

Foreign Involvement in the Preconditions for Political Violence

The World System and The Case of Chile

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Abstract

Current theories of internal political violence and revolution view foreign influence on these events as most often coming in two general forms: (1) direct and intentional involvement through various types of support for one side or another after a conflict has developed; and (2) the indirect and unintentional influence on the "preconditions" for political violence through such things as "cultural contact," disruption associated with international war, or "diffusion effects." Focusing on this second category (foreign influence on the preconditions for political violence), this paper charges that current theories have neglected the extent to which powerful nations today can have direct and intentional influence on the preconditions for political violence in highly dependent Third World nations. In attempting to account for political violence in Third World countries, recent research indicates that development must be viewed in terms of a world economic system. These findings are used in this paper, along with the recent case of Chile, to show that variables must be built into current theories of political violence to account for direct, intentional foreign involvement in the "structural strain," "system disequilibrium," or "potential for collective violence" that must be present for the development of political violence.

After a long period of relative neglect, social scientists in the 1960s turned to the study of revolutions and political violence with much enthusiasm¹. Fortified with research funding and new methods of causal analysis, sociologists and political scientists recaptured the field of study which had previously been more the domain of historians (Wolin, 1973). But with the surge of interest stimulated by events in the 1960s leveling off, it seems as if we may be moving into a new period of reevaluation. The theories in vogue by the end of this period are now being critically examined. The relative deprivation theories of Davies (1962, 1969) and Gurr (1970), for example, have recently come under strong attack (for example, see Tilly, 1973; Snyder and Tilly, 1972; Gerlach and Hine, 1970; Miller, Bolce and Halligan, 1977; and Stone, 1966). And an even more basic attack has come from those who charge that in the process of bringing the study of political violence within the realm of social science models, either a conservative bias is created (Mac-Intyre, 1973; Wolin, 1973), or the insights to be gained from a more.

1. We find much debate today, however, even over how the field should be defined. The most noted argument has been Gurr's (1970: 21) that we need a more general definition of revolution so as to facilitate empirical generalizations. Gurr's concept of political violence covering events from turmoil and riots to revolution and civil war is thus suggested in the place of the more limited concept of revolution because it is a general variable and can capture varying degrees of violence directed toward political actors. Zagorin (1976: 156) also argues for a more general concept, but for different reasons. He believes that the term revolution has too often implied only politically left movements. This move toward new concepts has not gone uncriticized, however. Skocpol (1976: 176) and Hermassi (1976: 212), for example, are critical of Gurr's concept of political violence because they believe it is too broad. Their view is that by placing riots, rebellions, and coups under the same heading we lose important distinctions which lead to theoretical problems in explaining the more narrow phenomena of revolution.

I believe that both sides of this debate have valid arguments and that, therefore, more conceptual work needs to be done on this problem. Especially when we consider Brier and Calvert's (1975) research, which shows that between 1960 and 1970 most cases of "revolution" have involved military coups (64.4%), we must suggest that the traditional concept of revolution is overly confining. But this is also the case with the traditional concept of coup d'etat when we consider Brier and Calvert's (1975: 6) finding that there is no relationship between military and nonmilitary "revolution" and later social change. Consequently, for lack of a better concept, in this paper I will use Gurr's concept of political violence which is defined as all collective attacks, involving actual or potential violence, "within a political community against the political regime, its actors-including competing political groups as well as incumbent-or its policies" (Gurr, 1970: 3-4).

"world historical" perspective have been neglected (see for example, Hermassi, 1976: 212; Zagorin, 1976: 151; and Skocpol, 1976: 176).

In the spirit of this reevaluation, the present analysis will focus on an additional charge (see, for example, Hermassi, 1976: 213, 217) that these theories of internal political violence have too often neglected the influence of the international political and economic system. Though this charge can be taken too far (as I will attempt to show below), the insights gained from an analysis of the world economic system can be used in pointing to a neglected consideration in the theories which attempt to explain the development of internal political violence in Third World nations, or the periphery.

Before we undertake an analysis of the specific nature of this neglected consideration in the development of political violence in Third World nations, however, we must look more closely at the theoretical writings said to contain these shortcomings. For upon closer examination, as I have suggested, we find that this criticism by Hermassi (1976), and others, though valid, is overly simple. Reviewing the current theoretical writings in this area in terms of their awareness of international influence on internal political violence we find that they can be placed in five general categories.

(1) In the first category we can identify a few theoretical writings which have almost nothing to say of foreign involvement in internal political violence (for example, see Eckstein, 1965; and Hopper, 1950). This, however, is due to their limited focus, that is, to their objectives of considering only one aspect of political violence rather than developing a general theory of the development of political violence.

(2) In the second category, we find that, like the first, the focus has been limited to one particular aspect of political violence. However, in the works of Rosenau (1970) and Kelly and Miller (1970), for example, the system of international relations is the explicit focus. But their focus is unidimensional and in the opposite direction of that suggested in Hermassi's (1976) criticism of the neglect of foreign involvement in internal political violence. In these works, and, in part, Hagopian's (1974: 112-115) more general work as well, we find a concern with how the system of international relations itself is affected by political violence in a particular nation.

In the final three categories, however, we find that the above criticism of the neglect of foreign involvement in internal political violence fits less well, though, as I will attempt to show, it still has limited validity.

(3) In the first of these three remaining groups we can locate theoretical works which do consider foreign influence on the *development* of internal political violence. But they explain that this influence is *unintentional* or *indirect* (see Figure 1, cell 1).³ The best recent example of this can be found in Paige's (1975) theory of political violence and export agriculture in underdeveloped countries. Paige (also see Moore, 1967; Wolf, 1969; Hobsbawm, 1959) is able to show that the world economic system and the resulting forms of agricultural production in underdeveloped countries has an unintended influence on promoting political violence in these countries. But he does not consider the more direct and intentional effects on the development of

2. It should also be pointed out that the current theories have also been criticized for their lack of a comparative perspective (see Zagorin, 1976: 151; Skocpol, 1976: 176). I believe, however, that this criticism is much less justified given the work of such researchers as Gurr (1969, 1970), Feierabend et al. (1969), Paige (1975), and Moore (1967).

