is involved in frustration of all desires, the fact that the desires in question are unlearned is irrelevant. The mention of the innateness of desires seems to me to appeal to another (albeit related) standard of value beyond the pleasure/pain calculus, namely naturalness. Singer's argument, which is highly rhetorical, appeals explicitly and connotatively to the idea of naturalness frequently; for example, when he contrasts the bucolic folk image of the farm with its mechanized, artificial reality, contrasts the "relatively natural conditions of the traditional farms" with the "stress of modern intensive farming," the "small independent farmers" with the "factory like plants" of "Agribusiness," etc.

When Singer writes that "every natural instinct the birds have is frustrated," I find it rather hard to confine the impact of his words to the claim that the birds are frustrated solely in ways that cause suffering. To me there seems to be an implication as well that wrong has been done because nature is not allowed to run in its own course.

Similarly, when veal calves are called "unhealthy and unhappy"—the meaning is not simply that the calves are in pain but they do not frolic and flourish robustly as calves in "relatively natural" settings might do. Again nature is frustrate—over and above the questions of pain and early death. I find this perennial line of argument interesting and not obviously fallacious in any formal way but certainly subject to a definite sort of abuse if one attempts to formalize it by formulating categorically the premises from which such a conclusion might be drawn. Its tendency, as I wrote, is romantic.

Mr. Johnson has apparently studied some or all of THE CASE OF THE ANIMALS vs. MAN BEFORE THE KING OF THE JINN and located one of the central ideas I elicited from my experience with translating that thousand-year old Arabic text, the idea that "every animal species and in a way every animal individual is

Replies

(Ref. E&A I/2 review by Edward Johnson of THE CASE OF THE ANIMALS vs. MAN BEFORE THE KING OF THE JINN)

Edward Johnson finds one argument in Singer's ANIMAL LIBERATION where I found two. Johnson subordinates the claim that animals' unlearned desires are frustrate in factory farming, to the theme of suffering, making hedonism the sole basis of Singer's claims. This seems a narrowing of Singer's focus, as is suggested by the mention of unlearned desires: if suffering
an end in itself (despite the fact that none is a moral subject or in a human sense a conscious subject) through existential claims to virtual subjecthood. By virtual subjecthood I refer to the possibility of human subjects' projecting themselves into any creature's position." (p. 16) I regret that Johnson placed an ellipsis where I mention existential claims, suggesting that my foundation for animal deserts is subjective rather than ontological and recognizable by (age old but here newly analyzed) projective (and rhetorical) devices. I have been pursuing the idea of virtual subjecthood as a foundation for the recognition of what I call a general theory of deserts (one which applies to all beings) in several of my recent philosophical studies. Whether other philosophers shall find such avenues worth exploring in old or new recensions is, I think, a matter best left up to them.

L. E. Goodman
University of Hawaii

(Ref. E&A I/1 review by Robert Greenwood of PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION)

Robert Greenwood is entirely correct in pointing out that the brief discussion of the problem of evil in my PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION does not cover the issue of animal pain. Further, I agree with him that any thorough treatment of the subject must take account of the sufferings of other forms of life than our own. I have, however, written about this at some length in Chapter 14 of my EVIL AND THE GOD OF LOVE (2nd edition, Harper and Row, 1978), and would refer the interested reader to this.

John Hick
Claremont Graduate School

(Ref. E&A I/3&4 review by Peter Singer of COMPASSION IS THE BUGLER—The Struggle for Animal Rights)

As Peter Singer states in his review of my book, COMPASSION IS THE BUGLER, I am an Animal Welfare administrator and not a philosophers and I endeavoured to write a straightforward account of two national campaigns in Britain which have been responsible for changing the whole face of the Animal Welfare Movement in this country.

Whether that change will be for the good remains to be seen. Singer states that Animal Welfare Year and the campaign to "Put Animals Into Politics" have not yet yielded any change in the laws relating to the treatment of animals in Britain. In this he is correct, but there can be no doubt that changes in the law will be made during the lifetime of this Parliament, certainly in the areas of animal experimentation, the welfare of farm animals and the protection of wildlife.

