barmé, In the Red, 244.
state sought to refashion itself through new corporate identities, “modernized” journalism, and mainstream appeal.\textsuperscript{71}

But, just as the Party tried to further its appeal through commercial culture, commercial culture has manipulated state rhetoric in order to make a profit. An insecticide, for example, was advertised using language from a 1963 poem written by Mao, proclaiming, “Away with all pests!”\textsuperscript{72} In a similar manner, a vacuum commercial remarked, “dust won’t disappear of its own accord,” a clear reference to Mao’s declaration that reactionaries would have to be swept away like dust.\textsuperscript{73}

While it is not unusual for companies to employ official discourse for their own profit, the reformulated rhetoric in China is profound in that its use is fundamentally at odds with its ideological significance. On one hand, this reinforces the strength of the Party as part of society’s collective consciousness, but it also makes state rhetoric subject to the needs of individuals and diminishes its inherent meaning. While the Party remains in a position of authority, the symbols of its hegemony become malleable as the state, the market, and the individual construct their own cultural niches.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

China’s cultural development since 1989 has thus been underscored by a complex interaction between the state, society, and the market. I have argued that this relationship can be conceptualized as “a velvet prison with Chinese characteristics.” The events of Tiananmen Square have undoubtedly been significant in the construction of this velvet prison. In the aftermath of June 4, the state—that is, the Chinese Communist Party—acted quickly to reassert its claim to hegemony by utilizing the discourse of patriotism and by reviving the rhetoric of national humiliation.

While the state has been reasonably successful in establishing and maintaining its legitimacy, the ambiguous nature of its new hegemonic

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 245. “Kong-Tai” culture refers to the commercial culture of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 250. Mao’s poem was entitled “Reply to Comrade Kuo Mo-Jo.”

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
ideology, combined with the forces of economic reform, has allowed a considerable degree of individual freedom that has ultimately undermined the state’s ability to exercise a *monopoly* on the development of culture. Hence, while the state tries to control the evolution of Chinese culture from “the top,” individuals and economic forces simultaneously affect the state, resulting in new relationships that redefine the role of the state and the ways in which the populace understands its ideology.

Moreover, the success of the penetration of state ideology has been a double-edged sword. While the diffusion of patriotic and national humiliation based discourses have often been useful in developing a pro-government mentality, groups and individuals have been able to use official ideology to make demands of the state and challenge the legitimacy of the state’s claims.

The CCP’s recent commitment to the development of a “harmonious society” attests to the changing nature of state power. Although “harmonious society” may imply a silencing of dissidence, harmony is also a concept based upon the synthesis of different elements. While this does not include “dissonant” elements, it does represent a departure from previous generations that sought to impose a monolithic cultural and economic order. In this regard, it seems that China’s future will be marked by the continued interaction of “a live network of lobbies” that further transform Chinese culture within the framework of China’s velvet prison.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


THE HOUSEWIFE’S BATTLE ON THE HOME FRONT: WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II ADVERTISEMENTS

By Caroline Cornell

A 1944 advertisement for Swift’s Beef in Good Housekeeping boldly proclaimed, “Her SEVEN jobs all help win the war!” The seven “jobs” were tasks that the Swift Company—as well as the U.S. government—believed that women on the home front should perform in order to aid their country during World War II. Among the tasks promoted by the advertisement were rationing, the growing of “victory gardens,” salvaging and recycling, and the purchasing of war bonds. Though the advertisement claimed that these responsibilities “all help win the war,” each of the jobs described centered around household activities. Despite the fact that the Swift’s Beef advertisement gave agency to American women by claiming they could impact the success of the war, it still emphasized their femininity by giving primacy to the roles of wife and mother and by utilizing an image of a Red Cross volunteer as their “war worker,” not a woman working in the war industry.

1 “Her Seven Jobs Help Win the War,” Swift’s Brands of Beef, Advertisement, Good Housekeeping, January 1944, 15.
The Good Housekeeping advertisement exemplifies how World War II advertisements not only frequently targeted American women to aid the war effort, but also placed the responsibility of obtaining victory in the hands of the housewife. To some, this may appear as a surprising contrast to the popular image of “Rosie the Riveter” that tends to dominate modern-day conceptions of the representation of American women during World War II. In this paper, however, I will argue that, although women were entering the workforce in large numbers during World War II, the U.S. government and the advertising industry believed American housewives to be as vital to the war’s success as “Rosie the Riveter.” While numerous scholars argue that housewives were a major contributing factor to America’s victory in World War II, they often neglect the ways in which advertisements largely ignored the roles of working women during the war. World War II era advertisements and posters glorified and elevated the status of the housewife, which, I will argue, encouraged women to remain in a sphere of domesticity during, as well as after, the war.

To fully comprehend the depiction of American women in advertisements, it is important to look at advertisements created by both the U.S. government and private American companies during the war. T.J. Jackson Lears has used the term “hegemony” to describe the ways in which a particular ruling class relies on various intellectual groups to establish a society’s conventional wisdom. This relationship was evident during World War II when the attacks on Pearl Harbor not only caused the U.S. government to enter World War II, but also to enter a partnership with the advertising industry. This intimate relationship is apparent in the creation of the War Advertising Council in 1942, wherein the government and private industry began a string of advertisements aimed at directly shaping the opinion of the American public.

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Lears’s observations on the “therapeutic ethos” are also applicable to World War II advertisements as advertisers began to make greater use of therapeutic and psychological techniques to attract the attention of consumers and sell their products or ideas. Because the war was an extremely emotional time for families at home, it was easy for advertisers to utilize these tactics.

While the U.S. government used the advertising industry as a vehicle for the dispersion of messages to the masses, advertisers also had numerous motives in entering a partnership with the government. In exploring the relationships between the U.S. government and the advertising industry throughout World War II, both Robert Griffith and Mark Leff have argued that the advertising industry used the war as a means to lift the industry from its dire financial state. While Griffith highlights the immense profit reaped by advertisers during the war, Leff goes further and labels the industry’s motivations as selfish. Moreover, Leff contends that such self-interest was representative of the general American population. He claims that because Americans were distanced from the physical conflict of the wars in Europe and the Pacific, the government had to work harder to convince Americans that they ought to sacrifice goods and luxuries to aid the war effort. In this sense, the creation of the War Advertising Council was as essential for the struggling advertising industry as it was for the Office of War Information, which relied on influential advertisements to sway public opinion. Understanding these “selfish motives” provides insight into the underlying messages of many World War II advertisements and their intended audience—which was, in many cases, women.

Though both Griffith and Leff recognize conflicting motives within the creation of advertisements, they ignore how the government, as well as the advertising industry, targeted the American housewife. They also fail to recognize and analyze why household advertisements

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4 Lears, 21.
5 Griffith, 391.
Caroline Cornell

peaked during the war years, an observation duly noted by Russell Belk and Richard Pollay. That domestic-centered advertisements peaked during the war years suggests not only that the government and the advertising industry were deliberately targeting a particular demographic, but also suggests that they were consciously emphasizing that women should return to their “proper places” at home at the conclusion of the war.

The emphasis on encouraging women to remain at home is evident in advertisements concerning rationing policies. Such advertisements portrayed the housewife as critical to the success of rationing policies and simultaneously encouraged women to continue with their domestic duties by exalting their daily tasks as critical to the war’s success. Advertisements not only called on women to buy groceries according to rationing policies, but also included ways that women could cope with rationing and product scarcity. Rationing coupons became a common accessory when women went grocery shopping, and housewives had to learn how to alter their favorite recipes due to the scarcity of certain ingredients. Traditionally imported goods, including sugar, spices, coffee, and tin (used for canned food), became extremely hard to acquire since crops were often ravaged by war or difficult to transport due to fuel shortages. Advertisements also called on American women to help enforce rationing policies and recognized that because females made up the majority of the consumer population buying groceries, they had a large amount of influence on whether or not the policies were successful.

John D. Morris, a journalist for The New York Times, stressed the importance of female consumers and urged them to use their influence to directly aid the government with rationing. As a congressional affairs correspondent, Morris called on housewives to help the government end the problem of black markets and counterfeit coupons, which had become a negative consequence of the food rationing policies and were

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harming the war economy. While discussing meat rationing in one of his articles, Morris stated “enforcement will be aided if a housewife reports to her ration board that her neighbor has plenty of meat, while she herself is limited to, say, two pounds a week.”

This direct call to American housewives demonstrates the belief that cooperation from American housewives was essential to the success of rationing policies. Although Morris’s call to action indicates a suspicion that some women were abusing rationing policies, it also encourages other housewives to combat the criminal acts by using the simple tasks that they already performed before the war—acts like grocery shopping and snooping out their neighbors. This trust in American women added an element of respect and admiration to their daily routine, and showed the belief that they could not only be relied on to carry out rationing policies, but could also be necessary allies for the battle on the home front.

Instead of emphasizing the national importance of implementing rationing policies, some American companies chose to manipulate existing frustrations that women had concerning rationing in order to gain a profit. Rationing had forced many women to alter their favorite recipes to accommodate the lack of certain ingredients. In response to this, numerous cookbooks emerged advertising recipes that suited limited ingredients—such as “sugarless recipes”—while continuing to ensure quality, well-balanced meals. A 1940s cookbook compiled by Marion White, for example, was described as “a ‘must’ for every American housewife,” and promised female consumers that they would “never worry about sugar rationing with this thrilling book which tells you how to make tempting, tasty, delicious desserts without sugar.”

This shows how the advertisers and the cookbook company automatically connected the task of rationing with housewives, and implied that one was an inadequate wife and mother if they did not adhere to their patriotic duties. Not only did cookbooks like Marion White’s serve as an example of how companies used wartime conditions to sell their prod-

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ucts, but it also epitomizes the ways in which housewives were specifically targeted and believed to be the leading force in policies relating to consumption.

Some food companies opted for a more indirect approach to advertising when dealing with rationing by including recipes that were suited for the war environment. A 1944 Swift’s Beef advertisement provides an example of this strategy. The advertisement included a pot roast recipe with a statement that urged women to pay close attention while cooking to preserve the nutritional value of their food and make the most of their meat, which was hard to come by due to food shortages. The advertisement recognized that housewives were significantly affected by rationing policies and thus tried to help them maintain their supremacy in the kitchen despite the resulting hardships of the period. It also links the recipe with the product’s name in order to maintain brand recognition both during and after the war. By helping consumers deal with restrictions on food products, companies were also able to create a positive image for themselves when housewives were able to purchase their products again.

The government also relied on advertisements in order to promote solutions to the drastic decrease in the amount of available food as a consequence of the war, particularly shortages of produce. “Victory gardens” were commonly advertised as an answer to the problems brought on by rationing and were presented as both a way for women to help feed their own families and a means to aid the government by decreasing the amount of dependence on American farmers. Women were urged to grow their own vegetables—about 20 million Americans eventually planted victory gardens and community gardens were set up in some towns using available vacant plots of land. Advertisements created by the War Advertising Council urged Americans, mainly

11 “Her Seven Jobs Help Win the War.” Swift’s Brands of Beef Advertisement.
women, to not only grow their own vegetables, but to can their produce to save for the winter.

One such advertisement featured a mother and daughter canning the vegetables from their garden. The girl is pictured asking her mother, “We’ll have lots to eat this winter, won’t we mother?” The mother is featured smiling and at the bottom of the page the advertisement states, “Grow your own, can your own.” The advertisement employs a therapeutic ethos by picturing a mother and daughter and by delivering the message that if women grow their own victory gardens, they will be able to support their families with a sufficient amount of vegetables that may not be available if they were to rely solely on American farmers. The daughter toys with the emotions of American women by urging them to view victory gardens as a necessity to protect their family from going hungry, and thus, by encouraging them to tend their gardens, the advertisement is able to advocate that women remain at home.

Recognizing that American women desired a quick end to the war, advertisements encouraging women to salvage and recycle materials sought to establish a direct relationship between the home and the battlefield, that would make women more receptive to the idea that their daily actions affected the outcome of the war. Magazine articles “called out” American women and argued that they were the reasons why the battle on the home front was failing. An article in *Life* stated that women had to help the country by conserving fats and tin, and attacked them by saying, “Just remember that everything your family consumes retards the war effort.” Though the article specifically relates to the failures of domestic consumption policies, the attribution of blame relative to the war effort recognizes housewives as the predominant “fighting force” at home.

Not only were women recognized as “fighters” at home, scholars have argued that advertisements and war campaigns caused a complete

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militarization of the household. Typical household chores were turned into “weapons of war,” which is especially evident with political posters urging women to aid salvaging and recycling efforts.\(^\text{15}\) A poster created by the War Production Board in 1941, which encouraged citizens to salvage their tin cans, highlighted how they believed American women had a direct impact on the success of the war overseas. It boldly stated, “Save Your Cans: Help Pass the Ammunition,” and lists the four steps that one must take to “Prepare your tin cans for war.” The poster pictures a woman’s arm holding a line of tin cans that eventually turn into bullets for a fighting soldier’s machine gun.\(^\text{16}\) This poster illustrates how the government used advertisements and posters to convince American women that their salvaging and recycling habits at home directly influenced the fighting occurring in Europe and the Pacific. The argument that the typical household became a direct extension of the battlefields that American soldiers were fighting on helped to add importance to the daily tasks conducted by housewives.

Despite the fact that numerous advertisements assisted in militarizing the role of the housewife, Maureen Honey argues that working women were seen as the bold heroines of the decade. Housewives, according to Honey, were depicted as the symbols of American values and virtues that had to be safeguarded.\(^\text{17}\) Even though both groups of women contributed greatly to the war effort, the housewife was not portrayed to be as passive as Honey claims, especially if her household tasks were viewed as “weapons of war.” By portraying these women as directly aiding and partaking in the war effort, advertisers portrayed their contributions from home to be equivalent to those made by women working in the factories and war industry.

Along with increasing the importance of the jobs and duties of American housewives during World War II, advertisements still advo-


cated that women follow their obligations as wives and mothers. The images commonly remembered today—such as the famous “Rosie the Riveter” image—were certainly present during the war years, but became less visible as the war came to a conclusion. Although Maureen Honey seems to emphasize the image of working women above the housewife during World War II, she does detail this shift in the portrayal of both groups and shows how even advertisements that did focus on the working mother sometimes included statements reiterating the temporality of roles as a working woman. That advertisers felt the need to state that jobs held by women during the war were purely provisional indicates a dramatic contrast to today’s image of female industry workers as wartime “heroines.” Indeed, it suggests that advertisers did not fully accept the new roles women occupied and expected post-war society to return to more conservative gender roles.