political violence in these countries that may be stimulated by actors in the world economic system. Another example of this can be found in Johnson's (1966) functional theory of revolution. Johnson (1966: 64) identifies outside influence through what he calls "exogenous value changes" and "exogenous environment changes." Of these two, "exogenous value changes" are of secondary importance in explaining the "disequilibration" leading to revolution. As he (Johnson, 1966: 65) writes, "Without environment-changing courses to 'open' a society to external influences, a functional domestic value structure would be likely to cause a population to reject foreign values." And as for "exogenous environment changes," these are limited to the *indirect* effects of such things as "imported technologies," "market stimulation," or "the migrations of populations" (Johnson, 1966: 69)⁴. Other theories along these lines consider what they often call a "demonstration effect" or "diffusion effect." This concept refers to the situation in which countries with similar structural strains find revolutionary events in other countries "catching" (as in the case of political violence in Europe in 1848). But again, the theoretical writings of Deutsch (1964), Newmann (1949), Oberschall (1973: 298), Hagopian (1974: 107),

3. The terms "intentional" and "unintentional" or "direct" and "indirect" foreign involvement in internal political violence refer to concepts similar to the concepts of manifest and latent functions of behavior or actions. By intentional and direct foreign involvement in internal political violence I am referring to actions taken by foreign actors with the goal or plan of actually effecting or causing political violence. By unintentional or indirect involvement I am referring to actions taken by foreign actors which effect or cause political violence in other countries, but which were not primarily intended or planned to do so by the foreign actors. Of course the development of an international division of labor, often resulting in political instability and lower class unrest in Third World nations, was made up of many planned, intentional actions by foreign actors in the core nations. But the political violence sometimes coming from these political and economic relations in the Third World were usually unintended consequences of actions taken by core actors. It is easy to understand that this political violence is an unintended consequence because it is usually in the interests of core actors to promote stable, orderly conditions in Third World countries to protect continued profit and capital investment. However, this paper argues that increasingly political and economic actors in core societies possess the means of intentionally and purposely promoting conditions leading to political violence in some Third World nations, when it is in the interest of core actors to do so (as will be discussed with the case of Chile). This is extremely important in that this ability of core nations adds a new dimension of power and control. And this ability of the core nations is especially valuable to core actors today given the problems coming from the old method of "gunboat diplomacy" to be discussed below.

and others view these "diffusion effects" as only indirect and unintentional, with no direct foreign manipulation.

(4) In the fourth category we can place most current theories. In these works we find the view that foreign involvement in internal political violence can be, and often is, direct and intentional. But these theories also stress that this direct foreign involvement comes only after the "preconditions" for the internal political violence have developed (see Figure 1, cell 4). In the works of Powell (1976: 332), Gottschalk (1944), and Deutsch (1964), for example, foreign actors often drawn into the drama of revolution and internal war when the outcome is viewed as affecting their national interests. Theories in this category can be demonstrated most simply by referring to Gurr's (1970) work in which internal political violence is broken down into three basic stages: the "potential for collective violence," the "potential for political violence,"⁵ and the "magnitude of political violence."⁵ Most important for Gurr, we must first consider the development of an underlying discontent (i.e., a precondition for political violence) which would motivate individual actors to become involved in an effort to create social change through violent means what Smelser (1962) and Johnson (1966), using a more macrolevel analysis, refer to as "structural strain"⁶ and "system disequilibrium."⁶ Here, a complex relative deprivation theory⁷, employing variables population, is used by Gurr to understand the underlying potential or preconditions for collective violence in a country. Gurr then moves to variables which attempt to account for the possibility of this discontent being directed to the political system (potential for political violence), and finally to variables which attempt to explain the magnitude of this political violence (how costly, widespread, and long lasting it will be). It is only in the final

4. It should be noted here that Johnson (1966: 69) also mentions "military conquest" as an "exogenous environment change leading to system disequilibrium." In this case, however, we are moving from internal political violence to international conflict. In this paper the reference is to foreign influence short of military invasion.

stages of his model, and especially the third, that Gurr considers variables relating to direct foreign involvement-such as outside support for forces of the status quo or rebels (Gurr, 1970: 269-270). Like theories in category 3, Gurr considers the indirect influence of outside factors, such as disruption due to a foreign war, in the development of relative deprivation. But he does not consider direct foreign manipulation with the intent of producing political violence in this the earliest stage.

(5) Finally, in the last category we find works which discuss possible unintended or indirect foreign influence in the later stages of political violence (see Figure 1, cell 3), rather than in the developmental stage of political violence (i.e., category 3 above). Though this situation is less often stressed in the literature, it remains an important consideration. For example, noting Gurr's (1970) writings on the importance of foreign support for one side in an internal war, when this support is lost to one side (or not forthcoming when it was expected) due to problems in the

5. As Gurr (1970: 8) states, "Propositionally, potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and intensity of shared discontents among members of a society; the potential for political violence is a function of the degree to which such discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents." Then the magnitude of political violence refers to how widespread and costly in lives and property the resulting political violence may be (i.e., whether the political violence involves only isolated turmoil or massive internal war; see Gurr; 1970: 11).

6. Structural strain and system disequilibrium both refer to the functional view of a holistic social system that has been disrupted, thus producing discontent, confusion, fear, or unrest among the system's members. As Smelser (1962: 47) writes, "we shall define strain as an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of social action." For a discussion of how Gurr's (1970) more social psychological theory of development of political violence is complimentary to the more structural theories of Johnson (1966) and Smelser (1962), see Gurr (1973: 368-372).

7. According to Gurr (1970: 13):

Relative deprivation is defined as a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them. Societal conditions that increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities increase the intensity of discontent.

foreign nation (such as lack of economic means or political conflicts such as those in the United States which led to withdrawing support for one side in the recent Angolan Civil War), we can suggest that this foreign power has unintentionally influenced the outcome of the political violence. Even more to the point are the situations in which a foreign power may unintentionally create conditions that affect the balance of power between opposing forces in an internal war. Much has been written, for example, about the effects of Japan's invasion of China on Mao's eventual victory in the Chinese Revolution (Wilson, 1971: 287-288). Or, in another case, it has been suggested that political debates in the United States had an important impact on the direction of the Mexican Revolution (Womack, 1968; Silberstein and Jordan, 1977).

