This is a book on the problematics of comparison between human beings and other animals. To effect this comparison, Midgley argues that philosophy must gain access to certain developments in contemporary science, notably ethology. There are risks attendant in constructing this road between philosophy and a natural science. Midgley would avoid the threat, posed by Wilson in Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, that a neurobiology eventually could bypass, by itself replacing, moral philosophy. More generally, she eschews the more obvious pitfalls of scientism and physicalism by finding a middle road between them and an existentialist thought, (to which she attributes, somewhat facilely and inaccurately, a concept of absolutized freedom). One potential gain in this project is a more informed philosophy that would desist from dividing the human being within itself and from other nonhuman beings. It would no longer fall prey to the over-simplifications of certain myths and metaphors about nonhuman animals: the animal automaton over against the person as soul or rationality housed in a body; or the "beast in man", man's brutality founded in his remnant animality.

Since the route must cut through an exceedingly dense conceptual thicket, Midgley, understandably, can only offer a preliminary clearing and direction for it. Positioning that the species human animal has a "nature", she gives considerable weight in its description to a concept of motive. By this she refers to a complex, evolved, genetically given "pattern of living", a structure consisting of general "active and social tendencies", and, on an individual or lived level, of certain "aims." With this kind of definition of a human species, she can indicate (1) how rationality, language, and culture, the traditional cleavers, are, rather, continuous with, being outgrowths of, the peculiar but general human way of living; how, for example, rationality is grounded in a sociality shared with other animals; and (2) how, then, the relation of humans to other animals, the latter consisting in variant structures of motives, is one of kinship and complex species-distinct affinities. There is continuity among species, making rich, productive, and non-dichotomous comparisons possible because our nature, in common with theirs, is a "certain range of powers and tendencies." The otherness of the other is not radical. Even a distinction between higher and lower beings, the metaphor of height applied to evolution, Midgley finds unintelligible in that adaptation is relative and contingent.

Largely implicitly, the book lays a foundation for such considerations as the ethical status of nonhumans. If ethics is the prioritizing of competing claims through reflection, human claims must derive from what is important to us. This necessarily issues from the structure of our motives. But these motives, in turn, point to "our kinship with the rest of the biosphere." That kinship is not only historical, as animals are part of the context of our world; it is structural--our being is continuous with that of other animals. Like us, the individual nonhuman animal is an end in itself, Midgley here extending Kant; like us, he is both an object and a subject; he is a person, in that he maintains particular significant relations; he has purposes, priorities and claims that issue from his own integrated pattern of motives.

While these last critical assertions about animals follow from the analysis of motive, in this work there is not room to fully argue and unpack them. However, Midgley does provide a consistent, clearly developed, and well-grounded justification for the requirement that we take nonhuman animals into account. We must do so not only to understand ourselves, but, the work suggests, to solve our own conflicts of interests. Her analysis gives a fuller meaning to the sense in which human ethics necessarily include the interspecific. That other animals also have claims is part of our ethical dilemma.

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