An advertisement for the Adel Manufacturing Company featured in a 1944 Saturday Evening Post illustrates this emphasis on temporary occupation. In the advertisement, a mother is pictured in overalls leaning on her bike before she leaves for work. Her daughter is pictured in a similar outfit and asks, “Mother, when will you stay home again?” Above the image a statement reads, “Some jubilant day mother will stay home again, doing the job she likes best—making a home for you and daddy…Meanwhile she’s learning the vital importance of precision in equipment made by ADEL. In her post-war home she’ll want appliances with the same high degree of precision.” Though the advertisement recognizes the importance of the female worker in helping the war effort, it clearly points out that women should return to the home once the war ends. The advertisement also seizes on the emotions of American females, utilizing a therapeutic ethos once again to make it appear that she is harming her children if she does not return to her duties at home and implements particular words that are charged with this sentiment. Phrases like “jubilant day” and “will stay home

18 Ibid., 124.
19 “Mother, when will you stay home again?” Adel Manufacturing Company, Advertisement, in Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 125.
again” suggest that her place in the workforce is only positive because it is temporarily filling an essential void in support of the war and that she should revert to her “housewife occupation” as soon as possible. Though advertisements often pictured working women, and regularly cast them in a positive light, the fact that some advertisements viewed females in the workplace as only a temporary advantage shows that companies were still hesitant for women to abandon their responsibilities at home and enter the work force permanently.

The encouragement found in advertisements for women to remain at home both during and after the war went so far as to urge them to take control of areas in their household that they typically did not manage. Despite the fact that women were not the main contributors to their family’s income, they were given the task to budget their family’s finances in order to set aside money for purchasing war bonds that directly funded the war abroad. The government created war bonds, modeled on the Liberty Bonds of World War I, as a way for American citizens to help fund the war effort by essentially loaning the government money along with a fixed interest rate. Numerous advertisements targeted women to purchase these war bonds and emphasized that by doing so, they would be doing their part to aid the war effort. This was seen in an advertisement created by the War Advertising Council that outlined the different tasks women could do, which read, “Help bring them back to you—Make yours a victory home!” The advertisement features a home with a blue star hanging in the window (signifying that someone in the family was serving in the military) and states as their last bullet-point that women should save 10% of their household’s income to purchase war bonds.20 By having a blue star as the main focus of the advertisement it targets the emotions of numerous American women who had husbands, sons, brothers, or other loved ones fighting in the war. The advertisement seems to claim that, by purchasing war bonds and assisting the war effort, women could help to

end the war and bring their men home—an convincing incentive for women to purchase war bonds.

Women responded to these advertisements by purchasing war bonds in large numbers. Mary Appling, a college student during the war, remembers that there were war bond sales at the high school she worked at. Appling remembers, “After several years I had amassed $1500 worth of $25 bonds, at $18.50 per purchase. That was not a lot, but my salary was only about $1900 yearly during the time.”21 This shows that advertisements for war bonds were successful since women were going beyond setting aside saved money and putting the majority of their income towards the purchasing of war bonds. Not only were women tightening their purchasing habits, but they were able to supply the government with an emergency amount of revenue for the war.

War bonds were also advertised as a means for women to aid the success of the post-war economy by saving money for the household appliances that would become available after the war. Advertisements showed that if women cut down on consumption during the war in order to purchase war bonds it would not only result in a war victory, but would have a major impact on the post-war economy when women were able to purchase products for their homes again. Numerous advertisements displayed in Ladies’ Home Journal and Good Housekeeping show how companies were targeting women to continue to buy and consume the products that were available to them, as well as to save money in anticipation for the products that would be available during peacetime.22 An advertisement for Emerson Electric home appliances stated, “The war bonds you buy today will pay for the new appliances and comfort conveniences you’ll want after victory.”23 The company encouraged women to save their money in order to buy war bonds that

23 Emerson Electric Motors, Emerson Electric Company, Advertisement, Good Housekeeping, March 1944, 139.
would not only help the current war effort, but would allow them to purchase the new technology available to them after the war. By purchasing new appliances and returning to their former consumption habits, housewives would be able to maintain their respected position after the war ended by improving the post-war economy.

Today the image of “Rosie the Riveter” is often revered as a symbol of the empowered women who served as heroines on the home front during World War II. However, a broader examination of the portrayal of women during World War II suggests that the housewife was more visibly depicted as a contributor to the fight for democracy overseas. Advertisements from the war also show that the dominant opinion of those in the advertising industry and government was that the home—not the workplace—was the proper place for American women. Advertisements frequently pictured housewives as the leading force behind the success of rationing policies, recycling efforts, and the purchasing of war bonds. Housewives were also viewed positively for their role as consumers, which made them crucial to aiding the post-war economy.

Taken together, these factors indicate a profound difference between present-day perceptions of “women on the home front” and the actual roles of women that were stressed during World War II. Though the wartime housewife is often overlooked today, she was the primary target for advertisements by the government and private corporations throughout the World War II period. Although advertisers were certainly influenced by financial motivations, the consequence of their work was an elevation of the domestic sphere, such that the American housewife was often portrayed as integral to the war’s success in a manner that was both respectful and empowering.


“What Women Can Do: Think War, Buy Little, Maintain Our Ideals.” *Life*, September 28, 1942, 32.

“THE CHINA LOBBY”: INFLUENCES ON U.S.-CHINA FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST WAR PERIOD, 1949-1954

By Jeff Blackwell

Generally defined, the “China Lobby” was a broad network of people, both foreign and domestic, whose interests coalesced around the goal of overthrowing of communism in China. It consisted of well-financed Nationalist Chinese officials in collaboration with right-wing U.S. political elites who worked toward the common goal of supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s recovery of mainland China from Mao Zedong and the Communist forces. Aided by the anticommunist environment of the 1950s, the Lobby’s loose affiliation of influential individuals—including associates in the private sector, media, and politics—exerted considerable pressure on U.S. foreign policy decisions concerning China.

It is important to note that the term “lobby” in the United States usually describes a private group that attempts to influence policy.

Though similar, the China Lobby encompassed a more broadly based consensus of individuals that cooperated in the promotion of anticommunism and a pro-Chiang U.S. policy. Indeed, the Lobby operated in an unconventional manner and existed without any particular leader or organization at its center. Yet, it effectively exerted significant pressures on the U.S. government without going through regular channels of diplomacy. Moreover, the Lobby took advantage of U.S. anticommmunist sentiments by circulating propaganda associating support of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime with loyalty to the United States and the advocacy of democracy abroad.

This study will examine how the China Lobby attempted to influence U.S. foreign policy toward a pro-Chinese Nationalist agenda in the 1950s. Using various tactics, including use of political lobbying, sympathetic media outlets, and attacks on critics of pro-Nationalist policy, the China Lobby distorted public and political perceptions regarding U.S. policy toward China and effectively promoted a pro-Chiang Kai-shek foreign policy. Indeed, the China Lobby indeed held significant sway over U.S. foreign policy after 1949 and, particularly after Mao’s victory in mainland China and the subsequent U.S. involvement in the Korean War, made use of an increasingly receptive American public as the domestic climate in the United States became increasingly anticommunist.

This examination of the China Lobby will scrutinize the organization’s political influence during the period 1949-1954 and will address the following questions: What was the China Lobby? Who were members of the China Lobby? How, and why, did it form? What means did the Lobby use to influence U.S.-China foreign policy? And, were the Lobby’s efforts successful in exerting pressure on U.S. foreign policy regarding China?

At the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, U.S-China relations had reached an impasse. The Communists had defeated Chiang-Kai-shek’s forces and created a conundrum for U.S. policymakers. Many had not foreseen the Communist victory and Chiang’s virtual exile to the island of Taiwan raised new dilemmas for policy and exacerbated
fears of Communist domination of Asia. As a Communist invasion of the island seemed inevitable, the U.S. weighed its options.

U.S. policymakers were divided on the issue of whether to defend Chiang on Taiwan if the Communists invaded. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had dealt with Chiang extensively in WWII, preferred to abandon the island, noting that if any of Chiang’s disciples controlled the island it was doomed to fall to the Communists. For Acheson, the primary goal was to wean Mao Zedong away from Stalin and Soviet domination, thereby driving a wedge between the Communist states. However, prominent Republican Senators William Knowland and Robert Taft, joined by former President Herbert Hoover, vehemently opposed such a course and demanded that the U.S. protect Taiwan.²

President Truman tended to agree with Acheson. In January 1950, Truman issued a statement declaring that, while the U.S. would give Taiwan financial assistance, U.S. military forces would not intervene should the island fall victim to a Communist attack.³ Furthermore, the current situation seemed to present a favorable opportunity for formalized relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The strongest opposition to formalizing relations with the PRC rested with Chiang’s supporters in public office, but even they saw the bleak reality of the Chinese Nationalist cause. Yet, in late June of 1955, any hope of Acheson’s policy coming to fruition was unhinged by the outbreak of the Korean War and the eventual Chinese involvement in the conflict. Chiang Kai-shek supporters capitalized on the surge of U.S. anticommunism and challenged the existing “China policy.”

The China Lobby coalesced in this political climate, bringing together people with differing motives and varying degrees of interest in China under the ideological banner of anticommunism. They constituted a diverse and disparate group of individuals composed of both public and private interests, including ardent supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and those more interested in using the Lobby’s influence to further their own agenda. Regardless of origin, the China Lobby

³ Ibid., 170.
association, ranging from religious leaders and businessmen to politicians and journalists, coalesced in a common purpose of anticom- munism and the Chinese Nationalist cause.

Part of the China Lobby’s success was due to the lack of centralized structural organization. Even in contemporary studies a precise definition of who the China Lobby consisted of is difficult to ascertain. Indeed, the Lobby was certainly a mysterious entity in the 1950s. As The New York Times reported in 1951, “The China Lobby, despite references to it in and outside Congress, never has been presented in any tangible shape.”4 However, despite the mystery surrounding the organization, particular individuals were unquestionably involved in the advocating the Lobby’s agenda.

Although members were all influential in their own right, among the more notable was Alfred Kohlberg, a wealthy New York businessman who would later become a fanatical anticommunist and pro-Chiang supporter. He published over a dozen articles attacking the United States’ non-interventionist policy toward China and those that supported it and subsidized at least two magazines supporting his views. He would also serve as chairman of the board of the American Chinese Policy Association (ACPA), an organization that surpassed all others in its directness of attacks on U.S. policy in China and contained considerable influence in Congress.5

Another intriguing affiliate of the China Lobby was Henry R. Luce, publisher of Time and Life newsmagazines. Luce held an ardent conviction that China was a prime target for U.S. uplift—whether as a model of political and economic development, religious faith, or diplomatic and military support. He also believed that Americans had a categorical obligation to fulfill in China’s national destiny. Unsurprisingly, he made Chiang Kai-shek the cover story of Time magazine a record ten times.6 Henry Luce’s role in advocating the

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5 Koen, 50.
China Lobby’s agenda through his media outlets was a fundamental aspect to the China Lobby’s success.

In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious in the Chinese Civil War, Lobby supporter’s worst fears were confirmed about the spread of communism in Asia. The Communist victory shocked many Americans, who had often associated Chiang’s regime with the efforts to establish democracy in China. In the minds of many Americans, the Communist victory was also equated a victory for the Soviet Union. Due to this perception, a large portion of the public, the press, and the membership of Congress came to believe the charge that Chiang had been “sold out” by the U.S. government. The development of closer relations between Peking and Moscow following the Communist victory, combined with the anticommunist feeling this engendered in the United States, made such allegations seem all the more justified.

In response to accusations that the U.S. had abandoned Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. Department of State released the “China White Paper,” a massive volume of documents and explanations to justify its policy of disengagement from the beleaguered Nationalist cause. By emphasizing the fact that the United States was not responsible for the fall of the Nationalist regime, the State Department sought to mollify opponents of its non-interventionist China policy, or at least to justify that policy to the American public in general. The effort failed, however, and provided the Republican Party with a useful political issue. Conservative members of the Republican Party saw their opportunity to deride the Truman administration’s handling of events in China, and they attached their interests to those of the China Lobby. In the years to follow, the China Lobby bitterly charged that the State Department had “betrayed” Chiang, the United States’ wartime ally, and launched campaigns to identify those allegedly responsible for the “loss” of China to Communist forces. In this alarmist climate, the “loss” of China debate helped to accelerate the momentum of the China Lobby.

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7 Koen, 13.
The Lobby’s hope for the success its agenda increased exponentially in June of 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel in a massive invasion of South Korea. Once the U.S. decided to defend South Korea, it would be increasingly difficult to explain why Taiwan should not also be defended. If the Chinese Communists attacked the island and simultaneously interfered with the defense of South Korea, the Truman administration would be terribly vulnerable to attacks from Chiang’s supporters in the U.S. When Chinese forces eventually became involved in the conflict, U.S. opposition to Mao’s regime hardened and simultaneously widened the circle of Americans who sought Chiang’s return to power.

As the climate of anticommunist ardor increased in the U.S., Senate hearings were held in April of 1950 to investigate Senator Joseph McCarthy’s accusations that State Department officials and some experts on China had been involved in a pro-communist conspiracy to influence the Truman administration’s China policy. Popularized during the Senate hearings, the term “China Lobby” came into use at this time. The phrase gained greater prominence in June and July 1951, during the Senate hearings on Truman’s removal of General Douglas MacArthur from his command in Korea. The subject of the China Lobby was introduced because MacArthur argued, in line with the China Lobby’s charges, that General George Marshall’s mission to China in 1945-1946 had been “one of the greatest blunders in American history.” Pro-Chiang forces had criticized Marshall for having attempted to force Chiang into a political alliance with the Communists, and later, as Secretary of State, for having allegedly sabotaged U.S. aid to Chiang, therefore guaranteeing the “loss” of China to the Communists. Secretary of State Dean Acheson countered MacArthur’s allegations by announcing that Truman had instructed all relevant government agencies to investigate the activities of the China Lobby.

In support of Acheson, Oregon Senator Wayne Morse asserted that “the China Lobby,” or the group supporting Chiang Kai-shek, had

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10 Ibid.
“for several years been conducting a violent campaign against American policies in China.”\textsuperscript{11} Alfred Kohlberg, retorted, “The real ‘China Lobby’ is the pro-Communist lobby within the State Department.”\textsuperscript{12} In response to the investigation, pro-Chiang forces denounced Acheson and demanded an investigation of “pro-Communist” China lobbies within the administration.

The congressional investigation of the China Lobby led by Senator Morse and others produced less than substantial findings. The probe had unearthed little in terms of concrete information about the operation of the Lobby despite clear indications that a substantial amount of money, largely from undisclosed sources, had been expended for a pro-Nationalist publicity and propaganda campaign and that a very close connection existed between the campaign and “certain politicians and public figures.”\textsuperscript{13} In the meantime, China Lobby forces, galvanized by the heightened voice among anti-Communist crusaders in Congress during the Korean War, intensified their efforts to discredit the administration’s China policy and to advocate continuing support of Chiang. Indeed, in the fierce anti-Communist climate of the time, the Lobby’s message found wide support, and critics of the Lobby exposed themselves to harsh censure from pro-Chiang advocates.

A major characteristic of the China Lobby was the way it propagated its arguments to the public. Indeed, the China Lobby became controversial for its extraordinary ability to discredit State Department officials and others for “betrayal” and “treason.” In historian Ross Koen’s view, “the China lobby was so successful in securing [public] acceptance of its explanation of America’s role in the Far East...because its propaganda exploited...the absence of an informed understanding of events in China”\textsuperscript{14} Such tactics appeared to have swayed a wide variety of Americans against the U.S. government’s policies toward China by

\textsuperscript{14} Koen, 22-23.
effectively utilizing propaganda that identified Chiang’s regime with American ideals and contended that Americans had a special responsibility for China’s development.