Upon closer review, therefore, we find the charge that current theories have neglected the impact of international influence on internal political violence is overly simple. What we do find, however, is that these theories have primarily neglected possible *intentional*, direct foreign involvement in the *preconditions* for political violence. At least three factors can be suggested as contributing to this neglect in current theories. Reacting against the conservative views of politicians in the 1950s and 1960s, who saw collective violence as the work of "communist agitators," and the work of early collective behavior theorists such as Le Bon (1960) and Hoffer (1958) who looked upon the members of social movements with contempt (Bramson, 1961), the traditionally liberal social scientists began constructing elaborate schemes to explain that political violence could come only from conditions of deprivation and exploitation (see Hagopian, 1974: 177-178, for a more detailed discussion). Thus, though writers such as Toch (1965) and Gurr (1970) have contributed much to our knowledge of the "problem situations" which motivate people to rebel, at the same time they have failed to see (or not wanted to see) that their own countries can have an *active* hand (much like an "agitator") in creating these

"problem situations." And, of course, this leads us to a second contributing factor in this neglect: the actions of major world powers in the international realm have become relatively hidden in contrast to an earlier period of "gunboat diplomacy." It has been only recently that details such as those revolving around the United States' influence on the overthrow of Allende and other such attempts (against, for example, Castro, Lumumba, Trujillo) have come to light (see Senate Select Committee, 1975a, 1975b). Finally, and by no means the least important reason for the neglect of foreign involvement in the preconditions for political violence, the most noted theories of revolution today have built their paradigmatic assumptions concerning revolution around the classic examples of the past (for a discussion of the assumptions see Hermassi, 1976; Zagorin, 1976; and Hagopian, 1974). The theories have thus neglected the realities of new political and economic forces which converge on noncore or Third World countries. Given the importance placed upon economic or "welfare variables" in the development of "structural strain" or the "potential for collective violence" (see Gurr, 1970: 68, 130; and Davies, 1962), we must examine more closely the economic dependence of many Third World countries as this dependence relates to the possibility of *direct* and intentional foreign involvement in the development of the "potential for collective violence" or "structural strain" This is to say that we should not necessarily discard insights in the theories attempting to show how economic conditions can promote the preconditions for political violence. For as I will attempt to show below, these theories can be useful in understanding the more direct, intentional means of producing political violence in Third World nations coming from actors in core nations. It is only that these theories have neglected how structural strain or relative deprivation can be consciously produced by external actors.

To complete our analysis of the neglect of the influence of core societies on political violence in noncore societies, I will now turn to a brief discussion of theoretical and empirical works which seriously question the old economic development models. Finally, I will consider as an example the political violence preceding the September 1973 coup in Chile.

THE WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNAL POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Many current theoretical explanations of the development of political violence in Third World countries are to a large degree based on a "stages of economic growth" model of economic development (such as Rostow's, 1960). The theoretical and empirical studies of Olson (1963), Huntington (1970), and Feierabend et al. (1969), for example, attempt to explain why countries in the "early stages of economic development" are more prone to political violence due to internal stress and change. Gurr (1969, 1970) uses much of this reasoning as well (though less explicitly) when fitting data from Third World nations into his theory of relative deprivation⁸. But recently we find growing criticism of the universal applications of these economic growth models (for a summary of these criticisms, see Skocpol, 1977). Hagopian (1974: 137), for one,

8. The basic argument of Olson (1963) and Feierabend et al. (1969) is that the early stages of economic growth produce extreme income inequalities, cultural contact which raises expectations, and a disruption of the social controls coming from traditional communities. While these authors explicitly relate the transition stage of economic growth in Third World nations to increased levels of political violence, others such as Johnson (1966), Davies (1962, 1969), and Gurr (1969, 1970)-with his discussions of progressive deprivation-relate political violence to economic growth with less explicit reference to the old development models (such as Rostow's, 1960). But all of these theories, to a large degree, contain assumptions from the old development models which consider Third World nations as coming out of this conflict-producing early stage of development, neglect the dominance of core societies even with increased growth and most importantly, fail to recognize the dominant nations' need to maintain the status quo in the dependent nations. And as I have pointed out above, they way neglect the degree to which the core societies can intentionally effect the preconditions for political violence in Third World nations, as well as why the core societies would be motivated to do this. It must be stressed that I am not suggesting that economic growth and other factors related to underdevelopment pointed to in these theories are not related to political violence; but only that they have neglected the additional factors outlined in this paper.

suggests there may be more variation in the stages and rate of economic growth than can be captured by these development theories. But a more basic attack has recently been leveled by Portes (1976). In a critical survey of a number of these theories of development, Portes (1976: 55) suggests that they are inadequate when applied to Third World countries today because they are based primarily on the early experiences of industrialized countries (also, see Johnson, 1973). His argument is that there are new realities for Third World countries, not least of which are the external influences from the already developed nations (Portes, 1976: 66; also see Chirot, 1977: 6; Chase-Dunn, 1975).

Even more to the point is the theoretical and empirical work by Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b). Working from a world system paradigm, his analysis strongly suggests that the old theories of development are based on several invalid assumptions. Most important of these is the view of economic systems as independent, or in other words, the assumption that production systems can be identified using political boundaries. Contrary to this, Rubinson's (1976: 639) empirical work using Wallerstein's model shows "that countries do not represent separate systems of production; but rather, that most countries are part of a single system of production which contains multiple political units within it." Thus we must learn to think in terms of what is called a "world-economy." Focusing on income inequalities in Third World countries, which old development theories suggest will be reduced with continued economic growth, Rubinson (1976: 646) finds that even with economic growth the income inequalities remain the same when a country's standing in the world economic, stratification system remains the same (see also Chirot, 1977: 184; Kaufman et al., 1975). Other measures also show that the greater the economic dependency of a nation (i.e., high foreign debt, and a high percentage of foreign investment in the economy), the greater these internal income inequalities become (Chase-Dunn,

1975: 735; Rubinson, 1976: 649). Another very important outcome of this world economic system is that small elites are formed in dependent countries who have strong ties to dominant countries, and who also have a vested interest in the status quo in their own country (Baran, 1956; Frank, 1969). Thus, these elites resist independent indigenous industrial growth (Rubinson, 1976: 643).

