deal with the issue in the 1960-1970 period with available data. At the very least, the problem of commuting to other counties and the impact of expanding opportunities for doing so in the 1960s on nonmetropolitan sustenance organization and net migration could have been discussed.

This review will overlook other technical limitations of Frisbie and Poston's work, such as their use of cross-sectional measures of sustenance activities to explain intercensal net migration rates, and turn to a brief discussion of their conventional analysis of ecological organization following the precedent of many other ecological studies. It is informative that sustenance differentiation, retailing, educational service and public administration, as well as certain kinds of agricultural activities make substantial positive contributions to net migration in the 1960-1970 period. These findings may suggest that the very nature of organized community life in rural and less densely populated metropolitan fringe areas is undergoing functional changes of a fundamental kind, and that this social change goes back nearly two decades now. But does a focus on the employment opportunities in these counties in and of itself provide an adequate picture of the ecological organization of a modern industrial or postindustrial society as it influences human populations living outside the dominant metropolitan communities? Are the enterprises which provide "sustenance" for nonmetropolitan residents locally controlled? Are they expanding components of already existing economic enterprises in these communities or absentee-owned retail, educational and agricultural organizations administered from corporate associations located in the United States or even in foreign-based metropolitan communities? And if this is so, what merit is there in even considering these counties as "nonmetropolitan" when they are or are becoming even more dominated by a metropolitan social organization which is national or multinational in scope?

While Frisbie and Poston's work is an excellent example of conventional ecological analysis which merits attention by sociologists in any area of interest, I wonder if their orthodoxy is deflecting their attention from the kinds of ecological sustenance organization now having such a profound influence on what metropolitan and nonmetropolitan residents alike can and cannot do with their lives, regardless of whatever attitudes, values and beliefs they may have. A more theoretical analysis of the vertical and horizontal linkages between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan-based sustenance organization, even a brief one in the concluding sections of the monograph, might lead students of "nonmetropolitan" community change into new and different kinds of ecological thought about this important sociological phenomenon.

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Consider the following thesis: poor people's movements, to be effective, must concentrate their efforts on building a strong formal organization (one that can exist over an extended period of time); coordinate the activities of many local affiliates; mount a successful drive for funds from sympathetic wealthy individuals and groups; put maximum efforts into lobby activities in state and national legislative bodies; and control their members' tendencies to create disruption in the streets, which can only bring bad publicity and repression. In short, poor people, like any other interest group in the United States, must push their way into the pluralist
pressure system. This thesis, or something like it, has been around for some time, and has even been a major assumption behind many recent attempts at "fighting" poverty. But, according to Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, this thesis is simply wrong on all points.

In their earlier and now classic work, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*, Piven and Cloward, in an indirect way, attacked this traditional wisdom about the ability of poor people to become an effective interest group. The welfare system, the dominant society's views toward and treatment of the poor (which the poor tend to accept), and the poor's lack of resources all worked toward keeping the poor in "their place," or putting them back "in their place" in those brief periods when they became uncooperative. In their most recent work, *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*, Piven and Cloward turn their attention more directly to periods in which the poor and relatively powerless have made attempts to change those conditions which assure their continuing status as an underclass. Contrary to the thesis outlined above, Piven and Cloward argue, in brief, the following: poor people have limited resources with which to mount an effective movement of social change. One of their few means (and perhaps their only means) of bargaining for concessions from political and economic elites is through disruption (e.g., negative sanctions). But the poor's ability to carry out even this means of influence is shaped by structural features in industrial societies which produce momentary political and economic crises. Because of all this, poor people's movements will ultimately fail to last over time, to change the basic status quo very much, or be an effective lobbying force. However, for a time they can exploit a momentary crisis to create maximum disturbance through mass protest and disruption to gain some benefits. Thus, movement leaders should not concern themselves with building a large formal organization, or a lobbying campaign (as most have attempted), but take their group into the streets when and while they can. In essence, thinking small is beautiful, or at least something!

Piven and Cloward begin their book with a limited discussion (but one probably adequate for their purpose) of the causes and dynamics of social movements (a discussion, it is interesting to note, from a more explicitly Marxian perspective than their first book). The remainder of this book is devoted to an analysis of four major "poor people's movements": the unemployed workers' movement of the 1930s, the industrial workers' movement (focusing upon the events of the 1930s), the black civil rights movement, and the welfare rights movement of the late 1960s (a most interesting and original chapter relating their direct participation in this movement).