One of the ways that the China Lobby influenced public opinion and pressured foreign policy decisions regarding China was to form committees. The most active of these committees was the ACPA. From its creation in the 1940s until 1953, the ACPA published a tremendous volume of literature in the form of letters, pamphlets, brochures, reprints of Communist directives, press releases, and book reviews. Most of these were prepared and published in the office of Alfred Kohlb erg, who tirelessly advocated the China Lobby’s agenda through the efforts of the ACPA. Among the other influential committees were the China Emergency Committee and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist. Not surprisingly, these various committees consisted of a similar membership. Thus, to a large degree, these committees’ agendas blurred together, and they coordinated their efforts to achieve the most widespread effect on public opinion and foreign policy decisions.

Another committee that efficiently swayed foreign policy decisions regarding China was the Committee of One Million. The idea of the committee was conceived in October 1953 by Marvin Liebman, in partnership with Senator Walter Judd and Count Nicolas De Rochemfort, with the intention of initiating a petition listing eight reasons opposing Communist China to the United Nations. The petition would be presented to a broad list of VIP’s in Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, with the goal of giving the petition legitimacy when it was published in a newspaper advertisement to solicit more signatures.

Among the more prominent members to sign the initial petition were former President Herbert Hoover and former Ambassador Joseph C. Grewt. Eventually garnering over one million signatures—hence the Committee of One Million—the petition’s signers included: forty-nine members of Congress (twenty-three of whom were Democrats), twelve

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15 Ibid., 51-52.
16 Ibid., 54.
governors, twenty retired generals and admirals (including General George C. Marshall), fourteen prominent religious leaders, and numerous scientists, educators, and business leaders.\(^{17}\) *The New York Times* reported at the time that New York’s four most prominent veteran’s organizations were mobilizing to collect signatures for the petition. According to the petitions spokesman, it was “a protest against the indignities to which those Chinese have been subjected by the ugly dogma and practice of international Communist imperialism.”\(^{18}\) At the collection of the millionth signature, the petition was presented to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who received the initial signatories in the White House and allowed Judd to make his case for denying the Communist China membership in the United Nations. It is difficult to assess how effective the petition was on President Eisenhower, yet at a news conference on July 7, 1953 Eisenhower announced that he would oppose Communist China’s admittance to the UN.\(^{19}\) In this instance, it does not seem unreasonable to speculate that the China Lobby did indeed help to sway foreign policy decisions concerning China.

Another means by which the China Lobby sought to influence foreign policy was through the media, undoubtedly one of the most efficient ways to disseminate propaganda. Alfred Kohlberg alone subsidized the pro-Chiang magazines *The China Monthly* and *Plain Talk* as outlets to denounce United States policy in China. Articles from *The China Monthly* frequently found their way into the congressional record, and the magazine has been cited as a source of China Lobby propaganda in congressional hearings.\(^{20}\) Moreover, *The China Monthly* frequently served as the major organ for the dissemination of the views of Americans associated with the China Lobby. In fact, neither magazine served not as a financially viable business, they were primarily mouthpieces for the diffusion of propaganda critical of U.S. foreign policy toward China.

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\(^{19}\) Bachrack, 81.

\(^{20}\) Koen, 49-50.
A number of other influential publications also helped to advocate the agenda of the Chinese National Government and the China Lobby. Foremost among these publications were Collier’s, The Saturday Evening Post, Readers Digest, U.S. News and World Report, and both Time and Life newsmagazines. Additionally, newspapers such as The Washington Times-Herald, the Los Angeles Examiner, the San Francisco Examiner, and the Oakland Tribune were also consistent in their criticism of U.S. policy and in their defense of the Chinese Nationalist cause. As the anticommunist climate grew in the U.S. during the decade of the 1950s, the tendency for the press to accept the viewpoint of the China Lobby also expanded. By the mid-1950s the prevalence of the China Lobby influenced bias in the press was near universal.

For example, Chiang’s most influential American friend, Henry Luce, turned Time and Life newsmagazines into advocates for the Chinese Nationalist Party. A fiercely partisan Republican, Luce readily blamed Democrats of denying Chiang essential aid and portrayed the Nationalists as an anticommmunist bulwark. These concerns, combined with his aspirations for a U.S.-influenced China, led him into a loose affiliation of pro-Chiang advocates, later called the China Lobby. Luce became one of the more prominent members of the Lobby’s associates, both due to his wealth and prominence, as well as for his proficiency at disseminating pro-Chiang propaganda to the American public. Using Time Inc.’s media outlets—including its magazines, films, and radio programs—Luce conveyed his conception of a China advancing under Chiang’s leadership with U.S. patronage. The exact number of copies of Time and Life that were sold during this period is uncertain, but by biographer W.A. Swanberg’s estimate, Luce stood guilty of “manipulating 50 million people weekly.”

Another aspect of the use of media to disseminate pro-Chiang propaganda and change U.S. policy towards China was the effort to discredit Far Eastern experts who did not continue to embrace the
Nationalist cause after the Communist victory. After Chiang’s defeat, such Far Eastern experts had come to believe that the Chinese Revolution had run its course and the future of mainland China no longer involved Chiang as an eventual leader. These experts constituted a small number of individuals and tended to maintain close ties and associations. Partly due to this intimacy, the close association of the Far Eastern experts tended to create the impression of unanimity on China policy, which substantially increased the impact of these scholars’ views on the American public.

Due to this apparent accord amongst the small group of Far Eastern experts, the China Lobby set about to discredit this prevailing school of thought. To this end, Lobby members began to levy the charge that China specialists had expressed a lack of belief in Chiang, a conviction in the ultimate triumph of the Communists, and had ultimately contributed to Mao’s victory. In the context of the growing anticommmunist climate in the United States, this accusation allowed the China Lobby to make an effective case for its attack on U.S. foreign policy. Accusations involving Communist sympathy and the use of Communist sources were therefore adopted early on in the attempt to discredit China specialists that were not pro-Chiang.

As these attacks were being written and published, they also began to gain public exposure through the congressional investigation of Owen Lattimore. Lattimore was a well-known Far Eastern specialist and writer who had traveled extensively in China and was generally recognized amongst scholars as an expert on the interior areas of China and Mongolia. He was also an ideal target for the China Lobby. By damaging Lattimore’s reputation and his legitimacy as a Far Eastern scholar, the China Lobby could more effectively advocate the viewpoint of a pro-Chiang U.S. policy to the American public. By voicing a pro-Chiang U.S. policy through the outlet of scholarly expertise, the China Lobby could go a long way in promoting their agenda.

The China Lobby’s attack on Owen Lattimore may have begun primarily because of Alfred Kohlberg’s unsuccessful attempt to gain control over the Institute for Pacific Relations. The campaign to discredit Lattimore continued for nearly five years, carried on primarily
through Kohlberg’s publications of *Plain Talk* and *The China Monthly*.\footnote{Ibid., 118.} In early 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy presented a complete compilation of all the attacks previously levied on Lattimore by Kohlberg. These charges made national headlines and focused on Lattimore as the central player.

*The New York Times*, for example, described Lattimore as “the top Russian espionage agent in this country,” and claimed that he was “dragged by the heels into a Senate subcommittee investigating...charges of communism in the State Department.”\footnote{R.L. Duffus, “The Dramatic Case of Mr. Lattimore,” *New York Times*, July 30, 1950.} Lattimore spent thirteen days testifying before the subcommittee refuting the committee’s accusations that his writings had been used to further the cause of the Soviet Union. Without ample evidence to support their claims, the committee recommended that the Department of Justice charge Lattimore with perjury. Although the charge was formalized by the Department of Justice, the court threw out key components of the indictment on the grounds of their vagueness and eventually dismissed the indictment. *The New York Times* offered their take on Lattimore’s trial: “Mr. Lattimore’s real offense was that he had come to differ sharply with something he calls ‘the China Lobby.’”\footnote{Ibid.} Although Lattimore escaped further prosecution, the original purpose of the attack was accomplished: the widespread publicity given to the accusations against had damaged his reputation. Scholars associated with him also became more vulnerable to accusations of Communist affiliation by the associates of the Lobby. Moreover, objective information regarding China policy was diminished while pro-Chiang propaganda was accentuated.

The encompassing effects of the China Lobby on U.S. foreign policy toward China are difficult to gauge. To a certain extent the China Lobby’s views seem to have become widely accepted due to the anti-Communist climate in the U.S. during the early 1950s, and the effectiveness of the Lobby’s propaganda efforts. The Lobby was also
highly successful in disseminating the view that anti-Chiang sentiment meant disloyalty to the United States. The Lobby’s propaganda unquestionably damaged the reputations of scholars, journalists, and politicians alike. The widely assorted and loosely affiliated China Lobby membership effectively used their political connections and media propaganda to channel their views. Lobby propaganda also fanned the flames of the growing anticommunist climate in the U.S., helping to create a political environment where their agenda would be more acceptable to the American public.

The political pressure that the China Lobby could bring to bear during the early 1950s should not be underestimated. As Michael Schaller states, “by the late 1950s, despite a broad agreement on the need to revisit [China] policy, few politicians were prepared to take the heat from the China Lobby.” The China Lobby and its allies, buttressed by the Republican Party, were able to aggressively argue for their cause and to intimidate those that might express contrary viewpoints. Exemplified through the well-known McCarthy hearings, the penalty for opposing the anticommunist crusaders and their China Lobby allies could be severe. However it is fair to say that despite the zeal of McCarthy and men like him, many of Chiang’s most ardent supporters actually cared little about China one way or the other, and only found it a useful issue to advance their personal political agendas. Although the China Lobby held significant sway over U.S. foreign policy—and had thus far prevented the formal recognition of the PRC—Chiang Kai-shek was no closer to regaining the China mainland than he had been since his expulsion by Mao in 1949.

In this regard, the China Lobby achieved mix results in obtaining their long term goals: Chiang Kai-shek had not “retaken” mainland China, but Taiwan had also not been overrun by the PRC. And, although the United States provided the military support necessary to prevent a Communist invasion of Taiwan (which had seemed imminent after the Communist government shelled the nearby islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1954), the U.S. had also increasingly advocated a

“two China policy” that recognized both the Communist and Nationalist governments. Moreover, even though Taiwan became incorporated into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, severe limitations were imposed on Chiang’s ability to initiate aggression against the PRC. In fact, Taiwan’s incorporation into SEATO, was accompanied not only Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ demand that Chiang “stop telling his people that their return to the mainland was imminent,” but also by the notice that the U.S. would refuse by its Security Council veto power should the United Nations voted to seat the PRC. 

In the following years, as Lobby members realized that mainland China had been definitively lost to the PRC, support of Taiwan would come to be the focal point of the Lobby’s efforts. With the relationship of the PRC and the United States in a mutually suspicious state of limbo after 1955, the China Lobby continued to rally for pro-Nationalist causes and the denial of UN recognition for the PRC. Nonetheless, from 1949 to 1955, the China Lobby unquestionably held significant sway over public and political perception on the United States’ China policy, and therefore, significantly influenced policy developments. Indeed, it can only be speculated how much effect China Lobby pressure had on politicians and the policies that they rendered. Although the China Lobby ultimately failed in its goal of returning Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government to power in China, it is nevertheless important to note that it would be nearly twenty years before the PRC would finally gain admittance to the United Nations.

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28 Cohen, 184-185.


SEEING PENNSYLVANIA AS THE KEystone
OF THE REVOLUTION: CHARLES H. LINCOLN’S
TREATMENT OF ETHNICITY

By Greg Rogers

Charles H. Lincoln’s 1901 *The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania 1760-1776* is an insightful examination of the internal politics of a state often overshadowed by Massachusetts and Virginia in studies on the roots of the American Revolution. In addition to being a valuable secondary source, Lincoln’s monograph can also be read as a primary source, specifically with regard to the issue of ethnicity. Lincoln’s argument relies heavily upon a particular conception of ethnicity, wherein ethnic identity, shaped by shared past experiences, influences the actions and interests of historical actors. This formulation of ethnicity and its importance can be attributed, in part, to the monograph’s focus on Pennsylvania, the most culturally heterogeneous of Britain’s North American colonies. However, the influence of progressive historiography, and the Progressive Era in general, distinctly shape both Lincoln’s focus and his thesis regarding the origins of the Revolution. The concept of ethnicity, as fashioned by the author’s social and intellectual surroundings, greatly affected Lincoln’s analysis of
Pennsylvania’s internal conflicts and their connection to the American Revolution as a whole.

Lincoln’s study begins with a thorough analysis of the roots of Pennsylvania’s “internal” revolutionary movement by highlighting the ethnic, sectional, religious, and geographic differences that led to a fissure between the ruling Quaker elite and the marginalized immigrants, urban workers, and western settlers that were growing in size and influence. Following this, Lincoln examines the consolidation of political factions into parties, which culminated in the demise of Quaker hegemony in Pennsylvania in the elections of 1775 and 1776, thus replacing the old order while simultaneously endorsing “the assertion of national independence.”¹ The presence of such interrelated contests is the foundation of the so-called “dual-revolution thesis,” in which revolution was directed against both an external agent (Britain) and against forces within the colony itself. This thesis was a key component of Progressive Era historiography. Lincoln’s articulation of this thesis predates the better-known, but arguably weaker, version made by Carl Becker in The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-1776, and is distinguished from Becker’s account—and the general body of Progressive-Era literature on the Revolution—in its treatment of ethnicity. In Lincoln’s work, the role of different ethnic groups and their grievances is a key component to understanding the internal revolt.²

In The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, these ethnic groups are treated as distinct political blocs. For Lincoln, ethnic identity serves as a determining factor for both economic interest and political culture. Given the centrality of ethnicity to his study, it is vital to have an understanding of what he means by invoking the term “race.” For Lincoln, ethnic groups are shaped not by their biology or by some “instilled ethnic spirit,” but are instead the product of their unique historical experience in the Old and New World.