Using the world-system paradigm developed by Wallerstein (1974a), Chirot (1977), and others recently, we can also gain a clear understanding of why core societies like the United States would want to dominate societies on the periphery. Most importantly, as (1974a: 349) points out, continued economic growth and profit in the core require it. In this regard, capital investment in the periphery from core societies (especially the United States) has continued to increase. As Modelski (1972: 7-8) and Johnson (1973: 16) show, before World War II there was relatively little direct investment in the periphery by U.S. multinationals. But by 1965, U.S. multinationals accounted for 60% of the world foreign investments. And in 1974, 70% of the U.S. foreign capital investment in the periphery was in Latin America (Omang, 1977)⁹.

In addition to the extent of capital investment in the periphery, it must be made clear that this type of investment is very profitable. Statistics compiled by Chirot (1977: 152-153) show, for example, that "in 1972, 27 percent of the American investment abroad was outside the core, but 54 percent of all profits, precisely twice as large a percentage, came from that area. The rate of return was more than three times as large outside the core as within the core." And also of

9. It is also of note that 80% of this foreign investment by U.S. multinationals is accounted for by only 187 companies (Ajami, 1972: 114), and 45% by just 50 multinationals (Johnson, 1973: 13). Projecting the rate of multinational investment to 1985, Johnson (1973: 15) predicts that only 60 multinationals will control 80% of the world's corporate assets. We must concur with Sampson (1973) that the power of the multinationals in the core will be even more important in the future.

note is the profitable import/export relation carried on between the core and periphery. United States exports to Latin America, for example, doubled between 1965-1973, and reached a total of \$15.7 billion by 1975. This compares with a \$11.9 billion import (of mostly raw materials) to the United States from Latin America in 1975 (Omang, 1977).

In Summary, Chirot (1977: 176-177) lists five important benefits coming to core societies from their domination of the periphery: (1) the core gains access to a large quantity of raw materials (2) cheap labor, (3) enormous profits for direct capital investments, (4) a market for exports, and (5) the core gains skilled professional labor through migration from the noncore.

With the above evidence in mind, therefore, we must suggest that theories attempting to explain the underlying conditions for political violence in the periphery, or Third World nations, relying explicitly or implicitly on assumptions from the old theories of economic development are at least partially inadequate in that they ignore continuing economic dependence and the motivation for core societies to continue this status quo. The data showing that Third World nations are prone to political violence (Gurr, 1969) cannot be denied. But we must at least entertain the hypothesis that part of the political violence is due to the "permeability" of these Third World nations; that is, because of the increasing ability of core societies to influence the internal economic conditions in dependent countries (Modelski, 1972), the core societies may be motivated to encourage political violence that will maintain a favorable state of affairs for their economic profit.

Modelski (1972: 14) reports figures showing there is no direct relationship between foreign investment in the periphery and higher or lower political violence in these countries. But this is as we would expect because core societies and their multinationals have an interest in reducing political violence in these periphery countries when the internal conditions in these

countries continue to work in the interests of the core. As Chirot (1977: 168) puts it, it is only when these nations on the periphery attempt to "opt out of the world system" or alter the economic relation favorable to the core that we find various types of intervention coming from core societies.

With increasing direct investment by core multinationals in the periphery (see Johnson, 1973: 16; Petras et al., 1973: 109), these corporations possess increasing power over the economic stability of many nations on the periphery. To this type of influence we must also add the national debt in the periphery that is rising at an increasing rate. Of the \$25.4 billion in aid to the periphery contributing to this national debt, for example, over 50% (\$13.9 billion) in 1974 came from private financial institutions in the core (Rowen, 1976). But, in addition, as Rubinson (1976: 642) and Chirot (1977) suggest, economic actors in core societies also work with their governments to secure and maintain stable and profitable foreign markets. Thus, the independent power of these economic actors in the core can be combined with their government's means of influence—such as giving or withdrawing government foreign aid (see Hayter, 1971), dominance over international banks (see Petras and La Porte, 1973: 217), and of course covert "intelligence" operations—to increase their means of disrupting political and economic conditions in the periphery when these core actors find this disruption in their interests.

It should be clear, as many such as Chirot (1977) point out, that this exploitative relationship between the core and periphery in itself can create internal social strain and discontent within the periphery. For one thing, the world system requires low wages and a large gap between the rich and poor in the periphery (Chirot, 1977: 57; Rubinson, 1976). And as Paige's (1975) excellent empirical study of export agriculture in the periphery demonstrates, this system shows a strong relation to the internal development of political violence, though not

always revolutionary political violence (also see Chirot and Ragin, 1975). But, and this must be stressed, these are examples of how the world system unintentionally or unconsciously produces the preconditions for political violence in the periphery. It is easy to see that these effects are unintentional because the type of political violence produced often creates situations that are not in the interests of economic actors in the core (i.e., nationalist revolutions). The main argument in this paper is that because of the economic and political power of actors in the core, and their motivation for continued dominance of the periphery, direct and *intentional* influence can be used to create the preconditions for political violence in the periphery when it is in the interests of these core actors. From the core societies' perspective, the resulting political violence can be a means of moving the dependent nation back into a status quo more favorable to the core. It is political violence stimulated in this manner that is neglected by current theories of revolution and political violence.

My arguments have thus far been very general and theoretical. It is now time to change out focus, to provide a more concrete example for these arguments. To do this, I will move briefly to an examination of the political violence in Chile preceding and leading to the 1973 coup.

10. In case anyone still believes the U.S. government does not often intervene in the affairs of foreign countries, Johnson (1973: 6), for example, points out that the U.S. military intervened 29 times in 27 Latin American countries between 1806-1940. And a recent study by the Brookings Institution (paid for by the Pentagon) shows the U.S. military was involved in a "show of force" in other countries 215 times since 1945 (Oberdorfer, 1977). This compares to the 115 interventions by the Soviet Union (who was second in number of interventions) in the same time period. Of course, it must be recognized that the less overt types of intervention do not often come to light, though this type is perhaps most important. But we are finding out more about this type of intervention recently. For example, in the case of the Brazil coup of 1964 (which shows a similar pattern to the Chile coup of 1974 to be discussed below), documents recently declassified under a new U.S. law shows the U.S. military was ready to help the Brazil military in carrying out the coup if needed. Documents describing "Operation Brother Sam" show that this operation was in "the advanced planning state" eleven days before the coup (Divguid, 1976).