The conclusions reached concerning these four poor people's movements fit their main thesis as follows: the relatively unorganized and at times spontaneous turmoil caused by the unemployed during the first years of the Great Depression brought them gains in the form of government relief. But as leaders of this movement developed and pushed to organize and consolidate their activities (by 1936 with the super-organization, National Workers Alliance of America), the leadership began turning from mass confrontation to lobbying activity and "working within the system." As a result, their mass base declined, they lost the only real means of influence they possessed (the ability to disrupt), and the few concessions they had obtained in the form of government relief began eroding. A similar pattern is described for the "industrial workers' movement." Of the total history of the labor movement in the United States, in Piven and Cloward's view, the only major and lasting gains came in the 1930s (a time of crisis when tactics of disruption could be used to their fullest). But alas, though this movement is judged more successful than the first, as their leaders became more concerned with organization and long-term political lobbying, the momentary crisis slipped away before the maximum press for concessions could be achieved. In fact, as with the movement of the unemployed, they, too, lost ground. And so it goes for the civil rights and welfare rights movements. For the civil rights movement the crisis was one of social dislocation brought on by the decline of feudalism and farm mechanism in the South, and electoral instability in the Democratic party. For the welfare rights movement, the crisis was one of turmoil in the cities and rapid expansion of the
welfare rolls. In both cases, after initial gains through disruption tactics, the leadership began the push for a stable organization while the crisis slipped away without maximum benefits being achieved.

The arguments in this analysis are both novel and for the most part convincing. They realistically confront the limitations of movements by the poor and seriously question the traditional wisdom which suggests that to achieve maximum success all movements must become highly organized and centralized. Using new insights from the resource mobilization perspective in the social movement literature (though they never refer to this perspective explicitly), Piven and Cloward are able to point to the frequent lack of individual rewards and incentives needed to keep a poor people's movement going, and the overwhelmingly repressive power of the government and economic elites producing an unfavorable reward/risk ratio for movement participants. (For example, in answering the question of why a civil rights movement developed in the late 1950s and 1960s and not before, they steer clear of an exclusive J-curve or relative deprivation argument to point out most convincingly that before the breakup of the feudal South, repression was simply too great.)

But there are weak points in Piven and Cloward's analysis. Two I find most striking. The first involves giving almost exclusive responsibility to the leaders for limiting and losing gains already won. If I read correctly their description of the "cooling-out" function of welfare systems in times of turmoil presented in their first book (which is also mentioned from time to time in the present book), mass protest is undermined to a large extent by its own limited success in achieving government relief. The poor, when brought into a public relief system, can be controlled and to some extent convinced that now the government is acting to correct the problem of poverty. Thus, could it be that the mass support of poor people's movements can be eroded not only by their leaders' organizational drives, but also by the movement's early limited "success" in winning relief? This presents a problem of contradiction in their thesis, but one, I believe, that is not completely destructive.

Finally, there is a problem left hanging in their first book which could have been approached smoothly in their most recent book (especially in their concluding chapter on the welfare rights movement). Following their argument that relief is extended when the poor become disruptive, they concluded that relief efforts will contrast when this pressure by the poor subsides. Their prediction in the first book (published in 1971) was that the decade of the 1970s could show a contraction of the welfare system as the poor became less disruptive. In this most recent book, this prediction is acknowledged uncritically. It is clear, as they point out, that a welfare "backlash" has occurred, that many of the Great Society programs have been cut, and various attempts have been made to reduce the welfare rolls. But nowhere do they cite the figures which, in fact, show that rather than being severely cut back, the welfare rolls continued to increase (if only at a decreasing rate), and have only recently leveled off. Their analysis could be strengthened with a recognition that welfare bureaucracies, like any others, once established become entrenched and erode only with great difficulty. One is left with the impression of a relief system which is constructed and only partially withdrawn (if at all) to be left in waiting for the next wave of anger from the growing industrial reserve army.

I received a copy of Piven and Cloward's latest work with great expectations arising from the success of their first collaborative efforts. Despite a few disappointments like those outlined above, my expectations have been met. No doubt like many others, I will be offering the book as a required reading in future classes. The only problem will come in deciding on which course—Social Movements or Poverty.