Lincoln addresses three major political blocs: the Germans, the Scotch-Irish, and the English Quakers. In Lincoln’s work, the Germans are endowed with a political culture characterized by an overriding distrust for all government, be it imperial, colonial, or local. These misgivings were based upon their past experience in various German states, England, colonial New York, and, eventually, in Pennsylvania itself—experiences that were retained in ethnic memory. Furthermore, they display no affinity or ties to traditional English political ideas. As a result, they prefer to be left alone and typically serve as a passive ally to either the Quakers or Scotch-Irish when they engage in politics. As revolutionary thought and action took center stage, however, Lincoln argues that the “race as a whole” embraced the cause of independence because they lacked “ties of blood” to England and were offered political equality.3

Like the Germans, the Scotch-Irish are also treated as a dissenting ethnic community. According to Lincoln, two centuries of experience with the English and the settlement of Ireland gave rise to a serious interest in politics, a “fierce” desire to protect their rights, and “confidence in the principles of democracy.”4 Additionally, their history with the Gaelic Irish was viewed as influential in their dealings with Native American populations in Pennsylvania’s western frontier, providing the basis for their assertion that the land was theirs to settle by the laws of God. The Scotch-Irish that had settled Ulster County, Ireland throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cared little for the Catholic Irish that they were expropriating land from and viewed them as backward savages. Native Americans thus played a role similar to that of the Gaelic Irish as the Scotch-Irish transplanted their religious justification for settlement across the Atlantic. It is in the Scotch-Irish that Lincoln locates the “spirit of colonial resistance to England.”5

The English Quakers are the last group dealt with in detail by Lincoln. In short, Lincoln contends that, despite their minority religious affiliation, the Quakers were representative of the British ruling

3 Lincoln, 24-27, 31-32, 36.
4 Ibid., 32.
5 Ibid., 32-36.
classes that the American Revolution ultimately sought to overthrow. Therefore, the Quakers were a stark English foil to the aforementioned ethnic groups.

In addition to dealing with ethnic groups as distinct units, Lincoln’s concern with ethnicity also results in an interest in immigration. The explosion of German and Scotch-Irish immigration after the second decade of the eighteenth century is depicted in a political context. Having arrived first and established the structure of the colonial government, the Quakers understandably were concerned about changing demographic trends. Lincoln sees the emerging power struggle as a game of numbers—one in which the ruling elite were forced to watch their own population become eclipsed by the influx of new immigrants. In the face of this irreversible trend, the Quakers sought to maintain political control, and did so until the mid-1770s. The relationship between immigration and control over the colony politicized the issue of immigration so that it became a point of contention between the later proprietors and the colonial legislature. While William Penn was wary of an “open door” policy, later proprietors, motivated by economic gains from land sales, had much fewer qualms about inviting a wide variety of immigrants into the colony.6

Although Lincoln placed a great deal of emphasis on ethnic identity, it was not necessarily the supreme factor in his study. Economic interests, religion, regionalism, and class differences were also present in his analysis. Nevertheless, Lincoln often connected these other factors to issues of ethnicity. For instance, he argues that the concerns of the frontier were not wholly shaped by geography and security, but were also influenced by the fact that those living in the frontier region were overwhelmingly German and Scotch-Irish—a consequence of the fact that the Quakers had intentionally encouraged the settlement of these groups away from Philadelphia in order to marginalize their influence and provide a buffer against the occasionally hostile Native American tribes.7 Lincoln also connects ethnicity to economic concerns. For instance, Lincoln argues that German and Scotch-Irish affinity for the

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6 Ibid., 33-36, 80.
7 Ibid., 34.
colony of Maryland and its center of trade in Baltimore can be credited to the similar ethnic heritage between residents of Maryland and the new immigrants to the north. Sharing a similar ethnic background, these groups became “racially united,” resulting in close trading ties. This shift in economic and even political allegiance contributed to the friction between Philadelphia and its outlying communities.8

There are three primary factors that can shed light on Lincoln’s perspective on ethnicity: (1) his focus on Pennsylvania, (2) trends within Progressive scholarship, and (3) the influence of the Progressive Era in general. Any scholar with at least a passing interest in the American Revolution and colonial America cannot but notice the striking ethnic diversity within Pennsylvania during the eighteenth century. More than any of the other thirteen colonies, Pennsylvania was characterized by ethnic pluralism. By 1750, the English Quakers accounted for only one-third of the population—a number roughly equal to the number of Scotch-Irish in Pennsylvania. The German segment had grown to constitute about 40 percent of the total. In addition, there were small but visible communities of Welsh, Swedish, Dutch, and Scottish colonists. Since the English were least numerous in the middle colonies, particularly in Pennsylvania, these areas were most ripe for ethnic studies.9 Pennsylvania also lends itself to the type of ethnic-political blocs put forward by Lincoln because of the nature of its political contests. While familial groups or loosely defined factions dominated other colonies, Pennsylvania had perhaps the clearest instance of party politics. This structure, paired with the existence of a clearly English elite and a non-English periphery, are the essential components that underlie Lincoln’s advancement of the dual-revolution thesis.10

Beyond the particularities of his subject matter, developing trends among Progressive Era historians also influenced Lincoln’s handling of ethnicity. Over the course of the nineteenth century, historians began

8 Ibid., 55, 75-76.
to expand their conception of who constituted the American people. No longer limited to Protestant Anglo-Americans, the works of scholars like Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard began to draw attention to other ethnic groups. While this movement did not fully materialize until after the First World War, Lincoln and his contemporaries, writing in the late 1800s and early 1900s, can be seen as its forerunners.11 This is evidenced in his sources for the chapter “The Influence of German and Irish Immigration.” He utilizes a plethora of works, almost all written in the 1890s, that are ethnic histories of the two groups in question. This is a strong testament to the vitality of ethnic studies in the early progressive period.12

This shift in historical interest was at least partially influenced by contemporary events taking place during the progressive era. Between 1890 and 1893 alone, there was an annual influx of about half a million immigrants. This new wave of immigration consisted primarily of Slavs, Italians, Russians, and Jews—groups that were culturally and politically quite different from the “old immigrants” of a century before. These differences caused a vocal and powerful backlash of nativism.13 Whether or not progressive historians were concerned with colonial immigration and ethnicity because of their nativist leanings or because of their hopes for the infusion of new diversity is an area that remains to be explored. Regardless, ethnicity and immigration were certainly salient issues of the time. Lincoln’s discussions of the debates surrounding the Pennsylvania colony’s immigration policy clearly parallel those taking place in the United States Congress. Questions concerning an open door policy versus a more restrictive approach were not just the milieu of the past—they were also present in Lincoln’s world. Philadelphia, the city where he worked on his PhD and published *The Revolutionary Movement*, was a minor port of entry for immigrants and, more importantly, “an immigrant city.” Between the years of 1900 and 1920 the population of those coming from ethnic

12 Lincoln, 23.
groups considered being ‘new’ immigrants nearly quadrupled from at least 60,000 to well over 200,000.\footnote{Frederic M. Miller, “Immigration Through the Port of Philadelphia,” in Forgotten Doors: The Other Ports of Entry to the United States, ed. M. Mark Stolarik (Philadelphia: Balch Institute Press, 1988), 37, 48.} The Pennsylvania of 1901 was clearly involved in an ethnic influx with political and demographic consequences not dissimilar to those of the Pennsylvania of 1750.

To some degree, all works of history are a product of their author’s environment. A historian’s surroundings shape and direct an analysis just as much as his or her theoretical inclinations. Written in another time, or about another place, Lincoln’s The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania would have been a significantly different work. His distinct view and emphasis on ethnicity and the related issue of immigration not only shape of his thematic content but also his argument. The colony is presented as a model of the British Empire in “miniature.” It is a heterogeneous collection of religions, regions, economic interests, and ethnicities or “races.” It is ethnicity, constructed by Lincoln as political-economic blocs, that usually transcends these other concerns. Far from being an obstacle, this diversity actually strengthened democracy as different groups had to unite and cooperate in order to overthrow ruling elites, Quaker or imperial. “Disunity” was an “excellent foundation for revolt.”\footnote{Lincoln, 3, 13, 53-54, 114, 189.} Whether or not Pennsylvania and Progressive Era thinking present a skewed and inaccurate account of the American Revolution is open to debate. What is certain is that factors of contemporary time and provincial place are just as evident in Lincoln’s text as the broader thesis he pioneered.
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READING BETWEEN THE LAWS:
LITERARY REPRESENTATIONS OF THE
FRENCH HOMOSEXUAL, 1942-1981

By Alison Veith

On August 4, 1942, the Vichy government under Marshal Philippe Pétain passed an ordinance declaring that the age of sexual consent for homosexuals would be twenty-one, while the age of consent for heterosexuals would remain at thirteen.1 As the first legal penalization of sodomy in the history of the French Republic, this ordinance remained in the penal code for decades after the fall of the Vichy government and France’s liberation in 1945. The law’s restrictive nature over homosexual acts was further compounded by the subsequent legislation of July 30, 1960, which authorized the government and police to take “all measures necessary to fight against homosexuality.”2 These measures focused on prosecuting public acts of indecency and again marked a

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blatant discrepancy between the treatment of heterosexual and homosexual participants. Homosexuals caught and prosecuted for sexual acts in public faced double the penalty of heterosexuals prosecuted for the same crime: six months to four years in prison and a fine ranging from 1,000 to 15,000 francs. Although neither law went so far as to make sodomy a criminal act—as was the case in Great Britain and the United States—these restrictions are still unique within their French context, as they legally defined homosexual acts as separate and more punishable than similar heterosexual acts. Lasting nearly forty years (1942-1981), this period of blatant legislative oppression of homosexuals imposed discretion and invisibility on the male homosexual community. Lacking acceptable outlets for expression, much of their activity was confined to sexual gratification and anonymous encounters.

It is only within the last decade that history, sociology, and “queer theory” scholars have genuinely begun to delve into the complexities of the French homosexual by considering the intersections of national identity, self-definition, and lived physical space. Although there is reticence to explicitly pinpoint any single universal marker of “homosexual identity,” even within the narrowed scope of twentieth-century France, three scholarly frameworks are commonly used to discuss the French homosexual male: (1) how he is regarded in relationship to his unique French national context; (2) how homosexuality relates to the more abstract theories of postmodernism and structuralism; and (3) how the physical space of Paris has defined him.

To best understand the French homosexual, many scholars focus their attention on trying to articulate the relationship between sexual identity and French citizenship, recognizing immediately that these two personal identities must coexist in some way. Edna McCaffrey and

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3 Gunther, 37.
4 The nature of the French Republic is to never deviate from their shared French identity, thus it is significant that homosexuals became legislatively isolated, as it is a blaring distinction in the French legislative context.
5 This essay places two immediate limiting factors on the discussion of French homosexuality. The first is that the history of the homosexual will be limited to post 1942, focusing on life under the law’s restrictions. The second is that this paper will focus only on male homosexuals due to a lack of literature and discussion of lesbian visibility during the chosen period.
Dennis Provencher focus most on the significance of French national identity, which has its roots in the French Revolution’s rallying cry, “liberté, égalité, fraternité.” McCaffrey notes that these values of liberty, equality, and brotherhood are so engrained in the French republic that French citizenship, by definition, emulates this continued spirit of equality among its citizens. For example, French legislation provides free and equal access to health care and education for all of its citizens. And although these rights are guaranteed to all French people simply by virtue of their nationality, McCaffrey argues that one negative of this political ideology is that it ignores or is indifferent to potential variations of need among French individuals. In *Queer French*, Denis Provencher explains the implications of this ideology for French homosexuality. Because the French government focuses only on universal rights, it does not protect or embrace mobilization of specific group and identity politics. For this reason, Provencher notes that French homosexuals in the modern context seem to resist community mobilization and identification with the familiar discourses of “queer” and “pride.” Unlike in the United States, where these words embody empowerment and activism, they mean very little in France—French homosexuals live in a political system that values similarity over difference, and provides equal protections, not specific ones. For Provencher and other scholars, this distinction is critical for understanding the French homosexual. True, a man may be gay, but he does not identify with a “gay community,” and this gay community does not receive specific political rights. Instead, he is first and foremost a French citizen, benefiting from the political protections of his citizenship only.

Focusing exclusively on the French homosexual’s national identity, however, ignores the significant influence of the twentieth century’s intellectual restructuring on the legitimization of homosexuality. For example, postmodernism and structuralism paved the way for theories

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that recognize and embrace all aspects of identity as socially constructed and fluctuating. Although not engaging specifically in these theoretical discussions, Florence Tamagne alludes to identity politics when he traces the historical emergence of the word “homosexual” as a signifier for a person rather than a sexual act. Appearing in the medical discourse of the late 1890s and the psychoanalytic work of Sigmund Freud and other early psychotherapists, this is the first time homosexuality is defined as a state of being. Despite “medically” defining homosexuals as ill or psychologically deficient in comparison to the heterosexual norm, these psychoanalytic observations were the first to recognize homosexuality as originating in the mind of a person. Rather than existing only as external sexual acts and experimentation, homosexual inclinations were now internal. For Tamagne, this is significant for the eventual formation of the homosexual identity.\(^8\) Once homosexuality becomes a legitimate condition of an individual, it is able to become an identity that can be embraced and harnessed. Following Tamagne’s lead, other scholars point to the emerging theories of postmodernism and structuralism as affording homosexuals further opportunity to self-define and mobilize around new types of rhetoric, which more generally sought to re-imagine identity and human purpose post World War II.

The scholar that pushed the limits of these emerging theories the most has been Michel Foucault, a French-homosexual philosopher, sociologist, and historian who, interestingly, in complete commitment to his identity theories, denied his own sexuality up until his death. Regarded as the father of queer theory, Foucault believed that homosexuality had the unique ability to push the boundaries of sexual identity and expression. Like most of his philosophy, Foucault viewed sexuality as a socially constructed system of power and hierarchy, in this instance as artificially dictated by heterosexual norms. Conversely, he viewed homosexuality as outside of, and free from, this hierarchy, precisely because it was not accepted as “normal.” Moreover, because homosexuality was not a “set” existence defined by the existing social schema—but was, instead, still in a state of becoming—it offered a criti-
cal and necessary avenue for all human beings to resist the constructed sexual hierarchy that dominated, and artificially labeled, all sexualities. Thus, for Foucault, recognizing homosexuality as legitimate effectively re-imagines culture as an environment in which all desires can co-exist devoid of power structures.\footnote{Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Random House, 1980), 21-22.}

Although Foucault’s three-volume work, \textit{The History of Sexuality}, is a well-respected historical and theoretical discussion of sexuality and identity politics, his highly abstract representation of homosexuality becomes an act of reticence in itself. His continual deconstruction of identity leaves only indiscernible fragments that resist not just homosexual identification, but all identification. Thus, it is difficult to utilize Foucault’s theories to better understand and explain the French homosexual identity.