11. With recent cases such as Project Camelot we must also consider social science to be a tool for foreign influence as well (see Wolin, 1973: 357, and Horowitz, 1967). For a discussion of how Project Camelot had an impact on Chile, see Sandford (1976: 57-60).

THE CASE OF CHILE

The increasing political violence in Chile during 1970-1973 (including events from demonstrations and strikers, to assassinations and attempted coups), preceding the military coup in September 1973, has been chosen to emphasize the theoretical arguments in this paper for several reasons. One of the most basic is that we simply have more information pertaining to this recent case of political violence. Because of the political debate in the United States at the time and the subsequent investigations (see Senate Select Committee, 1975a, 1975b), and because of the Allende government's willingness to help with research in that country (see, for example, Zeitlin et al., 1974), much is now known about the political and economic conditions leading up to the political violence in Chile that helped bring about the 1973 coup. Also, for two other reasons Chile is probably one of the best cases that can be used to illustrate the above arguments. As many have noted (for example, Zeitlin et al., 1974; Petras and Morley, 1975; and Goldberg, 1975), Chile had one of the strongest traditions of democracy in the Third World. Thus, we can suggest that a foreign power will have a more difficult time in helping to create and exploit conditions leading to a rejection of that constitutional government. In addition, Chile provides us with an example of a country highly dependent on economic actors from the outside. For example, before Allende took office, Chile had the second highest foreign debt in the world (Goldberg, 1975: 101; Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 35). In terms of foreign aid, "Between 1961 and 1970, Chile was the largest recipient of any country in Latin America, on a per capita basis, of U.S. Alliance for Progress loans, approximately \$1.3 to \$1.4 billion" (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 32; Petras and Morely, 1975: 22; for a summary of U.S. aid to Chile before and after Allende took office, see Table 1). Chile's internal class structure fits closely that of a

highly dependent country on the periphery described by Wallerstein (1974), Chirot (1977), and Rubinson (1976) above—a small, but powerful and united upper class with strong ties to private interests in core societies (for detailed figures on this class structure, see Zeitlin et al., 1976; Zeitlin et al., 1974). And finally as Petras and Morley's (1975: 8-9) research shows:

U.S. direct private investment in Chile in 1970 stood at \$1.1 billion, out of a total estimated foreign investment of \$1.672 billion ... the bulk of U.S. private investment in Chile [was] in the mining and smelting sector (over 50%). The balance was directed primarily into consumer-type activities and manufacturing. However, U.S. and foreign corporations controlled almost all of the most dynamic and critical areas of the economy by the end of 1970: machinery and equipment (50%); iron, steel, and metal products (60%); petroleum products and distribution (over 50%); industrial and other chemicals (60%); rubber products (45%); automotive assembly (100%); radio and television (nearly 100%); and advertising (90%). Furthermore, U.S. corporations controlled 80% of the production of Chile's only important foreign exchange earner: copper.

(Also see Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 32.)

Before I proceed in discussing how the preconditions for political violence in Chile developed with the help of foreign influence, we must look to the relative absence of these preconditions before 1970. The consensus has generally been, as I have already pointed out, that Chile had one of the most stable political systems in Latin America up to 1970. As Needler (1968: 891) shows, Chile had the longest history of constitutional democracy of any Latin

American country. His predictions in 1968 were that the future for democracy and political stability in Chile looked good (Needler, 1968: 896). Even more support for this conclusion in 1968 comes from the empirical work of Duff and McCamant (1968). In their comparative study of Latin American countries, Duff and McCamant attempt to build a model which can explain the stability or lack of stability among these countries. Using variables that can be placed under the general headings of "societal welfare, social mobilization, economic growth, distribution of income, government extractive capability, government distributive capability, and political party organization," they rank Chile third among nineteen Latin American countries in terms of overall "system stability" (Duff and McCamant, 1968: 1138).

More to the point of preconditions for political violence is the research by Ayres (1973). Using variables suggested by Gurr's (1970) model for the development of political violence, Ayres finds that, for example, the political ideology, social and political mobilization, economic trends and tradition of democracy and constitutionalism in Chile do not suggest that the preconditions for political violence existed (Ayres, 1973: 500, 515). The *only* conditions Ayres (1973: 505) found that might fit Gurr's view of a potential for collective violence was the existence of what Ayres labeled "relative deprivation among the lowest classes in Chile." Chile has had a long tradition of peasant and lower class unrest (Petras and Merino, 1972; Petras, 1973). However, as will be noted below, this lower class unrest was minor compared to the political violence in other Latin American countries before the 1970s and only a part of the overall political violence in Chile during the Allende years (Sobel, 1974; Petras and Morley, 1975; Sandford, 1976). Thus, more importantly, Ayres (1973: 506) found no relative deprivation among the *middle class* in Chile, a factor (to be discussed below) we find very important in the 1971-1973 political violence leading to the military coup.

Finally, we can look to the actual measures of political violence in Chile before 1970. Feierabend et al.'s (1969: 652) comparative study of political violence in Latin America (1948-1965) shows Chile had more political violence than only three other Latin American countries. Likewise, Gurr's (1969: 629) comparative study of political violence in 114 countries (1961-1965) shows Chile ranked eighty-first in "total magnitude of civil strife." Only two other countries in Latin America ranked lower in this scale than Chile (Ayres, 1973: 505).

In summary, therefore, we find the preconditions for, and actual level of, political violence low in Chile before 1970. We can concur with Ayres' (1973: 502) statement that before 1970, "Among Latin American countries, Chile [continued] to be distinguished by the relative absence of sizable social aggregates capable of taking the law into their own hands as well as by the relative absence of official repression. The general impression in Chile was one of relative absence of overt civil strife and civil disorder."

Chile, by 1970, though highly industrialized by Third World standards, was dominated economically by core nations (Petras, 1969; Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 32). It was a country in which outside interests, mainly from the United States, could apply pressures that had the potential of seriously disrupting that country's economy and basic social structure. Rather than simply sending support for one side in the conflict after it had broken out, these foreign interests had the potential to exacerbate chronic economic imbalances already existing due to its periphery status as well as help create new ones that could lead to serious political violence. The only thing lacking in Chile before 1970 was the motivation for outside interests to apply these pressures. With a newly elected Marxist president, one who moved toward policies viewed as highly unfavorable by these foreign interests (see, Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 44-45), that motivation soon materialized.