This is the dilemma now facing us and the root cause for the present disunity in the Animal Welfare Movement. For the past hundred and fifty years the Movement has been saying—"Abolish Vivisection and more recently, stop factory farming and ban blood sports". It is comparatively easy to campaign and gain public support when you are saying "stop it it is wrong". We now have to face the consequences of our own success since, with legislation pending in many areas which will not abolish Vivisection or stop factory farming or ban blood sports, the Animal Welfare Societies have to decide, do they intend to undertake the more difficult task of trying to achieve reform within the limits of how far the Government is prepared to go or, do they turn their back on such efforts and continue to seek the millennium.

History will record which of us are following the right path for the animals we all serve.

Clive Hollands
Ref. E&A II/1 review by Robert Greenwood of "Animal Pain", Chapter 4 of PROVIDENCE AND EVIL)

The 'contradiction' that Greenwood finds in my book PROVIDENCE AND EVIL is a problem inseparable from the traditional belief that the Son of God is God and man, and that what is predictable of Christ as man differs from what is predictable of him as God: e.g., as man he suffered pain and died, as God he neither suffered pain nor died. Whether this is a real contradiction obviously cannot be discussed here; no special point arises, anyhow, about the special pain of the compassion Christ may have felt as a man for the suffering of animals. It is furthermore part of the same traditional theology, which I defend, to hold that the Divine Nature as such excludes any sort of suffering, and thus that God the Father, who was never incarnate, never would suffer pains of sympathy or any other pains. As for whether the living world is designed to avoid or even minimize the sufferings of the lower animals, I must submit that all the appearances are against this supposition: maintenance of it looks like wishful thinking.

I am surprised that a review in ETHICS AND ANIMALS should actually not cite what I say about how human beings, rather than their Maker, ought to treat animals (pp. 103-106 of my book).

F. T. Geach
University of Leeds

(Ref. E&A I/1, review by Bart Gruzalski of "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism")

I have two comments on Bart Gruzalski's review of my critique of vegetarianism.

(1) Gruzalski argues that I misapply utilitarianism, in that I fail to take into account animal emotion. Obviously, animals are capable of experiencing some emotions, such as fear. That they are unable to feel others, such as sorrow at the passing of a social world, is equally plain. The precise issue is the weight to be given the impoverished conceptual structure of animal experience, and the rich conceptual structure of human experience, in attempting to determine whether vegetarianism is mandated from a utilitarian point of view. The pleasures of taste are not the only human enjoyment involved in meat-eating, nor an unsatisfied craving for such pleasures the only pain involved in its renunciation.

Utilitarianism is here showing an important ambiguity, arising from its assimilation of all pains and pleasures to the simple paradigms of headache and orgasm. To maintain his credibility, a utilitarian must be prepared to take every variety of sorrow and delight into account, while to work his calculus he must treat all forms of experience as homogeneous, and reduce their attractive and unattractive features to the simple categories of intensity, purity, and duration. The result of this argument turns out to be the rejection of utilitarianism as a moral system rather than support for one or another of its applications, but in playing utilitarian I am as entitled to exploit the complexities of suffering and enjoyment as lived experiences as Gruzalski is to insist on the homogenous portrayal of these experiences necessary to the working of a Benthamite calculus.

(2) Gruzalski complains that I overlook the difference between using human language and being a human speciesist. My argument was that words such as pain, fear, and grief have as their primary referents human experiences, and that their reference to nonhuman experiences takes place by way of analogy. Some nonhumans are enough like human beings to permit the employment of such words to their experiences, and chimpanzees may be enough like human beings to require the application to them of some of the moral principles we apply to human beings. But there is no
reason for suspicion when the application of a word in our psychological and normative vocabulary turns out to depend on, and to wax and wane with, the animal in question's resemblance to a human being. The word "speciesist" is question-begging in this context.

Philip E. Devine
Harvard Law School and
University of Scranton