Many scholars, however, have found the postmodernist theorist Roland Barthes—best known for his work on semiotics and signs—to be useful for bridging the gap between homosexual theory and lived experience. Rather than focus on deconstructing identity like Foucault, Barthes identifies the unstated signs that make up the physical spaces we live in and examines how these signs correspond with, and dictate how, we operate in those spaces. His theory suggests a symbiotic relationship between space and people, wherein each naturally mirrors the other. Like Foucault, this is also highly theoretical, but Barthes’s arguments in “Semiology and the Urban” are particularly useful for our exploration of the French homosexual. In “Semiology and the Urban,” he argues that the urban city is “felt as the place of exchange of social activities and...erotic activities in the broadest sense of the word. Better still, the city center is always felt as the space where subversive forces, forces of rupture, [and] forces act and meet.”\footnote{Roland Barthes, “Semiology and the Urban,” in The City and the Sign: An Introduction to Urban Semiotics, ed. Mark Gottdiener and Alexandros Ph Lagopoulos, 87-98 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 96} For Barthes, urban space facilitates the needs of our internal erotic. Although not limited explicitly to sexual intimacy, the “urban” is the unique physical landscape that, by its very nature, mirrors our internal landscape of desires.
Expanding on Barthes’s theoretical work on urban gratification, historians like Michael Sibalis seek to understand the French homosexual through his relationship with the Parisian urban. This framework, however, is also problematic, as it becomes a limited exploration of French homosexual identity merely in terms of the pursuit and fulfillment of sexual gratification within Paris. For example, Sibalis addresses both the historical and contemporary reality of the French homosexual by charting the development of his sexual expression and his emerging identity as it is linked to the changing ways he has utilized Parisian urban spaces. As Sibalis notes, public parks, quays along the Seine, and even street urinals have historically been spots for “cruising” and anonymous sexual encounters.\(^{11}\) Along with these public spaces, private bars, backrooms, and saunas of the 1950s also emerged as known places for sexual gratification. Again, though, there is reticence for scholars to fully embrace this framework as definitive of French homosexuality because it borders on oversimplification. Not only does it ignore the French homosexual experience outside of Paris, but it also dangerously regresses towards defining sexual identity in terms of acts and not being, the perspective held before the breakthroughs of twentieth century psychoanalytical discourse.

Despite the fact that this historical framework may oversimplify French homosexuality by focusing too much on these sexual encounters, due to the laws, this was the homosexual experience between 1942 and 1981. However, by analyzing these same encounters through literature, the complexities of the French homosexual participating in these sex acts becomes more discernable to the reader. Literature is able to synthesize the historical, cultural, and personal in one common space as it attempts to emulate the complex reality of lived experience. Thus, to better understand the French homosexual’s lived reality under the laws, this essay will analyze literature written about homosexual men in Paris during this time period. Focusing on American writer James Baldwin and French writer Jean Genet, two self-identified gay men who both lived and wrote in Paris during this time, this essay will also

\(^{11}\) Michael D. Sibalis, “Paris” in *Gay Urban Histories Since 1600*, ed. David Higgs, 10-37 (London: Routledge, 1999), 16
highlight the cultural differences between American and French views of sexuality. Put succinctly, Baldwin’s presentation seems shaped by America’s conservative tendency to “talk around sex,” whereas Genet is most decidedly French in his direct verbalization of the sexual act itself. Although both authors focus on sexual gratification and fleeting encounters amidst the Parisian backdrop, each author’s national and cultural perspective inevitably frames his depiction of these encounters, and his understanding of their French participants.

From an American perspective, expatriate writer James Baldwin is the most credible source from which to evaluate French homosexuality during the middle of the twentieth century. As a homosexual who spent most of his life in Paris after 1950, Baldwin’s personal experiences inform his fiction’s depiction of French homosexuality. His novel, *Giovanni’s Room*, published in 1956, focuses explicitly on homosexuals in Paris through the internal struggles of its American protagonist, David. Following David’s struggle in choosing between loving his female fiancée, Hella, and the young, virulent homosexual barman, Giovanni, this text offers an accessible commentary of French homosexuality in the 1950s. Moreover, as an American, David’s perspective facilitates a comparison of American and French cultural views of sexuality.

When David first meets Giovanni at a fictional bar on Paris’s Left Bank, Baldwin’s description of the scene not only highlights the reality of the 1942 law being enforced, but also suggests the undertones of sexual gratification motivating the bar’s homosexual patrons. Although fictional, the bar is located in the sixth arrondissement, and represents the emerging homosexual establishments of the Saint-Germain-des-Prés area. David’s narration also suggests the very real presence of police raids during the period. He describes how Guillaume, the bar’s owner, always seemed knowledgeable enough to successfully warn his favorite patrons which nights were best to “stay at home.”

David’s observation of the bar’s patrons highlights two “types” of

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13 Sidéris, 220.
14 Baldwin, 26.
homosexuals that were quite common in the contemporary Parisian homosexual community. For David (and Baldwin), both of these “types” play a specific role in the sexual encounter. Both Guillaume and Jacques, David’s friend, are described as older and well dressed, yet noticeably lacking the virility of youth. These two men play the role of the established, older pederast—the pursuer of younger males. Waiting and willing to receive this attention are the bar’s other patrons, whom David describes as the young, effeminate folles (birds). Dressed much like women, gossiping with each other in high-voices, they, too, play a role, hoping to obtain the approval and attention of men like Guillaume and Jacques.

Baldwin’s focus on pederasty—the sexual practice of an older male courting the younger in a symbiotic relationship of sex and education—in Giovanni’s Room, is historically and contemporarily representative of Parisian homosexual activity. During the 1950s, the area of Saint-Germain-des-Prés emerged as the first area in Paris where homosexual males began to visibly congregate at specifically identified homosexual bars and restaurants, a change from previously “cruising” parks and the Seine. Most of these males were the younger, more effeminate folles, whose visible portrayal of their homosexuality mirrored the visibility of the bars they frequented. David’s condescending narration of them, however, reflects the opinion of Baldwin and an older generation of French homosexuals, who viewed these young gays with disdain for abandoning their masculine virility in favor of what they viewed as a performance of the inferior feminine. Retrospectively though, French scholar Georges Siderís credits these effeminate homosexuals, through these outlandish performative acts of visibility, as the first French homosexuals to successfully show marked resistance against the laws.

Characteristic of his conservative American values, Baldwin never has David explicitly say that sex is the goal of these “performances” between the folles and the older men, even though the intention is clear.

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16 Sidérís, 222.
to the reader. Baldwin’s self-censorship suggests an unspoken sexual aspect to the French homosexual display that his American perspective does not fully condone. This hesitation is explicitly emphasized in a conversation between David and Jacques, which isolates a fundamental cultural difference between American and French opinions of sex’s role in (homosexual) relationships. Steeped in his American, sexually conservative perspective, David attacks Jacques’ sexual behavior, inquiring, “Is there really no other way for you [to love] but this? To kneel down forever before an army of boys for just five dirty minutes in the dark?” Jacques directly challenges David, however, justifying his sexual activity as meaningful, responding, “if you think of them as dirty, then they will be dirty—they will be dirty because you will be giving nothing, you will be despising your flesh and his.”

For Jacques, there is no shame in sex. His perspective reflects a more general French cultural view of the act itself, which unabashedly acknowledges the beauty of the physical.

Regarding French homosexuality and the arts, admiration of the physical is most clearly represented in Jean Genet’s iconic twenty-five minute film Un Chant d’Amour (1950). Set in an unnamed prison, the film is a visual ode to the beauty in the physical manifestation of male homosexual love. The film focuses on the sexual seduction between prisoners, a prison guard’s voyeurism, and repetitive images of masturbation, coupled with the imagery of prison walls as both physical and symbolic barriers between male-to-male connections. These components represent the French homosexual reality from 1942-1981. Genet’s artistic vision of the French homosexual contrasts Baldwin’s, beginning with his focus on a sex that Baldwin could not even face. Genet’s characters are empowered and uplifted through sex precisely because it is the unique physical manifestation of their sexual identity. Although the film is composed of separate, graphic vignettes of males pleasuring themselves or other males, its tone is anything but pornographic. Rather, the ultimate inability for these men to reach through

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17 Baldwin, 56-57.
18 Jean Genet, dir., Un Chant d’Amour (A Song of Love), DVD (Wea-des Moines Video, 2007). The original film was released in 1950.
the prison walls that separate them is a tragic rendering of futile pursuits of fulfillment and thwarted homosexual love. This must be seen as Genet’s artistic resistance of the anti-sodomy laws, which wrongly punished and imprisoned men for merely desiring to embrace and love another, and further stifled and debased the beauty of the sexual act itself—contradicting French cultural values.

Just as with *Un Chant d’Amour*, Jean Genet’s life and writings have done more to distinguish and uplift the French homosexual identity than any other man’s in the last fifty years. The key homosexual author of his time, Genet’s literature unequivocally pushed the French homosexual towards unashamed self-identification and representation between 1942-1981. Largely shaped by his own homosexual development under the laws, as well as his learned cultural embracing of sex, Genet’s literary focus is always on the sexual. His fiction embraces the sex act by presenting male characters that unabashedly describe their sexual fantasies. Genet’s focus on the sexual encounter is also an act of political resistance. Every time he writes a character that is unafraid to pursue and feel pleasure, Genet uplifts the homosexual, validating and honoring his desires. ¹⁹

Despite this freedom within his literature, Genet’s life as a homosexual in Paris under the laws required secrecy, repression, and watchfulness. As his biographer Edmund White notes, Genet himself was an avid frequenter of certain metro and train stations that were known for “cruising” and sexual encounters. ²⁰ Characteristically, “cruising” is sex shrouded in anonymity, and transitory in its very nature. For both participants the connection is often forbidden from the start, and the circumstances for meeting explicitly suggest a mutual desire for sexual gratification. American photographer Duane Michal’s famous photograph series *Chance Meeting* visually captures the spontaneity of

such an encounter between two men.²¹ Set in an alleyway in broad daylight, the piece is divided into two columns of six photographic frames. It is a progressive series of two mid-aged men walking towards each other. Neither man stops the other as their bodies pass in the fourth frame, but the viewer can sense the shift in tone. Both men appear to be interested in each other. Each subsequent frame shows the two men alternating looks back at the other, never meeting eyes, with each ultimately hesitating in their mutual desire to go back and pursue the connection. Regardless of whether one was French or American, these photographs reflect a common reality for homosexual men between 1942-1981.

In France, this forced silencing of desire due solely to homosexuality gained some reprieve in 1981 when newly elected François Mitterrand and the Socialist Party repealed the restrictive laws of 1942 and 1960. With this new freedom to visibly congregate and express their homosexuality, French men in Paris began to carve out Le Marais, Paris’s first neighborhood dedicated to the commercial development of gay-friendly businesses.²² Despite mixed feelings within the French homosexual community, who feared the explicit development of a “gay ghetto,” Le Marais has nevertheless become Paris’s gay center. Within this homosexual urban space, which is not raided and legally restricted like Saint-Germain-des-Prés of the 1950s, Le Marais’ inhabitants still act like the previous generation; pursuing the sexual encounter is still a priority.

American homosexual Edmund White and his French lover, Hubert Sorin, illuminate this lingering sexual reality present in Le Marais in their co-memoir Our Paris: Sketches from Memory. White, a well-known contemporary homosexual writer and cultural voice, describes a typical nightlife scene in Le Marais to highlight the focus on sexual gratification:


Wolf packs of guys in leather or jeans...stalk down the rue des Lombards. They are on their way from the Quetzal Bar on the rue des Mauvais Garçons (Bad Boys’ Street), which quietly booms behind its new bossed and brushed chrome façade like a party in a submerged submarine, to the Banana Café in Les Halles with its go-go boys.\textsuperscript{23}

The desire for casual encounters is accentuated in the subtle, sexual dynamic of the men themselves. Although the “types” look different than their 1950s counterparts, this scene still suggests the same sexual performances Baldwin described. The men in leather and jeans, who come from “Bad Boys’ Street,” stalk towards the Banana Café, in pursuit of its “go-go boys,” the more effeminate, yet equally sexualized and willing participants. Other French homosexual contemporaries of White readily agree with his description of Le Marais here. For example, scholar Frédéric Martel acknowledges how heavily Le Marais nightlife revolves around bars, saunas, and backroom scenes, insinuating that sexual gratification is still a main pursuit for French homosexuals.\textsuperscript{24}

Accompanying White’s text is a corresponding illustration by White’s lover, Hubert Sorin. Like White’s observations, Sorin’s illustration also suggests that Le Marais’ homosexuals are concerned with more sullied pursuits.\textsuperscript{25} His critique is framed through a drawing of Les Mots à la Bouche, “the local gay and lesbian bookshop” located at one end of rue Sainte-Croix de la Bretonnerie, a central Marais thoroughfare. The store has remained a frequented landmark of the homosexual community since its opening in 1980.\textsuperscript{26} Amidst a background of innumerable shelves, labeled only by various sections such as body-art, musculation, bisexualité, and oral, Sorin draws two younger, more casually dressed


\textsuperscript{24} Frédéric Martel, \textit{The Pink and the Black: Homosexuals in France since 1968}, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 204-205.

\textsuperscript{25} White, \textit{Our Paris}, 58.

male caricatures, presumably bookstore and Marais regulars. One male is looking at a drawing of a penis while the other is reading a text that says only “sex, sex, sex.” Sorin’s critique of Le Marais’ gay community is explicit—their homosexuality is preoccupied with “pornography,” the body, and other debased topics.

Although both White and Sorin seem to offer critical opinions of Le Marais, the fact that they do so within a shared literary space might symbolically represent a bridging of the American and French cultural perspectives from previous decades. Moreover, their critique arises from their personal experience as lovers, and homosexuals that have arguably moved beyond the laws and claimed their right to a monogamous, visible, and sustained relationship. Of course, just as with heterosexuals, monogamy is not for every gay man. Still, their dual critique here stems from the same place as both Baldwin and Genet’s previous writings. Regardless of his nationality, culture, or generation, each man writes with the ultimate desire to be uninhibited in his homosexual identity, where the only requirement is that he is free—free to live and free to love.


AN AMERICA THAT COULD BE: EMMA GOLDMAN, ANARCHISM, AND THE “AMERICAN DREAM”
By Christina Samons

The so-called “Gilded Age,” 1865-1901, was a period in American history characterized by great progress, but also of great turmoil. The evolving social, political, and economic climate challenged the way of life that had existed in pre-Civil War America as European immigration rose alongside the appearance of the United States’ first big businesses and factories.¹ One figure emerges from this era in American history as a forerunner of progressive thought: Emma Goldman. Responding, in part, to the transformations that occurred during the Gilded Age, Goldman gained notoriety as an outspoken advocate of anarchism in speeches throughout the United States and through published essays and pamphlets in anarchist newspapers. Years later, she would synthesize her ideas in collections of essays such as Anarchism and Other Essays, first published in 1917.

The purpose of this paper is to contextualize Emma Goldman’s anarchist theory by placing it firmly within the economic, social, and

Christina Samons

political reality of turn-of-the-twentieth-century America while demonstrating that her theory is based in a critique of the concept of the “American Dream.” To Goldman, American society had drifted away from the ideal of the “American Dream” due to the institutionalization of exploitation within all aspects of social and political life—namely, economics, religion, and law. The first section of this paper will give a brief account of Emma Goldman’s position within American history at the turn of the twentieth century. It will then discuss how Goldman’s use of the rhetoric of American independence and individualism helps us to fully understand the problems she saw in her contemporary society. Lastly, this paper will describe the ideal social system that would exist under Goldman’s model of anarchism.