Not long after Allende took office a concerted effort was mounted from outside to disrupt the highly dependent economy and government I am not suggesting that these foreign interests

12. This does not imply, however, that the United States did not attempt to employ other means in preventing Allende from taking office in the first place. Recent congressional investigations (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 1, 9) have established that \$3 million was secretly given to pro-United States political parties in Chile (the CIA provided about one-half of the winner's, Frei, total campaign funds; Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 15) as far back as 1964 (see Petras and Morley, 1975: 20). In 1970, before Allende took office, there was an attempted coup by the Chilean military with direct assistance by the CIA (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 11). And, of course, the attempt to bribe Chilean congressman to prevent Allende's 1970 election has been well publicized (see Petras and Morley, 1975: 133), but as the Senate Select Committee (1975b: 24) concluded, though this bribe money was authorized, it was never spent.

13. It should be noted that there is some disagreement over how much aid going to Chile was reduced after Allende took office. Sigmund (1974), for example, argues that the aid reduction was very small. However, the Senate Select Committee's (1975b: 33) conclusions contradict this view.

The bare figures tell the story. U.S. bilateral aid, \$35 million in 1969, was \$1.5 million in 1971. U.S. Export-Import Bank credits, which had totalled \$234 million in 1967 and \$29 million in 1969, dropped to zero in 1971. Loans from the multinational Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), in which the U.S. held what amounted to a veto, had totalled \$46 million in 1970; they fell to \$2 million in 1972. The only new IDB loans made to Chile during the Allende period were two small loans to Chilean universities made in January, 1971. Similarly, the World Bank made no new loans to Chile between 1970 and 1973. However, the International Monetary Fund extended Chile approximately \$90 million during 1971 and 1972 to assist with foreign exchange difficulties.

There is also the question of whether socialist bloc countries were able to make up this credit loss. As the Senate Select Committee (1975b: 32) found, Chile was able to obtain "in 1972 some \$600 million in credits and loans from socialist bloc countries and Western sources; however, a study done by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress concluded that these credits were 'tied to specific development projects and [could] be used only gradually'." Also, as Farnsworth et al. (1976: 366) point out, the loans from socialist countries did not help much because they were long term, and what Allende needed were short-term loans that could be used quickly (see note 14).

14. The loss of short-term loans was especially important. As the Senate Select Committee (1975b: 32) states, "The availability of short-term U.S. commercial credits dropped from around \$300 million during the Frei years to around \$30 million in 1972. The drop, a result of combined economic and political factors, seriously affected the Allende government's ability to purchase replacement parts and machinery for the most critical sectors of the economy: copper, steel, electricity, petroleum, and transport."

15. According to the Senate Select Committee's (1975b: 13) finding, for example, "Following the September 4, 1970 elections, the U.S. government adopted a policy of economic pressure directed against Chile and in this connection sought to enlist the influence of Geneen [head of ITT] or other American businessmen. Specifically, the State Department was directed by the 40 Committee to contact American businesses having interests in Chile to see if they could be induced to take actions in accord with the American government's policy of economic pressure on Chile".

150). After a coup supported by the United States failed in preventing Allende from assuming office (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 2), the efforts, mainly from the United States government and private industry, were directed toward two goals: to disrupt the economy and then aid segments within the country mobilized and mobilizing to oppose Allende's government.

Several actions were taken by multinationals and the U.S. government which helped disrupt the Chilean economy: (1) the various types of foreign aid coming from the United States before Allende took office were cut back severely (see Table 1; also, Sanford, 1975: 147-148; Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 33-35)¹³; (2) short-term credits to alone created the conditions leading to political violence in Chile (see discussion below), but as a Senate investigation (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 32) maintains, these outside pressures were very important (also see, Goldberg, 1975: 116; Petras and Morley, 1975: 6; Sandford, 1976: 149; Petras and Morley, 1975: 111).

The above measures contributed to severely limiting industrial output in Chile by 1972 (see Farnsworth et al., 1976; Petras and Morley, 1975: 12). And in Goldberg's (1975: 109-110) words:

The United States' credit blockade aroused intense consumer dissatisfaction which the opposition parties succeeded in mobilizing against the government. ... Producers whose imports were also curtailed joined newly deprived consumers in protest strikes and demonstrations against the government. ... The United States' resistance to Allende's reforms, then, was a major factor in the transformation of Chile from a civic to a disintegrated polity.

It must be noted that there is disagreement over the relative importance of the economic sanctions applied by the United States in Chile's economic disruption that led to Allende's fall in

September 1973. Valenzuela and Valenzuela's (1975) extensive review of the literature on Allende's downfall shows wide disagreement on the most important causes-disagreements often related to political values of authors. Clearly, other factors such as the political constraints resulting from Chile's highly bureaucratic government were important in producing disruption when basic changes were attempted by Allende (Valenzuela, 1976; Petras, 1969). There were also the longstanding economic problems due to Chile's highly dependent economy which led to extreme inequality and labor and peasant discontents that were brought to the surface (Petras, 1969; Petras and Merino, 1972; Farnsworth et al., 1976; Valenzuela, 1976, 1978). And finally, there was Allende's inability to maintain political order (no doubt related to factors above) which was disrupted by both the left and right (Valenzuela, 1978).¹⁶

However, it is interesting to note that one of the major critics of the argument that the economic boycott was significant or even existed (Sigmund, 1974) has been forced to at least partially agree with authors such as Petras and Morley (1975; see Sigmund, 1976) since a Senate Select Committee's (1975b) evidence on U.S. activities in this area has been released.¹⁷

16. No doubt, as many charge (Sigmund, 1976: 126; Petras and Morley, 1975; Sandford, 1976; for a review of these charges, see Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1975), Allende's many political mistakes and improper planning helped create further disorder and opposition on all sides. It must be remembered, however, that when attempting political and economic changes against the interests of the powerful, organized opposition will be strong. And to the extent that these powerful interests are successful in resisting these changes, opposition on the left will increase because the changes have not been brought about-thus, polarization, with Allende caught in the middle. But the U.S. government actions in promoting this polarization and political disorder must not be overlooked. The Senate Select Committee's (1975b: 19, 23) conclusions are that U.S. government actions and CIA covert operations were very important in creating the panic and polarization in Chile after Allende took office.