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Renvoize combines a selective summary of varied research findings with the more vivid observations of those involved with family violence. The focus is on the causes, consequences, and treatment of family violence in Britain. It is this comparative aspect that I find most informative. The author views violence in the family as an “expanding” problem. “I have come to see violence more and more in terms of a gigantic web in which countless generations are caught.” This approach to family violence underlies much of Renvoize’s work. She asks the proper questions:

Violence breeds violence. Not invariably, admittedly. One brother may escape while his sister is trapped. Why? Who are these people who hurt each other? Why do they attack? How do they do it? When do they do it? (1978:x).

Yes, the questions are appropriate. However, Renvoize like others cannot provide us with all the answers. As with other complex social and behavioral problems, we are still speculating and developing explanations. This volume gives us comparative information to move forward in this direction. Web of Violence adds another small piece to the unfinished puzzle.

For those unfamiliar with the severity of violence in the family, Renvoize first presents “Janet’s Story.” This case study also provides support for the author’s contention that “violence breeds violence.”

When I hit David, Bob hits me. Yeah, Bob bashes me too. Or he would, if he got a chance. He was brought up to it, same as me. His dad was really violent—he used to beat him up a lot. He used him as a skivvy. His mum was good to him, maybe she gave him the occasional biff, but nothing much. She got bashed up herself, real bad, by Bob’s dad. (1978:11).

Chapter Two presents summaries of selected studies of battered wives. The relationships between social class, age of marriage, alcohol use and abuse are examined. The presentation is somewhat rambling and superficial. Renvoize then, all too briefly, deals with “Children of Violence.” She suggest that:

A woman who sees her children being attacked by her husband may be stirred at last into leaving him, although until then she has been prepared to put up with his violence when it was only she who was being beaten. What she may not yet understand is that the emotional damage already done to her children simply by living in a violent home may be potentially more harmful to them than the physical blows now being inflicted (1978:52).

Another stand in the “web of violence” has been created. Once again we find a review of several relevant studies indicating that the impact of violence on exposed children can be severe.

Chapter Four, “The Law,” describes the problems faced by victims in their interaction with the legal system, particularly the police. The importance of fiscal constraints is noted:

Small amounts of government cash have been allocated towards limited research...but about the only change we can hope for in the near future will be a change of heart rather than a noticeable extension of facilities. (1978:64)
The arbitrary application of existing law by police is examined and viewed as a factor contributing to the continuation of wife abuse. The problems faced by British police intervening in family disputes are not unlike those faced by American police. These include the attitude that the wife belongs to the husband, feelings of embarrassment, belief that the victim will not provide evidence, and being understaffed and overworked during those times when disturbance are most likely to come in.

The most informative chapter of *Web of Violence* deals with "refuge." Here we find a discussion of the differences (both political and treatment orientations) between varied types of "safe houses." The importance of progressive stages of accommodation is examined. Unfortunately, the potentially stimulating chapter on "Granny Bashing" is weak. Social scientists have limited information available regarding the causes and consequences of violence against elderly family members. Renzoire adds little to this aspect of the pattern of violence in families.

The two chapters dealing with "baby battering" and "incest" are stronger. There is a recognition of the difficulties in making accurate estimates of the incidence of abuse. Discussion of the various factors shown to be related to abuse of the very young is included. The presentation in most cases is substantiated with research findings. However, Renzoire tends to draw unwarranted conclusions from the varied findings. She identifies causal factors in a haphazard way. For example:

To sum it up, most battering parents are inadequate, self-defeating, introverted, immature people who need love but find difficulty in giving it; who want gratification for their impulses now not next week; who often love their children and show great concern for them but whose love is inconsistent.... (1978:141).

*Web of Violence* concludes with "The Search for Answers." Emphasis is placed upon the difficulty in gaining cooperation from the various parties involved: victim, perpetrator, police, doctors, social workers, and government agencies. The particularly difficult role of the social worker is described in detail. Renzoire also provides a summary interpretation of "the true roots of violence."

It is not enough to argue that if we cure poverty we cure violence: we alleviate misery but that is not at all the same thing. To be happy, humans need a complicated interwoven set of circumstances, and freedom from want is only one strand of this net. (1978:215-16).

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The stated purpose of *Urban Sociology* was the definitions of urban sociology, its elements and theory, and its application to the analysis and understanding of urban society and its problems.