Since Goldman’s theory arises out of her criticism of late nineteenth-century American institutions, it is important to understand the position she occupied within such society. The traditional narrative of the “American Dream” tells of the unlimited potential in America for any person, regardless of social status or origin, to become economically successful through his or her own hard work and dedication. Coupled with the fact that the period from roughly 1880-1921 saw an unparalleled increase in the number of immigrants into America—largely from Eastern European countries—the “American dream” described above became a powerful driving force for industrial growth.\(^2\)

Unfortunately, for most of the immigrant population, this “dream” was little more than a myth. Instead of prosperity, many immigrants found that “by the end of the nineteenth century...unregulated working conditions and the free market in urban real estate caused the exploitation of millions of workers and in turn provoked protest and violence from below.”\(^3\) Historical accounts of workers’ protests increase rapidly from the end of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century and the growth of trade unions provide further evidence to corroborate these statements.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Ibid., 23.
\(^3\) Melvyn Dubofsky, *Industrialism and the American Worker, 1865-1920* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1996), 75.
\(^4\) Ibid., 79.
One explanation for Goldman’s advocacy of anarchism is that she desired to critique the difficult economic situation facing many immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century from her own position as an immigrant. Goldman herself had been born into a Jewish family in Lithuania—then a province of the Russian Empire—and had spent her youth in St. Petersburg before finding her way to in 1885 America at the age of seventeen. Goldman’s movement from Prussia to the United States provided her with knowledge of numerous languages, cultures, and movements, which all contributed in varying degrees to her thought. Although most of her early speeches were done in German, she quickly realized the importance of connecting with her new American compatriots by speaking English. The shift from German to English marked her personal transition from an immigrant “outsider” to a notorious public figure with whom one could get arrested for shaking hands. Not only would using English help her to reach a broader American audience, but it also shows her commitment to working through the tradition and history of America from a “new” American’s point of view. Although she came from an Eastern European background, Goldman fully embraced American culture, and her theory of anarchism is consequently firmly grounded in problems prevalent in the United States during her lifetime. In her speeches and essays, she commented on events that had relevance and immediacy in America as she saw them unfold within the context of contemporary society.

In fact, only after moving to the United States and hearing about the May 1886 Haymarket Affair in Chicago did Goldman officially become an anarchist. On March 4, 1886, a large group of workers held a labor rally in the Haymarket Square in Chicago. As the rally dispersed, an unknown person threw a pipe bomb into the crowd, killing numerous civilians and eight police officers. Following the incident, eight men associated with the anarchist organizers of the originally rally

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were put on trial for murder—all eight were convicted. At the time, some had argued that the incident was a consequence of rampant immigration and radical foreign idealism challenging American values. As historian Melvyn Dubofsky notes, “For many, the [Haymarket] incident justified fears of the ‘reckless foreign wretches,’ as one newspaper termed the protesting workers.” On the other hand, the Haymarket Affair became a rallying cry against police brutality, corruption, and prejudice against persons whose political views did not conform to mainstream society. Goldman sympathized with the latter view and was appalled at the flagrant disregard for justice of Illinois Judge Gary, quoting him fictitiously in her essay “The Psychology of Political Violence” as saying, “Not because you have caused the Haymarket bomb, but because you are Anarchists, are you on trial.”

However, while Goldman was certainly aware of the problems facing industrial workers, who were largely immigrants, and sympathized with their plight, her formulation of anarchism extends beyond a purely socio-economic critique to a historical critique. In her theory, she argues for a return to past American ideals—that is, a glorification of the principles first set forth during the American Revolution. Thus, the “American Dream” that Goldman believed to have been perverted throughout post-Civil War America, was not the traditional “rags to riches” fable, but the “dream” of a new nation that privileged individualism and natural freedom above all else. According to Goldman, these were the values advocated by America’s “founding fathers,” who declared independence from Great Britain in 1776 and subsequently wrote the United States Constitution. Goldman chose to present anarchism as a necessary response to problems rooted in the unique circumstances of American history in the decades following the American Civil War.

One way in which Goldman commented on the loss of American values in “Gilded Age” society was by appropriating traditional

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8 Kraut, 89.
American rhetoric to her own advantage, using it as a foil with which she contrasted the current state of affairs in America. As traditional schoolchildren during the time period were instructed in such areas as the wording of the Declaration of Independence, Goldman’s use of common phrases such as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” was able to draw on the national ideology instilled in many Americans since childhood. In “A New Declaration of Independence,” for instance, Goldman used language and composition based on the Declaration of Independence, proclaiming, “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all human beings, irrespective of race, color, or sex, are born with the equal right to share at the table of life; that to secure this right, there must be established among men economic, social, and political freedom.”

The combination of the familiar American phrase “We hold these truths to be self-evident” from the actual Declaration of Independence with the subsequent reformulation of anarchist goals creates a sense of irony that served to ridicule the current state, which had, according to Goldman, distanced itself and society from the “truths” established at the origin of the United States.

It important to note here the distinction Goldman drew between a commitment to adhering to what she viewed as original American ideals as opposed to the “perverted conception of patriotism” she linked to militarism, “conceit, arrogance and egotism.” To Goldman, patriotism represented the view that one nation believes itself to be greater than some other nation and, by virtue of that fact, may dominate others. This view is contrary to the equalizing nature of anarchism, which provides each person or group with the freedom to achieve their individual goals without relying on exploitative measures. Patriotism is also contrary to providing the freedom of all individuals.


that Goldman always hoped to achieve, because it asserts a false hierarchy of power relationships.\textsuperscript{12}

Goldman also utilized irony and repetitive rhetoric to assert the specifically American identity of her vision of anarchism in order to oppose critics who condemned her theory as foreign and “un-American.” After the assassination of William McKinley in September 1901, newspaper reports emerged that linked Goldman to assassin Leon Czolgosz by casting Czolgosz as an impressionable Polish foreigner who was inspired to the act by Goldman’s radical anarchist speeches.\textsuperscript{13} In defense of both herself and Czolgosz, Goldman wrote “The Tragedy at Buffalo,” in which she challenged the popular misconception that he was a foreigner and that his act was a manifestation of the European assault on American values.

To achieve this effect, Goldman contextualized his situation within a corrupted society in which “a small band of parasites have robbed the American people and trampled upon the fundamental principles laid down by the forefathers of this country.”\textsuperscript{14} Goldman emphasized that the American tradition of individualism was falsely employed to promote the growth of capitalism and the formation of both state and non-state institutions. “In vain they are making the world believe that he is the product of European conditions, and influenced by European ideas,” she argued, “This time the ‘assassin’ happens to be the child of Columbia [Ohio], who lulled him to sleep with ‘My country, ‘tis of thee, Sweet land of liberty,’ and who held out the hope to him that he, too, could become President of the country.”\textsuperscript{15}

Through the use of tropes and traditions that would be familiar to her American audience—in this case with the lyrics of “My Country ‘tis of Thee”—she played on the idea of a basic American identity by drawing attention to the shared heritage of the audience and Czolgosz, who would both recognize the lyrics and thus be reminded of their upbringing within American society.

\textsuperscript{12} Falk, 20.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 298.

\textsuperscript{14} Goldman, “The Tragedy at Buffalo.”

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
Conjuring up the imagery related to adolescence is important for Goldman’s theory because her theory also asserts that adolescence is the stage of development in which the concept of an American identity is formed in citizens’ minds. To Goldman, adolescence is also characterized by innocence, and her rhetoric creates an identity for Czolgosz that associated his irresponsibility for his deed with the innocence of young children being taught about American history and ideals. Goldman does not argue for a return to an individual’s literal adolescence, but to the fundamental principles of the revolutionary period of United States history that America was premised upon, which were characterized by a strong commitment to freedom.

Furthermore, she believed that the United States’ commitment to freedom followed directly from a very clear individualist tradition that began before the Revolutionary War and continued through the early nineteenth century. In many of the newspaper and magazine articles Goldman wrote after arriving in America, she hearkened back to an era in American history in which individuals stood up for their own desires in the face of government persecution. She often referenced the writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, and John Brown, who each argued for various forms of individualism in their philosophies. Goldman read these writers extensively after she arrived in America and their thoughts informed her views on the individual’s relationship to the political and institutional.16 From Emerson, for example, anarchists in the late nineteenth century utilized the idea that individuals should trust their own judgment and investigate for themselves the popular standards of thoughts and cultures.17 This idea paralleled Goldman’s belief that anarchism would break with the exploitative tradition of American republican democracy and challenge the population as a whole to rethink and analyze their current situation.18 Goldman’s thought is also

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18 Emma Goldman, “Anarchism: What it Really Stands For,” in Anarchism and Other Essays, 47-67 (see note 9), 50.
strongly influenced by Emerson’s recognition of the close relationship between humans and the natural earth, and the human body’s subordination to the whims of its natural desires, which will be discussed later.\(^{19}\)

At the heart of Goldman’s theory of anarchism, then, is a strong disavowal of the state and institutions that serve to naturalize mechanisms for exploitation and suppress individual freedom. Hence, Goldman explicitly defined anarchism as “the liberation of the human mind from the dominion of religion; the liberation of the human body from the dominion of property; liberation from the shackles and restraint of government.”\(^{20}\) Goldman’s theory of anarchism was also a subtle criticism of the democratic republic, in which the interests of the maximum number of citizens are mediated through a specific individual elected to represent those citizens. The problem Goldman located was that republics allow another person to make decisions on an individual’s behalf. Although, in theory, representatives are elected by the people they represent, Goldman argued that the republican form of government provided an opening for exploitation to occur in the gap between the desires of an individual and the desires of a representative. As the American system of government developed and the discrepancy between individuals and their representatives grew wide, exploitation effectively became institutionalized through official channels, which then reinforced and extended it into other sectors of society. Observing how the state government dominated the economic, social, and legal policies of the era, Goldman not only wished to dispense with government institutions, but also with institutions that she viewed as exploitative in their current states, such as religion or education. In order to analyze how Goldman saw the state as institutionalizing exploitation, it will be helpful to divide her arguments with regards to three separate categories: economics, law, and religion. In all three categories, Goldman contrasts institutions and the natural state of humans as individuals, and therefore casts institutions as oppressive and preventing individual growth.

\(^{19}\) Browne, 331.
As previously mentioned, economic issues were extremely relevant in Goldman’s time due to rapid industrialization and the influx of immigrants who were usually employed as unskilled workers that supported industrialism.\(^\text{21}\) She traces the exploitative nature of the institutionalized capitalist economic system to the protection of private property, reconstituting the words of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, widely considered the first anarchist thinker, who famously wrote, “Property is theft!”\(^\text{22}\) Goldman criticized the evolution of property in American society by defining it as, “the dominion of man’s needs, the denial of the right to satisfy his needs.”\(^\text{23}\) Of course, all individuals rely on certain items of property for survival and livelihood, but Goldman argued that in the exploitative capitalist system of the United States, humans are not even able to maintain their basic property needs since they are forced to provide goods for an arbitrary superior in exchange for menial wages. The monotony of the mechanized capitalist system stripped human beings of their ability to “enjoy the full fruit of [their] labor,”\(^\text{24}\) because they cannot work in a job that is important, let alone desirable, to them. The dire economic situation of the era prevented certain people from enjoying their right to all three essential aspects of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” outlined in the Declaration of Independence. Goldman argued that true individualism was being wrongly mobilized within society under the guise of capitalism, which assumed that entrepreneurship of business was an expression of the individual’s motivation and dedication to work, when entrepreneurship actually prevented individualist expression through exploitation.

Goldman continued to criticize the separation of products from their producers in “Anarchism: What it Really Stands For,” writing, “Man is being robbed not merely of the products of his labor, but of the power of free initiative, of originality, and the interest in, or desire for, the things he is making.”\(^\text{25}\) Her argument mirrors the Marxist critique

\(^{21}\) Kraut, 23.


\(^{24}\) Ibid., 53.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 55.
of capitalism, which marks the divide between an object’s use-value to its producer and the exchange-value it can only receive when considered in relation to some other product. According to Marx, “There it is a definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.”26 The subversion of use-values to exchange values to Marx abstracts the product away from its producer and leads to the confusion of social relationships between people and the relationships between products. Allowing social relationships to be replaced by products removes the human element from production and opens up the possibility for subjugation and exploitation of the workers who actually produce products. Current institutions reduce humans to machines that are inherently unnatural and therefore contrary to the most beneficial way of life for an individual. To counteract the exploitation of workers, Goldman wrote, “Anarchism aims to strip labor of its deadening, dulling aspect, of its gloom and compulsion. It aims to make work an instrument of joy, of strength, of color, of real harmony, so that the poorest sort of a man should find in work both recreation and hope.”27 Goldman believed that people in an anarchist society would choose to work in an occupation that is pleasurable to them and allows for the free expression of their individual desires, free of any institutional constraints.

Secondly, Goldman held little faith in the institution of the law as it existed in America at the turn of the century. As the Haymarket trials showed, the laws that were supposed to protect society from crime and danger did not actually function that way, and, oftentimes, legal protections were not given to many workers or underprivileged members of society. One major anxiety about the formation of an anarchist society was the concern that society would dissolve into chaos without a government or official legal institution to regulate it. It is accurate to say that Goldman’s theory of anarchism is strongly opposed


to the official legal institutions, but in its place she posited a conception of “natural law” as a regulative mechanism. Her definition of natural law can be seen as stemming from the transcendentalist view of the relationship between humans and nature of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau. Natural law is defined by Goldman as “that factor in man which asserts itself freely and spontaneously without any external force, in harmony with the requirements of nature. For instance, the demand for nutrition, for sex gratification, for light, air, and exercise.”28 These demands cannot find expression through institutions because the form of institutions is inherently opposed to a state of nature characterized by individual freedom. She inverts the common idea that laws are needed to maintain order in society and instead considers them as part of the larger social problem that causes crime. Anarchism does not equate to violence because politics is violence, and anarchism and the political are opposed to one another. According to Goldman’s view of anarchism, violence would not be an issue in a truly anarchist society because there would be no repressive and violent state for individuals to react against.

By extending Goldman’s arguments further, it is clear that she would be opposed to the idea that “natural law” is formed and given to mankind by God or a higher being. Religion expects its members to adhere to strict moral codes that affect all aspects of life. According to Goldman, however, the moral codes of religion do promote the basics of life, but, instead, impose unnecessary restrictions on personal freedom. As she states, “[Religion] repudiates, as something vile and sinful, our deepest feelings; but being absolutely ignorant as to the real functions of human emotions, Puritanism is itself the creator of the most unspeakable vices.”29 Religion is hypocritical, therefore, because it suppresses individual desires and asserts a moral hierarchy that does not actually exist, which ironically creates the specific problems that it hopes to address. Since religion excludes certain individuals from being considered moral, Goldman subjects it to the same criticism of

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28 Ibid., 58.
29 Emma Goldman, “The Hypocrisy of Puritanism” in Anarchism and Other Essays, 167-176 (see note 9), 170.
patriotism explored previously in this paper. Goldman’s theory views both the laws created by government and the moral rules created by religion as restricting individual liberties, even though those laws have erroneously been thought of as reflecting “natural law.” Goldman’s conception of “natural law” is not exploitative, as is human law, because it evolves from the expression of individual desires and requires only “spontaneity and free opportunity” for the laws to be followed.\(^{30}\) In this view, law does not function to resolve disputes or to judge, because there would presumably be no disputes within a system of anarchist organization. Anarchism rejects the notion of an objective arbitrator of justice because it requires obedience to a concept outside of oneself. Therefore, the institution of religion is a flagrant oppressor of individuals and should be repudiated along with all other institutions.