17. The existence of the economic blockade as corporate and government policy is hard to ignore when we read that after a CIA-supported coup attempt failed in 1970, at a meeting of the 40 Committee, overlooking the CIA in September 1970, "it was agreed that an attempt would be made to have American business take steps in line with the U.S. government's desire for immediate action" (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 25). And, as then CIA director Helm's notes show, at a meeting with Nixon in September 1970, in reference to Chile Nixon directed, "Make the economy scream" (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 33).

The relative importance of all of these factors listed above in bringing down the Allende government is extremely difficult to estimate (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 32). No doubt, they were all important and related to Chile's status as a highly dependent nation on the periphery. But the evidence to date strongly suggests that the independent effects of economic sanctions coming from the U.S. government and private economic interests in this country, and the CIA's covert support of opposition groups, were significant in creating the economic disruption in Chile leading to political violence. Thus, these measures, combined with the already existing economic problems related to Chile's periphery status, had the effect of creating discontent and motivating political violence¹⁸. A feeling of relative deprivation was created *especially in Chile's middle class* (Farnsworth et al., 1976: 367; Goldberg, 1975: 111).¹⁹

18. It must be stressed at this point that the military takeover in September 1973 was not a simple military coup d'etat. This old ideal-type concept implies a replacement of ruling elites with no change in government policy or participation from personnel below the elite level (such as the middle class or lower class; see Hagopian, 1974: 3). With the case of Chile we find much turmoil for months leading up to the military overthrow of the Allende government. Much of the political violence leading up to September 1973 was led and carried out by middle-class groups in opposition to Allende (see note 20 below). Various mixed types of political violence have been suggested to cover situations like Chile, such as revolutionary coup or counterrevolutionary coup by Hagopian (1974) and others (for example, Brier and Calvert, 1975). And though there are recent cases which fit these mixed types (such as Portugal, 1974, as a revolutionary coup), the case of Chile in September 1973 simply does not fit well. One might be tempted to call this military action a counterrevolutionary coup, but there are several problems with this definition. One problem comes from the fact that what was happening to Chile during Allende's leadership was by no means a revolution: most accurately it can be called reform by constitutional means (see Sandford, 1976: 151; Ayres, 1973: 498). And there is another problem with this definition; there was much mass participation. And finally, with the political violence in September 1973 we find a military dictatorship far from the previous constitutional status quo. At best, therefore, it seems that this case of political violence in September 1973 can be described as a right-wing revolution carried out primarily by the military, but with strong upper-class and middle-class support. As was pointed out in note 1, much work needs to be done on this problem of defining the subject matter-as this case and Brier and Calvert's (1975) research suggest.

19. It seems that the type of relative deprivation that best describes the position of Chile's middle and upper classes is Gurr's (1970: 47) "decremental deprivation." As Gurr (1970: 49) suggests, "decremental deprivation may be less common than other forms of relative deprivation in societies undergoing socioeconomic transformation, but it is not uncommon and it can have violent effects." When groups such as Chile's middle class lose what they have traditionally had, and believe they still legitimately deserve (as Farnsworth et al., 1976, argue happened), intense anger, Gurr (1970: 50) suggests, has often led to political violence.

The next step for foreign powers working within Chile was fairly simple; to provide support for old and newly emerging protest groups (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 29-30).²⁰ In this regard, the CIA was authorized to spend \$8 million between 1970 and 1973, \$3 million of this spent in 1973 alone (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 1). It is interesting to note that while all other aid to Chile from the United States was cut, the aid going specifically to the military in Chile was maintained at a high level (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 37-39; Sandford, 1976: 149; Petras and Morley, 1975: 126, also see Table 1). In line with this the United States military also attempted to cultivate stronger personal ties with the Chilean military (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 28; Sandford, 1976: 52, 78, 192; Petras and Morley, 1975: 119) in an attempt to make it known that the United States would not look unfavorably on a coup (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 26).²¹

20. Groups mobilized in opposition to Allende between 1971 and 1973 include shopkeepers, truckers, businessmen, taxi drivers, housewives, handicapped, mine workers, physicians, bank employees, lawyers, merchant marine captains, and bus drivers (Sobel, 1974: 73-140). Exactly how much money from the CIA went to support these groups, and to which groups, is not completely clear. Of the \$8 million spent by the CIA between 1970-1973, some went to media organizations, some to opposition political parties, and some to private sector organizations (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 2). In the private sector money went to a "university student organization, a women's group, democratic labor groups, an anticommunist civic action group, and business organizations" (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 9-10). It has been widely suggested that CIA money went directly to support the large truckers strike so costly to Allende's economic programs (Goldberg, 1975: 110; Sandford, 1976: III). However, the Senate Committee (1975b: 2) concluded "the 40 Committee did not approve any such support. However, the U.S. passed money to private sector groups which supported the strikers. And in at least one case, a small amount of CIA money was passed to the strikers by a private sector organization, contrary to CIA ground rules."

21. A few writers have charged that the United States military had at least a small active part in the military takeover in September of 1973. For example, the night before the military action, it has been reported that the U.S. Army sent communications equipment to Chile and helped set it up (see Sandford, 1976: 192; Petras and Morely, 1975: 131). And, of course, to do this the U.S. Army was given advanced knowledge of the action (Senate Select Committee, 1975b: 37; Sandford, 1976: 7; Petras and Morley, 1975: 129). This collaboration between the U.S. and Chilean military has also been suggested by the late General Carlos Prats of Chile (Simons, 1977). But as the Senate Select Committee (1975b: 28) reported, "There is no hard evidence of direct U.S. assistance to the coup [of September 1973], despite frequent allegations to such aid. Rather the United States by its previous action during Track II [the direct support by the CIA for the coup that failed in 1970], its existing general posture of opposition to Allende, and the nature of its contacts with the Chilean military-probably gave the impression that it would not look with disfavor on a military coup."