The brief account of Goldman’s critique of turn-of-the-century society outlined above provides the necessary background to understand her vision of an anarchist society. In Goldman’s anarchist theory, individualist social organization would provide for human contentment through freedom of work and social relationships “based on the free grouping of individuals for the purpose of producing real social wealth, free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessaries of life, according to individual desires, tastes, and inclinations.”\(^{31}\) Although she emphasizes the inevitability of free associations of people, Goldman refrains from establishing a set vision of what an anarchist society would look like. She instead recognizes that the form of anarchist society will result from the particular needs of the era in which the society is formed.\(^{32}\)

However, Goldman’s vision of a successful anarchist organization of society is not without theoretical problems. For example, she does not directly answer the critique that individual desires and interests may clash as a result of the varied backgrounds and histories from which each individual comes. Goldman locates the origin of most social ills within “the state,” but even if individuals were able to abolish the state


\(^{31}\) Ibid., 62.

\(^{32}\) Emma Goldman, Preface to Anarchism and Other Essays, 41-45 (see note 9), 43.
and institutions in the present, they may still be subject to action and opinions carried over from a pre-anarchist society. For this reason, Goldman foregrounds the inventive quality of anarchism in her theory, arguing that anarchism is able to break free from tradition and outdated ways of thinking which may otherwise hinder its application. In fact, she describes the practical characteristic of anarchism as “[having] vitality enough to leave the stagnant waters of the old, and built, as well as sustain, new life.”

Goldman again employs imagery revolving around nature and life to highlight the most basic and essential ability of creation and newness. Furthermore, the “new life” that is possible within an anarchist society can only be brought about through a revolution and a radical restructuring of the current status quo.

In conclusion, it is unfortunate that anarchism, as both a political and social theory, maintains a negative connotation in today’s society and has become synonymous with uncontrollable chaos and disorder. Because of this stigma, anarchist theories like Goldman’s have, more or less, been pushed to the fringe of popular political theory even though her ideas can still inform our present situation nearly a century later. Contemporary complaints about the recent economic crisis and the problems arising from unchecked capitalism echo many of the criticisms of institutional exploitation that Emma Goldman raised at the turn of the twentieth century. Global violence has not been eradicated by any means, despite the formation of numerous laws and international agreements, and many workers struggle to sustain themselves economically through jobs they do not enjoy. While many aspects of Goldman’s theory may not be relevant today, the transformative characteristic of anarchism—which requires a break from tradition and the creation of something new while still retaining a sense of history—could be an advantageous approach to future policy-making at the institutional level.

Christina Samons

Emma Goldman’s vision of anarchism, therefore, was one of individualism and natural freedom, not of chaos and disorder. Looking back on her speeches and writings, it is clear that Goldman simply wanted American society to achieve freedom from all constraints and exploitation and to gain confidence in the natural state of individuals that maintains that freedom.


On May 22, 1856, South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks approached the desk of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner following a meeting on the floor of the Senate chamber. As Sumner was busily writing, Brooks calmly announced in a low voice, “Mr. Sumner, I have read your speech twice over carefully. It is a libel on South Carolina, and Mr. Butler, who is a relative of mine.” These were the last words Sumner heard before he was repeatedly struck by Brooks’s cane. As the blows rained down on Sumner’s head, he attempted to rise from his chair and defend himself. However, his thighs were pinned down between his chair and his desk, which was anchored to the floor of the Senate chamber—Sumner was in no position to escape. As Sumner

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1 David Donald, *Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), 294. Brooks had intended to say more but cut his speech short when it looked like Sumner would try to stand.

2 Ibid., 294. This is Sumner’s version of Brooks’s speech. Brooks’s version is longer and more detailed but Donald finds Sumner’s version more reliable. For Brooks’s version of the speech see: Harold S. Schultz, *Nationalism and Sectionalism in South Carolina 1852-1860* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1950), 117.
struggled, Preston Brooks continued using his cane to lay brutal stripes across his victim’s head until Sumner, in a final act of desperation to save his own life, applied his adrenaline-fueled strength to tear his desk from its moorings.

Sumner received close to ten stripes to the head at this point. The blows tore open his scalp and blood poured into his eyes, rendering him temporarily blind. Coupled with the confusion resulting from concussions to the grey matter within his skull, this blindness left him just as defenseless as he was while trapped beneath his desk. Yet, Brooks was unyielding, and continued to strike at Sumner even after his cane had snapped in two. Sumner began to flail his arms about randomly, convulsing uncontrollably as moaning guttural noises emanated from his mouth, likely symptomatic of a seizure caused by the beating. Brooks continued to strike. Lapsing into total unconsciousness, Sumner began to fall, and knocked over another anchored desk. Before he could hit the ground, however, Brooks caught him by the lapel of his jacket and held him up as he continued with his beating.

After a total of thirty blows had been applied to Sumner’s skull, what was left of Brooks’s cane had disintegrated into splinters, leaving only the gold handle intact in his fist. The beating only came to an end when fellow Senators and Congressman, reacting to the ruckus, came to Sumner’s aid and restrained Brooks. They described the shoulders of Sumner’s jacket as being saturated with blood through to his waistcoat and shirt underneath, both of which were also covered in blood. Sumner subsequently laid in critical condition for months after the attack and did not return to his seat in the Senate for another three years.

What motivated Preston Brooks’s vicious attack on Charles Sumner? The short answer can be found in Brooks’s preface to the attack: Brooks believed himself to be defending the honor of his family and fellow citizens of South Carolina. But even this, possibly oversimplified, answer raises a number of questions. Why did Brooks believe this attack, which today seems grossly disproportionate to the offense, to be justified? Was Brooks’s response to Sumner’s speech appropriate in antebellum Southern culture? Does this attack point to any cultural

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3 Donald, 294-297; Schultz, 117.
themes that were promoted and maintained in the antebellum South? After reviewing the circumstances leading up to the attack and examining the cultural pressures to defend honor within antebellum Southern society, I believe that the answers to these questions will show that the “Bleeding Sumner” incident represented a microcosmic example of the cultural motivations for the Civil War.

The speech that had offended Brooks had been delivered by Sumner two days prior to the attack. In the speech, Sumner condemned the ongoing violence in “Bleeding Kansas” and accused South Carolina Senator Andrew Butler of promoting such violence by virtue of his expressed desire that Kansas would emerge from the conflict as a slave state. Sumner also referred to Butler as an American equivalent of Don Quixote, claiming that he had taken a “harlot” mistress that, in Butler’s deluded mind, was a woman of virtue—the mistress Sumner referred to was slavery. Sumner also ridiculed Butler’s physical impairments that caused him to slur his speech and emit spittle as he spoke.

Butler’s cousin, Preston Brooks, was deeply offended when he heard of Sumner’s insulting remarks. Yet, Brooks did not act impulsively. He waited until the speech had been transcribed and after “carefully reading” the speech twice and conferring with friends, he made the decision to attack Sumner. In his deliberations he never considered whether or not he should take offense to Sumner’s rhetoric. He only concerned himself with how Sumner should be punished. After considering a number of traditional options, including dueling, lashing with a horsewhip, or beating with a cowhide, Brooks decided on the use of a gutta-percha cane as an appropriate, and supposedly durable, weapon. Brooks decided against the traditional use of a horsewhip or a cow’s hide because Sumner was three inches taller than Brooks and at least thirty pounds heavier. Sumner could have easily overpowered Brooks if given an opportunity to wrest the weapon from his grasp. Given this issue, Brooks decided on a gutta-percha cane with a gold handle that weighed eleven and one-half ounces and tapered from one

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inch at the handle to three-quarters of an inch at the end. The light weight of the cane would allow Brooks to make repeated quick strikes to disable Sumner at the beginning of the fight and thereby prevent a defensive counter-attack.\footnote{Donald, 291.}

Just in case Brooks was harboring any thoughts of not redressing Sumner’s insults, his friends had continually asked him following Sumner’s speech: “Has the chivalry of South Carolina escaped, and is this to be tame submission?” Not responding to such criticism would certainly have left Brooks powerless in his home state, as he would have been seen as devoid of honor and courage.\footnote{Schultz, 116; Donald, 289.} Although Brooks had stated in a truce with a Northern congressman two years earlier that he had abandoned sectionalism and instead supported what he termed “Constitutionalism,” the offense to his state and family honor was too great to be ignored. He felt this had to be answered swiftly and severely, regardless of any intimations in the past that would have tolerated a rude difference of opinion from a Northerner, especially a Northerner as outspoken as Charles Sumner.

It is possible that Brooks’s need to be seen by his peers as a man of honor was his highest priority. Without his reputation as a “man of honor,” he was unlikely to gain campaign supporters or Southern endorsement of his motions in the House of Representatives.\footnote{Preston S. Brooks,\textit{ The World’s Famous Orations}, vol. 9, 174-176 (see note 4), 174.} The concept of honor was the cultural cornerstone of the gentlemen’s society in the antebellum South. While this concept was certainly not foreign to those in the North, it took on a different significance there. Honor in the North referred to one’s personal morality, honesty, integrity, and reliability. To have honor in the South, however, a gentleman needed all of these qualities and to be vigorously supportive of the Southern way of life.

This need to support the Southern way of life was founded on the premise that Southern culture was perfect. The insistence on perfection was applied to every aspect of Southern life, ranging from the South’s slave-supported agricultural economy to Southern customs,
preferences in literature, and even leisure activities. Each of these institutions and customs had to be defended aggressively lest they be esteemed to lose their perfect luster.

A key reason that sectionalism developed in antebellum America was because Southerners resented that Northerners had altered traditional American culture by adopting industrialism and abolitionist beliefs. Southerners perceived these changes as a slight on conservative Southern culture. For Northerners to suggest that any variance to this tradition represented a more “enlightened” approach to life, struck at the heart of Southern identity and Southern pride in its traditions. Southern gentlemen, however, had a means of dealing with others’ claims of superiority—the “Southern Code”.

The Southern Code was not a written law, but an unspoken tradition that prescribed proper behavior and specific punishment for those who deviated from the “proper” course. It covered nearly every aspect of a Southern gentleman’s life, including: how a gentleman should speak to a woman, the proper relationship between a white man and his slave, the proper mode of dueling with other gentlemen, and the appropriate means of punishment for slander. Yet, the Code’s prescribed punishments were not meant to apply solely to the uncouth brigands in the North. In the Southern gentleman’s mind they were applicable to any dispute between men in the North or the South. In an argument in 1848 between Georgia State Judge Francis Cone and future Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens, for example, the latter ended up being stabbed eighteen times by the former over a misunderstanding regarding a rumor that Cone had challenged Stephens’s honor. This violent defense of honor was part of a long tradition of Southern justice.

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that had been handed down for generations. Andrew Jackson’s mother famously taught him in Tennessee to “[never] sue anybody for slander or assault and battery. Always settle them cases yourself!”11 Jackson was obedient to his mother’s counsel and lived to fight in many duels in the defense of his personal and family honor.12

In the decades leading up to the Civil War, the values that the Southern Code defended were intensified. Disagreements over Northern non-enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and the ongoing battle taking place in “Bleeding Kansas” served to fuel hatred for Northern abolitionism in the hearts of Southern men, especially slave owning aristocrats. Because the North did not have a “Gentlemen’s Code” like the Southern Code, Southerners were flabbergasted that Northerners allowed speech that specifically ridiculed traditional American beliefs such as the need for—and righteousness of—slavery. In the face of this apparent lack of respect for tradition exhibited by Northerners, Southerners retreated to the familiar emotional and intellectual territory carved out by Southern traditional culture and the Southern Code. This was evident in the South’s strong embrace of literature that romanticized the concept of the chivalrous gentleman knight fighting to protect the honor of fair maidens and family. The favored author of such books was Sir Walter Scott, made famous for his classic adventure tales such as *Ivanhoe* (1820), *Rob Roy* (1817), and *Waverly* (1814), among many others. Mark Twain quipped that prior to the Civil War, the South had “Sir Walter disease.”13 Modern historian Rollin Osterweis wrote, “Instead of looking awkwardly for the days of knighthood, the South was convinced that it [was] living in them.”14

The decades preceding the Civil War saw the emergence of a new type of gentleman known as the Southern cavalier. These cavaliers were a kind of puffed up Southern gentleman playboy that viewed himself as

14 Ibid.
a valiant knight of royal white descent who claimed the right to demand reverence. Sumner ridiculed this Southern identity in his “Bleeding Kansas” speech, accusing Andrew Butler of living in an imagined world of chivalrous knighthood fueled by repeated readings of fantasy adventure books. Given Osterweis’s observation that Southern cavaliers truly saw themselves as knights, Sumner’s insinuation that the Southern cavalier was essentially an “emperor with no clothes” could not be tolerated. It struck directly at the heart of Southern identity and the concept of honor held by the cavaliers and stripped them of it in dramatic fashion. Brooks and his peers could not allow such an insult to go unanswered without losing credibility and tacitly admitting that his kinsmen had been living a farce of an existence.

Southerners on the whole agreed with Brooks’s actions in defense of his honor, whether it was imagined or not. This is evidenced by the resounding support Brooks received from Southerners following the beating. Numerous canes were sent to him with notes encouraging a repeat of the attack on Sumner and other Northern abolitionists. One such example was sent by an elderly female constituent of Brooks’s that read, “the ladies of the South would be pleased to send [Brooks] hickory sticks with which to chastise abolitionists and Republicans.” Many newspapers heralded the attack as a righteous example of the kinds of actions that were then required to combat the increasing Northern disrespect for Southern values. Brooks even bragged, “The fragments of the stick are begged for as sacred relicts.” The Richmond Enquirer announced, “[The abolitionist Republicans] have grown saucy, and dare to be impudent to gentlemen...The truth is, they have been suffered to

16 Schultz, 108; Schultz records that Brooks along with other South Carolina Congressmen wrote open letters published in local papers asking for “knights to go to battle in Kansas in support of property rights” (i.e. slavery) in May 1856.
17 Donald, 288
18 Schultz, 118.
19 Ibid., 117-120.
run too long without collars. They must be lashed into submission.”

Another Southern paper celebrated the, “classical caning which this outrageous Abolitionist received... at the hands of chivalrous Brooks.”

When a vote was taken in the House of Representatives to decide if Brooks should be expelled from the organization on account of his assault on Sumner, all but one of the Southern congressmen voted against expulsion. This broad support of Brooks was clearly a sign that the vast majority of Southerners believed strongly in the authority of the Southern Code. Not the least of which was Andrew Butler, who defended Brooks’s actions by saying that his cousin “[acted] under the dictates of high honor.”

Brooks defended himself by describing the attack as a quest for protection of honor in his speech on July 14, 1856 to the House of Representatives. He proclaimed, “Whatever insults my State insults me...I should have forfeited my own self-respect, and perhaps the good opinion of my countrymen, if I had failed to resent such an injury by calling the offender in question to a personal account.”

As if to signify that the House was not worthy of a man of Brooks’s caliber and honor, Brooks resigned his seat in the House at the end of his speech, but was promptly reelected by his constituents to another term in November.

Despite what Brooks, his constituents, and the papers were saying, support for Brooks’s actions was not unanimous in the South. While it is true that only one Southern congressman voted for expelling Brooks, Charles Sumner’s memoirs list three Southern congressmen that apologized for Brooks’s behavior. Given the political pressure from other Southern leaders to protect Brooks, two of the three congressmen later voted against Brooks’s expulsion in spite of their personal feelings on the matter. This scenario demonstrates the difficulty of determining

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21 Ibid., 307.
22 Ibid., 308.
23 Ibid., 307.
24 Brooks, 174; Donald, 290.
25 Edward Lillie Pierce and Charles Sumner, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner vol. 3, (Harvard University: Roberts Brothers, 1898), 489.
how widespread the Southern negative opinion of Brooks was during this time. Not only was there massive peer pressure to support Brooks, but there were also gag rules and censorship in place in the South at that time. Mail was opened and any support of abolition or abolitionist rhetoricians was not allowed to be delivered. Citizens who voiced support for policies that would limit slavery in any way were at best shunned and more often than not run out of town or worse. In one extreme case, a newspaper distributor was hung in Arkansas for simply carrying a copy of the New York Tribune, which was published by the outspoken abolitionist Horace Greeley. Those who opposed secession faced similar fates. Some were killed or intimidated by threats of violence, some were simply paid off, while many others were aggressively pressured into signing petitions in support of secession.  

However, as Bertram Wyatt-Brown concludes in his article, “Honor and Secession,” these tactics of intimidation and censorship were a means of preserving the honor of the South. Although there were many Southerners who disapproved of Brooks’s actions, we can be reasonably sure that the number of Brooks’s supporters far exceeded the number of his detractors. Even with the limitations on free speech put in place by Southern firebrands, we know that sectionalist rhetoric continued to ramp up in the next five years preceding the Civil War. Furthermore, secession and the war itself clearly prove general Southern agreement with Brooks.

By the mid 1850s, many Northerners also came to expect this type of violent response to aggressive abolitionist rhetoric from their Southern counterparts. Directly following Sumner’s speech on “Bleeding Kansas” his Northern friends in the Senate told him, “several of us are going home with you” to offer some defense against a likely Southern attack. This concern was not unwarranted. In the day following the speech, a congressman from Tennessee was overheard saying, “Mr. Sumner ought to be knocked down, and his face jumped into.”

27 Donald, 289
28 Ibid.
expectation of violence by Northern senators and the threats of violence by Southern congressmen serve to further illustrate that the Southern Code’s requirement of violent action in response to disgrace was understood and complied with by Southerners, and was at least roughly understood by many Northerners. Unfortunately for Sumner, despite the warnings from his friends and the rumor mill around the capital, he never saw it coming. He was so fully converted to the liberal Northern mindset and so disgusted with slavery that he had somehow forgotten that his words might be met with severe personal punishment. He remarked shortly after regaining consciousness while in the capital following the flogging that he “could not believe that a thing like this was possible.”

Unionist Southern leaders knew that some violent response to challenges of Southern honor were not only possible, but likely. These few voices in the wilderness included a group of unionists in Mississippi. They believed that such behavior only represented a “fictitious chivalry” that defended an artificial sense of honor embraced by cavaliers that feared Northern abolitionism. John Potter of Alabama believed that the Southern instinct to claim honor for itself was a good one but in this case it was misplaced and misguided. Potter described this artificial form of Southern honor as “a morbid sense of honor” expressed by “[men] in disgrace” who “vainly seek to maintain their false view of true honor.” Potter also asserted that true honor does not require constant defensive reactions to challenges. This is because true honor is self-assuring and therefore transcends the need for approval from inferiors. The “morbid false honor” he believed the South embraced, was an honor derived from fear that was reinforced by making juvenile threats to others. Those found possessed by this type of honor were caught in a hypnotic trance that locked eyes with a chivalrous angel of death.

The Sumner beating and its aftermath clearly illustrate this form of Southern honor and how it was applied and maintained in antebellum life. The assault on Sumner was certainly motivated by a desire to pro-

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29 Ibid., 297.
30 Wyatt-Brown, 87.
tect this honor. It was administered in a manner that was endorsed by the “Southern Code”; a code that existed for the purpose of defining and protecting honor. The fixation of the Southern gentry on this perceived need for honor motivated a violent response to the negative judgments cast by Northerners. Ultimately, this tendency to violent defense of honor helped to precipitate the Civil War and made the idea of entering into such a war more palatable to Southerners. It may have made some of them even relish it.\(^{31}\) Later, during the course of the Civil War, Southern General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson expressed this Southern morbid honor sentiment at Harpers Ferry: “What is life without honor? Degradation is worse than death.”\(^{32}\)

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 88.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Reviewed by John Paul Beck

Until recently, colonial historiography has primarily examined imperialism from the perspective of Europeans and downplayed the agency and role of indigenous peoples. In *Furs and Frontiers in the Far North: The Contest Among Native and Foreign Nations for the Bering Strait Fur Trade*, John R. Bockstoce examines the interactions that occurred between natives of the Bering Strait region and foreigners as they competed for control over the fur, walrus tusk, and whaling industries. Through Russian, British, and American expansion into the Bering Strait region, the history became, as one foreign trader predicted, “White men, whiskey, guns, powder and ball, small pox, debauchery, [and] extermination” (p. 297). However, Bockstoce successfully demonstrates that natives actively sought, participated in, and altered trade in the region. Additionally, *Furs and Frontiers* details foreign explorations, expanding and shifting modes of commerce, and the lifestyle changes that occurred in native communities throughout the Bering Strait region. In clearly laying out the history of the region, *Furs*
and Frontiers is an excellent resource not only for studies of the Bering Strait region, but also for understanding the history of imperialism, globalization, and maritime commerce and exploration.

Bockstoce’s methodological approach examines the Bering Strait region as a single unit of analysis in which national borders hardly help to understand the control of commerce in the region. Bockstoce also relies heavily on ethnography to derive information about indigenous people. By analyzing tobacco and alcohol “frontiers” and the origins of trade goods such as clothes, beads, and guns, he is able to determine probable trade networks, lifestyles, and inter-ethnic group relations.

Furs and Frontiers is organized into three parts, which, respectively, examine the early fur trade in the Bering Strait region, the British and Russian rivalry in Northern Alaska, and, finally, the arrival of foreign vessels and American control. Overall, the book progresses chronologically, but periods of time do overlap as the book transfers focus back and forth from British, Russian, and American initiatives in the region. Additionally, the geographic focus of the work shifts from Asia, to the Bering Strait region, to inland Alaska, and then back to the coast as European exploration and trade networks expand. Since a lack of native sources prevents the narrative from being structured around indigenous peoples, this organization around foreign nations and regions helps to clarify the acting agents in a region with many different foreign and native ethnic groups.

Bockstoce’s focus on center-periphery relationships and the extent of native agency also makes Furs and Frontiers a valuable source for the study of colonialism and the indigenous peoples of the Bering Strait. It is clear throughout the book that imperial powers struggled to monitor and control the isolated territory of the Bering Strait. Russian proclamations of exclusive trade rights and prohibitions on the trade of alcohol and firearms, for example, were virtually impossible to enforce (p. 38, 326). Additionally, failure to understand the situation of the peripheral peoples and regions caused the European powers to constantly undersupply trading forts and to rely on the unreasonable expectation that European technology was inherently adequate to defend against aggressive natives. Most relevant to postcolonial studies,
Bockstoce demonstrates that Native Alaskans had extensive preexisting trade networks, adapted to the intrusion of European trade, actively understood the fur market, and manipulated European competition. Moreover, the various explorers’ accounts of interactions with natives, which ranged from extremely hospitable to hostile, not only illustrates the variety of native responses to foreigners, but also emphasizes the need to consider the agency of indigenous people in colonization.

Bockstoce’s analysis of increasingly expanding and complex trade networks also makes *Furs and Frontiers* useful for understanding processes of globalization. The global trade networks involved were extensive and included exchanges of South American precious metals, Chinese tea, cotton, and silk, as well as European and American metal utensils, tools, guns, tobacco, and, among the most important commodities, alcohol. What’s more, financial demands by natives corresponded to changing Chinese and European fashion, which consequently altered the value of furs and whalebone.

*Furs and Frontiers* also illustrates the level of multinational involvement in the expansion of trade. For instance, Russians frequently hired Danish, English, and Chukchi explorers and, in the 1850s, whaling ships came to the region from around the world. Additionally, the Bering Strait developed its own trading language, which, as Bockstoce notes, combined “English, Hawaiian, Spanish, Dutch, and other languages” (p. 333). Further demonstrating the effects of global trade were the technological adaptations of the natives, including torsion-spring traps, guns, and even the purchasing of foreign whaling ships. Bockstoce thus demonstrates that even in this relatively isolated region, global trade networks were well established by the twentieth century.

Overall, Bockstoce clearly details the development of the fur trade in the Bering Strait region and effectively conveys both his fascination with the region’s inhabitants and his devotion to its history. However, although Bockstoce’s work is thoroughly researched, the introduction and conclusion feel somewhat inadequate for such a pioneering work. If there is one area in which *Furs and Frontiers* could be improved, therefore, it would be a more explicit discussion of the implications and
importance of the fur trade to world history. Despite this glaring lack of a satisfying contextualization, Bockstoce’s monograph provides much-needed insight into a region previously neglected.
In *A Shifting Shore: Locals, Outsiders, and the Transformation of a French Fishing Town, 1823-2000*, Alice Garner traces the transformation of a simple French fishing village into a popular resort destination. Intrigued by the realization that the beachside resorts she frequented often capitalized on their past as “fishing communities” and utilized fishing “paraphernalia” for décor, Garner set out to determine “when and how this romanticization had begun, and what it was like for the people pictured to become the object of a tourist’s fascination” (p. 6).

According to Garner, *A Shifting Shore* “required a familiarity with a broad body of literature, including geography and spatial theory, cartography, maritime history, fine arts, French literature, anthropology, sociology (incorporating leisure and tourism theory), architecture, planning, and the history of medicine” (p. 7). Accordingly, her bibliography reflects careful research—a fact that allows Garner’s discussion of various attempts to tame the marshes and other tidal areas by developers interested in exploiting the region to vividly demonstrate
how such transformation occurred. In doing so, she repeatedly demonstrates how, when the ultimate goal of resort building was financial reward for a select few and the entertainment, pleasure, and health of the elite, local interests and knowledge were rarely considered.

Garner also discusses the evolution of “bathing” in the sea—for both recreational and health purposes—pointing out that the existing “unregulated bathing habits of coast-dwellers” were ignored as the “great families” and other resort-going elite imposed a “new” practice of holidaying and sea bathing based on strict rules of etiquette. This early nineteenth century shift was the first step in displacing the fishing community from its traditional locale.

Surprisingly, while coastal inhabitants were described as an uncivilized, savage, and even moronic, people residing in an “exotic” locale, they were also regularly identified as a “must-see” attraction and considered one of the area’s major tourist attractions. Garner demonstrates the objectification of fisherfolk by pointing out that tourists felt free to “engage, ask questions, take a deep breath, and enter their living quarters,” as though fisherfolk existed solely for their personal entertainment. When it became apparent that tourists were not content to be mere “spectators,” cooperative fishermen were located and resort hotels began furnishing appropriate attire so that their guests could “help” with mostly-simulated fishing experiences.

Also interesting is Garner’s discussion of the ongoing battle between fishermen and resorts over the use of the beaches. Traditionally, fishermen would dry their nets and mend gear on the beaches. Although tourists loved to watch them work, the increasing numbers of tourists and eroding beaches increased competition for the beachfront—fishermen were confined to certain areas and were eventually “squeezed out” altogether.

While *A Shifting Shore* does document how the fishing village was transformed into a resort community, it does have its shortcomings. Garner explains how the development of jetties and promenades were intended to accommodate pleasure boating and beachgoers, for example, but she neglects to sufficiently explain how this change would have impacted the local fishing community—a long sea wall, after all,
would effectively block artisanal fishermen from the beach, thus prohibiting them from beaching their vessels. Additionally, while she does makes a brief mention of how moorage was to be offered for some vessels, she neglects to explain that this “improvement” could create difficulties for the fishermen, who would undoubtedly be expected to pay rent for a spot to keep their boat.

Furthermore, although Garner’s use of photographs and postcards from the period helps readers visualize the transformation, her assumption that the various photographs of working fisherfolk were staged is probably correct, which takes away from their historic value. In reality, these images only demonstrate that certain members of the displaced fishing community were willing to pose for cameras, most likely for a fee. She also fails to mention that at the same time their physical locations were being usurped, most fisherfolk were likely struggling to survive the increased cost of living associated with the emergence of a resort community. Moreover, the influx of an economic elite into the community would also be likely to have consequences for fishing families, as their children came into contact with wealthier, more privileged children, and began to desire goods and opportunities previously unknown to them.

Finally, while Garner has written an interesting book that demonstrates how the lands around the fishing community were usurped by development and transformed to benefit tourism, she does not follow through with the second part of her thesis concerning the impacts of this transference on the fisherfolk. In her “Acknowledgements,” she does thank one individual for facilitating “interviews with elderly fishermen who were usually wary of journalist types.” However, the bibliography lists no individuals as sources—no fishermen are identified in the text and Garner does not reference any interviews with existing fishermen concerning “what it was like...to become the object of tourist’s fascination” (p. 6).

The most remarkable thing about this book, however, is how the story can be applied to any fishing community, to any littoral community, and, for that matter, any place in the developed world. It is unfathomable for most Californians to imagine life without “the
beach,” but the oldest homes found in coastal communities are not vacation homes, but fishermen’s shacks, sheltered from the sea.
Although The Forum is student-produced academic journal, its development is indebted to the contributions of many individuals beyond the editorial board. We would, therefore, like to thank all of those people that made this year’s publication possible.

To begin, all of us at The Forum are incredibly grateful for the contributions made by our donors, without which, this issue could not have gone to print.

We would also like to thank Cal Poly librarian Marisa Ramirez for helping us archive this journal on the Cal Poly Digital Commons so that it could become available to a larger audience.

Additionally, we thank all of those who submitted to The Forum this year. While we were only able to include a portion of the nearly thirty submissions we received this year, we are appreciative of your contributions, which allowed us to compile a diverse publication that showcases the depth and richness of historical inquiry. We hope that you will continue to utilize The Forum as an outlet for your work for the remainder of your academic career.

The Forum also thanks the Cal Poly History Department, not only for allowing us to undertake this project in the first place, but also for allowing us to continue this project during what has been a difficult financial situation for the university, the college, and the department.

Finally, the members of the editorial board would like to thank Dr. Tom Trice, our Phi Alpha Theta faculty advisor, who helped us in the initial development of this publication and, more importantly, trusted us to produce it on our own. In doing so, you allowed us to acquire a range of skills that made us better students and more capable individuals—for that, we are incredibly grateful.
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