In conclusion, what we find with the case of Chile is a concerted effort by actors in a core society that contributed to the disruption of Chile's social structure. It was this disruption that helped create the preconditions for collective violence. Rather than sitting back and taking advantage of the internal political violence which mayor may not have arisen (as theorists such as Hagopian, 1974: 5, suggests is the usual case with foreign influence), foreign interests were working to help create the preconditions which could lead to political violence. Three main factors were important in the development of political violence in Chile during Allende's term in office. Due to the vested interests of those favored by the previous status quo of Chile's dependent relationship, opposition groups developed (aided by the CIA) as soon as Allende was elected. Newly deprived groups later arose to oppose Allende because of the economic disruption promoted by the U.S. government and multinational economic actions against Chile. Then both of these opposition groups were massively aided by CIA covert actions, and further contributed to an increasingly vicious cycle of political and economic breakdown. Thus, direct foreign influence was important not only in the later stages of political violence, as current theories suggest, but also in the actual development of the social and economic conditions which must precede political violence.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The major argument put forth has been that *current theories of revolution and political violence have overlooked the extent to which core societies can intentionally effect the preconditions leading to political violence in highly dependent Third World countries, or in Wallerstein's terms, the periphery.* I began by discussing five situations indicated by these theories, all in one way or another neglecting the extent to which core societies can influence the preconditions for political violence in the periphery. I then attempted to show that *one* reason for

this neglect is that these theories have implicitly or explicitly accepted paradigmatic assumptions contained in the old economic development theories which present inadequate views of socioeconomic conditions in Third World countries, or the periphery today. Finally, the case of political violence in Chile during 1970-1973 leading up to the September coup was used as an example of foreign influence on the preconditions for political violence I have certainly not suggested that direct foreign influence is the only factor to be considered in the development of political violence in Third World countries, but only that it can, under certain conditions, be of considerable importance, and thus must be considered by theoretical works in this area. This is especially so when we consider that the economic gap between rich and poor nations is continuing to increase (Portes, 1976: 56), that billions of dollars in foreign investment from the core continue to flow into the periphery at an increasing rate (most to Latin America; see Petras et al., 1973: 269; and Johnson, 1973, for exact figures), and that the power of multinational corporations based in the core will no doubt be even greater in the future (Ajami, 1972; Sampson, 1973: 109). Under "normal" conditions, actors from the core will attempt to suppress any political violence which threatens to disrupt the status quo. However, when these actors in the core find that changes are occurring in the periphery which are in opposition to their interests, they have the ability to influence the preconditions for political violence in the periphery, and, thus, exploiting the resulting political violence to strengthen or reestablish a relationship favorable to the core.

In conclusion, the major arguments of this paper suggest that we must now proceed by building into the current models of political violence variables which can help us account for the intentional actions of actors in the core contributing to the preconditions for political violence on the periphery. For example, with models such as that of Gurr (1970) which spell out stages in the

development of political violence (potential for collective violence, potential for political violence, and magnitude of political violence), while rejecting assumptions coming from the old development theories, we must look to variables such as degree of economic dependency that bring foreign influence into the earliest stages of the development of political violence.²² And at the same time we must direct our research to such questions as the ability and willingness of political and/ or economic actors in core societies to influence the preconditions for political violence in the periphery, as well as the ability and willingness of other foreign powers to counter these influences.²³

As Wallerstein (1974a: 16, 52) points out, the "modern world system," and thus capitalism, developed because the core societies were able to dominate societies on the periphery relying less on burdensome empire structures. In the early centuries of this modern world system the economic dominance of the core was not always complete, though the core was able to depend on its military to maintain control. More recently the core finds military means of control

22. Upon further analysis it may well be that this relationship between degree of economic dependency and the ability of foreign actors to influence the preconditions for political violence is much more complex than is suggested here. For as Kaufman et al. (1975) have found, the relationship between type of dependency (capital or trade dependency) and several dependent variables, such as income inequalities, land inequalities, and various political characteristics, are mixed. And Collier (1975) as well has found the "timing" of several economic growth measures is important in explaining various regime characteristics in Latin American countries. But at present the most serious problems in the research being suggested here come with operationalizing foreign influence on the preconditions for political violence. Current theories have not yet been able to even accurately specify these preconditions for political violence, much less agree on the reasons for the existence of these political and economic conditions.

23. With respect to the ability of other foreign powers to counter the influence of the core on the periphery, we must recognize that in the twentieth century nations outside of the capitalistic core have been growing in strength (see Chirot's 1977 discussion of the new communist challenge). In this regard, for example, the following propositions require consideration: (1) the more the actions of a core society in creating economic disruption in the periphery are perceived as threatening to another superpower, the more this superpower will attempt to counter the actions of the core, and thus possibly reduce the influence of the core on the periphery; and (2) the greater the ability of another superpower to check the military actions of a core society, the more that core society's efforts to influence events in the periphery will turn to means other than military.

less often effective (in part because of counterforce from nations outside the capitalist core), but its economic dominance in much of the periphery more complete. We are presently in a period of growing opposition in the periphery directed toward the core (Chirot, 1977). Thus, it must be suggested that in the face of these new realities, the core will increasingly turn to its ability to create internal political violence in the periphery to maintain the world system.

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	<i>Foreign Involvement</i>	
	<i>Unintentional</i>	<i>Intentional</i>
Preconditions for political violence	(1) – “exogenous environment changes” – “demonstration effects”	(2) <i>Neglected Category</i> – intentional disruption of social structure in dependent country by dominant country.
	(3) – inability to continue support for one side in a violent conflict – action by foreign power unintentionally creating favorable conditions for one side in internal war.	(4) – foreign support for old regime or rebels

Figure 1: The Nature of Foreign Influence on Internal Political Violence

TABLE 1
Foreign Aid to Chile From Selected U.S. Agencies
and International Organizations

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
U.S. AID	93.2 ^a	15.5	57.9	35.4	18.0	1.5	1.0	0.8
U.S. Food for Peace	14.4	7.9	23.0	15.0	7.2	6.3	5.9	2.5
U.S. Military Assistance	10.2	4.2	7.8	11.7	0.8	5.7	12.3	15.0
U.S. Export-Import Bank	0.1	212.3	13.4	28.7	--	--	1.6	3.1
World Bank	2.7	60.0	--	11.6	19.3	--	--	--
Inter-American Development Bank	62.2	31.0	16.5	31.9	45.6	12.0	2.1	5.2

SOURCE: Petras and Morley (1975: 166-167), and Senate Select Committee (1975b: 34).

a. Figures in millions of dollars.